June 30, 2026

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Debbie-Anne Reese, Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

Re: **Revisions to ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff to Change the Capacity Performance Payment Rate to $3,500 per MWh, Docket No. ER26-   -000**

Dear Secretary Reese:

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act ("Section 205"),[1] ISO New England Inc. (the "ISO" or "ISO-NE"), joined by the New England Power Pool ("NEPOOL") Participants Committee (together, the "Filing Parties"),[2] hereby submits to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the "Commission") this transmittal letter and revisions to the ISO Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff ("Tariff"),[3] to reduce the Capacity Performance Payment Rate of the Pay for Performance market rules from the current rate of $9,337 per MWh to a rate of $3,500 per MWh.[4] These revisions are supported by the joint testimony, sponsored solely by the ISO, of Drs. Christopher

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[1] 16 U.S.C. § 824d.

[2] Under New England's Regional Transmission Organization arrangements, the rights to make this filing of changes to the Tariff under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act are the ISO's. NEPOOL, through the Participants Committee and according to the Participant Agreement, provides the sole Participant Processes for advisory input on ISO-NE matters.

NEPOOL strongly supports the Tariff revisions reflected in this filing and accordingly joins in this Section 205 filing. NEPOOL's support reflects its vote supporting the proposed Tariff revisions but not on the entirety of the rationale articulated in this transmittal letter. Indeed, Participants do not vote on, and NEPOOL therefore does not take an institutional position on, the specific statements, characterization, rationales, and legal arguments set forth in Sections I, IV, V, and VII of this transmittal letter. In general, the reasons behind a particular member's vote are not always uniform across the membership. Thus, Participants typically vote only on Tariff revisions and not on justifying rationale.

[3] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined in this filing have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Tariff, Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, and the Participants Agreement. Market Rule 1 is Section III of the Tariff.

[4] The Capacity Performance Payment Rate is referred to herein, as well as in the Geissler-Withers Testimony, as the "Performance Payment Rate" or "PPR." The Pay for Performance market rules are sometimes referred to as "PFP."

Geissler, the ISO's Director of Economic Analysis, and Andrew Withers, a Senior Economist at the ISO.[5]

As is addressed in Section VII of this Transmittal Letter, the ISO requests an effective date of September 1, 2026 for the proposed change to the Performance Payment Rate.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Substantial improvements to the region's wholesale electricity markets over the last decade, supported by the region's investment in new capacity, have produced a strong performing capacity fleet in New England.[6] This was evident most recently in the performance of the fleet during the January and February 2026 cold spells and winter storms Fern and Hernando. Despite reduced energy imports from Québec and competing demand for natural gas to meet home heating needs, the New England fleet performed well throughout the prolonged cold spell and winter storms, including a consistently strong response from a broad range of capacity resources and relatively limited resource outages even during the worst of the hurricane-like winter storm conditions.[7]

The strong resource performance during the challenging winter conditions underscores the importance of the existing fleet to the overall reliability of the region's electricity system, and of the need to take the steps necessary to support the continued

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[5] *See* Testimony of Drs. Christopher Geissler and Andrew Withers on Behalf of ISO New England Inc. ("Geissler-Withers Testimony").

[6] *See*, *e.g.*, Memorandum of ISO New England Inc. to NEPOOL Markets Committee regarding Performance of Capacity Resources and Pay for Performance, dated September 7, 2022 (corrected September 9, 2022) ("2022 PFP Memo"), *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/09/a03_mc_2022_09_13-14_performance_of_capacity_resources_memo_rev1.pdf (finding that capacity resource performance had improved markedly since the development and implementation of the Pay for Performance market design, indicating PFP was achieving its intended objective of improving resource performance incentives); ISO-NE Internal Market Monitor, *An Assessment of the Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Market*, ISO New England Inc. June 8, 2026), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100032/a03_mc_2026_02_10-11_imm_recommendations_potential_daas_improvements.pdf (finding that the new Day-Ahead Ancillary Services market introduced in March of 2025 is, preliminarily, providing reliability benefits in the form of transparent day-ahead reserves pricing and stronger performance incentives, while recommending changes and further analysis to improve cost effectiveness and the overall performance of the new market).

[7] The strong performance of New England's capacity fleet, as well as New England's transmission system, throughout the winter, is detailed in the March 2026 ISO-NE System & Operations Report, at slides 14-52, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100033/system-and-market-ops-report-mar-2026.pdf.

viability of the existing fleet. This is particularly so given the continued challenges to maintaining system reliability that the region faces. To cite a few major examples:

- As this past winter reflects, the region has experienced notable reductions in electricity imports in recent years, in particular during periods of high demand, notwithstanding the introduction of the New England Clean Energy Connect transmission line that substantially expands import capability from Québec into New England.[8]
- Some of the New England states are taking action to expedite siting and permitting processes for new energy resources.[9] Nevertheless, the region continues to face challenges in the development of infrastructure, and efforts to relieve the constrained natural gas pipeline system, should they prove fruitful, would be, at best, several years away from providing relief.[10]
- Finally, while New England state incentive programs have attracted investment in substantial quantities of new capacity, and the New England states continue to focus on the development of additional capacity resources,[11] the future development of additional capacity that could provide valuable energy to the region to meet growing electricity demand over the next decade remains uncertain.

To be sure, the ISO, with the New England states and stakeholders, are taking steps to meet these challenges, through collective development of market reforms that will help ensure the region attracts and retains the mix of resources that can most reliably

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[8] *See* ISO-NE Internal Market Monitor, 2025 Annual Markets Report, dated May 29, 2026, at 144-145, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100035/2025-annual-markets-report.pdf.

[9] *See*, *e.g.*, An Act Promoting a Clean energy Grid, Advancing Equity and Protecting Ratepayers, 2024 Mass Acts, Chapter 239 (enacting improvements to state siting and permitting processes to facilitate the development of clean energy and related infrastructure), *available at* https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2024/Chapter239; An Act Relative to the Site Evaluation Committee for Energy Facility Siting, 2024 New Hampshire House Bill 609 (enacting improvements to streamline energy project siting), *available at* https://legiscan.com/NH/text/HB609/2024.

[10] *See* Scott Disavino, Enbridge launches Project Beacon open season to boost natgas supply in New England, Reuters, May 20, 2026, *available at* https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/enbridge-launches-project-beacon-open-season-boost-natgas-supply-new-england-2026-05-20/.

[11] *See* New England Governors' Joint Statement on Advancing Nuclear Energy for a 21st Century New England Electricity Grid, March 31, 2026, *available at* https://www.mass.gov/doc/new-england-governors-nuclear-statement/download; Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey, Executive Order No. 654: To Secure Massachusetts' Energy Future by Establishing an Energy Supply Plan that Drives Affordability and Reliability, March 16, 2026, *available at* https://www.mass.gov/executive-orders/no-654-to-secure-massachusetts-energy-future-by-establishing-an-energy-supply-plan-that-drives-affordability-and-reliability.

achieve seasonal resource adequacy objectives.[12] Nevertheless, at this critical juncture, the events of this past winter and strong resource demonstrate that the existing capacity fleet remains the region's best bet for reliably meeting New England's electricity demand and is the most economic solution for meeting the region's resource adequacy objectives.

With this in mind, in this filing the ISO is proposing, with the support of the New England states and stakeholders, surgical changes to the Pay for Performance market rules that are intended to reduce market participation risk for capacity resources while still providing robust performance incentives. The Pay for Performance market rules provide the "second settlement" in New England's capacity market. Resources that receive a capacity obligation in the capacity auction risk loss of their capacity revenues if they fail to deliver that capacity during scarcity conditions, and can receive additional payments if they deliver more than their required share of energy and reserves during such conditions. The Capacity Performance Payment Rate is the rate charged to, or paid to, capacity suppliers when they either fail to meet, or conversely, perform above, those delivery obligations, thus serving as a key component of PFP's performance incentive mechanism.

Recent experience indicates that the current rate—which jumped from $5,455 per MWh to $9,337 per MWh starting with the 2025-2026 capacity delivery period—engenders substantial risk for the region's capacity fleet. Older, slow start resources that provide invaluable energy during both summer and winter high demand events, face significant PFP charge risk due to their slow start capabilities. Of similar concern, strong performers face significant "stop loss" risk, due to the rate at which stopped losses can accrue under the currently high PPR, and the obligation of all capacity suppliers to cover those losses when they occur.

As is discussed in more detail in this filing, these risks may undermine the fundamental market efficiency and reliability objectives of the Pay for Performance market design—increasing the likelihood that higher cost resources will exit the market despite the reliability value they provide to the system. Such actions impact the reliability of the system from both a capacity and energy adequacy standpoint. Further, if a resource's exit request triggers a need to retain a resource for reliability reasons, this result can compromise the capacity auction clearing price signal, in particular its ability to send a signal for needed new capacity. As important, inefficient retirements will increase the prices suppliers demand in their capacity auction offers due to the higher risk, and ultimately increase the costs that consumers pay for capacity.

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[12] *ISO New England Inc.*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,249, at P 1, 22 (2026) ("CAR-PD Order") (accepting "phase 1" of the ISO's Capacity Auction Reforms project, which replaces the three-year forward capacity auction with a prompt capacity auction and reforms the resource deactivation processes, and noting the ISO's plan to file "phase 2" of the reforms by the end of 2026, which will implement summer and winter seasonal capacity auctions and a new accreditation process to reflect the marginal reliability contributions of resources during periods of highest system risk).

Concerns over the increasing Performance Payment Rate have been expressed for several years by the ISO's External Market Monitor.[13] In its 2024 report on the New England markets, the External Market Monitor stated that the then-current PPR of $5,455, when combined with energy and reserve market scarcity pricing, "substantially exceeds the true value of energy in New England."[14] It further argued that "excessively high incentives can create inefficient risk for less flexible resources and may lead to inefficient retirement decisions."[15] The External Market Monitor has also pointed out that, with the PPR of $9,337, New England's all-in scarcity price during shortage conditions (including the PFP rate and energy and reserve scarcity pricing) is almost $12,000 per MWh, a rate that is vastly higher than PJM's all-in scarcity price of approximately $3,500 per MWh, and New York's all-in scarcity pricing of approximately $2,000 per MWh.[16]

In this filing, the ISO, joined by NEPOOL, is proposing to reduce the PFP rate to $3,500 per MWh. Operational experience gained since the development of PFP in 2014 and its implementation in 2018 indicates that a Performance Payment Rate of $3,500 per MWh is adequate to incent strong performance from the region's capacity fleet. As is detailed further herein, a 2022 analysis of resource performance under PFP found substantial improvements in capacity resource performance under a range of metrics, including reduced forced outage rates, increased investment in dual fuel capability, and retirement of the region's poorest performing resources. These outcomes were achieved under a PPR that was either at or below $3,500 per MWh, indicating that this rate is sufficient to achieve the resource performance that PFP was intended to incent. Importantly, when a PPR of $3,500 is added to energy and reserve prices that are typically seen during scarcity events, the marginal incentive to provide energy during a scarcity condition can be in the range of $6,000 per MWh, if not higher, a rate that is among the highest of scarcity prices in the country's organized wholesale markets.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE FILING PARTIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

The ISO is the private, non-profit entity that serves as the Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO") for New England. The ISO operates the New England bulk power system and administers New England's organized wholesale electricity market pursuant to the Tariff and the Transmission Operating Agreement ("TOA") with the New England Participating Transmission Owners. In its capacity as an RTO, the ISO has the responsibility to protect the short-term reliability of the New England Control Area and

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[13] *See e.g.*, Potomac Economics, 2024 Assessment of the ISO New England Electricity Markets, June 2025, at 69-70, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100025/iso-ne-2024-emm-report-final.pdf.

[14] *Id*.

[15] *Id*.

[16] *See* Potomac Economics, 2025 State of the Markets Report for the New York ISO Markets, May 2026, at 54-55, *available at* https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/NYISO-2025-SOM-Report__5-19-2026-final.pdf.

to operate the system according to reliability standards established by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

The signatories to the New England Power Pool Agreement, which was first entered into in 1971, are referred to collectively as "NEPOOL." Currently, there are more than 560 signatories, which are referred to either as "Participants" or "members." They include all the electric utilities rendering or receiving services under the Tariff, as well as independent power generators, marketers, load aggregators, brokers, consumer-owned utility systems, demand response providers (including owners of distributed generation and aggregators of such generation), developers, end users, and merchant transmission providers. Pursuant to revised governance provisions the Commission accepted,[17] the Participants act through the NEPOOL Participants Committee. Specifically, Section 6.1 of the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement and Section 8.1.3(c) of the Participants Agreement authorize the Participants Committee to represent NEPOOL in proceedings before the Commission. Through the Commission-approved Participant Processes, NEPOOL is the vehicle through which all stakeholders with business interests in New England are able to provide informed input and advice to ISO-NE.

All correspondence and communications in this proceeding should be addressed to the undersigned for the ISO as follows:

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[17] *ISO New England Inc.*, 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 (2004).

[18] Due to the joint nature of this filing, the Filing Parties respectfully request a waiver of Section 385.203(b)(3) of the Commission's regulations to allow the inclusion of more than two persons on the service list in this proceeding.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

These Tariff changes are being submitted pursuant to Section 205, which "gives a utility the right to file rates and terms for services rendered with its assets."[19] Under Section 205, the Commission "plays 'an essentially passive and reactive' role"[20] whereby it "can reject [a filing] only if it finds that the changes proposed by the public utility are not 'just and reasonable.'"[21] The Commission limits this inquiry "into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable – and [this inquiry does not] extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative rate designs."[22] The changes proposed herein "need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most accurate."[23] As a result, even if an intervenor or the Commission develops an alternative proposal, the Commission must accept this Section 205 filing if it is just and reasonable.[24]

IV. BACKGROUND: NEW ENGLAND'S PAY FOR PERFORMANCE MARKET RULES AND THE ROLE OF THE PERFORMANCE PAYMENT RATE

The Pay for Performance market rules were filed with the Commission in 2014 and became effective with the start of the capacity market's 2018-2019 Capacity Commitment Period in June of 2018.[25] With the introduction of Pay for Performance, the New England's capacity market became a two-settlement market design. In the annual capacity auction, resources submit offers that reflect their costs to provide capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period. Resources that sell capacity in the capacity auction receive revenues that are determined by the auction clearing price and the MW quantity of capacity they clear (referred to as Capacity Base Payments).[26] These forward positions, referred to as the

19 *Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC*, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

20 *Id.* at 10 (quoting *City of Winnfield v. FERC*, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

21 *Id.* at 9 (citations omitted).

22 *City of Bethany v. FERC*, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

23 *Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC*, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

24 *Cf. S. Cal. Edison Co.*, 73 FERC ¶ 61,219, at 61,608 n.73 (1995) ("Having found the Plan to be just and reasonable, there is no need to consider in any detail the alternative plans proposed by the Joint Protesters." (citing *City of Bethany*, 727 F.2d at 1136)).

25 While New England's capacity market has moved from a three-year forward auction to a prompt auction, see CAR-PD Order at 1, it remains the case that the Capacity Supply Obligation received in the prompt auction is a forward position—an obligation to provide capacity during the future Capacity Commitment Period.

26 Tariff Sections III.13.7.1 and III.15.8.1.

Capacity Supply Obligation or "CSO," represent an obligation to provide a percentage share of the region's energy and reserve requirements during Capacity Scarcity Conditions.[27]

Capacity Scarcity Conditions serve as the "spot market" component of the two-settlement design. During these periods of system stress, resources with a CSO that provide more than their share of energy and reserves receive additional compensation, and resources that provide less than their share of energy and reserves incur a charge. These second settlements are referred to as Capacity Performance Payments, and function as a "settlement for deviations" from a capacity resource's Capacity Base Payments.[28]

A resource's Capacity Performance Payment is equal to the product of its Capacity Performance Score (which represents a measure of the capacity the resource delivers as compared to its share of system obligation—i.e., its performance—during a Capacity Scarcity Condition), and the administratively set Performance Payment Rate, a dollar per MWh value set in the Tariff.[29]

As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, the Performance Payment Rate "plays a central role both in ensuring that resources have a strong incentive to perform during times of greatest system need and in ensuring that the capacity auction awards capacity to a reliable set of resources to meet the region's resource adequacy needs."[30] As a performance incentive mechanism, Drs. Geissler and Withers explain that the PPR "serves as an additional scarcity price signal, on top of the energy market's scarcity pricing rules, that incents suppliers to provide as much energy and reserves as possible during the times when the system needs them the most."[31]

In addition, resources account for anticipated PFP payments or charges in their capacity auction offers, with anticipated payments tending to decrease auction offers, and anticipated charges tending to increase auction offers. As a result, Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, the PPR "helps ensure that the capacity auction is more likely to award capacity to resources with lower costs, better performance, or both,"[32] such that, "over time this would

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[27] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 5-6.

[28] Tariff Sections III.13.7.2 and III.15.8.2. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain at 7, this construct "is analogous to how Day-Ahead energy awards are settled in the Real-Time Energy Market, where resources that provide more energy in real-time than they sold in the Day Ahead Market are paid the real-time price for this incremental energy, and resources that provide less are charged the real-time price for their shortfall."

[29] The PFP market rules addressing the calculation of Capacity Performance Payments are in Tariff Sections III.13.7.2.4 – 6 and III.15.8.2.4 – 6. The Performance Payment Rate is in Tariff Sections III.13.7.2.5 and III.15.8.2.5.

[30] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 8.

[31] *Id*.

[32] *Id*.

result in the procurement of capacity from a more reliable and cost-effective set of resources."[33]

V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE PPR TO $3,500 PER MWH

The ISO is proposing to reduce the Performance Payment Rate from $9,337 per MWh to $3,500 per MWh for two primary reasons. The current rate—calculated using the same formulaic methodology employed to calculate the initial "full" PPR of $5,455 when PPR was originally introduced—subjects capacity suppliers to substantial financial risk in the form of negative Capacity Performance Payments and high stop-loss costs. Recent extreme weather events, and the strong response of the region's existing capacity fleet, demonstrate that the existing fleet remains the region's best option for reliably meeting New England's electricity demand and is the most economic solution for meeting the region's resource adequacy objectives. The ISO is concerned that the heightened risk engendered in the currently high PPR of $9,337 could cause some resources to prematurely exit the market despite their recent history of providing much-needed energy during the June 2025 heat wave and January-February 2026 prolonged cold spell, and, more generally, could prompt capacity suppliers to increase risk premiums in their capacity offers, which in turn would likely lead to increase capacity auction clearing prices and capacity costs.

At the same time, operational experience since PFP's inception supports the determination that a lower rate of no greater than $3,500—in place during PFP's initial transitional period before the first "full" rate went into effect in June of 2024—provides strong performance incentives to the capacity fleet, as is evidenced by increased investment in resource capabilities and fuel procurement to support performance, as well as the retirement of the worst performing resources. Importantly, this performance response occurred when the PPR was at or below $3,500 per MWh.

Finally, while the proposed rate of $3,500 is not derived using the formulaic approach employed when PFP was initially developed, that methodology was of particular importance at a time when the region lacked operational experience with a capacity performance incentive mechanism. Operational experience since PFP's inception now provides the ISO with an alternative basis for assessing how the capacity fleet is responding under PFP, and provides strong support for the proposed reduction in the Performance Payment Rate.

A. The Performance Payment Rate Has Increased From an Initial Rate of $2,000 per MWh to the Current Rate of $9,337 per MWh.

The dollar per MWh Performance Payment Rate is set forth in the Tariff, which also contains an obligation on the part of the ISO to periodically review the PPR and update it if

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[33] *Id*. at 9. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, this outcome helps address what is referred to as the "adverse selection" problem, where poor performing resources have inefficiently low incentives to perform, allowing them to clear in the capacity auction with offers that do not reflect the cost to reliability of their relatively poor performance. *Id*. at 7.

and when appropriate.[34] The methodology for calculating the PPR is not contained in the Tariff; instead, the ISO explains its methodology as part of the justification for the rate when filed with the Commission.[35]

When PFP was filed with the Commission, the PPR was set at $2,000 per MWh as the first step in a transition mechanism that gradually increased the rate to the "full" PPR of $5,455 per MWh.[36] Before the $5,455 rate was in place, the ISO had filed to increase the rate to its current value of $9,337 per MWh.[37] The following outlines the PPR that has been in place since PFP's implementation in 2018.

- From June 1, 2018 – May 31, 2021, the PPR was $2,000 per MWh (first step of transitional rate)
- From June 1, 2021 – May 31, 2024, the PPR was $3,500 per MWh (second step of transitional rate)
- From June 1, 2024 – May 31, 2025, the PPR was $5,455 per MWh ("full" rate calculated using methodology explained in ISO PFP Filing)
- From June 1, 2025 – present, the PPR is $9,337 per MWh (increased "full" rate calculated with updated parameters to the methodology explained in the ISO PFP Filing)

As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, the methodology used to produce the $5,455 and $9,337 values utilized three parameters to calculate the PPR: net cost of new entry (or Net CONE), a new resource's expected annual performance during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, and the expected number of hours of Capacity Scarcity Conditions annually when the system

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[34] *See* Tariff Sections III.13.7.2.5 and III.15.8.2.5.

[35] *See ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm*., Filing of Performance Incentives Market Rule Changes of ISO New England Inc., Docket Nos. ER14-1050-000, -001 (Jan. 17, 2014), PFP Transmittal Letter at 41-43 ("ISO PFP Filing"). The ISO's transmittal letter, supporting testimony of Dr. Matthew White, and supporting testimony of Peter Brandien, are referred to herein, respectively, as the "PFP Transmittal Letter," the "PFP White Testimony," and the "PFP Brandien Testimony." *See also ISO New England Inc.*, Updates to CONE, Net CONE, and Capacity Performance Payment Rate, FERC Docket No. ER21-787-000 (filed December 31, 2020), transmittal letter at 36-39 ("2020 PPR Update Filing") and

[36] PFP Transmittal Letter at 24.

[37] *See* 2020 PPR Update Filing, transmittal letter at 36-39 (updating the PPR to $8,782 starting with the capacity auction cycle for the June 2025 through May 2026 Capacity Commitment Period); *ISO New England Inc.*, Compliance Filing of ISO New England Inc. on Updates to CONE, Net CONE, and the Capacity Performance Payment Rate, Docket No. ER21-787-002 (filed June 11, 2021), transmittal letter at 2 ("2020 PPR Update Compliance Filing") (further updating the PPR to $9,337 for the June 2025 through May 2026 Capacity Commitment Period as the result of changes to the CONE and Net CONE values).

is at criterion, as estimated using the ISO's resource adequacy model.[38] When these parameters were updated as part of a triennial update of capacity market inputs, the same methodology employed to calculate the $5,455 PPR value produced an updated value of $9,337 per MWh.[39]

The PPR plays an important role in ensuring PFP meets its intended objectives. At the time of PFP's development, the ISO had observed several trends that indicated the region was facing significant and growing reliability risks. These concerns centered around declining generator performance (reductions in fossil-steam units' maximum output levels during extreme operating conditions, worsening forced outage rates, and poor performance when generators were dispatched in response to system contingencies) and inadequate incentives to acquire fuel.[40]

PFP was targeted at addressing these concerns by providing capacity resources with strong incentives to perform during periods of system stress, and by more properly reflecting the reliability value of stronger performing resources in capacity auction clearing.[41] The administratively-determined PPR, in turn, is central to ensuring resources have strong incentives to perform and in ensuring auctions award Capacity Supply Obligations to a reliable set of resources. To provide incentives to perform during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, as Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, "the Performance Payment Rate serves as an additional scarcity price signal, on top of the energy market's scarcity pricing rules, that incents suppliers to provide as much energy and reserves as possible during the times when the system needs them the most."[42]

In addition, payments and charges from PFP's second settlement are expected to be factored into forward capacity auction offers. As a result, stronger performing resources that face lower risk of incurring PFP charges at the Performance Payment Rate will tend to reflect lower performance risk in their capacity auction offers, while poorer performing resources that face higher risk of incurring PFP charges will tend to reflect higher performance risk in their

[38] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 15-16; *see also* PFP White Testimony at 88-111 for the complete formula-based derivation of the initial "full" PPR of $5,455.

[39] 2020 PPR Update Filing, transmittal letter at 36-39; 2020 PPR Update Compliance Filing, transmittal letter at 2.

[40] *See* Geissler-Withers Testimony at 9-10. For further discussion of these reliability risks and resource performance issues, see the PFP Brandien Testimony.

[41] *See* Geissler-Withers Testimony at 10 ("The ISO determined that two 'gaps' in the region's capacity market were contributing towards these reliability risks. First, resources that cleared in the capacity market had inefficiently low incentives to perform during periods of system stress, and second, the capacity auction did not appropriately consider the tradeoff between resource performance and cost when determining capacity awards. The primary purpose of PFP was to address these two flaws, thereby improving both short- and long-term performance incentives.")

[42] *Id*. at 8.

capacity auction offers.[43] This increases the likelihood of the stronger performing resources clearing in the auction. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain: "the inclusion of Capacity Performance Payments in capacity auction offers would tend to transfer capacity revenues from poor performing resources to strong performers, where over time this would result in the procurement of capacity from a more reliable and cost-effective set of resources and help address the adverse selection problem."[44]

B. While the Region Has Experienced Substantial Improvements in Resource Performance Since PFP's Inception, the Current Performance Payment Rate Engenders Substantial Performance Risk for the Capacity Fleet.

As explained above, PFP was implemented with the intention of reversing the concerning trends in generator performance that the region experienced in the years preceding its development. Following PFP's implementation, the ISO re-evaluated generator performance to evaluate whether data and operational experience gained with PFP in place supported the notion that the design was achieving its intended effect of improving resource performance through increased incentives to deliver energy and reserves during scarcity conditions, and addressing the tendency of the auction to clear poorer performing resources over stronger performing resources (i.e., the adverse selection concern). That analysis, performed in 2022 following four years of experience under PFP, demonstrated that PFP was, indeed, having its intended effect.[45]

The 2022 PFP assessment indicated two general trends related to improved resource performance. First, across five out of the six categories of resource performance that the ISO evaluated in 2022, there were clear signs of improvement in the years following the implementation of PFP.[46] These results document stronger incentives to make fuel arrangements, lower forced outage rates, and better response rates to the ISO's dispatch instructions, among others.[47]

Second, the 2022 assessment found that a number of the region's older fossil steam units had retired since the implementation of PFP, and those who had were the worst performing units as judged by the slow-and-failed start metric included in the 2022 memo.[48] As Drs. Geissler and Withers conclude, "the worst performing oil-steam units decided to leave

[43] *Id*. at 13-14.

[44] *Id*. at 9.

[45] *See* 2022 PFP Memo.

[46] *Id*. at 1-6.

[47] *Id*.

[48] *Id*. at 6-7.

the market, while the better performers have remained in the market. This is the exact pattern we would expect to see if PFP is effectively addressing the adverse selection issue."[49]

Nevertheless, the ISO is concerned that the current Performance Payment Rate of $9,337 per MWh unnecessarily increases the risk of capacity market participation for capacity suppliers. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, a higher PPR generally increases volatility for capacity suppliers, producing higher PFP payments when a resource overperforms relative to its obligation, but also producing higher PFP charges when a resource underperforms relative to its obligation.[50]

The resulting increased risk may have several deleterious impacts on capacity market participation and, ultimately, capacity costs and system reliability. First, the increased risk could lead older resources with slower start times to exit the market prematurely, even though they provide valuable energy to the system on high demand days. This raises a potentially serious reliability concern given the value these resources have provided during both summer heat waves and longer-duration winter cold spells. Second, the higher PPR can result in poorer performing resources "stopping out" of their PFP charges, i.e., hitting their monthly or annual stop-loss, more quickly during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, which both undercuts their performance incentives and forces stronger performing resources to cover the costs of those "stopped losses," thus raising their risk of participation and their cost of providing capacity. This is one way in which a higher PPR, more generally, engenders greater volatility for capacity suppliers, which may translate into higher capacity auction offers and, therefore, auction clearing prices. Each of these concerns is addressed in more detail in the remainder of this section.

1. Increased Risk of Retirements of Older, Slow-Start Resources that Provide Significant Value to the System

Older capacity resources in New England, the majority of which entered service prior to 1980, are less flexible than newer resources, often requiring 12 or more hours to start and provide energy to the system, at higher cost due to their high fuel costs and low heat rates.[51] These resources face significantly higher PFP risk, due to the fact that they typically cannot respond quickly in real-time to address Capacity Scarcity Conditions, and thus are more likely to incur negative Capacity Performance Charges during such events.[52] As a result, the ISO is concerned that these resources may find it unprofitable to remain in the capacity market at the currently higher PPR of $9,337 per MWh. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain:

> Given the higher operating costs that these resources incur, and given their higher PFP risks—in particular with the currently high PPR, which results in more volatile Capacity Performance Payments—there may be an increased

[49] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 17-18.

[50] *Id*. at 19-23.

[51] *Id*. at 24-25.

[52] *Id*. at 25-26.

> possibility that these resources will not find it profitable to continue operating. This would increase the likelihood that these resources will pursue deactivation, or at the very least will attempt to trade out of their Capacity Supply Obligation during periods of heightened risk.[53]

At the same time, despite the age of these resources, many of them provide substantial value to the system during high demand days, including summer heat waves and prolonged winter cold spells. To take one example, the region's 3,000 MW fleet of older oil-fired resources that utilize residual fuel oil (referred to as "RFO units") provided substantial amounts of energy during both the June 2025 New England heat wave that produced the region's lonest Capacity Scarcity Condition to date, as well as during the January and February 2026 prolonged cold weather events—the most challenging cold weather conditions the region has experienced since the middle of the last decade. During the June 24, 2025 heat wave, the RFO units contributed over 10 percent of the energy produced during the peak; without this contribution, it is "very possible … the region would not have had sufficient energy to meet demand."[54] During the January and February 2026 cold spell, oil-fired resources more generally provided approximately 22 percent of the energy and were essential to maintaining reliable operations during the period, making up for the reduced energy production from the region's natural gas-fired fleet that faced competition for fuel from home heating demand.[55]

With a substantial portion of the pre-1980 units having retired in New England,[56] the ISO is concerned that the loss of the remaining older, slow-start units could have adverse impacts on the reliability of the system during more extreme weather conditions. Many of these resources provide necessary fuel diversity during times when other resources either face outages, or when competition for natural gas renders significant portions of New England's natural gas fleet unavailable to provide energy. Therefore, as Drs. Geissler and Withers conclude, it is "important to balance the incentive effects of the PPR with its impact on market participation and cost."[57]

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[53] *Id*. at 25.

[54] *Id*. at 28-29. *See also*, August 2025 Report of Vamsi Chadalavada, ISO-NE Chief Operating Officer, to the NEPOOL Participants Committee, slides 22-38, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100026/august-2025-coo-report.pdf ("August 2025 ISO-NE COO Report").

[55] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 29. *See also* ISO New England's March 2026 ISO-NE System & Operations Report, at slides 14-52, for a discussion of the New England system's performance during the January through February 2026 cold spell, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100033/system-and-market-ops-report-mar-2026.pdf.

[56] *See* Geissler-Withers Testimony at 27 (explaining that 82 percent of the total capacity that has elected to retire since PFP was filed with the Commission in 2014 has been oil-fired fossil steam units).

[57] *Id*. at 19.

2. Weaker Performance Incentives for Poorer Performing Resources That Quickly Reach the Stop-Loss, and Increased Financial Risk for Stronger Performing Resources That Pay for Stopped Losses

The higher PPR can also undermine performance incentives for resources that reach PFP's stop-loss limit, while simultaneously increasing the financial risk of stronger performing resources that are more likely to be responsible for covering stop-loss costs.

To limit capacity suppliers' downside exposure, the Pay for Performance design includes a monthly stop-loss limit, which limits a resource's net financial losses from negative Capacity Performance Payments (i.e., PFP charges) in each month of the Capacity Commitment Period,[58] and an annual stop-loss limit, which limits a resource's net financial losses from PFP charges over the entire annual Capacity Commitment Period.[59] These provisions were designed to provide financial protection to suppliers "with minimal distortion to the Pay for Performance incentives and in a manner that is relatively simple and transparent."[60]

The ISO's stop-loss mechanism functions as a "mutual insurance system among all resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation."[61] In this design, the "insured pool" is all capacity suppliers,[62] and each capacity supplier in the pool is financially protected against losses beyond the stop-loss limit.[63] If one or more capacity supplier reaches the stop-loss limit, the other capacity suppliers in the pool—those that did not reach the stop-loss limit—pay for the stop-loss in the form of reduced net capacity market payments.[64]

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[58] Tariff Sections III.13.7.3.1 and III.15.8.3.1. The monthly stop-loss limit caps a resource's negative Capacity Performance Payment to an amount equal to the product of the applicable capacity auction starting price (or, in the case of the annual capacity auction, the capacity auction offer price cap) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. *Id.*; *see also* PFP White Testimony at 185.

[59] Under the annual stop-loss limit a capacity resource cannot be worse-off, on an annual basis, than three times its maximum monthly potential net loss. *See* Tariff Sections III.13.7.3.2 and III.15.8.3.2.

[60] PFP Transmittal Letter at 44 (citing PFP White Testimony at 172–176).

[61] PFP White Testimony at 176.

[62] *Id*. at 182.

[63] *Id.* at 180, 182.

[64] *Id.* at 176, 180. In effect, "capacity suppliers are insuring one another, in part, against the adverse financial consequences if one of them experiences very poor resource performance." *Id.* at 180.

In short, the pool of "capacity resources eligible to receive [the] insurance benefit also pay for it."[65]

While the underlying logic of the stop-loss as a mechanism to limit the financial exposure of capacity suppliers is sound,[66] when the PPR is at a higher level the stop-loss can weaken performance incentives for poorer performing resources and expose stronger performing resources to elevated financial risk.

At a higher PFP payment and charge rate, resources that fail to perform during a Capacity Scarcity Condition will accrue PFP charges more quickly than they would at a lower PPR. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, at a rate of $9,337 per MWh, a capacity resource that fails to perform could reach the monthly stop-loss limit in a matter of a couple of hours.[67] Should this occur early in the month, the poor performing resource would have a significantly reduced incentive to perform during the month; having reached the monthly stop-loss limit, should they fail to perform during an additional Capacity Scarcity Condition during the month they would no longer be subject to PFP charges for the remainder of the month. Similar logic could result in a poor performing resource having little incentive to perform for much of a Capacity Commitment Period once the annual stop-loss limit is met. These results are clearly contrary to the intent of the Pay for Performance rules.[68]

At the same time, with a higher PPR, stronger performing resources that do *not* trigger the stop-loss will face higher risk of incurring charges associated with the stop-loss. While "the stop-loss mechanism provides each capacity resource with insurance against the possibility of suffering net financial losses in excess of the stop-loss limit,"[69] stronger performing resources are more likely to face responsibility for covering stopped losses when poorer performing resources reach the stop-loss limit. As the PPR increases, and the time to

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[65] *Id.* at 176. In describing the stop-loss mechanism in the initial Pay for Performance proposal, Dr. White explained that "if a capacity resource reaches the stop-loss limit, the other capacity suppliers will receive reduced net payments." *Id.* at 180.

[66] *See ISO New England Inc.*, 147 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2014) at P 62 ("PFP Initial Order") (finding that ISO-NE's proposed Tariff revisions reflecting multiple mechanisms to help mitigate the risk to suppliers, including the monthly and annual stop-loss mechanisms, are just and reasonable).

[67] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 33-35. Drs. Geissler and Withers explain that, in contrast, with a PPR of $3,500, "it would have taken a zero performer 3.4 hours to hit the stop-loss limit, meaning we would likely not have seen any capacity suppliers stop-out under this counterfactual." *Id*. at 35.

[68] *See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 155 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 78 (2015) (reaffirming on rehearing its decision to require PJM to remove the initially proposed monthly stop-loss limit because "the monthly stop-loss would reduce the incentives for a resource to ensure that it stands able and ready to perform and could reduce performance after the monthly limit is reached.").

[69] *New England Power Generators Association*, 194 FERC ¶ 61,052, at P 83 (2026) (rejecting arguments to change the stop-loss cost allocation so that stopped losses are charged to non-Capacity Supply Obligation holders "because only resources with Capacity Supply Obligations enjoy these benefits (because only they are exposed to Pay for Performance losses)").

reach the stop-loss limit decreases, the financial risk associated with the stop-loss mechanism likewise increases.[70]

In short, a higher PPR can run counter to both the performance incentivizing purpose of PFP, as well as the risk-neutralizing purpose of the stop-loss mechanism. By increasing the likelihood that resources will meet the stop-loss limit, the higher PPR risks reducing performance incentives for the poorer performing resources that are most likely to reach the stop loss, and increases the financial risk for the stronger performing resources that are most likely to face responsibility for covering the costs of those stopped losses.

3. Heightened Financial Volatility for Capacity Suppliers Increases the Likelihood of Higher Capacity Auction Offers and Auction Clearing Prices

Ultimately, the risk engendered in a higher PPR reflects the higher volatility of a resource's costs and revenues from participating in the capacity market. As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, under the PFP market rules, "[r]esources that overperform their share of energy and reserves receive additional compensation, and resources that underperform incur charges. These settlements for deviations scale with the PPR: the higher the PPR, the higher the additional compensation when the resource performs well, but also the higher the charge when the resource performs poorly."[71]

As the volatility increases, the ISO generally expects that capacity sellers would account for the increased risk by increasing the risk premium they include in their capacity auction offers. In turn, these higher risk premiums would tend to increase capacity clearing prices. Ultimately, as Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, the increased risk that comes with the higher PPR highlights the tradeoff between increasing capacity incentives and the corresponding risk of selling capacity.[72] "Beyond a certain level, raising the PPR will serve to increase risk without providing a commensurate increase in performance incentives."[73]

C. Operational Experience Since PFP's Inception Indicates That the Proposed Rate of $3,500 per MWh Will Continue to Provide the Capacity Fleet with Strong Performance Incentives.

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[70] *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 186 FERC ¶ 61,080, at P 235 (2024) (holding that PJM's proposal to reduce its stop-loss limit "strikes a reasonable balance between incentivizing performance during emergency events and ensuring the economic viability of providing capacity in PJM").

[71] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 19.

[72] *Id*. at 21-23 (explaining with a detailed example how the difference in the PPR between the current and proposed rates creates a non-trivial difference in performance risk for capacity suppliers, which can "translate into material differences in the risk premiums included in capacity offers").

[73] *Id*. at 20.

Due to the heightened participation risks and risks to reliability explained in Section V.B above, the ISO is proposing to substantially reduce the Performance Payment Rate to $3,500 per MWh. Lowering the PPR to $3,500 will help to reduce the cost volatility of the currently higher PPR, which, in turn, will help to reduce the likelihood that older units that continue to provide significant value to the system will retire or trade out of their Capacity Supply Obligations during a period when they continue to provide considerable reliability value to the region. It will also help to reduce the stop-loss related risks related to reduced performance incentives and heightened stop-loss costs, and will ultimately reduce the financial risk that can increase capacity auction offers and clearing prices.

1. Operational Experience Under PFP Demonstrates Strong Resource Performance With a PPR of No Greater Than $3,500

In this section, the ISO explains the evidence that demonstrates why the lowered PPR of $3,500 per MWh will continue to provide the fleet of capacity resources in the region with strong performance incentives. A PPR of $3,500 per MWh continues to provide strong performance incentives during periods of system stress because it presents a substantial payment or charge to resources that either provide more than their share of energy and reserves during Capacity Scarcity Conditions (qualifying them for a payment of $3,500 per MWh of energy and reserves provided) or provide less than this share (qualifying them for a charge of $3,500 per MWh for the energy and reserves they do not deliver). As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain:

> With the proposed PPR, incentives to perform during scarcity conditions remain high. LMPs and reserve clearing prices are typically higher than $1,000 per MWh during Capacity Scarcity Conditions due to the application of Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors, meaning the marginal incentive to provide energy during a scarcity condition can be in the range of $6,000 per MWh, if not higher. This remains a significant performance incentive.[74]

This assessment is borne out by the ISO's 2022 evaluation of operational experience with the PFP market rules in place. The 2022 evaluation, summarized in the ISO's 2022 PFP Memo,[75] demonstrated that, with PFP in place, the region saw several notable improvements in resource performance during stressed conditions. These improvements took place during the transition period for the PPR (June 1, 2018 through May 31, 2024), when the PPR was less than or equal to the proposed rate of $3,500 per MWh.

a. Increase in Dual Fuel Capability by 40 Percent

Prior to the implementation of PFP, dual fuel capability in the region had been steadily declining, a trend that reversed concurrent with the implementation of PFP. Between the time PFP was accepted by the Commission in 2014 and 2021, investment in dual fuel capability

[74] *Id*. at 37.

[75] 2022 PFP Memo at 1-6; Geissler-Withers Testimony at 37-41.

increased by 40 percent (2,416 MW of additional dual fuel capability), with most of this increase occurring after the implementation of PFP in 2018.[76]

As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, it is likely that a PPR of $3,500 will continue to provide strong incentives for resources to make long-lived improvements to resource operating capabilities. This is because investment in dual fuel capability took place when the PPR was at or below $3,500, suggesting that this rate (or lower) was sufficient to provide a material performance incentive.[77] Furthermore, the ISO has not observed substantially more investment in dual fuel capability as the PPR has increased beyond $3,500, suggesting that incremental increases in the PPR are not providing materially stronger investments incentives than the proposed rate of $3,500 per MWh.[78]

b. Reductions in the Magnitude and Frequency of Resource Deratings Due to Gas Availability Issues

As is discussed in the 2022 PFP Memo, during times when natural gas-fired resources are unable to procure fuel due to pipeline constraints and competing demand, resources may reduce their resource Economic Maximum Capability—their maximum output level—in the Day-Ahead or Real-Time energy market to reflect the resource's more limited operating capabilities.[79] This issue is most likely to arise during winter months when the supply of natural gas available for electric generation is limited by home heating demand.

Between the implementation of PFP in 2018 and the beginning of 2022 (when the PPR was no greater than $3,500), the ISO observed a distinct decrease in both the frequency and magnitude of reductions in gas units' submitted Economic Maximum Limit, or "Ecomax" values.[80] This decrease would suggest that a PPR of $3,500 is sufficient to increase resource incentives to improve fuel procurement so that they could perform during scarcity conditions, thus "[driving] tangible improvements in gas generators' performance."[81]

c. Retirement of Poorly Performing Resources

As discussed above, at the time of its development in 2014, a significant objective of the PFP design was to reduce the potential for poorer performing resources to displace stronger performing resources, a concern that was grounded in the ISO's evaluation of the

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[76] *See* 2022 PFP Memo at 3 and Appendix Figure 1.

[77] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 38 (explaining that, if the $3500 value was *not* sufficient to provide such an incentive, "we might have expected to see participants defer making such investments in dual fuel capability until closer to 2024, the first year where the full PPR was in effect").

[78] *Id*. at 39.

[79] *See* 2022 PFP Memo at 3; PFP Brandien Testimony, Sections III.B and III.C.

[80] 2022 PFP Memo at 3 and Appendix Figure 2.

[81] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 39.

performance history of the region's capacity fleet prior to PFP's development.[82] PFP's performance incentive was intended to ensure that resources reflected their expected performance—including the higher PFP costs for poorly performing capacity resources—in their capacity auction offers.

As Drs. Geissler and Withers explain, the concern about adverse resource selection was most pronounced for the region's older fossil steam units.[83] The ISO's 2022 assessment evaluated resource performance for these resources, finding that their performance issues (as measured by the magnitude of slow and failed start events) declined steadily between 2014 and 2022, and had the largest drop in 2018, the year PFP was implemented.[84] During this period—when a PPR of $3,500 or lower was in effect—the region saw the retirement of the worst performing fossil steam units.[85] This pattern, Drs. Geissler and Withers conclude, "where the worst performing fossil-steam units leave the market while the better performers remain in the market, is the exact pattern we would expect to see if PFP effectively addresses the adverse selection issue, and this pattern occurred when the PPR was less than or equal to the proposed $3,500 per MWh value."

2. Strong Resource Performance Under the Initial Years of PFP With a PPR No Greater Than $3,500, Combined With the Heightened Participation Risk Engendered in the Current, Higher Rate, Justify the Proposed Reduction in the PPR

The ISO's 2022 assessment of resource performance under the initial years of PFP demonstrates that, with a Performance Payment Rate of no greater than $3,500 per MWh, the region experienced improvements in the two primary areas of concern that PFP was intended to address.[86] *First*, the 2022 assessment indicates that, in PFP's initial years, resource performance improved markedly as demonstrated by increased investments in resource operating capabilities (e.g., investment in dual fuel capability) and improved fuel procurement for gas-fired resources leading to a decrease in the magnitude and frequency of capacity reductions. *Second*, the 2022 assessment indicates that the introduction of PFP coincided with the retirement of the worst performing resources on the system, which served to address the adverse selection problem that plagued the capacity market before PFP's inception. Thus, the ISO's operational

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[82] PFP White Testimony at 8-9 and 23-24; PFP Brandien Testimony throughout.

[83] Geissler-Withers Testimony at 40-41; 2022 PFP Memo at 6-7 (discussing the adverse selection problem and resource performance since PFP's introduction).

[84] *See* 2022 PFP Memo, Appendix Figure 8.

[85] *Id*.

[86] *See* PFP Transmittal Letter at 3-4 (describing two reliability challenges that PFP was intended to address: capacity resources had inefficiently low incentives to perform during periods of system stress, and the capacity auction did not appropriately consider the tradeoff between resource performance and cost when determining capacity awards, leading to the "adverse selection" problem).

experience, as summarized in its 2022 assessment, provides substantial support for the ISO's determination that PFP provides strong, and adequate, performance incentives at a Performance Payment Rate of $3,500 per MWh.

The ISO's support for the proposed PPR of $3,500 rests upon the ISO's operational experience, rather than on the economic theory that underlies the formula-based methodology employed to develop the initial "full" PPR of $5,455 in place following the transition period and the updated PPR of $9,337 in place today.[87] The formula-based approach employed to develop the $5,455 and $9,337 values was of particular benefit when the region lacked experience with a capacity performance incentive mechanism; in that context, and lacking operational experience, utilizing economic theory to set the PPR was a sound way of developing a rate targeted at addressing the significant performance issues the region faced.[88]

However, economic theory is not the sole methodology for deriving a rate, and it is appropriate to account for operational experience when assessing how well a rate is performing and whether changes are warranted.[89] The evidence that the current rate of $9,337 engenders significant risk for capacity suppliers that could adversely impact reliability and unnecessarily increase capacity costs, combined with the evidence that the proposed lower rate of $3,500 has been sufficient to incent substantial performance improvements from the capacity fleet, serves as ample support for the proposed PPR reduction to $3,500, and demonstrates that the rate meets the requirements of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.[90]

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[87] *See, supra*, at 11-12; *see also* PFP White Testimony, at 88-111, for the formula-based derivation of the initial "full" PPR of $5,455.

[88] See, supra, n.86.

[89] *See ISO New England Inc.,* 147 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 73 (2014) (explaining that the PPR transitional period "will allow ISO-NE to evaluate market participants' behavior under the new market design and assess whether the phase-in levels and the ultimate Capacity Performance Payment Rate need to be adjusted in response").

[90] *ISO New England Inc.*, 153 FERC ¶ 61,223, at P 90 (2015) (rejecting ISO-NE External Market Monitor's proposal for an alternative to the ISO's proposed PPR in its initial PFP proposal on grounds that, even "assuming *arguendo* that Potomac Economics' alternative would be just and reasonable, it is well-established that there can be more than one just and reasonable rate."); *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 167 (2015) ("in submitting proposed tariff changes pursuant to a FPA section 205 filing, PJM need only demonstrate that its proposed revisions are just and reasonable, not that its proposal is the most just and reasonable among all possible alternatives."); *see also City of Bethany v. FERC*, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming that the Commission's authority to review rates under the FPA is "limited to an inquiry into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable – and [does not] extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative rate designs").

VI. REVIEW OF PROPOSED TARIFF CHANGES

The Tariff revisions for the proposed change to the Performance Payment Rate are contained in Sections III.13.7.2.5 and III.15.8.2.5 of Market Rule 1. The change in Section III.13.7.2.5 clarifies that the current rate of $9,337 will remain in place through August 31, 2026, and thereafter the new rate of $3,500 will be in effect. These provisions are applicable for the remaining Capacity Commitment Periods of the Forward Capacity Market, through May 31, 2028. The change in Section III.15.8.2.5 replaces the $9,337 PPR with the proposed $3,500 rate, which will be applicable starting with the annual capacity auction that replaces the Forward Capacity Market starting with the auction for the June 1, 2028 through May 31, 2029 Capacity Commitment Period.

In addition, the proposed Tariff revisions include two minor updates to the annual capacity auction rules in Section III.15. The first change, to the annual capacity overview paragraph in Section III.15(a), adds a reference to Capacity Performance Payments in the listing of matters covered in Section III.15.8. The second change adds a missing comma in Section III.15(d).

VII. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE

The ISO respectfully requests that the Commission accept the Tariff revisions proposed herein, as filed, without suspension or hearing, to be effective on September 1, 2026, which is 62 days from the date of this filing.

The ISO is requesting to implement the reduction to the PPR in the middle of the on-going Capacity Commitment Period, rather than wait for the next capacity auction cycle, out of concern for the continued viability of the existing capacity fleet and the region's reliance on the fleet's capacity to meet resource adequacy objectives and overall reliability. As is explained above in Section V.B.1, older capacity with slow start times face significant financial risk with the current PPR of $9,337 due to their slow start times and resulting inability to quickly respond and provide energy during Capacity Scarcity Conditions. The ISO is concerned that this heightened financial risk could prompt these resources to trade out of their existing Capacity Supply Obligations during periods of heightened system risk, which are the very periods when the region is relying on these resources to provide energy to the system during extreme heat and cold periods.[91] Thus, the concern is not solely about the potential for resource retirements in *future* capacity auctions for *future* Capacity Commitment Periods, but also about the potential that

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[91] *See* Geissler-Withers Testimony at 23-32. The ISO is permitted under the Tariff to reject a resource's request to trade out of its obligation on a monthly basis, should the ISO determine that the resource is likely to be needed to meet reliability. *See* Tariff Section III.13.4.2.1.5. However, there is no guarantee that the ISO's analysis of reliability-related need, performed in advance of the month, would trigger the rejection. Further, taking a more prophylactic approach to such a review to force resources to remain in the market for the month to provide much-needed energy during the very times when they face the greatest risk of financial loss would likely undermine confidence in the market.

resources will trade out of existing obligations for the *current* Capacity Commitment Period. Implementing the PPR reduction in September will help to mitigate this risk.

VIII. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND THE NEPOOL PARTICIPANT PROCESSES

Over the course of three meetings, starting in March 2026, the ISO discussed its proposal to reduce the PPR with regional stakeholders. At its May 12–14, 2026 meeting, the NEPOOL Markets Committee voted to recommend a motion that the NEPOOL Participants Committee support the ISO's PPR proposal, with an 82.23% vote in favor.[92] Also at that meeting, the Markets Committee considered two Participant-sponsored amendments to the ISO's proposal, neither of which were supported.[93]

At its June 16–18, 2026 meeting, the NEPOOL Participants Committee considered the Markets Committee-recommended Tariff revisions to reduce the PPR. Based on a show of hands vote, the Participants Committee supported the proposal. Moreover, the Participants Committee also considered a Participant-sponsored amendment, which was not supported.[94]

IX. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations generally requires public utilities to file certain cost and other information related to an examination of traditional cost-of-service rates. However, the proposed Tariff changes do not modify a traditional "rate" and the ISO is not a traditional investor-owned utility. Therefore, to the extent necessary, the Filing Parties request waiver of Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations.[95] Notwithstanding its request for waiver, the Filing Parties submit the following additional information in substantial compliance with relevant provisions of Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations:

<u>35.13(b)(1)</u> – Materials included herewith are as follows:

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[92] The result of the roll-call vote at the Markets Committee meeting was as follows: Generation Sector (11.11% in favor, 5.56% opposed, 2 abstentions); Transmission Sector (16.7% in favor, 0% opposed, 1 abstention); Supplier Sector (10.42% in favor, 6.25% opposed, 7 abstentions); Publicly Owned Entity Sector (16.7% in favor, 0% opposed, 0 abstentions); Alternative Resources Sector (10.70% in favor, 5.97% opposed, 0 abstentions); and End User Sector (16.67% in favor, 0% opposed, 2 abstentions).

[93] NEPOOL has indicated that it will file supplemental comments describing the amendments and the voting outcome for each amendment.

[94] In addition to this amendment, a Participant offered a procedural amendment to revise the main motion, which failed. As indicated in note 93, NEPOOL will provide further explanation in its supplemental comments.

[95] 18 C.F.R. § 35.13.

- This transmittal letter;

- The Joint Testimony of Drs. Christopher Geissler and Andrew Withers, sponsored solely by the ISO;

- Redlined Tariff sections effective September 1, 2026;

- Clean Tariff sections effective September 1, 2026; and

- List of governors and utility regulatory agencies in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont to which a copy of this filing has been sent.

35.13(b)(2) – As set forth above, the ISO requests that the Tariff revisions filed herewith become effective on September 1, 2026.

35.13(b)(3) – Pursuant to Section 17.11(e) of the Participants Agreement, Governance Participants are being served electronically rather than by paper copy. The names and addresses of the Governance Participants are posted on the ISO's website at https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/participant-asset-listings/directory?id=1&type=committee. A copy of this transmittal letter and the accompanying materials have also been sent to the governors and electric utility regulatory agencies for the six New England states that comprise the New England Control Area, the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, Inc., and to the New England States Committee on Electricity. Their names and addresses are shown in the attached listing. In accordance with Commission rules and practice, there is no need for the Governance Participants or the entities identified in the listing to be included on the Commission's official service list in the captioned proceeding unless such entities become intervenors in this proceeding.

35.13(b)(4) – A description of the materials submitted pursuant to this filing is contained in this Section IX of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(5) – The reasons for this filing are discussed in Sections I, IV and V of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(6) – The ISO's approval of these changes is evidenced by this filing. These changes reflect the results of the Participant Processes required by the Participants Agreement and reflect the support of the Participants Committee.

35.13(b)(7) – Neither the ISO nor NEPOOL has knowledge of any relevant expenses or costs of service that have been alleged or judged in any administrative or judicial proceeding to be illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary costs that are demonstrably the product of discriminatory employment practices.

35.13(b)(8) – A form of notice and electronic media are no longer required for filings in light of the Commission's Combined Notice of Filings notice methodology.

35.13(c)(1) – The market rule changes proposed herein do not modify a traditional "rate," and the statement required under this Commission regulation is not applicable to the instant filing.

35.13(c)(2) – The ISO does not provide services under other rate schedules that are similar to the wholesale, resale and transmission services it provides under the Tariff.

35.13(c)(3) – No specifically assignable facilities have been or will be installed or modified in connection with the revisions filed herein.

X. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Filing Parties respectfully request that the Commission accept the Tariff revisions filed herein without condition or delay to become effective on September 1, 2026, as described above.

Respectfully submitted,

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

ISO New England Inc. and	**)**	**Docket No. ER26-___-000**
NEPOOL Participants Committee	**)**	

TESTIMONY OF
DR. CHRISTOPHER GEISSLER AND DR. JOHN WITHERS
ON BEHALF OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

I. <u>WITNESS IDENTIFICATION</u>

Q: Please state your name, position, and business address.

A: Dr. Geissler: My name is Christopher Geissler. I am the Director of Economic Analysis for ISO New England Inc. (the "ISO"). My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Dr. Withers: My name is John (Andrew) Withers. I am a Senior Economist in the Market Development department of the ISO. My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Q: Dr. Geissler, please describe your responsibilities, work experience and educational background.

A: In my role as Director of Economic Analysis, I oversee a team of market designers and help to design and review the ISO's suite of wholesale electricity markets. My primary responsibilities include wholesale electricity market design and development, with much of my work focused on the Forward Capacity

Market. I have helped lead or support many capacity market initiatives, including the development of the Pay for Performance construct,[1] the region's move to marginal reliability impact-based sloped demand curves,[2] the development of Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources,[3] and the changes to the methodology to calculate the Forward Capacity Auction's Dynamic Delist Bid Threshold ("DDBT").[4,5] I am also the principle designer for the on-going capacity market reforms, and filed testimony in support of the proposal to replace the region's Forward Capacity Market with a prompt capacity market.[6] Prior to my current role in 2023, I served as an individual contributor with a similar focus on energy market design, and as Manager of Economic Analysis. Prior to joining the ISO in 2013, I received an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Duke University, where I conducted research on competition in regulated industries.

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[1] *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm*., Filing of Performance Incentives Market Rule Changes of ISO New England Inc., Docket Nos. ER14-1050-000, -001 (Jan. 17, 2014); *ISO New England Inc*, Compliance Filing of Two-Settlement Forward Capacity Market Design of ISO New England Inc., Docket Nos. ER14-2419-000, -001 (July 14, 2014).

[2] *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm*., Demand Curve Design Improvements of ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER16-1434-000 (Apr. 15, 2016).

[3] *ISO New England Inc.*, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources, Docket No. ER18-619-000 (Jan. 8, 2018).

[4] *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm*., Market Rule 1 Change to Implement New Methodology for Calculating Forward Capacity Market Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold of ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER21-782-000 (Dec. 31, 2020).

[5] Capitalized terms used in this testimony but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the "Tariff"), the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, the Participants Agreement, and in the proposed Tariff revisions submitted as part of this filing.

[6] *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, Revisions to ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff to Establish a Prompt Capacity Market and Deactivation Framework, Docket No. ER26-925-000 (Dec. 30, 2025).

Q: Dr. Withers, please describe your responsibilities, work experience and educational background.

A: My primary responsibilities include identifying and developing market design improvements for New England's competitive wholesale electricity markets, where the majority of my work has focused on the ISO's energy markets. Currently, my primary responsibility is to lead an investigation into multi-interval dispatch and pricing, which represents a possible future enhancement to the ISO's Real-Time Energy Market. In the past, I led the ISO's effort to modify the design of the market power mitigation rules in the Energy Market to address concerns over the adverse impacts of upward Energy Market mitigation and to facilitate the use of fuel price adjustments to reflect more than one fuel price in Energy Market Reference Levels.[7] Prior to that, as part of the Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Initiative, I led both the impact assessment, which evaluated how the joint procurement of energy and ancillary services in the Day-Ahead Market might change buyers' and sellers' wholesale energy market costs and revenues, and the analysis of how suppliers may be expected to formulate competitive Day-Ahead Ancillary Service offers.[8] I have served in this role since October 2023. Prior to that date, I was an Economist in the Market Development department of ISO New

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[7] *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, Market Rule 1 Change to Eliminate Energy Supply Offer Upward Mitigation, Docket Nos. ER24-324-000 and EL23-62-000 (Nov. 2, 2023); *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff to Implement Fuel Price Adjustment Functionality, Docket Nos. ER24-2584-000 and EL23-62-000 (July 24, 2024).

[8] *ISO New England, Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff to Establish a Jointly Optimized Day-Ahead Market for Energy and Ancillary Services, Docket No. ER24-275-000 (Oct. 31, 2023).

England, with similar responsibilities to my current role. Prior to joining the ISO in 2018, I received my M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University, where I conducted research on contracting and incentives, with applications in regulated industries.

II. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF TESTIMONY

Q: What is the purpose of this testimony?

A: In this testimony, we will explain the primary reasons for the ISO's proposal to replace the current Performance Payment Rate ("PPR") of $9,337 per MWh of the Pay for Performance ("PFP") market rules with a lower rate of $3,500 per MWh.

Q: Please summarize the main points and conclusions of your testimony.

A: The current PPR of $9,337 per MWh, while it provides substantial performance incentives for resources, also engenders a significant degree of risk for capacity suppliers, relative to a lower PPR. This volatility is likely to be reflected in stop-loss risk (decreasing performance incentives for poorer performing resources and increasing financial risk for all capacity resources) and higher capacity offers, which in turn may increase capacity auction clearing prices and, therefore, capacity costs to consumers.

In addition, the ISO is concerned that the current PPR could prompt older oil-fired resources that provide substantial reliability value to the region during more extreme weather events to exit the system, in particular because these resources have longer lead-times and therefore cannot respond to unanticipated scarcity conditions, thus increasing the likelihood that they will incur substantial PFP charges and increasing their overall cost of market participation.

Maintaining the current resource mix is of paramount importance to the region as it undergoes both a transition in its resource mix and foundational changes to its capacity market structure that are intended to ensure the region maintains and attracts a mix of resources that can reliably and competitively meet the region's resource adequacy objectives.

To achieve these objectives, the ISO is proposing to lower the PPR to $3,500 per MWh. It is critical that PFP should remain structured so that resources have strong incentives to perform during periods of system stress and so that over time, the market attracts and retains the better performing resources, and that poorer performers exit the market. Ensuring a PPR that is targeted at achieving these outcomes is therefore important for the success of the market.

In this regard, operational data from the first four years of the PFP market design indicates that the $3,500 PPR that was in place during PFP's initial phase-in period provided a substantial performance incentive, evidenced by considerable improvements in resource performance as measured in a number of ways that the region experienced under a PPR of no greater than $3,500.

The ISO is therefore confident that that the proposed PPR of $3,500 per MWh will continue to satisfy the important objective of procuring a reliable, cost-effective set of resources to meet the region's reliability needs and addresses the adverse selection concern that helped motivate the PFP design.

In sum, while a higher PPR value may also provide strong performance incentives, it also has the potential to increase costs and raise risks of capacity market participation for suppliers. The proposed PPR value therefore seeks to strike a sensible balance between maintaining strong performance incentives and reducing the risk to the existing fleet that could increase costs with little benefit and lead to resource retirements that may adversely impact system reliability.

Q: Please explain how your testimony is organized.

A: Following this introductory section, in Section III we provide an overview of the Pay for Performance rules. In Section IV we discuss the challenges the region's capacity fleet is facing under the current, higher Performance Payment Rate. In Section V we explain why the lower rate the ISO is proposing will continue to provide strong performance incentives at reduced risk.

III. <u>THE PAY FOR PERFORMANCE RULES AND PERFORMANCE PAYMENT RATE TO DATE</u>

Q: Please provide an overview of ISO New England's Pay for Performance market rules.

A: With the introduction of Pay for Performance, New England's capacity market became a two-settlement market design. In the annual capacity auction, resources submit offers that reflect their costs to provide capacity during a defined Capacity

Commitment Period. Resources that sell capacity in the capacity auction receive revenues that are determined by the auction clearing price and the MW quantity of capacity they clear (referred to as Capacity Base Payments). Importantly, these forward positions represent an obligation to provide a percentage share of the region's energy and reserve requirements during Capacity Scarcity Conditions.[9]

As a quick illustrative example, if the capacity auction clears 30,000 MW of capacity, a resource that clears a 300 MW Capacity Supply Obligation ("CSO") is responsible for providing one percent (300 MW/ 30,000 MW = .01, or 1%) of the region's energy and reserve requirements during any Capacity Scarcity Condition during the Capacity Commitment Period.[10]

Capacity Scarcity Conditions serve as the "spot market" component of the two-settlement design. During these periods of system stress, resources that provide more than their share of energy and reserves receive additional compensation, and resources that provide less than their share of energy and reserves incur a charge. These second settlements are referred to as Capacity Performance Payments.

[9] While New England's capacity market is in the process of moving from a three-year forward auction (with the final auction having run for the June 2027 through May 2028 Capacity Commitment Period) to a prompt auction (with the first auction to be run for the June 2028 through May 2029 Capacity Commitment Period), it remains the case that the Capacity Supply Obligation received in the prompt auction is a forward position—an obligation to provide capacity during the future Capacity Commitment Period.

[10] These requirements are subject to a "cap" on the Capacity Balancing Ratio, which the ISO is in the process of developing in response to the Commission's January 22, 2026 order in Docket No. EL25-106-000. *See New England Power Generators Assoc. v. ISO New England Inc.*, Order Granting Complaint in Part and Denying in Part, 194 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2026).

To illustrate this point, suppose that during a Capacity Scarcity Condition the region's energy and reserve requirements total 25,000 MW. If the resource that sold 300 MW of CSO provides less than 250 MW (1% of 25,000 MW) of energy and reserves, it receives a charge, and if it provides more than 250 MW of energy and reserves, the resource will receive additional compensation. This "settlement for deviations" is analogous to how Day-Ahead energy awards are settled in the Real-Time Energy Market, where resources that provide more energy in real-time than they sold in the Day Ahead Market are paid the real-time price for this incremental energy, and resources that provide less are charged the real-time price for their shortfall.

Q: At a high level, how do the PFP rules function as a performance incentive mechanism?

A: The fact that performance during scarcity conditions results in additional payments or charges is the main innovation of Pay for Performance, and the primary way that PFP addresses the two major issues identified with the capacity market at the time PFP was implemented: first, that resources had inefficiently low incentives to perform during periods of heightened system stress, and second, that the capacity market was more likely to award capacity positions to less reliable resources (that is, the capacity market suffered from adverse selection).[11]

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[11] These and related problems were discussed in more detail in the ISO's filing of the Pay for Performance market rules. *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, Filing of Performance Incentives Market Rule Changes of ISO New England Inc., Docket Nos. ER14-1050-000, -001 (Jan. 17, 2014) ("ISO PFP Filing"). The ISO's transmittal letter, supporting testimony of Dr. Matthew White, and supporting testimony of Peter Brandien, are referred to

Q: What role does the Performance Payment Rate play in incenting performance under PFP?

A: The administratively-determined rate at which the second settlement occurs, the Performance Payment Rate or PPR, plays a central role both in ensuring that resources have a strong incentive to perform during times of greatest system need and in ensuring that the capacity auction awards capacity to a reliable set of resources to meet the region's resource adequacy needs, thereby addressing the adverse selection concern.

In terms of providing incentives to perform during periods of system stress (i.e., during Capacity Scarcity Conditions), the Performance Payment Rate serves as an additional scarcity price signal, on top of the energy market's scarcity pricing rules, that incents suppliers to provide as much energy and reserves as possible during the times when the system needs them the most.

The Performance Payment Rate also helps ensure that the capacity auction is more likely to award capacity to resources with lower costs, better performance, or both. This is because resources account for their expected Capacity Performance Payments (whether positive or negative), and how these payments are impacted by their forward sale of capacity, when they formulate their capacity auction offers. The Capacity Performance Payment is equal to the product of the Capacity Performance Score

herein, respectively, as the "PFP Transmittal Letter," the "PFP White Testimony," and the "PFP Brandien Testimony." For the discussion of the identified problems, see the PFP Transmittal Letter at 11-17 and the PFP White Testimony at 14-19.

(which represents a measure of the capacity the resource delivers as compared to its share of system obligation—i.e., its performance—during a Capacity Scarcity Condition), and the Performance Payment Rate.[12] Therefore, holding resource performance fixed, Capacity Performance Payments scale linearly with the PPR.

For resources that expect to perform poorly, the Capacity Performance Payments represent expected charges that would tend to decrease the resource's capacity market revenues. For resources that expect to perform well, the expected Capacity Performance Payment may represent additional expected compensation. Thus, the inclusion of Capacity Performance Payments in capacity auction offers would tend to transfer capacity revenues from poor performing resources to strong performers, where over time this would result in the procurement of capacity from a more reliable and cost-effective set of resources and help address the adverse selection problem.

Q: Why did the ISO find it necessary to develop specific rules to incentivize better resource performance during times of scarcity?

A: At the time of the PFP filing in 2014, the ISO had observed several trends that indicated the region was facing significant and growing reliability risks. Most of the concerns centered around declining generator performance (reductions in fossil-steam units' maximum output levels (Economic Maximum Limit, or Ecomax) during extreme operating conditions, worsening forced outage rates across several generation

[12] The PFP market rules addressing the calculation of Capacity Performance Payments are in Tariff Sections III.13.7.2.4 – 6 (for the Forward Capacity Market) and III.15.8.2.4 – 6 (for the prompt capacity market).

technology types, poor performance when generators were dispatched in response to system contingencies, and inadequate incentives to acquire fuel (lack of firm fuel supply arrangements and declining dual-fuel capability among the region's natural gas fleet).[13]

The ISO determined that two "gaps" in the region's capacity market were contributing towards these reliability risks. First, resources that cleared in the capacity market had inefficiently low incentives to perform during periods of system stress, and second, the capacity auction did not appropriately consider the tradeoff between resource performance and cost when determining capacity awards. The primary purpose of PFP was to address these two flaws, thereby improving both short- and long-term performance incentives.

Q: How does PFP address these concerns?

A: The introduction of a second settlement to the capacity market is the primary market mechanism that both improves incentives to perform during Capacity Scarcity Conditions and ensures the capacity market is more likely to award capacity to resources with lower costs, better performance, or both.

Q: Please elaborate on how PFP improves performance incentives during scarcity conditions.

[13] For further discussion of these reliability risks and resource performance issues, see the PFP Brandien Testimony.

A: In the absence of PFP, incentives to perform during scarcity conditions are driven by energy market scarcity pricing. When energy demand is high enough relative to available energy supply that the system cannot satisfy both its energy balance and operating reserve requirements (i.e., during a Capacity Scarcity Condition), serving one additional MW of energy demand requires a corresponding one MW decrease in the (already deficient) operating reserve margin. For this reason, energy prices during scarcity conditions include the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor(s) of the violated reserve constraints. This means that during scarcity conditions, energy prices can be greater than $1,500 per MWh, which is the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement.

With PFP, the Capacity Performance Payment acts as a scarcity price adder on top of the energy scarcity pricing that is (by definition) in effect any time there is a Capacity Scarcity Condition. This provides capacity suppliers with strong incentives to take actions (to procure fuel, perform plant maintenance, ensure adequate staffing, etc.) that enable them to perform during periods of system stress. We briefly describe the mechanics of Capacity Performance Payments below.

Resources without a CSO are eligible to receive Capacity Performance Payments if they provide energy and/or reserves during a Capacity Scarcity Condition. This is analogous to the energy market, where resources that do not clear in the Day-Ahead Market will still receive Real-Time Energy Market revenues if they provide energy or reserves during the operating day. For resources without a CSO, the PPR is a pure scarcity price adder for each MWh of energy and reserves the resource provides during scarcity conditions.

For resources with a CSO, the PPR is still a scarcity price adder for each MWh of energy and reserve the resource provides during scarcity conditions, but the resource also settles its forward position in a process that is analogous to how resources settle their Day-Ahead energy awards in the Real-Time market. Thus, if a resource with a CSO delivers *less* than its share of the region's energy and reserve requirements during the Capacity Scarcity Condition, it is subject to a performance charge (referred to as a *negative* Capacity Performance Payment) against the forward Capacity Base Payment that it received for the Capacity Commitment Period to reflect the fact that it must effectively cover the remainder of its capacity position by buying from another resource that performs above its share of system requirements.

The important takeaway is that for both resources with and without a CSO, the PPR provides strong incentives to perform during periods of system stress, on top of the incentives provided by energy market scarcity pricing. With the current value of the PPR at $9,337 per MWh, and energy scarcity prices typically greater than $1,000 per MWh (and sometimes greater than $1,500 per MWh), the marginal incentives for resources to perform typically exceed $10,000 per MWh during Capacity Scarcity Conditions.

Q: Please elaborate on how PFP and the PPR improve the ability of the capacity market to procure a reliable, cost-effective set of resources to meet the region's reliability needs.

A: One of the most important properties of the PFP design is that it enables the capacity market to award capacity to resources with lower costs, better performance, or both.

To illustrate this point, consider two resources, one a strong performer and one a poor performer. The strong performer has higher capacity costs than the poor performer (it invests more in the maintenance and upkeep of its resource, for example), but because it is so much more reliable than the poor performer, its cost per MWh of performance during scarcity conditions is lower than the poor performing resource.

Assuming at least one of the resources needs to clear to satisfy the region's resource adequacy standards, it could be efficient for the capacity market to clear both the strong performer and the poor performer, or it could be efficient for the capacity market to clear only the strong performer. One outcome that would be clearly inefficient is for the capacity market to clear the poor performer but not the strong performer. This latter outcome is the adverse selection problem we refer to above, and is one of the central issues PFP was intended to resolve.

Under PFP, with a PPR that sends a strong performance signal, a strong performing resource is likely to have a lower competitive capacity offer than a poor performing resource. This is because the poorer performing resources are likely to include the risk of incurring negative Capacity Performance Payments from poor performance during Capacity Scarcity Conditions in its capacity auction offer. Therefore, if the two resources offer competitively, the capacity market could clear both the strong performer and poor performer, or just the strong performer; but under PFP it is very unlikely to clear just the poorer performer. What this illustrates is that with PFP, resources account for their expected performance payments during Capacity Scarcity Conditions in their competitive offers. This ensures two things: that the poor performing resource tends to have a higher competitive offer than the strong performer, and as a result, that the capacity market will typically not clear the poor performer instead of the strong performer. This illustrates how PFP helps to resolve the adverse selection problem that plagued the capacity market prior to the implementation of PFP, thereby producing more efficient capacity market outcomes.

Q: What is the current Performance Payment Rate, and how has it changed over time?

A: To date, the PPR has steadily increased over time. This is driven by two factors: the PPR "phase-in" period that was included in the PFP filing, and the Net CONE parameter updates that went into effect in June 2025, and which are summarized below.

At the time PFP was filed, the ISO understood that it represented a major change in how resources would be compensated for providing capacity. The purpose of the phase-in period was to allow participants to gain an understanding of the new market design, starting with a $2,000 per MWh PPR that was intended to reduce the risk of market participation as participants gained experience with the new design. In turn, the phase-in allowed the ISO to evaluate performance under PFP, and make adjustments if necessary before the final rate went into effect. Over time, the PPR gradually increased to the $5,455 per MWh value specified in the PFP filing, before increasing with the Net CONE parameter updates, as summarized below:

- From June 1, 2018 – May 31, 2021, the PPR was $2,000 per MWh
- From June 1, 2021 – May 31, 2024, the PPR was $3,500 per MWh

- From June 1, 2024 – May 31, 2025, the PPR was $5,455 per MWh (This was the "full" PPR value specified in the PFP filing.)
- From June 1, 2025 – present, the PPR is $9,337 per MWh (This change represents an update to the parameters that determine the PPR, while employing the same methodology used to determine the $5,455 PPR value.)

Q: Why did the ISO increase the Performance Payment Rate to its current rate of $9,337/MWh?

A: The ISO used two economic principles to develop a formulaic methodology to derive the Performance Payment Rate value that was in place after the transition was complete. Using this formulaic methodology, the PPR is a function of three parameters: net cost of new entry (or Net CONE), a new resource's expected annual performance during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, and the expected number of hours of Capacity Scarcity Conditions annually when the system is at criterion, as estimated using the ISO's resource adequacy model. Each of these parameters was updated as part of the broader Net CONE parameter updates performed in 2020 – 2021, and the new value of the PPR that resulted from these parameter updates went into effect on June 1, 2025. Notably, the formulaic methodology is not included in the Tariff itself; only the rate is included.

In short, the current $9,337 dollar per MWh rate is derived using the same formulaic methodology that was used to derive the initial "full" PPR value of $5,455 dollars per MWh, specified in the ISO PFP Filing. The updated value simply reflects updated estimates of the relevant input parameters: the Net CONE value, the new entrant's expected performance during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, and the expected number of hours of scarcity when the system is at criteria.

IV. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE'S RECORD TO DATE AND CONCERNS WITH THE CURRENT PERFORMANCE PAYMENT RATE

Q: You explain above that the Pay for Performance rules were designed to meet two primary objectives. Has the ISO performed an assessment of the extent to which PFP is achieving these two objectives?

A: As stated above, the primary objectives of the PFP design were to provide market incentives for resources to improve their performance during stressed conditions, and to select resources in the capacity market more efficiently, thereby alleviating the adverse selection issue that had been a feature of the capacity market prior to PFP.

In the ISO PFP Filing, the ISO included empirical analyses documenting concerning trends in generator performance in the years leading up to the PFP proposal.[14] In 2022, the ISO supplemented and extended the analyses performed in the ISO PFP Filing to evaluate whether data and operational experience gained since PFP's implementation supported the notion that the design was achieving its intended effect

[14] *See* PFP Brandien Testimony.

of improving resource performance by increasing incentives to deliver energy and reserves during scarcity conditions, and addressing the adverse selection concern.[15]

Q: What did the 2022 analysis of PFP's performance to date indicate with respect to how the PFP rules have met their two primary objectives?

A: While specific data points from the 2022 analysis are discussed below in our testimony, two general points are worth emphasizing here.

First, across five out of the six categories of resource performance that the ISO evaluated in 2022, there were clear signs of improvement in the years following the implementation of PFP.[16] These results document stronger incentives to make fuel arrangements, lower forced outage rates, and better response rates to the ISO's dispatch instructions, among others.

Second, the 2022 analysis explains that concerns regarding adverse selection were most pronounced for the region's older fossil steam units. A number of those units have retired since the implementation of PFP, and those who did were the worst performing units as judged by the slow- and failed-start metric included in the 2022 PFP Memo. In other words, the worst performing oil-steam units decided to leave the market, while the better performers have remained in the market. This is the exact

[15] *See* Memorandum of ISO New England Inc. to NEPOOL Markets Committed regarding Performance of Capacity Resources and Pay for Performance, dated September 7, 2022 (corrected September 9, 2022) ("2022 PFP Memo"), *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/09/a03_mc_2022_09_13-14_performance_of_capacity_resources_memo_rev1.pdf.

[16] *See* 2022 PFP Memo at 1-6.

pattern we would expect to see if PFP is effectively addressing the adverse selection issue.[17]

Q: Given these results, why is the ISO proposing to update the Performance Payment Rate at this time?

A: Fundamentally, decreasing the performance payment rate would reduce the risk of capacity market participation for capacity suppliers, which, in turn, could have several benefits for the region. Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that a reduction in the PPR could achieve this objective while still providing strong performance incentives and addressing the adverse selection issue present in the market prior to PFP.

Properly designed performance incentives ensure that compensation increases with performance. Good performers receive additional compensation, and poor performers incur charges to buy out of their forward positions and "replace" the energy and reserves they failed to deliver; both transactions (compensation for good performance and charges for poor performance) occur at the spot price (in the case of the capacity market, the administratively-determined PPR).

The potential charges for poor performance provide incentives for participants to take actions that improve their ability to provide energy and reserves when the system needs them, but also increase the risk of market participation. That increased risk—which is commensurately higher when the PPR is increased—can adversely impact

[17] *See* 2022 PFP Memo at 6-7.

market participation and increase overall costs that consumers pay for capacity. Thus, theoretically, a PPR of $1 million would provide extremely strong performance incentives; however, many (if not all) capacity resources would find it untenable to sell capacity with such a rate given the risk they would face in the event of nonperformance.

It is therefore important to balance the incentive effects of the PPR with its impact on market participation and cost. The ISO believes that a lower value of the PPR will maintain the core benefits of a higher PPR while reducing risk for capacity suppliers. While capacity costs, in the aggregate, could increase or decrease in the future, reducing the PPR will help to reduce those costs, or offset other increases.

Q: More specifically, how does an increase or decrease in the PPR influence capacity market participation for capacity suppliers?

A: As we have discussed, the PPR is the rate at which "settlements for deviations" take place in the capacity market. Resources that overperform their share of energy and reserves receive additional compensation, and resources that underperform incur charges. These settlements for deviations scale with the PPR: the higher the PPR, the higher the additional compensation when the resource performs well, but also the higher the charge when the resource performs poorly.

As the PPR increases, so does the volatility of a resource's revenues from participating in the capacity market. While risk management approaches differ from participant to participant, we would expect that many potential capacity sellers would account for a more volatile capacity revenue stream by increasing the risk premium they include in their capacity auction offer. And in turn, higher risk premiums in capacity offers would tend to increase capacity clearing prices.

This highlights that there is a tradeoff between strong incentives and the corresponding risk of selling capacity. Beyond a certain level, raising the PPR will serve to increase risk without providing a commensurate increase in performance incentives.

For example, suppose a Capacity Scarcity Condition is declared, and a natural-gas-fired generator has to decide whether to nominate more fuel during the intraday nomination cycle that would allow it to operate at an output level above its Day-Ahead energy award. Assume the generator has a heat rate of 8 MMBtu per MWh, which is conservative for ISO-NE's natural-gas fired combined cycle fleet, and the Real-Time Locational Marginal Price, or LMP, during the scarcity event is $1,000 per MWh, which is conservative for average LMPs during Capacity Scarcity Conditions. Under the proposed PPR of $3,500 per MWh, the natural gas generator would in theory be willing to pay up to $562 per MMBtu to capture the combined energy and capacity scarcity prices (LMP plus PPR). Under the current PPR of $9,337 per MWh, the generator would be willing to pay up to $1,290 per MMBtu to provide energy and reserves during the scarcity condition.

On January 28, 2026 the New England region observed the highest natural gas price for next-day delivery in over five years, averaging just over $120 per MMBtu at the most liquid pricing hub.[18] This gas price occurred during a prolonged cold snap,

[18] This $120 per MMBtu value is a volume-weighted average of the transactions for next-day delivery observed at the AGT-CG non G hub, which are provided by Intercontinental Exchange.

where home heating demand limited the amount of natural gas available for electric generation. While intraday gas markets are typically less liquid than markets for next-day delivery, intraday prices would have to be more than four and a half times the highest day-ahead gas price observed in over five years for the gas generator to find it, on the one hand, *profitable* under the current PPR to make intraday fuel arrangements during the scarcity condition, but, on the other hand, *unprofitable* to make such arrangements under the proposed PPR. Thus, under current market conditions, it is reasonable to conclude that the proposed $3,500 PPR will provide strong performance incentives during scarcity conditions, including in cases where fuel costs are elevated. *However*, at the same time, a nearly $6,000 per MWh difference in the PPR (between the current and proposed rates) creates a non-trivial difference in performance risk for capacity suppliers, and this can translate into material differences in the risk premiums included in capacity offers.

Further, as risk of participation in the capacity market increases, some capacity suppliers may choose to avoid those risks entirely by deactivating a resource permanently or “trading out” of a Capacity Supply Obligation during riskier performance months. In some instances, this can occur even when the resource in question provides significant value to the system.

Q: Can you provide a more concrete example of how the volatility of a resource’s capacity performance payments increases with an increase in the PPR?

A: Yes, we will provide a brief illustration of this concept.

With PFP, capacity resources are likely to receive either additional compensation or incur charges, depending on how their performance during a scarcity condition compares with their share of system energy and operating reserve requirements. With a higher value of the PPR, these second settlements represent "higher highs" when the resource performs well (i.e., provides more than its share of the required energy and reserves during the scarcity event), and "lower lows" when the resource performs poorly (i.e., provides less than its share of the required energy and reserves during the scarcity event).

To illustrate this, consider a resource that sells 100 MW of capacity in the capacity auction. First, suppose the resource performs well during a one-hour Capacity Scarcity Condition, delivering 100 MW of energy and reserves. Further, suppose the balancing ratio is 0.85 (meaning that the resource is obligated to delivery 85 percent of its CSO in energy and reserves during the Capacity Scarcity Condition). With a PPR of $9,337, the resource receives additional compensation of $140,055 for its good performance:

$$9{,}337*(100 - 0.85*100) = 140{,}055$$

If the PPR were instead $3,500 per MWh, the resource would have received $52,500 in additional compensation:

$$3{,}500*(100 - 0.85*100) = 52{,}500$$

Next, suppose the resource performs poorly during the same one hour Capacity Scarcity Condition, delivering zero MWh of energy or reserves. If the PPR is $9,337, the resource would incur a charge of $793,645:

$$9{,}337*(0-0.85*100) = -793{,}645$$

If the PPR were $3,500, the charge for poor performance would be $297,500:

$$3{,}500*(0-0.85*100) = -297{,}500$$

While this simple numerical example uses two specific values of the PPR, it illustrates a general concept: holding other factors constant, the distribution of negative and positive Capacity Performance Payments is more volatile (i.e., it has a higher variance or standard deviation) as the PPR increases.

Individual participants have different strategies for managing risk, but it would be intuitive for a participant to reduce the risk premium it includes in its capacity offer if the volatility of Capacity Performance Payments decreases. Suppose, for instance, that the participant could purchase an insurance policy that would make it whole in case it performs poorly during a Capacity Scarcity Condition. The premium necessary to cover a $793,645 charge would be larger than the premium necessary to cover a $297,500 charge. If the cost of the insurance premium is reflected in the risk premium component of the capacity offer, then, all else equal, we would expect the capacity offer to be greater when the PPR is $9,337 than when the PPR is $3,500.

Q: You explain above that, as risk of participation in the capacity market increases, some capacity suppliers may choose to avoid those risks entirely by deactivating a resource permanently or "trading out" of a Capacity Supply Obligation during riskier performance months, even when the resource in question provides

significant value to the system. Can you elaborate on why such a resource might choose this path rather than remain in the capacity market?

A: As illustrated above, a higher value of the PPR tends to increase the volatility of Capacity Performance Payments for capacity suppliers. For longer lead-time fossil-steam resources, this is especially true. This is because such units typically have to be committed in the Day-Ahead Market to be able to operate during a Capacity Scarcity Condition that arises during the Operating Day, but these resources are rarely committed in the Day-Ahead Market. We discuss this in more detail below.

Q: Does the ISO have concerns that, under the current PPR, resources may prematurely exit the market?

A: Yes. The region has approximately 3,000 MW of older fossil steam resources that operate on residual fuel oil and have a CSO for the June 1, 2026 – May 31, 2027 Capacity Commitment Period.

Most of these resources entered service in the 1960s and 1970s, are less flexible than newer technology types, and run on a fuel, residual fuel oil or "RFO," that is typically more expensive than natural gas. For this reason, these "RFO resources" will have typically performed worse than other resource types during Capacity Scarcity Conditions. Nevertheless, as we highlight below, these resources have provided valuable energy and reserves during recent periods of heightened system stress, and the near-term retirement of these resources could result in reliability risks to the New England system.

The poorer performance of the RFO resources during scarcity conditions stems from the fact that these units are not fast-start resources, but instead require 12 hours or more to start before they can provide energy to the system. This impacts these resources' risk from selling capacity because it means they must typically be committed prior to the operating day to be able to provide energy and reserves in Real-Time; put differently, they cannot respond quickly in Real-Time to unanticipated scarcity conditions, due to their 12-hour Start-Up and Notification Times.

Further, as explained above, these units run on more expensive residual fuel oil and all of them were built prior to 1980, meaning they tend to convert input energy into electric energy less efficiently than newer generators. Collectively, these facts combined explain why fossil-steam units are typically not committed prior to the operating day.

Q: Why would the fact that such resources cannot be committed during the operating day potentially increase their risk of an early retirement?

A: Because they are long lead-time resources, it is not possible for them to come online quickly during the operating day in response to a sudden contingency or series of contingencies that result in a Capacity Scarcity Condition. This means that these units are more likely to incur negative Capacity Performance Payments during such events, in particular during scarcity conditions that occur on operating days where the Day-Ahead load forecasts, supply offers and demand bids did not indicate that the commitment of these slower, more expensive oil-fired steam units was warranted.

Given the higher operating costs that these resources incur, and given their higher PFP risks—in particular with the currently high PPR, which results in more volatile Capacity Performance Payments—there may be an increased possibility that these resources will not find it profitable to continue operating. This would increase the likelihood that these resources will pursue deactivation, or at the very least will attempt to trade out of their Capacity Supply Obligation during periods of heightened risk.

Q: You note that the risk for the older, oil-fired steam units is greatest when the scarcity events are unanticipated. Is the risk, then, not as significant when the scarcity event is anticipated?

A: The risk to these resources is not as significant when the scarcity events occur on days where high loads or other stressed operating conditions (constrained natural gas supply, for example) are anticipated. This is because, when more extreme operating conditions are forecasted in advance of the operating day, these conditions will be reflected in the Day Ahead Market, and there is an increased chance that the market will clear higher priced energy supply offers to satisfy bid in demand, the load forecast, and operating reserve requirements.

However, many Capacity Scarcity Conditions that have occurred since the inception of the Pay for Performance rules in 2018 have occurred on days where load forecasts and other operating conditions did not warrant the commitment of these longer lead time, more expensive units, often as a result of resource trips or unanticipated transmission line outages that unexpectedly reduce available capacity during the operating day.

These are exactly the types of events that pose heightened risk for the older, long lead-time RFO units that cannot respond quickly to such events, and thus face heightened PFP risk that is exacerbated with the currently high PPR.

Q: How concerned is the ISO that the current PPR could result in the premature exit of these older, oil-fired steam units?

A: While we cannot calculate this risk with any degree of certainty, as noted in the 2022 PFP Memo, a number of fossil-steam units have already retired or are scheduled to retire from the ISOs energy and capacity markets since PFP was filed with the Commission in 2014: of the 97 Generating Capacity Resources that have retired or are scheduled to retire, 42 have been fossil-steam units. This represents 82% of the total MW capability (measured using summer CNR Interconnection Service) of the resources that have elected to retire since 2014. For the reasons discussed above, the remaining fossil-steam units may be at a heightened risk of retirement in the coming years.

Q: Why is the ISO concerned about the loss of these resources, if in fact they struggle to perform during such events?

A: Despite the challenges these resources face during more transient scarcity events, they nevertheless provide valuable energy diversity during high demand periods, both during summer heat waves and extreme winter cold spells—in particular events where high energy demand, or limited supply from other resource types, is forecasted far enough in advance to signal the need for these units prior to the start of the operating day. During summer heat waves, all the region's capacity can at times be necessary to serve load and maintain required reserves. When these events are anticipated, the older RFO units can clear in the Day-Ahead Market (when high load forecasts lead to higher Day-Ahead energy prices) or self-schedule in anticipation of the high demand. During winter cold spells, the constrained natural gas system can prevent a substantial portion of the region's natural gas-fired fleet from providing energy to meet demand; in these circumstances RFO units play a critical role in ensuring adequate energy and reserves to reliably serve load.

Q: Can you point to recent examples of the role the region's older fossil-steam units have played during summer or winter capacity scarcity events?

A: Yes. The fleet of RFO units provided substantial amounts of energy during both the June 2025 heat wave that produced the region's longest Capacity Scarcity Condition to date, as well as during the January and February 2026 prolonged cold weather—the most challenging cold weather conditions the region has experienced in the last eight years.

The June 24, 2025 heat wave has been well-documented. The ISO's load forecast on June 23rd reflected the expectation that high temperatures and dew points on June 24th would produce high electricity demand and low capacity margins. This provided slow start resources such as the older RFO units, many of which cleared in the Day-Ahead Market, adequate time to come online and prepare to provide energy during the June

24th operating day. Temperatures and the dew point rose throughout the day, and the system peak in the 6:00 evening hour was 26,024 MW, approximately 225 MW higher that the ISO's forecast. During the peak, the RFO fleet provided, at its maximum, approximately 2,700 MW of energy, contributing over 10 percent of the energy produced during the peak. With approximately 2,560 MW of generator capacity out of service during this time period, it is very possible that, without the contribution of the RFO fleet, the region would not have had sufficient energy to meet demand.[19]

The January and February extended cold spell paints a similar, though more complex and potentially more dire, picture. Prolonged cold temperatures resulted in consistently high peak loads during the last week of January and first week of February, creating the most challenging winter conditions for the system since the winter of 2017-2018. During this period of time, high home heating demand for natural gas reduced energy production from the region's natural gas-fired generation fleet. In its place, oil-fired resources provided approximately 22 percent of the energy produced from January 24 through February 10, the coldest days of the cold weather event. The ability of the RFO fleet to operate throughout this period and replenish oil

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[19] The ISO's August 2025 Chief Operating Officer Report to NEPOOL provides substantial detail regarding the June 24 Capacity Scarcity Condition, at slides 22–38. *See* August 2025 Report of Vamsi Chadalavada, ISO-NE Chief Operating Officer, to the NEPOOL Participants Committee, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100026/august-2025-coo-report.pdf ("August 2025 ISO-NE COO Report").

supplies was essential to maintaining reliable operations during late January and early February 2026.[20]

Q: Has the ISO studied (or assessed) the likelihood that the current PPR will result in near-term increases in retirements of older, fuel-secure resources or near-term increases in capacity clearing prices tied to the risk of increased PFP costs?

A: Not directly. However, in its 2022 assessment of PFP's performance to date, the ISO made two observations that are relevant to these concerns. First, the ISO observed that the introduction of PFP had coincided with the retirement of several older power plants, suggesting that the risks that PFP would pose for these poorly performing resources had helped to remove them from the system. However, as we have discussed, the RFO fleet also faces heightened PFP risk, which has increased as the PPR has increased (substantially) since PFP's inception. It is reasonable to be concerned that the substantial increase in the rate since that time might facilitate further retirements of the older RFO resources—ones that still provide substantial value to the system but which nevertheless face significant non-performance risk that could raise concerns about their continued viability with the higher PPR.

[20] From January 23 through February 10, the RFO fleet burned 41 million gallons of oil, and was able to replenish approximately 20 million gallons of oil. *See* the March 2026 ISO-NE System & Operations Report, at slides 14-52, for a discussion of the New England system's performance during the January through February 2026 cold spell, *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/100033/system-and-market-ops-report-mar-2026.pdf. One diversity-related point worth highlighting is that the RFO fleet oil replenishment generally relies upon barges and ships to have fuel transported to the generating stations, whereas distillate fuel oil units rely upon trucks for fuel transportation. Thus, if weather conditions prevent truck transportation, the RFO units may still be able to have fuel stocks replenished, and vice versa. This type of fuel-related diversity contributes to the overall reliability of the system.

Second, while capacity clearing prices have remained relatively stable over the past several auctions, if the number of scarcity conditions increases (five of the six total scarcity conditions have occurred since 2022), the region could see a meaningful increase in capacity clearing prices if the PPR remains at the current value, as capacity resources reflect the heightened risk of substantial PFP-related costs in their capacity auction offers. As we have discussed above, the higher volatility engendered in the current PPR is likely to exacerbate this issue.

Q: If these resources retire, won't the capacity market procure the necessary replacement capacity?

A: The ISO is actively working on a suite of capacity market improvements that would introduce seasonality, better align resource accreditation values with expected resource adequacy contributions, and better reflect the impacts of the region's constrained gas delivery system on resource adequacy contributions, among other enhancements. These changes, which would be expected to take effect in 2028, will help improve the price signals and may therefore help to incent competitive new entry that can efficiently replace more costly older resources while maintaining system reliability.

However, at present, there remain a number of challenges that raise questions about new entry in the near-term, where if the existing resources retire and such new entry does not materialize on a similar timeline, this could raise resource adequacy concerns. These include challenges with permitting new generation at the federal, state, and local levels, which can lead to projects being delayed or cancelled. Moreover, the increasing costs to build resources, as well as supply chain delays, make it harder to forecast when new entry will come online.

Between these factors and the potential for load growth, the ISO, as the region's reliability coordinator, believes that it is important that the wholesale markets support the continued operation of the existing fleet, including those resources that meaningfully contribute to the region's resource adequacy during extended stressed system conditions. The proposed reduction in the PPR supports this perspective, and will help to ensure that the capacity market continues to meet its resource adequacy objectives in a cost effective manner.

Q: Does the current PPR value pose any risks for stronger performing resources?

A: Yes. In addition to the risk posed by the heightened volatility that a higher PPR produces—which is an issue for all resources, whether they generally perform well or not—the higher PPR also increases the rate at which resources could hit the PFP stop-loss limit, which imposes financial risk on capacity resources that perform well during scarcity events.

To limit suppliers' downside exposure, the Pay for Performance design includes a monthly stop-loss limit, which limits a resource's net financial losses in each month of the Capacity Commitment Period,[21] and an annual stop-loss limit, which

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[21] Under the stop-loss rules (Tariff Sections III.13.7.3.1 and III.15.8.3.1), the monthly stop-loss limit caps a resource's negative Capacity Performance Payment to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month.

limits a resource's net financial losses over the entire annual Capacity Commitment Period.[22] These provisions were designed to provide financial protection to suppliers.

Under the stop-loss design, if one or more capacity suppliers reaches the stop-loss limit, the other capacity suppliers in the pool—those Capacity Supply Obligation holders that did not reach the stop-loss limit—pay for any losses from the stopped out resources that would be accrued beyond the stop loss limit in the form of reduced net capacity market payments. These costs are allocated on a Capacity Supply Obligation pro rata basis.

At a higher PPR, resources that fail to perform during a Capacity Scarcity Condition will accrue PFP charges more quickly than they would at a lower PPR—and could reach their stop-loss limit in a matter of a couple of hours. Should this occur early in the month, poorer performing resources would have a significantly reduced incentive to perform during the month; having reached the monthly stop-loss limit, they would no longer be subject to PFP charges for the remainder of the month. Similar logic could result in a poorer performing resource having little incentive to perform for much of a Capacity Commitment Period once the annual stop-loss limit is met. These results are clearly contrary to the intent of the Pay for Performance rules.

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[22] Under the annual stop-loss limit a capacity resource cannot be worse-off, on an annual basis, than three times its maximum monthly potential net loss. Tariff Sections III.13.7.3.2 and III.15.8.3.2.

At the same time, with a higher PPR, stronger performing resources that do *not* trigger the stop-loss will face higher risk of incurring stop-loss charges, as they are more likely to face responsibility for covering stopped losses when poorer performing resources reach the stop-loss limit. Thus, as the PPR increases, and the time required to reach the stop-loss limit decreases, the financial risk associated with the stop-loss mechanism likewise increases.

Q: Can you explain how resources that perform poorly during a Capacity Scarcity Condition can quickly hit the monthly stop-loss limit under the current value of the PPR?

A: Yes. We'll use the June 24, 2025 Capacity Scarcity Condition to provide an example of how quickly the stop-loss limit can be reached. For context, the monthly stop-loss limit is equal to a resource's CSO MW multiplied by the applicable capacity auction starting price. For FCA 16, which corresponds to the June 1, 2025 – May 31, 2026 Capacity Commitment Period, the auction starting price was $12.40/kW-m. This means that for a resource with a 100 MW CSO, the monthly stop-loss limit capped their losses from negative Capacity Performance Payments at $1,240,000 per month.[23]

Whether a resource hits the monthly stop-loss limit during a Capacity Scarcity Condition depends on four factors: how poorly the resource performs, how long the

[23] To arrive at this value, we multiply the auction starting price, in dollars per MW-m, by the CSO MW: $12,400/MW-m * 100 MW = $1,240,000/m.

scarcity condition lasts, the balancing ratio during the scarcity condition, and the value of the PPR.

The average balancing ratio for the June 24, 2025 CSC was 1.031. Using this average value, a resource that did not provide any energy or reserves during the Capacity Scarcity Condition would have hit the monthly stop-loss limit in just one hour and seventeen minutes. In other words, after just over one and a quarter hours, a "zero performer" with a 100 MW CSO would have incurred negative performance payments totaling $1,240,000. Note, however, that a resource would not need to have been a zero performer to hit the monthly stop-loss limit during the June 2025 Capacity Scarcity Condition. Because the CSC lasted for roughly three hours, even moderate performers could have hit the monthly stop-loss limit.[24]

While the ISO is in the process of capping the balancing ratio at 1.0 in response to the Commission's January 22, 2026 order in Docket No. EL25-106-000, had the balancing ratio been capped at 1.0 during the June 2025 Capacity Scarcity Condition, it would not have significantly changed the rate at which resources reached their stop-loss limit—for zero performing resources, the stop-loss limit still would have been reached in under two hours.

While the June 2025 Capacity Scarcity Condition was an outlier in terms of both its duration and the average balancing ratio during the event, the currently-high PPR nevertheless clearly contributed to the number of resources that hit the stop-loss limit

[24] Roughly 2,800 MW of CSO resources hit the stop-loss during the June 2025 CSC. See August 2025 COO report.

during the Capacity Scarcity Condition. This is related to the point, made above, that higher values of the PPR result in both larger positive performance payments when a resource performs well, and importantly with regards to the stop-loss, larger negative performance payments when a resource performs poorly.

In contrast, if the PPR during the June 2025 Capacity Scarcity Condition had been equal to the proposed $3,500 per MWh value, it would have taken a zero performer 3.4 hours to hit the stop-loss limit, meaning we would likely not have seen any capacity suppliers stop-out under this counterfactual.

As illustrated above, the monthly stop-loss limit can be reached very quickly under the current PPR (roughly one hour and twenty minutes for the June 2025 CSC). Of the seven CSCs the region has observed since 2018, four have lasted longer than an hour. This means that under the current PPR, it is reasonably likely that performance incentives could diminish for some resources (roughly ten percent of CSO resources hit the stop-loss during the June 2025 CSC) after a single scarcity condition. In contrast, at the $3,500 per MWh value of the PPR, fewer resources would be expected to hit the stop-loss after a single scarcity condition, preserving strong incentives to continue to perform for the remainder of the month (or year).

V. <u>THE RATIONALE FOR THE SELECTION OF A $3,500 PPR</u>

Q: You have explained above the concerns that are driving the ISO's proposal to reduce the current PPR. Why is the ISO proposing a value of $3,500 for the lowered PPR?

A: As we have explained above, lowering the PPR to $3,500 per MWh will help to reduce the cost volatility of the currently higher PPR, which in turn will help to reduce the likelihood that older oil-fired units that continue to provide significant value to the system will retire during a period when they continue to provide considerable reliability value to the region, as illustrated during recent stressed system conditions including during the winter of 2025-2026, and may also help to reduce capacity costs. Of equal importance, a PPR of $3,500 per MWh is intended to produce a rate that continues to serve as a material performance incentive under the Pay for Performance market design.

Q: Please explain why the ISO believes a rate of $3,500 will continue to serve as a material performance incentive under the Pay for Performance market design.

A: With the proposed PPR, incentives to perform during scarcity conditions remain high. LMPs and reserve clearing prices are typically higher than $1,000 per MWh during Capacity Scarcity Conditions due to the application of Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors, meaning the marginal incentive to provide energy during a scarcity condition can be in the range of $6,000 per MWh, if not higher. This remains a significant performance incentive. The 2022 evaluation of the PFP design summarized in the 2022 PFP Memo provided operational evidence that the PPR during the phase-in period (June 1, 2018 – May 31, 2024)—when the PPR was less than or equal to the proposed rate of $3,500—was sufficient to prompt several notable improvements in resource performance during stressed conditions. These improvements include a 60% increase in dual fuel capability, a decrease in the magnitude and frequency of gas-fired generator Economic Maximum Limit reductions due to gas issues, and the retirement of the worst-performing fossil-steam units that had been a key source of the ISO's concerns regarding adverse selection in the capacity market. Based on this operational evidence, the ISO is confident that the proposed PPR of $3,500 per MWh will continue to satisfy the PFP design objective of improving resource performance during Capacity Scarcity Conditions.

In the 2022 analysis of the Pay for Performance design, the ISO provided observations on several market outcomes that were consistent with improved resource performance under a PPR of $3,500 during periods of system stress and efficient resource selection in the capacity auction.[25]

Dual fuel capability increases by 40%: Prior to the implementation of PFP, dual fuel capability in the region had been steadily declining. This trend reversed concurrent with the implementation of PFP, with dual fuel capability increasing by 40% (2,416 MW of additional dual fuel capability) between 2014, when PFP was approved, and 2021, with most of this increase occurring after the 2018 PFP implementation.

The period of time where dual fuel capability rose from roughly 6,000 MW to 8,416 MW corresponds to the first half of the PPR "phase-in" period, where the PPR was $2,000 per MWh from June 1, 2018 – May 31, 2021, only rising to $3,500 per MWh on June 1, 2021. While investments in dual fuel capability are likely to have investment horizons spanning more than a few years, we believe two observations support the conclusion that the proposed PPR value of $3,500 per MWh will continue

[25] These observations are explained in additional detail in the 2022 PFP Memo at 2-6.

to provide strong incentives for resources to make long-lived improvements in resource operating capabilities.

First, the investments in dual fuel capability observed in the 2022 memo were made during the phase-in period. If the $3,500 per MWh PPR did not provide material performance incentives, we might have expected to see participants defer making such investments in dual fuel capability until closer to 2024, the first year where the full PPR was in effect.

Second, if higher values of the PPR provided materially stronger investment incentives than the proposed $3,500 per MWh value, then we may have expected to see incremental investment in dual fuel capability after 2021, when the $9,337 per MWh rate was filed and approved by FERC. To date, we have not observed any increase in dual fuel capability since the 2022 memo was published.

Ecomax reductions due to gas issues decrease in magnitude and frequency: When resources are unable to operate at their full nameplate capacity, they may offer reduced Economic Maximum Limit, or "Ecomax" values into the Day-Ahead and Real-Time energy markets that reflect their limited operating capabilities. For natural gas units, a common reason for submitting reduced Ecomax values is the inability to obtain gas. This issue is most likely to arise during winter months when the supply of natural gas available for electric generation is limited by home heating demand.

Between the implementation of PFP in 2018 and the beginning of 2022, there was a distinct decrease in both the frequency and magnitude of reductions in gas units' submitted Ecomax values. The fact that this improvement was concurrent with the implementation of PFP suggests that the potential to earn Capacity Performance Payments improved gas units' incentives to, for example, contract for Liquified Natural Gas ("LNG") or take other actions to improve their ability to procure gas so that they can deliver energy and reserves during tight winter operating conditions. The fact that these improvements took place during the PPR phase-in, when the PPR was less than or equal to $3,500 per MWh, suggests that the proposed PPR value drove tangible improvements in gas generator's performance.

Retirement of poorly performing resources: As the ISO's filing to implement PFP reflected, the potential for poorer performing resources to displace stronger performing resources was a significant concern when PFP was being developed. This reflected the performance history of the resource fleet at that time. Dr. White and Mr. Brandien detailed the concerning performance history in the ISO PFP Filing.[26] PFP was implemented in order to right this ship, and added incentives to the market that ensure resources reflect their expected performance during scarcity events in their capacity offers.

One of the performance metrics the 2022 analysis investigated was slow and failed-start events of the fossil steam generation fleet. Importantly, at the time PFP was being developed, concerns regarding adverse selection were most pronounced for the region's older fossil steam units.[27] The 2022 assessment found that the magnitude of slow and failed start events for the older fossil steam units declined steadily between

[26] PFP White Testimony at 8-9 and 23-24; PFP Brandien Testimony throughout.

[27] *See* 2022 PFP Memo at 6-7.

2014 and 2022, with the largest drop occurring in 2018, the year PFP was implemented.[28]

Interestingly, and of particular relevance to the ISO's proposed $3,500 per MWh PPR, the ISO found that the early years of the PFP market design, when a significantly lower PPR was in effect, coincided with the retirement of the worst performing fossil steam units, as judged by the slow-and-failed start metric included in the 2022 PFP Memo.[29]

This pattern, where the worst performing fossil-steam units leave the market while the better performers remain in the market, is the exact pattern we would expect to see if PFP effectively addresses the adverse selection issue, and this pattern occurred when the PPR was less than or equal to the proposed $3,500 per MWh value.

Q: Is changing the rate to $3,500 at this point supported by the methodology the ISO employed to establish the current PPR?

A: Strictly speaking, the $3.500 per MWh rate was not developed using the methodology that the ISO employed to derive the current $9,337 per MWh rate, which is the same methodology employed to establish the initial $5,455 PPR that was proposed in the original PFP filing for implementation starting with the 2024-2025 Capacity Commitment Period. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that the proposed reduction in the PPR will meet the primary objectives of the PFP design.

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[28] *Id*. at Appendix Figure 8.

[29] *Id*.

Prior to the implementation of Pay for Performance, there was effectively a PPR of zero dollars per MWh, as there was essentially no second settlement of forward capacity awards during Capacity Scarcity Conditions. As summarized above, this resulted in poor performance incentives and created concerns regarding the cost-effectiveness and reliability of the resource mix that cleared in the capacity auction. To address these performance issues, the Pay for Performance rules credit resources that overperform their Capacity Supply Obligation share of energy and reserves during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, and charge resources that underperform their share of energy and reserve during scarcity conditions.

Because the ISO lacked experience with a performance incentive mechanism like PFP when the design was being developed, it relied upon economic theory to develop the formula-based methodology that produced the $5,455 and $9,337 rates. Thus, without operational data to rely on, it used a sound methodology grounded in economic theory to establish a performance rate that would incent stronger performance and address the adverse selection concerns that plagued the capacity market before PFP was introduced.

As detailed above, the 2022 evaluation of PFP indicates the market design has been successful in achieving both improvements in resource performance and in facilitating the exit of poorly performing resources (and, by extension, retaining good performers) at the lower, transitional payment rates. For most of the time that PFP has been in place (and for the entire period considered in the 2022 PFP Memo), the PPR has been less than or equal to the proposed value of $3,500 per MWh. Based on this operational experience, it is reasonable to conclude that a

PPR of $3,500 will continue to provide strong incentives for resources to perform during times of system stress and will facilitate the efficient clearing of the capacity market.

Q: Does this conclude your testimony?

A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 29, 2026.

/s/ *Christopher Geissler*

Christopher Geissler, ISO New England, Market Development

/s/ *John Withers*

John Withers, ISO New England, Market Development

III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1.

III.13.7.1.1. Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period. Each monthly payment and charge listed in Section III.13.7.1.1 (a) through (d) below will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction**. For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions**. For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals**. For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows.

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located= [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.

III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.
A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.
For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.

(ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(e) A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Metered Quantity for Settlement and Reserve Quantity for Settlement of all the components of its constituent Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Based on the Real-Time operational coordination, the resource must follow any distribution system limitation and update its physical parameters accordingly. The Actual Capacity Provided cannot be less than zero.

(i) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

(Load + Reserve Requirement) / Total Capacity Supply Obligation

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $5455/MWh. For the ~~Capacity Commitment~~ ~~P~~period beginning on June 1, 2025 and ending on ~~May~~ August 31, 2026~~ and thereafter~~, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $9337/MWh. Thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

MaxCSO x [3 months x (FCAcp – FCAsp) – (12 months x FCAcp)]

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCAcp = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCAsp = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation on any day of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments. Each charge and adjustment described in subsection (b) of Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1 through III.13.7.5.1.1.9 will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.
>
> Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource,

and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.
The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.
The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections IIII.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.
The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections IIII.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

> The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; when all load of a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation participating as a Storage DARD is load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's daily Coincident Peak Contributions, to the sum of all load serving entities' daily Coincident Peak Contributions in that Capacity Zone.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource, Demand Response Resource, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource. The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface**. The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface**. Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.
(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface**. Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive for each Capacity Commitment Period an allocation of CTRs for each such unit that is the product of: (i) the MW quantity of capacity that the unit cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the municipal utility's ownership entitlements in such unit. The CTRs allocated pursuant to this Section may be designated as self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6. Municipal utility ownership entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

	Millstone 3	Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%		
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%		
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%		
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%		
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%		
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%		
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%		
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%		
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%		
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%		
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%		
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%		
Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%		
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%		
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%		
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%		

Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%		
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%		
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%		
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%		
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%		
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%		
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%		
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%		
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%		

Allocation of CTRs as described in this Section shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a unit listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, allocation of CTRs for such unit shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (“MMWEC”) and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) For any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section that are not designated self-supply quantities for the Capacity Commitment Period, the municipal utility entitlement holder shall receive a credit reflecting the value of such remaining CTRs. The value of each remaining CTR shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located; and (ii) the remaining MW quantity. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

III.15. Annual Capacity Market.

(a) Annual Capacity Market Overview.

The ISO shall administer an annual market for capacity (Annual Capacity Market) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.15. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2028 to May 31, 2029, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Annual Capacity Market ("Capacity Commitment Period"), the ISO shall conduct an Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.15.4 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Annual Capacity Auction, a resource must have Qualified Capacity resulting from the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3. Obligations associated with the Annual Capacity Market may be traded during ISO-administered Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and monthly bilateral transactions, in accordance with Section III.15.5 and Section III.15.6, respectively. The obligations of resources with Capacity Supply Obligations resulting from the Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, and monthly bilateral transactions are set forth in Section III.15.7. Payments and charges resulting from participation in the Annual Capacity Market, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, and bilateral transactions, as well as Capacity Performance Payments, are set forth in Section III.15.8. The publication of auction-related information is set forth in Section III.15.9.

(b) Capacity Auction Calendar.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028, and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the ISO shall publish a calendar of dates and deadlines for the administration of the Capacity Market, with the dates and deadlines being consistent for each Annual Capacity Auction cycle. The Capacity Auction Calendar shall include specific dates and deadlines for all such Capacity Market dates and deadlines defined in this Section III.15 and related Tariff provisions. The following defines several milestone dates and deadlines.

(1) the Qualification Data Submission Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of February;

(2) the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of April; and

(3) the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of May.

(c) Modification of Capacity Auction Calendar.

The ISO may, on a prospective basis, reasonably revise any date or deadline in the Capacity Auction Calendar with written notice of such revision to each Governance Participant in the manner specified in Section 17.11(b) of the Participants Agreement prior to the occurrence of the date or deadline being revised. In the event a Market Participant fails to meet a deadline in the Capacity Auction Calendar for submission of information or data, the ISO shall extend such deadline for that Market Participant upon receipt of an order from the Commission granting the Market Participant's request for a waiver of such deadline for good cause shown. In no event shall a date or deadline be extended, prospectively by the ISO or retroactively by filing of a Market Participant, should doing so interfere with the ISO's effective administration of the Capacity Market.

(d) Effectiveness for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period and Thereafter.

The provisions of this Section III.15 are effective for the Capacity Commitment Period that runs from June 1, 2028 through May 31, 2029 and all Capacity Commitment Periods thereafter. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the provisions of this Section III.15 are not applicable to the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13, addressing the administration of the Forward Capacity Market, shall continue to be effective for Capacity Commitment Periods through May 31, 2028. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the provisions of Section III.13 are not applicable to the Annual Capacity Market, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and monthly bilateral transactions addressed in this Section III.15 of Market Rule 1.

III.15.A. Non-Commercial Capacity Transition Rules.

All Capacity Resources that are on critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3 as of June 1, 2028 are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A.

The ISO shall monitor the Non-Commercial Capacity resource's compliance with its critical path schedule from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, is terminated pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3.

III.15.A.1. Non-Commercial Capacity Resource Critical Path Schedule Reports.

For each resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Lead Market Participant does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Lead Market Participant. If the Lead Market Participant fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1. Each critical path schedule report shall include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.15.A.1.1 through Section III.15.A.1.3.

III.15.A.1.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.15.A.1, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule must clearly indicate if the Lead Market Participant is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Lead Market Participant must also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

III.15.A.1.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.

(a) For all new resources (except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, which are discussed in Section III.15.A.1.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Lead Market Participant must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits**. For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders**. For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.15.A.1.2(a)(v).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery**. For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity subject to critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity subject to critical path schedule monitoring. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Lead Market Participant is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that all interconnection facilities and upgrades identified for the project associated with the resource in a Transitional Cluster Study, Cluster Study, or Cluster Restudy (conducted pursuant to Section 7.5 of Schedule 22, Section 7.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 7.5 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), or interconnection request or agreement under applicable state tariff, rules or procedures, have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Lead Market

Participant must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing the resource will be capable of providing its total offered demand reduction value as described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package by the proposed Commercial Operation Date reported in the critical path schedule report.

(ii) **Additional Requirements**. For each customer and each prospective customer the Lead Market Participant shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Lead Market Participant shall also provide the Asset identification number.

III.15.A.1.3. Additional Relevant Information.

The Lead Market Participant must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule.

III.15.A.2. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Lead Market Participant proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.15.A.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Lead Market Participant to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Lead Market Participant to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Lead Market Participant does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Lead Market Participant. If the Lead Market Participant fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.15.A.1.

III.15.A.2.1. Termination of Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

If a Lead Market Participant fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.15.A.1 or III.15.A.2, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's status on critical path schedule monitoring, provided that, where a Lead Market Participant voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.15.A.2.3 no filing with the Commission shall be necessary. Upon Commission ruling, the Lead Market Participant shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource and instead permits the Lead Market Participant to continue on critical path schedule monitoring, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource, and subject to continued reporting by the Lead Market Participant in accordance with Section III.15.A.1.

III.15.A.2.2. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's ability to remain on critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. The ISO shall also reduce the resource's assigned capacity interconnection service (or equivalent for resources not subject to the ISO Interconnection Procedures).

III.15.A.2.3. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Lead Market Participant may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO.

III.15.A.3. Financial Assurance.

The financial assurance requirements for Designated FCM Participants offering Non-Commercial Capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section VII.B.2.b the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, shall continue to apply to all Capacity Resources that are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A.

Once a resource with Non-Commercial Capacity achieves commercial operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as a resource that has achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

If a Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.15.A shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.15.A.4. Demonstrating FCM Commercial Operation

All Capacity Resources subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A shall achieve commercial operation, for purposes of ending critical path schedule monitoring, in accordance with the FCM Commercial Operation requirements specified in Section III.13.3.8.

III.15.A.5. Settlement of Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.

Upon the date on which the entire resource is no longer on critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall provide the Lead Market Participant with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. All Capacity Resources that are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A shall be subject to the Forward Capacity Market payment and refund requirements as set forth in Section III.13.1.9.3.2 of the Tariff.

III.15.1. Auction Demand Curves and Other Auction Inputs.

III.15.1.1. Annual Capacity Auction Demand Curves.

The total amount of capacity cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.15.4 shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the Capacity Zones modeled for the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.1.1.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

III.15.1.1.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

III.15.1.1.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.15.1.1.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.15.1.2. Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap and the Cost of New Entry.

III.15.1.2.1. Calculation of Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap, CONE, and Net CONE.

(a) The Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap shall be the greater of (i) 1.6 multiplied by Net CONE; and (ii) CONE. References in this Section III.15 and Sections III.A.21 and III.A.24 to the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap shall mean the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap for the Annual Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) To determine the CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auctions associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028 and the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2029, the ISO shall make interim-year adjustments as described in Section III.15.1.2.2 to the following CONE and Net CONE calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025:

(i) CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 was $12.400/kW-month.

(ii) Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 was $7.468/kW-month.

(c) The ISO shall recalculate CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2030. Thereafter, CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every four years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders, and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Annual Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

III.15.1.2.2. Interim-Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.

(a) For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.15.1.2.1, CONE and Net CONE shall be adjusted for each Annual Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.15.1.2:

(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model shall be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).

(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.15.1.2.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) The annual adjustment to CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2028, shall use a cost of debt of 6.85% and a cost of equity of 13.80%. These values shall also be used for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2029.

(5) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.15.1.2.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

(b) The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.15.1.2.2 will be published on the ISO's website.

III.15.2. Capacity Resource Qualification.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a Generating Capacity Resource, an Import Capacity Resource, a Demand Capacity Resource, or a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of Section III.13 became effective. The summer period of a Capacity Resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall be the months of June through September and the winter period shall be the months of October through May, except in the case of Demand Capacity Resources, where the summer period shall be the months of April through November and the winter period shall be the months of December through March.

This Section III.15.2 details the requirements of the qualification process for the Annual Capacity Auction, as well as certain requirements related to Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions. Data submission and demonstration requirements for resources that have never previously counted as capacity and seek to qualify to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, are set forth in Section III.15.2.1. Data submission and demonstration requirements for resources that have never previously counted as capacity and seek to qualify to participate in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction are set forth in Section III.15.2.2. Qualification requirements with respect to interconnection service are addressed in Section III.15.2.3. Qualification requirements with respect to resources that have previously counted as capacity and have materially changed are addressed in Section III.15.2.4. Following the Annual Capacity Auction's Qualification Data Submission Deadline, the ISO calculates and provides to Lead Market Participants Advisory Qualified Capacity Values for each Capacity Resource, per Section III.15.2.5. Lead Market Participants then have until the Capacity Demonstration Deadline to demonstrate that their Capacity Resources have achieved Commercial Operation, per Section III.15.2.6. Thereafter, the ISO calculates Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for each Capacity Resource, per Section III.15.2.7, which values are subject to the challenge process addressed therein. Lead Market Participants are then permitted to submit Composite Offers in accordance with Section III.15.2.8, and load serving entities are permitted to submit self-supply designations in accordance with III.15.2.9. Final Qualified Capacity values for each Capacity Resource are calculated by the ISO one Business Day prior to the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window in accordance with Section III.15.2.10. The publication of offer information during the qualification process and after the Annual Capacity Auction is addressed in Section III.15.2.11.

Resources seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction may be subject to buyer-side market power review and mitigation pursuant to Section III.A.21 and must abide by the applicable submission requirements and timelines set forth therein prior to seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction. To the extent not already established for the purposes of the submission requirements of Section III.A.21.1.5, all capacity suppliers seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction must be Market Participants prior to the Qualification Data Submission Deadline. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in an Annual Capacity Auction may not change during the period beginning 15 Business Days prior to the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window and ending with the posting of the results of the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.2.1. Qualification Data Submission Requirements.

III.15.2.1.1. Qualification Data Submission Package.

(a) For a resource that has not previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction to qualify as a Capacity Resource for participation in an Annual Capacity Auction, a Lead Market Participant must submit the following information to the ISO by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, as applicable:

(a) the resource name;

(b) the Lead Market Participant's contact information;

(c) the date by which the resource is expected to complete its capacity demonstration pursuant to III.15.2.6(c) or to update its as-built data pursuant to III.15.2.6(d);

(d) the resource address or location, and if available, asset identification number;

(e) whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation;

(f) the location of the resource's interconnection;

(g) the estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of the resource, as well as an estimate of any incremental Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values (in MW) (for Generating Capacity Resources and Import Capacity Resources);

(h) the estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value (for Demand Capacity Resources and Distributed Energy Capacity Resources) or net injection capability values per facility (for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources);

(i) a description of the resource, including (for Generating Capacity Resources and Import Capacity Resources) a general description of the resource's equipment configuration and a description of the resource technology type, and (for Demand Capacity Resources) a description of the resource's Demand Capacity Resource type and measure type, and (for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources) a description of the project and its configuration, including the types of generation and demand response composing the project, and (for

Generating Capacity Resources and Distributed Energy Capacity Resources comprising generation) a one-line diagram of the resource's configuration;

(j) for resources supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all unique project identifiers associated with the Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade;

(k) for Generating Capacity Resources with a contract to export capacity from the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, the interface over which the capacity will be exported and the contract associated with the export capacity;

(l) Additional requirements for Import Capacity Resources, the interface over which the capacity will be imported and one of the following submissions documenting the source of the imported capacity, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.1: (i) documentation of a contract entered into before the Qualification Data Submission Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for one or more years encompassing the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iii) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the Import Capacity Resource will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load.

(m) Additional requirements for Demand Capacity Resources, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.2: resource technical and credit/financial contacts; Measurement and Verification Plan (for On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources); Load Zone and Dispatch Zone (for Active Demand Capacity Resources);

(n) Additional requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.3: expected nameplate capacity by technology type per facility; installation date of facilities that are part of the project and already constructed, installed, or in commercial operation; indication of whether the project elects Intermittent Power Resource treatment; resource technical and credit/financial contacts; Load Zone, Dispatch Zone and DRR Aggregation Zone;

(o) Additional requirements for resources with capacity impacted by ambient air conditions between 90 degrees and 100 degrees, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.5; and

(p) Additional requirements for resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, as further detailed in III.15.2.6(d): the Qualification Data Submission Package shall satisfy the technical data requirements associated with such resources and be supplemented with the as-built status of the resource on the date of the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline.

(b) By submitting the required qualification information, the Lead Market Participant certifies that a Capacity Offer from the resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Tariff.

(c) The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of the resource.

III.15.2.1.1.1. Additional Import Capacity Resource Requirements.

Import Capacity Resources must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. For the purposes of the qualification process, all Import Capacity Resources shall be treated as if they had never previously participated as capacity and must submit the materials described pursuant to this Section III.15.2.1.1 for each Capacity Commitment Period for which the Import Capacity Resource seeks to qualify capacity. Import Capacity Resources backed by an External Control Area that does not have a Coordination Agreement with the ISO shall be ineligible to participate in the Annual Capacity Market. No single Import Capacity Resource may qualify capacity in excess of the external interface limits as described in Section III.12.10.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall have its external node modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Annual Capacity Auction qualification requirements of this Section III.15.2.1 and demonstration requirements of III.15.2.6. The Qualified Capacity of all Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Capacity Network Import Capability.

Capacity Offers for Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to rationing except for Capacity Offers priced above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold for Import Capacity resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, which must obtain a Capacity Supply Obligation or not in whole unless the Capacity Offer indicated that it may be rationed as described in III.15.4.1.

III.15.2.1.1.1.1. Imports Backed by External Resources.

If the Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources, the Lead Market Participant shall submit a description of how the Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify. The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period and contain the relevant historical performance data for each resource. If those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Lead Market Participant, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.15.2.1.1.1.2. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.

If the Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area, the Lead Market Participant shall submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the Import Capacity Resource.

III.15.2.1.1.1.3. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.

Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) for imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing; (2) for imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load; and (3) the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.15.2.1.1.2. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Requirements.

A Demand Capacity Resource may be an Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, and may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility's Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit a Capacity Offer to import into or export out of the New England Control Area.

For a resource, or portion thereof, that never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction to qualify as an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2028, the measure or measures contained in the resource must not have been in-service prior to June 1, 2024. For a resource, or portion thereof, that never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction to qualify as an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in the Annual Capacity Auction or Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, as relevant, for or during the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2029, and all Capacity Commitment Periods thereafter, the measure or measures contained in the resource must have been placed in-service or previously qualified as capacity no more than six months before the prior Annual Capacity Auction's Capacity Demonstration Deadline.

III.15.2.1.1.2.1. Measurement and Verification of Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the Lead Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Annual Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall submit to the ISO Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(b) Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall: (1) serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource; (2) document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource; and (3) contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and, for those Demand Capacity Resources composed of energy efficiency measures, over the expected Measure Lives. An On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(c) The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process, as described in this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1, and monthly Measurement and Verification data submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification data shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan.

Such monthly Measurement and Verification data shall document the Lead Market Participant's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Lead Market Participant's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification data shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Lead Market Participants. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(d) Lead Market Participants for On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource for which the Lead Market Participant is requesting compensation continues to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than ten Business Days before the Qualification Data Submission Deadline.

(e) For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources comprising customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Lead Market Participants shall maintain records of retail customers served, including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Lead Market Participant shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction values and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Lead Market Participants shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is retired or deactivated from the Annual Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

(f) The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.15.2 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.15.2.1.1.3. Additional Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Requirements.

(a) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources. A facility connected at a point of interconnection that is 5 MW or greater cannot be a part of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource comprises one or more Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations located in a single Capacity Zone and a single DRR Aggregation Zone, except that (a) a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation may not participate in a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with any other type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, and (b) an end-use customer facility participating as part of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource with measures other than Energy Efficiency may not participate in a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit a Capacity Offer to import into or export out of the New England Control Area. For purposes of this Section III.15.2.1.1.3: (i) if a facility is expected to interconnect at a point of interconnection, its net injection capability is the generation capability of the installed generation technology at the point of interconnection; (ii) if a facility is expected to interconnect at a Retail Delivery Point and does not plan to participate in the aggregation as a Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, the net injection capability is the lesser of the generation less the load profile measured at the location of the end-use customer meter or the amount the facility is contractually able to inject.

(b) Demand Response Resource in Distributed Energy Capacity Resources. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource includes Demand Response Resources, the completed Qualification Data Submission Package shall include the following additional information: the estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); the estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Response Resource (which must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section

III.8.2); and supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values.

(c) Net Injection of 5 MW or Greater. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource contains a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation with a facility with net injection of 5 MW or greater at a Retail Delivery Point, then the completed Qualification Data Submission Package for such a resource shall include the following additional information: the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; nameplate MW and net injection capability; non-coincident peak load (MW) of the facility without generation; technology type; and the Market Participant's portion of generation requested to be included as Qualified Capacity.

(d) Net Injection Greater Than or Equal to 1 MW and less than 5 MW. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource contains a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation with a facility that has net injection capability at the point of interconnection of 1 MW or greater and less than 5 MW, then the completed Qualification Data Submission Package for such a facility shall include the following additional information: distribution bus; technology type; nameplate MW; one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; if the facility is intermittent, the requested contribution of Qualified Capacity and supporting site-specific data; if an interconnection agreement is required under state requirements, the date when the interconnection request was submitted and the status of that interconnection request.

III.15.2.1.2. Market Power Review.

Lead Market Participants seeking to qualify a Capacity Resource that has not previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or that is otherwise treated as if it had never done so pursuant to this Section III.15.2, must comply with the market power review provisions of Section III.A.21 by the Annual Capacity Auction Qualification Data Submission Deadline.

III.15.2.1.3. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

For the Annual Capacity Auctions for the 2028-2029, 2029-2030 and 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Periods, a Lead Market Participant that has made the election in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 of the Forward Capacity Market rules with respect to a Capacity Resource must specify by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline whether it elects to continue to have the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply in Annual Capacity Auctions for the balance of the period permitted for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Should a Lead Market Participant elect to terminate Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 treatment for its Capacity Resource, it may not re-elect such treatment for any future Annual Capacity Auctions.

A Lead Market Participant that has made the election in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 of the Forward Capacity Market rules with respect to a Capacity Resource which has not achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation as defined in Section III.15.2.6 of Market Rule 1 may not participate in the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period and shall not have the previously elected Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period. Should such resource achieve Capacity Market Commercial Operation in time for participation in the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2029-2030 Capacity Commitment Period, or the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Period, it may elect to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price it received pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 apply for the balance of the period permitted for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4, and in no event after the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.2.1.4. Material Deficiency in Data Submission.

In its review of a Lead Market Participant's data submission under this Section III.15.2.1, the ISO may consult with the Lead Market Participant, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO determines that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Lead Market Participant may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

In the event the ISO determines that a Lead Market Participant's data submission under Section III.15.2.1 is materially deficient, it shall notify the participant of such deficiencies at least ten Business Days prior to publication of the Advisory Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, and the Lead Market Participant shall have five Business Days from the date of notification to cure the deficiencies. Should a Lead Market Participant fail to cure such deficiencies by the end of the cure period, it shall not be permitted to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction. In the event of such a rejection, the ISO shall provide the

Lead Market Participant with a written explanation of the reason for the rejection within ten Business Days of the close of the cure period.

III.15.2.1.5. Additional Qualification Requirements for Ambient Air Condition Impacts.

In the Qualification Data Submission Package, a Lead Market Participant may submit documentation indicating that a portion of its resource's capacity will not be physically available due to an ambient air condition. The size of such ambient air condition is calculated as the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process the size of the ambient air condition.

III.15.2.2. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Qualification.

For a resource that has not previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction to qualify as a Capacity Resource for the purpose of participation in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction pursuant to Section III.15.5 or bilateral activities pursuant to Section III.15.6, prior to the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the relevant month a Lead Market Participant must: (1) submit the Qualification Data Submission Package as described in Section III.15.2.1 (except for the information described at Section III.15.2.1.2) by the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the relevant month, except that an Import Capacity Resource or a Resource seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(d) must submit its Qualification Data Submission Package 30 calendar days prior to the Capacity Demonstration Deadline; and (2) complete a capacity demonstration pursuant to Section III.15.2.6.

III.15.2.3. Deliverability Review.

A Generating Capacity Resource, Active Demand Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource associated with an External Elective Transmission Upgrade, and Distributed Energy Capacity Resource must satisfy the deliverability review requirements described in this Section III.15.2.3 in order to qualify capacity for participation in an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction above the deliverability value associated with the resource's qualification for any previous Forward Capacity Auction, Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction. None of the provisions of this Section III.15.2, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder.

III.15.2.3.1. Deliverability Review for Capacity Resources Associated with Generating Facilities or External Elective Transmission Upgrades Subject to Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

A Generating Facility or External Elective Transmission Upgrade subject to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Tariff must complete the applicable interconnection processes set forth therein and have been assigned, as applicable, either Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, as necessary to support the delivery of the associated Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity.

III.15.2.3.2. Deliverability Review for Capacity Resources Associated with Resources Not Subject to Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

For a Generating Capacity Resource, Active Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource not subject to Schedules 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff, the ISO shall perform a deliverability review based on: (1) the information provided in the resource's Qualification Data Submission Package; and (2) the results of the ISO's most recent deliverability analysis, performed consistent with the criteria and conditions conducted as described in the ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that such a resource cannot deliver any of the requested incremental capacity, then the resource or incremental portion thereof shall not qualify for participation in the Capacity Market as reflected in the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values issued pursuant to Section III.15.2.7; otherwise, the ISO shall determine that the requested Qualified Capacity of the Capacity Resource is deliverable, and the Capacity Resource shall be eligible to continue to proceed with the remainder of the processes described in this Section III.15.2.

III.15.2.4. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

Resources that have previously counted as capacity shall, for the purposes of Section III.15.2, be treated as if they had never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction if: (1) there is a material change to the Capacity Resource as described in III.15.2.4.1, or (2) if a deactivated or retired resource seeks to re-enter the Capacity Market pursuant to III.15.2.4.2.

III.15.2.4.1. Material Change to a Capacity Resource.

(a) A Lead Market Participant that materially changes a Capacity Resource that has previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or plans to do so prior to the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline, may, by the relevant Qualification Data

Submission Deadline or monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, inform the ISO of that material change, update the information provided under Section III.15.2.1.1 to reflect the change to the Capacity Resource, and demonstrate its updated Commercial Capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.6. The updated Qualified Capacity of the resource, accounting for the change, shall be calculated in accordance with Section III.15.3.1 for the subsequent Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. The Seasonal Qualified Capacity of a Capacity Resource that notifies the ISO of a material change but does not demonstrate pursuant to III.15.2.6 shall remain unmodified until demonstration of the material change occurs.

(b) For purposes of this Section III.15.2.4, a material change to a Capacity Resource is a change to the design or operating characteristics of the resource, including its interconnection facilities, that may have a significant effect on the reliability or operating characteristics associated with the Capacity Resource, and shall include, but not be limited to, changing the resource technology type, making a change to the Capacity Resource that increases or decreases the resource's Annual Qualified Capacity by greater than the lesser of 5 MW or 10 percent, or any change to the resource that requires a material modification to its interconnection agreement. No less than 30 calendar days prior to the Qualification Data Submission Deadline or Monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, as relevant, a Lead Market Participant may request, and the ISO shall within 20 calendar days provide, a determination regarding whether a change qualifies as a material change to a Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.15.2.4 and requires submission of the materials required pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.1.

III.15.2.4.2. Treatment of Previously Deactivated or Retired Resources.

In order to qualify for participation in the Capacity Market, a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) must: (1) have reached its deactivation date and reduced its Capacity Network Resource Capability pursuant to Section II.48.3; (2) if the resource was compensated for delaying deactivation through a Commission-approved cost-of-service agreement, have refunded to the ISO all costs subject to refund under the claw-back provision set forth in Section II.54.1; and (3) have satisfied the provisions of Section III.15.2, including submission of the Qualification Data Submission Package described in Section III.15.2.1 and completed the capacity interconnection service requirements described in Section III.15.2.3, as if the resource had never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.2.5. Calculation of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values.

Following the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, by a date in the month of February published on the Capacity Auction Calendar, the ISO shall calculate and provide to Lead Market Participants summer and winter Advisory Qualified Capacity Values for each resource that has met the data submission requirements in Section III.15.2.1. The Advisory Qualified Capacity Values of any resource that has not previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or is otherwise treated as if it had not done so, shall equal its demonstrated Commercial Capacity determined in accordance with Section III.15.2.6; except that in the event that a resource has not yet demonstrated a portion of its Commercial Capacity, its Advisory Qualified Capacity Values shall equal the sum of its Commercial Capacity and the estimated incremental Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of the resource as submitted pursuant to Section III.15.2.1. For all other resources, the Advisory Qualified Capacity Values shall equal the Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.

During the period beginning with the ISO's issuance of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values and ending with the conclusion of the Annual Capacity Auction, any change to a capacity resource or the information submitted in a Qualification Data Submission Package shall not impact the resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for that Annual Capacity Auction unless the change has already been accounted for in the submitted Qualification Data Submission Package, or is made pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.4 or Section III.15.2.7.

III.15.2.6. Capacity Commercial Operation Demonstration Requirement.

To participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transaction, a Capacity Resource must first demonstrate that its capacity is commercially operational by meeting the demonstration requirements in this Section III.15.2.6 by the applicable Capacity Demonstration Deadline. A resource that meets the demonstration requirements of this Section III.15.2.6 shall be deemed to have achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation.

(a) Demonstration must be completed (i) prior to a Capacity Resource's initial participation in the Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction, and (ii) when a Capacity Resource that has previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction materially changes or reactivates pursuant to Section III.15.2.4.

(b) The Capacity Demonstration Deadline for each Annual Capacity Auction shall be during the month of April preceding the relevant Annual Capacity Auction, as published on the Capacity Auction

Calendar; for each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral window, the Capacity Demonstration Deadline shall precede the relevant Obligation Month by approximately two weeks, as published on the Capacity Auction Calendar.

(c) To demonstrate commercial capacity, a resource must perform an audit by the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline, using the following audit requirements:

(i) For Generating Capacity Resources that are not Intermittent Power Resources, each Generator Asset must perform an Establish Claim Capability Audit pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2, provide the data described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 23, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2(d)(iv).

(ii) For Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources, each Generator Asset must perform a Seasonal Claim Capability Audit pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3, provide the data described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 23, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3(i).

(iii) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, each Demand Response Asset must perform a Seasonal DR Audit pursuant to III.1.5.1.3.1, as specified by season in III.15.7.1.5.3(c), requested by the Lead Market Participant, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1(m).

(iv) For Demand Capacity Resources that are not Active Demand Capacity Resources, each Demand Capacity Resource must perform a Passive DR Audit pursuant to III.15.7.1.5.4, as specified by season in III.15.7.1.5.3(c), at the request of the Lead Market Participant, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.15.7.1.5.4(f).

(v) For Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, each asset comprising the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource must meet the demonstration requirement in sub-sections (i) through (iii) above for its corresponding asset type.

(vi) For Import Capacity Resources, demonstration is achieved through provision of performance data in the resource's Qualification Data Submission Package in accordance with Section III.15.2.1, except that Import Capacity Resources associated with an external Elective

Transmission Upgrade must demonstrate the ability to transfer power between regions pursuant to Schedule 25, Article 6.

(d) For those resources identified in Sections III.15.2.6(c)(ii), III.15.2.6(c)(iv), and III.15.2.6(c)(v) providing asset-level meter-based performance data by the Capacity Demonstration Deadline that is, as determined by the Lead Market Participant, of insufficient duration to establish accurate Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, or for a period inconsistent with the audit described in Section III.15.2.6(c), the Lead Market Participant may request that the ISO determine Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values based on the lesser of: (1) the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values requested for qualification by the Lead Market Participant; or (2) the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values estimated by the ISO. In no instance shall the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values developed pursuant to this Section III.15.2.6(d) exceed a resource's seasonal Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service, or its equivalent.

The ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall be based on technical data requirements for recently commercial resources identified in the Qualification Data Submission Package. The Qualification Data Submission Package of resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall include a description of the as-built status of the resource at time of submission, including whether the resource is fully or partially operational. For those resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, the Qualification Data Submission Package must be submitted to the ISO by the Lead Market Participant by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction, or 30 days prior to the relevant monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, with the submission updated at the time of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline to reflect the as-built status of the resource. Resources satisfying the provisions of this Section III.15.2.6(d) shall be deemed to have demonstrated Commercial Capacity.

Resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values that have completed the relevant audit described in III.15.2.6(c) for only one season may elect to use the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for one or both seasons. The ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values may constitute a resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for up to one year after issuance, but shall be valid for no longer than one year after a resource becomes fully operational. A Lead Market Participant may request replacement of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values once the relevant seasonal audit has been completed.

III.15.2.7. Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values and Challenge Process.

(a) Following the April Capacity Demonstration Deadline, for each Capacity Resource qualified to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, the ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, calculated in accordance with Section III.15.3, and the Load Zone in which the resource is located. This notification will be provided by the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for a Capacity Resource, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five calendar days of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date.

(c) If a Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity has been subject to a significant decrease pursuant to Section III.15.3.6, the Lead Market Participant may submit a restoration plan in accordance with Section III.15.3.6(b) within five calendar days of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date.

(d) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any challenge submitted under (b) above or of its determination regarding the sufficiency of a restoration plan submitted under (c) above, by the date specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar for such responses. In assessing the sufficiency of a restoration plan, the ISO shall determine whether the plan provides sufficient information to support the reasonable likelihood of the resource providing capacity consistent with its summer Qualified Capacity value by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.2.8. Offers Composed of Separate Resources (Composite Offers).

Separate resources seeking to participate together in an Annual Capacity Auction shall submit a Composite Offer Form no later than the Composite Offer Deadline, which shall be approximately two business days prior to the auction as specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar, with the exception that Distributed Energy Capacity Resources may not participate in composite offers. Composite offers may not be modified or withdrawn after the Composite Offer Deadline. Composite offers must meet the following conditions:

(a) In all months of the summer period of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources combined meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of a composite offer must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of Section III.15.2 applicable to that resource type. A composite offer participates in the Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of a composite offer shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.15.3.7 shall apply, even where one or more of the resources that are part of the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the composite offer in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Composite offers are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

		Location of Summer Resource			
		Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone
Location of Winter Resource	Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)

	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)

III.15.2.9. Self-Supplied Capacity.

Where a load serving entity elects to designate all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation as self-supplied, the load serving must make such designation to the ISO during the self-supply designation window, as published in the Capacity Auction Calendar on the ISO's website. The load serving entity's designation shall specify the MW amount and Lead Market Participant providing the self-supplied capacity. During the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the Lead Market Participant supplying such capacity shall confirm the load serving entity's self-supply designation by specifying each Self-Supplied Capacity Resource and the MW amount of self-supplied capacity in its Capacity Offer. A Generating Capacity Resource or an Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource. A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource may only designate its net injection capability as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource. All self-supplied capacity shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.15.2.9. If designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource the resource will clear in the Annual Capacity Auction as described in Section III.15.4 and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied Capacity Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.15.2. All designations as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource in the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.15.2.9.1. Self-Supplied Capacity Eligibility.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource and must satisfy the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.15.2 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.15.2.9.1. Where a Capacity Offer composed of separate resources is submitted for a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.15.2.8 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.15.2.9. The total quantity of capacity that a load serving entity designates as self-supplied capacity may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.15.2.9.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied Capacity Resources.

In order to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.15.2.10. Publication of Annual Qualified Capacity Values for Annual Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall provide Annual Qualified Capacity values to Lead Market Participants of each Capacity Resource participating in an Annual Capacity Auction one business day before the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window.

III.15.2.11. Publication of Offer Information.

(a) For each Capacity Offer, the quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located will be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 days after the Annual Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) For Capacity Offers from Import Capacity Resources, the name of submitter, quantity, and interface shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 days after the Annual Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Capacity Offers, as well as the number of Capacity Offers submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 calendar days after the issuance of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Capacity Offers upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.15.3. Capacity Resource Accreditation.

Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.15.3, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity, a winter Qualified Capacity, an Annual Qualified Capacity and, where applicable, a Monthly Qualified Capacity for each Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, and Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. A Capacity Resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall not exceed its seasonal Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or equivalent, or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, as applicable. Qualified Capacity for resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the resource's highest previously received Capacity Supply Obligation unless the resource has demonstrated and qualified the additional capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.4.1.

Qualified Capacity values for resources that have never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall be calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.1. Qualified Capacity for resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall be calculated pursuant to Sections III.15.3.2 through III.15.3.5.

III.15.3.1. Qualified Capacity for Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

III.15.3.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity of a Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or is otherwise treated as such pursuant to the terms of this Section III.15, shall be determined in accordance with the capacity demonstration requirements set forth in Section III.15.2.6, as specified below.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(c)(i), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.2(c) audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3 and III.15.3.2.4, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(c)(ii), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.3 audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3 and Section III.15.3.2.4, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(iii), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.3.1 audit results. To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Demand Capacity Resource other than an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(iv), the ISO shall use the Section III.15.7.1.5.4 audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such resources shall be determined pursuant to Sections III.15.3.4.2 and III.15.3.4.3, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(v), the ISO shall use the audit results specified therein for the corresponding asset type. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to III.15.3.5.2 and III.15.3.5.3, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of an Import Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(c)(vi), the ISO shall use the performance data results specified therein. The annual and monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to III.15.3.3.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and that has elected to demonstrate commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(d), the ISO shall use the values developed pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(d). The annual Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3, Section III.15.3.4.2, or Section III.15.3.5.2, as applicable to the relevant resource type. The Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.4, III.15.3.4.3, or Section III.15.3.5.3, as applicable to the relevant resource type.

III.15.3.2 Qualified Capacity for Generating Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Generating Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.2.

III.15.3.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.

(a) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the summer Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where a Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation.

(b) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the summer Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours for each of the previous five summer periods. If there are fewer than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation, the summer Qualified Capacity of such resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation. The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition, and for Intermittent Power Resources in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all summer period hours in which there was a Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.3.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

(a) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the winter Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where a Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation.

(b) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the winter Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours for each of the previous five summer periods. If there are fewer than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation, the winter Qualified Capacity of such resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation. The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition, and for Intermittent Power Resources in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all winter period hours in which there was a Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.3.2.3. Annual Qualified Capacity.

The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.15.3.2.4. Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource shall be the resource's most recent Seasonal Claimed Capability value for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Generating Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

III.15.3.3. Qualified Capacity for Import Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Control Area shall be based on the values and data submitted during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification. The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be based on the data submitted during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and calculated based on the summer and winter Qualified Capacity of the resources underlying the Import Capacity Resource, in accordance with Sections III.15.3.2.1 and III.15.3.2.2.

III.15.3.4. Qualified Capacity for Demand Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Demand Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.4.

III.15.3.4.1. Summer and Winter Qualified Capacity.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or deactivate, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses).

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the median of the resource's Seasonal DR Audit value or Passive DR Audit value from the five most recent years, for the relevant season, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. Where a Demand Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer or winter Seasonal Audit Values, as applicable, then the summer (or winter) Qualified Capacity for that Demand Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the resource's previous summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation.

III.15.3.4.2. Annual Qualified Capacity.

The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall equal the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.15.3.4.3 Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource, other than a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures, shall equal its most recent Seasonal DR Audit value or Passive DR Audit value for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Demand Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures shall equal the most recently-determined summer or winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire, deactivate, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Obligation Month, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses).

III.15.3.5. Qualified Capacity of Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.5.

III.15.3.5.1. Summer and Winter Qualified Capacity.

The summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall equal the median of the resource's summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Value from the five most recent years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation. Where a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, then the summer (or winter) Qualified Capacity for that Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of the resource's previous summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation.

The summer or winter Qualified Capacity of Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources shall be determined in accordance with the rules for Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources in Section III.15.3.2.

III.15.3.5.2. Annual Qualified Capacity.

Annual Qualified Capacity for a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, unless the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource is an Intermittent Power Resource, in which case the Annual Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

III.15.3.5.3. Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall equal the most recent Seasonal DECR Audit for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

III.15.3.6. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.

For a Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Resource, Distributed Energy Capacity Resource, or Demand Capacity Resource, if the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability rating, summer season Import Capacity Resource performance data submitted pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.1.1, summer Seasonal DECR Audit Value, summer Seasonal DR Audit Value, or summer Passive DR Audit Value as of the Annual Capacity Auction's Capacity Demonstration Deadline is below the resource's Qualified Capacity by more than the threshold defined in the following formula:

$$Threshold = min[max(10\% \times QC_{Summer}, 2\ MW), 10\ MW]$$

Where,

QC_{Summer} = the resource's summer Qualified Capacity then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments set forth in this Section III.15.3.6 by the close of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Challenge and Restoration Plan Submission Window. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.15.3.6(b) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.15.3.6(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Annual Capacity Auction only, to have the resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability rating, summer Seasonal DECR Audit Value, Seasonal DR Audit Value, or Passive DR Audit Value as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a restoration plan describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.2, Section III.15.3.3, Section III.15.3.4, or Section III.15.3.5 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Generating Capacity Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.2, Section III.15.3.3, Section III.15.3.4, or Section III.15.3.5 for the Annual Capacity Auction. The ISO shall review submitted restoration plans in accordance with the requirements and timelines set forth in Section III.15.2.7.

III.15.3.7. Resources Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where a Generating Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource), Demand Capacity Resource, or Import Capacity Resource has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.15.3, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, in accordance with Section III.15.2.8; or (ii) have its Annual Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

Where a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this

Section III.15.3, then that resource must have its Annual Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.15.4. Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.4.1 Capacity Offers.

Lead Market Participants submitting Capacity Offers in the Annual Capacity Auction shall submit Capacity Offers for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction as specified in this Section III.15.4.1.

(a) Each Capacity Offer shall be associated with a Capacity Resource for which an Annual Qualified Capacity value has been established for the Annual Capacity Auction through the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process set forth in Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3.

(b) Capacity Offers must be submitted during the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the dates of which will be specified as published in the Capacity Auction Calendar. Capacity Offers are not considered final until the close of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window and may be amended or corrected as necessary until such time as the window closes.

(c) If a Lead Market Participant fails to submit a Capacity Offer for a resource subject to the requirements of Section III.A.22.1, the ISO shall enter a Capacity Offer for the resource into the Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.A.22.1(d).

(d) Each Capacity Offer must specify at least one price-quantity pair, which consists of one price, denominated in $/kW-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and a quantity value, expressed in MW to an accuracy of up to three decimal places. The Capacity Offer may specify up to ten price-quantity pairs, where each such pair represents the total amount of capacity offered from the Capacity Resource at the price specified. If more than one price-quantity pair is submitted, the price-quantity pairs must specify prices and quantity values in such a way that, when the price-quantity pairs are ordered from lowest price to highest price, the quantity value in each price-quantity pair increases with each successive, higher-priced price-quantity pair. The price-quantity pair with the greatest specified price must include the Capacity Resource's total Annual Qualified Capacity. The Capacity Offer must not contain any offer prices less than $0.00/kW-month or greater than the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap, unless otherwise allowed pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.3 and subsection (e) of this Section III.15.4.1 or required by Section III.A.21 and subsection (f) of this Section III.15.4.1. The Capacity Offer must not specify a total MW quantity value that exceeds the Capacity Resource's Annual Qualified Capacity.

(e) A price-quantity pair in a Capacity Offer must not specify a price above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, except under the following circumstances:

(i) the Lead Market Participant for the Capacity Resource submitted the price-quantity pair to the Internal Market Monitor as part of a Proposed Capacity Offer, pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.2;

(ii) the Internal Market Monitor determined an Allowable Capacity Offer Price relative to the price-quantity pair pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.3; and

(iii) the specified price in the Capacity Offer does not exceed the price specified in the price-quantity pair reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor.

(f) For capacity included in a Capacity Offer that is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.3, the price specified must not be less than the Capacity Offer Floor Price.

(g) A Capacity Offer may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit up to which the offer may not be rationed and must be accepted or rejected in whole. Without such indication, offers shall be rationable up to the total MW quantity in the offer that is priced at or below the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, subject to the auction clearing constraint described in Section III.15.4.2.2(d). The lowest priced price-quantity pair in a Capacity Offer that specifies a Rationing Minimum Limit must specify a quantity value equal to or greater than the specified Rationing Minimum Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Offer for an Import Capacity Resource may only specify a Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to this subsection (g) if the Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, as described in Section III.15.2.1.1.1.

(h) If the Capacity Offer specifies any price above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, the Capacity Offer may elect to have the Above-Threshold Offer Segment be treated as rationable, subject to any Rationing Minimum Limit specified pursuant to subsection (g). Without such an election, the Above-Threshold Offer Segment will be treated as non-rationable and accepted or rejected in whole. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Offer for an Import Capacity Resource may only elect rationability for the Above-Threshold Offer Segment pursuant to this subsection (h) if the Import

Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, as described in Section III.15.2.1.1.1.

(i) In order to give effect to a self-supply designation made by a load serving entity pursuant to Section III.15.2.9 for any portion of the Capacity Resource's Annual Qualified Capacity, the Capacity Offer for such resource must (i) identify the load serving entity for which its capacity will serve as self-supplied capacity and the MW quantity of self-supplied capacity and (ii) include a price-quantity pair with an offer price of $0.00/kW-month that includes the amount of such capacity, unless such capacity is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price. If the self-supplied capacity is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price, then the price specified in the price-quantity pair including the self-supplied capacity must equal the Capacity Offer Floor Price.

(j) A Capacity Offer for a Generating Capacity Resource with a contract to export capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period must specify an Export Offer Segment and the interface over which the Export Offer Segment will be exported.

(k) A Lead Market Participant for a Capacity Resource that is subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 shall not enter a Capacity Offer for any capacity supplied by the Capacity Resource that is subject to delayed deactivation. The ISO shall enter such Capacity Resource's capacity subject to delayed deactivation into the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month.

(l) If a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the Capacity Resource had been made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for a Forward Capacity Auction, the Capacity Offer submitted for such Capacity Resource must include a price-quantity pair with an offer price of $0.00/kW-month that includes the total amount of the resource's capacity that cleared subject to such election.

III.15.4.2. Conduct of the Annual Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall determine Capacity Supply Obligations and Capacity Clearing Prices for the Capacity Commitment Period by conducting the Annual Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.15.4.2.

III.15.4.2.1. Replacement of Specified Prices for Mitigation Purposes.

After the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the ISO shall replace specified prices in submitted Capacity Offers as necessary, pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.4(c). Any such adjusted Capacity Offers shall be inputs for the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.4.2.2. Clearing of the Annual Capacity Auction.

(a) In determining Capacity Supply Obligations and Capacity Clearing Prices, the ISO shall employ an optimization algorithm that is designed to maximize social surplus in order to clear Capacity Offers, capacity entered into the auction by the ISO as described in Section III.15.4.1(k), and any Proxy Capacity Offers against the capacity demand curves calculated in accordance with Section III.15.1.1. In clearing Capacity Offers, the optimization algorithm shall take into account, as applicable, the inputs and constraints set forth in this Section III.15.4.2.2.

(b) The optimization algorithm shall take into account the following: (i) all price-quantity pairs in Capacity Offers for the Annual Capacity Auction submitted pursuant to Section III.15.4.1, subject to any adjustments made pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.1 and the constraint described in subsection (c) of this Section III.15.4.2.1; (ii) any Rationing Minimum Limits and rationability elections specified in Capacity Offers pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(g) and Section III.15.4.1(h), respectively; (iii) capacity from a Capacity Resource subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 at a default price of $0.00/kW-month; (iv) the set of distinct Capacity Zones determined to be modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4; (v) the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve calculated in accordance with Section 15.1.1.1; (vi) any Capacity Zone Demand Curves for import-constrained and export-constrained Capacity Zones, calculated in accordance with Sections 15.1.1.2 and 15.1.1.3, respectively; (vii) external interface limits calculated pursuant to Section III.12.10; and (viii) any Proxy Capacity Offers for the Annual Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.A.24.7, which shall be treated as non-rationable.

(c) The optimization algorithm shall not take into account price-quantity pairs in Capacity Offers that specify a price that exceeds the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

(d) Capacity entered into the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month shall clear the auction.

(e) A Capacity Offer that specifies a Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(g) shall not clear at quantities less than the specified Rationing Minimum Limit, and Above-Threshold Offer

Segments that are non-rationable pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(h) shall not clear at quantities less than the MW quantity of the segment.

(f) For an Export Offer Segment specified in a Capacity Offer that indicates a Generating Capacity Resource's contract to export capacity over an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or over an external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the ISO shall model the Export Offer Segment as though that quantity of capacity were located in the Capacity Zone where the external interface identified in the Capacity Offer is located and adjust Capacity Zone Demand Curves as necessary to reflect such modeling.

(g) In determining the clearing result that accounts for auction inputs and satisfies all applicable constraints, the optimization may select from among multiple possible alternative clearing results that satisfy such requirements, including clearing results where a Capacity Offer with a specified price below the Capacity Clearing Price does not clear.

(h) Where the clearing of the Annual Capacity Auction either system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone results in a tie (that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs), the following rules shall apply in sequence, as necessary, to determine clearing: (i) if multiple Capacity Offers may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately; and (ii) the Capacity Offer associated with the Lead Market Participant having the lower market share in the capacity auction shall be cleared.

(i) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the system-wide capacity entered into the Annual Capacity Auction that maximizes social surplus. In no case, however, shall the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone be less than the highest price specified in an offer for capacity that clears the auction, excluding any capacity that, due to its specified price, would not have cleared but for the fact that it is located within an import-constrained Capacity Zone that has a cleared quantity of capacity equal to or less than the truncation point for the zone's Capacity Zone Demand Curve.

(j) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the import-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(k) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Zone; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the export-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(l) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the export-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(m) The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

(n) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area shall be equal to:

(i) if the quantity of capacity over the external interface that clears the auction is equal to the external interface limit for such interface, the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource offering capacity over such external interface and that clears the auction; or

(ii) if the quantity of capacity over the external interface that clears the auction is less than the external interface limit for such interface, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone associated with the external interface.

III.15.4.2.3. Results of the Annual Capacity Auction.

(a) Annual Capacity Supply Obligations shall be awarded to Capacity Resources in accordance with the results of the Annual Capacity Auction clearing mechanics described in Section III.15.4.2.2. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.15.2) shall be adjusted based on the winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.2. Additional Capacity Supply Obligations may be awarded in accordance with Section III.15.4.2.4.

(b) The Capacity Clearing Prices in each Capacity Zone modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction shall be the clearing prices determined as a result of the Annual Capacity Auction clearing mechanics described in Section III.15.4.2.2.

III.15.4.2.4. Additional Clearing of Auction in the Event of Cleared Proxy Offers.

If any Proxy Capacity Offer entered into the Annual Capacity Auction clears and receives a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall conduct an additional run of the auction. This additional run shall use the same methodology described in Section III.15.4.2.2, except that the additional run shall (i) exclude all Proxy Capacity Offers and (ii) enter all other capacity that cleared in the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month. The additional run of the auction shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Prices of the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.2. Capacity (other than capacity still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction shall be paid the Capacity

Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone associated with the capacity during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the additional run of the auction procures additional capacity, that additionally procured capacity shall be paid the price resulting from the additional run in the Capacity Zone associated with that additional capacity during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and such price shall be equal to or greater than the price resulting from the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.4.3. Publication of Annual Capacity Auction Results.

As soon as practicable after the Annual Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall publish the results of that Annual Capacity Auction publicly on its website, including the set of Capacity Zones modeled in the auction, the Capacity Clearing Prices in each of those Capacity Zones, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. The published information shall identify Proxy Capacity Offers that cleared, if any, in the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.5. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions as described in this Section III.15.5. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in the Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Section III.15.5.1) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

III.15.5.1. Capacity Zones Included in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the Capacity Zones and external interfaces modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Section III.15.4.2.2.

III.15.5.2. Participation in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Each supply offer and demand bid in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction must be associated with a specific resource and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.15.5.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.13.2, supply offers and demand bids submitted for Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Resources with capacity subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 may not participate in reconfiguration auctions, unless otherwise authorized pursuant to the terms of a cost-of-service agreement of the type described in Section II.54.1. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. The offer and bid deadline for each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be announced by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated Obligation Month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.15.5.2.

III.15.5.2.1. Supply Offers in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

(a) All supply offers in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall be submitted by the Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, denominated in $/kW-month.

(b) A resource may not submit a supply offer for a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction unless a Monthly Qualified Capacity value has been established for the resource for the month associated with the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction pursuant to the qualification processes described in Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3.

(c) The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource's Monthly Qualified Capacity for the month associated with the auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.15.3 during the most recent qualification process for the resource; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month.

III.15.5.2.2. Demand Bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

(a) All demand bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall be submitted by the Lead Market Participant and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW and the price, denominated in $/kW-month.

(b) To submit a demand bid in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.

(c) Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource that cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource.

(d) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource's capacity that is already obligated for the month associated with that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction as of the offer and bid deadline for the auction.

III.15.5.3. Clearing Offers and Bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

All supply offers and demand bids are rationable and may be cleared in whole or in part in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

III.15.5.4. Conduct of Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the ISO shall employ an optimization algorithm that is designed to maximize social surplus in order to clear the supply offers against demand bids submitted for the auction. The truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.15.1.1.2 and Section III.15.1.1.3 and external interface limits established pursuant to Section III.12 shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

III.15.5.5. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.

For each supply offer that clears in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with the auction shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with the auction shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.

III.15.6. Bilateral Capacity Contracts.

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.15.6, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation. To the extent necessary for the ISO's review and approval of any of the bilateral contracts described in this Section III.15.6, the ISO shall apply the Capacity Zones and external interfaces modeled as inputs and constraints in the Annual Capacity Auction for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.15.4.2.2. Resources with capacity subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 may not participate in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or Capacity Performance Bilaterals, unless otherwise authorized pursuant to the terms of a cost-of-service agreement of the type described in Section II.54.1.

III.15.6.1. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

A Capacity Transferring Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation and seeking to shed that obligation may enter into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part, to a Capacity Acquiring Resource, or portion thereof, for a whole-month period during the Capacity Commitment Period, as described in this Section III.15.6.1.

III.15.6.1.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(a) Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly periods, and a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month.

(b) The qualification of Capacity Acquiring Resources for participation in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources submitting supply offers for Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions as specified in Section III.15.5.2.1(b). A resource that does not have a Monthly Qualified Capacity value established for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that month.

(c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the amount of unobligated Monthly Qualified Capacity of the Capacity Acquiring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. For the purpose of this subsection (c), unobligated Monthly Qualified Capacity refers to the Monthly Qualified Capacity that was determined pursuant to Section III.15.3 in the most recent qualification process for the resource prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO and that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation.

(d) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource as a result of the transaction.

(e) Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are allowed between a Capacity Transferring Resource and a Capacity Acquiring Resource that are located within different Capacity Zones and across external interfaces modeled as part of the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period of the relevant monthly period, subject to the transmission interface limits between Capacity Zones and external interface limits, as described in Section III.15.6.1.4(b).

(f) Participation in any Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of submission to the ISO.

III.15.6.1.2. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.

The Lead Market Participant for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals in the Capacity Auction Calendar. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

III.15.6.1.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, denominated in $/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of $0.00/kW-month.

III.15.6.1.4. ISO Review.

(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the submission and participation requirements described in this Section III.15.6.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the submittal window, the ISO shall conduct a review to determine the deliverability of the submitted Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals. In its review, the ISO shall model as constraints the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Sections III.15.1.1.2 and III.15.1.1.3 and external interface limits established pursuant to Section III.12 for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals that are not fully deliverable up to their specific MW values without violating transmission transfer limits between Capacity Zones or external transfer limits. Transactions will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety. The ISO shall approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected, the Lead Market Participant for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the basis for such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.1.5. Approval.

Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply

Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.

A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant seeking to shed its Capacity Load Obligation may enter into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone to a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation, as described in this Section III.15.6.2.

III.15.6.2.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.

A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2.2. Timing of Submission to the ISO.

Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial daily settlements of payments and charges associated with the Annual Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 p.m. on the first Business Day of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

III.15.6.2.4. ISO Review.

The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.15.6.2 are not met.

III.15.6.2.5. Approval.

Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral for the period covered by the bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral for the period covered by the bilateral.

III.15.6.3. Capacity Performance Bilaterals.

A resource's Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.15.6.3.

III.15.6.3.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Performance Bilaterals.

If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval through a Capacity Performance Bilateral, so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition. The Lead Market Participant for the transferring resource may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for such five-minute interval to the receiving resource. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

III.15.6.3.2. Timing of Submission to the ISO.

A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Annual Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity

Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 p.m. on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

III.15.6.3.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; and (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

III.15.6.3.4. ISO Review.

The ISO shall review the information provided in the submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.15.6.3 are not met.

III.15.6.3.5. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.

A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect either party's Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Condition subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.2.

III.15.7. Obligations of Capacity Suppliers.

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through an Annual Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.15.7 for each Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.7.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.15.7.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

III.15.7.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

(i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource's Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or

(ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.15.7.1.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource's Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.1.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice. Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.15.7.1.1.3. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.

Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas; and

(c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements), provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, except that:

(a) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
(b) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
(c) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

III.15.7.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource must:

(a) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource's native Control Area, and;
(b) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

III.15.7.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) Market Participants with Intermittent Power Resources that are Dispatchable Resources and have a Capacity Supply Obligation are required to submit offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market consistent with the Market Participant's expectation of the output of the resource in Real-Time. Market Participants with non-dispatchable Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit, but are not required to submit, offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.3.2. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

III.15.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.15.7.1.5.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of Demand Reduction Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources and On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.15.7.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) An Energy Efficiency measure may be added to an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource (other than one consisting of Load Management or Distributed Generation) until two years after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation; provided, however, that a resource that qualified for a Forward Capacity Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or before June 1, 2024 may install Energy Efficiency measures until May 31, 2027. Once an Energy Efficiency measure has been associated with an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the measure may not be transferred to a different resource.

(c) For purposes of confirming Capacity Market Commercial Operation as described in Section III.15.2.6, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource. The summer and winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource consisting of Energy Efficiency measures may be verified in any month of the year.

(d) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(e) On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section

III.15.2.1.1.2.1. and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.15.7.1.5.4 and III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(f) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.7.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource Auditing Requirements.

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values shall be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

(d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.

(e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the

Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.

(f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.

(g) For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures, the ISO shall calculate a summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value in each month of the year. For all other On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources, a Market Participant may request that a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.

III.15.7.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.

The ISO may perform one or both of the following additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures.

(a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO shall establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.

(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO shall establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource's audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

III.15.7.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.

III.15.7.1.6.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.
DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource's expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

III.15.7.1.7. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.7.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.
(a) A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit offers for its Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.15.7.1.7.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of any Demand Reductions Offers or Baseline Deviation Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the offers must be equal to or greater than the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations are physically available. If the Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations are physically available at a level less than the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the offers must equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each offer from a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation made into the Day- Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

> (i) the sum of the resource's notification time plus start-up time plus Minimum Run Time (or Minimum Deviation Time or Minimum Reduction Time) plus Minimum Down Time (or Minimum Time Between Deviations or Minimum Time Between Reductions) is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource comprises Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations, it is not obligated to submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and may not submit Supply Offers into the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.7.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice. Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the then-known capability of the resource.

III.15.7.1.7.3. Additional Requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

Distributed Energy Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Distributed Energy Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Distributed Energy Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources shall comply with the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

(c) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources shall comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in this Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(d) For Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, the Seasonal DECR Audit Value shall be established pursuant to Section III.1.7.13.

III.15.7.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.15.7.2 and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.15.7.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Generating Capacity Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.2.2. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.
A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to submit offers for the resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant with a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation is not permitted to submit an offer for that resource into the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.2.2. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.
A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day- Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire offer, up to the maximum capability offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market so long as it is not a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.15.7.2.2.3. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit an offer in the Real-Time Energy Market so long as the resource is not a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.2.4. Additional Requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in Section III.15.7.1.7.3.

III.15.7.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

An Intermittent Power Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. An Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

Intermittent Power Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.7.2.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer Demand Reduction Offers for the Demand Response Resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources and On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) complying with Section III.15.7.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.3. Exporting Resources.

A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.15.7.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7 and Section III.1.10.7.A, as applicable.

III.15.7.4. ISO Requests for Energy.

The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource, or a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under this Section III.15 by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

III.15.7.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.

For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.15.7.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.

III.15.8. Capacity Payments and Charges.

Revenue in the Annual Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.15.8.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.2, adjusted as described in Section III.15.8.3 and Section III.15.8.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation shall be subject to charges as described in Section III.15.8.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.15 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.15.8.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.15.8.1.1.

III.15.8.1.1. Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in an Annual Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied Capacity Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period. Each monthly payment and charge listed in Section III.15.8.1.1 (a) through (d) below will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

(a) **Annual Capacity Auction**. For a resource whose offer has cleared in an Annual Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the

Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer cleared, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only, and subject to the limitations set forth in Section III.15.2.1.3.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions**. For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals**. For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and the price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.8.1.2 Export Capacity

If there are any unobligated Export Offer Segments from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows.

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x [Cleared MWs of Export Offer Segment]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x [Cleared MWs of Export Offer Segment]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.15.8.5.2.

III.15.8.2. Capacity Performance Payments.

III.15.8.2.1. Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.15.8.2.2. Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.15.8.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.15.8.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.15.8.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(ii) A Demand Response Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource’s Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.

(iii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(e) A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Metered Quantity for Settlement and Reserve Quantity for Settlement of all the components of its constituent Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Based on the Real-Time operational coordination, the resource must follow any distribution system limitation and update its physical parameters accordingly. The Actual Capacity Provided cannot be less than zero.

(i) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response

Baseline of the Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with the Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.15.8.2.3. Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

(Load + Reserve Requirement) / Total Capacity Supply Obligation

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in

Section III.15.8.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(c).

III.15.8.2.4. Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.15.8.2.5. Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

The Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $~~9337~~3500/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.15.8.2.6. Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity

Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.15.8.3. Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.15.8.3.1 and Section III.15.8.3.2 below.

III.15.8.3.1. Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month shall be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month.

III.15.8.3.2. Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

MaxCSO x [3 months x (ACAcp – ACAsp) – (12 months x ACAcp)]

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

ACAcp = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Annual Capacity Auction.

ACAsp = the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap for the relevant Annual Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the

Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.15.8.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month shall be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.15.8.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.3.2(b).

III.15.8.4. Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.15.8.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.15.8.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.15.8.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.15.8.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.15.8.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.15.8.4(b)

III.15.8.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.15.8.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges.

For purposes of this Section III.15.8.5.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation on any day of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments. Each charge and adjustment described in rate component (b) of Sections III.15.8.5.1.1 through III.15.8.5.1.8 shall be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.1.1. Annual Capacity Auction Charge.

The ACA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone ACA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Capacity Zone ACA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total ACA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total ACA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.15.8.5.1.5) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to the resource.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.15.8.5.1.2. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction in each zone and the applicable Monthly Reconfiguration Auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction in each zone and the applicable Monthly Reconfiguration Auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.3. HQICC Capacity Charge.

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.15.8.5.1.1(b), III.15.8.5.1.2(b), III.15.8.5.1.5(b), III.15.8.5.1.6(b), III.15.8.5.1.7(b), and III.15.8.5.1.8(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.4. Self-Supply Adjustment.

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied Capacity Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.15.8.5.1.1.(b), III.15.8.5.1.2(b), III.15.8.5.1.5(b), III.15.8.5.1.6(b), III.15.8.5.1.7(b) and III.15.8.5.1.8(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.5. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources in the Obligation Month and the base ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

ACA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.3, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Annual Qualified Capacity procured from Intermittent Power Resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.6. CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.1(f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.15.8.5.1.7. CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2.

Where:

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2(b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.8. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that were terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A or Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdrawn pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that were terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.8.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Annual Capacity

Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

The Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; when all load of a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation participating as a Storage DARD is load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's daily Coincident Peak Contributions, to the sum of all load serving entities' daily Coincident Peak Contributions in that Capacity Zone.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied Capacity Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource, Demand Response Resource, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.15.8.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Annual Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource. The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.8.5.3. Excess Revenues.

Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A or Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdrawn pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3, shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.15.8.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.15.8.5.4.1. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.15.8.5.1.6.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.15.8.5.1.6.

(e) **Maine Export Interface**. Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.4.2. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive for each Capacity Commitment Period an allocation of CTRs for each such unit that is the product of: (i) the MW quantity of capacity that the unit cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the municipal utility's ownership entitlements in such unit. The CTRs allocated pursuant to this Section may be designated as self-supply quantities as described in Section III.15.2.9. Municipal utility ownership entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

	Millstone 3	Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%

Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%

Allocation of CTRs as described in this Section shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a unit listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, allocation of CTRs for such unit shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Annual Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant (collectively, "WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) For any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section that are not designated self-supply quantities for the Capacity Commitment Period, the municipal utility entitlement holder shall receive a credit reflecting the value of such remaining CTRs. The value of each remaining CTR shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located; and (ii) the remaining MW quantity. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.5. Annual Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Annual Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; and (c) any applicable export charges.

III.15.9. Information Publication and Reporting.

III.15.9.1. Publication of Certain Data Prior to the Annual Capacity Auction.

For each Annual Capacity Auction, no later than one Business Day before the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the ISO shall publish publicly on its website:

a. which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction;
b. the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
c. which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction;
d. determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to deliverability impacts pursuant to Section III.15.2.3;
e. the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;
f. for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.4 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power; and
g. which resources are qualified to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction, including resource type, Capacity Zone, and Annual Qualified Capacity.

III.15.9.2. Publication of Certain Data After Conducting the Annual Capacity Auction

In addition to the Annual Capacity Auction results information identified by Section III.15.2.11 and Section III.15.4.3 of Market Rule 1, within 15 days of conducting the Annual Capacity Auction, the ISO shall publish publicly on its website:

a. which Capacity Offers, satisfying the requirements of Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1, were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.4 of Market Rule 1; and the condition met by each such resource;
b. the Internal Market Monitor's determinations made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any Capacity Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to capacity not previously cleared

in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and the basis for any such determinations; except that offer price information and any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to the potential impact of a Capacity Resource's offer on Capacity Clearing Prices shall not be published publicly;

c. the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding Proposed Capacity Offers, including whether the Internal Market Monitor accepted or rejected prices specified in a resource's Proposed Capacity Offer that were subject to Internal Market Monitor review and whether the Internal Market Monitor accepted or rejected the cost components of the resource' offer, which are set forth in Section III.A.22.2.3(a). No offer prices, cost components, or other underlying data shall be published; and,

d. which resources offering capacity not previously offered into an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction were qualified to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction (this information will include a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations).

III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1.

III.13.7.1.1. Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period. Each monthly payment and charge listed in Section III.13.7.1.1 (a) through (d) below will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction**. For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions**. For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals**. For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows.

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located= [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.

III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.
A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.
For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.

(ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(e) A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Metered Quantity for Settlement and Reserve Quantity for Settlement of all the components of its constituent Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Based on the Real-Time operational coordination, the resource must follow any distribution system limitation and update its physical parameters accordingly. The Actual Capacity Provided cannot be less than zero.

(i) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

(Load + Reserve Requirement) / Total Capacity Supply Obligation

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.13.7.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $5455/MWh. For the period beginning on June 1, 2025 and ending on August 31, 2026, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $9337/MWh. Thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

MaxCSO x [3 months x (FCAcp – FCAsp) – (12 months x FCAcp)]

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCAcp = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCAsp = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation on any day of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments. Each charge and adjustment described in subsection (b) of Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1 through III.13.7.5.1.1.9 will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.
>
> Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d).

Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.
The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections IIII.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections IIII.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), IIII.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.
The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward

Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

> Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

> The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).
>
> Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.
The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

> Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.
>
> Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.
>
> Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.
>
> Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.
The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; when all load of a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation participating as a Storage DARD is load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's daily Coincident Peak Contributions, to the sum of all load serving entities' daily Coincident Peak Contributions in that Capacity Zone.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource, Demand Response Resource, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource. The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface**. The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface**. Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.
(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface**. Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive for each Capacity Commitment Period an allocation of CTRs for each such unit that is the product of: (i) the MW quantity of capacity that the unit cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the municipal utility's ownership entitlements in such unit. The CTRs allocated pursuant to this Section may be designated as self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6. Municipal utility ownership entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

	Millstone 3	Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%		
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%		
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%		
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%		
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%		
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%		
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%		
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%		
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%		
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%		
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%		
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%		
Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%		
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%		
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%		
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%		

Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%		
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%		
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%		
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%		
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%		
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%		
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%		
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%		
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%		
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%		

Allocation of CTRs as described in this Section shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a unit listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, allocation of CTRs for such unit shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) For any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section that are not designated self-supply quantities for the Capacity Commitment Period, the municipal utility entitlement holder shall receive a credit reflecting the value of such remaining CTRs. The value of each remaining CTR shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located; and (ii) the remaining MW quantity. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

III.15. Annual Capacity Market.

(a) Annual Capacity Market Overview.

The ISO shall administer an annual market for capacity (Annual Capacity Market) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.15. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2028 to May 31, 2029, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Annual Capacity Market ("Capacity Commitment Period"), the ISO shall conduct an Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.15.4 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Annual Capacity Auction, a resource must have Qualified Capacity resulting from the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3. Obligations associated with the Annual Capacity Market may be traded during ISO-administered Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and monthly bilateral transactions, in accordance with Section III.15.5 and Section III.15.6, respectively. The obligations of resources with Capacity Supply Obligations resulting from the Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, and monthly bilateral transactions are set forth in Section III.15.7. Payments and charges resulting from participation in the Annual Capacity Market, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, and bilateral transactions, as well as Capacity Performance Payments, are set forth in Section III.15.8. The publication of auction-related information is set forth in Section III.15.9.

(b) Capacity Auction Calendar.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028, and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the ISO shall publish a calendar of dates and deadlines for the administration of the Capacity Market, with the dates and deadlines being consistent for each Annual Capacity Auction cycle. The Capacity Auction Calendar shall include specific dates and deadlines for all such Capacity Market dates and deadlines defined in this Section III.15 and related Tariff provisions. The following defines several milestone dates and deadlines.

(1) the Qualification Data Submission Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of February;

(2) the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of April; and

(3) the Annual Capacity Auction shall occur during the month of May.

(c) Modification of Capacity Auction Calendar.

The ISO may, on a prospective basis, reasonably revise any date or deadline in the Capacity Auction Calendar with written notice of such revision to each Governance Participant in the manner specified in Section 17.11(b) of the Participants Agreement prior to the occurrence of the date or deadline being revised. In the event a Market Participant fails to meet a deadline in the Capacity Auction Calendar for submission of information or data, the ISO shall extend such deadline for that Market Participant upon receipt of an order from the Commission granting the Market Participant's request for a waiver of such deadline for good cause shown. In no event shall a date or deadline be extended, prospectively by the ISO or retroactively by filing of a Market Participant, should doing so interfere with the ISO's effective administration of the Capacity Market.

(d) Effectiveness for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period and Thereafter.

The provisions of this Section III.15 are effective for the Capacity Commitment Period that runs from June 1, 2028 through May 31, 2029 and all Capacity Commitment Periods thereafter. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the provisions of this Section III.15 are not applicable to the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13, addressing the administration of the Forward Capacity Market, shall continue to be effective for Capacity Commitment Periods through May 31, 2028. Unless otherwise expressly stated, the provisions of Section III.13 are not applicable to the Annual Capacity Market, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and monthly bilateral transactions addressed in this Section III.15 of Market Rule 1.

III.15.A. Non-Commercial Capacity Transition Rules.

All Capacity Resources that are on critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3 as of June 1, 2028 are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A.

The ISO shall monitor the Non-Commercial Capacity resource's compliance with its critical path schedule from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, is terminated pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3.

III.15.A.1. Non-Commercial Capacity Resource Critical Path Schedule Reports.

For each resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Lead Market Participant does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Lead Market Participant. If the Lead Market Participant fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1. Each critical path schedule report shall include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.15.A.1.1 through Section III.15.A.1.3.

III.15.A.1.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.15.A.1, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule must clearly indicate if the Lead Market Participant is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Lead Market Participant must also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

III.15.A.1.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.

(a) For all new resources (except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, which are discussed in Section III.15.A.1.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Lead Market Participant must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits**. For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders**. For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.15.A.1.2(a)(v).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery**. For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity subject to critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity subject to critical path schedule monitoring. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Lead Market Participant is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing that all interconnection facilities and upgrades identified for the project associated with the resource in a Transitional Cluster Study, Cluster Study, or Cluster Restudy (conducted pursuant to Section 7.5 of Schedule 22, Section 7.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 7.5 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), or interconnection request or agreement under applicable state tariff, rules or procedures, have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Lead Market

Participant must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion**. The Lead Market Participant shall provide documentation showing the resource will be capable of providing its total offered demand reduction value as described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package by the proposed Commercial Operation Date reported in the critical path schedule report.

(ii) **Additional Requirements**. For each customer and each prospective customer the Lead Market Participant shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Lead Market Participant shall also provide the Asset identification number.

III.15.A.1.3. Additional Relevant Information.

The Lead Market Participant must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule.

III.15.A.2. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Lead Market Participant proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.15.A.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Lead Market Participant to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Lead Market Participant to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Lead Market Participant does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Lead Market Participant. If the Lead Market Participant fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.1. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.15.A.1.

III.15.A.2.1. Termination of Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

If a Lead Market Participant fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.15.A.1 or III.15.A.2, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's status on critical path schedule monitoring, provided that, where a Lead Market Participant voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.15.A.2.3 no filing with the Commission shall be necessary. Upon Commission ruling, the Lead Market Participant shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource and instead permits the Lead Market Participant to continue on critical path schedule monitoring, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource, and subject to continued reporting by the Lead Market Participant in accordance with Section III.15.A.1.

III.15.A.2.2. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's ability to remain on critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. The ISO shall also reduce the resource's assigned capacity interconnection service (or equivalent for resources not subject to the ISO Interconnection Procedures).

III.15.A.2.3. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Lead Market Participant may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO.

III.15.A.3. Financial Assurance.

The financial assurance requirements for Designated FCM Participants offering Non-Commercial Capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section VII.B.2.b the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, shall continue to apply to all Capacity Resources that are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A.

Once a resource with Non-Commercial Capacity achieves commercial operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as a resource that has achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

If a Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.15.A shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.15.A.4. Demonstrating FCM Commercial Operation

All Capacity Resources subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A shall achieve commercial operation, for purposes of ending critical path schedule monitoring, in accordance with the FCM Commercial Operation requirements specified in Section III.13.3.8.

III.15.A.5. Settlement of Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.

Upon the date on which the entire resource is no longer on critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall provide the Lead Market Participant with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. All Capacity Resources that are subject to the provisions of this Section III.15.A shall be subject to the Forward Capacity Market payment and refund requirements as set forth in Section III.13.1.9.3.2 of the Tariff.

III.15.1. Auction Demand Curves and Other Auction Inputs.

III.15.1.1. Annual Capacity Auction Demand Curves.

The total amount of capacity cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.15.4 shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the Capacity Zones modeled for the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.1.1.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

III.15.1.1.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

III.15.1.1.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.15.1.1.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.15.1.1.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.15.1.2. Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap and the Cost of New Entry.

III.15.1.2.1. Calculation of Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap, CONE, and Net CONE.

(a) The Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap shall be the greater of (i) 1.6 multiplied by Net CONE; and (ii) CONE. References in this Section III.15 and Sections III.A.21 and III.A.24 to the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap shall mean the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap for the Annual Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) To determine the CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auctions associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2028 and the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2029, the ISO shall make interim-year adjustments as described in Section III.15.1.2.2 to the following CONE and Net CONE calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025:

(i) CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 was $12.400/kW-month.

(ii) Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 was $7.468/kW-month.

(c) The ISO shall recalculate CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2030. Thereafter, CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every four years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders, and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Annual Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

III.15.1.2.2. Interim-Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.

(a) For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.15.1.2.1, CONE and Net CONE shall be adjusted for each Annual Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.15.1.2:

(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model shall be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).

(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.15.1.2.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) The annual adjustment to CONE and Net CONE for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2028, shall use a cost of debt of 6.85% and a cost of equity of 13.80%. These values shall also be used for the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2029.

(5) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.15.1.2.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

(b) The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.15.1.2.2 will be published on the ISO's website.

III.15.2. Capacity Resource Qualification.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a Generating Capacity Resource, an Import Capacity Resource, a Demand Capacity Resource, or a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of Section III.13 became effective. The summer period of a Capacity Resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall be the months of June through September and the winter period shall be the months of October through May, except in the case of Demand Capacity Resources, where the summer period shall be the months of April through November and the winter period shall be the months of December through March.

This Section III.15.2 details the requirements of the qualification process for the Annual Capacity Auction, as well as certain requirements related to Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions. Data submission and demonstration requirements for resources that have never previously counted as capacity and seek to qualify to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, are set forth in Section III.15.2.1. Data submission and demonstration requirements for resources that have never previously counted as capacity and seek to qualify to participate in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction are set forth in Section III.15.2.2. Qualification requirements with respect to interconnection service are addressed in Section III.15.2.3. Qualification requirements with respect to resources that have previously counted as capacity and have materially changed are addressed in Section III.15.2.4. Following the Annual Capacity Auction's Qualification Data Submission Deadline, the ISO calculates and provides to Lead Market Participants Advisory Qualified Capacity Values for each Capacity Resource, per Section III.15.2.5. Lead Market Participants then have until the Capacity Demonstration Deadline to demonstrate that their Capacity Resources have achieved Commercial Operation, per Section III.15.2.6. Thereafter, the ISO calculates Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for each Capacity Resource, per Section III.15.2.7, which values are subject to the challenge process addressed therein. Lead Market Participants are then permitted to submit Composite Offers in accordance with Section III.15.2.8, and load serving entities are permitted to submit self-supply designations in accordance with III.15.2.9. Final Qualified Capacity values for each Capacity Resource are calculated by the ISO one Business Day prior to the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window in accordance with Section III.15.2.10. The publication of offer information during the qualification process and after the Annual Capacity Auction is addressed in Section III.15.2.11.

Resources seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction may be subject to buyer-side market power review and mitigation pursuant to Section III.A.21 and must abide by the applicable submission requirements and timelines set forth therein prior to seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction. To the extent not already established for the purposes of the submission requirements of Section III.A.21.1.5, all capacity suppliers seeking to qualify for an Annual Capacity Auction must be Market Participants prior to the Qualification Data Submission Deadline. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in an Annual Capacity Auction may not change during the period beginning 15 Business Days prior to the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window and ending with the posting of the results of the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.2.1. Qualification Data Submission Requirements.

III.15.2.1.1. Qualification Data Submission Package.

(a) For a resource that has not previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction to qualify as a Capacity Resource for participation in an Annual Capacity Auction, a Lead Market Participant must submit the following information to the ISO by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, as applicable:

(a) the resource name;

(b) the Lead Market Participant's contact information;

(c) the date by which the resource is expected to complete its capacity demonstration pursuant to III.15.2.6(c) or to update its as-built data pursuant to III.15.2.6(d);

(d) the resource address or location, and if available, asset identification number;

(e) whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation;

(f) the location of the resource's interconnection;

(g) the estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of the resource, as well as an estimate of any incremental Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values (in MW) (for Generating Capacity Resources and Import Capacity Resources);

(h) the estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value (for Demand Capacity Resources and Distributed Energy Capacity Resources) or net injection capability values per facility (for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources);

(i) a description of the resource, including (for Generating Capacity Resources and Import Capacity Resources) a general description of the resource's equipment configuration and a description of the resource technology type, and (for Demand Capacity Resources) a description of the resource's Demand Capacity Resource type and measure type, and (for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources) a description of the project and its configuration, including the types of generation and demand response composing the project, and (for

Generating Capacity Resources and Distributed Energy Capacity Resources comprising generation) a one-line diagram of the resource's configuration;

(j) for resources supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all unique project identifiers associated with the Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade;

(k) for Generating Capacity Resources with a contract to export capacity from the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, the interface over which the capacity will be exported and the contract associated with the export capacity;

(l) Additional requirements for Import Capacity Resources, the interface over which the capacity will be imported and one of the following submissions documenting the source of the imported capacity, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.1: (i) documentation of a contract entered into before the Qualification Data Submission Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for one or more years encompassing the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iii) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the Import Capacity Resource will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load.

(m) Additional requirements for Demand Capacity Resources, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.2: resource technical and credit/financial contacts; Measurement and Verification Plan (for On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources); Load Zone and Dispatch Zone (for Active Demand Capacity Resources);

(n) Additional requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.1.3: expected nameplate capacity by technology type per facility; installation date of facilities that are part of the project and already constructed, installed, or in commercial operation; indication of whether the project elects Intermittent Power Resource treatment; resource technical and credit/financial contacts; Load Zone, Dispatch Zone and DRR Aggregation Zone;

(o) Additional requirements for resources with capacity impacted by ambient air conditions between 90 degrees and 100 degrees, as further detailed in Section III.15.2.1.5; and

(p) Additional requirements for resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, as further detailed in III.15.2.6(d): the Qualification Data Submission Package shall satisfy the technical data requirements associated with such resources and be supplemented with the as-built status of the resource on the date of the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline.

(b) By submitting the required qualification information, the Lead Market Participant certifies that a Capacity Offer from the resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Tariff.

(c) The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of the resource.

III.15.2.1.1.1. Additional Import Capacity Resource Requirements.

Import Capacity Resources must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. For the purposes of the qualification process, all Import Capacity Resources shall be treated as if they had never previously participated as capacity and must submit the materials described pursuant to this Section III.15.2.1.1 for each Capacity Commitment Period for which the Import Capacity Resource seeks to qualify capacity. Import Capacity Resources backed by an External Control Area that does not have a Coordination Agreement with the ISO shall be ineligible to participate in the Annual Capacity Market. No single Import Capacity Resource may qualify capacity in excess of the external interface limits as described in Section III.12.10.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall have its external node modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Annual Capacity Auction qualification requirements of this Section III.15.2.1 and demonstration requirements of III.15.2.6. The Qualified Capacity of all Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Capacity Network Import Capability.

Capacity Offers for Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to rationing except for Capacity Offers priced above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold for Import Capacity resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, which must obtain a Capacity Supply Obligation or not in whole unless the Capacity Offer indicated that it may be rationed as described in III.15.4.1.

III.15.2.1.1.1.1. Imports Backed by External Resources.

If the Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources, the Lead Market Participant shall submit a description of how the Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify. The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period and contain the relevant historical performance data for each resource. If those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Lead Market Participant, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.15.2.1.1.1.2. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.

If the Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area, the Lead Market Participant shall submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the Import Capacity Resource.

III.15.2.1.1.1.3. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.

Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) for imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing; (2) for imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load; and (3) the Lead Market Participant entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.15.2.1.1.2. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Requirements.
A Demand Capacity Resource may be an Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, and may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility's Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit a Capacity Offer to import into or export out of the New England Control Area.

For a resource, or portion thereof, that never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction to qualify as an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2028, the measure or measures contained in the resource must not have been in-service prior to June 1, 2024. For a resource, or portion thereof, that never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction to qualify as an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in the Annual Capacity Auction or Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, as relevant, for or during the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2029, and all Capacity Commitment Periods thereafter, the measure or measures contained in the resource must have been placed in-service or previously qualified as capacity no more than six months before the prior Annual Capacity Auction's Capacity Demonstration Deadline.

III.15.2.1.1.2.1. Measurement and Verification of Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the Lead Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Annual Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall submit to the ISO Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(b) Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall: (1) serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource; (2) document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource; and (3) contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and, for those Demand Capacity Resources composed of energy efficiency measures, over the expected Measure Lives. An On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(c) The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process, as described in this Section III.15.2.1.1.2.1, and monthly Measurement and Verification data submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification data shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan.

Such monthly Measurement and Verification data shall document the Lead Market Participant's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Lead Market Participant's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification data shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Lead Market Participants. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(d) Lead Market Participants for On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource for which the Lead Market Participant is requesting compensation continues to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than ten Business Days before the Qualification Data Submission Deadline.

(e) For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources comprising customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Lead Market Participants shall maintain records of retail customers served, including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Lead Market Participant shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction values and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Lead Market Participants shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is retired or deactivated from the Annual Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

(f) The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.15.2 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.15.2.1.1.3. Additional Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Requirements.

(a) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources. A facility connected at a point of interconnection that is 5 MW or greater cannot be a part of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource comprises one or more Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations located in a single Capacity Zone and a single DRR Aggregation Zone, except that (a) a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation may not participate in a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with any other type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, and (b) an end-use customer facility participating as part of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource with measures other than Energy Efficiency may not participate in a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit a Capacity Offer to import into or export out of the New England Control Area. For purposes of this Section III.15.2.1.1.3: (i) if a facility is expected to interconnect at a point of interconnection, its net injection capability is the generation capability of the installed generation technology at the point of interconnection; (ii) if a facility is expected to interconnect at a Retail Delivery Point and does not plan to participate in the aggregation as a Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, the net injection capability is the lesser of the generation less the load profile measured at the location of the end-use customer meter or the amount the facility is contractually able to inject.

(b) Demand Response Resource in Distributed Energy Capacity Resources. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource includes Demand Response Resources, the completed Qualification Data Submission Package shall include the following additional information: the estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); the estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Response Resource (which must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section

III.8.2); and supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values.

(c) Net Injection of 5 MW or Greater. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource contains a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation with a facility with net injection of 5 MW or greater at a Retail Delivery Point, then the completed Qualification Data Submission Package for such a resource shall include the following additional information: the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; nameplate MW and net injection capability; non-coincident peak load (MW) of the facility without generation; technology type; and the Market Participant's portion of generation requested to be included as Qualified Capacity.

(d) Net Injection Greater Than or Equal to 1 MW and less than 5 MW. If the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource contains a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation with a facility that has net injection capability at the point of interconnection of 1 MW or greater and less than 5 MW, then the completed Qualification Data Submission Package for such a facility shall include the following additional information: distribution bus; technology type; nameplate MW; one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; if the facility is intermittent, the requested contribution of Qualified Capacity and supporting site-specific data; if an interconnection agreement is required under state requirements, the date when the interconnection request was submitted and the status of that interconnection request.

III.15.2.1.2. Market Power Review.

Lead Market Participants seeking to qualify a Capacity Resource that has not previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or that is otherwise treated as if it had never done so pursuant to this Section III.15.2, must comply with the market power review provisions of Section III.A.21 by the Annual Capacity Auction Qualification Data Submission Deadline.

III.15.2.1.3. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

For the Annual Capacity Auctions for the 2028-2029, 2029-2030 and 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Periods, a Lead Market Participant that has made the election in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 of the Forward Capacity Market rules with respect to a Capacity Resource must specify by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline whether it elects to continue to have the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply in Annual Capacity Auctions for the balance of the period permitted for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Should a Lead Market Participant elect to terminate Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 treatment for its Capacity Resource, it may not re-elect such treatment for any future Annual Capacity Auctions.

A Lead Market Participant that has made the election in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 of the Forward Capacity Market rules with respect to a Capacity Resource which has not achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation as defined in Section III.15.2.6 of Market Rule 1 may not participate in the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period and shall not have the previously elected Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply for the 2028-2029 Capacity Commitment Period. Should such resource achieve Capacity Market Commercial Operation in time for participation in the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2029-2030 Capacity Commitment Period, or the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Period, it may elect to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price it received pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 apply for the balance of the period permitted for such Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4, and in no event after the Annual Capacity Auction for the 2030-2031 Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.2.1.4. Material Deficiency in Data Submission.

In its review of a Lead Market Participant's data submission under this Section III.15.2.1, the ISO may consult with the Lead Market Participant, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO determines that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Lead Market Participant may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

In the event the ISO determines that a Lead Market Participant's data submission under Section III.15.2.1 is materially deficient, it shall notify the participant of such deficiencies at least ten Business Days prior to publication of the Advisory Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, and the Lead Market Participant shall have five Business Days from the date of notification to cure the deficiencies. Should a Lead Market Participant fail to cure such deficiencies by the end of the cure period, it shall not be permitted to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction. In the event of such a rejection, the ISO shall provide the

Lead Market Participant with a written explanation of the reason for the rejection within ten Business Days of the close of the cure period.

III.15.2.1.5. Additional Qualification Requirements for Ambient Air Condition Impacts.
In the Qualification Data Submission Package, a Lead Market Participant may submit documentation indicating that a portion of its resource's capacity will not be physically available due to an ambient air condition. The size of such ambient air condition is calculated as the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process the size of the ambient air condition.

III.15.2.2. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Qualification.
For a resource that has not previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction to qualify as a Capacity Resource for the purpose of participation in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction pursuant to Section III.15.5 or bilateral activities pursuant to Section III.15.6, prior to the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the relevant month a Lead Market Participant must: (1) submit the Qualification Data Submission Package as described in Section III.15.2.1 (except for the information described at Section III.15.2.1.2) by the Capacity Demonstration Deadline for the relevant month, except that an Import Capacity Resource or a Resource seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(d) must submit its Qualification Data Submission Package 30 calendar days prior to the Capacity Demonstration Deadline; and (2) complete a capacity demonstration pursuant to Section III.15.2.6.

III.15.2.3. Deliverability Review.
A Generating Capacity Resource, Active Demand Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource associated with an External Elective Transmission Upgrade, and Distributed Energy Capacity Resource must satisfy the deliverability review requirements described in this Section III.15.2.3 in order to qualify capacity for participation in an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction above the deliverability value associated with the resource's qualification for any previous Forward Capacity Auction, Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction. None of the provisions of this Section III.15.2, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder.

III.15.2.3.1. Deliverability Review for Capacity Resources Associated with Generating Facilities or External Elective Transmission Upgrades Subject to Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

A Generating Facility or External Elective Transmission Upgrade subject to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Tariff must complete the applicable interconnection processes set forth therein and have been assigned, as applicable, either Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, as necessary to support the delivery of the associated Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity.

III.15.2.3.2. Deliverability Review for Capacity Resources Associated with Resources Not Subject to Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

For a Generating Capacity Resource, Active Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource not subject to Schedules 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Tariff, the ISO shall perform a deliverability review based on: (1) the information provided in the resource's Qualification Data Submission Package; and (2) the results of the ISO's most recent deliverability analysis, performed consistent with the criteria and conditions conducted as described in the ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that such a resource cannot deliver any of the requested incremental capacity, then the resource or incremental portion thereof shall not qualify for participation in the Capacity Market as reflected in the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values issued pursuant to Section III.15.2.7; otherwise, the ISO shall determine that the requested Qualified Capacity of the Capacity Resource is deliverable, and the Capacity Resource shall be eligible to continue to proceed with the remainder of the processes described in this Section III.15.2.

III.15.2.4. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

Resources that have previously counted as capacity shall, for the purposes of Section III.15.2, be treated as if they had never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction if: (1) there is a material change to the Capacity Resource as described in III.15.2.4.1, or (2) if a deactivated or retired resource seeks to re-enter the Capacity Market pursuant to III.15.2.4.2.

III.15.2.4.1. Material Change to a Capacity Resource.

(a) A Lead Market Participant that materially changes a Capacity Resource that has previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or plans to do so prior to the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline, may, by the relevant Qualification Data

Submission Deadline or monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, inform the ISO of that material change, update the information provided under Section III.15.2.1.1 to reflect the change to the Capacity Resource, and demonstrate its updated Commercial Capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.6. The updated Qualified Capacity of the resource, accounting for the change, shall be calculated in accordance with Section III.15.3.1 for the subsequent Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. The Seasonal Qualified Capacity of a Capacity Resource that notifies the ISO of a material change but does not demonstrate pursuant to III.15.2.6 shall remain unmodified until demonstration of the material change occurs.

(b) For purposes of this Section III.15.2.4, a material change to a Capacity Resource is a change to the design or operating characteristics of the resource, including its interconnection facilities, that may have a significant effect on the reliability or operating characteristics associated with the Capacity Resource, and shall include, but not be limited to, changing the resource technology type, making a change to the Capacity Resource that increases or decreases the resource's Annual Qualified Capacity by greater than the lesser of 5 MW or 10 percent, or any change to the resource that requires a material modification to its interconnection agreement. No less than 30 calendar days prior to the Qualification Data Submission Deadline or Monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, as relevant, a Lead Market Participant may request, and the ISO shall within 20 calendar days provide, a determination regarding whether a change qualifies as a material change to a Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.15.2.4 and requires submission of the materials required pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.1.

III.15.2.4.2. Treatment of Previously Deactivated or Retired Resources.

In order to qualify for participation in the Capacity Market, a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) must: (1) have reached its deactivation date and reduced its Capacity Network Resource Capability pursuant to Section II.48.3; (2) if the resource was compensated for delaying deactivation through a Commission-approved cost-of-service agreement, have refunded to the ISO all costs subject to refund under the claw-back provision set forth in Section II.54.1; and (3) have satisfied the provisions of Section III.15.2, including submission of the Qualification Data Submission Package described in Section III.15.2.1 and completed the capacity interconnection service requirements described in Section III.15.2.3, as if the resource had never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.2.5. Calculation of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values.

Following the Qualification Data Submission Deadline, by a date in the month of February published on the Capacity Auction Calendar, the ISO shall calculate and provide to Lead Market Participants summer and winter Advisory Qualified Capacity Values for each resource that has met the data submission requirements in Section III.15.2.1. The Advisory Qualified Capacity Values of any resource that has not previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or is otherwise treated as if it had not done so, shall equal its demonstrated Commercial Capacity determined in accordance with Section III.15.2.6; except that in the event that a resource has not yet demonstrated a portion of its Commercial Capacity, its Advisory Qualified Capacity Values shall equal the sum of its Commercial Capacity and the estimated incremental Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of the resource as submitted pursuant to Section III.15.2.1. For all other resources, the Advisory Qualified Capacity Values shall equal the Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.

During the period beginning with the ISO's issuance of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values and ending with the conclusion of the Annual Capacity Auction, any change to a capacity resource or the information submitted in a Qualification Data Submission Package shall not impact the resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for that Annual Capacity Auction unless the change has already been accounted for in the submitted Qualification Data Submission Package, or is made pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.4 or Section III.15.2.7.

III.15.2.6. Capacity Commercial Operation Demonstration Requirement.

To participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transaction, a Capacity Resource must first demonstrate that its capacity is commercially operational by meeting the demonstration requirements in this Section III.15.2.6 by the applicable Capacity Demonstration Deadline. A resource that meets the demonstration requirements of this Section III.15.2.6 shall be deemed to have achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation.

(a) Demonstration must be completed (i) prior to a Capacity Resource's initial participation in the Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or bilateral transaction, and (ii) when a Capacity Resource that has previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Forward Capacity Auction or Annual Capacity Auction materially changes or reactivates pursuant to Section III.15.2.4.

(b) The Capacity Demonstration Deadline for each Annual Capacity Auction shall be during the month of April preceding the relevant Annual Capacity Auction, as published on the Capacity Auction

Calendar; for each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral window, the Capacity Demonstration Deadline shall precede the relevant Obligation Month by approximately two weeks, as published on the Capacity Auction Calendar.

(c) To demonstrate commercial capacity, a resource must perform an audit by the relevant Capacity Demonstration Deadline, using the following audit requirements:

(i) For Generating Capacity Resources that are not Intermittent Power Resources, each Generator Asset must perform an Establish Claim Capability Audit pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2, provide the data described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 23, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2(d)(iv).

(ii) For Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources, each Generator Asset must perform a Seasonal Claim Capability Audit pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3, provide the data described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 23, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3(i).

(iii) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, each Demand Response Asset must perform a Seasonal DR Audit pursuant to III.1.5.1.3.1, as specified by season in III.15.7.1.5.3(c), requested by the Lead Market Participant, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1(m).

(iv) For Demand Capacity Resources that are not Active Demand Capacity Resources, each Demand Capacity Resource must perform a Passive DR Audit pursuant to III.15.7.1.5.4, as specified by season in III.15.7.1.5.3(c), at the request of the Lead Market Participant, and have its audit value become effective pursuant to Section III.15.7.1.5.4(f).

(v) For Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, each asset comprising the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource must meet the demonstration requirement in sub-sections (i) through (iii) above for its corresponding asset type.

(vi) For Import Capacity Resources, demonstration is achieved through provision of performance data in the resource's Qualification Data Submission Package in accordance with Section III.15.2.1, except that Import Capacity Resources associated with an external Elective

Transmission Upgrade must demonstrate the ability to transfer power between regions pursuant to Schedule 25, Article 6.

(d) For those resources identified in Sections III.15.2.6(c)(ii), III.15.2.6(c)(iv), and III.15.2.6(c)(v) providing asset-level meter-based performance data by the Capacity Demonstration Deadline that is, as determined by the Lead Market Participant, of insufficient duration to establish accurate Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, or for a period inconsistent with the audit described in Section III.15.2.6(c), the Lead Market Participant may request that the ISO determine Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values based on the lesser of: (1) the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values requested for qualification by the Lead Market Participant; or (2) the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values estimated by the ISO. In no instance shall the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values developed pursuant to this Section III.15.2.6(d) exceed a resource's seasonal Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service, or its equivalent.

The ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall be based on technical data requirements for recently commercial resources identified in the Qualification Data Submission Package. The Qualification Data Submission Package of resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall include a description of the as-built status of the resource at time of submission, including whether the resource is fully or partially operational. For those resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values, the Qualification Data Submission Package must be submitted to the ISO by the Lead Market Participant by the Qualification Data Submission Deadline for the Annual Capacity Auction, or 30 days prior to the relevant monthly Capacity Demonstration Deadline, with the submission updated at the time of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline to reflect the as-built status of the resource. Resources satisfying the provisions of this Section III.15.2.6(d) shall be deemed to have demonstrated Commercial Capacity.

Resources seeking ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values that have completed the relevant audit described in III.15.2.6(c) for only one season may elect to use the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values for one or both seasons. The ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values may constitute a resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for up to one year after issuance, but shall be valid for no longer than one year after a resource becomes fully operational. A Lead Market Participant may request replacement of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values once the relevant seasonal audit has been completed.

III.15.2.7. Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values and Challenge Process.

(a) Following the April Capacity Demonstration Deadline, for each Capacity Resource qualified to participate in an Annual Capacity Auction, the ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, calculated in accordance with Section III.15.3, and the Load Zone in which the resource is located. This notification will be provided by the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for a Capacity Resource, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five calendar days of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date.

(c) If a Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity has been subject to a significant decrease pursuant to Section III.15.3.6, the Lead Market Participant may submit a restoration plan in accordance with Section III.15.3.6(b) within five calendar days of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Notification Date.

(d) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any challenge submitted under (b) above or of its determination regarding the sufficiency of a restoration plan submitted under (c) above, by the date specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar for such responses. In assessing the sufficiency of a restoration plan, the ISO shall determine whether the plan provides sufficient information to support the reasonable likelihood of the resource providing capacity consistent with its summer Qualified Capacity value by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.2.8. Offers Composed of Separate Resources (Composite Offers).

Separate resources seeking to participate together in an Annual Capacity Auction shall submit a Composite Offer Form no later than the Composite Offer Deadline, which shall be approximately two business days prior to the auction as specified in the Capacity Auction Calendar, with the exception that Distributed Energy Capacity Resources may not participate in composite offers. Composite offers may not be modified or withdrawn after the Composite Offer Deadline. Composite offers must meet the following conditions:

(a) In all months of the summer period of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources combined meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of a composite offer must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of Section III.15.2 applicable to that resource type. A composite offer participates in the Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of a composite offer shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.15.3.7 shall apply, even where one or more of the resources that are part of the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the composite offer in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Composite offers are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

		Location of Summer Resource			
		Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone
Location of Winter Resource	Import-Constrained Capacity Zone	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Eligible	Eligible	Eligible
	Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)

	Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone	Ineligible	Ineligible	Ineligible	Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)

III.15.2.9. Self-Supplied Capacity.

Where a load serving entity elects to designate all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation as self-supplied, the load serving must make such designation to the ISO during the self-supply designation window, as published in the Capacity Auction Calendar on the ISO's website. The load serving entity's designation shall specify the MW amount and Lead Market Participant providing the self-supplied capacity. During the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the Lead Market Participant supplying such capacity shall confirm the load serving entity's self-supply designation by specifying each Self-Supplied Capacity Resource and the MW amount of self-supplied capacity in its Capacity Offer. A Generating Capacity Resource or an Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource. A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource may only designate its net injection capability as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource. All self-supplied capacity shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.15.2.9. If designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource the resource will clear in the Annual Capacity Auction as described in Section III.15.4 and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied Capacity Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.15.2. All designations as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource in the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.15.2.9.1. Self-Supplied Capacity Eligibility.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource and must satisfy the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.15.2 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.15.2.9.1. Where a Capacity Offer composed of separate resources is submitted for a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.15.2.8 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.15.2.9. The total quantity of capacity that a load serving entity designates as self-supplied capacity may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.15.2.9.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied Capacity Resources.

In order to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied Capacity Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.15.2.10. Publication of Annual Qualified Capacity Values for Annual Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall provide Annual Qualified Capacity values to Lead Market Participants of each Capacity Resource participating in an Annual Capacity Auction one business day before the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window.

III.15.2.11. Publication of Offer Information.

(a) For each Capacity Offer, the quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located will be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 days after the Annual Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) For Capacity Offers from Import Capacity Resources, the name of submitter, quantity, and interface shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 days after the Annual Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Capacity Offers, as well as the number of Capacity Offers submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published to the ISO's website no later than 15 calendar days after the issuance of Advisory Qualified Capacity Values. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Capacity Offers upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.15.3. Capacity Resource Accreditation.

Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.15.3, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity, a winter Qualified Capacity, an Annual Qualified Capacity and, where applicable, a Monthly Qualified Capacity for each Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, and Distributed Energy Capacity Resource. A Capacity Resource's Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values shall not exceed its seasonal Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or equivalent, or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, as applicable. Qualified Capacity for resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the resource's highest previously received Capacity Supply Obligation unless the resource has demonstrated and qualified the additional capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.4.1.

Qualified Capacity values for resources that have never previously obtained a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall be calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.1. Qualified Capacity for resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or a Forward Capacity Auction shall be calculated pursuant to Sections III.15.3.2 through III.15.3.5.

III.15.3.1. Qualified Capacity for Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

III.15.3.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity of a Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, or is otherwise treated as such pursuant to the terms of this Section III.15, shall be determined in accordance with the capacity demonstration requirements set forth in Section III.15.2.6, as specified below.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(c)(i), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.2(c) audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3 and III.15.3.2.4, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(c)(ii), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.3 audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3 and Section III.15.3.2.4, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(iii), the ISO shall use the Section III.1.5.1.3.1 audit results. To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Demand Capacity Resource other than an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(iv), the ISO shall use the Section III.15.7.1.5.4 audit results. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such resources shall be determined pursuant to Sections III.15.3.4.2 and III.15.3.4.3, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant III.15.2.6(c)(v), the ISO shall use the audit results specified therein for the corresponding asset type. The annual and Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to III.15.3.5.2 and III.15.3.5.3, respectively.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of an Import Capacity Resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and has demonstrated commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(c)(vi), the ISO shall use the performance data results specified therein. The annual and monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to III.15.3.3.

To determine the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values of a resource that has never previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and that has elected to demonstrate commercial capacity pursuant Section III.15.2.6(d), the ISO shall use the values developed pursuant to Section III.15.2.6(d). The annual Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.3, Section III.15.3.4.2, or Section III.15.3.5.2, as applicable to the relevant resource type. The Monthly Qualified Capacity of such a resource shall be determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.4, III.15.3.4.3, or Section III.15.3.5.3, as applicable to the relevant resource type.

III.15.3.2 Qualified Capacity for Generating Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Generating Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.2.

III.15.3.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.

(a) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the summer Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where a Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation.

(b) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the summer Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours for each of the previous five summer periods. If there are fewer than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation, the summer Qualified Capacity of such resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation. The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition, and for Intermittent Power Resources in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all summer period hours in which there was a Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.3.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

(a) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the winter Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where a Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation.

(b) For the purpose of Annual Capacity Auction qualification, the winter Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours for each of the previous five summer periods. If there are fewer than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation, the winter Qualified Capacity of such resource shall be the average of the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output during Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved Capacity Market Commercial Operation or FCM Commercial Operation. The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition, and for Intermittent Power Resources in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all winter period hours in which there was a Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.3.2.3. Annual Qualified Capacity.

The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.15.3.2.4. Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource shall be the resource's most recent Seasonal Claimed Capability value for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Generating Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

III.15.3.3. Qualified Capacity for Import Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Control Area shall be based on the values and data submitted during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification. The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be based on the data submitted during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and calculated based on the summer and winter Qualified Capacity of the resources underlying the Import Capacity Resource, in accordance with Sections III.15.3.2.1 and III.15.3.2.2.

III.15.3.4. Qualified Capacity for Demand Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Demand Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.4.

III.15.3.4.1. Summer and Winter Qualified Capacity.

(a) For Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or deactivate, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses).

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the median of the resource's Seasonal DR Audit value or Passive DR Audit value from the five most recent years, for the relevant season, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. Where a Demand Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer or winter Seasonal Audit Values, as applicable, then the summer (or winter) Qualified Capacity for that Demand Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all the resource's previous summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation.

III.15.3.4.2. Annual Qualified Capacity.

The Annual Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall equal the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.15.3.4.3 Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource, other than a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures, shall equal its most recent Seasonal DR Audit value or Passive DR Audit value for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Demand Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures shall equal the most recently-determined summer or winter demand reduction values of the resource's installed Energy Efficiency measures (excluding any capacity that will retire, deactivate, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to the start of the relevant Obligation Month, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses).

III.15.3.5. Qualified Capacity of Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

The summer, winter, annual, and monthly Qualified Capacity for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that have previously received a Capacity Supply Obligation in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined pursuant to this Section III.15.3.5.

III.15.3.5.1. Summer and Winter Qualified Capacity.

The summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall equal the median of the resource's summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Value from the five most recent years, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation. Where a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, then the summer (or winter) Qualified Capacity for that Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of the resource's previous summer (or winter) Seasonal Audit Values, as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline of each year, with only positive summer (or winter) values included in the median calculation.

The summer or winter Qualified Capacity of Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources shall be determined in accordance with the rules for Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources in Section III.15.3.2.

III.15.3.5.2. Annual Qualified Capacity.

Annual Qualified Capacity for a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, unless the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource is an Intermittent Power Resource, in which case the Annual Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

III.15.3.5.3. Monthly Qualified Capacity.

The Monthly Qualified Capacity of a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource shall equal the most recent Seasonal DECR Audit for the season applicable to the relevant month; for those Distributed Energy Capacity Resources that elect use of ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Values pursuant to III.15.2.6(d), the Monthly Qualified Capacity shall be the ISO-estimated Seasonal Qualified Capacity Value for the season applicable to the relevant month.

III.15.3.6. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.

For a Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Resource, Distributed Energy Capacity Resource, or Demand Capacity Resource, if the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability rating, summer season Import Capacity Resource performance data submitted pursuant to Section III.15.2.1.1.1, summer Seasonal DECR Audit Value, summer Seasonal DR Audit Value, or summer Passive DR Audit Value as of the Annual Capacity Auction's Capacity Demonstration Deadline is below the resource's Qualified Capacity by more than the threshold defined in the following formula:

$$Threshold = min[max(10\% \times QC_{Summer}, 2\ MW), 10\ MW]$$

Where,

QC_{Summer} = the resource's summer Qualified Capacity then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments set forth in this Section III.15.3.6 by the close of the Seasonal Qualified Capacity Challenge and Restoration Plan Submission Window. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.15.3.6(b) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.15.3.6(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Annual Capacity Auction only, to have the resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability rating, summer Seasonal DECR Audit Value, Seasonal DR Audit Value, or Passive DR Audit Value as of the Capacity Demonstration Deadline, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a restoration plan describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Generating Capacity Resource, Import Capacity Resource backed by an External Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.2, Section III.15.3.3, Section III.15.3.4, or Section III.15.3.5 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Generating Capacity Resource, Demand Capacity Resource, or Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.15.3.2, Section III.15.3.3, Section III.15.3.4, or Section III.15.3.5 for the Annual Capacity Auction. The ISO shall review submitted restoration plans in accordance with the requirements and timelines set forth in Section III.15.2.7.

III.15.3.7. Resources Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where a Generating Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource), Demand Capacity Resource, or Import Capacity Resource has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.15.3, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, in accordance with Section III.15.2.8; or (ii) have its Annual Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

Where a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this

Section III.15.3, then that resource must have its Annual Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.15.4. Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.4.1 Capacity Offers.

Lead Market Participants submitting Capacity Offers in the Annual Capacity Auction shall submit Capacity Offers for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction as specified in this Section III.15.4.1.

(a) Each Capacity Offer shall be associated with a Capacity Resource for which an Annual Qualified Capacity value has been established for the Annual Capacity Auction through the Annual Capacity Auction qualification process set forth in Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3.

(b) Capacity Offers must be submitted during the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the dates of which will be specified as published in the Capacity Auction Calendar. Capacity Offers are not considered final until the close of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window and may be amended or corrected as necessary until such time as the window closes.

(c) If a Lead Market Participant fails to submit a Capacity Offer for a resource subject to the requirements of Section III.A.22.1, the ISO shall enter a Capacity Offer for the resource into the Annual Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.A.22.1(d).

(d) Each Capacity Offer must specify at least one price-quantity pair, which consists of one price, denominated in $/kW-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and a quantity value, expressed in MW to an accuracy of up to three decimal places. The Capacity Offer may specify up to ten price-quantity pairs, where each such pair represents the total amount of capacity offered from the Capacity Resource at the price specified. If more than one price-quantity pair is submitted, the price-quantity pairs must specify prices and quantity values in such a way that, when the price-quantity pairs are ordered from lowest price to highest price, the quantity value in each price-quantity pair increases with each successive, higher-priced price-quantity pair. The price-quantity pair with the greatest specified price must include the Capacity Resource's total Annual Qualified Capacity. The Capacity Offer must not contain any offer prices less than $0.00/kW-month or greater than the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap, unless otherwise allowed pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.3 and subsection (e) of this Section III.15.4.1 or required by Section III.A.21 and subsection (f) of this Section III.15.4.1. The Capacity Offer must not specify a total MW quantity value that exceeds the Capacity Resource's Annual Qualified Capacity.

(e) A price-quantity pair in a Capacity Offer must not specify a price above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, except under the following circumstances:

(i) the Lead Market Participant for the Capacity Resource submitted the price-quantity pair to the Internal Market Monitor as part of a Proposed Capacity Offer, pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.2;

(ii) the Internal Market Monitor determined an Allowable Capacity Offer Price relative to the price-quantity pair pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.3; and

(iii) the specified price in the Capacity Offer does not exceed the price specified in the price-quantity pair reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor.

(f) For capacity included in a Capacity Offer that is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.3, the price specified must not be less than the Capacity Offer Floor Price.

(g) A Capacity Offer may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit up to which the offer may not be rationed and must be accepted or rejected in whole. Without such indication, offers shall be rationable up to the total MW quantity in the offer that is priced at or below the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, subject to the auction clearing constraint described in Section III.15.4.2.2(d). The lowest priced price-quantity pair in a Capacity Offer that specifies a Rationing Minimum Limit must specify a quantity value equal to or greater than the specified Rationing Minimum Limit. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Offer for an Import Capacity Resource may only specify a Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to this subsection (g) if the Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, as described in Section III.15.2.1.1.1.

(h) If the Capacity Offer specifies any price above the Capacity Offer Price Threshold, the Capacity Offer may elect to have the Above-Threshold Offer Segment be treated as rationable, subject to any Rationing Minimum Limit specified pursuant to subsection (g). Without such an election, the Above-Threshold Offer Segment will be treated as non-rationable and accepted or rejected in whole. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Capacity Offer for an Import Capacity Resource may only elect rationability for the Above-Threshold Offer Segment pursuant to this subsection (h) if the Import

Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, as described in Section III.15.2.1.1.1.

(i) In order to give effect to a self-supply designation made by a load serving entity pursuant to Section III.15.2.9 for any portion of the Capacity Resource's Annual Qualified Capacity, the Capacity Offer for such resource must (i) identify the load serving entity for which its capacity will serve as self-supplied capacity and the MW quantity of self-supplied capacity and (ii) include a price-quantity pair with an offer price of $0.00/kW-month that includes the amount of such capacity, unless such capacity is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price. If the self-supplied capacity is subject to a Capacity Offer Floor Price, then the price specified in the price-quantity pair including the self-supplied capacity must equal the Capacity Offer Floor Price.

(j) A Capacity Offer for a Generating Capacity Resource with a contract to export capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period must specify an Export Offer Segment and the interface over which the Export Offer Segment will be exported.

(k) A Lead Market Participant for a Capacity Resource that is subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 shall not enter a Capacity Offer for any capacity supplied by the Capacity Resource that is subject to delayed deactivation. The ISO shall enter such Capacity Resource's capacity subject to delayed deactivation into the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month.

(l) If a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the Capacity Resource had been made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for a Forward Capacity Auction, the Capacity Offer submitted for such Capacity Resource must include a price-quantity pair with an offer price of $0.00/kW-month that includes the total amount of the resource's capacity that cleared subject to such election.

III.15.4.2. Conduct of the Annual Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall determine Capacity Supply Obligations and Capacity Clearing Prices for the Capacity Commitment Period by conducting the Annual Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.15.4.2.

III.15.4.2.1. Replacement of Specified Prices for Mitigation Purposes.

After the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the ISO shall replace specified prices in submitted Capacity Offers as necessary, pursuant to Section III.A.22.2.4(c). Any such adjusted Capacity Offers shall be inputs for the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.4.2.2. Clearing of the Annual Capacity Auction.

(a) In determining Capacity Supply Obligations and Capacity Clearing Prices, the ISO shall employ an optimization algorithm that is designed to maximize social surplus in order to clear Capacity Offers, capacity entered into the auction by the ISO as described in Section III.15.4.1(k), and any Proxy Capacity Offers against the capacity demand curves calculated in accordance with Section III.15.1.1. In clearing Capacity Offers, the optimization algorithm shall take into account, as applicable, the inputs and constraints set forth in this Section III.15.4.2.2.

(b) The optimization algorithm shall take into account the following: (i) all price-quantity pairs in Capacity Offers for the Annual Capacity Auction submitted pursuant to Section III.15.4.1, subject to any adjustments made pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.1 and the constraint described in subsection (c) of this Section III.15.4.2.1; (ii) any Rationing Minimum Limits and rationability elections specified in Capacity Offers pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(g) and Section III.15.4.1(h), respectively; (iii) capacity from a Capacity Resource subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 at a default price of $0.00/kW-month; (iv) the set of distinct Capacity Zones determined to be modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4; (v) the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve calculated in accordance with Section 15.1.1.1; (vi) any Capacity Zone Demand Curves for import-constrained and export-constrained Capacity Zones, calculated in accordance with Sections 15.1.1.2 and 15.1.1.3, respectively; (vii) external interface limits calculated pursuant to Section III.12.10; and (viii) any Proxy Capacity Offers for the Annual Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.A.24.7, which shall be treated as non-rationable.

(c) The optimization algorithm shall not take into account price-quantity pairs in Capacity Offers that specify a price that exceeds the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap.

(d) Capacity entered into the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month shall clear the auction.

(e) A Capacity Offer that specifies a Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(g) shall not clear at quantities less than the specified Rationing Minimum Limit, and Above-Threshold Offer

Segments that are non-rationable pursuant to Section III.15.4.1(h) shall not clear at quantities less than the MW quantity of the segment.

(f) For an Export Offer Segment specified in a Capacity Offer that indicates a Generating Capacity Resource's contract to export capacity over an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or over an external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the ISO shall model the Export Offer Segment as though that quantity of capacity were located in the Capacity Zone where the external interface identified in the Capacity Offer is located and adjust Capacity Zone Demand Curves as necessary to reflect such modeling.

(g) In determining the clearing result that accounts for auction inputs and satisfies all applicable constraints, the optimization may select from among multiple possible alternative clearing results that satisfy such requirements, including clearing results where a Capacity Offer with a specified price below the Capacity Clearing Price does not clear.

(h) Where the clearing of the Annual Capacity Auction either system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone results in a tie (that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs), the following rules shall apply in sequence, as necessary, to determine clearing: (i) if multiple Capacity Offers may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately; and (ii) the Capacity Offer associated with the Lead Market Participant having the lower market share in the capacity auction shall be cleared.

(i) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the system-wide capacity entered into the Annual Capacity Auction that maximizes social surplus. In no case, however, shall the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone be less than the highest price specified in an offer for capacity that clears the auction, excluding any capacity that, due to its specified price, would not have cleared but for the fact that it is located within an import-constrained Capacity Zone that has a cleared quantity of capacity equal to or less than the truncation point for the zone's Capacity Zone Demand Curve.

(j) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the import-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(k) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Zone; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the export-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(l) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, shall be the greater of:

(i) the sum of (1) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone for the quantity of capacity within the zone that clears the auction and (2) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located; and

(ii) the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource in the export-constrained Capacity Zone and that clears the auction.

(m) The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

(n) Subject to the other conditions in this Section III.15.4.2.2, the Capacity Clearing Price for an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area shall be equal to:

(i) if the quantity of capacity over the external interface that clears the auction is equal to the external interface limit for such interface, the highest price specified in a Capacity Offer for capacity that is supplied from a resource offering capacity over such external interface and that clears the auction; or

(ii) if the quantity of capacity over the external interface that clears the auction is less than the external interface limit for such interface, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone associated with the external interface.

III.15.4.2.3. Results of the Annual Capacity Auction.

(a) Annual Capacity Supply Obligations shall be awarded to Capacity Resources in accordance with the results of the Annual Capacity Auction clearing mechanics described in Section III.15.4.2.2. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.15.2) shall be adjusted based on the winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.15.3.2.2. Additional Capacity Supply Obligations may be awarded in accordance with Section III.15.4.2.4.

(b) The Capacity Clearing Prices in each Capacity Zone modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction shall be the clearing prices determined as a result of the Annual Capacity Auction clearing mechanics described in Section III.15.4.2.2.

III.15.4.2.4. Additional Clearing of Auction in the Event of Cleared Proxy Offers.

If any Proxy Capacity Offer entered into the Annual Capacity Auction clears and receives a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall conduct an additional run of the auction. This additional run shall use the same methodology described in Section III.15.4.2.2, except that the additional run shall (i) exclude all Proxy Capacity Offers and (ii) enter all other capacity that cleared in the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction at a price of $0.00/kW-month. The additional run of the auction shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Prices of the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.2. Capacity (other than capacity still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction shall be paid the Capacity

Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone associated with the capacity during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the additional run of the auction procures additional capacity, that additionally procured capacity shall be paid the price resulting from the additional run in the Capacity Zone associated with that additional capacity during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and such price shall be equal to or greater than the price resulting from the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction in that Capacity Zone.

III.15.4.3. Publication of Annual Capacity Auction Results.

As soon as practicable after the Annual Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall publish the results of that Annual Capacity Auction publicly on its website, including the set of Capacity Zones modeled in the auction, the Capacity Clearing Prices in each of those Capacity Zones, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. The published information shall identify Proxy Capacity Offers that cleared, if any, in the primary run of the Annual Capacity Auction.

III.15.5. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions as described in this Section III.15.5. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in the Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Section III.15.5.1) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

III.15.5.1. Capacity Zones Included in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the Capacity Zones and external interfaces modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Section III.15.4.2.2.

III.15.5.2. Participation in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Each supply offer and demand bid in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction must be associated with a specific resource and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.15.5.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.13.2, supply offers and demand bids submitted for Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Resources with capacity subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 may not participate in reconfiguration auctions, unless otherwise authorized pursuant to the terms of a cost-of-service agreement of the type described in Section II.54.1. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. The offer and bid deadline for each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be announced by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated Obligation Month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.15.5.2.

III.15.5.2.1. Supply Offers in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

(a) All supply offers in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall be submitted by the Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, denominated in $/kW-month.

(b) A resource may not submit a supply offer for a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction unless a Monthly Qualified Capacity value has been established for the resource for the month associated with the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction pursuant to the qualification processes described in Sections III.15.2 and III.15.3.

(c) The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource's Monthly Qualified Capacity for the month associated with the auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.15.3 during the most recent qualification process for the resource; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month.

III.15.5.2.2. Demand Bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

(a) All demand bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions shall be submitted by the Lead Market Participant and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW and the price, denominated in $/kW-month.

(b) To submit a demand bid in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.

(c) Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource that cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource.

(d) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource's capacity that is already obligated for the month associated with that Monthly Reconfiguration Auction as of the offer and bid deadline for the auction.

III.15.5.3. Clearing Offers and Bids in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

All supply offers and demand bids are rationable and may be cleared in whole or in part in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

III.15.5.4. Conduct of Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the ISO shall employ an optimization algorithm that is designed to maximize social surplus in order to clear the supply offers against demand bids submitted for the auction. The truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.15.1.1.2 and Section III.15.1.1.3 and external interface limits established pursuant to Section III.12 shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

III.15.5.5. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.

For each supply offer that clears in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with the auction shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the month associated with the auction shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.

III.15.6. Bilateral Capacity Contracts.

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.15.6, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation. To the extent necessary for the ISO's review and approval of any of the bilateral contracts described in this Section III.15.6, the ISO shall apply the Capacity Zones and external interfaces modeled as inputs and constraints in the Annual Capacity Auction for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.15.4.2.2. Resources with capacity subject to delayed deactivation pursuant to Sections II.52 and II.53 may not participate in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or Capacity Performance Bilaterals, unless otherwise authorized pursuant to the terms of a cost-of-service agreement of the type described in Section II.54.1.

III.15.6.1. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

A Capacity Transferring Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation and seeking to shed that obligation may enter into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part, to a Capacity Acquiring Resource, or portion thereof, for a whole-month period during the Capacity Commitment Period, as described in this Section III.15.6.1.

III.15.6.1.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(a) Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly periods, and a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month.

(b) The qualification of Capacity Acquiring Resources for participation in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources submitting supply offers for Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions as specified in Section III.15.5.2.1(b). A resource that does not have a Monthly Qualified Capacity value established for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that month.

(c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the amount of unobligated Monthly Qualified Capacity of the Capacity Acquiring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. For the purpose of this subsection (c), unobligated Monthly Qualified Capacity refers to the Monthly Qualified Capacity that was determined pursuant to Section III.15.3 in the most recent qualification process for the resource prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO and that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation.

(d) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied Capacity Resource as a result of the transaction.

(e) Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are allowed between a Capacity Transferring Resource and a Capacity Acquiring Resource that are located within different Capacity Zones and across external interfaces modeled as part of the Annual Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period of the relevant monthly period, subject to the transmission interface limits between Capacity Zones and external interface limits, as described in Section III.15.6.1.4(b).

(f) Participation in any Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of submission to the ISO.

III.15.6.1.2. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.

The Lead Market Participant for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals in the Capacity Auction Calendar. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

III.15.6.1.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, denominated in $/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of $0.00/kW-month.

III.15.6.1.4. ISO Review.

(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the submission and participation requirements described in this Section III.15.6.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the submittal window, the ISO shall conduct a review to determine the deliverability of the submitted Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals. In its review, the ISO shall model as constraints the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Sections III.15.1.1.2 and III.15.1.1.3 and external interface limits established pursuant to Section III.12 for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals that are not fully deliverable up to their specific MW values without violating transmission transfer limits between Capacity Zones or external transfer limits. Transactions will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety. The ISO shall approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected, the Lead Market Participant for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the basis for such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.1.5. Approval.

Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply

Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource for the month covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.

A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant seeking to shed its Capacity Load Obligation may enter into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone to a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation, as described in this Section III.15.6.2.

III.15.6.2.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.

A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2.2. Timing of Submission to the ISO.

Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial daily settlements of payments and charges associated with the Annual Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 p.m. on the first Business Day of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.6.2.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

III.15.6.2.4. ISO Review.

The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.15.6.2 are not met.

III.15.6.2.5. Approval.

Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral for the period covered by the bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral for the period covered by the bilateral.

III.15.6.3. Capacity Performance Bilaterals.

A resource's Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.15.6.3.

III.15.6.3.1. Terms of and Participation in Capacity Performance Bilaterals.

If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval through a Capacity Performance Bilateral, so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition. The Lead Market Participant for the transferring resource may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for such five-minute interval to the receiving resource. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

III.15.6.3.2. Timing of Submission to the ISO.

A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Annual Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity

Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 p.m. on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

III.15.6.3.3. Contents of Submission to the ISO.

The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; and (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

III.15.6.3.4. ISO Review.

The ISO shall review the information provided in the submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.15.6.3 are not met.

III.15.6.3.5. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.

A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect either party's Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Condition subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.2.

III.15.7. Obligations of Capacity Suppliers.

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through an Annual Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.15.7 for each Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.7.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through an Annual Capacity Auction, Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.15.7.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

III.15.7.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

(i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource's Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or

(ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.15.7.1.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource's Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.1.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice. Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.15.7.1.1.3. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.

Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas; and

(c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements), provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, except that:

(a) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
(b) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
(c) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

III.15.7.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource must:

(a) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource's native Control Area, and;
(b) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

III.15.7.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) Market Participants with Intermittent Power Resources that are Dispatchable Resources and have a Capacity Supply Obligation are required to submit offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market consistent with the Market Participant's expectation of the output of the resource in Real-Time. Market Participants with non-dispatchable Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit, but are not required to submit, offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.3.2. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

III.15.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.15.7.1.5.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of Demand Reduction Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources and On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.15.7.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) An Energy Efficiency measure may be added to an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource (other than one consisting of Load Management or Distributed Generation) until two years after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation; provided, however, that a resource that qualified for a Forward Capacity Auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or before June 1, 2024 may install Energy Efficiency measures until May 31, 2027. Once an Energy Efficiency measure has been associated with an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the measure may not be transferred to a different resource.

(c) For purposes of confirming Capacity Market Commercial Operation as described in Section III.15.2.6, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource. The summer and winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource consisting of Energy Efficiency measures may be verified in any month of the year.

(d) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(e) On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section

III.15.2.1.1.2.1. and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.15.7.1.5.4 and III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(f) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.7.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource Auditing Requirements.

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values shall be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

(d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.

(e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource shall be determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the

Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.

(f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.

(g) For On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources consisting of Energy Efficiency measures, the ISO shall calculate a summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value in each month of the year. For all other On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources, a Market Participant may request that a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.

III.15.7.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.

The ISO may perform one or both of the following additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures.

(a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO shall establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.

(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO shall establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource's audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

III.15.7.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.

III.15.7.1.6.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource's expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

III.15.7.1.7. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

III.15.7.1.7.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

(a) A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit offers for its Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market in at least the MW amount described in this Section III.15.7.1.7.1; for purposes of the following comparisons, the portion of any Demand Reductions Offers or Baseline Deviation Offers not associated with Net Supply shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The sum of the offers must be equal to or greater than the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations are physically available. If the Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations are physically available at a level less than the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the offers must equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each offer from a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation made into the Day- Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the resource's notification time plus start-up time plus Minimum Run Time (or Minimum Deviation Time or Minimum Reduction Time) plus Minimum Down Time (or Minimum Time Between Deviations or Minimum Time Between Reductions) is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Distributed Energy Capacity Resource comprises Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations, it is not obligated to submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and may not submit Supply Offers into the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.1.7.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice. Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the then-known capability of the resource.

III.15.7.1.7.3. Additional Requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

Distributed Energy Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Distributed Energy Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Distributed Energy Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources shall comply with the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

(c) Distributed Energy Capacity Resources shall comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in this Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(d) For Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, the Seasonal DECR Audit Value shall be established pursuant to Section III.1.7.13.

III.15.7.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.15.7.2 and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.15.7.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.1.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Generating Capacity Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.2.2. Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.2.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.
A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to submit offers for the resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant with a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation is not permitted to submit an offer for that resource into the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.2.2. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.
A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day- Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire offer, up to the maximum capability offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market so long as it is not a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.15.7.2.2.3. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is not associated with a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit an offer in the Real-Time Energy Market so long as the resource is not a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.2.4. Additional Requirements for Distributed Energy Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in Section III.15.7.1.7.3.

III.15.7.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

An Intermittent Power Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market. An Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

Intermittent Power Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.7.2.4. [Reserved.]

III.15.7.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.15.7.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation is not required to offer Demand Reduction Offers for the Demand Response Resource into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resources and On-Peak Demand Capacity Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.15.7.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) complying with Section III.15.7.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.15.7.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation, or that a Lead Market Participant indicates will not have a Capacity Supply Obligation, are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.15.7.3. Exporting Resources.

A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.15.7.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7 and Section III.1.10.7.A, as applicable.

III.15.7.4. ISO Requests for Energy.

The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource, or a Distributed Energy Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under this Section III.15 by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

III.15.7.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.

For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.15.7.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.

III.15.8. Capacity Payments and Charges.

Revenue in the Annual Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.15.8.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.2, adjusted as described in Section III.15.8.3 and Section III.15.8.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation shall be subject to charges as described in Section III.15.8.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.15 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.15.8.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.15.8.1.1.

III.15.8.1.1. Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in an Annual Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied Capacity Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period. Each monthly payment and charge listed in Section III.15.8.1.1 (a) through (d) below will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

(a) **Annual Capacity Auction**. For a resource whose offer has cleared in an Annual Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the

Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer cleared, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only, and subject to the limitations set forth in Section III.15.2.1.3.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions**. For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals**. For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and the price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

III.15.8.1.2 Export Capacity

If there are any unobligated Export Offer Segments from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows.

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x [Cleared MWs of Export Offer Segment]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the interface}}$ - Capacity Clearing Price $_{\text{location of the resource}}$] x [Cleared MWs of Export Offer Segment]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.15.8.5.2.

III.15.8.2. Capacity Performance Payments.

III.15.8.2.1. Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.15.8.2.2. Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.15.8.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.15.8.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.15.8.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(ii) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.

(iii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(e) A Distributed Energy Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Metered Quantity for Settlement and Reserve Quantity for Settlement of all the components of its constituent Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Based on the Real-Time operational coordination, the resource must follow any distribution system limitation and update its physical parameters accordingly. The Actual Capacity Provided cannot be less than zero.

(i) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource or Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response

Baseline of the Demand Response Asset or Distributed Energy Resource associated with the Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.15.8.2.3. Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

(Load + Reserve Requirement) / Total Capacity Supply Obligation

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero) (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Energy Efficiency measures.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in

Section III.15.8.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.15.8.2.3(c).

III.15.8.2.4. Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval (with the Actual Capacity Provided of Energy Efficiency measures being zero, as specified in Section III.15.8.2.2(c)(i)) minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Capacity Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Capacity Resource, the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.15.8.2.5. Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

The Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.15.8.2.6. Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity

Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.15.8.3. Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.15.8.3.1 and Section III.15.8.3.2 below.

III.15.8.3.1. Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month shall be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month.

III.15.8.3.2. Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$$MaxCSO \times [3 \text{ months} \times (ACAcp - ACAsp) - (12 \text{ months} \times ACAcp)]$$

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

ACAcp = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Annual Capacity Auction.

ACAsp = the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Price Cap for the relevant Annual Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the

Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.15.8.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month shall be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.15.8.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.15.8.3.2(b).

III.15.8.4. Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.
For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.15.8.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3 for the Obligation Month and excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures. If the charge described in this Section III.15.8.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.15.8.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.15.8.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.15.8.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources (excluding any resource, or portion thereof, consisting of Energy Efficiency measures) in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.15.8.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.15.8.4(b)

III.15.8.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.15.8.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges.

For purposes of this Section III.15.8.5.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation on any day of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments. Each charge and adjustment described in rate component (b) of Sections III.15.8.5.1.1 through III.15.8.5.1.8 shall be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.1.1. Annual Capacity Auction Charge.

The ACA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone ACA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

> Capacity Zone ACA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total ACA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.
>
> Total ACA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.15.8.5.1.5) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to the resource.
>
> Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.
>
> Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.15.8.5.1.2. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction in each zone and the applicable Monthly Reconfiguration Auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the Monthly Reconfiguration Auction in each zone and the applicable Monthly Reconfiguration Auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.3. HQICC Capacity Charge.

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.15.8.5.1.1(b), III.15.8.5.1.2(b), III.15.8.5.1.5(b), III.15.8.5.1.6(b), III.15.8.5.1.7(b), and III.15.8.5.1.8(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.4. Self-Supply Adjustment.

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where:

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied Capacity Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.15.8.5.1.1.(b), III.15.8.5.1.2(b), III.15.8.5.1.5(b), III.15.8.5.1.6(b), III.15.8.5.1.7(b) and III.15.8.5.1.8(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.5. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources in the Obligation Month and the base ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

ACA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.15.4.2.3, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base ACA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Annual Qualified Capacity procured from Intermittent Power Resources in the Annual Capacity Auction process, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.6. CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

> Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.1(f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.15.8.5.1.7. CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2.

Where:

> The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.15.8.5.4.2(b).
>
> Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.15.8.5.1.8. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

> Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that were

terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A or Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdrawn pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that were terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.15.8.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Annual Capacity

Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

The Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; when all load of a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation participating as a Storage DARD is load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's daily Coincident Peak Contributions, to the sum of all load serving entities' daily Coincident Peak Contributions in that Capacity Zone.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each day of the month and each Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied Capacity Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource, Demand Response Resource, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

III.15.8.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Annual Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource. The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.15.8.5.3. Excess Revenues.

Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A or Section III.15.A.2.1, or withdrawn pursuant to Section III.15.A.2.3, shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.15.8.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.15.8.5.4.1. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.15.8.5.1.6.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.15.8.5.1.6.

(e) **Maine Export Interface**. Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.4.2. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive for each Capacity Commitment Period an allocation of CTRs for each such unit that is the product of: (i) the MW quantity of capacity that the unit cleared in the Annual Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the municipal utility's ownership entitlements in such unit. The CTRs allocated pursuant to this Section may be designated as self-supply quantities as described in Section III.15.2.9. Municipal utility ownership entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

	Millstone 3	Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%

Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%

Allocation of CTRs as described in this Section shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a unit listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, allocation of CTRs for such unit shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Annual Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant (collectively, "WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) For any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section that are not designated self-supply quantities for the Capacity Commitment Period, the municipal utility entitlement holder shall receive a credit reflecting the value of such remaining CTRs. The value of each remaining CTR shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located; and (ii) the remaining MW quantity. This value will be divided by the number of days in the month to derive a daily settlement value.

III.15.8.5.5. Annual Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Annual Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; and (c) any applicable export charges.

III.15.9. Information Publication and Reporting.

III.15.9.1. Publication of Certain Data Prior to the Annual Capacity Auction.

For each Annual Capacity Auction, no later than one Business Day before the opening of the Annual Capacity Auction Offer Window, the ISO shall publish publicly on its website:

a. which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Annual Capacity Auction;
b. the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
c. which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction;
d. determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to deliverability impacts pursuant to Section III.15.2.3;
e. the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Annual Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;
f. for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.4 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power; and
g. which resources are qualified to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction, including resource type, Capacity Zone, and Annual Qualified Capacity.

III.15.9.2. Publication of Certain Data After Conducting the Annual Capacity Auction

In addition to the Annual Capacity Auction results information identified by Section III.15.2.11 and Section III.15.4.3 of Market Rule 1, within 15 days of conducting the Annual Capacity Auction, the ISO shall publish publicly on its website:

a. which Capacity Offers, satisfying the requirements of Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1, were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.4 of Market Rule 1; and the condition met by each such resource;
b. the Internal Market Monitor's determinations made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any Capacity Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to capacity not previously cleared

in an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction, and the basis for any such determinations; except that offer price information and any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to the potential impact of a Capacity Resource's offer on Capacity Clearing Prices shall not be published publicly;

c. the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding Proposed Capacity Offers, including whether the Internal Market Monitor accepted or rejected prices specified in a resource's Proposed Capacity Offer that were subject to Internal Market Monitor review and whether the Internal Market Monitor accepted or rejected the cost components of the resource' offer, which are set forth in Section III.A.22.2.3(a). No offer prices, cost components, or other underlying data shall be published; and,

d. which resources offering capacity not previously offered into an Annual Capacity Auction or Forward Capacity Auction were qualified to participate in the Annual Capacity Auction (this information will include a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations).

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