December 17, 2016

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

RE: ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER16- -000,
Forward Capacity Market Retirement Reforms

Dear Secretary Bose:

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (“Section 205”),¹ ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”), hereby electronically submits this transmittal letter and revisions to the ISO Tariff that revise the Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”) rules to provide a means for capacity suppliers to price the potential retirement of existing resources and to address market power issues that can be associated with the retirement of existing resources in certain circumstances. The revised rules are referred to hereafter as the “Retirement Reforms.”

As discussed in the remainder of this filing letter, the Retirement Reforms include three significant and important improvements to the capacity market rules. First, as discussed in Section IV.C.1, the Retirement Reforms provide that capacity suppliers with existing resources will be required to submit a price for the retirement of a resource rather than using the existing Non-Price Retirement Request process. The use of priced retirements, rather than a non-priced administrative process, will improve the economic efficiency of the capacity market. In addition, as discussed in Section IV.C.3, capacity suppliers retain the right to retire a resource regardless of price (called an “unconditional retirement”) and also have the option to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation only if the auction clears above their originally submitted retirement bid (called “conditional treatment”).

Second, as described in Section IV.C.3, the Retirement Reforms remove the potential for a capacity supplier to exercise market power in the form of physical withholding by unconditionally retiring a resource that is still economically viable or, if the conditional treatment option is elected, in the form of economic withholding by submitting a priced retirement bid at a level that is not economically justified. The Retirement Reforms address this issue by using a

Commission-approved Proxy De-List Bid to ensure that capacity prices cannot be artificially inflated above competitive levels by the uneconomic retirement of a resource\(^2\) or when a capacity supplier has elected conditional treatment.

Third, as described in Section IV.C.4, the Retirement Reforms require that a capacity supplier that may retire a resource give notice of the potential retirement and submit the proposed retirement price prior to the commencement of the qualification process for new resources for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”) in order to enhance the opportunity for new resources to meet the region’s capacity needs.

As discussed in Section VI of this filing letter, the NEPOOL Participants Committee’s vote on the Retirement Reforms garnered 48.17% support, which is short of the 60% vote needed to support the Market Rule changes and the 66-2/3% vote needed to support the other ISO Tariff changes. The New England States Committee on Electricity, representing the collective position of the six states in regional electricity matters, has indicated its support for the Retirement Reforms.

In support of the Retirement Reforms, the ISO is submitting the joint testimony of Mark G. Karl, Vice President, Market Development and Andrew G. Gillespie, Principal Analyst, Market Development (the “Karl-Gillespie Testimony”) and the testimony of Jeffrey D. McDonald, Vice President, Market Monitoring (the “McDonald Testimony”). The Karl-Gillespie Testimony explains the market design changes and the resulting auction mechanics. The McDonald Testimony describes the necessity of the new mitigation mechanisms and explains the components of those mechanisms.

I. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE

The ISO requests that the Retirement Reforms become effective on February 16, 2016 (61 days after filing). The implementation of the Retirement Reforms on the requested effective date means that the new rules will be applicable after the completion of FCA 10 and before the qualification process begins for FCA 11. Assuming the Retirement Reforms are accepted, the February 16, 2016 effective date will mean that the ISO would not open the “show of interest” window for new resources under the existing rules that otherwise would open on February 16, 2016 and close on March 18, 2016. The February 16, 2016 effective date also ensures that there will be some lead time between the issuance of the Commission’s order in this proceeding and the opening of the new retirement bid submission window under the new rules, which will be scheduled to open on March 7, 2016 and close on March 18, 2016. The requested effective date also precedes other FCA 11 events that begin to occur during this period.

\(^2\) The term “uneconomic retirement” is used to refer to the retirement of a capacity resource that would be expected to remain profitable if it were not retired.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ISO; COMMUNICATIONS

The ISO is the private, non-profit entity that serves as the regional transmission organization ("RTO") for New England. The ISO operates the New England bulk power system and administers New England’s organized wholesale electricity market pursuant to the Tariff and the Transmission Operating Agreement with the New England Participating Transmission Owners. In its capacity as an RTO, the ISO has the responsibility to protect the short-term reliability of the New England Control Area and to operate the system according to reliability standards established by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council ("NPCC") and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC").

All correspondence and communications in this proceeding should be addressed to the undersigned as follows:

One Sullivan Road One Sullivan Road
Holyoke, MA 01040-2841 Holyoke, MA 01040-2841
Tel: (413) 540-4559 Tel: (413) 540-4663
Fax: (413) 535-4379 Fax: (413) 535-4379
E-mail: jdouglass@iso-ne.com E-mail: jwolfson@iso-ne.com

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

These changes are being submitted pursuant to Section 205, which “gives a utility the right to file rates and terms for services rendered with its assets.” 3 Under Section 205, the Commission “plays ‘an essentially passive and reactive role’” 4 whereby it “can reject [a filing] only if it finds that the changes proposed by the public utility are not ‘just and reasonable.’” 5 The Commission limits this inquiry “into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable - and [this inquiry does not] extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative rate designs.” 6 The changes proposed herein “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most accurate.” 7 As a result, even if an intervenor or

3 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F. 3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
4 Id. at 10 (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
5 Id. at 9.
6 City of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
7 Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
the Commission develops an alternative proposal, the Commission must accept this Section 205 filing if it is just and reasonable.\footnote{Cf. Southern California Edison Co., et al, 73 FERC ¶ 61,219 at 61,608 n.73 (1995) (“Having found the Plan to be just and reasonable, there is no need to consider in any detail the alternative plans proposed by the Joint Protesters.” (citing Bethany)).}

IV. BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR THE RETIREMENT REFORMS

A. Summary of Existing Resource Retirement Process

To put the Retirement Reforms in context, it is useful to consider the current processes and requirements for retiring existing resources and qualifying new resources in the Forward Capacity Market. The current auction process begins with submission beginning in February (approximately eleven months prior to the next auction) of “show of interest” forms for new resources. Full qualification packages for new resources are then due in June.

The process for existing resources begins a little later. Suppliers are required to submit de-list bids for existing resources in June (approximately eight months prior to the auction). De-list bids specify a price below which a supplier does not wish to provide capacity from an existing resource and may be in the form of either a Static De-List Bid (a one year exit from the capacity market) or a Permanent De-List Bid (a permanent exit from the capacity market). De-list bids may only reflect the net going forward costs of a capacity resource (generally meaning those costs that can be avoided by not being subject to the obligation of a capacity resource to be ready to respond to commitment and dispatch instructions). In other words, future capital expenses cannot be included in a de-list bid.\footnote{The Commission has addressed the treatment of capital expenditures in de-list bids in a number of prior orders. See, e.g. ISO New England Inc., Order Accepting Informational Filing, 132 FERC ¶ 61,044 at PP 25-29 (2010) and ISO New England Inc., Order Accepting Informational Filing and Waiving Qualification Deadline, 135 FERC ¶ 61,147 at PP 42-44 (2011).}

Finally, if a capacity supplier would like to permanently retire an existing resource without regard to price at all, it may submit a Non-Price Retirement Request as late as 120 days prior to the auction (October). The ISO conducts a review to determine whether a resource subject to a Non-Price Retirement Request is required for reliability, but that review does not consider the cost of the resource and the ISO cannot require the continued operation of the resource. Under the current rules, a resource subject to a Non-Price Retirement Request is removed from the supply stack for the upcoming auction regardless of whether the retirement may benefit the resource owner’s remaining resource portfolio.
B. Overview of Retirement Reforms

The Retirement Reforms address several weaknesses in the way that the existing Forward Capacity Market structure handles the potential retirement of existing resources.

First, the primary means of fully retiring a resource under the current rules is the use of Non-Price Retirement Requests, which means that a supplier that has a resource that may be nearing retirement but that also may continue to be economic at a particular price does not have an effective way to submit the resource’s retirement price under the existing structure. The Retirement Reforms address this issue by providing for the use of priced retirement bids in place of Non-Price Retirement Requests.

Second, the current FCM rules do not address the potential for a capacity supplier to exercise market power by retiring a resource prematurely in order to decrease supply, artificially increase prices and benefit the remainder of the supplier’s portfolio. The Retirement Reforms address this issue by providing for review of priced retirement bids by the Internal Market Monitor and the Commission and, if appropriate, the use of the Commission-approved prices (called Proxy De-List Bids) to mitigate the impact of an uneconomic retirement.

Third, the current FCM auction schedule does a poor job of signaling potential new entrants that additional capacity may be needed due to the retirement of existing resources. The Retirement Reforms address this issue by changing the FCM auction timeline to provide for the submission of retirement bids prior to the “show of interest” deadline for new resources.

As explained in detail in the remainder of this section, the improvements made by the Retirement Reforms are organized around four key principles:

1. Providing capacity suppliers the ability to use priced de-list bids when they are contemplating the potential retirement of a resource;

2. Retaining the existing option for a supplier to avoid its perceived risks of continued operation and unconditionally retire a resource;¹⁰

3. Assuring that consumers are protected because capacity prices cannot be artificially increased, and;

4. Changing the FCM auction schedule for retirement-related decisions to provide improved signals for new entry.

The remainder of this filing letter provides an explanation of the key design aspects of the Retirement Reforms. Additional detail concerning how the Retirement Reforms will work and why they were developed is contained in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony and the McDonald

¹⁰ As explained later in this section, in addition to submitting a priced retirement bid or unconditionally retiring a resource, the Retirement Reforms also provide a “conditional treatment” option.
Testimony. Additional detail concerning the Tariff revisions associated with the Retirement Reforms is provided in Section V of the filing letter.

C. Key Design Aspects of the Retirement Reforms

1. Providing for the Pricing of Potential Resource Retirements

The Retirement Reforms improve the functioning of the capacity market by providing for new and better options for suppliers to price the retirement of existing resources. Specifically, the Retirement Reforms provide the opportunity for suppliers to price the full retirement of an existing resource from all markets through the new priced Retirement De-List Bid option. In addition, the Retirement Reforms enhance the ability of suppliers to use Permanent De-List Bids to price the retirement of resources that are only exiting the capacity market.

For both types of retirement de-list bids, the Retirement Reforms establish a new methodology for suppliers to reflect in their bids the multi-year nature of a decision to permanently remove a resource from either the capacity market (a Permanent De-List Bid) or all markets (a Retirement De-List Bid). The new methodology generally provides for determining the net present value of the resource using a discounted cash flow approach that takes into consideration the resource’s remaining economic life (which may be more than one year) and the operating and capital costs that are likely to be incurred in order for the resource to remain reliable and financially viable over that life. This net present value methodology appropriately reflects the analysis that a supplier should use for purposes of making a non-revocable retirement decision that will extend beyond the initial year of retirement, whereas Static De-List Bids are determined based on a net going forward cost methodology (which does not include prospective capital costs) because the de-list decision is only for one year.

The new and enhanced options for pricing retirements improve the functioning of the capacity market from several perspectives. From an economic efficiency perspective, the use of priced retirement de-list bids makes it more likely that resource retirements will occur as a result of the economic clearing of the auction rather than through a non-priced administrative withdrawal. While the option to unconditionally retire a resource outside the capacity market will continue to exist, unconditional retirement will no longer be the primary option to fully retire a resource from all markets as it is today with the use of Non-Price Retirement Requests. From a capacity supplier’s perspective, the improved pricing options mean that a supplier contemplating a resource retirement no longer is forced to make an irrevocable retirement decision on the basis of estimated capacity clearing-prices. Instead, the supplier can reflect an

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11 As explained elsewhere in this filing letter, the “retirement” of an existing resource may be in the form of either a full retirement from all markets through a Retirement De-List Bid or a retirement only from the capacity market through a Permanent De-List Bid.
appropriate price in a retirement de-list bid and let the actual auction-clearing price determine whether the resource is retired.  

2. Mitigating the Risk of Uneconomic Retirement

Over the past several years the previous excess supply of capacity in New England has effectively disappeared and the ISO and both its internal and external market monitors have identified the need to develop market rules to explicitly address the potential for the uneconomic retirement of an existing capacity resource in order to ensure that the Forward Capacity Market remains workably competitive. The need to address the risk of uneconomic retirements was discussed by the ISO and its Internal Market Monitor in a November 5, 2014 memorandum to the NEPOOL Markets Committee which explained that as supply conditions become tighter an incumbent supplier could seek to retire an existing resource to reduce available supply and increase prices in order to benefit the remainder of the supplier’s resource portfolio. Earlier, in June 2014, the ISO’s External Market Monitor also had recommended the development of mitigation measures to address the potential that an uneconomic retirement could be used to increase FCM prices above competitive levels.

The ISO and its stakeholders considered several approaches to addressing the risks associated with uneconomic retirements. For example, in February 2015 the Internal Market Monitor discussed the possibility of imposing a sufficiently large “exit charge” on any supplier that sought to uneconomically retire a capacity resource in order to deter such behavior. While an exit charge mechanism is used in other regions, some of the ISO’s stakeholders expressed

12 As discussed in more detail in the McDonald Testimony, retirement bids “persist” in the sense that a capacity supplier is required to continue to submit the same type of bid (Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid) in subsequent auctions once it has first submitted a retirement bid for a resource. The persistence requirement reflects the non-revocable, multi-year nature of a retirement bid. If a supplier does not believe that a resource is at the point of permanent retirement, it can and should use a Static De-List Bid rather than a retirement bid. If a supplier believes that there has been a change of circumstances and that a prior decision to take the retirement bid approach is no longer valid, it may request that the persistence requirement be discontinued. The Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the discontinuation request is valid and its decision will be reviewed by the Commission.


concern that the exit charge approach is relatively imprecise and could be overly punitive. After considering this feedback, the ISO developed the alternative priced-retirement approach that is proposed in the Retirement Reforms.

The use of the priced retirement approach is made possible by applying to retirement de-list bids a bid review and mitigation approach that is similar to the approach used for Static De-List Bids in the capacity market and for supply offers in the real-time energy market. As discussed in more detail elsewhere in this filing letter, the primary improvement made by the Retirement Reforms is to provide capacity suppliers the opportunity to price all of their retirement de-list bids, including both Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids. Consistent with the bid review and mitigation process that is used with other priced bids, under the Retirement Reforms the Internal Market Monitor will review the priced retirement de-list bids to determine if they are reasonable and the results will be filed with and reviewed by the Commission. This process will ultimately result in a Commission-approved de-list bid price that may be mitigated below the level that the capacity supplier was seeking.

3. The Use of Proxy De-List Bids

In some situations, such as in the real-time energy market, in which the physical or economic withholding of supply is specifically forbidden, the mitigation process would end with the use of the mitigated bid in the market. In the Forward Capacity Market, however, the Retirement Reforms preserve the existing ability of capacity suppliers to choose to unconditionally retire their resources even if the Commission ultimately has determined that the retirement is uneconomic. In this situation, it is critical to take some action to assure that capacity prices are “just and reasonable” and to protect consumers by ensuring that an uneconomic retirement does not increase capacity prices above competitive levels.

Under the Retirement Reforms, the use of a Commission-approved proxy de-list bid ensures that capacity prices are not increased above competitive levels. Under the proxy de-list bid approach, if a capacity supplier either: (1) chooses to unconditionally retire a resource through an uneconomic retirement, or (2) chooses the conditional treatment option discussed in more detail in Section IV.C.6.c, then the Commission-approved de-list bid for that resource will be entered into the capacity auction as a “proxy” de-list bid. Through the use of the proxy de-list bid, the auction will produce the competitive price levels that would have existed in the absence of the uneconomic retirement.

(...continued)


16 There are some exceptions to the review process. The Internal Market Monitor will not review retirement bids that are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold or that are for resources that are smaller than 20 MW.
Importantly, in the case of an unconditional retirement, a proxy de-list bid is only used if a capacity supplier retains a resource portfolio that could be advantaged by any increase in prices associated with an uneconomic retirement. If a supplier has no portfolio (in other words, the supplier only has a single capacity resource), then a proxy de-list bid will not be used. If a supplier has a portfolio of resources, then a portfolio benefits test is used to determine if a proxy de-list bid should be used in this situation. The portfolio benefits test works by comparing the estimated revenue that a capacity supplier would earn with and without the capacity of the retiring resource. If a supplier’s expected revenue without the capacity of the retiring resource is greater than its revenues with the capacity of the retiring resource, then the supplier is determined to have a portfolio benefit and a proxy de-list bid is used for capacity associated with an unconditional retirement. The portfolio benefits test is set out in Section III.A.24 of the Tariff and described in the McDonald Testimony.

In short, the proxy de-list bid approach addresses the risk that market power could be exercised through an uneconomic retirement in the form of either an unconditional retirement or when conditional treatment is elected, and produces capacity prices that reflect the competitive outcome that would have occurred in the absence of the uneconomic retirement.

4. Improving the Signal for New Entry

In the November 5, 2014 memorandum to the NEPOOL Markets Committee, the ISO and the Internal Market Monitor identified shortcomings in the existing Forward Capacity Market schedule due to the potential for existing resources to be retired after the deadline for the entry of new resources. The Retirement Reforms address this issue by changing the sequence and timing of several of the current FCM deadlines. Specifically, the FCM schedule is revised as follows:

- The deadline for submitting Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids is moved to March (the current deadline is June for Permanent De-List Bids and October for Non-Price Retirement Requests).\(^\text{17}\)

- Shortly after the new March de-list bid deadline, the ISO will post information regarding the amount of existing capacity that may exit the capacity market through a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

- The “show of interest” window for new resources is moved later in the process, from February to April.

The earlier submission of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids provides several benefits. Perhaps most importantly, the earlier submission of retirement information provides project sponsors that are considering developing new resources with better and timelier

\(^{17}\) Under the Retirement Reforms, the new priced Retirement De-List Bids completely replace the Non-Price Retirement Requests that are currently used for full retirements.
information about when and where new capacity may be needed. The new sequence of deadlines provides the opportunity for project sponsors to react to this information before the “show of interest” deadline for the immediately upcoming auction. For projects that are less advanced and cannot be entered into the immediately upcoming auction, the new deadlines significantly increase the time that project sponsors have to prepare submissions for the “show of interest” deadline for the following auction.

In addition to providing a timelier signal of the need for new capacity, the earlier submission of retirement information is better aligned with the capacity zone determination process. The formation of capacity zones is determined, in part, by assumptions regarding the retirement of resources within zones. The earlier retirement de-list bid submission deadline means that potential resource retirements can be better reflected in the zonal determination process.

Finally, the changes to the FCM auction schedule will avoid the situation under the current rules in which the timing of resource retirements can occur so late in the auction process that the time available for any regulatory review or remedial action can be very compressed. The problematic nature of this compressed period for review or action is accentuated by the limited nature of the existing resource retirement rules. While the ISO’s market monitors have generic and relatively broad authority to review any market power issues, including the retirement of a capacity resource that may reflect an inappropriate exercise of market power, the only remedy available under the current rules is to refer the matter to the Commission. Given the compressed time period for retirements under the current process and the potential difficulties associated with a referral, the current process could require a delay in running a capacity auction or result in the Internal Market Monitor concluding that an auction was not competitive, leaving substantial doubt and uncertainty in the marketplace.

5. More Comprehensive and Consistent Bid Review

Over the past several years, the ISO, partly at the direction of the Commission, has expanded the review of various capacity market bids to address the potential for the exercise of both supplier-side and buyer-side market power. For example, on October 16, 2014 the ISO submitted tariff changes to provide for the review and potential mitigation of capacity imports in compliance with an order to show cause issued by the Commission. The Commission accepted the capacity import mitigation changes, subject to additional compliance requirements on December 15, 2014. In a series of earlier filings and orders in Docket No. ER12-953, minimum offer price rules were established to address the potential for the submission of below-cost bids and the exercise of buyer-side market

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power. As with these earlier initiatives, the Retirement Reforms provide for a more complete and consistent review of capacity market bids by providing for the review and potential mitigation of another class of bids - priced retirement bids.

As discussed earlier, the Retirement Reforms provide new and better options for suppliers to price resource retirements. Consistent with the treatment of other capacity market bids, the Retirement Reforms provide for the Internal Market Monitor to review retirement bids to determine if they are based on reasonable cost assumptions and to consult with suppliers during the review process. As noted earlier and as explained more fully in the McDonald Testimony, the Retirement Reforms provide that the Internal Market Monitor will review retirement bid prices using a net present value methodology that reflects the fact that a retirement decision is not revocable and extends beyond the initial year of retirement.

The new methodology generally provides for determining the net present value of the resource using a discounted cash flow approach that takes into consideration the resource’s remaining economic life (which may be more than one year) and the capital costs that are likely to be incurred in order for the resource to remain reliable and financially viable over that life. This net present value methodology appropriately reflects the analysis that a supplier should use for purposes of making a non-revocable retirement decision that will extend beyond the initial year of retirement, whereas Static De-List Bids are determined based on a net going forward cost methodology because the de-list decision is only for one year.

Following the review process, the Internal Market Monitor will issue Retirement Determination Notifications (“RDNs”) to suppliers that submitted Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids. The RDNs will be issued in June, 90 days after the retirement bids were submitted. The RDNs will specify an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for each retirement bid.

6. Suppliers Have Multiple Options Following Receipt of RDN

Following the bid review process and after receiving their RDNs, capacity suppliers have approximately 10 days to choose how they would like to proceed. The Retirement Reforms provide three options (each of which is more fully described and illustrated in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony):

a. Continue to Auction.

After receiving an RDN, a capacity supplier that takes no action will continue to auction using a retirement bid. The retirement bid used in the auction will reflect the outcome of the Commission’s review of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any cost information submitted by the supplier. The use of the Commission-approved price in the auction mitigates

any potential exercise of market power that could occur through economic withholding if the initially submitted price is determined to be unjustified.

b. Unconditional Retirement.

A capacity supplier may choose to unconditionally retire a resource, as it can under the existing rules. In this case, the supplier can be certain that its resource will not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation. However, in order to mitigate the impact on the market of the uneconomic retirement of the resource the Commission-approved price may be used as a proxy de-list bid in the auction.

c. Conditional Treatment.

A supplier may choose to conditionally retire or permanently de-list a resource. In this case, the resource may receive a Capacity Supply Obligation if the auction clearing price is greater than the retirement bid that the supplier submitted in March. However, a proxy de-list bid would be used during the auction to ensure that the clearing price is not increased above competitive levels. The conditional treatment option allows a supplier to avoid its perceived risk of under-compensation without unconditionally retiring. For example, a supplier may believe that it requires a capacity price of $10.00/kW-month in order for its resource to remain profitable, but the Commission may determine that only $8.00/kW-month is required. If there is no conditional treatment, the supplier may choose to unconditionally retire the resource rather than risk that the capacity clearing price may be lower than $10.00/kW-month. However, the actual capacity clearing price may turn out to be greater than $10.00/kW-month, in which case it would have been economically efficient to retain the resource. The conditional treatment option addresses this issue by providing a means for a resource to potentially receive a Capacity Supply Obligation if the actual capacity clearing price is greater than the price that the supplier believed it needed.

The intent of providing a range of options is to allow (as much as is possible while retaining the unconditional retirement option) for a resource’s retirement to be determined based on the competitive price levels that would have existed in the absence of any uneconomic retirement.

7. Commission Review of Retirement Bids

Approximately 10 days after suppliers have chosen how they would like to proceed after receiving their RDNs, the ISO will file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act the results of the Internal Market Monitor’s retirement bid review and supporting documentation (including the information submitted by the capacity supplier). Suppliers and other affected parties will have the opportunity to protest the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations and provide additional information. Ultimately, the Commission will determine the reasonableness of each retirement bid. The Commission may determine that the price initially submitted by a supplier is reasonable, that the Internal Market Monitor-determined price is reasonable or, based on the information it receives, that some other price is reasonable.
In any event, the Commission-approved price will be used in the auction as either the supplier’s bid or, in certain cases, as a proxy de-list bid if the supplier has chosen either the conditional or unconditional retirement options discussed above.20

The proposed regulatory review process, including the filing of the Internal Market Monitor determinations by the ISO, is reasonable and most consistent with the Commission’s previously expressed views concerning how the Commission’s oversight of market mitigation mechanisms should be structured. In the most directly relevant case, the Commission in 2007 prescribed the current structure for de-list bids in which those bids are first reviewed by the market monitor and then filed by the ISO for review by the Commission.21 In the rehearing order in that case, the Commission explained that under this structure: “the Commission will be able to evaluate the Market Monitor’s determination, rather than having to determine the propriety of the generator’s costs de novo.”22 It is under this structure that the ISO currently files and the Commission reviews a variety of FCM auction inputs, including Permanent De-List Bids and Static De-List Bids. The Retirement Reforms follow this existing structure except that the results of the Internal Market Monitor’s review of retirement bids will now be filed earlier in the year (in June rather than November).23

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20 As a general matter, the Retirement Reforms provide the Commission with significantly more time to resolve any disputes concerning a resource retirement than under the current rules. The ISO currently expects that its submission of the results of the Internal Market Monitor’s review of retirement bids would include a request for an effective date 90 days after filing. However, if the Commission chooses to undertake any type of hearing process, it would be important to act earlier than 90 days so that any hearing could be completed and an order issued well before the auction.


22 120 FERC ¶ 61,087 at P 61.

23 During the stakeholder review process, some stakeholder suggested that suppliers should be the entities submitting their retirement bids to the Commission for review and argued that there is precedent for this approach in the filing of cost-of-service agreements by generators. The ISO agrees that the Commission has accepted rules that provide for generators, rather than the ISO or a market monitor, to file cost-of-service agreements. However, the treatment of cost-of-service agreements that primarily involve only the affected generator can be clearly distinguished from market-based bid submissions that potentially affect all participants in the market. The Commission appears to have consistently preferred that competitive market bid review and mitigation be conducted in the first instance by market monitors, subject to the oversight of the Commission. This was the case in the 2007 decisions noted above. It is also the case for energy market mitigation, in which the Internal Market Monitor administers mitigation pursuant to Commission-approved rules. Further, it was the case in Docket No. EL01-93 when the Commission directed the ISO, rather than affected generators, to file energy market bid mitigation agreements that the market monitor had entered into with generators. See Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, L.P. v. ISO New England Inc., Order Granting Clarification and Denying Rehearing, 97 FERC ¶ 61,108 (2001).
8. Post-Auction Action to Further Address Consequences of Uneconomic Retirement

As discussed earlier, the use of proxy de-list bids is an effective means to ensure that the clearing prices in a Forward Capacity Auction are not artificially increased above competitive levels by an uneconomic retirement. However, while the use of proxy de-list bids produces appropriate prices, there is the possibility that a proxy de-list bid will not “clear” (meaning that the capacity associated with the proxy de-list bid will remain in the supply stack at the end of the auction but there is no actual resource to take on the associated Capacity Supply Obligation). In this case, the primary auction may have acquired less capacity than it would have if a resource had not been uneconomically retired and, therefore, it is likely that future reconfiguration auctions would seek to acquire additional capacity to replace the lost capacity associated with the uneconomic retirement. While it is possible to wait for the first annual reconfiguration auction to determine whether additional capacity should be acquired when a proxy de-list bid has been used to address an uneconomic retirement, waiting that additional year to conduct a reconfiguration auction may mean that some resources that are available immediately after the primary auction will no longer be available. These resources may include new resources that require three years to achieve commercial operation or existing resources that would be economically retired after the primary auction if no action is taken.

The Retirement Reforms address this situation by providing for a re-running of the FCM clearing algorithm following a primary auction in which a proxy de-list bid has not “cleared” (meaning that it normally would receive a Capacity Supply Obligation). Re-running the clearing algorithm can be conceived as the equivalent of an “instant” reconfiguration auction. Using the same market-clearing process that is used for reconfiguration auctions, the second run of the clearing algorithm may procure additional capacity and the prices for that additional capacity will also be determined in the same manner as they would in a reconfiguration auction.

Re-running the clearing algorithm immediately after a primary auction in which a proxy de-list bid has not cleared has several benefits. First, by re-running the auction clearing algorithm immediately following the primary FCA, some resources that would no longer be available a year later may still be in the supply stack and a more efficient outcome may be achieved. Second, by using the same clearing algorithm that is used in both primary and reconfiguration auctions, capacity prices continue to be determined in a consistent manner. In contrast, taking no action following the initial FCA is likely to result in less supply and higher prices when the first reconfiguration auction is eventually administered a year later. In some cases, a lack of supply in the later reconfiguration auctions could require the ISO to take out-of-market actions to address reliability, which also would be a less efficient outcome.

24 The amount of capacity that is acquired in a reconfiguration auction may be affected by a variety of factors, including changes in the load forecast, reductions in the qualified capacity of resources and the amount of capacity that cleared in the primary auction.

25 The “clearing algorithm” is the optimization algorithm used for both primary and reconfiguration auctions.
While it would be ideal if there were a way to produce a single clearing-price in the initial Forward Capacity Auction while ensuring that the price is the result of a workably competitive market and not increased above competitive levels by an uneconomic retirement, neither the ISO nor any stakeholders were able to identify an approach that would achieve this ideal during the stakeholder review process. The Retirement Reforms are reasonable because they produce appropriate prices, not increased by market power, in the initial Forward Capacity Auction and procure any additional capacity using a re-running of the clearing algorithm on a basis that is not discriminatory (capacity acquired through the re-running of the clearing algorithm could be new or existing) and that is consistent with the underlying FCM structure of having a primary auction and a series of reconfiguration auctions.

V. DESCRIPTION OF TARIFF REVISIONS

This section provides a guide to the ISO Tariff revisions associated with the Retirement Reforms.

The revisions begin with several key changes to the definitions in Section I.2.2. The definition changes eliminate the term Non-Price Retirement Request and replace it with the new term, Retirement De-List Bid, to reflect that capacity suppliers seeking to retire an existing resource will now be required to submit a priced de-list bid reflecting the economic basis for the retirement. Several other new terms, Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and Existing Capacity Retirement Package are established to define the timing and content of retirement de-list bids. The new term Proxy De-List Bid also is added to the definitions.

There are numerous conforming changes associated with these definitional changes, including, in particular changes related to the replacement of Non-Price Retirement Requests with Retirement De-List Bids. For example, Attachment K of the OATT is revised to reflect how Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids, rather than Non-Price Retirement Requests, will be treated for system planning purposes. Similarly, Section III.12 is revised to reflect how Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids, rather than Non-Price Retirement Requests, will be treated for purposes of calculating the New England region’s Installed Capacity Requirement and related values.

The bulk of the tariff revisions are to Section III.13, the market rules that govern the administration of the Forward Capacity Market. The changes to this section are summarized as follows:

- Section III.13.1.2.3.1 is revised to incorporate the new Existing Capacity Retirement Package concept into the rules governing the submission of information concerning the treatment of existing resources in the annual FCA process

- Section III.13.1.2.3.1.2 concerning the submission of Permanent De-List Bids is deleted and Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 is revised so that the revised section now covers both the submission of Permanent De-List Bids and the submission of Retirement De-List Bids. Consolidating the provisions reflects the similarities in these types of bids.
The new provisions in this section address several issues, including details concerning how these de-list bids are structured and the review of these types of bids from a reliability perspective.

- Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 is updated to specify criteria concerning the Internal Market Monitor’s review of cost information for retirement de-list bids.

- Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 is revised to consolidate provisions concerning the Internal Market Monitor’s review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids into one section and the previous standalone section (Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2) governing Static De-List Bids is deleted.

- Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 is added to specify that the Internal Market Monitor will develop approved Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to its review of the cost support for those bids.

- Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B is added to provide details concerning the financial information submitted by capacity suppliers to support retirement de-list bids and the methodology the Internal Market Monitor will use to analyze these types of bids. The rules for determining the expected remaining economic life of a resource, a key part of the financial analysis, are specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C.

- Section III.13.1.2.4, which currently covers the issuance of Qualification Determination Notifications to capacity suppliers with existing resources, is expanded to cover the issuance of retirement determination notifications for capacity suppliers that have submitted retirement de-list bids. The expanded provisions also add a new subsection to cover a capacity supplier’s option to elect to unconditionally retire or seek conditional treatment for a resource after receiving an RDN.

- Section III.13.1.8 is revised to specify that the ISO will post information concerning submitted retirement de-list bids no later than three business days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

- The FCA schedule provisions of Section III.13.1.10 are updated. As a housekeeping matter, the table that governed the schedule for the first eight FCAs is eliminated as it is now no longer needed since those FCAs have all been completed. The remaining provisions are revised to reflect that the show of interest window for new resources will occur later and the submission of retirement de-list bids for existing resources will occur earlier under the Retirement Reforms.

- With respect to the conduct of the capacity auctions themselves, Sections III.13.2.3.2 and III.13.2.5.2 are revised to explain how retirement de-list bids and Proxy De-List Bids, as appropriate, are treated during an auction. The changes to Section III.13.2.5.2 cover several important changes, including the general requirement that the use of a retirement de-list bid for a resource persists in later auctions (subsection
(b)) and the second run of the auction-clearing process that occurs under certain circumstances (subsections (d) and (e)).

- Changes to the way that the ISO conducts reliability reviews for resources with de-list bids are set out in Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 and III.13.2.5.2.5 and changes to the compensation rules for any resources retained for reliability are set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 et seq.

- The rules concerning the submission to the Commission of the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations concerning retirement de-list bids are set out in Section III.13.8.1. As a housekeeping matter, subsection (c) of this section is deleted as it contained special provisions that were only applicable during the conduct of the ninth FCA.

The remaining tariff revisions associated with the Retirement Reforms are in Appendix A, which governs market monitoring issues. The primary change in Appendix A is the addition of Section III.A.24, which specifies the retirement portfolio test that the Internal Market Monitor will use to determine whether a capacity supplier that has elected to unconditionally retire a resource may experience a portfolio benefit.

VI. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

The Retirement Reforms were considered through the complete NEPOOL Participant Processes. As discussed earlier, the immediate impetus for the Retirement Reforms came from a recommendation by the External Market Monitor in June 2014 that the ISO develop mitigation measures to address the potential consequences of an uneconomic retirement in the capacity market. In November 2014, the Internal Market Monitor appeared before the NEPOOL Markets Committee to explain the necessity of addressing the potential for uneconomic retirements in the capacity market. In January 2015 and continuing over the next several months the ISO and the Internal Market Monitor discussed with stakeholders the option of using an exit fee approach to addressing concerns over uneconomic retirements. In response to feedback from stakeholders, the ISO and the Internal Market Monitor developed a revised approach that is reflected in the Retirement Reforms and the new approach was presented at the NEPOOL Markets Committee beginning in August 2015. Over the following months, further changes were made and a final proposal was presented to the appropriate NEPOOL technical committees in November 2015 for their formal review and vote.

NEPOOL ultimately failed to support the Retirement Reforms. At its November 18, 2015 meeting, the NEPOOL Markets Committee failed to recommend that the NEPOOL Participants Committee support the provisions of the Retirement Reforms that are included in
Market Rule 1, Appendix A to Market Rule 1 and Tariff Section I.2.2 by a vote of 57.01%. On November 20, 2015, the NEPOOL Reliability Committee recommended support for the provisions of the Retirement Reforms that are included in Section III.12 of the market rules, but failed to support the provisions of the Retirement Reforms under its jurisdiction that are included in Section I of the Tariff. In each case, the Reliability Committee vote was 64.04%. On November 20, 2015, the NEPOOL Transmission Committee failed to recommend support of the provisions of the Retirement Reforms that are included in Section I of the Tariff and conforming revisions to Attachment K of Section II of the Tariff by a vote of 64.04%. At its December 4, 2015 meeting, the Participants Committee failed to support the package of Retirement Reforms by a vote of 48.17% in favor.

VII. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Section 35.13 of the Commission’s regulations generally requires public utilities to file certain cost and other information related to an examination of traditional cost-of-service rates. However, the Retirement Reforms do not modify a traditional “rate” and the ISO is not a traditional investor-owned utility. Therefore, to the extent necessary, the ISO requests waiver of Section 35.13 of the Commission’s regulations. Notwithstanding its request for waiver, the ISO submits the following additional information in substantial compliance with relevant provisions of Section 35.13 of the Commission’s regulations:

35.13(b)(1) – Materials included herewith are as follows:

- This transmittal letter;
- Blacklined ISO Tariff sections reflecting the revision submitted in this filing;
- Clean ISO Tariff sections reflecting the revision submitted in this filing;
- Testimony of Mark G. Karl, Vice President, Market Development, and Andrew G. Gillespie, Principal Analyst, Market Development;

26 Pursuant to the Participants Agreement, a vote of at least 60% is required for support of any proposed Market Rule changes and a vote of at least 66-2/3% is required for support of any other proposed change. Market Rules are included in Section III of the Tariff.

27 The NEPOOL Technical Committees have jurisdiction over different parts of Section I of the Tariff and, therefore, each committee voted on the parts of Section I of the Tariff that are under its jurisdiction.

28 NEPOOL has indicated that it plans to submit comments in this proceeding to provide the Commission with additional information regarding stakeholder consideration of the Retirement Reforms and to present an explanation of proposed modifications to the Retirement Reforms that were considered in the stakeholder process (including information regarding the outcome of NEPOOL’s votes on those proposed modifications).

• Testimony of Jeffrey D. McDonald, Vice President, Market Monitoring;

• List of governors and utility regulatory agencies in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont to which a copy of this filing has been sent.

35.13(b)(2) – As set forth in Section I above, the ISO requests that the changes become effective on February 16, 2016.

35.13(b)(3) – Pursuant to Section 17.11(e) of the Participants Agreement, Governance Participants are being served electronically rather than by paper copy. The names and addresses of the Governance Participants are posted on the ISO’s website at http://www.iso-ne.com/participate/participant-asset-listings. A copy of this transmittal letter and the accompanying materials have also been sent to the governors and electric utility regulatory agencies for the six New England states that comprise the New England Control Area, the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, Inc., and to the New England States Committee on Electricity. Their names and addresses are shown in the attached listing. In accordance with Commission rules and practice, there is no need for the Governance Participants or the entities identified in the listing to be included on the Commission’s official service list in the captioned proceeding unless such entities become intervenors in this proceeding.

35.13(b)(4) – A description of the materials submitted pursuant to this filing is contained in Section VII of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(5) – The reasons for this filing are discussed in Section IV of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(6) – The ISO’s approval of the changes is evidenced by this filing. The Participant Processes required by the Participants Agreement have been met.

35.13(b)(7) – Neither the ISO nor NEPOOL has knowledge of any relevant expenses or costs of service that have been alleged or judged in any administrative or judicial proceeding to be illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary costs that are demonstrably the product of discriminatory employment practices.

35.13(b)(8) – A form of notice and electronic media are no longer required for filings in light of the Commission’s Combined Notice of Filings notice methodology.

35.13(c)(1) – The changes submitted herein do not modify a traditional “rate,” and the statement required under this Commission regulation is not applicable to the instant filing.

35.13(c)(2) – The ISO does not provide services under other rate schedules that are similar to the wholesale, resale and transmission services it provides under the Tariff.

35.13(c)(3) - No specifically assignable facilities have been or will be installed or modified in connection with the revision filed herein.
VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed in this transmittal letter, the ISO requests that the Commission accept the Retirement Reforms to become effective on February 16, 2016.

Respectfully submitted,

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

By: /s/ James H. Douglass

Raymond W. Hepper, Esq.
James H. Douglass, Esq.
Jennifer Wolfson, Esq.
ISO New England Inc.
One Sullivan Road
Holyoke, MA  01040-2841
Tel:  (413) 540-4559
Fax:  (413) 535-4379
E-mail: jdouglass@iso-ne.com
I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions

I.2.1 Rules of Construction:

In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;
(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day); (k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

I.2.2. Definitions:
In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.

**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Administrative Sanctions** are defined in Section III.B.4.1.2 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.
**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource** is any Resource eligible to provide Regulation that is not registered as a different Resource type.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.
**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annualized FCA Payment** is used to determine a resource’s availability penalties and is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**APR-1** means the first of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

**APR-2** means the second of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

**APR-3** means the third of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

**Asset** is a generating unit, interruptible load, a component of a demand response resource or load asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering a physical load, generator, or tie-line for settlement purposes. The Asset Registration Process is posted on the ISO’s website.

**Asset Related Demand** is a physical load that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node and, except for pumped storage load, is made up of one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply, with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration.
**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net risk-adjusted going forward costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net risk-adjusted going forward costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.12. (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Audited Demand Reduction** is the seasonal claimed capability of a Demand Response Resource as established pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Audited Full Reduction Time** is the Offered Full Reduction Time associated with the Demand Response Resource’s most recent audit.
**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a generating unit change its output while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; (ii) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month; or (iii) in each Real-Time Demand Response Event Hour, the sum of the baseline electrical energy consumption less the sum of the actual electrical energy consumption of all of the Real-Time Demand Response Assets associated with the Real-Time Demand Response Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month; or (iv) in each Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour, the sum of the baseline electrical energy consumption less the sum of the actual electrical energy consumption of all of the Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets associated with the Real-time Emergency Generation Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month. The Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; (ii) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month; or (iii) in each Real-Time Demand Response Event Hour or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour, the sum of the electrical energy output of all of the Real-Time Demand Response Assets or Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets associated with the Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure
consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.

**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
**Blackstart CIP Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 utilizing data from Table 6 of Appendix A to this Schedule 16, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Blackstart Station’s costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart CIP O&M Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, utilizing data from Table 6 of Appendix A to this Schedule 16, for a Blackstart Station’s operating and maintenance costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of the provision of Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s operating and maintenance costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for operating and maintenance costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT, which also encompasses “System Restoration and Planning Service” under the predecessor version of Schedule 16.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service under a “Signature Page for Schedule 16 of the NEPOOL OATT” that was executed and in effect prior to January 1, 2013 for Category A Designated Blackstart Resources or a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating
Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11) for Category B Designated Blackstart Resources.

Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

Blackstart Standard Rate Payment is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

Blackstart Station is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

Blackstart Station-specific Rate CIP Capital Payment is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service.

Block is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5)
with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capability Year** means a year’s period beginning on June 1 and ending May 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market beginning on June 1, 2018 pursuant to rules filed with the Commission on July 14, 2014.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.
Capacity Clearing Price is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Clearing Price Floor is described in Section III.13.2.7.

Capacity Commitment Period is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

Capacity Cost (CC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Load Obligation is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible, equal to that Market Participant’s Capacity Requirement (if any) adjusted to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, as described in Section III.13.7.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability) is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service) is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market beginning on June 1, 2018 pursuant to rules filed with the Commission on July 14, 2014.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Requirement** is described in Section III.13.7.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in the rules filed with the Commission on January 17, 2014, and accepted by the Commission on May 30, 2014.

**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Transfer Right (CTR)** is a financial right that entitles the holder to the difference in the Net Regional Clearing Prices between Capacity Zones for which the transfer right is defined, in the MW amount of the holder’s entitlement.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Value** is the value (in kW-month) of a Demand Resource for a month determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category A Designated Blackstart Resource** is a Designated Blackstart Resource that has committed to provide Blackstart Service under a “Signature Page for Schedule 16 of the NEPOOL OATT” that was executed and in effect prior to January 1, 2013 and has not been converted to a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** is a Designated Blackstart Resource that is not a Category A Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.

**CLAIM10** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**CLAIM30** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.
Claimed Capability Audit is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset.

CNR Capability is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Coincident Peak Contribution is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each power year, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset in all Load Zones. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

Commercial Capacity. for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, is defined in Section VII.A of that policy.

Commission is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

Commitment Period is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

Common Costs are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by (i) the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, or the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station; or (ii) the acceptance of a Non-Price Retirement Request of the Station.

Completed Application is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.
Compliance Effective Date is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

Composite FCM Transaction is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

Conditional Qualified New Resource is defined in Section III.13.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

Confidential Information is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

Confidentiality Agreement is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Congestion is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Congestion Component is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

Congestion Cost is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

Congestion Paying LSE is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer.
paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
4. provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.
Coordinated Transaction Scheduling means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

Correction Limit means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of Energy Produced (CEP) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of New Entry (CONE) is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

Counterparty means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

Covered Entity is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Credit Coverage is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO, in the form of credit insurance coverage, a performance or surety bond, or a combination thereof.

Credit Qualifying means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

Credit Threshold consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

Current Ratio is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

Curtailment is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

Customer is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

Data Reconciliation Process means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

Day-Ahead is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation is a cleared Demand Reduction Offer multiplied by one plus the percent average avoided peak distribution losses. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation is the hourly demand reduction amounts of a Demand Response Resource scheduled by the ISO as a result of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, multiplied by one plus the percent average avoided peak distribution losses.

Day-Ahead Energy Market means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1 and purchase of demand
reductions pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Response Program** provides a Day-Ahead aspect to the Load Response Program. The Day-Ahead Load Response Program allows Market Participants with registered Load Response Program Assets to make energy reduction offers into the Day-Ahead Load Response Program concurrent with the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(h) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.
**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.
**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Real-Time Demand Response Asset to reduce demand. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Reduction Offer is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.E1.6 and Section III.E2.6.

**Demand Reduction Value** is the quantity of reduced demand calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Demand Resource** is a resource defined as Demand Response Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. Demand Resources are installed measures (i.e., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) that result in additional and verifiable reductions in end-use demand on the electricity network in the New England Control Area pursuant to Appendix III.E1 and Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1, or during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours, respectively. A Demand Resource may include a portfolio of measures aggregated together to meet or exceed the minimum Resource size requirements of the Forward Capacity Auction.

**Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit** is an audit initiated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.4.

**Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours** are those hours, or portions thereof, in which, absent the dispatch of Real-Time Demand Response Resources, Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide implementation of the action of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4 where the ISO would have begun to allow the depletion of Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve is forecasted in the ISO’s most recent next-day forecast.

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.
**Demand Resource Operable Capacity Analysis** means an analysis performed by the ISO estimating the expected dispatch hours of active Demand Resources given different assumed levels of Demand Resources clearing in the primary Forward Capacity Auction.

**Demand Resource Performance Incentives** means the additional monthly capacity payment that a Demand Resource may earn for producing a positive Monthly Capacity Variance in a period where other Demand Resources yield a negative monthly capacity variance.

**Demand Resource Performance Penalties** means the reduction in the monthly capacity payment to a Demand Resource for producing a negative Monthly Capacity Variance.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and the pumping load associated with pumped storage generators) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end use customers from multiple delivery points that meets the registration requirements in Section III.E2.2. The demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset is the difference between the Demand Response Asset’s actual demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point, which could reflect Net Supply, at the time the Demand Response Resource to which the asset is associated is dispatched by the ISO, and its adjusted Demand Response Baseline.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers or the expected output levels of the generation of an individual end-use metered customer whose asset is comprised of Distributed Generation as determined pursuant to Section III.8A or Section III.8B.
**Demand Response Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Regulation Resource** is a Real-Time Demand Response Resource eligible to provide Regulation.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a Dispatch Zone that meets the registration requirements and participates in the Energy Market pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the minimum time, from the receipt of a Dispatch Instruction, that it takes a Demand Response Resource that was not previously reducing demand to start reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the time required from the time a Demand Response Resource that was not previously reducing demand starts reducing demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction and the time the resource achieves its Minimum Reduction.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.
**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, and may be a Category A Designated Blackstart Resource or a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for generation and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** is the Dispatch Rate expressed in megawatts.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant.
Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Rate** means the control signal, expressed in dollars per MWh and/or megawatts, calculated and transmitted to direct the output, consumption or demand reduction level of each generating Resource, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand and Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the Offer Data.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.6.1.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand** is any portion of an Asset Related Demand of a Market Participant that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions has Electronic Dispatch Capability, and must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Pumped storage facilities may qualify as Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources, however, such resources shall not qualify as a capacity resource for both the generating output and dispatchable pumping demand of the facility.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation resources directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s meter, which reduce the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced by other capacity resources on the electricity network in the New England Control Area during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours, provided that the aggregate nameplate capacity of the generation resource does not exceed 5 MW, or does not exceed the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand of the end-use metered customer at the location where the generation resource is directly connected, whichever is greater. Generation resources cannot participate in the Forward Capacity Market or the Energy Markets as Demand Resources or Demand Response Resources, unless they meet the definition of Distributed Generation.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a wind resource must not exceed.

**DR Auditing Period** is the summer DR Auditing Period or winter DR Auditing Period as defined in Section III.13.6.1.5.4.3.1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.
Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC) is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount) is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC) is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

EAWW Amount is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

Economic Dispatch Point is the output level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max is the maximum available output, in MW, of a resource that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the resource’s Supply Offer. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a resource for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit for all hours in which a resource has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min is (a) for Resources with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for Resources without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Resource and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and
(c) for Resources undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Resource requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for non-dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its non-dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the set of Supply Offer values that are used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1.a.

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electronic Dispatch Capability** is the ability to provide for the electronic transmission, receipt, and acknowledgment of data relative to the dispatch of generating units and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands and the ability to carry out the real-time dispatch processes from ISO issuance of Dispatch Instructions to the actual increase or decrease in output of dispatchable Resources.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the
Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

Eligible FTR Bidder is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

Emergency is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

Emergency Condition means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

Emergency Energy is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min means the minimum generation amount, in MWs, that a generating unit can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

EMS is energy management system.

End-of-Round Price is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.
**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Cap** is $1,000/MWh.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative $150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Enrolling Participant** is the Market Participant that registers Customers for the Load Response Program.
**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the Capacity Requirement from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Estimated Net Regional Clearing Price (ENRCP)** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource, and, subject to ISO evaluation, for the Forward Capacity Auction to be conducted beginning February 1, 2008, any resource that is under construction and within 12 months of its expected commercial operations date.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.

**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service...
obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically; and (vi) has satisfied its Minimum Time Between Reductions.

**Fast Start Generator** means a generating unit that the ISO may dispatch within the hour through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) minimum run time does not exceed one hour; (ii) minimum down time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down dispatch instruction electronically; and (vi) has satisfied its minimum down time.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Payment** is the monthly capacity payment for a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.7.2.1.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


**Financial Transmission Right (FTR)** is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

**Firm Point-To-Point Service** is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.

**Firm Transmission Service** is Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, service for Excepted Transactions, firm MTF Service, firm OTF Service, and firm Local Service.

**Force Majeure** - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

**Forecast Hourly Demand Reduction** means the estimated maximum quantity of energy reduction (MWh), measured at the end-use customer meter that can be produced by a Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource, in each hour of an Operating Day. For a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset that is metered at the generator and associated with a Real-Time
Emergency Generation Resource, the Forecast Hourly Demand Reduction means the estimated maximum generator output (MWh) in each hour of an Operating Day.

**Formal Warning** is defined in Section III.B.4.1.1 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Formula-Based Sanctions** are defined in Section III.B.4.1.3 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual descending clock auction in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is $14,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.
**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Award Financial Assurance** is a required amount of financial assurance that must be maintained at all times from a Designated FTR Participant for each FTR awarded to the participant in any FTR Auctions. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Bid Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a
“Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a generator that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.
**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission...
Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

**Hourly Calculated Demand Resource Performance Value** means the performance of a Demand Resource during Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours and Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours for purposes of calculating a Demand Reduction Value pursuant to Sections III.13.7.1.5.7.3 and III.13.7.1.5.8.3.

**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.1.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the difference between the Average Hourly Load Reduction or Average Hourly Output of the Real-Time Demand Response Resource and the amount of load reduction or output that the Market Participant was instructed to produce pursuant to a Dispatch Instruction calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.7.3.1.

**Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Deviation** is calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.8.3.1.
Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Hub is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

Hub Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC) is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

Import Capacity Resource means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

Inadequate Supply is defined in Section III.13.2.8.1 of Market Rule 1.

Inadvertent Energy Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.
**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Insufficient Competition** is defined in Section III.13.2.8.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.
**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Intermittent Settlement Only Resource** is a Settlement Only Resource that is also an Intermittent Power Resource.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market
Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with
the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Manuals are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.


ISO New England Operating Procedures are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

ISO New England Planning Procedures are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


ITC Agreement is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC Rate Schedule is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC System is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC System Planning Procedures is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC) is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.
**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means generating resources that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Load Management** means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage from Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, or Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours to other hours and reduce the amount of capacity needed, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, chilled water storage, and other forms of electricity storage.

**Load Response Program** means the program implemented and administered by the ISO to promote demand side response as described in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.
**Load Response Program Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned an identification number, that participate in the Load Response Program and which encompass assets registered in the Real-Time Price Response Program or Real-Time Demand Response Assets, and are further described in Appendix E of Market Rule 1.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.
**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

**Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP)** is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

**Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

**Local Resource Adequacy Requirement** is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

**Local Second Contingency Protection Resources** are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

**Local Service** is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

**Local Service Schedule** is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

**Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR)** is the minimum amount of capacity that must be located within an import-constrained Load Zone, calculated as described in Section III.12.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Local System Planning (LSP)** is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Localized Costs** are the incremental costs resulting from a RTEP02 Upgrade or a Regional Benefit Upgrade or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade that exceeds those requirements that the ISO deems reasonable and consistent with Good Utility Practice and the current engineering design and construction practices in the area in which the Transmission Upgrade is built. In making its determination of whether Localized Costs exist, the ISO will consider, in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT, the reasonableness of the proposed engineering design and construction method with respect to alternate feasible Transmission Upgrades and the relative costs, operation, timing of implementation, efficiency and reliability of the proposed Transmission Upgrade. The ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, as appropriate, shall review such Transmission Upgrade, and determine whether there are any Localized Costs resulting from such Transmission Upgrade. If there are any such costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

**Location** is a Node, External Node, Load Zone or Hub. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, the Location also is a Dispatch Zone.

**Locational Marginal Price (LMP)** is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, the Location Marginal Price for a Dispatch Zone is the Zonal Price for that Dispatch Zone.

**Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Long-Term** is a term of one year or more.

**Long-Term Transmission Outage** is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.
**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**LSE** means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart CIP Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Major Transmission Outage** is a major transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(v) of Market Rule 1.
**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


**Market Participant Obligations** is defined in Section III.B.1.1 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.
**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is the maximum amount of capacity that can be procured in an export-constrained Load Zone, calculated as described in Section III.12.2 of Market Rule 1, to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available from the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand for economic dispatch and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of a Resource’s Offer Data except that a Self-Scheduled Dispatchable Asset Related Demand may modify its Minimum Consumption Limit on an hourly basis, as part of its Demand Bid, in order to indicate the desired level of Self-Scheduled MW.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand or, if unavailable, an estimate of the annual non-coincident peak demand of a Real-Time Demand Response Asset or a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, where the demand evaluated is established by adding actual metered
demand and the output of all generators located behind the asset’s end-use customer meter in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Generation** is the maximum generation output of a Real-Time Demand Response Asset comprised of Distributed Generation or the maximum generation output of a Demand Response Asset comprised of Distributed Generation.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum hourly demand reduction amount that a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or a Demand Asset can deliver. For assets that deliver demand reduction, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the asset’s peak load less its uninterruptible load. For assets that deliver reductions through the use of generation, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the difference between the generator’s maximum possible output and its expected output when not providing demand reduction. For assets that deliver demand reduction and Net Supply, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the asset’s peak load plus Maximum Net Supply as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand or, if unavailable, an estimate of the annual non-coincident peak demand, of a Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Demand Response Asset or Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset.

**Maximum Net Supply** is an estimate of the maximum hourly Net Supply for a Demand Response Asset as measured from the Demand Response Asset’s Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Measure Life** is the estimated time a Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource is greater than or equal to the
amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the Demand Reduction Value for an Existing Demand Resource is not overstated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1, which includes Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by a Demand Resource supplier as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by Demand Resource suppliers during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by a Demand Resource supplier with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total Demand Reduction Values for all Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.
Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF) are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider) is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service) is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA) is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO) is an owner of MTF.

Meter Data Error means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the data reconciliation process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the data reconciliation process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

Minimum Consumption Limit is the minimum amount, in MW, available from a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that is not available for economic dispatch and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of a Resource’s Offer Data.

Minimum Down Time is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit before the Generator Asset can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit.
**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more generating Resources to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the minimum number of hours that a Market Participant requires between the time the Demand Response Resource receives a Dispatch Instruction from the ISO to not reduce demand and the time the Demand Response Resource receives a Dispatch Instruction from the ISO to reduce demand.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Variance** means a Demand Resource’s actual monthly Capacity Value established pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.1 of Market Rule 1, minus the Demand Resource’s final Capacity Supply Obligation for the month.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2(a) of Market Rule 1.
Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

Monthly Regional Network Load is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

Monthly Statement is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

MUI is the market user interface.

Municipal Market Participant is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

MW is megawatt.

MWh is megawatt-hour.

Native Load Customers are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

NCPC Charge means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

NCPC Credit means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Needs Assessment is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
NEMA, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

NEMA Contract is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE) is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.


NEPOOL Agreement is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

NEPOOL GIS is the generation information system.

NEPOOL GIS Administrator is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

NESCOE is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.
**Net CONE** is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of the first-year non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require, in its first year of operation, to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the first year energy and ancillary services revenues, and projected revenue for subsequent years.

**Net Regional Clearing Price** is described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Net Supply** is energy injected at the Retail Delivery Point by a Demand Response Asset with Distributed Generation.

**Net Supply Limit** is the estimated portion of the offered Maximum Reduction of a Demand Response Resource that would be provided through Net Supply. The Net Supply Limit is calculated by multiplying the offered Maximum Reduction of the Demand Response Resource by the ratio of total Net Supply to total demand reduction performance from the prior like Seasonal DR Audit of the Demand Response Assets that are mapped to the Demand Response Resource for the month.

**Network Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Customer** is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

**Network Import Capability (NI Capability)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Resource** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date.
until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Required** is the amount of additional capacity required to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement or a Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement, as described in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III 13.1.4.2.3 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource.

**New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Response Asset** is a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or Demand Response Asset that is registered with the ISO, has been mapped to a resource, is ready to respond, and has been included in the dispatch model of the remote terminal unit but does not have a winter audit value and a summer audit value.

**New Demand Response Asset Audit** is an audit of a New Demand Response Asset performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.8.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.2.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Nodal Amount** is node(s)-specific on-peak and off-peak proxy value to which an FTR bid or awarded FTR bid relates.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a generating unit that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the unit for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the generating unit is scheduled in the New England Markets.
**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.3.1.3.

**Non-Commercial Capacity** is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an increment of an Existing Capacity Resource that is treated as a New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and that has not been declared commercial and has not had its capacity rating verified by the ISO.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period** is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount)** is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments** are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Non-Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Non-Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer** is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to
the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

**Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resource** is a Settlement Only Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource.

**Non-Market Participant** is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

**Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer** is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

**Non-Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Price Retirement Request** is a binding request to retire the entire capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

**Non-Qualifying** means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

**Notice of RBA** is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Notification Time** is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

**Northeastern Planning Protocol** is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL: www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc.

**NPCC** is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.
**Obligation Month** means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

**Offer Data** means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including generating unit and Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generating and Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources, and for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Response Resources for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

**Offered CLAIM10** is, for a generating Resource, a Supply Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the Resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available from the Resource from an off-line state, and, for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand or Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched, is a Demand Bid or Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the Resource that represents the amount of TMNSR or TMSR available from the Resource.

**Offered CLAIM30** is a Supply Offer, Demand Bid or Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of a Resource that represents the amount of TMOR available from an off-line generating Resource, or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand or Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**Offered Full Reduction Time** is the value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.6.

**On-Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS)** is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.
Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Operating Authority is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

Operating Data means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

Operating Day means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

Operating Reserve means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

Operations Date is February 1, 2005.

OTF Service is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

Other Transmission Facility (OTF) are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA) is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

Other Transmission Owner (OTO) is an owner of OTF.
Ownership Share is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a generating unit asset or Load Asset, where such unit or load is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

Participant Expenses are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participant Required Balance is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Participant Vote is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participants Agreement is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

Participants Committee is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

Payment is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

Payment Default Shortfall Fund is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Peak Energy Rent (PER) is described in Section III.13.7.2.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

PER Proxy Unit is described in Section III.13.7.2.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

Percent of Total Demand Reduction Value Complete means the delivery schedule as a percentage of a Demand Resource’s total Demand Reduction Value that will be or has been achieved as of specific target dates, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

Permanent De-list Bid is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1.52 of Market Rule 1.
Phase I Transfer Credit is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

Phase I/II HVDC-TF is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability. Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

Phase One Proposal is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Phase II Transfer Credit is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

Phase Two Solution is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Planning Advisory Committee is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

Planning and Reliability Criteria is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

Planning Authority is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.

**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Poorly Performing Resource** is described in Section III.13.7.1.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (Pumps Only) Postured for Reliability, the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.

**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.
**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.
**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is a Real-Time demand reduction amount determined pursuant to Section III.E1.8 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing prior to June 1, 2018, and Section III.E2.7 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018.

**Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours** means those hours, or portions thereof, in which ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4 is implemented and the ISO has begun to allow the depletion of Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve on a Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide basis, and the ISO notifies the Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources of such hours.

**Real-Time Demand Response Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that are located at a single Node, report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned a unique asset identification number by the ISO, and that participate in the Forward Capacity Market as part of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Demand Response Resource.

**Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours** means hours when the ISO dispatches Real-Time Demand Response Resources in response to Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours, which may include Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide dispatch of such resources.

**Real-Time Demand Response Resource** is a type of Demand Resource that is comprised of installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer...
facilities that: (i) curtail electrical usage in response to a Dispatch Instruction; and (ii) continue curtailing electrical usage until receiving Dispatch Instructions to restore electrical usage. Such measures include Load Management and Distributed Generation. The period of curtailment shall be consistent with Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that are located at a single Node, report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned a unique asset identification number by the ISO, and that participate in the Forward Capacity Market as part of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours** means those hours, or portions thereof, between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. Monday through Friday, non-Demand Response Holidays in which the ISO dispatches Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources on a Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide basis when deficient in Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve and when the ISO implements voltage reductions of five percent of normal operating voltage that require more than 10 minutes to implement.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource** is Distributed Generation whose federal, state and/or local air quality permits, rules or regulations limit operation in response to requests from the ISO to the times when the ISO implements voltage reductions of five percent of normal operating voltage that require more than 10 minutes to implement. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource must be capable of: (i) curtailing its end-use electric consumption from the New England grid within 30 minutes of receiving a Dispatch Instruction; and (ii) continuing that curtailment until receiving a Dispatch Instruction to restore consumption.

**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.
Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Generation Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time High Operating Limit is the maximum output, in MW, of a resource that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy under Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1, for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the resource’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the unit.

Real-Time Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(i) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(i) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Loss Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Price Response Program** is the program described in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (Pumps Only) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Real-Time Reserve Designation as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.
Real-Time Reserve Designation is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as adjusted after-the-fact utilizing revenue quality meter data as described under Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

Receiving Party is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

Reference Level is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU) means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or an Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

Regional Network Load is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses) and shall not be credited or reduced for any behind-the-meter generation. A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements.
under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.
**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.

**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.
**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.

**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfer its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPF)** are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a generating unit, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource or an External Transaction or, for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, a Demand Response Resource. For purposes of providing Regulation, Resource means a generating unit, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, a Demand Response Regulation Resource or an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource.

**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.
**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such
Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Sanctionable Behavior** is defined in Section III.B.3 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a generating unit or ISO-approved combination of units, and represent the maximum dependable load carrying ability of such unit or units, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is a seasonal audit of the demand response capability of a Demand Resource initiated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.1.

**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak
Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling its Resource, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Resource would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to consume Energy. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Scheduled MW** is an amount, in megawatts, that is Self-Scheduled and is equal to: (i) a Generator Asset’s Economic Minimum Limit; (ii) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand’s Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that office.

**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.
**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VLD of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW or otherwise eligible for Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortage Event** is defined in Section III.13.7.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Shortage Event Availability Score** is the average of the hourly availability scores for each hour or portion of an hour during a Shortage Event, as described in Section III.13.7.1.1.1.A of Market Rule 1.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

**SMD Effective Date** is March 1, 2003.

**Solutions Study** is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.
**Special Constraint Resource (SCR)** is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a generating unit to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the unit each time the unit is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.
**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net risk-adjusted going forward costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by (1) the clearing of the Static De-List Bids or the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station or (2) the acceptance of a Non-Price Retirement Request of the Station, calculated in the same manner as the net risk-adjusted going forward costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.
Successful FCA is a Forward Capacity Auction in which a Capacity Zone has neither Inadequate Supply nor Insufficient Competition.

Summer ARA Qualified Capacity is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

Summer Capability Period means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

Supplemental Availability Bilateral is described in Section III.13.5.3.2 of Market Rule 1.

Supplemental Capacity Resources are described in Section III.13.5.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

Supplemented Capacity Resource is described in Section III.13.5.3.2 of Market Rule 1.

Supply Offer is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.

Supply Offer Block-Hours are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

Synchronous Condenser is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.
**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks,
franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each
case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes from the request of the ISO (2) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that can be fully utilized within ten minutes from the request of the ISO to reduce consumption; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within ten minutes from the request of the ISO.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that is electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes from the request of the ISO; (2) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand pump that is electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System that can reduce energy consumption to provide reserve capability within ten minutes from the request of the ISO; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within ten minutes from the request of the ISO for which none of the associated Demand Response Assets have a generator whose output can be controlled located behind the Retail Delivery Point other than emergency generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)** means the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that can be converted fully into energy within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO (2) a
Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that can be fully utilized within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO to reduce consumption; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO.

Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate) is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

Through or Out Service (TOUT Service) means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

Tie-Line Asset is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

Total Available Amount is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

Total Blackstart Capital Payment is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

Total Blackstart O&M Payment is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Negative Hourly Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the absolute value of the sum of the negative Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviations and negative Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Deviations from all Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources receiving Dispatch Instructions in the same hour in the same Dispatch Zone.

**Total Positive Hourly Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the sum of the positive Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviations and positive Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Deviations from all Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources receiving Dispatch Instructions in the same hour in the same Dispatch Zone.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

**Transmission Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

**Transmission Default Period** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff)** is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.

**Transmission Obligations** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA)** is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Transmission Owner** means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

**Transmission Provider** is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

**Transmission Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Security Analysis Requirement** shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

**Transmission Service Agreement (TSA)** is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

**Transmission Upgrade(s)** means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.
**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.
**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated Demand Resource project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.
Year means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

Zonal Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.
I.3 Obligations of Market Participants and Other Customers

The ISO acts as Counterparty for sales to its Customers of Regional Transmission Service, and for agreements and transactions with its Customers, including but not limited to assignments involving Customers, and agreements and transactions with Customers involving sale to the ISO and/or purchase from the ISO of energy, capacity, reserves, regulation, Ancillary Services, FTRs and involving other products, service and transactions, all as specified in Sections II and III of the Tariff (collectively, the “Products”).

To the extent permitted by applicable law, any warranties provided by the sellers or assignors to the ISO of the Products which cover the Products, whether express or implied, are hereby passed to the Customers on a “pass through basis” and to the extent not passed through, any such warranties are hereby assigned by ISO to Customers. Sellers and assignors to the ISO and Customers acknowledge that warranties on such Products are limited to that offered by the seller or assignor to the ISO and will exist, if at all, solely between the seller or assignor to the ISO and the Customer. AS BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND ISO AS COUNTERPARTY, NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE MADE BY THE ISO REGARDING THE PRODUCTS SOLD BY THE ISO AS COUNTERPARTY, AND ANY SUCH PRODUCTS ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” BASIS. THE ISO MAKES NO WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION THAT THE PRODUCTS WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR FREE. THE CUSTOMER HEREBY WAIVES, AND THE ISO HEREBY DISCLAIMS, ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. THE ISO DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE PRODUCTS OFFERED WILL MEET CUSTOMER’S REQUIREMENTS. NO ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE GIVEN BY THE ISO OR ANY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISO SHALL CREATE A WARRANTY OR IN ANY WAY INCREASE THE SCOPE OF ANY PASS THROUGH OR ASSIGNED WARRANTY. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.

I.3.1 Service Agreement

Receipt of service under this Tariff requires the execution of a Market Participant Service Agreement in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1, as applicable, to this Tariff unless the Customer seeks transmission service only and does not participate in the New England Markets (in which case the Customer must execute a Transmission Service Agreement). Receipt of Local Service under Section II of
this Tariff requires the execution of a Transmission Service Agreement in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of Section II of this Tariff for Local Service and shall be subject to the requirements of Schedule 21. Receipt of OTF Service under Section II of this Tariff requires the execution of a Transmission Service Agreement in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of Section II of this Tariff and shall be subject to the requirements of Schedule 20.

I.3.2. Assets:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable, cause all of the Assets it owns or operates to be designed, constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the provisions of this Tariff, the ISO New England Operating Procedures, and the ISO New England Planning Procedures.

I.3.3. Maintenance and Repair:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable: (a) cause Assets owned or operated by it to be withdrawn from operation for maintenance and repair only in accordance with maintenance schedules reported to, and approved and published by the ISO in accordance with the ISO New England Operating Procedures, (b) restore such Assets to good operating condition with reasonable promptness, and (c) in emergency situations, accelerate maintenance and repair at the reasonable request of the ISO in accordance with the ISO New England Planning Procedures.

I.3.4. Central Dispatch:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable, subject each of the Assets it owns or operates to central dispatch by the ISO; provided, however, that each Market Participant shall at all times be the sole judge as to whether or not and to what extent safety requires that at any time any of such facilities will be operated at less than their full capacity.

I.3.5. Provision of Information:
The Customers shall provide the ISO with any and all information within their custody or control that the ISO deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Tariff, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. Each Customer shall ensure that the ISO has an accurate list of the Customer’s Affiliates. The ISO will compile a list that shall be considered definitive. It will be the Customer’s responsibility to regularly review the list and to promptly (and in advance of Affiliate changes, where possible) provide the ISO with additions and/or corrections to the list and, when requested, relevant supporting documentation.
I.3.6. Records and Information:
Each Customer shall keep such records as may reasonably be required by the ISO, and shall furnish to the ISO such records, reports and information (including forecasts) as it may reasonably require, provided that confidentiality thereof is protected in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

I.3.7. Payment of Invoices; Compliance with Policies:
Each Customer is obligated to pay when due in accordance with this Tariff, the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy all amounts invoiced to it pursuant to this Tariff, and to comply with those terms, conditions and policies in all respects. If a Customer fails to meet the requirements specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and ISO New England Billing Policy, the ISO may take such actions as are specified in those policies.

I.3.8. Protective Devices for Transmission Facilities:
Each Market Participant shall install, maintain and operate such protective equipment and switching, voltage control, load shedding and emergency facilities as the ISO and the applicable Transmission Owner may determine to be required in order to assure continuity of service and the stability of the New England Transmission System.

I.3.9. Review of Market Participant’s Proposed Plans:

I.3.9.1 Submission and Review of Proposed Plan Applications:
Each Market Participant and Transmission Owner shall submit to the ISO, in such form, manner and detail as the ISO may reasonably prescribe, (i) any new or materially changed plan for additions to or changes to any generating and demand resources or transmission facilities rated 69 kV or above subject to control of such Market Participant or Transmission Owner, and (ii) any new or materially changed plan for any other action to be taken by the Market Participant or Transmission Owner, except for retirements of or reductions in the capacity of a generating resource or a demand resource, which may have a significant effect on the stability, reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of a Market Participant. No significant action (other than preliminary engineering action) leading toward implementation of any such new or changed plan shall be taken earlier than sixty days (or ninety days, if the ISO determines that it requires additional time to consider the plan and so notifies the Market Participant in writing within the sixty days) after the plan has been submitted to the ISO. Unless prior to
the expiration of the sixty or ninety days, whichever is applicable, the ISO notifies the Market Participant or Transmission Owner in writing that it has determined that implementation of the plan will have a significant adverse effect upon the reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of a Market Participant, the Market Participant or Transmission Owner shall be free to proceed. The ISO shall maintain on its website a list of such applications that are currently under review and the status of each such application. The ISO shall provide notice of any action taken with respect to any such applications, including an explanation of its reasons for such action, to each Market Participant or Transmission Owner as soon as reasonably practicable after such action is taken. The time limits provided by this section may be changed with respect to any such submission by agreement between the ISO and the Market Participant or Transmission Owner.

I.3.9.2 Additional Review of Additions of or Changes to Generating Resources:
Proposals for new generating resources or modifications to existing generating resources are also subject to the terms set out in Schedule 22, the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreement, and Schedule 23, the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreement, to Section II of the Tariff.

I.3.9.3 Reliability Review of Retirements of or Reductions in Capacity of an Existing Demand Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource:
Proposals for the reduction of capacity from an Existing Demand Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource below its Qualified Capacity amount for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including unit retirement, are reviewed for reliability impact pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 of the Tariff. Once a demand resource or generating resource has a cleared de-list bid pursuant to Section III of the Tariff it may reduce its capacity consistent with the terms of its de-list bid for all or any part of the Capacity Commitment Period of the approved de-list without further reliability review. However, any proposed physical modification to a de-listed generating facility must comply with the requirements, including the reliability review process, set out in Schedules 22 or 23, as applicable.

Once a generating resource has an approved Non-Price Retirement Request, it must retire as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a), except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2, without further reliability review.

I.3.10 Market Participant to Avoid Adverse Effect:
If the ISO notifies a Market Participant pursuant to Section I.3.9.1 that implementation of the Market Participant’s or Transmission Owner’s plan has been determined to have a significant adverse effect upon
the reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of one or more Market Participants, the Market Participant or Transmission Owner shall not proceed to implement such plan unless the Market Participant (or the Non-Market Participant on whose behalf the Market Participant has submitted its plan) or Transmission Owner takes such action or constructs at its expense such facilities as the ISO determines to be reasonably necessary to avoid such adverse effect.
## ATTACHMENT K
### REGIONAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

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APPENDIX 1 – ATTACHMENT K – LOCAL: LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS
APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION
APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS
1. Overview

This Attachment describes the regional system planning process conducted by the ISO, as well as the coordination with transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems to ensure the reliability of the New England Transmission System and compliance with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures, while accounting for market performance, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as may be agreed upon from time to time. The New England Transmission System is comprised of PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF within the New England Control Area that is under the ISO’s operational authority or control pursuant to the ISO Tariff and/or various transmission operating agreements. This Attachment describes the regional system planning process for the PTF conducted by the ISO, and local system planning process conducted by the PTOs, pursuant to their responsibilities defined in the Tariff, the various transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. Additional details regarding the regional system planning process are also provided in the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, which are available on the ISO’s website.

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems, consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the Tariff, applicable transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. As described in this Attachment’s Section 6 and Appendix 1, entitled “Attachment K - Local System Planning Process”, the PTOs are responsible for the Local System Planning (“LSP”) process for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. As also described in Section 6, and pursuant to the Tariff and/or transmission operating agreements, the OTOs and MTOs are required to participate in the ISO’s regional system planning process for reliability purposes and to perform and/or support studies of the impact of regional system planning projects on their respective OTF and MTF.

The regional system planning process described in this Attachment provides for the ISO to undertake assessments of the needs of the PTF system on a systemwide or specific area basis. These assessments shall be referred to as Needs Assessments, as described in Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The ISO shall incorporate market responses that have met the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment into the Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the Regional System Plan (“RSP”).
described below. Where market responses incorporated into the Needs Assessments or Public Policy Transmission Studies do not eliminate or address the needs identified by the ISO in Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the RSP, the ISO shall develop or evaluate, pursuant to Sections 4.2(b) or 4.3 of this Attachment, as applicable, regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified by the ISO.

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of this Attachment, the ISO shall develop the RSP for approval by the ISO Board of Directors following stakeholder input through the Planning Advisory Committee established pursuant to Section 2 of this Attachment. The RSP is a compilation of the regional system planning process activities conducted by the ISO during a given year. The RSP shall address needs of the PTF system determined by the ISO through Needs Assessments initiated and updated on an ongoing basis by the ISO to: (i) account for changes in the PTF system conditions; (ii) ensure reliability of the PTF system; (iii) comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures; and (iv) account for market performance, economic, environmental and other considerations as may be agreed upon from time to time.

As more fully described in Section 3 of this Attachment, the RSP shall identify:

(i) PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs,

(ii) the requirements and characteristics of the types of resources that may satisfy PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs to provide stakeholders an opportunity to develop and propose efficient market responses to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments;

(iii) regulated transmission solutions to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments where market responses do not address such needs or additional transmission infrastructure may be required to comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures or provide market efficiency benefits in accordance with Attachment N of this OATT; and

(iv) those projects identified through the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K.
In addition, the RSP shall also provide information on a broad variety of power system requirements that serves as input for reviewing the design of the markets and the overall economic performance of the system. The RSP shall also describe the coordination of the ISO’s regional system plans with regional, local and inter-area planning activities.

Pursuant to Section 3.6 of this Attachment, the ISO shall also develop, maintain and post on its website a cumulative list reflecting the regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to Needs Assessments (the “RSP Project List”). The RSP Project List shall be a cumulative representation of the regional transmission planning expansion efforts ongoing in New England.

1.1 Enrollment
For purposes of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to this Attachment K, and distinct from Transmission Providers as defined in Section I of this Tariff, an entity chooses to enroll by executing (or having already executed) a: (i) transmission operating agreement with the ISO, or (ii) a Market Participant Service Agreement coupled with a written notification to the ISO that the entity desires to be a transmission provider in the New England region. Such enrollment in the transmission planning region is not necessary to participate in the Planning Advisory Committee, which is open to any entity as described in Section 2.3 of this Attachment K.

1.2 A List of Entities Enrolled in the Planning Region
A list of entities enrolled in the transmission planning region as transmission providers as described in Section 1.1. above, is included as Appendix 2 of this Attachment K.

2. Planning Advisory Committee
2.1 Establishment
A Planning Advisory Committee shall be established by the ISO to perform the functions set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. It shall have a Chair and Secretary, who shall be appointed by the chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee. Before appointing an individual to the position of the Chair or Secretary, the ISO shall notify the Planning Advisory Committee of the proposed assignment and, consistent with its personnel practices, provide any other information about the individual reasonably requested by the Planning Advisory Committee. The chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee shall consider the input of the members of the Planning Advisory Committee in selecting,
removing or replacing such officers. The Planning Advisory Committee shall be advisory only and shall have no formal voting protocol.

The ISO may form subcommittees that, at the discretion of the ISO, may report to the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.2 Role of Planning Advisory Committee
The Planning Advisory Committee may provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning the regional system planning process, including the development of and review of Needs Assessments, the conduct of Solutions Studies, the development of the RSP, and updates to the RSP Project List. Specifically, the Planning Advisory Committee serves to review and provide input and comment on: (i) the development of the RSP, (ii) assumptions for studies, (iii) the results of Needs Assessments, Solutions Studies, and competitive solutions developed pursuant to Section 4.3 of this Attachment, and (iv) potential market responses to the needs identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP. The Planning Advisory Committee, with the assistance of and in coordination with the ISO, serves also to identify and prioritize requests for Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO, and provides input and feedback to the ISO concerning the conduct of Economic Studies and Public Policy Transmission Studies, including the criteria and assumptions for such studies. Based on input and feedback related to the regional system planning process provided by the Planning Advisory Committee to the ISO, the ISO shall consult with the appropriate NEPOOL technical committees, including but not limited to, the Markets, Reliability and Transmission Committees, on issues and concerns identified by the Planning Advisory Committee as requiring further investigation and consideration of potential changes to ISO New England Operating Documents.

2.3 Membership
Any entity, including State regulators or agencies and NESCOE, as specified in Attachment N of the OATT, may designate a member to the Planning Advisory Committee by providing written notice to the Secretary of that Committee identifying the name of the entity represented by the member and the member's name, address, telephone number, facsimile number and electronic mail address. The entity may remove or replace such member at any time by written notice to the Secretary of the Planning Advisory Committee.
2.4 Procedures

(a) Notice of Meetings
Prior to the beginning of each year, the ISO shall list on the ISO Calendar, which is available on the ISO’s website, the proposed meeting dates for the Planning Advisory Committee for each month of the year. Prior to a Planning Advisory Committee meeting, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee by electronic email with the date, time, format for the meeting (i.e., in person or teleconference), and the purpose for the meeting.

(b) Frequency of Meetings
Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be held as frequently as necessary to serve the purposes stated in Section 2.2 of this Attachment and as further specified elsewhere in this Attachment, generally expected to be no less than four (4) times per year.

(c) Availability of Meeting Materials
The ISO shall post materials for Planning Advisory Committee meetings on the Planning Advisory Committee section on the ISO’s website prior to meetings. The materials for the Planning Advisory Committee meetings shall be made available to the members of the Planning Advisory Committee subject to protections warranted by confidentiality requirements of the ISO New England Information Policy set forth in Attachment D of the ISO Tariff and Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (“CEII”) policy as further described in Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment.

(d) Access to Planning-Related Materials that Contain CEII
CEII is defined as specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure (physical or virtual) that:

(i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy;
(ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;
(iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and

(iv) Does not simply give the location of critical infrastructure.

CEII pertains to existing and proposed system and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. CEII does not include information that is otherwise publicly available. Simplified maps and general information on engineering, vulnerability, or design that relate to production, generation, transportation, transmission or distribution of energy shall not constitute CEII.

Planning-related materials determined to be CEII will be posted on the ISO’s password-protected website. To obtain access to planning-related materials determined to be CEII, the entity seeking to obtain such access must contact the ISO’s Customer Service department. Authorized Market Participants or their representatives, such as consultants, are bound by the ISO New England Information Policy and will be able to access CEII materials through the ISO’s password-protected website. State and federal governmental agency employees and their consultants will be able to access such materials through the ISO’s password-protected website upon submittal of a signed non-disclosure agreement, which is available on the ISO’s website. Personnel of the ERO, NPCC, other regional transmission organizations or independent system operators, and transmission owners from neighboring regions will be able to access CEII materials pursuant to governing agreements, rules and protocols. All external requests by other persons for planning-related materials determined to be CEII shall be recorded and tracked by ISO’s Customer Services staff. Such requestors will be able to obtain access to CEII documents filed with the Commission pursuant to the Commission’s regulations governing access to CEII. To the extent a requestor seeks access to planning-related material that is not filed with the Commission, such requestor shall comply with the requirements provided in the CEII procedures of the ISO, available on the ISO’s website, prior to receiving access to CEII information. Upon compliance with the ISO’s CEII procedures, the ISO shall grant the requestor access to the planning-related CEII document through direct distribution or access to the ISO password-protected website.
2.5 Local System Planning Process

The LSP process described in Appendix 1 to this Attachment applies to the transmission system planning for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. The PTOs will utilize interested members of the Planning Advisory Committee for advisory stakeholder input in the LSP process that will meet, as needed, at the conclusion of, or independent of, scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. The LSP meeting agenda and meeting materials will be developed by representatives of the pertinent PTOs and PTO representatives will chair the LSP meeting. The ISO will post the LSP agenda and materials for LSP.

3. RSP: Principles, Scope, and Contents

3.1 Description of RSP

The ISO shall develop the RSP based on periodic comprehensive assessments (conducted not less than every third year) of the PTF systemwide needs to maintain the reliability of the New England Transmission System while accounting for market efficiency, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as agreed upon from time to time. The ISO shall update the RSP to reflect the results of ongoing Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The RSP shall also account for projected improvements to the PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability in accordance with national and regional standards and the operation of efficient markets under a set of planning assumptions.

The RSP shall, among other things:

(i) describe, in a consolidated manner, the assessment of the PTF system needs, the results of such assessments, and the projected improvements;

(ii) provide the projected annual and peak demands for electric energy for a five-to ten-year horizon, the needs for resources over this period and how such resources are expected to be provided;

(iii) specify the physical characteristics of the physical solutions that can meet the needs defined in the Needs Assessments and include information on market responses that can address them; and
(iv) provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations, operating characteristics and required availability criteria of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

The RSP shall also include a description of proposed regulated transmission solutions that, based on the Solutions Studies described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment and the competitive solution process described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, may meet the needs identified in the Needs Assessments. To this end, as further described in Section 3.6 below, the ISO shall develop and maintain a RSP Project List, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions classified, to the extent known, as Reliability Transmission Upgrades, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, and Public Policy Transmission Upgrades (which, for the foregoing types of upgrades, may include the portions of Interregional Transmission Projects located within the New England Control Area) and of External Transmission Projects. The RSP shall also provide reasons for any new regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP Project List, any change in status of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade in the RSP Project List, or for any removal of regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades from the RSP Project List that are known as of that time.

The RSP shall also include the results of the annual assessment of transmission transfer capability, conducted pursuant to applicable NERC, NPCC and ISO New England standards and criteria and the identification of potential future transmission system weaknesses and limiting facilities that could impact the transmission system’s ability to reliably transfer energy in the planning horizon. Each annual assessment will identify those portions of the New England system, along with the associated interface boundaries, that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market pursuant to ISO Tariff Section III.12. Each annual assessment of interface boundaries that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market will model out-of-service all submitted Non-Price Retirement De-List Bids Requests and submitted Permanent De-List Bids as well as rejected—for—reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected—for—reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction.
Each RSP shall be built upon the previous year’s RSP.

### 3.2 Baseline of RSP

The RSP shall account for: (i) all projects that have met milestones, including market responses and regulated transmission solutions (e.g., planned demand-side projects, generation and transmission projects and Elective Transmission Upgrades) as determined by the ISO, in collaboration with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of this Attachment; and (ii) the requirements for system operation and restoration services, not including the development of a system operations or restoration plan, which is outside the scope of the regional system planning process.

### 3.3 RSP Planning Horizon and Parameters

The RSP shall be based on a five-to ten-year planning horizon, and reflect five-to ten-year capacity and load forecasts.

The RSP shall conform to: Good Utility Practice; applicable Commission compliance requirements related to the regional system planning process; applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of the ERO, NPCC, and any of their successors; planning criteria adopted and/or developed by the ISO; Transmission Owner criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies developed by the Transmission Owner for its facilities consistent with the ISO planning criteria, the applicable criteria of the ERO and NPCC; local transmission planning criteria; and the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, as they may be amended from time to time (collectively, the “Planning and Reliability Criteria”).

The revisions to this Attachment K submitted to comply with FERC’s Order No. 1000 shall not apply to any Proposed or Planned project included in an RSP approved by the ISO Board of Directors (or in an RSP Project List update) prior to the effective date of the Order No. 1000 compliance filing of the ISO and the PTOs, unless the ISO is re-evaluating the solution design for such project as of that effective date, or subsequently determines that the solution design for such project requires re-evaluation.

### 3.4 Other RSP Principles
The RSP shall be designed and implemented to: (i) avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities; (ii) identify facilities that are necessary to meet Planning and Reliability Criteria; (iii) avoid the imposition of unreasonable costs upon any Transmission Owner, Transmission Customer or other user of a transmission facility; (iv) take into account the legal and contractual rights and obligations of the Transmission Owners and the transmission-related legal and contractual rights and obligations of any other entity; (v) provide for coordination with existing transmission systems and with appropriate inter-area and local expansion plans; and (vi) properly coordinate with market responses, including, but not limited to generation, merchant transmission and demand-side responses.

3.5 Market Responses in RSP

Market responses shall include investments in resources (e.g., demand-side projects, generation and distributed generation) and Elective Transmission Upgrades and shall be evaluated by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1(f) and 7 of this Attachment.

In developing the RSP, the ISO shall account for market responses: (i) proposed by Market Participants as addressing needs (and any critical time constraints for addressing such needs) identified in a RSP, Needs Assessment, or Public Policy Transmission Study; and (ii) that have proved to be viable by meeting the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) or 4A.3(b) of this Attachment, as applicable.

Specifically, market responses that are identified to the ISO and are determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to be sufficient to alleviate the need for a particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, based on the criteria specified in the pertinent Needs Assessment or RSP, and are judged by the ISO to be achievable within the required time period, shall be reflected in the next RSP and/or in a new or updated Needs Assessment. That particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade may continue to be included in the appropriate category on the RSP Project List (as described in Section 3.6 below), subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the project should proceed at a later date or it may be removed if it is determined to be no longer needed. If the market response does not fully address the defined needs, or if additional transmission infrastructure is required to facilitate the efficient operation of the market, the RSP shall also include that particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the Transmission Upgrade or regulated transmission solution should proceed at a later date and be modified, if necessary.
3.6 The RSP Project List

(a) Elements of the RSP Project List

The RSP Project List shall identify regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified in a RSP or Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, and shall identify Public Policy Transmission Upgrades identified pursuant to Section 4A of this Attachment. The RSP Project List shall identify the proposed regulated transmission solutions separately as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

With regard to Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, the following subcategories will be utilized to indicate the status of each proposed regulated transmission solution in the evaluation process. These subcategories include: (i) Concept; (ii) Proposed; (iii) Planned; (iv) Under Construction; and (v) In-Service. A Public Policy Transmission Upgrade will be identified in the RSP Project List as (i) Proposed; (ii) Planned; (iii) Under Construction; or (iv) In-Service.

The regulated transmission solution subcategories are defined as follows:

(i) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Concept” shall include a transmission project that is being considered by its proponent as a potential solution to meet a need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but for which there is little or no analysis available to support the transmission project.

(ii) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” shall include a regulated transmission solution that (a) has been proposed in response to a specific need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP and (b) has been evaluated or further defined and developed in a Solutions Study, as specified in Section 4.2(a) of this Attachment, or in the competitive solutions process specified in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, such that there is significant
analysis that supports a determination by the ISO, as communicated to the Planning Advisory Committee, that the proposed regulated transmission solution would likely meet the need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but has not received approval by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

For purposes of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” means that the ISO has included the project in the RSP Project List pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K, but that the project has not yet been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iii) “Planned” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has met the requirements for a Proposed project and has been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iv) “Under Construction” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has received the approvals required under the Tariff and engineering and construction is underway.

(v) “In Service” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has been placed in commercial operation.

The RSP Project List shall also list External Transmission Projects for which cost allocation and, if applicable, operating agreements have been accepted by the Commission, and indicate whether such External Transmission Projects are proposed, under construction or in service.

Each Reliability Transmission Upgrade and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced to the specific systemwide or area needs identified in a Needs Assessment or RSP. Each proposed Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced in the RSP Project List to a specific Public Policy Transmission Study.

For completeness, the RSP Project List shall also include Elective Transmission Upgrades and transmission facilities (as determined under the ISO interconnection
process specified in this OATT) to be built to accommodate new generation, and Elective Transmission Upgrades that have satisfied the requirements of this OATT.

An Interregional Transmission Project developed pursuant to Section 6.3 of this Attachment K may displace a regional Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade on the RSP Project List where the ISO has determined that the Interregional Transmission Project is a more efficient or cost-effective solution. In the case of an Interregional Transmission Project that could meet the needs met by a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade, the associated Public Policy Transmission Upgrade may be removed from the RSP Project List in the circumstances described, and using the procedures specified, in Section 4A of Attachment K.

(b) Periodic Updating of RSP Project List

The RSP Project List will be updated by the ISO periodically by adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee.

Updating of the RSP Project List shall be considered an update of the RSP to be reflected in the next RSP, as appropriate, pursuant to Section 3.1 of this Attachment.

(c) RSP Project List Updating Procedures and Criteria

As part of the periodic updating of the RSP Project List, the ISO: (i) shall modify (in accordance with the provisions of this Attachment) regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades to reflect changes to the PTF system configurations, including ongoing investments by Market Participants or other stakeholders; (ii) may add to and classify accordingly, regulated transmission solutions; (iii) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades previously identified in the RSP Project List if the ISO determines that the need for the proposed regulated transmission solution or the approved Transmission Upgrade no longer exists or is no longer feasible; and (iv) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades that have been displaced by an Interregional Transmission Project in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of
this Attachment. With regard to (iii) above, this may include a removal of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade because a market response meeting the need reaches the maturity specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment and has been determined, pursuant to Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment, to meet the need described in the pertinent Needs Assessment, Public Policy Transmission Study or RSP, as applicable. In doing so, the ISO shall consult with and consider the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee. In addition, the ISO shall remove from the RSP Project List any Public Policy Transmission Upgrade if the ISO determines, with input from the Planning Advisory Committee, that the need to which the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade responds no longer exists.

If a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO, the entity responsible for the construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade proposed for removal from the RSP Project List. The provisions of Schedule 12 of this OATT shall apply to any cost reimbursement under this Section. Prior to finalizing the RSP, the ISO shall provide the Planning Advisory Committee with written information explaining the reasons for any removal under this Section.

(d) Posting of LSP Project Status

Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on its company website. The ISO’s posting of the RSP Project Lists will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP posting to be provided to the ISO by the PTOs.


4.1 Non-Applicability of Sections 4.1 through 4.3; Needs Assessments
The reliability planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a reliability need. The market efficiency planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a market efficiency need. The public policy planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a public policy need. For needs identified initially as reliability, market efficiency or public policy needs, the collateral benefits of potential solutions to those needs shall not change the planning process applicable to those identified needs; notwithstanding the foregoing, the ISO shall report its views as to whether a project or preferred solution may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system as described in Sections 4A.5(e) or 4A.7, respectively, of this Attachment K. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 of this Attachment are not applicable to the planning of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, which is governed instead by Section 4A of this Attachment.

On a regular and ongoing basis, the ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall conduct assessments (i.e., Needs Assessments) of the adequacy of the PTF system, as a whole or in part, to maintain the reliability of such facilities while promoting the operation of efficient wholesale electric markets in New England. A Needs Assessment shall analyze whether the PTF in the New England Transmission System: (i) meet applicable reliability standards; (ii) have adequate transfer capability to support local, regional, and inter-regional reliability; (iii) support the efficient operation of the wholesale electric markets; (iv) are sufficient to integrate new resources and loads on an aggregate or regional basis; or (v) otherwise examine various aspects of its performance and capability. A Needs Assessment shall also identify: (i) the location and nature of any potential problems with respect to the PTF and (ii) situations that significantly affect the reliable and efficient operation of the PTF along with any critical time constraints for addressing the needs of the PTF to facilitate the development of market responses and to initiate the pursuit of regulated transmission solutions.

(a) Triggers for Needs Assessments

The ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall perform Needs Assessments, inter alia, if:

(i) a need for additional transfer capability is identified by the ISO in its ongoing evaluation of the PTF’s adequacy and performance;
(ii) a need for additional transfer capability is identified as a result of an ERO and/or NPCC reliability assessment or more stringent publicly available local reliability criteria, if any;

(iii) constraints or available transfer capability limitations that are identified possibly as a result of generation additions or retirements, evaluation of load forecasts or proposals for the addition of transmission facilities in the New England Control Area;

(iv) as requested by a stakeholder pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; or

(v) as otherwise deemed appropriate by the ISO as warranting such an assessment.

(b) Requests by Stakeholders for Needs Assessments for Economic Considerations
The ISO’s stakeholders may request the ISO to initiate a Needs Assessment to examine situations where potential regulated transmission solutions or market responses or investments could result in (i) a net reduction in total production cost to supply system load based on the factors specified in Attachment N of this OATT, (ii) reduced congestion, or (iii) the integration of new resources and/or loads on an aggregate or regional basis (an “Economic Study”).

Requests for Economic Studies shall be submitted, considered and prioritized as follows:

(i) By no later than April 1 of each year, any stakeholder may submit to the ISO for public posting on the ISO’s website a request for an Economic Study.

(ii) The ISO shall thereafter add any of its own proposals for Economic Studies. The ISO shall also develop a rough work scope and cost estimate for all requested Economic Studies, and develop preliminary prioritization based on the ISO’s perceived regional and/or, as coordinated with the applicable neighboring system, inter-area benefits to assist stakeholders in the prioritization of Economic Studies.
By no later than May 1 of each year, the ISO shall provide the foregoing information to the Planning Advisory Committee, and a Planning Advisory Committee meeting shall be held at which Economic Study proponents will provide an explanation of their request.

By no later than June 1 of each year, the ISO shall hold a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee for the members of the Planning Advisory Committee to discuss, identify and prioritize, as further facilitated by the ISO’s preparation of a straw priority list to be further discussed at such meeting, up to two (2) Economic Studies (the costs of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff) to be performed by the ISO in a given year taking into consideration their impact on the ISO budget and other priorities. The ISO may consider performing up to three (3) Economic Studies if a Public Policy Transmission Study will not be concurrently performed.

The ISO and the Planning Advisory Committee may agree to hold additional meetings to further discuss and resolve any issue concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.

If the Planning Advisory Committee, after discussions between the Planning Advisory Committee and ISO management, is not able to prioritize the Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO in a given year, any member of the Planning Advisory Committee must submit a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process pursuant to Section 12 of this Attachment, such request to be submitted no later than August 30, to resolve the issues concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.

The ISO will issue a notice to the Planning Advisory Committee detailing the prioritization of the Economic Studies as identified by the Planning Advisory Committee or, if a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process is submitted pursuant to Section 4.1.(b)(vi), as determined through that Process.
The foregoing timelines are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee. The ISO will provide periodic updates on the status of Economic Studies to the Planning Advisory Committee.

Economic Study requests not within the three studies identified in Section 4.1(b)(iv) to be performed in a given year may be requested and paid for by the study proponent.

(c) Conduct of a Needs Assessment for Rejected Non-Price Retirement Requests and De-List Bids

(i) Where a Needs Assessment is underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement De-List Bid Request, the Needs Assessment will represent the resource with the rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid as being interconnected, but unavailable for reliability purposes, and the Non-Price Retirement Request as being retired in the base representation being used to assess the system to identify reliability needs that must be addressed.

(ii) Where there is not a Needs Assessment underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement De-List Bid Request, the ISO will initiate a Needs Assessment for that area.

(iii) In the case of a rejected Static De-List Bid or Dynamic De-List Bid, the ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, examine the unavailability of the resource(s) with the rejected bid as a sensitivity in a Needs Assessment, or examine the unavailability of the resource(s) in the base representation in a Needs Assessment. The ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, initiate a Needs Assessment for the purpose of modeling rejected Static De-List Bids or Dynamic De-List Bids where the ISO believes that the initiation of such a study is warranted.

(iv) Prior to the start of each New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall present to the Reliability Committee the status of any prior rejected Dynamic De-
List Bids, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids, or Non-Price Retirement Requests being studied in the regional system planning process.

(d) Notice of Initiation of Needs Assessments
Prior to its commencement, the ISO shall provide notice of the initiation of a Needs Assessment to the Planning Advisory Committee consistent with Section 2 of this Attachment.

(e) Preparation of Needs Assessment
Needs Assessments may examine resource adequacy, transmission adequacy, projected congestion levels and other relevant factors as may be agreed upon from time to time. Needs Assessments shall also consider the views, if any, of the Planning Advisory Committee, State regulators or agencies, NESCOE, the Market Advisor to the ISO Board of Directors, and the ISO Board of Directors. A corresponding assessment shall be performed by the PTOs to identify any needs relating to the Non-PTF transmission facilities (of whatever voltage) that could affect the provision of Regional Transmission Service over the PTF.

(f) Treatment of Market Solutions in Needs Assessments
The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the regional system planning process. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding resources in Needs Assessments that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids and submitted Permanent De-List Bids and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding a proposed
Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff. In the case where the Elective Transmission Upgrades are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, these Elective Transmission Upgrades shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Needs Assessment provided that the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff.

(g) Needs Assessment Support

For the development of the Needs Assessments, the ISO will coordinate with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee to support the ISO’s performance of Needs Assessments. To facilitate this support, the ISO will post on its website the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used to perform Needs Assessments. The ISO may establish requirements that any PTO or member of the Planning Advisory Committee must satisfy in order to access certain information used to perform Needs Assessments, due to ISO New England Information Policy and CEII constraints. The ISO may ask PTOs or Planning Advisory Committee members with special expertise to provide technical support or perform studies required to assess one or more potential needs that will be considered in the Needs Assessments process. These entities will provide, and the ISO will post on its website, the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used by those entities to perform studies. The ISO will post the draft results of any such Needs Assessment studies on its website. The ISO will convene meetings open to any representative of an entity that is a member of the Planning Advisory Committee to facilitate input on draft Needs Assessment studies and the inputs to those studies prior to the ISO’s completion of a draft Needs Assessment report to be reviewed by the entire Planning Advisory Committee pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment. All provisions of this subsection (g) relating to the provision and sharing of information shall be subject to the ISO-NE Information Policy.

(h) Input from the Planning Advisory Committee
Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be convened to identify additional considerations relating to a Needs Assessment that were not identified in support of initiating the assessment, and to provide input on the Needs Assessment’s scope, assumptions and procedures, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

(i) **Publication of Needs Assessment and Response Thereto**
The ISO shall report the results of Needs Assessments to the Planning Advisory Committee, subject to CEII constraints. Needs Assessments containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s password-protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. Needs Assessments will identify high-level functional requirements and characteristics for regulated transmission solutions and market responses that can meet the needs described in the assessment. The ISO will also present the Needs Assessments in appropriate market forums to facilitate market responses. Where the ISO forecasts that a solution is needed to solve reliability criteria violations in three years or less from the completion of a Needs Assessment (unless the solution to the Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade), and the requirements of Section 4.1(j) of this Attachment have been met or where there is only one Phase One Proposal or Stage One Proposal submitted in response to a public notice issued under Sections 4.3(a) or 4A.5(a) of this Attachment, respectively, or only one proposed solution that is selected to move on to Phase Two or Stage Two, the ISO will evaluate the adequacy of proposed regulated solutions by performing Solutions Studies, as described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment. Where the solution to a Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or where the forecast year of need for a solution that is likely to be a Reliability Transmission Upgrade is more than three years from the completion of a Needs Assessment, the ISO will conduct a solution process based on a two-stage competition, as described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment.

(j) **Requirements for Use of Solution Studies Rather than Competitive Process for Projects Based on Year of Need**
The following requirements must be met in order for the ISO to use Solution Studies in the circumstances described in Section 4.1(i) based on the solution’s year of need:
(i) The ISO shall separately identify and post on its website an explanation of the reliability criteria violations and system conditions that the region has a time-sensitive need to solve within three years of the completion of the relevant Needs Assessment. The explanation shall be in sufficient detail to allow stakeholders to understand the need and why it is time-sensitive.

(ii) In deciding whether to utilize Solutions Studies, such that the regulated transmission solution will be developed through a process led by the ISO and built by the PTO(s), the ISO shall:
   (A) Provide to the Planning Advisory Committee and post on its website a full and supported written description explaining the decision to designate a Participating Transmission Owner as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the reliability project, including an explanation of other transmission or non-transmission options that the region considered but concluded would not sufficiently address the immediate reliability need, and the circumstances that generated the reliability need and an explanation of why that reliability need was not identified earlier.
   (B) Provide a 30-day period during which comments from stakeholders on the posted description may be sent to the ISO, which comments will be posted on the website, as well.

(iii) The ISO shall maintain and post on its website a list of prior year designations of all projects in the limited category of transmission projects for which the PTO(s) was designated as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the project following the performance of Solution Studies. The list must include the project’s need-by date and the date the PTO(s) actually energized the project, i.e., placed the project into service. The ISO shall file such list with the Commission as an informational filing in January of each calendar year covering the designations of the prior calendar year, when applicable.

4.2 Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies, Where Competitive Solution Process of Section 4.3 Is Not Applicable
The procedures described in this Section 4.2 shall be utilized for the evaluation of regulated transmission solutions for reliability and market efficiency needs where the requirements of Sections 4.1(i) and/or (j) of this Attachment are satisfied. Otherwise, the procedures of Section 4.3 shall be utilized for that purpose.

(a) **Evaluation and Development of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades**

In the case of Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades, the ISO, in coordination with the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders, shall conduct or participate in studies ("Solutions Studies") to evaluate whether proposed regulated transmission solutions meet the PTF system needs identified in Needs Assessments. The ISO, in coordination with affected stakeholders shall also identify regulated transmission projects for addressing the needs identified in Needs Assessments.

The ISO may form ISO-led targeted study groups to conduct Solutions Studies. Such study groups will include representatives of the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders. Through this process, the ISO may identify the solutions for the region that offer the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability, and feasibility to meet a need identified in a Needs Assessment in the required time frame. These solutions may differ from a transmission solution proposed by a transmission owner.

Proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to Needs Assessments shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the PTF system needs.

(b) **Notice of Initiation of a Solutions Study**

The ISO shall provide notice of the initiation and scope of a Solutions Study to the Planning Advisory Committee.
(c) **Classification of Regulated Transmission Solutions as Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades or Reliability Transmission Upgrades**

As described in Section 3.1 and 3.6(a) of this Attachment, proposed regulated transmission solutions determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to address needs identified in Needs Assessments shall be classified as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade and/or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the standards set forth in Attachment N of this OATT.

(d) **Identification of the Preferred Solution and Inclusion of Results of Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades in the RSP**

The results of Solutions Studies related to Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades will be reported to the Planning Advisory Committee. After receiving feedback from the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO will identify the preferred solution. The ISO will inform the appropriate Transmission Owners in writing regarding the identification of the preferred solution.

Once identified, the preferred solution, as appropriate, will be reflected (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

4.3 **Competitive Solution Process for Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades**

(a) **Public Notice Initiating Competitive Solution Process**

The ISO will issue a public notice with respect to each Needs Assessment for which, pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment, a competitive solution process will be utilized. The notice will indicate that Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors may submit Phase One Proposals offering solutions that comprehensively address the identified needs.
A PTO or PTOs shall submit an individual or joint Phase One Proposal as a Backstop Transmission Solution for any need that would be solved by a project located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, and which it/they would therefore have an obligation to build under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA. Such PTOs may recover the costs of preparing Phase One Proposals in accordance with the mechanisms reflected in the OATT and the terms of the TOA.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Phase One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Needs Assessment (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must, before the deadline for the submission of Phase One Proposals, identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Phase One Proposal and Phase Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Phase One. Upon request by the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Phase One.

(b) Use and Control of Right of Way

Neither the submission of a project by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor nor the selection by the ISO of a project submitted by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor for inclusion in the RSP Project List shall alter a PTO’s use and control of an existing right of way, the retention, modification, or transfer of which remain subject to the relevant law or regulation, including
property or contractual rights, that granted the right-of-way. Nothing in the processes described in this Attachment K requires a PTO to relinquish any of its rights-of-way in order to permit a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor to develop, construct or own a project.

(c) Information Required for Phase One Proposals; Study Deposit; Timing

Phase One Proposals shall provide the following information:

(i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;

(ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;

(iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;

(iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and

(v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a $100,000 study deposit per submitted proposal to support the cost of Phase One and Phase Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of $100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Phase One and Phase Two proposal.

Phase One Proposals must be submitted by the deadline specified in the posting by the ISO of the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment, which shall not be less than 60 days
from the posting date of the notice. The ISO may reject submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

(d) **LSP Coordination**
Sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(e) **Preliminary Review by ISO**
If the sole Phase One Proposal in response to a given Needs Assessment has been submitted by PTO(s), proposing a project that would be located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, the ISO shall proceed under Section 4.2(a)-(d) of this Attachment, rather than pursuant to the procedures set forth in the remainder of this Section 4.3.

If more than one Phase One Proposal has been submitted in response to the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment K, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

(i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4.3(c) of this Attachment;

(ii) appears to satisfy the needs described in the Needs Assessment;

(iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and

(iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities, or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(f) **Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information**
If the ISO identifies any minor deficiencies in meeting the requirements of Section 4.3(a) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Phase One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Phase One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO’s evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Phase One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (f), or in Phase Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Phase Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Phase One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(g) Listing of Qualifying Phase One Proposals
For each Needs Assessment, the ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO’s website, a listing of Phase One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4.3(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input on the listing, and the listed proposals. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Phase Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Phase One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input. The ISO shall post on its website an explanation of why it has determined to exclude a Phase One Proposal from consideration in Phase Two.

(h) Information Required for Phase Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Phase Two Solution
Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects reflected on the final listing developed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Phase Two Solutions:

(i) updates of the information provided in Phase One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;
(ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

(iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Phase Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;

(iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Phase One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;

(v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;

(vi) design standards to be used;

(vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;

(viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

(ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;

(x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;

(xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and

(xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Phase Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4.3(g). The deadline for submittal of Phase Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Phase Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.
The ISO will identify the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe as the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution in response to each Needs Assessment. The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution, together with explanatory materials, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solution.

(i) **Reimbursement of Phase Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs**
Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) for review as Phase Two Solutions shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff (and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA), all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Phase Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs’ existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor’s study deposit and the actual cost of the Phase One and Phase Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the ISO Tariff.

(j) **Inclusion of Preferred Phase Two Solution in RSP and/or RSP Project List**
Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Phase Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO’s identification will select the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Phase Two Solution that its project has been selected for development. The ISO will include the
project as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as appropriate, in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(k) **Milestone Schedules**

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4.3(j) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information, as specified by the ISO, showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall request the applicable PTO(s) to implement the Backstop Transmission Solution, and prepare a report explaining why it has reassigned the project. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO’s proposed course of action. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

4A. **Public Policy Transmission Studies; Public Policy Transmission Upgrades**
4A.1 NESCOE Requests for Public Policy Transmission Studies

No less often than every three years, by January 15 of that year, the ISO will post a notice indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee may: (i) provide NESCOE with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements, and (ii) provide the ISO with input regarding local (e.g., municipal and county) Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee may be held for this purpose. By no later than April 1 of that year, NESCOE may submit to the ISO in writing a request for a new Public Policy Transmission Study, or an update of a previously conducted study. The request will identify the Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and may identify particular NESCOE-identified public policy-related transmission needs as well. Along with any such request, NESCOE will provide the ISO with a written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate for potential solutions in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. The ISO will post the NESCOE request and explanation on the ISO’s website. If NESCOE does not provide that listing of identified transmission needs (which may consist of a NESCOE statement of its determination that no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process) and that explanation (which may consist of a NESCOE explanation of why no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process), the ISO will note on its website that a NESCOE listing and explanation has not been provided. In that circumstance, the ISO will determine subsequently (after opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee input), and post on its website an explanation of, which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated.

4A.1.1 Study of Federal Public Policy Requirements Not Identified by NESCOE; Local Public Policy Requirements
If a stakeholder believes that a federal Public Policy Requirement that may drive transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System has not been appropriately addressed by NESCOE, it may file with the ISO, no later than 15 days after the posting of NESCOE’s explanation as described in Section 4A.1 of this Attachment, a written request that explains the stakeholder’s reasoning and that seeks reconsideration by the ISO of NESCOE’s position regarding that requirement. Where the ISO agrees with a stated stakeholder position, or on its own finding, the ISO may perform an evaluation under Sections 4A.2 through 4A.4 of this Attachment of a federal Public Policy Requirement not otherwise identified by NESCOE. The ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE will not be evaluated.

In addition, the ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will not be evaluated.

4A.2 Preparation for Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input
Upon receipt of the NESCOE request, or as the result of the ISO’s consideration of a federal or local Public Policy Requirement pursuant to Section 4A.1.1, the ISO will prepare and post on its website a proposed scope for the Public Policy Transmission Study, and associated parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions), and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee by no later than June 1 of the request year. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the study’s scope, parameters and assumptions.

4A.3 Public Policy Transmission Studies
(a) Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input
With input from Planning Advisory Committee and potentially impacted PTOs, the ISO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study to develop a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of high-level concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The study’s results will be posted on the ISO’s website, and a meeting of
the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input on the results of the initial phase of the study, and the scope, parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions) for any follow-on phase of the study. The ISO may – as a follow-on phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study – perform more detailed analysis and engineering work on the high-level concepts.

(b) Treatment of Market Solutions in Public Policy Transmission Studies
The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the Public Policy Transmission Study. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), Merchant Transmission Facilities and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate in the Public Policy Transmission Study information regarding resources that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate information regarding a proposed Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), and a commercial operation date has been ascertained, with the exception of Elective Transmission Upgrades that are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, which shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Public Policy Transmission Study.

4A.4 Response to Public Policy Transmission Studies
The results of the Public Policy Transmission Study will be provided to the Planning Advisory Committee and posted on the ISO’s website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on those results, including any updates from the states on any methods by which they are satisfying their respective Public Policy Requirements included in the Public Policy Transmission Study. The ISO’s costs of
performing the Public Policy Transmission Study described in Section 4A.3 will be collected by the ISO pursuant to Schedule 1 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. Any prudently incurred PTO costs for assistance requested by the ISO to support the Public Policy Transmission Study will be recovered by the applicable PTO(s) in accordance with Attachment F and Schedule 21 of the Tariff.

The ISO will evaluate the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and provide the results of the Public Policy Transmission Study to Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for their use in preparing Stage One Proposals to develop, build and operate one or more projects consistent with the general design requirements identified by the ISO in the study.

4A.5 Stage One Proposals

(a) Information Required for Stage One Proposals

The ISO will post on its website a notice inviting, for each high-level general project concept identified by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.3(a) above, Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors to submit (by the deadline specified in the public notice, which shall be not less than 60 days from the date of posting the public notice) a Stage One Proposal providing the following information:

(i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
(ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
(iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;
(iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
(v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.
A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Stage One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Public Policy Transmission Study (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Stage One. Upon request of the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Stage One.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a $100,000 study deposit per submitted project to support the cost of Stage One and Stage Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of $100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Stage One and Stage Two proposal.

(b) LSP Coordination
Sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(c) Preliminary Review by ISO
Upon receipt of Stage One Proposals, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:
(i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4A.5(a);

(ii) appears to satisfy the needs driven by Public Policy Requirements, as reflected in the Public Policy Transmission Study;

(iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and;

(iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(d) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any deficiencies (compared with the requirements of Section 4A.5(a)) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Stage One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Stage One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO’s evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Stage One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (d), or in Stage Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Stage Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Stage One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(e) List of Qualifying Stage One Proposals

The ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO’s website, a list of Stage One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4A.5(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on that list. The ISO shall also indicate whether any of the projects may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Stage Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical
performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Stage One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input.

4A.6 Reimbursement of Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors that are requested by NESCOE in writing or by one or more states' governors or regulatory authorities directly to submit a Stage One Proposal shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and the TOA, their prudently incurred costs from the Regional Network Load of the states identified by NESCOE in the written communication as having made the request or from the Regional Network Load of the states that made the request directly. Stage One Proposal costs shall otherwise not be subject to recovery under the ISO Tariff.

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA, all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Stage Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs' existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor’s study deposit and the actual cost of the Stage One and Stage Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the Tariff.
4A.7 Information Required for Stage Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Stage Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects listed pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Stage Two Solutions:

(i) updates of the information provided in Stage One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;

(ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

(iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Stage Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;

(iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Stage One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;

(v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;

(vi) design standards to be used;

(vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;

(viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

(ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;

(x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;

(xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and
(xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Stage Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4A.5(e). The deadline for submittal of Stage Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Stage Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Stage Two Solution(s), along with its views as to whether the preferred solution(s) also satisfies identified reliability needs of the system, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solutions.

4A.8 Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List; Milestone Schedules; Removal from RSP Project List

(a) Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Stage Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO’s identification will select the project that best addresses the identified Public Policy Requirement while utilizing the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Stage Two Solution that its project has been selected for development, and include the project as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional Public Policy Transmission Upgrades are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.
(b) **Milestone Schedules**

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4A.8(a) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information (as specified by the ISO) showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report, including a proposed course of action. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO’s proposed course of action. The proposed course of action may include, for example, a consideration and selection of another Stage Two Proposal relating to the pertinent Public Policy Requirement, or the re-solicitation of Stage One Proposals to meet the pertinent Public Policy Requirement. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

(c) **Removal from RSP Project List**

If a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO pursuant to Section 3.6(c), the entity responsible for the construction of the Public
Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of that Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4A.9 Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

The costs of Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade(s) that are required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan in accordance with Section 4A.8 shall be allocated in accordance with Schedule 21 of the ISO OATT.

4B. Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors

4B.1 Periodic Evaluation of Applications

The ISO will periodically evaluate applications submitted by an entity that seeks to qualify as a sponsor of a proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4B.2 Information To Be Submitted

The application to be submitted to the ISO by an entity desiring to be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor will include the following information:

(i) the current and expected capabilities of the applicant to finance and construct a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade and operate and maintain it for the life of the project;

(ii) the financial resources of the applicant;

(iii) the technical and engineering qualifications and experience of the applicant;

(iv) if applicable, the previous record of the applicant regarding construction and maintenance of transmission facilities;

(v) demonstrated capability of the applicant to adhere to construction, maintenance and operating Good Utility Practices, including the capability to respond to outages;

(vi) the ability of the applicant to comply with all applicable reliability standards; and
(vii) demonstrated ability of the applicant to meet development and completion schedules.

4B.3 Review of Qualifications
The ISO shall review each application for completeness. The ISO will notify each applicant within 30 calendar days of receipt of such application whether the application is complete, or identify any deficiencies in provision of the information required by Section 4B.2 of this Attachment. An applicant notified of deficiencies must provide any remedial information within 30 calendar days of the receipt of such notice. Thereafter, the ISO will determine whether the applicant is physically, technically, legally, and financially capable of constructing a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in a timely and competent manner, and operating and maintaining the facilities consistent with Good Utility Practice and applicable reliability criteria for the life of the project, and use its best efforts to inform the applicant within 90 days from the date on which it has a completed application on file with the ISO whether it has met all of these criteria. A PTO determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will, be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. A non-PTO entity determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will, upon its execution of the Non-incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (in the form specified in Attachment O of the OATT) and the Market Participant Service Agreement, be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

4B.4 List of Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors; Annual Certification
Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors are listed in Appendix 3 of this Attachment K. Each Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO annually a certification that the information initially submitted in response to Section 4B.2 of this Attachment K has not changed adversely in a material fashion, or (if a material adverse change has occurred in the intervening year) submit instead a new application for qualification as a project sponsor. In the latter case, the entity shall not be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor unless and until the ISO approves its new application.

5. Supply of Information and Data Required for Regional System Planning
The Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, Transmission Customers, Market Participants and other entities requesting transmission or interconnection service or proposing the integration of facilities to PTF
in the New England Transmission System or alternatives to such facilities, and stakeholders requesting a Needs Assessment pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, shall supply, as required by the Tariff, the Participants Agreement, MPSAs, applicable transmission operating agreements, and/or other existing agreements, protocols and procedures, or upon request by the ISO, and subject to required CEII and confidentiality protections as specified in Section 2.4 of this Attachment, any information (including cost estimates) and data that is reasonably required to prepare an RSP or to perform a Needs Assessment or Solutions Study.

6. Regional, Local and Interregional Coordination

6.1 Regional Coordination

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the ISO OATT, applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, and/or this Attachment. Pursuant to Section II.49 of this OATT and Sections 3.02, 3.05 and 3.09 of the TOA, the ISO has Operating Authority or control over all PTF and Non-PTF within the New England Control Area, which are utilized for the provision of transmission service under this OATT. The ISO also has Operating Authority or control over the United States portions of the HVDC ties to Quebec and over Merchant Transmission Facilities and Other Transmission Facilities, pursuant to this OATT or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols. The ISO, however, is not responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF, OTF and MTF. As provided in Section 6.2 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, the PTOs are responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF and coordinating such planning efforts with the ISO. Pursuant to the OATT and/or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, the transmission owners of OTF and MTF are required to participate in the ISO’s regional system planning process and perform and/or support studies of the impacts of regional system projects on their respective facilities.

6.2 Local Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the annual RSP shall be developed in coordination with the local system plans of the PTOs. In accordance with the TOA and OATT provisions identified in Section 6.1 of this Attachment, the PTOs have responsibility for planning Non-PTF. The PTOs conduct planning of Non-PTF using the LSP process outlined in Section 2.5 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, in coordination with the ISO, other entities interconnected with the New England
Transmission System, Transmission Customers and stakeholders, and in accordance with the provisions in the TOA, the OATT and the Planning and Reliability Criteria. The openness and transparency of the LSP process is intended to be consistent with the regional system planning process.

6.3 Interregional Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the annual RSP shall be developed in coordination with the similar plans of the surrounding ISOs/RTOs and Control Areas pursuant to the Northeastern Planning Protocol and other agreements with neighboring systems (including entities that are not Parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) and NPCC.

(a) **Interregional Coordination and Cost Allocation Among ISO, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) Under Order No. 1000**

Pursuant to Section 7 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol (which is posted on the web at www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc, the Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (“JIPC”) reviews regional needs and solutions identified in the regional planning processes of the ISO, NYISO and PJM in order to identify, with input from the Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (“IPSAC”), the potential for Interregional Transmission Projects that could meet regional needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than regional transmission projects. All members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be considered IPSAC members. The JIPC will coordinate studies deemed necessary to allow the effective consideration by the regions, in the same general timeframe, of a proposed Interregional Transmission Project in comparison to regional transmission solutions. Any stakeholder may propose in the New England planning process, for evaluation under Section 4.2 or 4A (as applicable) of Attachment K, an Interregional Transmission Project (or project concept) that may be more efficient or cost-effective than a regional transmission solution. If a proposed Interregional Transmission Project is approved in each region in which the project is located, the corresponding New England regional transmission project(s) will be displaced in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment, and the costs of the Interregional Transmission Project will be allocated among the regions based on the formula provided in Schedule 1 of this OATT, or in accordance with another funding arrangement filed with and accepted by the Commission. The amount of the costs of an Interregional Transmission Project
allocated as the responsibility of New England pursuant to the methodology referenced in Section 6.3(a) of this Attachment shall be allocated within New England as specified in Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.

(b) Other Interregional Assessments and Other Interregional Transmission Projects
Interregional system assessments and/or interregional system expansion planning studies may be performed periodically by the ISO with Planning Authorities who are not parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or with the JIPC pursuant to Section 6 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or both. The ISO shall convene periodic meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee (which may be combined with meetings of the IPSAC), to provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning such assessments and studies. To the extent that an Interregional Transmission Project is agreed to by ISO and by another region (not a Party to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) in which a portion of the project is located, the related cost allocation and operating agreements will be filed with the Commission (and, as applicable, with Canadian jurisdictional agencies) in accordance with existing filing rights.

7. Procedures for Development and Approval of the RSP

7.1 Initiation of RSP
Every year, the ISO shall initiate an effort to develop its annual RSP and solicit input on regional system needs for the RSP from the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee shall meet to perform its respective functions in connection with the preparation of the RSP, as specified in Section 2 of this Attachment.

7.2 Draft RSP; Public Meeting
On or about August of each year, the ISO shall provide a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee and input from that Committee shall be received and considered in preparing and revising subsequent drafts. The ISO shall post the draft RSP and provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of a meeting to review the draft RSP as specified in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

On or about September of each year, the ISO shall issue a second draft of the RSP to be presented by the ISO staff to the ISO Board of Directors for approval. The draft RSP shall incorporate the results of any Needs Assessment, and corresponding Solutions Studies, performed since the last RSP was approved. A
subcommittee of that Board shall hold a public meeting, at their discretion, to receive input directly and to
discuss any proposed revisions to the RSP. The final recommended RSP shall be presented to the ISO
Board of Directors no later than September 30 of each year and shall be acted on by the ISO Board of
Directors within 60 days of receipt. The foregoing timeframes are subject to adjustment as determined by
the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee.

7.3 Action by the ISO Board of Directors on RSP; Request for Alternative Proposals

(a) Action by ISO Board of Directors on RSP

The ISO Board of Directors may approve the recommended draft RSP as submitted, modify the
RSP or remand all or any portion of it back with guidance for development of a revised
recommendation. The Board of Directors may consider the RSP in executive session, and shall
consider in its deliberations the views of the subcommittee of the Board of Directors reflecting
the public meeting held pursuant to Section 7.2 of this Attachment. In considering whether to
approve the draft RSP, the Board of Directors may, if it finds a proposed Reliability Benefit
Upgrade not to be viable, or if no Reliability Benefit Upgrade has been proposed, direct the ISO
staff to meet with the affected load serving entities and State entities in order to develop an
interim solution. Should that effort fail, and as a last resort, the Board of Directors may direct the
ISO to issue a Request For Alternative Proposal (“RFAP”), subject to the procedures described
below, and may withhold approval of the draft RSP, or portions thereof, pending the results of
that RFAP and any Commission action on any resulting jurisdictional contract or funding
mechanism. The ISO shall provide a written explanation as to any subsequent changes or
modification made in the final version of the RSP.

(b) Requests For Alternative Proposals

(i) The RFAP shall seek generation, demand-side and merchant transmission
alternatives that can be implemented rapidly and provide substantial reliability benefits
over the period solicited in the RFAP, and normally will focus on an interim (“gap”)
solution until an identified Reliability Transmission Upgrade has been placed in-service.
The ISO will file a proposed RFAP with the Commission for approval at least 60 days
prior to its issuance. The filing shall explain why the issuance of an RFAP is necessary.
(ii) The ISO staff shall provide the Board of Directors and subject to confidentiality requirements, the Planning Advisory Committee with an analysis of the alternatives offered in response to the RFAP, and provide a recommendation together with a funding mechanism reflecting input from the Planning Advisory Committee.

(iii) The ISO may enter into contracts awarded pursuant to an RFAP process, and/or propose a funding mechanism. Bidders that are awarded contracts through the RFAP process shall file those contracts with the Commission for approval of the rates to be charged thereunder to the extent that such contracts are for services that are jurisdictional to the Commission. The ISO shall file related or separate funding mechanisms with the Commission as well. All other contracts entered into pursuant to an RFAP shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes.

(iv) The Board of Directors will reflect the results of the RFAP process in the approved RSP.

8. Obligations of PTOs to Build; PTOs’ Obligations, Conditions and Rights

In accordance with the TOA, PTOs designated by the ISO as the appropriate entities to construct and own or finance Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP shall construct and own or finance such facilities or enter into appropriate contracts to fulfill such obligations. In the event that a PTO: (i) does not construct or indicates in writing that it does not intend to construct a Transmission Upgrade included in the RSP; or (ii) demonstrates that it has failed (after making a good faith effort) to obtain necessary approvals or property rights under applicable law, the ISO shall promptly file with the Commission a report on the results of the planning process, which report shall include a report from the PTO responsible for the planning, design or construction of such No. 3 Open Access Transmission Tariff Section II – Attachment K – Regional System Planning Process Transmission Upgrade, in order to permit the Commission to determine what action, if any, it should take.

In connection with regional system planning, the ISO will not propose to impose on any PTO obligations or conditions that are inconsistent with the explicit provisions of the TOA or deprive any PTO of any of the rights set forth in the TOA.
Subject to necessary approvals and compliance with Section 2.06 of the TOA, nothing in this OATT shall affect the right of any PTO to expand or modify its transmission facilities in the New England Transmission System on its own initiative or in response to an order of an appropriate regulatory authority. Such expansions or modifications shall conform with: (a) Good Utility Practice; (b) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of national, regional, and local reliability councils that may be in existence; and (c) the ISO and relevant PTO criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies. The ISO reserves its right to challenge the permitting of such expansions or modifications.

9. Merchant Transmission Facilities

9.1 General

Subject to compliance with the requirements of the Tariff and any other applicable requirements with respect to the interconnection of bulk power facilities with the New England Transmission System, any entity shall have the right to propose and construct the addition of transmission facilities (“Merchant Transmission Facilities”), none of the costs of which shall be covered under the cost allocation provisions of this OATT. Any such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the requirements of Section 9.2 of this Attachment. In performing studies in connection with the RSP, the prospect that proposed Merchant Transmission Facilities will be completed shall be accounted for as will the prospect that proposed generating units will be completed.

9.2 Operation and Integration

All Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to: (i) an agreement to transfer to the ISO operational control authority over any facilities which constitute part of the Merchant Transmission Facilities that are to be integrated with, or that will affect, the New England Transmission System; and (ii) taking such other action as may be required to make the facility available for use as part of the New England Transmission System.

9.3 Control and Coordination

Until such time as a Merchant Transmission Owner has transferred operational control over its Merchant Transmission Facilities to the ISO pursuant to Section 9.2(i), all such Merchant Transmission Facilities
shall be subject to the operational control, scheduling and maintenance coordination of the System Operator in accordance with the Tariff.

10. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades
The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included with the status of “Planned” in the RSP Project List as defined in Section 3.6 of this Attachment shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 12 of this OATT.

11. Allocation of ARRs
The allocation of ARRs in connection with Transmission Upgrades is addressed in Section III.C.8 of the Tariff.

12. Dispute Resolution Procedures

12.1 Objective
Section 12 of this Attachment sets forth a dispute resolution process (the “Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process”) through which regional transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

12.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections
All information disclosed in the course of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

12.3 Eligible Parties
Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a Reviewable Determination, defined in Section 12.4(a) of this Attachment, with respect to the regional system planning process described in this Attachment is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this Dispute Resolution Process (“Disputing Party”).

12.4 Scope
In order to ensure that the regional transmission planning process set forth under this Attachment moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute
Resolution Process under this Section 12 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the ISO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) **Reviewable Determinations**

The determinations that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 that include certain procedural and substantive challenges that may arise at limited designated key decision points in the regional transmission planning process for PTF. Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a designated key decision point conform to the requirements set forth in this Attachment. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a designated key decision point was supported by adequate basis in fact.

The designated key decision points for Reviewable Determinations shall be limited to the following:

(i) Results of a Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.1 of this Attachment;

(ii) Updates to the RSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in Section 3.6 of this Attachment;
(iii) Results of Solutions Studies conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.2 of this Attachment;

(iv) Consideration of market responses in Needs Assessments as specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment;

(v) Substance of Economic Studies to be conducted by the ISO in a given year as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; and

(vi) Prioritization of Economic Studies to be performed in a given year where the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to prioritize them as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment.

(b) **Material Adverse Impact**

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the ISO, and (iii) as a result the ISO made an incorrect decision or determination.

12.5 **Notice and Comment**

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a Reviewable Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable Determination following the ISO’s presentation of such Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the ISO (“Request for Dispute Resolution”). A Request for Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be addressed to the ISO’s Chair of the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by the ISO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the ISO shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of an ISO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory
Committee may submit to the ISO’s designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the ISO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the ISO’s designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The ISO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

12.6 Dispute Resolution Procedures

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiations

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiation within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.
If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.

12.7 Notice of Dispute Resolution Process Results
Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 12.6(b) or Section 12.6(c) of this Attachment, the ISO shall distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

13. Rights Under The Federal Power Act
Nothing in this Attachment shall restrict the rights of any party to file a Complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.
APPENDIX 1
ATTACHMENT K - LOCAL
LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

1. Local System Planning Process

1.1 General
In circumstances where transmission system planning for Non-Pool Transmission Facilities ("Non-PTF")\(^1\), including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, is taking place in New England that is not incorporated into the RSP planning process, the following Local System Plan ("LSP") process will be utilized for transmission planning purposes. The purpose of the LSP is to enable formal stakeholder input to planning for Non-PTF that is not incorporated into the RSP. The LSP shall ensure the opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee participation in the LSP process. The LSP will not be subject to approval by the ISO or the ISO Board under the RSP.

1.2 Planning Advisory Committee Review
The Planning Advisory Committee shall periodically provide input and feedback to the PTOs concerning the development of the LSP and the conduct of associated system enhancement and expansion studies. It is contemplated that LSP issues for identified local areas will be periodically addressed at the end of regularly scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. Regular meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be extended as necessary to serve the purposes of this section. Each PTO contemplating the addition of new Non-PTF will present its respective LSP to the Planning Advisory Committee not less than once per year. Not less than every three years, each PTO will post a notice as part of its LSP process indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee, NESCOE, or any state may provide the PTO with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to Non-PTF and regarding particular local transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The PTO will provide a written explanation, to be posted on the ISO website, of why suggested transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements will or will not be evaluated for potential solutions in the LSP planning process.

\(^1\) For absence of doubt, the PTOs clarify that Non-PTF is meant to include Category B and Local Area Facilities as defined by the TOA.
1.3 Role of the PTOs
Each PTO will be responsible for administering the LSP process pertaining to its own Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, by presenting LSP information to the Planning Advisory Committee, developing an appropriate needs analysis and addressing LSP needs within its local area. In developing its LSP, each PTO will ensure comparable treatment of similarly situated customers or potential customers and will take into consideration data, comments and specific requests supplied by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders. To the extent that generation and/or demand resources are identified that could impact planning for Non-PTF, each PTO will take such resources into account when developing the LSP for its facilities, consistent with Good Utility Practice. Each PTO will also be responsible for addressing issues or concerns arising out of Planning Advisory Committee review of its proposed LSP and posting its LSP and the LSP Project List.

1.4 Description of LSP
The LSP shall describe the projected improvements to Non-PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability or as Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, and shall reflect the results of such reviews within the limited geographical areas that pertain to the LSP, as determined by each PTO (“LSP Needs Assessments”), and corresponding system planning and expansion studies. The LSP Needs Assessments will be coordinated with the RSP and include the information that the ISO-NE incorporates into the RSP plans, as applicable. The proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to LSP Needs Assessments shall also identify any RSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the Non-PTF system needs.

The LSP shall identify the planning process, criteria, data, and assumptions used to develop the LSP. To the extent the current LSP utilizes data, assumptions or criteria used by the ISO in the RSP, any such data, assumptions or criteria will also be identified in the LSP.

Each PTO shall consult with NESCOE and applicable states, local authorities and stakeholders to consider their views prior to including a Local Public Transmission Upgrade in its LSP, as described in Section 1.6.

Each PTO’s LSP will be made available on a website for review by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders, subject to the ISO New England Information Policy and
CEII restrictions or requirements. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and the RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP posting.

The LSP of a particular PTO shall be posted not less than 3 business days prior to its presentation by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers, and other stakeholders will have 30 days from the date of the PTO’s presentation to the Planning Advisory Committee to provide any written comments for consideration by the PTO. The LSP shall specify the physical characteristics of the solutions that can meet the needs identified in the LSP. The LSP shall provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations and operating characteristics of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

Each year’s LSP shall be based upon the LSP completed in the prior year by either recertifying the results of the prior LSP or providing specific updates.

1.5 Economic Studies
To the extent that the ISO selects any Economic Studies pursuant to Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K or otherwise performs Economic Studies that will impact Non-PTF, the PTOs will coordinate with the ISO in the performance of such Economic Studies.

1.6 Public Policy Studies
As part of the LSP process, each PTO will evaluate potential transmission solutions on its Non-PTF system that are likely to be both efficient and cost-effective for meeting Public Policy Requirements.

1.6A Process to Identify Public Policy Requirements Driving Non-PTF Transmission Needs
Within six months of publication, each PTO will review the Public Policy Requirements posted by the ISO to determine and evaluate at a high level any public policy needs potentially driving transmission needs on their respective Non-PTF systems. Such evaluations will also include potential public policy needs suggested by third parties. Each PTO will review NESCOE’s written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. If NESCOE does not provide a listing
of identified transmission needs and explanation, each PTO will review the ISO’s explanations of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. In addition, each PTO will review the ISO’s explanation of which transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated in the regional system planning process and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy requirements will not be evaluated. Each PTO will then determine if any of the posted state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements are driving a need on its Non-PTF transmission system and will include the non-PTF needs in its local planning process.

As part of the local planning process, each PTO will list the identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated, and provide an explanation of why any identified transmission needs will not be evaluated as part of its LSP. The list will be posted in the PTO’s LSP and presented at the annual PAC meeting. The PTO will seek input at the PAC meeting from stakeholders about whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs and seek recommendations about whether to proceed with such studies. A stakeholder may provide written input on the list within 30 days from the date of presentation for consideration by the PTO. Each PTO will then confirm, or modify if appropriate, its determination of which identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated and which will not be evaluated, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary.

### 1.6B Procedure for Evaluating Potential Public Policy Solutions on the Non-PTF

Once it has been determined that a non-PTF need driven by state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated, each PTO will prepare a scope and associated assumptions as part of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study. For those needs where a scope is available, a PTO may present the proposed scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study within its LSP and as part of its LSP presentation described in Section 1.6A. A stakeholder may provide written input to the scope within 30 days after the LSP presentation for the PTO to consider.

Each PTO will schedule a follow-up PAC meeting presentation for additional stakeholder input within 4 months after the PTO’s LSP presentation as described in Section 1.6A if the proposed scope for a Public Policy Local Transmission Study was not included in its annual LSP presentation. Within 30 days after
the follow-up meeting, a stakeholder may provide written input to the scope for the PTO to consider. Subsequently, the PTO will determine the study scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study and revise its annual LSP.

In preparation of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study that will be presented to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year, the PTO will undertake the following: First, the PTO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Local Transmission Study to develop an estimate of costs and benefits and post its preliminary results on a website. Second, the PTO will use good faith efforts to contact stakeholders and the appropriate state and/or local authorities informing them of the posting, requesting input on whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, and seeking recommendations about whether to proceed with further planning and construction of a Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade. Each PTO will then make a determination of whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, or will select its final solution, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary. Results of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study will be provided to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year.

2. Posting of LSP Project List
Each PTO shall develop, maintain and make available on a website, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions that may meet LSP needs (the “LSP Project List”). The LSP Project List will be updated at least annually. The LSP Project List shall also provide reasons for any new Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, any change in status of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, or any removal of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, from the LSP Project List. Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on a website in a format comparable to the manner in which RSP plans and projects are posted on the RSP Project List. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP Project List.

3. Posting of Assumptions and Criteria
Each PTO will make available on a website the planning criteria and assumptions used in its current LSP. A link to each PTO’s planning criteria and assumptions will be posted on the ISO website.
4. **Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades**

   The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included in the LSP Project List of this Appendix 1 shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 21 of this OATT.

5. **LSP Dispute Resolution Procedures**

   5.1 **Objective**

       Section 5 of this Appendix 1 sets forth an LSP dispute resolution process (the "LSP Dispute Resolution Process") through which LSP-related transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

   5.2 **Confidential Information and CEII Protections**

       All information disclosed in the course of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

   5.3 **Eligible Parties**

       Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a PTO’s Reviewable Determination with respect to the LSP transmission planning process described in this Appendix 1 is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this LSP Dispute Resolution Process (“Disputing Party”).

   5.4 **Scope**

       In order to ensure that the LSP transmission planning process set forth under this Appendix 1 moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the applicable PTO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the
Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) Reviewable Determinations:
The LSP determinations made by the applicable PTO that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 ("Reviewable LSP Determination") shall include certain procedural and substantive challenges at designated key decision points during the LSP transmission planning process for Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades ("Key LSP Decision Points"). Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a Key LSP Decision Point conform to the requirements set forth in this Appendix 1. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a Key LSP Decision Point was supported by adequate basis in fact. The Key LSP Decision Points shall be limited to the following:

(i) Results of an LSP Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by a PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1;

(ii) Updates to the LSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated Non-PTF transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in this Appendix 1;

(iii) Results of Non-PTF transmission solution studies, including any Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade studies, conducted and communicated by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1; and

(iv) Consideration of market responses in LSP Needs Assessments as specified in this Appendix 1.
(b) Material Adverse Impact
In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion made by the applicable PTO. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the PTO, and (iii) as a result thereof, the PTO made an incorrect decision or determination.

5.5 Notice and Comment
A Disputing Party aggrieved by a PTO’s Reviewable LSP Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable LSP Determination following the PTO’s presentation of such LSP Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the Applicable PTO (“Request for LSP Dispute Resolution”).

A Request for LSP Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be provided to the applicable PTO and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by a PTO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the PTO, in coordination with the ISO, shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of a PTO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the PTO’s designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the PTO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The Disputing Party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the PTO’s designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The PTO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

5.6 Dispute Resolution Procedure
(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee
The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any LSP related dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the applicable PTO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners and the ISO (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiation
To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the Parties, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution
In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiations within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such LSP related dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the LSP related dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.

5.7 Notice of Results of Dispute Resolution
Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 5.6(b) or 5.6(c) of this Appendix 1, the PTO shall distribute to members of the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

5.8 Rights under the Federal Power Act:
Nothing in this Appendix 1 shall restrict the rights of any party to file a complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.
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ENTITIES
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LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

Town of Braintree Electric Light Department
Central Maine Power Company
Chicopee Municipal Lighting Department
Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative
The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department
Emera Maine
Green Mountain Power Corporation
The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department
Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company
Maine Electric Power Company
Middleborough Gas and Electric Department
New England Power Company
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.
New Hampshire Transmission, LLC
Northeast Utilities Service Company dba Eversource Energy Service Company as agent for: The
Connecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, and Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Norwood Municipal Light Department
Town of Reading Municipal Light Department
Shrewsbury Electric and Cable Operations
Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant
The United Illuminating Company
Unitil Energy Systems, Inc. and Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company
Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc.
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority
Vermont Transco LLC
Town of Wallingford – Electric Division
New England Hydro-Transmission Electric Company Inc.
New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation
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III.12.1 Installed Capacity Requirement.
Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with this Section III.12.1.

The ISO shall determine the Installed Capacity Requirement such that the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiency, on average, will be no more than once in ten years. Compliance with this resource adequacy planning criterion shall be evaluated probabilistically, such that the Loss of Load Expectation (“LOLE”) of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiencies shall be no more than 0.1 day each year. The forecast Installed Capacity Requirement shall meet this resource adequacy planning criterion for each Capacity Commitment Period. The Installed Capacity Requirement shall be determined assuming all resources pursuant to Sections III.12.7 and III.12.9 will be deliverable to meet the forecasted demand determined pursuant to Section III.12.8.

If the Installed Capacity Requirement shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall make adjustments to the modeling assumptions and/or methodology through the stakeholder process to eliminate the bias in the Installed Capacity Requirement. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement are specified in Sections III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9. For the purpose of this Section III.12, a “resource” shall include generating resources, demand resources, and import capacity resources eligible to receive capacity payments in the Forward Capacity Market.

The ISO shall determine, by applying the same modeling assumptions and methodology used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, the capacity requirement value for each LOLE probability specified in Section III.13.2.2 for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

III.12.2 Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits.
Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the capacity requirements and limitations, accounting for relevant transmission interface limits which shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.5, for each modeled Capacity Zone (as described in Section III.12.4) for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity
Auction. The Local Sourcing Requirement shall represent the minimum amount of capacity that must be procured within an import-constrained Capacity Zone. The Maximum Capacity Limit shall represent the maximum amount of capacity that can be procured in an export-constrained Capacity Zone to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement.

The ISO shall use consistent assumptions and standards to establish a resource’s electrical location for purposes of qualifying a resource for the Forward Capacity Market and for purposes of calculating Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits. The methodology used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.2.1 and III.12.2.2, respectively. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.5, III.12.6, III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9.

III.12.2.1 Calculation of Local Sourcing Requirements for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Local Sourcing Requirement shall be the amount needed to satisfy the higher of: (i) the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1; or (ii) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

III.12.2.1.1 Local Resource Adequacy Requirement.

The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement shall be calculated as follows:

(a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the unconstrained side of the interface, if any.

(b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
(c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for the import-constrained Capacity Zone Z shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

\[
\text{LRA}_Z = \text{Resources}_z + \text{Proxy Units}_z - (\text{Proxy Units Adjustment}_z \times (1 - \text{FOR}_z))) - (\text{Firm Load Adjustment}_z \times (1 - \text{FOR}_z))
\]

In which:

- \( \text{LRA}_Z \) = MW of Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for Capacity Zone Z;
- \( \text{Resources}_z \) = MW of resources electrically located within Capacity Zone Z, including import Capacity Resources on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any;
- \( \text{Proxy Units}_z \) = MW of proxy unit additions in Load Zone Z;
- \( \text{Firm Load Adjustment}_z \) = MW of firm load added (or subtracted) within Capacity Zone Z to make the LOLE of the New England Control Area equal to 0.105 days per year; and
- \( \text{FOR}_z \) = Capacity weighted average of the forced outage rate modeled for all resources within Capacity Zone Z, including and proxy unit additions to Capacity Zone Z.

Proxy Units Adjustment = MW of firm load added to (or unforced
capacity subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z
until the system LOLE equals 0.1
days/year.

To determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, the firm load is adjusted within Capacity Zone Z until the LOLE of the New England Control Area reaches 0.105 days per year. The LOLE of 0.105 days per year includes an allowance for transmission related LOLE of 0.005 days per year associated with each interface. As firm load is added to (or subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z, an equal amount of firm load is removed from (or added to) the rest of New England Control Area.

III.12.2.1.2 Transmission Security Analysis Requirement.
A Transmission Security Analysis shall be used to determine the requirement of the zone being studied, and shall include the following features:

(a) The ISO shall perform a series of transmission load flow studies and/or a deterministic operable capacity analysis targeted at determining the performance of the system under stressed conditions, and at developing a resource requirement sufficient to allow the system to operate through those stressed conditions.

(b) The Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be set at a level sufficient to cover most reasonably anticipated events, but will not guarantee that every combination of obligated resources within the zone will meet system needs.

(c) In performing the Transmission Security Analysis, the ISO may establish static transmission interface transfer limits, as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5, as a reasonable representation of the transmission system’s capability to serve load with available existing resources.

(d) The Transmission Security Analysis may model the entire New England system and individual zones, for both the first contingency (N-1) and second contingency (N-1-1) conditions. First contingency conditions (N-1) shall include the loss of the most critical generator or most critical transmission element with respect to the zone. Second contingency conditions (N-1-1) shall include both: (i) the loss of the most critical generator with respect to the zone followed by the loss of the most critical transmission element (“Line-Gen”); and (ii) the loss of the most critical transmission element followed by the loss of the next most critical transmission element (“Line-Line”) with respect to the zone.
III.12.2.2 Calculation of Maximum Capacity Limit for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Maximum Capacity Limit shall be calculated using the following method:

(a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area, which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits to the rest of the New England Control Area, if any.

(b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.

(c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Maximum Capacity Limit for the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

\[ \text{Maximum Capacity Limit}_Y = \text{ICR} - \text{LRA}_{\text{RestofNewEngland}} \]

In which:

Maximum Capacity Limit\(_Y\) = Maximum MW amount of resources, including Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any, that can be procured in the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement;
ICR = MW of Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area, determined in accordance with Section III.12.1; and

LRA_{RestofNewEngland} = MW of Local Sourcing Requirement for the rest of the New England Control Area, which for the purposes of this calculation is treated as an import-constrained region, determined in accordance with Section III.12.2.1.

III.12.3 Consultation and Filing of Capacity Requirements.
At least two months prior to filing the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission, the ISO shall review the modeling assumptions and resulting Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve with the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. Following consultation with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO shall file the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act 90 days prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the proposed identification of a potential new Capacity Zone when the boundary of the potential new Capacity Zone differs from the boundaries of existing Load Zones or Capacity Zones. In order to be used in a given FCA, any new Capacity Zone must have received approval from the Commission prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable FCA.

III.12.4 Capacity Zones.
For each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall, using the results of the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability conducted pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, determine the Capacity Zones to model as described below, and will include such designations in its filing with the Commission pursuant to Section III.13.8.1(c):
(a) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate export-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the Maximum Capacity Limit is less than the sum of the existing qualified capacity and proposed new capacity that could qualify to be procured in the export constrained Capacity Zone, including existing and proposed new Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface.

(b) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate import-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the second contingency transmission capability results in a line-line Transmission Security Analysis Requirement, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2 and pursuant to ISO New England Planning Procedures, that is greater than the Existing Qualified Capacity in the zone, with the largest generating station in the zone modeled as out-of-service. Each assessment will model out-of-service all Non-Price Retirement Requests, De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids (including any received for the current FCA at the time of this calculation) and Permanent De-List Bids as well as rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) Adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained shall be modeled together as the Rest of Pool Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.12.5 Transmission Interface Limits.
Transmission interface limits, used in the determination of Local Sourcing Requirements, shall be determined pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, using network models that include all resources, existing transmission lines and proposed transmission lines that the ISO determines, in accordance with Section III.12.6, will be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The transmission interface limits shall be established, using deterministic analyses, at levels that provide acceptable thermal, voltage and stability performance of the system both with all lines in service and after any criteria contingency occurs as specified in ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

III.12.6 Modeling Assumptions for Determining the Network Model.
The ISO shall determine, in accordance with this Section III.12.6, the generating units and transmission infrastructure to include in the network model that: (i) are expected to be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) may have a material impact on the network model, a potential interface constraint, or on one or more Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall be used, among other purposes, (i) for the Forward Capacity Market qualification process and (ii) to calculate transmission interface limits in order to forecast the Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall include:

(a) For the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the network model shall include:

(i) all existing resources, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades that have not been approved to be retired for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3;

(ii) all new resources with Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades; and

(iii) in the case of an initial interconnection analysis that is conducted consistent with the Network Capability Interconnection Standard, any generating unit or External Elective Transmission Upgrade that has a valid Interconnection Request and is reasonably expected to declare commercial operation no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction and each annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall determine and publish a list of the transmission projects and elements of transmission projects that will be included in the network model. During the process of making the transmission infrastructure determinations, as described in Section III.12.6.1, the ISO shall consult with the Governance Participants, the Transmission Owners, any transmission project proponents, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies.

III.12.6.1 Process for Establishing the Network Model

(a) The ISO shall establish an initial network model prior to the Forward Capacity Auction that only includes transmission infrastructure, including Internal Elective Transmission Upgrades, that is already in service at the time that the initial network model is developed.
(b) After establishing the initial network model, the ISO shall compile a preliminary list of the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List, individually or in combination with each other, as appropriate, to identify transmission projects that may achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and that will have a material impact on the network model, on a potential interface constraint or one or more Local Sourcing Requirements.

(c) For the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List that are included in the preliminary list developed pursuant to subsection (b), the ISO shall determine whether the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2 and will be considered for further evaluation pursuant to subsection (d).

(d) For those transmission projects or elements of transmission projects that meet the initial threshold milestones in subsection (c), the ISO shall use the evaluation criteria specified in Section III.12.6.3, and any other relevant information, to determine whether to include a transmission project or element of a transmission project in the final network model.

(e) If after completing its evaluation pursuant to Sections III.12.6.1 through III.12.6.3 and conferring with the transmission project proponents, the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO determines that the transmission project or a portion of the transmission project is reasonably expected to be in service no later than the first day for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then such transmission project or portion of transmission project shall be considered in service in the finalized network model to calculate the transmission interface limits pursuant to Section III.12.5.

III.12.6.2 Initial Threshold to be Considered In-Service.
The ISO shall determine whether transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the following initial threshold milestones:

(a) A critical path schedule for the transmission project has been furnished to ISO showing that the transmission project or the element of the transmission project will be in-service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule must be sufficiently detailed to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the schedule.
(b) At the time of the milestone review, siting and permitting processes, if required, are on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) At the time of the milestone review, engineering is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(d) At the time of the milestone review, land acquisition, if required, is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(e) Corporate intent to build the transmission project has been furnished to the ISO. An officer of the host Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer has submitted to the ISO a statement verifying that the officer has reviewed the proposal and critical path schedule submitted to the ISO, and the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer concurs that the schedule is achievable, and it is the intent of the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer to build the proposed transmission project in accordance with that schedule. The Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer may develop alternatives or modifications to the transmission project during the course of design of the transmission project that accomplish at least the same transfer capability. Such alternatives or modifications are acceptable, so long as the ISO determines that the alternative or modification is reasonably expected to achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The provision of an officer’s statement shall be with the understanding that the statement shall not create any liability on the officer and that any liability with respect to the Transmission Owner’s obligations shall be as set forth in the Transmission Operating Agreement and shall not be affected by such officer’s statement.

III.12.6.3 Evaluation Criteria.

For a transmission project or element of a transmission project that meets the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2, the ISO shall consider the following factors and any other relevant information to determine whether to include the transmission project or element of the transmission project in the network model for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Sufficient engineering to initiate construction is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.
(b) Approval under Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, if required, has been obtained or is on schedule to be obtained as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) Significant permits, including local permits, if required to initiate construction have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(d) Easements, if required, have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule. Needed land purchases, if required, have been made or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(e) Any contracts required to procure or construct a transmission project are in place consistent with the critical path schedule. The ISO’s analysis may also take into account whether such contracts contain incentive and/or penalty clauses to encourage third parties to advance the delivery of material services to conform with the critical path schedule.

(f) Physical site work is on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(g) The transmission project is in a designated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor in accordance with Section 216 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p.

III.12.7 Resource Modeling Assumptions.

III.12.7.1 Proxy Units.
When the available resources are insufficient for the unconstrained New England Control Area to meet the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1, proxy units shall be used as additional capacity to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. The proxy units shall reflect resource capacity and outage characteristics such that when the proxy units are used in place of all other resources in the New England Control Area, the reliability, or LOLE, of the New England Control Area does not change. The outage characteristics are the summer capacity weighted average availability of the resources in the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.7.3. The capacity of the proxy unit is determined by adjusting the capacity of the proxy unit until the LOLE of the New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE calculated while using the capacity assumptions described in Section III.12.7.2.
When modeling transmission constraints for the determination of Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, the same proxy units may be added to the import-constrained zone or elsewhere in the rest of the New England Control Area depending on where system constraints exist.

**III.12.7.2 Capacity.**

The resources included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall include:

(a) all Existing Generating Capacity Resources,

(b) resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

(c) all Existing Import Capacity Resources backed by a multiyear contract to provide capacity in the New England Control Area, where that multiyear contract requires delivery of capacity for the Commitment Period for which the Installed Capacity Requirement is being calculated, and

(d) Existing Demand Resources that are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Market and New Demand Resources that have cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

but shall exclude:

(e) capacity associated with Export Bids cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

(f) capacity de-listed or retired as a result of Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids resources for which Permanent De-list Bids cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions, and or for which Non-Price Retirement Requests have been received.

(g) capacity retired pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), unless the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1.
The rating of Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value of such resources for the relevant zone. The rating of Demand Resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value reduced by any reserve margin adjustment factor that is otherwise included in the summer Qualified Capacity value. The rating of resources, except for Demand Resources, cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period shall be based on the amount of Qualified Capacity that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Resources are located within the Capacity Zones in which they are electrically connected as determined during the qualification process.

III.12.7.2.1 [Reserved.]

III.12.7.3 Resource Availability.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be calculated taking resource availability into account and shall be determined as follows:

For Existing Generating Capacity Resources:

(a) The most recent five-year moving average of EFORd shall be used as the measure of resource availability used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. The most recent five-year moving average of EFORd shall be used as the measure of resource availability for non-peaking resources used in the calculation of Transmission Security Analysis Requirements. A deterministic adjustment factor, based on the operational experience of the ISO, shall be used as the measure of resource availability for peaking resources used in the calculation of Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, and will be reviewed periodically.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Once sufficient data are collected under the availability incentives in the Forward Capacity Market, a resource availability metric, which reflects resource availability in a manner that is consistent
with the availability incentives in the Forward Capacity Market, shall be developed and reviewed with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies and used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

For resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period that do not have sufficient data to calculate an availability metric as defined in subsections (a) or (c) above, class average data for similar resource types shall be used. For Demand Resources, including Real-Time Emergency Generation, historical performance data for those resources will be used to develop an availability metric for use in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

III.12.7.4 Load and Capacity Relief.
Load and capacity relief expected from system-wide implementation of the following actions specified in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4. Action During a Capacity Deficiency, shall be included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve:

(a) Implement voltage reduction. The MW value of the load relief shall be equal to the percentage load reduction achieved in the most applicable voltage reduction tests multiplied by the forecasted seasonal peak loads.

(b) Arrange for available Emergency energy from Market Participants or neighboring Control Areas. These actions are included in the calculation through the use of tie benefits to meet system needs. The MW value of tie benefits is calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.

(c) Maintain an adequate amount of ten-minute synchronized reserves. The amount of system reserves included in the determination of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be consistent with those needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions. When modeling transmission constraints, the reserve requirement for a zone shall be the
zone’s pro rata share of the forecasted system peak load multiplied by the system reserves needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions.

III.12.8 Load Modeling Assumptions.

The ISO shall forecast load for the New England Control Area and for each Load Zone within the New England Control Area. The load forecasts shall be based on appropriate models and data inputs. Each year, the load forecasts and underlying methodologies, inputs and assumptions shall be reviewed with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. If the load forecast shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall propose adjustments to the load modeling methodology to the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies to eliminate the bias.

Demand Resources shall be reflected in the load forecast as specified below:

(a) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Resource not qualifying for or not participating in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The expected reduction from these resources will be included in the load forecast to the extent that they meet the qualification process rules, including monitoring and verification plan and financial assurance requirements. If no qualification process rules are in place for the expected reductions from these resources, they shall not be included within the load forecast.

(b) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Resource that qualifies to participate in the Forward Capacity Market, participates but does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, or has cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction and is expected to continue in the Forward Capacity Market shall not be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(c) [Reserved.]

(d) Any realized Demand Resource reductions in the historical period that received Forward Capacity Market payments for these reductions, or Demand Resource reductions that are expected to receive
Forward Capacity Market payments by participating in the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction or having cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, shall be added back into the appropriate historical loads to ensure that such resources are not reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.12.9 Tie Benefits.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be calculated assuming appropriate tie benefits, if any, available from interconnections with neighboring Control Areas. Tie benefits shall be calculated only for interconnections (1) without Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service or (2) that have not requested Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service with directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas with which the ISO has in effect agreements providing for emergency support to New England, including but not limited to inter-Control Area coordination agreements, emergency aid agreements and the NPCC Regional Reliability Plan.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using a probabilistic multi-area reliability model, by comparing the LOLE for the New England system before and after interconnecting the system to the neighboring Control Areas. To quantify tie benefits, firm capacity equivalents shall be added until the LOLE of the isolated New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE of the interconnected New England Control Area.


III.12.9.1.1. Tie Benefits Calculation for the Forward Capacity Auction and Annual Reconfiguration Auctions; Modeling Assumptions and Simulation Program.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, tie benefits shall be calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction and the third annual reconfiguration auction using the calculation methodology in this Section III.12.9. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions for a Capacity Commitment Period, the tie benefits calculated for the associated Forward Capacity Auction shall be utilized in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve as adjusted to account for any changes.
in import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas and changes in import capacity resources using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using the modeling assumptions developed in accordance with Section III.12.9.2 and using the General Electric Multi-area Reliability Simulation (MARS) program.

III.12.9.1.2. **Tie Benefits Calculation.**
The total tie benefits to New England from all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas are calculated first using the methodology in Section III.12.9.3. Following the calculation of total tie benefits, individual tie benefits from each qualifying neighboring Control Area are calculated using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from each Control Area does not equal the total tie benefits to New England, then each Control Area’s tie benefits are adjusted based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits calculated for each Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.2. Following this calculation, tie benefits are calculated for each qualifying individual interconnection or group of interconnections using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from individual interconnections or groups of interconnections does not equal their associated Control Area’s tie benefits, then the tie benefits of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits within the Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.1.3. **Adjustments to Account for Transmission Import Capability and Capacity Imports.**
Once the initial calculation of tie benefits is performed, the tie benefits for each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted to account for capacity imports and any changes in the import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas, using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6. Once the import capability and capacity import adjustments are completed, the sum of the tie benefits of all individual interconnections and groups of interconnections for a Control Area, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the tie benefits associated with that Control Area, and the sum of the tie benefits from all Control Areas, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the total tie benefits available to New England.

III.12.9.2. **Modeling Assumptions and Procedures for the Tie Benefits Calculation.**
III.12.9.2.1. Assumptions Regarding System Conditions.
In calculating tie benefits, “at criterion” system conditions shall be used to model the New England Control Area and all interconnected Control Areas.

In calculating tie benefits, all New England internal transmission constraints that (i) are modeled in the most recent Regional System Plan resource adequacy studies and assessments and (ii) are not addressed by either a Local Sourcing Requirement or a Maximum Capacity Limit calculation shall be modeled, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.3. Modeling Transmission Constraints in Neighboring Control Areas.
The ISO will review annually NPCC’s assumptions regarding transmission constraints in all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas that are modeled for the tie benefits calculations. In the event that NPCC models a transmission constraint in one of the modeled neighboring Control Areas, the ISO will perform an evaluation to determine which interfaces are most critical to the ability of the neighboring Control Area to reliably provide tie benefits to New England from both operational and planning perspectives, and will model those transmission constraints in the tie benefits calculation, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.4. Other Modeling Assumptions.

A. External transfer capability determinations. The transfer capability of all external interconnections with New England will be determined using studies that take account of the load, resource and other electrical system conditions that are consistent with those expected during the Capacity Commitment Period for which the calculation is being performed. Transfer capability studies will be performed using simulations that consider the contingencies enumerated in sub-section (iii) below.

(i) The transmission system will be modeled using the following conditions:

1. The forecast 90/10 peak load conditions for the Capacity Commitment Period;
2. Qualified Existing Generating Capacity Resources reflecting their output at their Capacity Network Resource level;
3. Qualified Existing Demand Resources reflecting their Capacity Supply Obligation received in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction;
4. Transfers on the transmission system that impact the transfer capability of...
the interconnection under study.

(ii) The system will be modeled in a manner that reflects the design of the interconnection. If an interconnection and its supporting system upgrades were designed to provide incremental capacity into the New England Control Area, simulations will assume imports up to the level that the interconnection was designed to support. If the interconnection was not designed to be so comparably integrated, simulations will determine the amount of power that can be delivered into New England over the interconnection.

(iii) The simulations will take into account contingencies that address a fault on a generator or transmission facility, loss of an element without a fault, and circuit breaker failure following the loss of an element or an association with the operation of a special protection system.

B. In calculating tie benefits, New England capacity exports are removed from the internal capacity resources and are modeled as a resource in the receiving Control Area. The transfer capability of external interconnections is not adjusted to account for capacity exports.

III.12.9.2.5. Procedures for Adding or Removing Capacity from Control Areas to Meet the 0.1 Days Per Year LOLE Standard.

In calculating tie benefits, capacity shall be added or removed from the interconnected system of New England and its neighboring Control Areas, until the LOLE of New England and the LOLE of each Control Area of the interconnected system equals 0.1 days per year simultaneously. The following procedures shall be used to add or remove capacity within New England and the interconnected Control Areas to achieve that goal.

A. Adding Proxy Units within New England when the New England system is short of capacity. In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, proxy units (with the characteristics identified in Section III.12.7.1) will be added to the sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmission constraints within New England, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then proxy units will be added to the entire Control Area. If, as a result of the addition of one or more proxy units, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(b) will be used to remove the surplus capacity.
B. **Removing capacity from New England when the New England system is surplus of capacity.** In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in these surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the Existing Qualified Capacity, and any amount of proxy units added in that sub-area that is above its 50-50 peak load forecast. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratios described above for the removal of capacity surplus. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then the surplus capacity shall be removed from the entire Control Area.

C. **Adding capacity within neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, additional capacity will be added to the neighboring Control Area’s sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmissions constraints, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the Control Area, then capacity will be added to the entire Control Area. The process that the neighboring Control Area utilizes in its resource adequacy study to meet its resource adequacy criterion will be utilized to add capacity to that Control Area. In filing the Installed Capacity Requirement values pursuant to Section III.12.3, the ISO will provide citations to any resource adequacy studies relied upon for these purposes. If, as a result of the capacity addition, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(d) shall be used to remove the surplus capacity.

D. **Removing capacity from neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the neighboring Control Area’s sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its 50/50 peak load forecast. For a sub-area that has a
minimum locational resource requirement above its 50/50 peak load forecast, the amount of capacity surplus is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its minimum locational resource requirement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources from a sub-area will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the those remaining surplus sub-areas. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the neighboring Control Area, then the surplus capacity will be removed from the entire Control Area.

E. Maintaining the neighboring Control Area’s locational resource requirements. In modeling a neighboring Control Area with internal transmission constraints, all minimum locational resource requirements in the Control Area’s sub-areas as established by the neighboring Control Area’s installed capacity requirement calculations shall be observed.

III.12.9.3. Calculating Total Tie Benefits.
The total tie benefits with all qualifying directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas shall be calculated by comparing the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections to neighboring Control Areas connected with the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections with neighboring Control Areas disconnected. To calculate total tie benefits:

A. The New England system shall be interconnected with all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas and the New England Control Area, and each neighboring Control Area shall be brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE simultaneously by adjusting the capacity of each Control Area, utilizing the methods for adding or removing capacity in Section III.12.9.2.5.

B. Once the interconnected system is brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE, the LOLE of the New England Control Area shall be calculated a second time, with the New England system isolated from the rest of the interconnected system that was brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE.

C. Total tie benefits shall be the sum of the amounts of firm capacity that needs to be added to the isolated New England Control Area at the point at which each interconnection with neighboring Control Areas interconnects in New England to bring the New England LOLE back to 0.1 days per year. This value is subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.4. Calculating Each Control Area’s Tie Benefits.
III.12.9.4.1. Initial Calculation of a Control Area’s Tie Benefits.
Tie benefits from each neighboring Control Area shall be determined by calculating the tie benefits for every possible interconnection state that has an impact on the tie benefit value between the New England system and the target neighboring Control Area. If two or more interconnections between New England and the target neighboring Control Area exist, then all interconnections grouped together will be used to represent the state of interconnection between New England and the target neighboring Control Area. The tie benefits from the target neighboring Control Area shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.2.

III.12.9.4.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.
If the sum of the individual Control Area tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.1 is different than the total tie benefits from all Control Areas calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3, then each Control Area’s tie benefits shall be increased or decreased based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits for each individual Control Area, so that the sum of each Control Area’s tie benefits, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3. The pro-rated Control Area tie benefits are subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.5. Calculating Tie Benefits for Individual Ties.
Tie benefits shall be calculated for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the extent that a discrete and material transfer capability can be identified for the interconnection or group of interconnections. All interconnections or groups of interconnections shall have equal rights in calculating individual tie benefits, with no grandfathering or incremental tie capability treatment.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits, a group of interconnections refers to two or more AC lines that operate in parallel to form a transmission interface in which there are significant overlapping contributions of each line toward establishing the transfer limit, such that the individual lines in a group of interconnections cannot be assigned individual contributions.

III.12.9.5.1. Initial Calculation of Tie Benefits for an Individual Interconnection or Group of Interconnections.
Tie benefits for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be calculated by calculating tie benefits for each possible interconnection state between the New England system and the individual interconnection or group of interconnections. The tie benefits from that interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.5.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.
If the sum of the individual interconnection’s or group of interconnection’s tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.1 is different than the associated Control Area’s tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4, then the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in that Control Area, so that the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in the Control Area, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits for the Control Area calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4. The pro-rated tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections is subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.


III.12.9.6.1. Accounting for Capacity Imports.
In the initial tie benefits calculations, capacity imports are modeled as internal resources in New England, and the import capability of the interconnections with neighboring Control Areas is not reduced to reflect the impact of capacity imports. After the initial tie benefits calculations, total tie benefits, tie benefits for each Control Area, and tie benefits from each individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted to account for capacity imports using the methodology contained in this Section III.12.9.6.1. For the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefit values calculated in accordance with Sections III.12.9.3, III.12.9.4 and III.12.9.5 respectively. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefits values calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction.

A. Capacity imports shall be deducted from the import capability of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections to determine the available import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections prior to accounting for tie benefits from
those interconnections. The transfer capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections shall be determined using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.4.A.

B. If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections, as determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5, is greater than the remaining transmission import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections after accounting for capacity imports, the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the remaining transmission import capability (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2). If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections is not greater than the remaining transmission import capability after accounting for capacity imports, then the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the value determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5 (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2).

C. The tie benefits for each Control Area shall be the sum of the tie benefits from the individual interconnections or groups of interconnections with that Control Area, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.

D. The total tie benefits from all qualifying neighboring Control Areas shall be the sum of the Control Area tie benefits, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.

E. For purposes of determining the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under this Section III.12.9.6.1, the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Qualified Existing Import Capacity Resources for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the annual reconfiguration auctions are those Import Capacity Resources that hold Capacity Supply Obligations for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period as of the time the tie benefits calculation is being performed for the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.12.9.6.2. Changes in the Import Capability of Interconnections with Neighboring Control Areas.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, the most recent import capability values for an interconnection or group of interconnections with
a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the modeling of system conditions for the tie benefits calculation. In addition, for the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, any changes to the import capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under Section III.12.9.6.1.

III.12.9.7 Tie Benefits Over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF.
The tie benefits from the Quebec Control Area over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.1 shall be allocated to the Interconnection Rights Holders or their designees in proportion to their respective percentage shares of the HQ Phase I and the HQ Phase II facilities, in accordance with Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.12.10 Calculating the Maximum Amount of Import Capacity Resources that May be Cleared Over External Interfaces in the Forward Capacity Auction and Reconfiguration Auctions.
For external interfaces, Import Capacity Resources shall be allowed in the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions up to the interface limit minus the tie benefits, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.9.1 or 12.9.2 over the applicable interface.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Resource. A Generating Capacity Resource and a Demand Resource may not both participate in the Forward Capacity Market if located at the same Retail Delivery Point, unless the Generating Capacity Resource is separately metered and its output is added to the metered load as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit.


To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.


A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.
(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or
Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs; or

Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

III.13.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output greater than 2 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff...
(or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section does not cause the resource to exceed the megawatt amount approved in the resource’s Interconnection Agreement, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package but is not required to submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form for the incremental amount by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 causes the resource to exceed the megawatt amount approved in the resource’s Interconnection Agreement or MW amount approved pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.1.4. **De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.
III.13.1.1.5. **Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6. **Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to Commercial Operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 150 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to Commercial Operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 **Renewable Technology Resources.**

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;

(b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state’s mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as
in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state’s renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the state in which it is geographically located;

(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export De-List Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.


For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also submit to the ISO, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, an Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be
irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor’s contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the project’s expected Commercial Operation date; the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; the Economic Minimum Limit (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a
description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.8.

III.13.1.2.2.1. Site Control.
For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.
In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve Commercial Operation as qualified no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) Major Permits. In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.
(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.1.1.1.2.2.2(d) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (d) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent Commercial Operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.
(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

### III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity at or above the Economic Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

### III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional
and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

### III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.
III.13.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.2.2(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource or the Intermittent Settlement Only Resource.

III.13.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2, III.13.1.3, III.13.1.4, or III.13.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity
Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the
Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

(g) New Generating Capacity Resources, or portions thereof, shall not be considered to have met their Capacity Supply Obligation for the purposes of this Forward Capacity Market and shall not receive compensation if any upgrades to be completed by the Project Sponsor required to remove overlapping interconnection impacts as identified in (f) have not been completed, including, any upgrades identified in a restudy pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff in time for the Capacity Commitment Period unless the Capacity Supply Obligation is appropriately covered.

**III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.**

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:
(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this 
Section III.13.1.1.2;

(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for 
treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource, 
sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, 
and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power 
Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource 
that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that has cleared in 
the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification 
process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section 
III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s 
summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers 
composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources 
and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource 
that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be the summer 
Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section 
III.13.1.1.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified
Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

### III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

### III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

### III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.

### III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.
No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, the Internal
Market Monitor’s determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than five Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.2.5.3. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 or Section III.13.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c) and (d) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than three Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Generating Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.
(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2020 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Generating Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.

III.13.1.2. **Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.2.1. **Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.**

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. **Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

III.13.1.2.2.1. **Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.**

III.13.1.2.2.1.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity.**

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each
year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.
The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources are defined as wind, solar, run of river hydro and other renewable resources that do not have control over their net power output. Wind and solar resources shall be qualified as Intermittent Power Resources or Intermittent Settlement Only Resources. The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that
is an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be calculated as follows:

**III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource has not been in Commercial Operation for the requisite five full summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource achieved Commercial Operation during a summer period. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource began Commercial Operation after the 2006 summer period and prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction, its summer Qualified Capacity shall be established pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e).

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which the ISO has declared a system-wide Shortage Event and if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Shortage Events in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

**III.13.1.2.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.**
(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource has not been in Commercial Operation for the requisite five full winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource achieved Commercial Operation during a winter period.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which the ISO has declared a system-wide Shortage Event and if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Shortage Events in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity
Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification-Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not a Settlement Only Resource, Intermittent Power Resource, or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW, then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Qualification-Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.
(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.
Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not a Settlement Only Resource, meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.
Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 2045 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located. If the Lead Market Participant believes that an ISO-determined summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not accurately reflect the determination described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than 155 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Qualification Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, or a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 150 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Qualification Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids, and Permanent De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline.
Capacity Qualification Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Sections III.13.1.2.3.1 and III.13.1.2.3.1.1.5.2. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and Permanent De-List Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A  Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.
The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for a Forward Capacity Auction is $5.50/kW-month. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. When the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1  Static De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.] Permanent De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction. A Permanent De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits a Permanent De-List Bid for the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Permanent De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Permanent De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Permanent De-List Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the
III.13.1.2.3.1.3. **Export Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area other than an Intermittent Power Resource, an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource, an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an
Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bids

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Description of Non-Price Retirement Request.
(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be
detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

A Non-Price Retirement Request is a binding request to retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource. Non-Price Retirement Requests will be approved subject to review for reliability impacts under Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Even if not approved, a resource that has submitted a Non-Price Retirement Request may retire in whole or in part, as applicable, pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii). Once submitted, a Non-Price Retirement Request may not be withdrawn. A Non-Price Retirement Request submitted in accordance with the timing requirements of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.2 supersedes any prior de-list bid for the same Capacity Commitment Period.

### Timing Requirements

The request must be submitted to the ISO between the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline and 120 days prior to the date of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Permanent De-List Bid for which an Internal Market Monitor determined price has been established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1, a Non-Price Retirement Request may be submitted for the affected portion of the bid within 14 days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification or 120 days prior to the date of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, whichever is later.

### Reliability Review of Non-Price Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement Requests De-List Bids During the Qualification Process

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-approved Retirement De-List Bids that are above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:
(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee no later than 30 days after the ISO submits to the Commission the retirement filing described in Section III.13.8.1(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than 10 Business Days after being informed that a resource is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).
For a Permanent De-List Bid above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

The ISO will review a Non-Price Retirement Request pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5 to determine if the resource is needed for reliability. If the Non-Price Retirement Request is rejected for reliability reasons and the resource elects not to proceed with retirement as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii), and the resource remains in operation to meet the reliability need, the resource will be compensated pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.4. Upon resolution of the reliability issue, the Non Price Retirement Request will be approved and the resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, will retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.4 — Obligation to Retire.

A Generating Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, with an approved Non-Price Retirement Request will be retired as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a) unless, in the case of a Generating Capacity Resource that had its Non-Price Retirement Request rejected for reliability reasons, the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, or Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, or Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, or Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost.
composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor–approved price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, and Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, and each Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to
Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3; and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to
Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is
submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal
Market Monitor shall review each such bid above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all
such bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor
shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price
pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List
Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than
20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal
Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section
III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each of these bid components must be included in the
Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the
Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or
Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to
previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted
price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information
may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it
will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient
supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially
changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is
appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting
to the accuracy of its content, including the reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and
adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the
obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding
Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject
to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant
(including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market
III.13.1.2.3.1.1.1. Review of Permanent Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, that a Permanent Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid is not consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs, plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, plus reasonable risk premium assumptions, and plus reasonable opportunity costs, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid that is consistent with its determination of the foregoing. If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Permanent Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(ace) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1.2. Review of Static De-List Bids.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines, after due consideration and consultation with a Lead Market Participant, that a Static De-List Bid is not consistent with a resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid that is consistent with its determination of the foregoing.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the
Commission described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

After due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-approved Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-approved price based on the Internal Market Monitor review of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor, and shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold or Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report net going forward costs in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor using ISO spreadsheets and forms provided, and may supplement this information with other evidence as deemed necessary. A Static De-List Bid, or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula. To the extent possible, all costs and operational data used in this calculation shall
be the cumulative actual data for the Existing Capacity Resource from the most recent full Capacity Commitment Period available.

\[
\left[ GFC \right] \cdot \left( IMR \right) \cdot \left( \text{InfIndex} \right) \\
(CQ_{\text{Summer}} \times 12, \text{months})
\]

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are costs that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (and thereafter, in the case of a Permanent De-List Bid). These costs shall be reported to the ISO using the spreadsheet provided on the ISO website by any Existing Generating Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Export Bid, shall be accompanied by a signed affidavit, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO. To the extent that the Capacity Commitment Period data used to calculate these data do not reflect known and measurable costs that would or are likely to be incurred in the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Internal Market Monitor shall also consider adjustments submitted, provided the costs are based on known and measurable conditions and supported by appropriate documentation to reflect those costs.

\[ CQ_{\text{Summer}} k\text{W} = \text{capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.} \]

IMR = annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (and thereafter, in the
case of a Permanent De-List Bid, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative actual cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has not indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00. As soon as practicable, the resource’s total ISO market revenues used in this calculation shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

PER = resource-specific annual peak energy rents, in dollars. As soon as practicable, this value shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

At the option of the Lead Market Participant, the cumulative production costs for each of the most recent three Capacity Commitment Periods may be submitted and the annual infra-marginal rents calculated for each year. The Lead Market Participant may then specify two of the three years to be averaged and subsequently used as the IMR value. Upon exercising such option, the PER value used shall be an average of the PER values for the two years selected.

\[
\text{InfIndex} = \text{inflation index}, \text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4
\]

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

### III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.
The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

Expected net operating profit, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

Expected capacity revenues, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity
prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.
If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide
documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.2.1.2.1.2 may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).
III.13.1.2.3.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all de-list bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted
average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\text{Cost Of Capital} = \frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1-(1+\text{CostOfCapital})^{\text{RemainingLife}})}
\]

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

### III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.

**(a)** No later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

**(b)** No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

### III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than ten Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).
(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package
III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external Demand Resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.3 is met, only...
the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPAP contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.
Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3 for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3, no later than 150 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: CMECC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: MMWEC</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: Pascoag</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY─ NE: VELCO</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 225</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE (extension)</td>
<td>Up to 6</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(beginning 11/01/2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Phase I/II ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 110</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.
Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.
The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.
For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification
Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the Capacity Supply Obligation, if an offer from the New Import Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, will be met.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of
how the Capacity Supply Obligation, if an offer from the New Import Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, will be met.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

**III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

**III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract
shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford
the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load,
that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage
between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export
to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked
import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the
requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the
ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and
operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be
delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the
intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except
in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract
shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or
curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is
located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own
Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4.  Capacity Commitment Period Election.
The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply
to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity
Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity
Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall
receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward
Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5.  Initial Interconnection Analysis.
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the
capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import
Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services
Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.
III.13.1.3.5.6. **Cost Information.**
The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. **Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**
In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7. **Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.**
For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.
III.13.1.3.5.8. **Rationing Election.**
New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. **Demand Resources.**

III.13.1.4.1. **Demand Resources.**
To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1. No resource shall be permitted to participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Response Capacity Resource prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period. A Demand Response Capacity Resource with a Commercial Operation Date before June 1, 2018, or a Demand Response Capacity Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period, shall be considered a Real-Time Demand Response Resource for any Capacity Commitment Period commencing prior to June 1, 2018. No resource shall be permitted to participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Real-Time Demand Response Resource beginning with the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity offered by a Demand Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW aggregated in a Dispatch Zone. A Demand Resource may continue to offer capacity into Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods in an amount less than or equal to its remaining Measure Life. Demand Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Resource. Demand Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids.

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A Demand Resource shall no longer be eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Market if its Permanent De-list Bid is accepted. For purposes of this Section III.13.1.4, references to the Lead Market Participant for a resource shall include the Enrolling Participant for a Demand Resource.

III.13.1.4.1.1. **Existing Demand Resources.**
Demand Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Resources, shall be Existing Demand Resources. Existing Demand Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO
to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in Section III.13.1.4.1, Existing Demand Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.5.2. An Existing Demand Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5, provided, however, that neither a Permanent De-List Bid Non-Price nor a Retirement Request De-List Bid shall not be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify assets associated with Existing Demand Resources as New Demand Resources. Existing Demand Resources may de-list consistent with Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.1 and III.13.1.2.3.1.2. Existing Demand Response Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.7.1.1.5.

III.13.1.4.1.2. New Demand Resources.
A New Demand Resource is a Demand Resource that has not been in service prior to the applicable Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the Forward Capacity Auction, or Distributed Generation that has operated only to address an electric power outage due to failure of the electrical supply, on-site disaster, local equipment failure, or public service emergencies such as flood, fire, or natural disaster, or excessive deviations from standard voltage from the electrical supplier to the premises during the 12-month period prior to the applicable Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the Forward Capacity Auction, and is not an Existing Demand Resource. A Demand Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Resource shall be considered a New Demand Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.4.1.2.1. Qualified Capacity of New Demand Resources.
For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s Demand Reduction Values as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.

The documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.2.1 must be submitted as part of the Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.2.2. Initial Analysis for Certain New Demand Resources
For each New Demand Resource that is a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

All Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be treated in the same manner as Existing Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources may: (i) submit Static De-list Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, (ii) submit Dynamic De-list Bids pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(d), or (iii) submit Permanent De-list Bids or Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources may not submit an Export Bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 or an Administrative Export De-list Bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources may not import capacity pursuant to Section III.13.1.3. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource may not participate in a reconfiguration auction. Such resources may participate in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral as either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource, provided, however, that where a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource participates in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral as a Capacity Acquiring Resource, the Capacity Transferring Resource must also be a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource. Such resources may not be Supplemental Capacity Resources. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources that are New Demand Resources as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.2 shall be subject to the qualification and financial assurance requirements applicable to New Demand Resources.

III.13.1.4.2. Show of Interest Form for New Demand Resources.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.2 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission.
Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. The New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form is available on the ISO website.

(a) A completed New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Resource project will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter Demand Reduction Values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses) expected to be achieved five weeks prior to the first and second annual Forward Capacity Auctions after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award would be made, if applicable, and on the Commercial Operation date; estimated total summer and winter Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project; supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated Demand Reduction Values; Demand Resource type (On-Peak Demand Resource, Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource); brief Demand Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; expected Commercial Operation date – i.e., the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to reach Commercial Operation (Commercial Operation for a Demand Resource shall mean the demonstration to the ISO by the Project Sponsor that the Demand Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full Demand Reduction Value); ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; and for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualification Package for Existing Demand Resources.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification-Retirement Deadline. The Existing Capacity Qualification
Package for an Existing Demand Resource shall conform to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.1. All Existing Demand Resources must provide a Measurement and Verification Plan which complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Qualification Package for New Demand Resources.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.2.2.2. Source of Funding.
The Project Sponsor must provide source of funding which includes, but is not limited to, the following information: The source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; A completed ISO credit application.

III.13.1.4.2.2.3. Measurement and Verification Plan.
For all Demand Resources other than Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide a Measurement and Verification Plan which complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3, Section III.8A and III.8B and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4. Customer Acquisition Plan.
A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must provide a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.
III.13.1.4.2.2.4.1. Individual Distributed Generation Projects and Demand Resource Projects From a Single Facility With A Demand Reduction Value Greater Than or Equal to 5 MW.

For individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value greater than or equal to 5 MW the critical path schedule requirements and the monitoring and milestones are the same as those required for New Generating Capacity Resources as set forth in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4.2. Demand Resource Projects Involving Multiple Facilities and Demand Resource Projects From a Single Facility With A Demand Reduction Value Less Than 5 MW.

A critical path schedule for Demand Resource projects installed at multiple facilities and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value of less than 5 MW shall be comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered Demand Reduction Value achieved as of target dates which are: (i) The cumulative percentage of total Demand Reduction Value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii) The cumulative percentage of total Demand Reduction Value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the expected Commercial Operation date, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total Demand Reduction Value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4.3. Additional Requirement For Demand Resource Project Sponsor Proposing Total Demand Reduction Value of 30 Percent or Less by the Second Target Date.

If a Demand Resource Project Sponsor proposes in its New Demand Resource Qualification Package a cumulative Percent of Total Demand Reduction Value Complete that is 30 percent or less by the second critical path schedule target date, then a pipeline analysis must be submitted to the ISO five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the award was made. A pipeline analysis demonstrates the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s ability to fulfill its obligation to deliver capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction by the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Such an analysis must list the customers that have made a commitment to participate in the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s program to deliver capacity to meet the Demand
Resource Project Sponsor’s Forward Capacity Auction obligations, and must include each customer’s projected summer and winter Demand Reduction Values, and expected measure installation date; provided, however, that a Demand Resource Project Sponsor targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility shall have the option of using a targeting and marketing plan based on past performance in that market to determine the Project Sponsor’s ability to fulfill its obligation by the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. To the extent that the Demand Resource Project Sponsor is unable to demonstrate through its pipeline analysis that it has sufficient customers to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall be subject to the ISO’s critical path schedule monitoring procedures, as specified in Section III.13.3 of Market Rule 1.

### III.13.1.4.2.2.5. Capacity Commitment Period Election

In the New Demand Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5.

### III.13.1.4.2.2.6. Rationing Election

The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Resource must indicate in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will...
only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.2.3. Consistency of the New Demand Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form.

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter Demand Reduction Value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); (vi) a change in the treatment as an Existing Demand Resource for the first Forward Capacity Auction; or (viii) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

III.13.1.4.2.4. Offers From New Demand Resources.

All New Demand Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

III.13.1.4.2.5. Notification of Qualification for Demand Resources.

III.13.1.4.2.5.1. Evaluation of Demand Resource Qualification Materials.

The ISO shall review the information submitted by Existing Demand Resources and New Demand Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Resource is
accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by Existing Demand Resources and New Demand Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.5.2. Notification of Qualification for Existing Demand Resources.

For each Existing Demand Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 2015 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline of: (i) Demand Resource type; and (ii) summer and winter Demand Reduction Values and estimates of summer and winter Qualified Capacity as defined in Section III.13.1.4.3 and the Load Zone in which the Capacity Resource is located, and the Dispatch Zone within which a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is located. If the Lead Market Participant believes that an ISO-determined summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Demand Resource does not accurately reflect the determination described in Section III.13.1.4.3, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. If an Existing Demand Resource is not submitting a change in its Demand Resource type, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Static De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification, and may not elect to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the
Forward Capacity Auction. If a Market Participant believes that the Demand Reduction Value or Qualified Capacity for an Existing Demand Resource is inaccurate or wishes to change its Demand Resource type, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification and submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its Demand Resource type, if applicable. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than 5 Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3. Notification of Qualification for New Demand Resources.
No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Resource indicating whether the New Demand Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3.1. Notification of Acceptance to Qualify of a New Demand Resource.
For a New Demand Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Resource’s summer and winter Demand Reduction Value and summer and winter Qualified Capacity. Designation of the Demand Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3.2. Notification of Failure to Qualify of a New Demand Resource.
For a New Demand Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to All Demand Resources.
To demonstrate the Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Resource project, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1, all Demand Resources participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Demand Resource project Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3, Sections III.8A and III.8B and the ISO New England Manuals. Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or reconfiguration auctions must estimate Demand Reduction Values pursuant to the requirements of Sections III.8A, Section III.8B, Section III.13.6.1.5.4, and Section III.E1 and Section III.E2. To the extent that a Demand Response Capacity Resource consists, in whole or in part, of assets
capable of delivering Net Supply, the estimated Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Response Capacity Resource may include an estimate of Net Supply. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3, Section III.8A, Section III.8B, and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

Measurement and Verification Documents for On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources must demonstrate both availability and performance of Demand Resource projects in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly Demand Reduction Value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manual on Measurement and Verification of Demand Reduction Value from Demand Resources. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Resource project. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the Demand Resource project’s Demand Reduction Value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Life of the Demand Resource project. A Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s total Demand Reduction Value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total Demand Reduction Value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the
ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Demand Resource Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. **Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.**
At the option of the Demand Resource Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. **Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.**
At the option of the Demand Resource Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated Demand Resource project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total Demand Reduction Value and the Demand Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. **Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**
Demand Resource Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and Real-Time Demand Response Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and
Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.
For Demand Resource projects targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, Demand Resource Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly Demand Reduction Values. For Demand Resource projects targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated Demand Reduction Value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Demand Resource Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. Measurement and Verification Documentation of Demand Reduction Values Applicable to All Demand Resources.
The Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall designate the specific methodology used to establish Demand Reduction Values, including the specification of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours for On-Peak Demand Resources, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours for Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, or Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours for Real-Time Demand Response Resources, in its Measurement and Verification Plan pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3. For Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall provide an estimate of Demand Reduction Values consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8A and Section III.8B. To the extent that a Demand Response Capacity Resource consists, in whole or in part, of assets capable of delivering Net Supply, the estimated Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Response Capacity Resource may include an estimate of Net Supply. Distributed Generation, Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response, and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource projects must include individual metering or a metering protocol consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals to monitor and verify the Demand Reduction Values of the Demand Resource project.
For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, all Demand Response Assets must be metered at the Retail Delivery Point.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, if the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset cannot operate synchronized to the grid, and there is no Demand Response Asset at the same facility, the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset can be metered at the Retail Delivery Point or at the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset. If the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is capable of operating synchronized to the grid or there is a Demand Response Asset at the same facility then both the Retail Delivery Point and the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must be metered. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets must utilize a remote terminal unit for communicating telemetry and receiving Dispatch Instructions, and the metering equipment used to measure the performance of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must meet the requirements of Section E2.2.1(a), (b), and (c), must be tested pursuant to Section E2.2.3, and are subject to auditing pursuant to Section E2.2.4.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, if a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is metered at the generator, the associated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource’s Demand Reduction Value shall be calculated using the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset’s Average Hourly Output. If a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is only metered at the Retail Delivery Point, the associated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource’s Demand Reduction Value shall be calculated using the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset’s Average Hourly Load Reduction.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing before June 1, 2018, the output of the generators comprising a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must be directly metered and reported to the ISO as a single set of interval meter data, provided that if there is no other Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, Real-Time Demand Response Asset or other generator whose output can be controlled at the same facility, the Market Participant may instead meter the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset at the retail delivery point. Meter data associated with the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset shall be recorded and reported by the Market Participant to the ISO in Real-Time at an interval of five minutes.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing before June 1, 2018, the output of generators comprising a Real-Time Demand Response Asset located behind the retail delivery point must be directly metered and reported to the ISO in Real-Time as a single set of interval meter data at an interval of five minutes.
III.13.1.4.3.2.1. **No Performance Data to Determine Demand Reduction Values.**

Should a new Demand Resource, other than a Demand Response Capacity Resource, enter service at a time such that there is no performance data for June, July, August, December or January upon which to establish summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Values, and the Demand Resource has relieved itself of its Capacity Supply Obligation for those months through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or reconfiguration auction, then the summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Values will be the simple average of its Demand Reduction Values for those months with a Capacity Supply Obligation. For a new Demand Resource, other than a Demand Response Capacity Resource, that enters service outside of the summer DR Auditing Period or winter DR Auditing Period and the Demand Resource has relieved itself of its Capacity Supply Obligation for those months through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or reconfiguration auction, the Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit results shall be used in the determination of the summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.1.4.3.3. **ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.4.3.4. **Measurement and Verification Costs.**

Costs associated with measurement and verification of the Demand Resource project shall be borne by the Demand Resource Project Sponsor. Demand Resource Project Sponsors submitting application materials and Measurement and Verification Documents for review during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process shall be subject to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.4.4. **Dispatch of Active Demand Resources During Event Hours.**
III.13.1.4.4.1. Notification of Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours.
The ISO shall issue notice to Market Participants concerning Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours on the day before the relevant Operating Day. The notice issued pursuant to this section is for informational purposes only and shall not constitute a Dispatch Instruction.

III.13.1.4.4.2. Dispatch of Demand Resources During Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours.
The ISO shall issue Dispatch Instructions to Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources to curtail and restore loads during Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours. Dispatch Instructions shall apply to Real-Time Demand Response Resources. The amount of Demand Resources dispatched for each Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hour will be the amount that the ISO determines is necessary to meet the reserve deficiency. The ISO may issue Dispatch Instructions that reduce or increase the amount dispatched in each hour.

III.13.1.4.4.3. Dispatch of Demand Resources During Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours.
The ISO shall issue Dispatch Instructions to Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources to curtail and restore loads during Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours. Dispatch Instructions shall apply to specific Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. The amount of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources dispatched for each Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour will be the amount the ISO determines is necessary to meet the reserve deficiency.

III.13.1.4.5. Selection of Active Demand Resources For Dispatch.

A Market Participant must manage its Real-Time Demand Response Assets that are registered as a component of a Real-Time Demand Response Resource as of the first of a month so that the Real-Time Demand Response Resource complies with Dispatch Instructions. If the operation or potential operation of Real-Time Demand Response Assets cause, or potentially cause, a reliability problem, the ISO may direct Market Participants to not dispatch such assets or to restore the loads of such assets that have already been dispatched. If the ISO directs a Market Participant to not dispatch a Real-Time Demand Response Asset or to restore the load of a dispatched Real-Time Demand Response Asset, an adjustment
to the dispatch and/or settlement process will be made to reflect the exclusion of that asset from dispatch or the restoration of that asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Assets shall report to the ISO the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of each asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources consisting of an aggregation of more than one Real-Time Demand Response Asset shall report the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of the resource, to the ISO as the sum of the load reduction, consumption, or generator output of the individual assets making up that resource. Real-Time Demand Response Resources shall be assigned a unique resource identification number. The load reduction and consumption, or generator output of a Real-Time Demand Response Resource is reported to the ISO as a single set of values. A Real-Time Demand Response Resource shall consist of one or more Real-Time Demand Response Assets that are located within the same Dispatch Zone.


A Market Participant must manage its Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets that are registered as a component of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource as of the first of a month so that the Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource complies with Dispatch Instructions. If the operation or potential operation of Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets causes, or potentially causes, a reliability problem, the ISO may direct Market Participants to not dispatch such assets or to discontinue the output of such assets that have already been dispatched. If the ISO directs a Market Participant to not dispatch a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or to discontinue the output of a dispatched Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, an adjustment to the dispatch and/or settlement process will be made to reflect the exclusion of that asset from dispatch or the discontinued output of that asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets shall report to the ISO the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of each asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources consisting of an aggregation of more than one Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset shall report the generator output of the resource to the ISO as the sum of the generator outputs of the individual assets making up that resource. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be assigned a unique resource identification number. The generator output of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is reported to the ISO as a single set of values. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource shall consist of one or more Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets that are located within the same Dispatch Zone.

III.13.1.4.5.3. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.4.6. Conversion of Active Demand Resources Defined at the Load Zone to Active Demand Resources Defined at Dispatch Zones.


The ISO shall establish Dispatch Zones that reflect potential transmission constraints within a Load Zone that are expected to exist during each Capacity Commitment Period. Dispatch Zones shall be used to establish the geographic location and dispatch of Demand Response Capacity Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. Dispatch Zones shall not change during a Capacity Commitment Period. For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall establish and publish Dispatch Zones by the beginning of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. The ISO will review proposed Dispatch Zones with Market Participants prior to establishing and publishing final Dispatch Zones.

III.13.1.4.6.2. Disaggregation of Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources From Load Zones to Dispatch Zones.


Market Participants with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is being fulfilled using a Real-Time Demand Response Resource in a Load Zone shall, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, disaggregate that Real-Time Demand Response Resource into one or more Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the original Load Zone. The sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the Load Zone must be equal to the initial Capacity Supply Obligation within the original Load Zone. If the sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within a Load Zone is less than the initial Capacity Supply Obligation by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the Market Participant does not transfer the entire difference through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or an annual reconfiguration auction by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then the Market Participant will be deemed to have failed to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case the ISO shall terminate the Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation associated with the resource in the amount of the difference, terminate the Market Participant’s right to any payments associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation, and retain any applicable financial assurance associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation.
III.13.1.4.6.2.2. **Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Disaggregation.**

Market Participants with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is being fulfilled using a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource in a Load Zone shall, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, disaggregate that Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource into one or more Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the original Load Zone. The sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the Load Zone must be equal to the initial Capacity Supply Obligation within the original Load Zone. If the sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within a Load Zone is less than the initial Capacity Supply Obligation by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the Market Participant does not transfer the entire difference through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or an annual reconfiguration auction by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then the Market Participant will be deemed to have failed to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in which case the ISO shall terminate the Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation associated with the resource in the amount of the difference, terminate the Market Participant’s right to any payments associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation, and retain any applicable financial assurance associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.1.4.7. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.8. [Reserved.]


A Market Participant may not register and, if previously registered, must retire in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.9.1, a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or asset associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that is comprised of:

(a) the customers of Host Utilities that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year if the relevant electric retail regulatory authority prohibits such customers’ demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs, or
(b) the customers of Host Utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the relevant electric retail regulatory authority permits such customers’ demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs.


A Market Participant must retire a previously registered Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or asset associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that is comprised of customers specified in subsections (a) or (b) of Section III.13.1.4.9 no later than 12 months from the date that the ISO receives notice that the relevant electric retail regulatory authority prohibits such customer’s demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs or May 31, 2013, whichever is later.


If requested by a Market Participant with a registered Load Asset, the ISO will provide the following information about end-use customers served by the Market Participant: (a) whether the end-use customer’s facility is registered with the ISO as part of an asset and whether the asset is associated with a Demand Response Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource, and; (b) the load reduction capability of the asset, as specified in the ISO’s asset registration system, to which the end-use customer’s facility is registered.

III.13.1.4.11. Assignment of Demand Assets to a Demand Resource.

The following mapping provisions apply to Demand Resources other than Demand Response Capacity Resources, the mapping for which is addressed in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.

(a) When a demand asset can be mapped to more than one Demand Resource, any demand assets shall be mapped to a commercial Demand Resource whose demand reduction capability is less than the lower of (i) its commercial capacity, as reflected in the resource’s highest audit value or (ii) its highest Capacity Supply Obligation acquired for the current Capacity Commitment Period or any future Capacity Commitment Period, before being mapped to a non-commercial Demand Resource or non-commercial increment of a Demand Resource.
A demand asset cannot be unmapped from a Demand Resource if, following the unmapping, the sum of the audit values of the remaining demand assets that are mapped to the Demand Resource would be lower than the resource’s highest Capacity Supply Obligation acquired for the current Capacity Commitment Period or any future Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.
Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.2.4.5.3. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource.
The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the Local Sourcing Requirement in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the capacity requirement in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in a Capacity Zone that is not export-constrained.

If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is for capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located inside of the export-constrained Capacity Zone or be located in any non-export constrained Capacity Zone.

A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources as a winter resource if the summer resource is also a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource.

A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Resource of the resource's final...
FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

### III.13.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

#### III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA
Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winterQualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.
In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.
(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids if a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold or a Static De-List Bid for which an Internal Market Monitor determined price has not been established, resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting de-list bids, Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-List Bids, and Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Resources shall be required to meet the
financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c), it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource achieves Commercial Operation and is tested for its capacity rating, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England...
Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance. Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone to replace that capacity.

III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit. For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3.
An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Generating Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an</th>
<th>New Generating Resources &lt; 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW</th>
<th>Imports and New Demand Resources (including Distributed)</th>
<th>New Generating Resources &lt; 2 MW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

#### III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the Affected Transmission Owner(s), the ISO shall reimburse the Project Sponsor for such excess.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</th>
<th>Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$6500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.
III.13.1.10. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**

The table below provides the major dates and deadlines for each of the first eight Forward Capacity Auctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window</th>
<th>Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline</th>
<th>New Capacity Qualification Deadline</th>
<th>First-Day-of Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period</th>
<th>Capacity Commitment Period Begins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April February (after the Forward Capacity Auction for the prior Capacity Commitment Period), approximately four years and two three-months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June, just over approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

The table below shows this generic timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning in year “X”, where X is any year after 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline</th>
<th>New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window</th>
<th>Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline</th>
<th>New Capacity Qualification Deadline</th>
<th>First Day of Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period</th>
<th>Capacity Commitment Period Begins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March (X-4)</td>
<td>April/Feb. (X-4)</td>
<td>June (X-4)</td>
<td>June/July (X-4)</td>
<td>Feb. (X-3)</td>
<td>June X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.4.2.2.5) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

Except with respect to the first six Forward Capacity Auctions (as described in Section III.13.1.10), each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is defined as follows:
(a) For quantities less than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.200 LOLE, the price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE];
(b) For quantities equal to or greater than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.200 LOLE, but less than 0.011 LOLE, the price will be determined by a straight line between the price at 0.200 LOLE (which shall be max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE] and the price at 0.011 LOLE (which shall be zero);
(c) For quantities equal to or greater than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.011 LOLE, the price is zero.

III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Forward Capacity Auction shall be a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. Each Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is
concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

### III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

### III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources.**

(i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).
(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Economic Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} 
q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\
q_1, & \text{if } p_1 < p \leq p_1, \\
q_2, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_2, \\
\vdots & \vdots \\
q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m.
\end{cases}$$

where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with
an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic Delist Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources Submitted in Qualification.**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources, as finalized submitted in the qualification process for as otherwise directed by the Commission, shall be automatically bid into the appropriate round(s) of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. **In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the resource’s**
FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was
retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or
Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-
List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or
Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be bid into the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated
according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market
Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used
in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the
auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be
automatically entered into the first round of the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward
Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an
interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List
Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the
interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface)
having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for
which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into
the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-
List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following
circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a)
to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant
to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit
pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional
treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability
pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list
bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and
less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-
rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as,
the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List
Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that
the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply
curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward
Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply
curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-
approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Permanent De-List Bid or Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid converted into a Non-Price Retirement Request pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 and any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources. Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.
(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Economic Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the
aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a
valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.
The auctioneers shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round. The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area (the “Total System Capacity”) shall reflect at each price the sum of (the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources)) plus (the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources)) plus (for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)) or the Capacity Zone’s Maximum Capacity Limit) plus (for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits) or the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources). In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. In no event shall the Capacity Clearing Price for a Capacity Zone be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:
(1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement; or

(2) the Total System Capacity, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which either of the two conditions above are satisfied, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.** For the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, if the Total System Capacity adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If the Total System Capacity exceeds the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.
(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.** For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if both of the following two conditions are met during the round:

(i) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or below the Capacity Zone’s Maximum Capacity Limit; and

(ii) the Total System Capacity, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which both of the conditions above are satisfied, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If it is not the case that both of the two conditions above are satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of
tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears against the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will
be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

(f) **Treatment of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.** In determining when the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded, no more than 600 MW of capacity from Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be counted towards meeting the cleared amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. If the sum of the Capacity Supply Obligations of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources exceeds 600 MW, the Capacity Clearing Price, or in the case of Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition, the payment as described in Section III.13.2.8, (as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.3(b)) paid to all Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be adjusted by the ratio of 600 MW divided by the total of the final Capacity Supply Obligations of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. The acceptance of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Static De-list Bid, Dynamic De-list Bid, or Permanent De-list Bid or Retirement De-list Bid shall clear be based on the effective Capacity Clearing Price as described in Section III.13.2.7.

III.13.2.3.4. **Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.
(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.
The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is $14.04/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is $11.08/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated using updated data coincident with the recalculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e), except that the energy and ancillary services offset will be adjusted using publicly available data for Mass Hub On-Peak electricity futures through the commitment period of the FCA and will not be adjusted based on natural gas prices. Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by $0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.

III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources.

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and Section III.13.2.5.2.7, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the bid has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1.5.
(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated if either of the following conditions is met in the initial auction clearing process: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation); or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) and the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is a or above the Capacity Clearing Price. The second run of the auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bid(s), (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the auction-clearing process, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that received a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the auction-clearing process. The second run of the auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the auction-clearing process).

Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price, as adjusted pursuant to Sections III.13.2.7.9 and III.13.2.8, during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and Section III.13.2.5.2.7, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. **Dynamic De-List Bids.**
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Economic Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price and regardless of whether there is Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.5. **Bids Rejected for Reliability Review Reasons.**
The ISO shall review each Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, and Dynamic De-List Bid entered into the Forward Capacity Auction to determine whether the capacity associated with that Non-Price Retirement Request or de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction. Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The capacity shall be deemed needed for
reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Non-Price Retirement Requests and de-list bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the Non-Price Retirement Request or de-list bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

Where a Non-Price Retirement Request, De-List Bid, would otherwise be accepted, or a Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the Non-Price Retirement Request or de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction and the Non-Price Retirement Request will not be approved as described in Section III.13.2.3.1.5.3, and the following provisions will apply:

The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its de-list bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the de-list bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

In the case of Non-Price Retirement Request, the Lead Market Participant will be notified whether or not the request has been rejected for reliability reasons within 90 days of the submission of the request.
A resource that has a de-list bid rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and An Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Resource that has a Non Price Retirement Request rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 shall have the option to retire pursuant to Section III.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii) or to continue operation and be compensated pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1. A resource receiving payment under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which prevented the de-listing of the resource caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

If the reliability need that prevented the de-listing of the resource caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall be de-listed, relieved of its Capacity Supply Obligation and no longer be eligible to receive the compensation specified in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(b). Retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability. Resources that submitted Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii)).

If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid that would otherwise clear in a Forward Capacity Auction or a Non Price Retirement Request is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 until such time as it is no longer needed for reliability reasons.

(Reserved.)
The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

In instances where an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Non-Price Retirement Request DE-List Bid, or the rejection of a Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. For de-list bids, this review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2. System needs associated with Non-Price Retirement Requests that are rejected for reliability reasons will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee prior to the notification of the Lead Market Participant that has submitted the Non-Price Retirement Request consistent with Section 13.2.5.2.5(a)(i).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a)(i) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, or partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction but the de-list bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5 and the resource qualifies for payment under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a)(ii), the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).
(a)(ii) A resource will qualify for payment under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a)(i) if the ISO has not notified the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability reasons by 12:00 a.m. on June 1 of the year preceding the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was rejected. Once qualified under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a)(ii), the resource will have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the 12-month Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was rejected.

(b)(i) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction but the Permanent De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5 and the resource qualifies for payment under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b)(ii), the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the accepted Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.
A resource will qualify for payment under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b)(i) if the ISO has not notified the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability reasons by 12:00 a.m. on June 1 of the year preceding the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid was rejected. Once qualified under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b)(ii), the resource will have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the 12-month Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid was rejected. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid was rejected, payment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b)(i) will continue and will terminate upon 120 day notice from the ISO to the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability.

(c)(i)—In cases where a Non-Price Retirement Request for less than the entire resource has been submitted and the request has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and the resource has not elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii), the resource will continue to be paid in the same manner as other listed capacity resources until such time as the resource is no longer needed for reliability. In cases where a Non-Price Retirement Request for the entire resource has been submitted and the request has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and the resource has not elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii), the resource may elect to either (i) continue to be paid in the same manner as other listed capacity resources until such time as the resource is no longer needed for reliability, or (ii) the resource may elect to receive cost-of-service compensation pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Non-Price Retirement Request rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid in the same manner as other listed capacity resources. Cost of service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost of service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost of service rates for the unit in question or has accepted subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will compensation under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request was rejected.

(c)(ii)—A resource will qualify for payment under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(c)(i) if the ISO has not notified the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability reasons by 12:00 a.m. on June 1 of the year preceding the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request was rejected. Once qualified under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(c)(ii), compensation will be provided for the 12-month Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request
was rejected. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request was rejected, payment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 will continue and will terminate upon 120 day notice from the ISO to the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability.

(c4) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability. If a Static De-List Bid, or Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(c)(iii) or III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the
resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation** that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO: A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**: In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation**: Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3. **Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources-Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Retirement De-List Bid was submitted, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource that submitted a Non-Price Retirement De-List Bid Request that was not included in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5(d): elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; was subject to conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction; or, for a resource, or portion thereof, that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) and
was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be retired coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request is submitted if the request is approved, or if not approved the resource nonetheless elects to retire pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii). In the case of a Non-Price Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, Request is approved after the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request was submitted, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2(c)(iii). The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Resource with an approved Non-Price Retirement Request that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Non-Price Retirement De-List Bid Request has been approved was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(iii) In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Resource has submitted a Non-Price Retirement Request and the request is not approved because the resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the portion of the resource subject to the Non-Price Retirement Request may nonetheless retire as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Non-Price Retirement Request is submitted by notifying ISO no later than 15 days prior to commencement of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. Such an election will be binding. A resource making an election
pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii) will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource has submitted a non-partial Permanent De-List Bid that was not included in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5(d); was subject to conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction may retire the resource as of the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid has cleared or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii) by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) with a cleared non-partial Permanent De-List Bid may retire the resource earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid has cleared if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4. A resource electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.
(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying
the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is
subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights
for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of
retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be
deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of
the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an
application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be
maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn
voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22
or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

III.13.2.5.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.5.2.7. Treatment of De-List and Export Bids When the Capacity Clearing Price is
Set Administratively.
Where the Capacity Clearing Price is set pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.9 (Capacity Carry Forward Rule),
or where payments are set pursuant to Section III.13.2.8 (Inadequate Supply and Insufficient
Competition), and as a result a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or
Export Bid clears that would not otherwise have cleared, then the de-listed or exported capacity will not
be replaced in the current Forward Capacity Auction (that is, the amount of capacity procured in the
Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Local Sourcing Requirement, as appropriate, minus the amount of
the de-listed or exported capacity that results from the application of administratively determined prices).

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are
subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are
subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction
must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A
resource may elect to be rationed to either its Economic Minimum Limit or a level above its Economic
Minimum Limit. These levels are submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offers from New Import
Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Economic Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Economic Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. **Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

**III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone is higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.2.7.3. Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**
In the Forward Capacity Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2013, June 1, 2014, June 1, 2015, and June 1, 2016 only, the following additional provisions regarding the Capacity Clearing Price shall apply in all Capacity Zones (and in the application of Section III.13.2.3.3(d)(iii)):
(a) [Reserved.]

(b) The Capacity Clearing Price shall not fall below 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 below $3.15). Where the Capacity Clearing Price reaches 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 reaches $3.15), offers shall be prorated such that no more than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) is procured in the Forward Capacity Auction, as follows:

(i) The total payment to all listed capacity resources during the associated Capacity Commitment Period shall be equal to 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 shall be equal to $3.15) times the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) applicable in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(ii) Payments to individual listed resources shall be prorated based on the total number of MWs of capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction (receiving a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period).

(iii) Suppliers may instead prorate their bid MWs of participation in the Forward Capacity Market by partially de-listing one or more resources. Regardless of any such proration, the full amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction will be ineligible for treatment as new capacity in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions (except as provided under Section III.13.1.1.1.2).

(iv) Any proration shall be subject to reliability review. Where proration is rejected for reliability reasons, the resource’s payment shall not be prorated as described in subsection (ii) above, and the difference between its actual payment based on the Capacity Clearing Price and what its payment would have been had prorationing not been rejected for reliability reasons shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region. In this case, the total payment described in subsection (i) above will increase accordingly.
(v) Any election to prorate bid MWs associated with a New Capacity Offer that clears in the Forward Capacity Auction shall also apply in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5.

III.13.2.7.3A Treatment of Imports.
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4 Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing a Capacity Zone at the precise amount of capacity required, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that result in procuring at least the amount of capacity required while seeking to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. In an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the clearing algorithm will not consider blocks of capacity not needed to meet the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement when price separation occurs between the import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

### III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

### III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.
Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

### III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.
Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]
(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources) shall be cleared.

III.13.2.7.8. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.9 Capacity Carry Forward Rule.

III.13.2.7.9.1. Trigger.
The capacity carry forward rule shall be triggered in an import-constrained Capacity Zone if all of the following conditions are met:

(a) the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone is less than or equal to zero;

(b) there is not Inadequate Supply in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone; and

(c) at the Capacity Clearing Price, the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction plus the amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing is greater than zero. The amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing shall equal the amount of capacity above the Local Sourcing Requirement procured in that Capacity Zone in the previous Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule.

III.13.2.7.9.2. Pricing.
If the capacity carry forward rule is triggered, then the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone shall be the lesser of: (1) $0.01 below the price at which the last New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource in the Capacity Zone to withdraw withdrew from the Forward Capacity Auction; or (2) the applicable Net CONE value; provided, however, that if in the Capacity Zone there is Insufficient Competition and no capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources has been withdrawn from the Forward Capacity Auction, then the Capacity Clearing Price shall equal the applicable Net CONE value.

III.13.2.8. Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition.
In the case of either Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition, as defined in this Section III.13.2.8, the Forward Capacity Auction shall still be used to the extent possible; that is, the remedy for Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition shall be limited to import-constrained Capacity Zones having Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition.

III.13.2.8.1. Inadequate Supply.

III.13.2.8.1.1. Inadequate Supply in an Import-Constrained Capacity Zone.
An import-constrained Capacity Zone will be considered to have Inadequate Supply if at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price the amount of capacity offered in the import-constrained Capacity Zone through New Capacity Offers is less than the amount of New Capacity Required in that Capacity Zone. In an import-constrained Capacity Zone, “New Capacity Required” shall mean the Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement, minus (the total amount of capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources in the Capacity Zone (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period) plus the capacity of Proxy De-List Bids entered as result of a retirement election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a)) minus capacity otherwise obligated in the Capacity Zone for the Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Where an import-constrained Capacity Zone has Inadequate Supply, Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) in that Capacity Zone, other than such resources, or portions thereof, that have no Capacity Supply Obligation or are designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources for the Capacity Commitment Period, shall be paid the max [applicable Net CONE value, Capacity Clearing...
Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction in that Capacity Zone shall be paid the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5).

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Inadequate Supply in one or more import-constrained Capacity Zones shall not affect Capacity Zones having adequate supply.

(d) Any availability penalty assessed during the associated Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2 on a resource in an import-constrained Capacity Zone having Inadequate Supply will be assessed at a rate equal to $7.025/kW-month.

III.13.2.8.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.8.2. Insufficient Competition.
The Forward Capacity Auction shall be considered to have Insufficient Competition in an import-constrained Capacity Zone if there is not Inadequate Supply and the following two conditions are both satisfied:

(a) at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the amount of capacity offered from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period), minus capacity otherwise obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period, is less than the Local Sourcing Requirement; and

(b) at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price:

(i) less than 300 MW of capacity is offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources (the ISO shall revisit the appropriateness of the 300 MW threshold in the case of an import-constrained Capacity Zone having a Local Sourcing Requirement of less than 5000 MW);
(ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources is less than twice the amount of New Capacity Required; or

(iii) any Market Participant’s total capacity from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources is pivotal. For purposes of this Section III.13.2.8.2, a Market Participant shall be considered pivotal if, at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, some capacity from that Market Participant’s potential New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, or New Demand Resources is required to satisfy the Local Sourcing Requirement.

If the Forward Capacity Auction has Insufficient Competition, New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) shall be paid the lower of: (1) the Capacity Clearing Price; or (2) max [applicable Net CONE value, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone] during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that cleared in the seventh Forward Capacity Auction in the NEMA Capacity Zone shall be paid $6.661/kW-month and Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that cleared in the eighth Forward Capacity Auction in all Capacity Zones but the NEMA Capacity Zone shall be paid $7.025/kW-month. Any availability penalty assessed during the associated Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2 on a resource in an import-constrained Capacity Zone having Insufficient Competition will be assessed at the payment rate for Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources under this Section III.13.2.8.2.

III.13.2.9. [Reserved.]
III.13.4. Reconfiguration Auctions.
For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

III.13.4.1. Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.
Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

III.13.4.2. Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.
Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions, except Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources which may only submit demand bids. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of Appendix A of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource’s Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 10...
Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated obligation month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability.

**III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.**
Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Non-Price Retirement Request De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

**III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**
For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

**III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**
III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and where the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period
and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Qualification Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and where the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity.
(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the
Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined
pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Adjustment for Certain Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

For an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that was not part of an offer composed of separate resources and that has a winter Capacity Supply Obligation that was adjusted as described in Section III.13.2.7.6, if the difference between the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation and its Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction is greater than the difference between the resource’s summer Capacity Supply Obligation and Summer ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, then the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation shall be reduced such that the difference between the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation and its Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction equals the difference between the resource’s summer Capacity Supply Obligation and Summer ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction. For settlement purposes, any such reduction in Capacity Supply Obligation shall be at the same payment rate applicable to the reduced MW, such that there is a net zero payment for the reduced MW.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:
III.13.4.2.1.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (i) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (ii) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value in effect after the most recently completed winter season or its Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit performed during the most recently completed winter season, whichever is more recent.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.

For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values, if the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is
subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by more than the lesser of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or 40 MW, then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price (or, in the case of a resource that cleared in the seventh Forward Capacity Auction, at $12.11/kW-month) on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3.

(c) If the ISO determines that the resource is not able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, and if the resource was part of an offer composed of separate resources when it qualified to participate in the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, then before a demand bid is entered for the resource pursuant to subsection (b) above, the resource may submit monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals to cover the deficiency for the months of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the Capacity Supply Obligation is associated with participation in an offer composed of separate resource prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, but in no case may such a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for a month be for an amount of capacity greater than the difference between the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the month and the resource’s lowest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period.
III.13.4.2.1.4. **Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.**

A resource that has not achieved Commercial Operation by the offer and bid deadline for a monthly reconfiguration auction may not submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2., as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month. However, a resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month.

III.13.4.2.1.5. **ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved generation or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

III.13.4.2.2. **Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**
Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

(a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.

(b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource’s capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.

(c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared demand bids to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved generation or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead
Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

III.13.4.3. ISO Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.
The ISO shall not submit supply offers or demand bids in monthly reconfiguration auctions. The ISO shall submit supply offers and demand bids in annual reconfiguration auctions as appropriate to address year-to-year changes in the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, to procure capacity not purchased in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of Inadequate Supply, to procure any shortfall in capacity resulting from a resource’s achieving Commercial Operation at a level less than that resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation or other significant decreases in capacity, and to address any changes in external interface limits, as follows:

(a) For each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or before June 1, 2017, the ISO shall submit supply offers and demand bids in annual reconfiguration auctions as appropriate to ensure that the applicable Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, and external interface limits are respected. Where less capacity than needed is obligated, the ISO shall submit demand bids as appropriate to procure the additional needed capacity in each subsequent annual reconfiguration auction until the need is met. Where more capacity than needed is obligated, the ISO may in its discretion submit supply offers in subsequent annual reconfiguration auctions to release the excess capacity, but in any case the ISO shall be required to submit supply offers as appropriate in the third annual reconfiguration auction for a Capacity Commitment Period to release the excess capacity.

(b) For each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall submit demand bids for the amount of additional capacity needed to meet the Local Sourcing Requirements and shall submit supply offers in the third annual reconfiguration auction for a Capacity Commitment Period to release capacity exceeding the Maximum Capacity Limits or external interface limits.

(c) No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall provide notice regarding whether the ISO will be submitting supply offers or demand bids in that auction.
Any demand bid submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, except for any demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions associated with the seventh Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be at $12.11/kW-month.

Any supply offer submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be in the form of a supply curve having the following characteristics:

(i) at prices equal to or greater than 0.75 times the Capacity Clearing Price, as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.3(b), from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period covered by the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall offer the full amount of the surplus;

(ii) at prices between 0.75 times such Capacity Clearing Price and 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the amount of the surplus offered by the ISO shall decrease linearly (for example, at 0.5 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer half of the amount of the surplus); and

(iii) At prices equal to or below 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer no capacity.

For purposes of this Section III.13.4.3, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not subject to the requirements and limitations described in Section III.13.4.2.

Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not associated with a resource.

III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.
All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.4.5.  Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.
Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each annual reconfiguration auction, the New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

III.13.4.5.1.  Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.
Except for the first five Capacity Commitment Periods, the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. There shall be no first annual reconfiguration auction for the first five Capacity Commitment Periods. The table below illustrates the annual reconfiguration auction timing provisions stated above, providing the schedule of annual reconfiguration auctions for the first eight Capacity Commitment Periods.
### III.13.4.5.2. Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.

If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

### III.13.4.6. [Reserved.]

### III.13.4.7. Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

### III.13.4.8. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.
For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality

III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(cb) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential:

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) the multipliers applied in determining the Capacity Value of a Demand Resource, as described in Section III.13.7.1.5.1;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.2, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or bids, Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;
(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction
(this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity
Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts.

(bd) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described
in Section III.13.8.1(ac) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections
III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days
after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within
75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations
contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and
challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in
accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of
the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s
determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following
that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs
otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall
be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1,
2018), the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission no later than December 16, 2014
detailing its determination of the New Resource Offer Floor Price for each New Import Capacity
Resource making a request and cost information submittal as described in Section III.13.1.3.5.6 and
providing supporting documentation for each such determination. These determinations shall be filed
confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing. Any comments or challenges to the
determinations contained in the informational filing described in this Section III.13.8.1(c) must be filed
with the Commission no later than December 23, 2014. If the Commission does not issue an order by
January 15, 2015 that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be
used in conducting the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices
resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of
Section III.13.8.2(c). If by January 15, 2015, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more
of the ISO’s determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the
determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.
III.13.8.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.8.4. [Reserved.]
SECTION III

MARKET RULE 1

APPENDIX A

MARKET MONITORING,
REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION
APPENDIX A
MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

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EXHIBIT 5 ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. CODE OF CONDUCT
MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

III.A.1 Introduction and Purpose; Structure and Oversight: Independence.

III.A.1.1 Mission Statement.
The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this Appendix A.

III.A.1.2 Structure and Oversight.
The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this Appendix A shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this Appendix A. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor’s functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO’s contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor’s scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

III.A.1.3 Data Access and Information Sharing.
The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market
Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this Appendix A. This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO’s electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.1.4. Interpretation.
In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this Appendix A, the provisions of Appendix A shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either Appendix A or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

III.A.1.5. Definitions.
Capitalized terms not defined in this Appendix A are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

(a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor...
Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

(b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.

(c) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

(a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.
(b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of this Appendix A, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.

(d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this Appendix A.

(f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.

(g) Review the ISO’s filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor’s assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this Appendix A, as appropriate.

(h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

III.A.2.3. Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.
To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

(a) Maintain Appendix A and consider whether Appendix A requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.

(b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this Appendix A.

(c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this Appendix A.

(d) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this Appendix A.

(e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s functions.

(g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.
(h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

(i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this Appendix A.

(j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this Appendix A are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

(i) **Economic withholding**, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.

(ii) **Uneconomic production from a Resource**, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.

(iii) **Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids**, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this Appendix A.

(iv) **Anti-competitive Demand Bids**, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A.
(v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend Appendix A as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of the New England Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the Commission as may be appropriate.

(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

(i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
(ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
(iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
(iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
(v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this Appendix A, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
(vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this Appendix A. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

(l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other
information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.

(m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission in accordance with Appendix B of this Market Rule 1.

(n) If and when established, participate in a committee of regional market monitors to review issues associated with interregional transactions, including any barriers to efficient trade and competition.

III.A.2.4. Overview of the Internal Market Monitor’s Mitigation Functions.

III.A.2.4.1. Purpose.
The mitigation measures set forth in this Appendix A for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule 1 (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this Appendix A. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied ex ante. Nothing in this Appendix A, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO’s authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential sanctions under Appendix B of this Market Rule 1.

III.A.2.4.2. Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.

(a) Imposing Mitigation. To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below:

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other provision of this Appendix A, and as more fully described in Section III.B.3.2.6 of Appendix B to this Market Rule 1, certain economic decisions shall not be deemed a form of withholding or otherwise inconsistent with competitive conduct.
III.A.2.4.3 Applicability.
Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.

III.A.2.4.4 Mitigation Not Provided for Under This Appendix A.
The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this Appendix A, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act (“§205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

III.A.2.4.5 Duration of Mitigation.
Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this Appendix A or in Appendix B to this Market Rule 1.

III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.
Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective.
Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

III.A.3.1. Consultation Prior to Offer
If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4(c) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this Appendix A, the Market Participant may contact the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant’s submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources
In evaluating bids or offers under this Appendix A for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:
(a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.

(b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.

If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five business days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.

For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource’s higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource’s Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

III.A.3.3. Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.
The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant’s Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO’s or Internal Market Monitor’s systems.

(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource’s Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant’s expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

(i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

(ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-
specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

(iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer plus $2.50/MMBtu.

(b) Within five business days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm’s length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

(c) If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from
using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>6</td>
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III.A.4.1.  Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.
This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

(a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
(b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
(c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
(d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

III.A.4.2.  Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.

III.A.4.2.1.  Initial Thresholds.
Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

(a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource’s capacity;
(b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant’s total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or
(c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO’s Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.

The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource’s available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.

A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.

Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.

Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.
III.A.5. Mitigation.

III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.
Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.
Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

(a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
(b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
(c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset’s Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource.

The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior.

III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.
There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

(a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation” apply, and;
(b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation” apply.

**III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.**
The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.

The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

**III.A.5.2.2. Constrained Area Test.**
A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

(a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;

(b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource’s Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than $25/MWh.

**III.A.5.3. Calculation of Impact Test in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.**
The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource’s Node and the LMP at the Hub.
The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource’s Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:

(a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
(b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.

III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below $25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails
the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower.

III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.


III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource’s Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

### III.A.5.5.3.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

### III.A.5.5.3.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.
If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

### III.A.5.5.4. General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.

#### III.A.5.5.4.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

#### III.A.5.5.4.2. Conduct Test.
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

#### III.A.5.5.4.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.
If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

### III.A.5.5.5. Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.

#### III.A.5.5.5.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.
III.A.5.5.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

III.A.5.5.3. **Consequence of Failing Test.**
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.6. **Reliability Commitment Mitigation.**

III.A.5.5.6.1. **Applicability.**
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are
(a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

i. local first contingency;
ii. local second contingency;
iii. VAR or voltage;
iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

III.A.5.5.6.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.6.3. **Consequence of Failing Test.**
If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.
III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.

III.A.5.5.7.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.8. Low Load Cost.
Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

(a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
(b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
(c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource's Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.
For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.

III.A.5.6. **Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:

(a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
   i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
   ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.

(b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.7. **Duration of Commitment Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

III.A.5.8. **Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

III.A.5.9. **Correction of Mitigation.**
If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.

The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

III.A.6.1. Time-Based Offer Parameters.
Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource's Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource’s Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.

III.A.6.3. Other Offer Parameters.
Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater, for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per day) compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject to the provisions of this section.


The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the basis of one or more of the following:

(a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and fuel types.

(b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing environmental regulatory body.

(c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.
The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, and offer blocks will be calculated separately and assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.

III.A.7.2.1. Order of Reference Level Calculation.
The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of a Supply Offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

(a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
(b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
(c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

III.A.7.2.2. Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.
In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

(a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
(b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
(c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
(d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
   (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
   (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of
operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.

(iii) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4.

For the purposes of this subsection:

i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.

ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO’s or the Internal Market Monitor’s systems, telemetered values will be used.

iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.

iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.

(e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

(f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:

(i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,

(ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,

(iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,

(iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and
whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,
then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource’s Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller’s Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource’s Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant though the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3. The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

(a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 “Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources”.
(b) Costs must be documented.
(c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible.
(d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.
(e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be
calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:

i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and

ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.
The Internal Market Monitor’s determination of a Resource’s marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource’s incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy:
\[(\text{incremental heat rate} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{emissions rate} \times \text{emissions allowance price}) + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs}\]

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

(a) emissions limits;
(b) water storage limits; and,
(c) other operating permits that limit production of energy.

No-Load:
\[(\text{no-load fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{no-load emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}\]

Start-Up:
\[(\text{start-up fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{start-up emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}\]
III.A.8. **Determination of Offer Competitiveness During Shortage Event.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate the competitiveness of the Supply Offer of each Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is off-line during a Shortage Event, as described below. The evaluation for competitiveness shall be performed on Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and on Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market. For purposes of these evaluations, Reference Levels are calculated using the cost-based method specified in Section III.A.7.5. The Real-Time Energy Market evaluation uses the final Supply Offer in place for the hour.

(a) **Hours Evaluated.** For Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, competitiveness is evaluated for all hours of the Operating Day during which a Shortage Event occurs. For Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market competitiveness is evaluated for the last hour that the Resource could have been committed to be online at its Economic Minimum Limit at the start of the Shortage Event, taking into account the Resource’s Start-Up Time and Notification Time.

(b) **Competitiveness Evaluation of Energy Offer At Low Load.**
   
   (i) If the Resource is not in a constrained area as determined under Section III.A.5.2.2, then the Supply Offer is not competitive if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

   (ii) If the Resource is in a constrained area as determined under Section III.A.5.2.2, then the Supply Offer is not competitive if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

(c) **Competitiveness Evaluation of Energy Offer Above Low Load.** If a Supply Offer evaluated for competitiveness pursuant to Section III.A.8 (b) above is competitive for an hour, then the energy price parameter for each incremental Supply Offer block above the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit shall be evaluated for competitiveness using the thresholds identified in Section III.A.5.5.1.2, for Resources not in a constrained area, and the thresholds identified in Section III.A.5.5.2.2, for Resources in a constrained area, in order of lowest energy price to highest energy price. If any Supply Offer block is non-competitive, then that block and all blocks above it shall be non-competitive, and all blocks below it shall be competitive.

(d) **Low Load Cost test.** Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit for its Minimum Run Time, is calculated as the sum of:

   i. The Start-Up Fee (cold start);

   ii. The sum of the No Load Fees for the Resource’s Minimum Run Time; and
iii. The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Resource’s Minimum Run Time.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer Block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer Block.

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.10. Demand Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor Demand Resources as outlined below:

(a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.
(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as: \((\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}} / \text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1\). The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

(c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant’s bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.

III.A.11.1. Purpose.

The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.
III.A.11.2. Implementation.

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:
\[(\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}} / \text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1.\]
The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.
(ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.
(iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

**III.A.12. Cap on FTR Revenues.**

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.

**III.A.13. Additional Internal Market Monitor Functions Specified in Tariff.**

**III.A.13.1. Review of Offers and Bids in the Forward Capacity Market.**

In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor’s review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor’s determination following such review.

(a) [Reserved].

(b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, and Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.

(c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
(d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
(e) Section III.13.1.3.5.6 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
(f) Section III.13.1.7 - Internal Market Monitor review of summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values.

Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

Appendix G of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner’s scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.13.4. Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.
The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this Appendix A. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

III.A.13.5. Imposition of Sanctions.
Appendix B of Market Rule 1 sets forth the procedures and standards under which sanctions may be imposed for certain violations of Market Participants’ obligations under the ISO New England Filed
Documents and other ISO New England System Rules. The Internal Market Monitor shall administer Appendix B in accordance with the provisions thereof.

III.A.14. **Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.**

Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in Appendix I to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.

III.A.15. **Request for Additional Cost Recovery.**

III.A.15.1. **Filing Right.**

If either

(a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this Appendix A for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or

(b) in the absence of mitigation, despite having submitted a Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap,

a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource for the hours of the Operating Day during which the Supply Offer was mitigated or during which the Resource was operated at the Energy Offer Cap, the Market Participant may, within sixty days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having submitted a Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the Energy Offer Cap.

III.A.15.2. **Contents of Filing.**

Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data
and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the costs as reflected in the Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap; (iii) the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

III.A.15.3. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.

Within twenty days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section III.A.15 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the information and explanation detailed in Section III.A.15.2 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that resulted in the Section III.A.15 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section III A.15.


In the event that the Commission accepts a Market Participant’s filing for cost recovery under this section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.


III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.

A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) review of any Internal Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in Appendix D to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to review are:

- Imposition of a mitigation remedy.
Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.)

III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.
On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor’s mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor’s application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor’s action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

III.A.17. Reporting.

III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.
Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Appendix A, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant’s cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:
III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market’s performance in the most recent period.

III.A.17.2.2. Quarterly Report.
The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this Appendix A and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.3. Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.
The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO’s website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.4. Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO’s priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.

The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of Appendix A. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:
(i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

(ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of Appendix A and the administration of Appendix A by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of Appendix A.

(v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.

III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:
(a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;

(b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;

(c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,

(d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government
agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten business days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

### III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.


The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct attached hereto as Exhibit 5.

#### III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.
The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.18.2.1. **Prohibition on Employment with a Market Participant.**

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

III.A.18.2.2. **Prohibition on Compensation for Services.**

No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

III.A.18.2.3. **Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.**

In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of Appendix A, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.19. **Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.**

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the Commission.
Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

(B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information

1. The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);

2. The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;

3. The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;

4. The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;

5. The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;

6. If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;

7. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(B) All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral should be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.

1. A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
2. The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
3. The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
4. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from new resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21.

### III.A.21.1 Offer Review Trigger Prices.

For each new technology type, the Internal Market Monitor shall establish an Offer Review Trigger Price. Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are equal to or above the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price will not be subject to further review by the Internal Market Monitor. A request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must be submitted in advance of the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.2.4 and shall be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor as described in this Section III.A.21.

### III.A.21.1.1 Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Ninth Forward Capacity Auction.

For resources other than New Import Capacity Resources, the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018) shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology Type</th>
<th>Offer Review Trigger Price ($/kW-month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combustion turbine</td>
<td>$13.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined cycle gas turbine</td>
<td>$8.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on-shore wind</td>
<td>$10.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Resources - Commercial and Industrial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Management and/or previously installed Distributed Generation</td>
<td>$1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new Distributed Generation</td>
<td>based on generation technology type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Resources – Residential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Management</td>
<td>$7.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previously installed Distributed Generation</td>
<td>$1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new Distributed Generation based on generation technology type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Resources**

| All other technology types | Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price |

Where a new resource is composed of assets having different technology types, the resource’s Offer Review Trigger Price will be calculated in accordance with the weighted average formula in Section III.A.21.2(c).

For purposes of determining the Offer Review Trigger Price of a Demand Resource composed in whole or in part of Distributed Generation, the Distributed Generation is considered new, rather than previously installed, if (1) the Project Sponsor for the new Demand Resource has participated materially in the development, installation or funding of the Distributed Generation during the five years prior to commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource is being qualified for participation, and (2) the Distributed Generation has not been assigned to a Demand Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation in a prior Capacity Commitment Period.

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, the Offer Review Trigger Prices in the table above shall apply, based on the technology type of the External Resource; provided that, if a New Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, it shall have an Offer Review Trigger Price of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.

For any other New Import Capacity Resource, the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.

**III.A.21.1.2 Calculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices.**

(a) The Offer Review Trigger Price for each of the technology types listed above shall be recalculated using updated data no less often than once every three years. Where any Offer Review Trigger Price is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.
and the new Offer Review Trigger Price shall be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Offer Review Trigger Price is to apply.

(b) For new generation resources, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is as follows. Capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues and operating costs, assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes and discount rate are input into a capital budgeting model which is used to calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Offer Review Trigger Price is set equal to the year-one capacity price output from the model. The model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two unrelated parties).

(c) For new Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above shall be the same as that used for new generation resources, with the following exceptions. First, the model takes account of all costs incurred by the utility and end-use customer to deploy the efficiency measure. Second, rather than energy revenues, the model recognizes end-use customer savings associated with the efficiency programs. Third, the model assumes that all costs are expensed as incurred. Fourth, the benefits realized by end-use customers are assumed to have no tax implications for the utility. Fifth, the model discounts cash flows over the Measure Life of the energy efficiency measure.

(d) For new Demand Resources other than Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is the same as that used for new generation resources, except that the model discounts cash flows over the contract life. For Demand Resources (other than those comprised of Energy Efficiency) that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include new equipment costs and annual operating costs such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions. For Demand Resources (other than Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency) primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs.
(e) For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to subsection (a) above, the Offer Review Trigger Prices will be adjusted as follows:

(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be associated with the indices included in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Component</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gas turbines</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steam turbines</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wind turbines</td>
<td>Bloomberg Wind Turbine Price Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Equipment</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;General Purpose Machinery and Equipment&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| construction labor           | BLS "Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages" 2371 Utility System Construction Average Annual Pay:  
                                - Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts  
                                - On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine |
| other labor                  | BLS "Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages" 2211 Power Generation and Supply Average Annual Pay:  
                                - Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts  
                                - On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine |
| materials                    | BLS-PPI "Materials and Components for Construction"                  |
| electric interconnection     | BLS - PPI "Electric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution"   |
| gas interconnection          | BLS - PPI "Natural Gas Distribution: Delivered to ultimate consumers for the account of others (transportation only)" |
| fuel inventories             | Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis "Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF)" |

(2) Each line item associated with fixed operating and maintenance costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be associated with the indices included in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Component</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| labor, administrative and general | BLS "Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages" 2211 Power Generation and Supply Average Annual Pay:  
                                - Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts  
                                - On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine |
| materials and contract services | BLS-PPI "Materials and Components for Construction"                  |
| site leasing costs             | Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis "Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF)" |
(3) For each line item in (1) and (2) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the ninth FCA reflected in the table in Section III.A.21.1.1 above. The value of each line item associated with capital costs and fixed operating and maintenance costs included in the capital budgeting model for the ninth FCA will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(4) The energy and ancillary services offset values for each technology type in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the most recent Henry Hub natural gas futures prices from the time of the update through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA, and the Massachusetts Hub On-Peak electricity prices and the Algonquin City Gates natural gas prices for the 12 months following the time of the update, as published by the CME Group.

(5) Renewable energy credit values in the capital budgeting model shall be updated based on the most recent MA Class 1 REC price for the vintage closest to the first year of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA as published by SNL Financial.

(6) The capital budgeting model and the Offer Review Trigger Prices adjusted pursuant to this subsection (e) will be published on the ISO’s web site.

(7) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this subsection (e) are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

III.A.21.2 New Resource Offer Floor Prices and Offer Prices.
For every new resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price or offer prices, as described in this Section III.A.21.2.

(a) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does not submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.2.4, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be calculated as follows:
For a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be $0.00/kW-month.

For a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and New Demand Resource, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price.

A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 and III.13.1.4.2.4, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices in the case of a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be calculated as follows:

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be equal to the lower of (i) the requested offer price submitted to the ISO as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5; or (ii) the price revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

For any other New Capacity Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into the capital budgeting model used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the
requested offer price to this capacity price estimate and the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be determined as follows:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a new Demand Resource, the resource’s costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred by the Demand Response provider and end-use customers to acquire the Demand Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the Demand Resource, and expected costs avoided by the end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the Demand Resource.

(iii) For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing
market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.

(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource’s qualification package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this subsection (b). Such documentation should include all relevant financial estimates and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data. For a New Import Capacity Resource, such documentation should also include the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all relevant financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. If the supporting documentation and information required by this subsection (b) is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Offer Review Trigger Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price, subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s offer prices shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource’s qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in
Section III.13.8.1(c), subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vii) For New Import Capacity Resources that have been found to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7 to values that are below the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate established pursuant to subsection (v) or (vi), then the resource’s offer prices shall be equal to the revised offer prices.

(c) For a new capacity resource composed of assets having different technology types the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the weighted average of the Offer Review Trigger Prices of the asset technology types of the assets that comprise the resource, based on the expected capacity contribution from each asset technology type. Sufficient documentation must be included in the resource’s qualification package to permit the Internal Market Monitor to determine the weighted average Offer Review Trigger Price.

For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017), the provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and III.A.21.2 shall also apply to certain resources that cleared in the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2015) and/or the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2016), as follows:

(a) This Section III.A.21.3 shall apply to: (i) any capacity clearing in the sixth or seventh Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource; and (ii) any capacity clearing in the sixth or seventh Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource at prices found by the Internal Market Monitor to be not consistent with either: (a) the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues for a New Generating Capacity Resource and a New Demand Resource or (b) opportunity costs for a New Import Capacity Resource.
(b) For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity described in subsection (a) above shall receive Offer Review Trigger Prices as described in Section III.A.21.1 and New Resource Offer Floor Prices as described in Section III.A.21.2. These values will apply to such capacity in the conduct of the eighth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

(c) For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for such capacity may be required to comply with some or all of the qualification provisions applicable to new resources described in Section III.13.1. These requirements will be determined by the ISO on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant.

(d) For any capacity described in subsection (a) above that does not clear in the eighth Forward Capacity Auction:

   (i) any prior election to have a Capacity Clearing Price and Capacity Supply Obligation continue to apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period made pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 shall be terminated as of the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the eighth FCA (beginning June 1, 2017); and

   (ii) after the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, such capacity will be deemed to have never been previously counted as capacity, such that it meets the definition, and must meet the requirements, of a new capacity resource for the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate.

III.A.22  [Reserved.]

III.A.23  Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.A.23.1  Pivotal Supplier Test

The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is
less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.

For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

(a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;
(b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of: (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and; (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;
(c) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and; (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone, and;
(d) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:
(e) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity Zone; and

(f) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

III.A.23.2 Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.
FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

(a) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(b) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(c) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

III.A.23.3 Timing of Pivotal Supplier Test and Notification of Results.
The pivotal supplier test will be calculated prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction, and no earlier than the deadline by which a supplier that has submitted a Non-Price Retirement Request for capacity must elect to retire for that auction.

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.A.23.4 Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.
For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.

III.A.24 Retirement Portfolio Test for Existing Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than

ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List
Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then

iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.

Where,

iv. the Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor–estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

The Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor–estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
I.2 **Rules of Construction; Definitions**

I.2.1. **Rules of Construction:**

In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;

(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;

(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;

(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;

(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;

(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;

(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;

(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;

(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;

(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day); (k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

I.2.2. Definitions:

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.

**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Administrative Sanctions** are defined in Section III.B.4.1.2 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.
**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource** is any Resource eligible to provide Regulation that is not registered as a different Resource type.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.
Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

Annualized FCA Payment is used to determine a resource’s availability penalties and is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2(b) of Market Rule 1.

Applicants, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

Application is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

APR-1 means the first of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

APR-2 means the second of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

APR-3 means the third of three Alternative Capacity Price Rule mechanisms described in Section III.13.2.7.8.

Asset is a generating unit, interruptible load, a component of a demand response resource or load asset.

Asset Registration Process is the ISO business process for registering a physical load, generator, or tie-line for settlement purposes. The Asset Registration Process is posted on the ISO’s website.

Asset Related Demand is a physical load that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node and, except for pumped storage load, is made up of one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply, with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration.
**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Audited Demand Reduction** is the seasonal claimed capability of a Demand Response Resource as established pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Audited Full Reduction Time** is the Offered Full Reduction Time associated with the Demand Response Resource’s most recent audit.
**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a generating unit change its output while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; (ii) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month; or (iii) in each Real-Time Demand Response Event Hour, the sum of the baseline electrical energy consumption less the sum of the actual electrical energy consumption of all of the Real-Time Demand Response Assets associated with the Real-Time Demand Response Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month; or (iv) in each Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour, the sum of the baseline electrical energy consumption less the sum of the actual electrical energy consumption of all of the Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets associated with the Real-time Emergency Generation Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month. The Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; (ii) the sum of the Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month; or (iii) in each Real-Time Demand Response Event Hour or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour, the sum of the electrical energy output of all of the Real-Time Demand Response Assets or Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets associated with the Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource as registered with the ISO as of the first day of the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure
consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.1.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.

**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
**Blackstart CIP Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 utilizing data from Table 6 of Appendix A to this Schedule 16, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Blackstart Station’s costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart CIP O&M Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, utilizing data from Table 6 of Appendix A to this Schedule 16, for a Blackstart Station’s operating and maintenance costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of the provision of Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s operating and maintenance costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for operating and maintenance costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT, which also encompasses “System Restoration and Planning Service” under the predecessor version of Schedule 16.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service under a “Signature Page for Schedule 16 of the NEPOOL OATT” that was executed and in effect prior to January 1, 2013 for Category A Designated Blackstart Resources or a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating
Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11) for Category B Designated Blackstart Resources.

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate CIP Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service.

**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5)
with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capability Year** means a year’s period beginning on June 1 and ending May 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market beginning on June 1, 2018 pursuant to rules filed with the Commission on July 14, 2014.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Clearing Price Floor** is described in Section III.13.2.7.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible, equal to that Market Participant’s Capacity Requirement (if any) adjusted to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, as described in Section III.13.7.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market beginning on June 1, 2018 pursuant to rules filed with the Commission on July 14, 2014.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Requirement** is described in Section III.13.7.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in the rules filed with the Commission on January 17, 2014, and accepted by the Commission on May 30, 2014.

**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Transfer Right (CTR)** is a financial right that entitles the holder to the difference in the Net Regional Clearing Prices between Capacity Zones for which the transfer right is defined, in the MW amount of the holder’s entitlement.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Value** is the value (in kW-month) of a Demand Resource for a month determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category A Designated Blackstart Resource** is a Designated Blackstart Resource that has committed to provide Blackstart Service under a “Signature Page for Schedule 16 of the NEPOOL OATT” that was executed and in effect prior to January 1, 2013 and has not been converted to a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** is a Designated Blackstart Resource that is not a Category A Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.

**CLAIM10** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

**CLAIM30** is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.
**Claimed Capability Audit** is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset.

**CNR Capability** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Coincident Peak Contribution** is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each power year, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset in all Load Zones. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

**Commercial Capacity**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, is defined in Section VII.A of that policy.

**Commission** is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.
**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer.
paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
4. provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.
Coordinated Transaction Scheduling means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

Correction Limit means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of Energy Produced (CEP) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of New Entry (CONE) is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

Counterparty means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

Covered Entity is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Credit Coverage is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO, in the form of credit insurance coverage, a performance or surety bond, or a combination thereof.

Credit Qualifying means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

Credit Threshold consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailment** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is a cleared Demand Reduction Offer multiplied by one plus the percent average avoided peak distribution losses. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation is the hourly demand reduction amounts of a Demand Response Resource scheduled by the ISO as a result of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, multiplied by one plus the percent average avoided peak distribution losses.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1 and purchase of demand
reductions pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing
on or after June 1, 2018.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market
Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to
Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit
calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit
calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Response Program** provides a Day-Ahead aspect to the Load Response Program. The
Day-Ahead Load Response Program allows Market Participants with registered Load Response Program
Assets to make energy reduction offers into the Day-Ahead Load Response Program concurrent with the

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a)(iv) of Market Rule
1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(h) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.
**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.
**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Real-Time Demand Response Asset to reduce demand. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Reduction Offer is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.E1.6 and Section III.E2.6.

**Demand Reduction Value** is the quantity of reduced demand calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Demand Resource** is a resource defined as Demand Response Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. Demand Resources are installed measures (i.e., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) that result in additional and verifiable reductions in end-use demand on the electricity network in the New England Control Area pursuant to Appendix III.E1 and Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1, or during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours, respectively. A Demand Resource may include a portfolio of measures aggregated together to meet or exceed the minimum Resource size requirements of the Forward Capacity Auction.

**Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit** is an audit initiated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.4.

**Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours** are those hours, or portions thereof, in which, absent the dispatch of Real-Time Demand Response Resources, Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide implementation of the action of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4 where the ISO would have begun to allow the depletion of Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve is forecasted in the ISO’s most recent next-day forecast.

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.
**Demand Resource Operable Capacity Analysis** means an analysis performed by the ISO estimating the expected dispatch hours of active Demand Resources given different assumed levels of Demand Resources clearing in the primary Forward Capacity Auction.

**Demand Resource Performance Incentives** means the additional monthly capacity payment that a Demand Resource may earn for producing a positive Monthly Capacity Variance in a period where other Demand Resources yield a negative monthly capacity variance.

**Demand Resource Performance Penalties** means the reduction in the monthly capacity payment to a Demand Resource for producing a negative Monthly Capacity Variance.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and the pumping load associated with pumped storage generators) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end use customers from multiple delivery points that meets the registration requirements in Section III.E2.2. The demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset is the difference between the Demand Response Asset’s actual demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point, which could reflect Net Supply, at the time the Demand Response Resource to which the asset is associated is dispatched by the ISO, and its adjusted Demand Response Baseline.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers or the expected output levels of the generation of an individual end-use metered customer whose asset is comprised of Distributed Generation as determined pursuant to Section III.8A or Section III.8B.
**Demand Response Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Regulation Resource** is a Real-Time Demand Response Resource eligible to provide Regulation.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a Dispatch Zone that meets the registration requirements and participates in the Energy Market pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the minimum time, from the receipt of a Dispatch Instruction, that it takes a Demand Response Resource that was not previously reducing demand to start reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the time required from the time a Demand Response Resource that was not previously reducing demand starts reducing demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction and the time the resource achieves its Minimum Reduction.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.
**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, and may be a Category A Designated Blackstart Resource or a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for generation and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** is the Dispatch Rate expressed in megawatts.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant
Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Rate** means the control signal, expressed in dollars per MWh and/or megawatts, calculated and transmitted to direct the output, consumption or demand reduction level of each generating Resource, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand and Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the Offer Data.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.6.1.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand** is any portion of an Asset Related Demand of a Market Participant that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions has Electronic Dispatch Capability, and must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Pumped storage facilities may qualify as Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources, however, such resources shall not qualify as a capacity resource for both the generating output and dispatchable pumping demand of the facility.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation resources directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s meter, which reduce the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced by other capacity resources on the electricity network in the New England Control Area during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours, provided that the aggregate nameplate capacity of the generation resource does not exceed 5 MW, or does not exceed the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand of the end-use metered customer at the location where the generation resource is directly connected, whichever is greater. Generation resources cannot participate in the Forward Capacity Market or the Energy Markets as Demand Resources or Demand Response Resources, unless they meet the definition of Distributed Generation.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a wind resource must not exceed.

**DR Auditing Period** is the summer DR Auditing Period or winter DR Auditing Period as defined in Section III.13.6.1.5.4.3.1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.
Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC) is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount) is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC) is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

EAWW Amount is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

Economic Dispatch Point is the output level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max is the maximum available output, in MW, of a resource that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the resource’s Supply Offer. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a resource for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit for all hours in which a resource has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min is (a) for Resources with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for Resources without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Resource and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and
(c) for Resources undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Resource requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for non-dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its non-dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the set of Supply Offer values that are used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1.a.

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electronic Dispatch Capability** is the ability to provide for the electronic transmission, receipt, and acknowledgment of data relative to the dispatch of generating units and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands and the ability to carry out the real-time dispatch processes from ISO issuance of Dispatch Instructions to the actual increase or decrease in output of dispatchable Resources.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the
Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum generation amount, in MWs, that a generating unit can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.
End User Participant is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Energy is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

Energy Administration Service (EAS) is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

Energy Component means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

Energy Efficiency is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

Energy Imbalance Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours are hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

Energy Offer Cap is $1,000/MWh.

Energy Offer Floor is negative $150/MWh.

Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs) are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

Enrolling Participant is the Market Participant that registers Customers for the Load Response Program.
**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the Capacity Requirement from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Estimated Net Regional Clearing Price (ENRCP)** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource, and, subject to ISO evaluation, for the Forward Capacity Auction to be conducted beginning February 1, 2008, any resource that is under construction and within 12 months of its expected commercial operations date.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.
Existing Capacity Retirement Package is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Demand Resource is a type of Demand Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Generating Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Import Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

Expedited Study Request is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.

Export-Adjusted LSR is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

Export Bid is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

Exports are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

External Market Monitor means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

External Node is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service
obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically; and (vi) has satisfied its Minimum Time Between Reductions.

**Fast Start Generator** means a generating unit that the ISO may dispatch within the hour through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) minimum run time does not exceed one hour; (ii) minimum down time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down dispatch instruction electronically; and (vi) has satisfied its minimum down time.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Payment** is the monthly capacity payment for a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.7.2.1.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Final Forward Reserve Obligation is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.


Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

Firm Point-To-Point Service is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part IIC of the OATT.


Force Majeure - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

Forecast Hourly Demand Reduction means the estimated maximum quantity of energy reduction (MWh), measured at the end-use customer meter that can be produced by a Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource, in each hour of an Operating Day. For a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset that is metered at the generator and associated with a Real-Time
Emergency Generation Resource, the Forecast Hourly Demand Reduction means the estimated maximum generator output (MWh) in each hour of an Operating Day.

**Formal Warning** is defined in Section III.B.4.1.1 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Formula-Based Sanctions** are defined in Section III.B.4.1.3 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual descending clock auction in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is $14,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.
**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Award Financial Assurance** is a required amount of financial assurance that must be maintained at all times from a Designated FTR Participant for each FTR awarded to the participant in any FTR Auctions. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Bid Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a
“Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a generator that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.
**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission
Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

**Hourly Calculated Demand Resource Performance Value** means the performance of a Demand Resource during Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours and Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours for purposes of calculating a Demand Reduction Value pursuant to Sections III.13.7.1.5.7.3 and III.13.7.1.5.8.3.

**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.1.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the difference between the Average Hourly Load Reduction or Average Hourly Output of the Real-Time Demand Response Resource and the amount of load reduction or output that the Market Participant was instructed to produce pursuant to a Dispatch Instruction calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.7.3.1.

**Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Deviation** is calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.8.3.1.
**Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Hub** is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadequate Supply** is defined in Section III.13.2.8.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.
**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled generation at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Insufficient Competition** is defined in Section III.13.2.8.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.
**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Intermittent Settlement Only Resource** is a Settlement Only Resource that is also an Intermittent Power Resource.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market
Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with
the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Manuals** are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

**ISO New England Operating Documents** are the Tariff and the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**ISO New England Operating Procedures** are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

**ISO New England Planning Procedures** are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


**ITC Agreement** is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC Rate Schedule** is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.
**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means generating resources that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Load Management** means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage from Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, or Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours to other hours and reduce the amount of capacity needed, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, chilled water storage, and other forms of electricity storage.

**Load Response Program** means the program implemented and administered by the ISO to promote demand side response as described in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.
**Load Response Program Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned an identification number, that participate in the Load Response Program and which encompass assets registered in the Real-Time Price Response Program or Real-Time Demand Response Assets, and are further described in Appendix E of Market Rule 1.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.
**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

**Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP)** is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

**Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

**Local Resource Adequacy Requirement** is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

**Local Second Contingency Protection Resources** are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

**Local Service** is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

**Local Service Schedule** is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

**Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR)** is the minimum amount of capacity that must be located within an import-constrained Load Zone, calculated as described in Section III.12.2 of Market Rule 1.
Local System Planning (LSP) is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

Localized Costs are the incremental costs resulting from a RTEP02 Upgrade or a Regional Benefit Upgrade or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade that exceeds those requirements that the ISO deems reasonable and consistent with Good Utility Practice and the current engineering design and construction practices in the area in which the Transmission Upgrade is built. In making its determination of whether Localized Costs exist, the ISO will consider, in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT, the reasonableness of the proposed engineering design and construction method with respect to alternate feasible Transmission Upgrades and the relative costs, operation, timing of implementation, efficiency and reliability of the proposed Transmission Upgrade. The ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, as appropriate, shall review such Transmission Upgrade, and determine whether there are any Localized Costs resulting from such Transmission Upgrade. If there are any such costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

Location is a Node, External Node, Load Zone or Hub. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, the Location also is a Dispatch Zone.

Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, the Location Marginal Price for a Dispatch Zone is the Zonal Price for that Dispatch Zone.

Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Long-Term is a term of one year or more.

Long-Term Transmission Outage is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.
**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**LSE** means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart CIP Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Major Transmission Outage** is a major transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(v) of Market Rule 1.
**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


**Market Participant Obligations** is defined in Section III.B.1.1 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.
**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is the maximum amount of capacity that can be procured in an export-constrained Load Zone, calculated as described in Section III.12.2 of Market Rule 1, to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available from the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand for economic dispatch and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of a Resource’s Offer Data except that a Self-Scheduled Dispatchable Asset Related Demand may modify its Minimum Consumption Limit on an hourly basis, as part of its Demand Bid, in order to indicate the desired level of Self-Scheduled MW.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand or, if unavailable, an estimate of the annual non-coincident peak demand of a Real-Time Demand Response Asset or a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, where the demand evaluated is established by adding actual metered
demand and the output of all generators located behind the asset’s end-use customer meter in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Generation** is the maximum generation output of a Real-Time Demand Response Asset comprised of Distributed Generation or the maximum generation output of a Demand Response Asset comprised of Distributed Generation.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum hourly demand reduction amount that a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or a Demand Response Asset can deliver. For assets that deliver demand reduction, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the asset’s peak load less its uninterruptible load. For assets that deliver reductions through the use of generation, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the difference between the generator’s maximum possible output and its expected output when not providing demand reduction. For assets that deliver demand reduction and Net Supply, the Maximum Interruptible Capacity is the asset’s peak load plus Maximum Net Supply as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the most recent annual non-coincident peak demand or, if unavailable, an estimate of the annual non-coincident peak demand, of a Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Demand Response Asset or Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset.

**Maximum Net Supply** is an estimate of the maximum hourly Net Supply for a Demand Response Asset as measured from the Demand Response Asset’s Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Measure Life** is the estimated time a Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource is greater than or equal to the
amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the Demand Reduction Value for an Existing Demand Resource is not overstated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1, which includes Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by a Demand Resource supplier as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by Demand Resource suppliers during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by a Demand Resource supplier with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total Demand Reduction Values for all Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.
Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF) are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider) is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service) is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA) is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO) is an owner of MTF.

Meter Data Error means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the data reconciliation process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the data reconciliation process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

Minimum Consumption Limit is the minimum amount, in MW, available from a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that is not available for economic dispatch and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of a Resource’s Offer Data.

Minimum Down Time is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit before the Generator Asset can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit.
Minimum Generation Emergency means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more generating Resources to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit, in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

Minimum Generation Emergency Credits are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

Minimum Reduction is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

Minimum Reduction Time is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

Minimum Run Time is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit.

Minimum Time Between Reductions is the minimum number of hours that a Market Participant requires between the time the Demand Response Resource receives a Dispatch Instruction from the ISO to not reduce demand and the time the Demand Response Resource receives a Dispatch Instruction from the ISO to reduce demand.

Monthly Blackstart Service Charge is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Monthly Capacity Variance means a Demand Resource’s actual monthly Capacity Value established pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.5.1 of Market Rule 1, minus the Demand Resource’s final Capacity Supply Obligation for the month.

Monthly Peak is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

Monthly PER is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.2.7.1.1.2(a) of Market Rule 1.
**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Needs Assessment** is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
NEMA, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

NEMA Contract is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE) is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.


NEPOOL Agreement is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

NEPOOL GIS is the generation information system.

NEPOOL GIS Administrator is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

NESCOE is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.
**Net CONE** is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of the first-year non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require, in its first year of operation, to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the first year energy and ancillary services revenues, and projected revenue for subsequent years.

**Net Regional Clearing Price** is described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Net Supply** is energy injected at the Retail Delivery Point by a Demand Response Asset with Distributed Generation.

**Net Supply Limit** is the estimated portion of the offered Maximum Reduction of a Demand Response Resource that would be provided through Net Supply. The Net Supply Limit is calculated by multiplying the offered Maximum Reduction of the Demand Response Resource by the ratio of total Net Supply to total demand reduction performance from the prior like Seasonal DR Audit of the Demand Response Assets that are mapped to the Demand Response Resource for the month.

**Network Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Customer** is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

**Network Import Capability (NI Capability)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Network Resource** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date
until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Required** is the amount of additional capacity required to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement or a Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement, as described in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

New Demand Resource is a type of Demand Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

New Demand Resource Qualification Package is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III 13.1.4.2.3 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource.

New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form is described in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

New Demand Response Asset is a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or Demand Response Asset that is registered with the ISO, has been mapped to a resource, is ready to respond, and has been included in the dispatch model of the remote terminal unit but does not have a winter audit value and a summer audit value.

New Demand Response Asset Audit is an audit of a New Demand Response Asset performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.8.

New England Control Area is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

New England Markets are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.2.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Nodal Amount** is node(s)-specific on-peak and off-peak proxy value to which an FTR bid or awarded FTR bid relates.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a generating unit that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the unit for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the generating unit is scheduled in the New England Markets.
**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.3.1.3.

**Non-Commercial Capacity** is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an increment of an Existing Capacity Resource that is treated as a New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and that has not been declared commercial and has not had its capacity rating verified by the ISO.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period** is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount)** is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments** are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Non-Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Non-Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer** is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

**Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to
the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

**Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resource** is a Settlement Only Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource.

**Non-Market Participant** is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

**Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer** is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

**Non-Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

**Non-Qualifying** means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

**Notice of RBA** is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Notification Time** is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.


**NPCC** is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

**Obligation Month** means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.
**Offer Data** means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including generating unit and Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch generating and Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources, and for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Demand Response Resources for the provision of energy and other services and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

**Offered CLAIM10** is, for a generating Resource, a Supply Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the Resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available from the Resource from an off-line state, and, for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand or Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched, is a Demand Bid or Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the Resource that represents the amount of TMNSR or TMSR available from the Resource.

**Offered CLAIM30** is a Supply Offer, Demand Bid or Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of a Resource that represents the amount of TMOR available from an off-line generating Resource, or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand or Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**Offered Full Reduction Time** is the value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.6.

**On-Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS)** is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

Operating Authority is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

Operating Data means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

Operating Day means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

Operating Reserve means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

Operations Date is February 1, 2005.

OTF Service is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

Other Transmission Facility (OTF) are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA) is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

Other Transmission Owner (OTO) is an owner of OTF.
**Ownership Share** is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a generating unit asset or Load Asset, where such unit or load is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

**Participant Expenses** are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participant Required Balance** is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Participant Vote** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participants Agreement** is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

**Participants Committee** is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

**Participating Transmission Owner (PTO)** is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Peak Energy Rent (PER)** is described in Section III.13.7.2.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**PER Proxy Unit** is described in Section III.13.7.2.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Percent of Total Demand Reduction Value Complete** means the delivery schedule as a percentage of a Demand Resource’s total Demand Reduction Value that will be or has been achieved as of specific target dates, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability. Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.

**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Poorly Performing Resource** is described in Section III.13.7.1.1.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (Pumps Only) Postured for Reliability, the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.

**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.
**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.
**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is a Real-Time demand reduction amount determined pursuant to Section III.E1.8 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing prior to June 1, 2018, and Section III.E2.7 for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018.

**Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours** means those hours, or portions thereof, in which ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4 is implemented and the ISO has begun to allow the depletion of Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve on a Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide basis, and the ISO notifies the Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources of such hours.

**Real-Time Demand Response Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that are located at a single Node, report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned a unique asset identification number by the ISO, and that participate in the Forward Capacity Market as part of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Demand Response Resource.

**Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours** means hours when the ISO dispatches Real-Time Demand Response Resources in response to Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours, which may include Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide dispatch of such resources.

**Real-Time Demand Response Resource** is a type of Demand Resource that is comprised of installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer
facilities that: (i) curtail electrical usage in response to a Dispatch Instruction; and (ii) continue curtailing electrical usage until receiving Dispatch Instructions to restore electrical usage. Such measures include Load Management and Distributed Generation. The period of curtailment shall be consistent with Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset** means one or more individual end-use metered customers that are located at a single Node, report load reduction and consumption, or generator output as a single set of values, are assigned a unique asset identification number by the ISO, and that participate in the Forward Capacity Market as part of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours** means those hours, or portions thereof, between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. Monday through Friday, non-Demand Response Holidays in which the ISO dispatches Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources on a Dispatch Zone, Load Zone, or system-wide basis when deficient in Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve and when the ISO implements voltage reductions of five percent of normal operating voltage that require more than 10 minutes to implement.

**Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource** is Distributed Generation whose federal, state and/or local air quality permits, rules or regulations limit operation in response to requests from the ISO to the times when the ISO implements voltage reductions of five percent of normal operating voltage that require more than 10 minutes to implement. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource must be capable of: (i) curtailing its end-use electric consumption from the New England grid within 30 minutes of receiving a Dispatch Instruction; and (ii) continuing that curtailment until receiving a Dispatch Instruction to restore consumption.

**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions pursuant to Appendix III.E2 of Market Rule 1, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.
Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Generation Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time High Operating Limit is the maximum output, in MW, of a resource that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy under Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1, for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the resource’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the unit.

Real-Time Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(i) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(i) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Loss Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Price Response Program** is the program described in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (Pumps Only) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Real-Time Reserve Designation as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as adjusted after-the-fact utilizing revenue quality meter data as described under Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses) and shall not be credited or reduced for any behind-the-meter generation. A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements...
under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.
**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.

**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.
**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.

**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs)** are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a generating unit, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource or an External Transaction or, for Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, a Demand Response Resource. For purposes of providing Regulation, Resource means a generating unit, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, a Demand Response Regulation Resource or an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource.

**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.
**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.
RTO is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction is defined in Section III.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

Sanctionable Behavior is defined in Section III.B.3 of Appendix B of Market Rule 1.

Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP) is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

Scheduling Service, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

Seasonal Claimed Capability is the summer or winter claimed capability of a generating unit or ISO-approved combination of units, and represent the maximum dependable load carrying ability of such unit or units, excluding capacity required for station use.

Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

Seasonal DR Audit is a seasonal audit of the demand response capability of a Demand Resource initiated pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.1.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is a type of Demand Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.
**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling its Resource, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Resource would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing or scheduling a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand would have been scheduled or dispatched by the ISO to consume Energy. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Scheduled MW** is an amount, in megawatts, that is Self-Scheduled and is equal to: (i) a Generator Asset’s Economic Minimum Limit; (ii) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand’s Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that office.

**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.
Settlement Financial Assurance is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Settlement Only Resources are generators of less than 5 MW or otherwise eligible for Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

Shortage Event is defined in Section III.13.7.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

Shortage Event Availability Score is the average of the hourly availability scores for each hour or portion of an hour during a Shortage Event, as described in Section III.13.7.1.1.1.A of Market Rule 1.

Shortfall Funding Arrangement, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

Short-Term is a period of less than one year.

Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

SMD Effective Date is March 1, 2003.

Solutions Study is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource (SCR) is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.
**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a generating unit to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the unit each time the unit is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.
**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Successful FCA** is a Forward Capacity Auction in which a Capacity Zone has neither Inadequate Supply nor Insufficient Competition.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Supplemental Availability Bilateral** is described in Section III.13.5.3.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Supplemental Capacity Resources** are described in Section III.13.5.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Supplemented Capacity Resource** is described in Section III.13.5.3.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Supply Offer** is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.

**Supply Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

**Synchronous Condenser** is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service...
or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes from the request of the ISO (2) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that can be fully utilized within ten minutes from the request of the ISO to reduce consumption; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within ten minutes from the request of the ISO.
Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR) is the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that is electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System that can be converted fully into energy within ten minutes from the request of the ISO; (2) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand pump that is electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System that can reduce energy consumption to provide reserve capability within ten minutes from the request of the ISO; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within ten minutes from the request of the ISO for which none of the associated Demand Response Assets have a generator whose output can be controlled located behind the Retail Delivery Point other than emergency generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to the New England Transmission System.

Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

Third-Party Sale is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR) means the reserve capability of (1) a generating Resource that can be converted fully into energy within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO (2) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand that can be fully utilized within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO to reduce consumption; or (3) a Demand Response Resource that can provide demand reduction within thirty minutes from the request of the ISO.

Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate) is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

Through or Out Service (TOUT Service) means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a
single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Negative Hourly Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the absolute value of the sum of the negative Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviations and negative Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Deviations from all Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources receiving Dispatch Instructions in the same hour in the same Dispatch Zone.

**Total Positive Hourly Demand Response Resource Deviation** means the sum of the positive Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviations and positive Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Deviations from all Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources receiving Dispatch Instructions in the same hour in the same Dispatch Zone.
**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.
Transmission Default Amount is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

Transmission Default Period is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account Limit is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Charge is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff) is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.

Transmission Obligations are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA) is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

Transmission Owner means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

Transmission Provider is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

Transmission Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

Transmission Upgrade(s) means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

UDS is unit dispatch system software.

Unconstrained Export Transaction is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

Uncovered Default Amount is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Unrated means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

Unsecured Covered Entity is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

Unsecured Municipal Default Amount is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated Demand Resource project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Year** means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

**Zonal Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.
I.3 Obligations of Market Participants and Other Customers

The ISO acts as Counterparty for sales to its Customers of Regional Transmission Service, and for agreements and transactions with its Customers, including but not limited to assignments involving Customers, and agreements and transactions with Customers involving sale to the ISO and/or purchase from the ISO of energy, capacity, reserves, regulation, Ancillary Services, FTRs and involving other products, service and transactions, all as specified in Sections II and III of the Tariff (collectively, the “Products”).

To the extent permitted by applicable law, any warranties provided by the sellers or assignors to the ISO of the Products which cover the Products, whether express or implied, are hereby passed to the Customers on a “pass through basis” and to the extent not passed through, any such warranties are hereby assigned by ISO to Customers. Sellers and assignors to the ISO and Customers acknowledge that warranties on such Products are limited to that offered by the seller or assignor to the ISO and will exist, if at all, solely between the seller or assignor to the ISO and the Customer. AS BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND ISO AS COUNTERPARTY, NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE MADE BY THE ISO REGARDING THE PRODUCTS SOLD BY THE ISO AS COUNTERPARTY, AND ANY SUCH PRODUCTS ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” BASIS. THE ISO MAKES NO WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION THAT THE PRODUCTS WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR FREE. THE CUSTOMER HEREBY WAIVES, AND THE ISO HEREBY DISCLAIMS, ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. THE ISO DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE PRODUCTS OFFERED WILL MEET CUSTOMER’S REQUIREMENTS. NO ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE GIVEN BY THE ISO OR ANY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISO SHALL CREATE A WARRANTY OR IN ANY WAY INCREASE THE SCOPE OF ANY PASS THROUGH OR ASSIGNED WARRANTY. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.

I.3.1 Service Agreement:

Receipt of service under this Tariff requires the execution of a Market Participant Service Agreement in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1, as applicable, to this Tariff unless the Customer seeks transmission service only and does not participate in the New England Markets (in which case the Customer must execute a Transmission Service Agreement). Receipt of Local Service under Section II of
this Tariff requires the execution of a Transmission Service Agreement in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of Section II of this Tariff for Local Service and shall be subject to the requirements of Schedule 21. Receipt of OTF Service under Section II of this Tariff requires the execution of a Transmission Service Agreement in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of Section II of this Tariff and shall be subject to the requirements of Schedule 20.

I.3.2. Assets:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable, cause all of the Assets it owns or operates to be designed, constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the provisions of this Tariff, the ISO New England Operating Procedures, and the ISO New England Planning Procedures.

I.3.3. Maintenance and Repair:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable: (a) cause Assets owned or operated by it to be withdrawn from operation for maintenance and repair only in accordance with maintenance schedules reported to, and approved and published by the ISO in accordance with the ISO New England Operating Procedures, (b) restore such Assets to good operating condition with reasonable promptness, and (c) in emergency situations, accelerate maintenance and repair at the reasonable request of the ISO in accordance with the ISO New England Planning Procedures.

I.3.4. Central Dispatch:
Each Market Participant shall, to the fullest extent practicable, subject each of the Assets it owns or operates to central dispatch by the ISO; provided, however, that each Market Participant shall at all times be the sole judge as to whether or not and to what extent safety requires that at any time any of such facilities will be operated at less than their full capacity.

I.3.5. Provision of Information:
The Customers shall provide the ISO with any and all information within their custody or control that the ISO deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Tariff, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. Each Customer shall ensure that the ISO has an accurate list of the Customer’s Affiliates. The ISO will compile a list that shall be considered definitive. It will be the Customer’s responsibility to regularly review the list and to promptly (and in advance of Affiliate changes, where possible) provide the ISO with additions and/or corrections to the list and, when requested, relevant supporting documentation.
I.3.6.  Records and Information:
Each Customer shall keep such records as may reasonably be required by the ISO, and shall furnish to the ISO such records, reports and information (including forecasts) as it may reasonably require, provided that confidentiality thereof is protected in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

I.3.7.  Payment of Invoices; Compliance with Policies:
Each Customer is obligated to pay when due in accordance with this Tariff, the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy all amounts invoiced to it pursuant to this Tariff, and to comply with those terms, conditions and policies in all respects. If a Customer fails to meet the requirements specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and ISO New England Billing Policy, the ISO may take such actions as are specified in those policies.

I.3.8.  Protective Devices for Transmission Facilities:
Each Market Participant shall install, maintain and operate such protective equipment and switching, voltage control, load shedding and emergency facilities as the ISO and the applicable Transmission Owner may determine to be required in order to assure continuity of service and the stability of the New England Transmission System.

I.3.9.  Review of Market Participant’s Proposed Plans:

I.3.9.1 Submission and Review of Proposed Plan Applications:
Each Market Participant and Transmission Owner shall submit to the ISO, in such form, manner and detail as the ISO may reasonably prescribe, (i) any new or materially changed plan for additions to or changes to any generating and demand resources or transmission facilities rated 69 kV or above subject to control of such Market Participant or Transmission Owner, and (ii) any new or materially changed plan for any other action to be taken by the Market Participant or Transmission Owner, except for retirements of or reductions in the capacity of a generating resource or a demand resource, which may have a significant effect on the stability, reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of a Market Participant. No significant action (other than preliminary engineering action) leading toward implementation of any such new or changed plan shall be taken earlier than sixty days (or ninety days, if the ISO determines that it requires additional time to consider the plan and so notifies the Market Participant in writing within the sixty days) after the plan has been submitted to the ISO. Unless prior to
the expiration of the sixty or ninety days, whichever is applicable, the ISO notifies the Market Participant or Transmission Owner in writing that it has determined that implementation of the plan will have a significant adverse effect upon the reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of a Market Participant, the Market Participant or Transmission Owner shall be free to proceed. The ISO shall maintain on its website a list of such applications that are currently under review and the status of each such application. The ISO shall provide notice of any action taken with respect to any such applications, including an explanation of its reasons for such action, to each Market Participant or Transmission Owner as soon as reasonably practicable after such action is taken. The time limits provided by this section may be changed with respect to any such submission by agreement between the ISO and the Market Participant or Transmission Owner.

I.3.9.2 Additional Review of Additions of or Changes to Generating Resources:
Proposals for new generating resources or modifications to existing generating resources are also subject to the terms set out in Schedule 22, the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreement, and Schedule 23, the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreement, to Section II of the Tariff.

I.3.9.3 Reliability Review of Retirements of or Reductions in Capacity of an Existing Demand Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource:
Proposals for the reduction of capacity from an Existing Demand Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource below its Qualified Capacity amount for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including unit retirement, are reviewed for reliability impact pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 of the Tariff. Once a demand resource or generating resource has a cleared de-list bid pursuant to Section III of the Tariff it may reduce its capacity consistent with the terms of its de-list bid for all or any part of the Capacity Commitment Period of the approved de-list without further reliability review. However, any proposed physical modification to a de-listed generating facility must comply with the requirements, including the reliability review process, set out in Schedules 22 or 23, as applicable.

I.3.10. Market Participant to Avoid Adverse Effect:
If the ISO notifies a Market Participant pursuant to Section I.3.9.1 that implementation of the Market Participant’s or Transmission Owner’s plan has been determined to have a significant adverse effect upon the reliability or operating characteristics of the Transmission Owner’s transmission facilities, the transmission facilities of another Transmission Owner, or the system of one or more Market Participants, the Market Participant or Transmission Owner shall not proceed to implement such plan unless the
Market Participant (or the Non-Market Participant on whose behalf the Market Participant has submitted its plan) or Transmission Owner takes such action or constructs at its expense such facilities as the ISO determines to be reasonably necessary to avoid such adverse effect.
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APPENDIX 1 – ATTACHMENT K – LOCAL: LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS
1. **Overview**

This Attachment describes the regional system planning process conducted by the ISO, as well as the coordination with transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems to ensure the reliability of the New England Transmission System and compliance with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures, while accounting for market performance, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as may be agreed upon from time to time. The New England Transmission System is comprised of PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF within the New England Control Area that is under the ISO’s operational authority or control pursuant to the ISO Tariff and/or various transmission operating agreements. This Attachment describes the regional system planning process for the PTF conducted by the ISO, and local system planning process conducted by the PTOs, pursuant to their responsibilities defined in the Tariff, the various transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. Additional details regarding the regional system planning process are also provided in the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, which are available on the ISO’s website.

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems, consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the Tariff, applicable transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. As described in this Attachment’s Section 6 and Appendix 1, entitled “Attachment K - Local System Planning Process”, the PTOs are responsible for the Local System Planning (“LSP”) process for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. As also described in Section 6, and pursuant to the Tariff and/or transmission operating agreements, the OTOs and MTOs are required to participate in the ISO’s regional system planning process for reliability purposes and to perform and/or support studies of the impact of regional system planning projects on their respective OTF and MTF.

The regional system planning process described in this Attachment provides for the ISO to undertake assessments of the needs of the PTF system on a systemwide or specific area basis. These assessments shall be referred to as Needs Assessments, as described in Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The ISO shall incorporate market responses that have met the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment into the Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the Regional System Plan (“RSP”), described below. Where market responses incorporated into the Needs Assessments or Public Policy
Transmission Studies do not eliminate or address the needs identified by the ISO in Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the RSP, the ISO shall develop or evaluate, pursuant to Sections 4.2(b) or 4.3 of this Attachment, as applicable, regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified by the ISO.

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of this Attachment, the ISO shall develop the RSP for approval by the ISO Board of Directors following stakeholder input through the Planning Advisory Committee established pursuant to Section 2 of this Attachment. The RSP is a compilation of the regional system planning process activities conducted by the ISO during a given year. The RSP shall address needs of the PTF system determined by the ISO through Needs Assessments initiated and updated on an ongoing basis by the ISO to: (i) account for changes in the PTF system conditions; (ii) ensure reliability of the PTF system; (iii) comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures; and (iv) account for market performance, economic, environmental and other considerations as may be agreed upon from time to time.

As more fully described in Section 3 of this Attachment, the RSP shall identify:

(i) PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs,

(ii) the requirements and characteristics of the types of resources that may satisfy PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs to provide stakeholders an opportunity to develop and propose efficient market responses to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments;

(iii) regulated transmission solutions to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments where market responses do not address such needs or additional transmission infrastructure may be required to comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures or provide market efficiency benefits in accordance with Attachment N of this OATT; and

(iv) those projects identified through the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K.

In addition, the RSP shall also provide information on a broad variety of power system requirements that serves as input for reviewing the design of the markets and the overall economic performance of the
system. The RSP shall also describe the coordination of the ISO’s regional system plans with regional, local and inter-area planning activities.

Pursuant to Section 3.6 of this Attachment, the ISO shall also develop, maintain and post on its website a cumulative list reflecting the regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to Needs Assessments (the “RSP Project List”). The RSP Project List shall be a cumulative representation of the regional transmission planning expansion efforts ongoing in New England.

1.1 Enrollment
For purposes of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to this Attachment K, and distinct from Transmission Providers as defined in Section I of this Tariff, an entity chooses to enroll by executing (or having already executed) a: (i) transmission operating agreement with the ISO, or (ii) a Market Participant Service Agreement coupled with a written notification to the ISO that the entity desires to be a transmission provider in the New England region. Such enrollment in the transmission planning region is not necessary to participate in the Planning Advisory Committee, which is open to any entity as described in Section 2.3 of this Attachment K.

1.2 A List of Entities Enrolled in the Planning Region
A list of entities enrolled in the transmission planning region as transmission providers as described in Section 1.1. above, is included as Appendix 2 of this Attachment K.

2. Planning Advisory Committee
2.1 Establishment
A Planning Advisory Committee shall be established by the ISO to perform the functions set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. It shall have a Chair and Secretary, who shall be appointed by the chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee. Before appointing an individual to the position of the Chair or Secretary, the ISO shall notify the Planning Advisory Committee of the proposed assignment and, consistent with its personnel practices, provide any other information about the individual reasonably requested by the Planning Advisory Committee. The chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee shall consider the input of the members of the Planning Advisory Committee in selecting, removing or replacing such officers. The Planning Advisory Committee shall be advisory only and shall have no formal voting protocol.
The ISO may form subcommittees that, at the discretion of the ISO, may report to the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.2 Role of Planning Advisory Committee
The Planning Advisory Committee may provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning the regional system planning process, including the development of and review of Needs Assessments, the conduct of Solutions Studies, the development of the RSP, and updates to the RSP Project List. Specifically, the Planning Advisory Committee serves to review and provide input and comment on: (i) the development of the RSP, (ii) assumptions for studies, (iii) the results of Needs Assessments, Solutions Studies, and competitive solutions developed pursuant to Section 4.3 of this Attachment, and (iv) potential market responses to the needs identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP. The Planning Advisory Committee, with the assistance of and in coordination with the ISO, serves also to identify and prioritize requests for Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO, and provides input and feedback to the ISO concerning the conduct of Economic Studies and Public Policy Transmission Studies, including the criteria and assumptions for such studies. Based on input and feedback related to the regional system planning process provided by the Planning Advisory Committee to the ISO, the ISO shall consult with the appropriate NEPOOL technical committees, including but not limited to, the Markets, Reliability and Transmission Committees, on issues and concerns identified by the Planning Advisory Committee as requiring further investigation and consideration of potential changes to ISO New England Operating Documents.

2.3 Membership
Any entity, including State regulators or agencies and NESCOE, as specified in Attachment N of the OATT, may designate a member to the Planning Advisory Committee by providing written notice to the Secretary of that Committee identifying the name of the entity represented by the member and the member’s name, address, telephone number, facsimile number and electronic mail address. The entity may remove or replace such member at any time by written notice to the Secretary of the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.4 Procedures
(a) Notice of Meetings
Prior to the beginning of each year, the ISO shall list on the ISO Calendar, which is available on the ISO’s website, the proposed meeting dates for the Planning Advisory Committee for each month of the year. Prior to a Planning Advisory Committee meeting, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee by electronic email with the date, time, format for the meeting (i.e., in person or teleconference), and the purpose for the meeting.

(b) **Frequency of Meetings**
Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be held as frequently as necessary to serve the purposes stated in Section 2.2 of this Attachment and as further specified elsewhere in this Attachment, generally expected to be no less than four (4) times per year.

(c) **Availability of Meeting Materials**
The ISO shall post materials for Planning Advisory Committee meetings on the Planning Advisory Committee section on the ISO’s website prior to meetings. The materials for the Planning Advisory Committee meetings shall be made available to the members of the Planning Advisory Committee subject to protections warranted by confidentiality requirements of the ISO New England Information Policy set forth in Attachment D of the ISO Tariff and Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (“CEII”) policy as further described in Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment.

(d) **Access to Planning-Related Materials that Contain CEII**
CEII is defined as specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure (physical or virtual) that:

(i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy;
(ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;
(iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and
(iv) Does not simply give the location of critical infrastructure.
CEII pertains to existing and proposed system and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. CEII does not include information that is otherwise publicly available. Simplified maps and general information on engineering, vulnerability, or design that relate to production, generation, transportation, transmission or distribution of energy shall not constitute CEII.

Planning-related materials determined to be CEII will be posted on the ISO’s password-protected website. To obtain access to planning-related materials determined to be CEII, the entity seeking to obtain such access must contact the ISO’s Customer Service department. Authorized Market Participants or their representatives, such as consultants, are bound by the ISO New England Information Policy and will be able to access CEII materials through the ISO’s password-protected website. State and federal governmental agency employees and their consultants will be able to access such materials through the ISO’s password-protected website upon submittal of a signed non-disclosure agreement, which is available on the ISO’s website. Personnel of the ERO, NPCC, other regional transmission organizations or independent system operators, and transmission owners from neighboring regions will be able to access CEII materials pursuant to governing agreements, rules and protocols. All external requests by other persons for planning-related materials determined to be CEII shall be recorded and tracked by ISO’s Customer Services staff. Such requestors will be able to obtain access to CEII documents filed with the Commission pursuant to the Commission’s regulations governing access to CEII. To the extent a requestor seeks access to planning-related material that is not filed with the Commission, such requestor shall comply with the requirements provided in the CEII procedures of the ISO, available on the ISO’s website, prior to receiving access to CEII information. Upon compliance with the ISO’s CEII procedures, the ISO shall grant the requestor access to the planning-related CEII document through direct distribution or access to the ISO password-protected website.

2.5 Local System Planning Process
The LSP process described in Appendix 1 to this Attachment applies to the transmission system planning for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. The PTOs will utilize interested members of the Planning Advisory Committee for advisory stakeholder input in the LSP process that will meet, as needed, at the conclusion of, or independent of, scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. The LSP meeting agenda and meeting materials will be developed by representatives of the pertinent PTOs and PTO representatives will chair the LSP meeting. The ISO will post the LSP agenda and materials for LSP.

3. **RSP: Principles, Scope, and Contents**

3.1 **Description of RSP**

The ISO shall develop the RSP based on periodic comprehensive assessments (conducted not less than every third year) of the PTF systemwide needs to maintain the reliability of the New England Transmission System while accounting for market efficiency, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as agreed upon from time to time. The ISO shall update the RSP to reflect the results of ongoing Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The RSP shall also account for projected improvements to the PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability in accordance with national and regional standards and the operation of efficient markets under a set of planning assumptions.

The RSP shall, among other things:

(i) describe, in a consolidated manner, the assessment of the PTF system needs, the results of such assessments, and the projected improvements;

(ii) provide the projected annual and peak demands for electric energy for a five-to ten-year horizon, the needs for resources over this period and how such resources are expected to be provided;

(iii) specify the physical characteristics of the physical solutions that can meet the needs defined in the Needs Assessments and include information on market responses that can address them; and
(iv) provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations, operating characteristics and required availability criteria of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

The RSP shall also include a description of proposed regulated transmission solutions that, based on the Solutions Studies described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment and the competitive solution process described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, may meet the needs identified in the Needs Assessments. To this end, as further described in Section 3.6 below, the ISO shall develop and maintain a RSP Project List, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions classified, to the extent known, as Reliability Transmission Upgrades, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, and Public Policy Transmission Upgrades (which, for the foregoing types of upgrades, may include the portions of Interregional Transmission Projects located within the New England Control Area) and of External Transmission Projects. The RSP shall also provide reasons for any new regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP Project List, any change in status of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade in the RSP Project List, or for any removal of regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades from the RSP Project List that are known as of that time.

The RSP shall also include the results of the annual assessment of transmission transfer capability, conducted pursuant to applicable NERC, NPCC and ISO New England standards and criteria and the identification of potential future transmission system weaknesses and limiting facilities that could impact the transmission system’s ability to reliably transfer energy in the planning horizon. Each annual assessment will identify those portions of the New England system, along with the associated interface boundaries, that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market pursuant to ISO Tariff Section III.12. Each annual assessment of interface boundaries that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids and submitted Permanent De-List Bids as well as rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction.
Each RSP shall be built upon the previous year’s RSP.

3.2 **Baseline of RSP**
The RSP shall account for: (i) all projects that have met milestones, including market responses and regulated transmission solutions (e.g., planned demand-side projects, generation and transmission projects and Elective Transmission Upgrades) as determined by the ISO, in collaboration with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of this Attachment; and (ii) the requirements for system operation and restoration services, not including the development of a system operations or restoration plan, which is outside the scope of the regional system planning process.

3.3 **RSP Planning Horizon and Parameters**
The RSP shall be based on a five-to ten-year planning horizon, and reflect five-to ten-year capacity and load forecasts.

The RSP shall conform to: Good Utility Practice; applicable Commission compliance requirements related to the regional system planning process; applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of the ERO, NPCC, and any of their successors; planning criteria adopted and/or developed by the ISO; Transmission Owner criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies developed by the Transmission Owner for its facilities consistent with the ISO planning criteria, the applicable criteria of the ERO and NPCC; local transmission planning criteria; and the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, as they may be amended from time to time (collectively, the “Planning and Reliability Criteria”).

The revisions to this Attachment K submitted to comply with FERC’s Order No. 1000 shall not apply to any Proposed or Planned project included in an RSP approved by the ISO Board of Directors (or in an RSP Project List update) prior to the effective date of the Order No. 1000 compliance filing of the ISO and the PTOs, unless the ISO is re-evaluating the solution design for such project as of that effective date, or subsequently determines that the solution design for such project requires re-evaluation.

3.4 **Other RSP Principles**
The RSP shall be designed and implemented to: (i) avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities; (ii) identify facilities that are necessary to meet Planning and Reliability Criteria; (iii) avoid the imposition of
unreasonable costs upon any Transmission Owner, Transmission Customer or other user of a transmission facility; (iv) take into account the legal and contractual rights and obligations of the Transmission Owners and the transmission-related legal and contractual rights and obligations of any other entity; (v) provide for coordination with existing transmission systems and with appropriate inter-area and local expansion plans; and (vi) properly coordinate with market responses, including, but not limited to generation, merchant transmission and demand-side responses.

3.5 Market Responses in RSP
Market responses shall include investments in resources (e.g., demand-side projects, generation and distributed generation) and Elective Transmission Upgrades and shall be evaluated by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1(f) and 7 of this Attachment.

In developing the RSP, the ISO shall account for market responses: (i) proposed by Market Participants as addressing needs (and any critical time constraints for addressing such needs) identified in an RSP, Needs Assessment, or Public Policy Transmission Study; and (ii) that have proved to be viable by meeting the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) or 4A.3(b) of this Attachment, as applicable.

Specifically, market responses that are identified to the ISO and are determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to be sufficient to alleviate the need for a particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, based on the criteria specified in the pertinent Needs Assessment or RSP, and are judged by the ISO to be achievable within the required time period, shall be reflected in the next RSP and/or in a new or updated Needs Assessment. That particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade may continue to be included in the appropriate category on the RSP Project List (as described in Section 3.6 below), subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the project should proceed at a later date or it may be removed if it is determined to be no longer needed. If the market response does not fully address the defined needs, or if additional transmission infrastructure is required to facilitate the efficient operation of the market, the RSP shall also include that particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the Transmission Upgrade or regulated transmission solution should proceed at a later date and be modified, if necessary.

3.6 The RSP Project List
(a) **Elements of the RSP Project List**

The RSP Project List shall identify regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified in a RSP or Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, and shall identify Public Policy Transmission Upgrades identified pursuant to Section 4A of this Attachment. The RSP Project List shall identify the proposed regulated transmission solutions separately as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

With regard to Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, the following subcategories will be utilized to indicate the status of each proposed regulated transmission solution in the evaluation process. These subcategories include: (i) Concept; (ii) Proposed; (iii) Planned; (iv) Under Construction; and (v) In-Service. A Public Policy Transmission Upgrade will be identified in the RSP Project List as (i) Proposed; (ii) Planned; (iii) Under Construction; or (iv) In-Service.

The regulated transmission solution subcategories are defined as follows:

(i) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Concept” shall include a transmission project that is being considered by its proponent as a potential solution to meet a need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but for which there is little or no analysis available to support the transmission project.

(ii) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” shall include a regulated transmission solution that (a) has been proposed in response to a specific need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP and (b) has been evaluated or further defined and developed in a Solutions Study, as specified in Section 4.2(a) of this Attachment, or in the competitive solutions process specified in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, such that there is significant analysis that supports a determination by the ISO, as communicated to the Planning Advisory Committee, that the proposed regulated transmission solution would likely
meet the need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but has not received approval by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

For purposes of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” means that the ISO has included the project in the RSP Project List pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K, but that the project has not yet been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iii) “Planned” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has met the requirements for a Proposed project and has been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iv) “Under Construction” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has received the approvals required under the Tariff and engineering and construction is underway.

(v) “In Service” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has been placed in commercial operation.

The RSP Project List shall also list External Transmission Projects for which cost allocation and, if applicable, operating agreements have been accepted by the Commission, and indicate whether such External Transmission Projects are proposed, under construction or in service.

Each Reliability Transmission Upgrade and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced to the specific systemwide or area needs identified in a Needs Assessment or RSP. Each proposed Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced in the RSP Project List to a specific Public Policy Transmission Study.

For completeness, the RSP Project List shall also include Elective Transmission Upgrades and transmission facilities (as determined under the ISO interconnection process specified in this OATT) to be built to accommodate new generation, and Elective Transmission Upgrades that have satisfied the requirements of this OATT.
An Interregional Transmission Project developed pursuant to Section 6.3 of this Attachment K may displace a regional Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade on the RSP Project List where the ISO has determined that the Interregional Transmission Project is a more efficient or cost-effective solution. In the case of an Interregional Transmission Project that could meet the needs met by a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade, the associated Public Policy Transmission Upgrade may be removed from the RSP Project List in the circumstances described, and using the procedures specified, in Section 4A of Attachment K.

(b) **Periodic Updating of RSP Project List**
The RSP Project List will be updated by the ISO periodically by adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee.

Updating of the RSP Project List shall be considered an update of the RSP to be reflected in the next RSP, as appropriate, pursuant to Section 3.1 of this Attachment.

(c) **RSP Project List Updating Procedures and Criteria**
As part of the periodic updating of the RSP Project List, the ISO: (i) shall modify (in accordance with the provisions of this Attachment) regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades to reflect changes to the PTF system configurations, including ongoing investments by Market Participants or other stakeholders; (ii) may add to and classify accordingly, regulated transmission solutions; (iii) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades previously identified in the RSP Project List if the ISO determines that the need for the proposed regulated transmission solution or the approved Transmission Upgrade no longer exists or is no longer feasible; and (iv) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades that have been displaced by an Interregional Transmission Project in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment. With regard to (iii) above, this may include a removal of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade because a market response meeting the need reaches the maturity specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment and has been
determined, pursuant to Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment, to meet the need described in the pertinent Needs Assessment, Public Policy Transmission Study or RSP, as applicable. In doing so, the ISO shall consult with and consider the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee. In addition, the ISO shall remove from the RSP Project List any Public Policy Transmission Upgrade if the ISO determines, with input from the Planning Advisory Committee, that the need to which the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade responds no longer exists.

If a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO, the entity responsible for the construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade proposed for removal from the RSP Project List. The provisions of Schedule 12 of this OATT shall apply to any cost reimbursement under this Section. Prior to finalizing the RSP, the ISO shall provide the Planning Advisory Committee with written information explaining the reasons for any removal under this Section.

(d) Posting of LSP Project Status

Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on its company website. The ISO’s posting of the RSP Project Lists will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP posting to be provided to the ISO by the PTOs.


4.1 Non-Applicability of Sections 4.1 through 4.3; Needs Assessments

The reliability planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a reliability need. The market efficiency planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a market efficiency need. The
public policy planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a public policy need. For needs identified initially as reliability, market efficiency or public policy needs, the collateral benefits of potential solutions to those needs shall not change the planning process applicable to those identified needs; notwithstanding the foregoing, the ISO shall report its views as to whether a project or preferred solution may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system as described in Sections 4A.5(e) or 4A.7, respectively, of this Attachment K. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 of this Attachment are not applicable to the planning of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, which is governed instead by Section 4A of this Attachment.

On a regular and ongoing basis, the ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall conduct assessments (i.e., Needs Assessments) of the adequacy of the PTF system, as a whole or in part, to maintain the reliability of such facilities while promoting the operation of efficient wholesale electric markets in New England. A Needs Assessment shall analyze whether the PTF in the New England Transmission System: (i) meet applicable reliability standards; (ii) have adequate transfer capability to support local, regional, and inter-regional reliability; (iii) support the efficient operation of the wholesale electric markets; (iv) are sufficient to integrate new resources and loads on an aggregate or regional basis; or (v) otherwise examine various aspects of its performance and capability. A Needs Assessment shall also identify: (i) the location and nature of any potential problems with respect to the PTF and (ii) situations that significantly affect the reliable and efficient operation of the PTF along with any critical time constraints for addressing the needs of the PTF to facilitate the development of market responses and to initiate the pursuit of regulated transmission solutions.

(a) **Triggers for Needs Assessments**

The ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall perform Needs Assessments, inter alia, if:

(i) a need for additional transfer capability is identified by the ISO in its ongoing evaluation of the PTF’s adequacy and performance;

(ii) a need for additional transfer capability is identified as a result of an ERO and/or NPCC reliability assessment or more stringent publicly available local reliability criteria, if any;
(iii) constraints or available transfer capability limitations that are identified possibly as a result of generation additions or retirements, evaluation of load forecasts or proposals for the addition of transmission facilities in the New England Control Area;

(iv) as requested by a stakeholder pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; or

(v) as otherwise deemed appropriate by the ISO as warranting such an assessment.

(b) Requests by Stakeholders for Needs Assessments for Economic Considerations
The ISO’s stakeholders may request the ISO to initiate a Needs Assessment to examine situations where potential regulated transmission solutions or market responses or investments could result in (i) a net reduction in total production cost to supply system load based on the factors specified in Attachment N of this OATT, (ii) reduced congestion, or (iii) the integration of new resources and/or loads on an aggregate or regional basis (an “Economic Study”).

Requests for Economic Studies shall be submitted, considered and prioritized as follows:

(i) By no later than April 1 of each year, any stakeholder may submit to the ISO for public posting on the ISO’s website a request for an Economic Study.

(ii) The ISO shall thereafter add any of its own proposals for Economic Studies. The ISO shall also develop a rough work scope and cost estimate for all requested Economic Studies, and develop preliminary prioritization based on the ISO’s perceived regional and/or, as coordinated with the applicable neighboring system, inter-area benefits to assist stakeholders in the prioritization of Economic Studies.

(iii) By no later than May 1 of each year, the ISO shall provide the foregoing information to the Planning Advisory Committee, and a Planning Advisory Committee meeting shall be held at which Economic Study proponents will provide an explanation of their request.
By no later than June 1 of each year, the ISO shall hold a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee for the members of the Planning Advisory Committee to discuss, identify and prioritize, as further facilitated by the ISO’s preparation of a straw priority list to be further discussed at such meeting, up to two (2) Economic Studies (the costs of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff) to be performed by the ISO in a given year taking into consideration their impact on the ISO budget and other priorities. The ISO may consider performing up to three (3) Economic Studies if a Public Policy Transmission Study will not be concurrently performed.

The ISO and the Planning Advisory Committee may agree to hold additional meetings to further discuss and resolve any issue concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.

If the Planning Advisory Committee, after discussions between the Planning Advisory Committee and ISO management, is not able to prioritize the Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO in a given year, any member of the Planning Advisory Committee must submit a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process pursuant to Section 12 of this Attachment, such request to be submitted no later than August 30, to resolve the issues concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.

The ISO will issue a notice to the Planning Advisory Committee detailing the prioritization of the Economic Studies as identified by the Planning Advisory Committee or, if a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process is submitted pursuant to Section 4.1.(b)(vi), as determined through that Process.

The foregoing timelines are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee. The ISO will provide periodic updates on the status of Economic Studies to the Planning Advisory Committee.

Economic Study requests not within the three studies identified in Section 4.1(b)(iv) to be performed in a given year may be requested and paid for by the study proponent.
(c) **Conduct of a Needs Assessment for Rejected De-List Bids**

(i) Where a Needs Assessment is underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the Needs Assessment will represent the resource with the rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid as being interconnected, but unavailable for reliability purposes in the base representation being used to assess the system to identify reliability needs that must be addressed.

(ii) Where there is not a Needs Assessment underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the ISO will initiate a Needs Assessment for that area.

(iii) In the case of a rejected Static De-List Bid or Dynamic De-List Bid, the ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, examine the unavailability of the resource(s) with the rejected bid as a sensitivity in a Needs Assessment, or examine the unavailability of the resource(s) in the base representation in a Needs Assessment. The ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, initiate a Needs Assessment for the purpose of modeling rejected Static De-List Bids or Dynamic De-List Bids where the ISO believes that the initiation of such a study is warranted.

(iv) Prior to the start of each New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall present to the Reliability Committee the status of any prior rejected Dynamic De-List Bids, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids being studied in the regional system planning process.

(d) **Notice of Initiation of Needs Assessments**

Prior to its commencement, the ISO shall provide notice of the initiation of a Needs Assessment to the Planning Advisory Committee consistent with Section 2 of this Attachment.

(e) **Preparation of Needs Assessment**
Needs Assessments may examine resource adequacy, transmission adequacy, projected congestion levels and other relevant factors as may be agreed upon from time to time. Needs Assessments shall also consider the views, if any, of the Planning Advisory Committee, State regulators or agencies, NESCOE, the Market Advisor to the ISO Board of Directors, and the ISO Board of Directors. A corresponding assessment shall be performed by the PTOs to identify any needs relating to the Non-PTF transmission facilities (of whatever voltage) that could affect the provision of Regional Transmission Service over the PTF.

(f) Treatment of Market Solutions in Needs Assessments

The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the regional system planning process. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding resources in Needs Assessments that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids and submitted Permanent De-List Bids and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding a proposed Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff. In the case where the Elective Transmission Upgrades are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, these Elective Transmission Upgrades shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Needs Assessment provided that the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section
I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff.

(g) **Needs Assessment Support**
For the development of the Needs Assessments, the ISO will coordinate with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee to support the ISO’s performance of Needs Assessments. To facilitate this support, the ISO will post on its website the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used to perform Needs Assessments. The ISO may establish requirements that any PTO or member of the Planning Advisory Committee must satisfy in order to access certain information used to perform Needs Assessments, due to ISO New England Information Policy and CEII constraints. The ISO may ask PTOs or Planning Advisory Committee members with special expertise to provide technical support or perform studies required to assess one or more potential needs that will be considered in the Needs Assessments process. These entities will provide, and the ISO will post on its website, the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used by those entities to perform studies. The ISO will post the draft results of any such Needs Assessment studies on its website. The ISO will convene meetings open to any representative of an entity that is a member of the Planning Advisory Committee to facilitate input on draft Needs Assessments studies and the inputs to those studies prior to the ISO’s completion of a draft Needs Assessment report to be reviewed by the entire Planning Advisory Committee pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment. All provisions of this subsection (g) relating to the provision and sharing of information shall be subject to the ISO-NE Information Policy.

(h) **Input from the Planning Advisory Committee**
Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be convened to identify additional considerations relating to a Needs Assessment that were not identified in support of initiating the assessment, and to provide input on the Needs Assessment’s scope, assumptions and procedures, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

(i) **Publication of Needs Assessment and Response Thereto**
The ISO shall report the results of Needs Assessments to the Planning Advisory Committee, subject to CEII constraints. Needs Assessments containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s password-protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. Needs Assessments will identify high-level functional requirements and characteristics for regulated transmission solutions and market responses that can meet the needs described in the assessment. The ISO will also present the Needs Assessments in appropriate market forums to facilitate market responses. Where the ISO forecasts that a solution is needed to solve reliability criteria violations in three years or less from the completion of a Needs Assessment (unless the solution to the Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade), and the requirements of Section 4.1(j) of this Attachment have been met or where there is only one Phase One Proposal or Stage One Proposal submitted in response to a public notice issued under Sections 4.3(a) or 4A.5(a) of this Attachment, respectively, or only one proposed solution that is selected to move on to Phase Two or Stage Two, the ISO will evaluate the adequacy of proposed regulated solutions by performing Solutions Studies, as described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment. Where the solution to a Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or where the forecast year of need for a solution that is likely to be a Reliability Transmission Upgrade is more than three years from the completion of a Needs Assessment, the ISO will conduct a solution process based on a two-stage competition, as described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment.

(j) **Requirements for Use of Solution Studies Rather than Competitive Process for Projects Based on Year of Need**

The following requirements must be met in order for the ISO to use Solution Studies in the circumstances described in Section 4.1(i) based on the solution’s year of need:

(i) The ISO shall separately identify and post on its website an explanation of the reliability criteria violations and system conditions that the region has a time-sensitive need to solve within three years of the completion of the relevant Needs Assessment. The explanation shall be in sufficient detail to allow stakeholders to understand the need and why it is time-sensitive.
(ii) In deciding whether to utilize Solutions Studies, such that the regulated transmission solution will be developed through a process led by the ISO and built by the PTO(s), the ISO shall:

(A) Provide to the Planning Advisory Committee and post on its website a full and supported written description explaining the decision to designate a Participating Transmission Owner as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the reliability project, including an explanation of other transmission or non-transmission options that the region considered but concluded would not sufficiently address the immediate reliability need, and the circumstances that generated the reliability need and an explanation of why that reliability need was not identified earlier.

(B) Provide a 30-day period during which comments from stakeholders on the posted description may be sent to the ISO, which comments will be posted on the website, as well.

(iii) The ISO shall maintain and post on its website a list of prior year designations of all projects in the limited category of transmission projects for which the PTO(s) was designated as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the project following the performance of Solution Studies. The list must include the project’s need-by date and the date the PTO(s) actually energized the project, i.e., placed the project into service. The ISO shall file such list with the Commission as an informational filing in January of each calendar year covering the designations of the prior calendar year, when applicable.

4.2 Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies, Where Competitive Solution Process of Section 4.3 Is Not Applicable

The procedures described in this Section 4.2 shall be utilized for the evaluation of regulated transmission solutions for reliability and market efficiency needs where the requirements of Sections 4.1(i) and/or (j) of this Attachment are satisfied. Otherwise, the procedures of Section 4.3 shall be utilized for that purpose.
(a) Evaluation and Development of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades

In the case of Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades, the ISO, in coordination with the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders, shall conduct or participate in studies (“Solutions Studies”) to evaluate whether proposed regulated transmission solutions meet the PTF system needs identified in Needs Assessments. The ISO, in coordination with affected stakeholders shall also identify regulated transmission projects for addressing the needs identified in Needs Assessments.

The ISO may form ISO-led targeted study groups to conduct Solutions Studies. Such study groups will include representatives of the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders. Through this process, the ISO may identify the solutions for the region that offer the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability, and feasibility to meet a need identified in a Needs Assessment in the required time frame. These solutions may differ from a transmission solution proposed by a transmission owner.

Proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to Needs Assessments shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the PTF system needs.

(b) Notice of Initiation of a Solutions Study

The ISO shall provide notice of the initiation and scope of a Solutions Study to the Planning Advisory Committee.

(c) Classification of Regulated Transmission Solutions as Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades or Reliability Transmission Upgrades

As described in Section 3.1 and 3.6(a) of this Attachment, proposed regulated transmission solutions determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to address needs identified in Needs Assessments shall be classified as a Reliability Transmission
Upgrade and/or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the standards set forth in Attachment N of this OATT.

(d) Identification of the Preferred Solution and Inclusion of Results of Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades in the RSP

The results of Solutions Studies related to Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades will be reported to the Planning Advisory Committee. After receiving feedback from the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO will identify the preferred solution. The ISO will inform the appropriate Transmission Owners in writing regarding the identification of the preferred solution.

Once identified, the preferred solution, as appropriate, will be reflected (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

4.3 Competitive Solution Process for Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades

(a) Public Notice Initiating Competitive Solution Process

The ISO will issue a public notice with respect to each Needs Assessment for which, pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment, a competitive solution process will be utilized. The notice will indicate that Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors may submit Phase One Proposals offering solutions that comprehensively address the identified needs.

A PTO or PTOs shall submit an individual or joint Phase One Proposal as a Backstop Transmission Solution for any need that would be solved by a project located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, and which it/they would therefore have an obligation to build under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA. Such PTOs may recover the costs of preparing Phase One Proposals in accordance with the mechanisms reflected in the OATT and the terms of the TOA.
A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Phase One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Needs Assessment (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must, before the deadline for the submission of Phase One Proposals, identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Phase One Proposal and Phase Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Phase One. Upon request by the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Phase One.

(b) Use and Control of Right of Way

Neither the submission of a project by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor nor the selection by the ISO of a project submitted by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor for inclusion in the RSP Project List shall alter a PTO’s use and control of an existing right of way, the retention, modification, or transfer of which remain subject to the relevant law or regulation, including property or contractual rights, that granted the right-of-way. Nothing in the processes described in this Attachment K requires a PTO to relinquish any of its rights-of-way in order to permit a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor to develop, construct or own a project.

(c) Information Required for Phase One Proposals; Study Deposit; Timing
Phase One Proposals shall provide the following information:

(i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;

(ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;

(iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;

(iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and

(v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a $100,000 study deposit per submitted proposal to support the cost of Phase One and Phase Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of $100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Phase One and Phase Two proposal.

Phase One Proposals must be submitted by the deadline specified in the posting by the ISO of the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment, which shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the notice. The ISO may reject submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

(d) LSP Coordination
Sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.
(e) Preliminary Review by ISO

If the sole Phase One Proposal in response to a given Needs Assessment has been submitted by PTO(s), proposing a project that would be located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, the ISO shall proceed under Section 4.2(a)-(d) of this Attachment, rather than pursuant to the procedures set forth in the remainder of this Section 4.3.

If more than one Phase One Proposal has been submitted in response to the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment K, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

(i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4.3(c) of this Attachment;

(ii) appears to satisfy the needs described in the Needs Assessment;

(iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and

(iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities, or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(f) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any minor deficiencies in meeting the requirements of Section 4.3(a) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Phase One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Phase One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO’s evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the
ISO of any Phase One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (f), or in Phase Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Phase Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Phase One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(g) **Listing of Qualifying Phase One Proposals**
For each Needs Assessment, the ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO’s website, a listing of Phase One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4.3(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input on the listing, and the listed proposals. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Phase Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Phase One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input. The ISO shall post on its website an explanation of why it has determined to exclude a Phase One Proposal from consideration in Phase Two.

(h) **Information Required for Phase Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Phase Two Solution**
Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects reflected on the final listing developed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Phase Two Solutions:

(i) updates of the information provided in Phase One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;

(ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

(iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Phase Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;
(iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Phase One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;

(v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;

(vi) design standards to be used;

(vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;

(viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

(ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;

(x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;

(xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and

(xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Phase Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4.3(g). The deadline for submittal of Phase Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Phase Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will identify the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe as the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution in response to each Needs Assessment. The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution, together with explanatory materials, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solution.
(i) **Reimbursement of Phase Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs**

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) for review as Phase Two Solutions shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff (and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA), all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Phase Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs’ existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor’s study deposit and the actual cost of the Phase One and Phase Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the ISO Tariff.

(j) **Inclusion of Preferred Phase Two Solution in RSP and/or RSP Project List**

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Phase Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO’s identification will select the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Phase Two Solution that its project has been selected for development. The ISO will include the project as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as appropriate, in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.
(k) **Milestone Schedules**

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4.3(j) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information, as specified by the ISO, showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall request the applicable PTO(s) to implement the Backstop Transmission Solution, and prepare a report explaining why it has reassigned the project. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO’s proposed course of action. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

4A. **Public Policy Transmission Studies; Public Policy Transmission Upgrades**

4A.1 **NESCOE Requests for Public Policy Transmission Studies**

No less often than every three years, by January 15 of that year, the ISO will post a notice indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee may: (i) provide NESCOE with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements, and (ii) provide the ISO with input regarding local (e.g., municipal and county) Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission
needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee may be held for this purpose. By no later than April 1 of that year, NESCOE may submit to the ISO in writing a request for a new Public Policy Transmission Study, or an update of a previously conducted study. The request will identify the Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and may identify particular NESCOE-identified public policy-related transmission needs as well. Along with any such request, NESCOE will provide the ISO with a written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate for potential solutions in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. The ISO will post the NESCOE request and explanation on the ISO’s website. If NESCOE does not provide that listing of identified transmission needs (which may consist of a NESCOE statement of its determination that no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process) and that explanation (which may consist of a NESCOE explanation of why no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process), the ISO will note on its website that a NESCOE listing and explanation has not been provided. In that circumstance, the ISO will determine subsequently (after opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee input), and post on its website an explanation of, which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated.

4A.1.1 Study of Federal Public Policy Requirements Not Identified by NESCOE; Local Public Policy Requirements

If a stakeholder believes that a federal Public Policy Requirement that may drive transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System has not been appropriately addressed by NESCOE, it may file with the ISO, no later than 15 days after the posting of NESCOE’s explanation as described in Section 4A.1 of this Attachment, a written request that explains the stakeholder’s reasoning and that seeks reconsideration by the ISO of NESCOE’s position regarding that requirement. Where the ISO agrees with a stated stakeholder position, or on its own finding, the ISO may perform an evaluation under Sections 4A.2 through 4A.4 of this
Attachment of a federal Public Policy Requirement not otherwise identified by NESCOE. The ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE will not be evaluated. In addition, the ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will not be evaluated.

4A.2 Preparation for Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input
Upon receipt of the NESCOE request, or as the result of the ISO’s consideration of a federal or local Public Policy Requirement pursuant to Section 4A.1.1, the ISO will prepare and post on its website a proposed scope for the Public Policy Transmission Study, and associated parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions), and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee by no later than June 1 of the request year. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the study’s scope, parameters and assumptions.

4A.3 Public Policy Transmission Studies
(a) Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input
With input from Planning Advisory Committee and potentially impacted PTOs, the ISO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study to develop a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of high-level concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The study’s results will be posted on the ISO’s website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input on the results of the initial phase of the study, and the scope, parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions) for any follow-on phase of the study. The ISO may – as a follow-on phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study – perform more detailed analysis and engineering work on the high-level concepts.

(b) Treatment of Market Solutions in Public Policy Transmission Studies
The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the Public Policy Transmission Study. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), Merchant Transmission Facilities and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate in the Public Policy Transmission Study information regarding resources that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate information regarding a proposed Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), and a commercial operation date has been ascertained, with the exception of Elective Transmission Upgrades that are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, which shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Public Policy Transmission Study.

4A.4 Response to Public Policy Transmission Studies

The results of the Public Policy Transmission Study will be provided to the Planning Advisory Committee and posted on the ISO’s website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on those results, including any updates from the states on any methods by which they are satisfying their respective Public Policy Requirements included in the Public Policy Transmission Study. The ISO’s costs of performing the Public Policy Transmission Study described in Section 4A.3 will be collected by the ISO pursuant to Schedule 1 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. Any prudently incurred PTO costs for assistance requested by the ISO to support the Public Policy Transmission Study will be recovered by the applicable PTO(s) in accordance with Attachment F and Schedule 21 of the Tariff.
The ISO will evaluate the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and provide the results of the Public Policy Transmission Study to Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for their use in preparing Stage One Proposals to develop, build and operate one or more projects consistent with the general design requirements identified by the ISO in the study.

4A.5 Stage One Proposals

(a) Information Required for Stage One Proposals

The ISO will post on its website a notice inviting, for each high-level general project concept identified by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.3(a) above, Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors to submit (by the deadline specified in the public notice, which shall be not less than 60 days from the date of posting the public notice) a Stage One Proposal providing the following information:

(i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
(ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
(iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;
(iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
(v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Stage One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Public Policy Transmission Study (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO
solicitation in Stage One. Upon request of the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Stage One.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a $100,000 study deposit per submitted project to support the cost of Stage One and Stage Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of $100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Stage One and Stage Two proposal.

(b) **LSP Coordination**
Sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(c) **Preliminary Review by ISO**
Upon receipt of Stage One Proposals, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

(i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4A.5(a);
(ii) appears to satisfy the needs driven by Public Policy Requirements, as reflected in the Public Policy Transmission Study;
(iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and;

(iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(d) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information
If the ISO identifies any deficiencies (compared with the requirements of Section 4A.5(a)) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Stage One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Stage One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO’s evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Stage One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (d), or in Stage Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Stage Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Stage One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(e) List of Qualifying Stage One Proposals
The ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO’s website, a list of Stage One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4A.5(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on that list. The ISO shall also indicate whether any of the projects may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Stage Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Stage One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO’s protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input.
4A.6 Reimbursement of Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors that are requested by NESCOE in writing or by one or more states' governors or regulatory authorities directly to submit a Stage One Proposal shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and the TOA, their prudently incurred costs from the Regional Network Load of the states identified by NESCOE in the written communication as having made the request or from the Regional Network Load of the states that made the request directly. Stage One Proposal costs shall otherwise not be subject to recovery under the ISO Tariff.

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA, all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Stage Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs’ existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor’s study deposit and the actual cost of the Stage One and Stage Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the Tariff.

4A.7 Information Required for Stage Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Stage Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects listed pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Stage Two Solutions:
(i) updates of the information provided in Stage One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;

(ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

(iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Stage Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;

(iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Stage One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;

(v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;

(vi) design standards to be used;

(vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;

(viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

(ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;

(x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;

(xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and

(xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.
Stage Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4A.5(e). The deadline for submittal of Stage Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Stage Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Stage Two Solution(s), along with its views as to whether the preferred solution(s) also satisfies identified reliability needs of the system, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solutions.

4A.8 Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List; Milestone Schedules; Removal from RSP Project List

(a) Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Stage Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO’s identification will select the project that best addresses the identified Public Policy Requirement while utilizing the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Stage Two Solution that its project has been selected for development, and include the project as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional Public Policy Transmission Upgrades are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(b) Milestone Schedules

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4A.8(a) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and
shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information (as specified by the ISO) showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report, including a proposed course of action. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO’s proposed course of action. The proposed course of action may include, for example, a consideration and selection of another Stage Two Proposal relating to the pertinent Public Policy Requirement, or the re-solicitation of Stage One Proposals to meet the pertinent Public Policy Requirement. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

(c) Removal from RSP Project List
If a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO pursuant to Section 3.6(c), the entity responsible for the construction of the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing,
engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of that Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4A.9 Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

The costs of Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade(s) that are required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan in accordance with Section 4A.8 shall be allocated in accordance with Schedule 21 of the ISO OATT.

4B. Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors

4B.1 Periodic Evaluation of Applications

The ISO will periodically evaluate applications submitted by an entity that seeks to qualify as a sponsor of a proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4B.2 Information To Be Submitted

The application to be submitted to the ISO by an entity desiring to be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor will include the following information:

(i) the current and expected capabilities of the applicant to finance and construct a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade and operate and maintain it for the life of the project;

(ii) the financial resources of the applicant;

(iii) the technical and engineering qualifications and experience of the applicant;

(iv) if applicable, the previous record of the applicant regarding construction and maintenance of transmission facilities;

(v) demonstrated capability of the applicant to adhere to construction, maintenance and operating Good Utility Practices, including the capability to respond to outages;

(vi) the ability of the applicant to comply with all applicable reliability standards; and

(vii) demonstrated ability of the applicant to meet development and completion schedules.

4B.3 Review of Qualifications
The ISO shall review each application for completeness. The ISO will notify each applicant within 30 calendar days of receipt of such application whether the application is complete, or identify any deficiencies in provision of the information required by Section 4B.2 of this Attachment. An applicant notified of deficiencies must provide any remedial information within 30 calendar days of the receipt of such notice. Thereafter, the ISO will determine whether the applicant is physically, technically, legally, and financially capable of constructing a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in a timely and competent manner, and operating and maintaining the facilities consistent with Good Utility Practice and applicable reliability criteria for the life of the project, and use its best efforts to inform the applicant within 90 days from the date on which it has a completed application on file with the ISO whether it has met all of these criteria. A PTO determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. A non-PTO entity determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will, upon its execution of the Non-incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (in the form specified in Attachment O of the OATT) and the Market Participant Service Agreement, be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

4B.4 List of Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors; Annual Certification

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors are listed in Appendix 3 of this Attachment K. Each Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO annually a certification that the information initially submitted in response to Section 4B.2 of this Attachment K has not changed adversely in a material fashion, or (if a material adverse change has occurred in the intervening year) submit instead a new application for qualification as a project sponsor. In the latter case, the entity shall not be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor unless and until the ISO approves its new application.

5. Supply of Information and Data Required for Regional System Planning

The Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, Transmission Customers, Market Participants and other entities requesting transmission or interconnection service or proposing the integration of facilities to PTF in the New England Transmission System or alternatives to such facilities, and stakeholders requesting a Needs Assessment pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, shall supply, as required by the Tariff, the Participants Agreement, MPSAs, applicable transmission operating agreements, and/or other existing
agreements, protocols and procedures, or upon request by the ISO, and subject to required CEII and confidentiality protections as specified in Section 2.4 of this Attachment, any information (including cost estimates) and data that is reasonably required to prepare an RSP or to perform a Needs Assessment or Solutions Study.

6. Regional, Local and Interregional Coordination

6.1 Regional Coordination

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the ISO OATT, applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, and/or this Attachment. Pursuant to Section II.49 of this OATT and Sections 3.02, 3.05 and 3.09 of the TOA, the ISO has Operating Authority or control over all PTF and Non-PTF within the New England Control Area, which are utilized for the provision of transmission service under this OATT. The ISO also has Operating Authority or control over the United States portions of the HVDC ties to Quebec and over Merchant Transmission Facilities and Other Transmission Facilities, pursuant to this OATT or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols. The ISO, however, is not responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF, OTF and MTF. As provided in Section 6.2 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, the PTOs are responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF and coordinating such planning efforts with the ISO. Pursuant to the OATT and/or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, the transmission owners of OTF and MTF are required to participate in the ISO’s regional system planning process and perform and/or support studies of the impacts of regional system projects on their respective facilities.

6.2 Local Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the annual RSP shall be developed in coordination with the local system plans of the PTOs. In accordance with the TOA and OATT provisions identified in Section 6.1 of this Attachment, the PTOs have responsibility for planning Non-PTF. The PTOs conduct planning of Non-PTF using the LSP process outlined in Section 2.5 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, in coordination with the ISO, other entities interconnected with the New England Transmission System, Transmission Customers and stakeholders, and in accordance with the provisions in the TOA, the OATT and the Planning and Reliability Criteria. The openness and transparency of the LSP process is intended to be consistent with the regional system planning process.
6.3 Interregional Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the annual RSP shall be developed in coordination with the similar plans of the surrounding ISOs/RTOs and Control Areas pursuant to the Northeastern Planning Protocol and other agreements with neighboring systems (including entities that are not Parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) and NPCC.


Pursuant to Section 7 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol (which is posted on the web at www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc, the Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (“JIPC”) reviews regional needs and solutions identified in the regional planning processes of the ISO, NYISO and PJM in order to identify, with input from the Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (“IPSAC”), the potential for Interregional Transmission Projects that could meet regional needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than regional transmission projects. All members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be considered IPSAC members. The JIPC will coordinate studies deemed necessary to allow the effective consideration by the regions, in the same general timeframe, of a proposed Interregional Transmission Project in comparison to regional transmission solutions. Any stakeholder may propose in the New England planning process, for evaluation under Section 4.2 or 4A (as applicable) of Attachment K, an Interregional Transmission Project (or project concept) that may be more efficient or cost-effective than a regional transmission solution. If a proposed Interregional Transmission Project is approved in each region in which the project is located, the corresponding New England regional transmission project(s) will be displaced in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment, and the costs of the Interregional Transmission Project will be allocated among the regions based on the formula provided in Schedule 1 of this OATT, or in accordance with another funding arrangement filed with and accepted by the Commission. The amount of the costs of an Interregional Transmission Project allocated as the responsibility of New England pursuant to the methodology referenced in Section 6.3(a) of this Attachment shall be allocated within New England as specified in Schedule 1 of the ISO OATT.
(b) Other Interregional Assessments and Other Interregional Transmission Projects

Interregional system assessments and/or interregional system expansion planning studies may be performed periodically by the ISO with Planning Authorities who are not parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or with the JIPC pursuant to Section 6 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or both. The ISO shall convene periodic meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee (which may be combined with meetings of the IPSAC), to provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning such assessments and studies. To the extent that an Interregional Transmission Project is agreed to by ISO and by another region (not a Party to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) in which a portion of the project is located, the related cost allocation and operating agreements will be filed with the Commission (and, as applicable, with Canadian jurisdictional agencies) in accordance with existing filing rights.

7. Procedures for Development and Approval of the RSP

7.1 Initiation of RSP

Every year, the ISO shall initiate an effort to develop its annual RSP and solicit input on regional system needs for the RSP from the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee shall meet to perform its respective functions in connection with the preparation of the RSP, as specified in Section 2 of this Attachment.

7.2 Draft RSP; Public Meeting

On or about August of each year, the ISO shall provide a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee and input from that Committee shall be received and considered in preparing and revising subsequent drafts. The ISO shall post the draft RSP and provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of a meeting to review the draft RSP as specified in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

On or about September of each year, the ISO shall issue a second draft of the RSP to be presented by the ISO staff to the ISO Board of Directors for approval. The draft RSP shall incorporate the results of any Needs Assessment, and corresponding Solutions Studies, performed since the last RSP was approved. A subcommittee of that Board shall hold a public meeting, at their discretion, to receive input directly and to discuss any proposed revisions to the RSP. The final recommended RSP shall be presented to the ISO Board of Directors no later than September 30 of each year and shall be acted on by the ISO Board of Directors.
Directors within 60 days of receipt. The foregoing timeframes are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee.

7.3 **Action by the ISO Board of Directors on RSP; Request for Alternative Proposals**

(a) **Action by ISO Board of Directors on RSP**

The ISO Board of Directors may approve the recommended draft RSP as submitted, modify the RSP or remand all or any portion of it back with guidance for development of a revised recommendation. The Board of Directors may consider the RSP in executive session, and shall consider in its deliberations the views of the subcommittee of the Board of Directors reflecting the public meeting held pursuant to Section 7.2 of this Attachment. In considering whether to approve the draft RSP, the Board of Directors may, if it finds a proposed Reliability Benefit Upgrade not to be viable, or if no Reliability Benefit Upgrade has been proposed, direct the ISO staff to meet with the affected load serving entities and State entities in order to develop an interim solution. Should that effort fail, and as a last resort, the Board of Directors may direct the ISO to issue a Request For Alternative Proposal (“RFAP”), subject to the procedures described below, and may withhold approval of the draft RSP, or portions thereof, pending the results of that RFAP and any Commission action on any resulting jurisdictional contract or funding mechanism. The ISO shall provide a written explanation as to any subsequent changes or modification made in the final version of the RSP.

(b) **Requests For Alternative Proposals**

(i) The RFAP shall seek generation, demand-side and merchant transmission alternatives that can be implemented rapidly and provide substantial reliability benefits over the period solicited in the RFAP, and normally will focus on an interim (“gap”) solution until an identified Reliability Transmission Upgrade has been placed in-service. The ISO will file a proposed RFAP with the Commission for approval at least 60 days prior to its issuance. The filing shall explain why the issuance of an RFAP is necessary.

(ii) The ISO staff shall provide the Board of Directors and subject to confidentiality requirements, the Planning Advisory Committee with an analysis of the alternatives offered in response to the RFAP, and provide a recommendation together with a funding mechanism reflecting input from the Planning Advisory Committee.
(iii) The ISO may enter into contracts awarded pursuant to an RFAP process, and/or propose a funding mechanism. Bidders that are awarded contracts through the RFAP process shall file those contracts with the Commission for approval of the rates to be charged thereunder to the extent that such contracts are for services that are jurisdictional to the Commission. The ISO shall file related or separate funding mechanisms with the Commission as well. All other contracts entered into pursuant to an RFAP shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes.

(iv) The Board of Directors will reflect the results of the RFAP process in the approved RSP.

8. Obligations of PTOs to Build; PTOs’ Obligations, Conditions and Rights
In accordance with the TOA, PTOs designated by the ISO as the appropriate entities to construct and own or finance Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP shall construct and own or finance such facilities or enter into appropriate contracts to fulfill such obligations. In the event that a PTO: (i) does not construct or indicates in writing that it does not intend to construct a Transmission Upgrade included in the RSP; or (ii) demonstrates that it has failed (after making a good faith effort) to obtain necessary approvals or property rights under applicable law, the ISO shall promptly file with the Commission a report on the results of the planning process, which report shall include a report from the PTO responsible for the planning, design or construction of such No. 3 Open Access Transmission Tariff Section II – Attachment K – Regional System Planning Process Transmission Upgrade, in order to permit the Commission to determine what action, if any, it should take.

In connection with regional system planning, the ISO will not propose to impose on any PTO obligations or conditions that are inconsistent with the explicit provisions of the TOA or deprive any PTO of any of the rights set forth in the TOA.

Subject to necessary approvals and compliance with Section 2.06 of the TOA, nothing in this OATT shall affect the right of any PTO to expand or modify its transmission facilities in the New England Transmission System on its own initiative or in response to an order of an appropriate regulatory
authority. Such expansions or modifications shall conform with: (a) Good Utility Practice; (b) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of national, regional, and local reliability councils that may be in existence; and (c) the ISO and relevant PTO criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies. The ISO reserves its right to challenge the permitting of such expansions or modifications.

9. Merchant Transmission Facilities

9.1 General
Subject to compliance with the requirements of the Tariff and any other applicable requirements with respect to the interconnection of bulk power facilities with the New England Transmission System, any entity shall have the right to propose and construct the addition of transmission facilities (“Merchant Transmission Facilities”), none of the costs of which shall be covered under the cost allocation provisions of this OATT. Any such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the requirements of Section 9.2 of this Attachment. In performing studies in connection with the RSP, the prospect that proposed Merchant Transmission Facilities will be completed shall be accounted for as will the prospect that proposed generating units will be completed.

9.2 Operation and Integration
All Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to: (i) an agreement to transfer to the ISO operational control authority over any facilities which constitute part of the Merchant Transmission Facilities that are to be integrated with, or that will affect, the New England Transmission System; and (ii) taking such other action as may be required to make the facility available for use as part of the New England Transmission System.

9.3 Control and Coordination
Until such time as a Merchant Transmission Owner has transferred operational control over its Merchant Transmission Facilities to the ISO pursuant to Section 9.2(i), all such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the operational control, scheduling and maintenance coordination of the System Operator in accordance with the Tariff.

10. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades
The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included with the status of “Planned” in the RSP Project List as defined in Section 3.6 of this Attachment shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 12 of this OATT.

11. Allocation of ARRs
The allocation of ARRs in connection with Transmission Upgrades is addressed in Section III.C.8 of the Tariff.

12. Dispute Resolution Procedures
12.1 Objective
Section 12 of this Attachment sets forth a dispute resolution process (the “Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process”) through which regional transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

12.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections
All information disclosed in the course of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

12.3 Eligible Parties
Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a Reviewable Determination, defined in Section 12.4(a) of this Attachment, with respect to the regional system planning process described in this Attachment is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this Dispute Resolution Process (“Disputing Party”).

12.4 Scope
In order to ensure that the regional transmission planning process set forth under this Attachment moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the ISO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of
the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) **Reviewable Determinations**

The determinations that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 that include certain procedural and substantive challenges that may arise at limited designated key decision points in the regional transmission planning process for PTF. Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a designated key decision point conform to the requirements set forth in this Attachment. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a designated key decision point was supported by adequate basis in fact.

The designated key decision points for Reviewable Determinations shall be limited to the following:

(i) Results of a Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.1 of this Attachment;

(ii) Updates to the RSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in Section 3.6 of this Attachment;

(iii) Results of Solutions Studies conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.2 of this Attachment;
(iv) Consideration of market responses in Needs Assessments as specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment;

(v) Substance of Economic Studies to be conducted by the ISO in a given year as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; and

(vi) Prioritization of Economic Studies to be performed in a given year where the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to prioritize them as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment.

(b) **Material Adverse Impact**

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the ISO, and (iii) as a result the ISO made an incorrect decision or determination.

12.5 **Notice and Comment**

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a Reviewable Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable Determination following the ISO’s presentation of such Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the ISO (“Request for Dispute Resolution”). A Request for Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be addressed to the ISO's Chair of the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by the ISO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the ISO shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of an ISO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the ISO’s designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the ISO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The party filing the Request for Dispute
Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the ISO’s designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The ISO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

12.6 Dispute Resolution Procedures

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiations

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiation within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.
12.7  Notice of Dispute Resolution Process Results
Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 12.6(b) or Section 12.6(c) of this Attachment, the ISO shall distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

13.  Rights Under The Federal Power Act
Nothing in this Attachment shall restrict the rights of any party to file a Complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.
APPENDIX 1
ATTACHMENT K - LOCAL
LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

1. Local System Planning Process

1.1 General
In circumstances where transmission system planning for Non-Pool Transmission Facilities (“Non-PTF”)
1, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, is taking place in New England that is not
incorporated into the RSP planning process, the following Local System Plan (“LSP”) process will be
utilized for transmission planning purposes. The purpose of the LSP is to enable formal stakeholder input
to planning for Non-PTF that is not incorporated into the RSP. The LSP shall ensure the opportunity for
Planning Advisory Committee participation in the LSP process. The LSP will not be subject to approval
by the ISO or the ISO Board under the RSP.

1.2 Planning Advisory Committee Review
The Planning Advisory Committee shall periodically provide input and feedback to the PTOs concerning
the development of the LSP and the conduct of associated system enhancement and expansion studies. It
is contemplated that LSP issues for identified local areas will be periodically addressed at the end of
regularly scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. Regular meetings of the Planning Advisory
Committee shall be extended as necessary to serve the purposes of this section. Each PTO contemplating
the addition of new Non-PTF will present its respective LSP to the Planning Advisory Committee not less
than once per year. Not less than every three years, each PTO will post a notice as part of its LSP
process indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee, NESCOE, or any state may
provide the PTO with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving
transmission needs relating to Non-PTF and regarding particular local transmission needs driven by
Public Policy Requirements. The PTO will provide a written explanation, to be posted on the ISO
website, of why suggested transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements will or will not be
evaluated for potential solutions in the LSP planning process.

1.3 Role of the PTOs

1 For absence of doubt, the PTOs clarify that Non-PTF is meant to include Category B and Local Area Facilities as defined by the TOA.
Each PTO will be responsible for administering the LSP process pertaining to its own Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, by presenting LSP information to the Planning Advisory Committee, developing an appropriate needs analysis and addressing LSP needs within its local area. In developing its LSP, each PTO will ensure comparable treatment of similarly situated customers or potential customers and will take into consideration data, comments and specific requests supplied by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders. To the extent that generation and/or demand resources are identified that could impact planning for Non-PTF, each PTO will take such resources into account when developing the LSP for its facilities, consistent with Good Utility Practice. Each PTO will also be responsible for addressing issues or concerns arising out of Planning Advisory Committee review of its proposed LSP and posting its LSP and the LSP Project List.

1.4 Description of LSP

The LSP shall describe the projected improvements to Non-PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability or as Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, and shall reflect the results of such reviews within the limited geographical areas that pertain to the LSP, as determined by each PTO (“LSP Needs Assessments”), and corresponding system planning and expansion studies. The LSP Needs Assessments will be coordinated with the RSP and include the information that the ISO-NE incorporates into the RSP plans, as applicable. The proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to LSP Needs Assessments shall also identify any RSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the Non-PTF system needs.

The LSP shall identify the planning process, criteria, data, and assumptions used to develop the LSP. To the extent the current LSP utilizes data, assumptions or criteria used by the ISO in the RSP, any such data, assumptions or criteria will also be identified in the LSP.

Each PTO shall consult with NESCOE and applicable states, local authorities and stakeholders to consider their views prior to including a Local Public Transmission Upgrade in its LSP, as described in Section 1.6.

Each PTO’s LSP will be made available on a website for review by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders, subject to the ISO New England Information Policy and
CEII restrictions or requirements. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and the RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP posting.

The LSP of a particular PTO shall be posted not less than 3 business days prior to its presentation by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers, and other stakeholders will have 30 days from the date of the PTO’s presentation to the Planning Advisory Committee to provide any written comments for consideration by the PTO. The LSP shall specify the physical characteristics of the solutions that can meet the needs identified in the LSP. The LSP shall provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations and operating characteristics of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

Each year’s LSP shall be based upon the LSP completed in the prior year by either recertifying the results of the prior LSP or providing specific updates.

1.5 Economic Studies
To the extent that the ISO selects any Economic Studies pursuant to Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K or otherwise performs Economic Studies that will impact Non-PTF, the PTOs will coordinate with the ISO in the performance of such Economic Studies.

1.6 Public Policy Studies
As part of the LSP process, each PTO will evaluate potential transmission solutions on its Non-PTF system that are likely to be both efficient and cost-effective for meeting Public Policy Requirements.

1.6A Process to Identify Public Policy Requirements Driving Non-PTF Transmission Needs
Within six months of publication, each PTO will review the Public Policy Requirements posted by the ISO to determine and evaluate at a high level any public policy needs potentially driving transmission needs on their respective Non-PTF systems. Such evaluations will also include potential public policy needs suggested by third parties. Each PTO will review NESCOE’s written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. If NESCOE does not provide a listing
of identified transmission needs and explanation, each PTO will review the ISO’s explanations of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. In addition, each PTO will review the ISO’s explanation of which transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated in the regional system planning process and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy requirements will not be evaluated. Each PTO will then determine if any of the posted state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements are driving a need on its Non-PTF transmission system and will include the non-PTF needs in its local planning process.

As part of the local planning process, each PTO will list the identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated, and provide an explanation of why any identified transmission needs will not be evaluated as part of its LSP. The list will be posted in the PTO’s LSP and presented at the annual PAC meeting. The PTO will seek input at the PAC meeting from stakeholders about whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs and seek recommendations about whether to proceed with such studies. A stakeholder may provide written input on the list within 30 days from the date of presentation for consideration by the PTO. Each PTO will then confirm, or modify if appropriate, its determination of which identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated and which will not be evaluated, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary.

1.6B Procedure for Evaluating Potential Public Policy Solutions on the Non-PTF

Once it has been determined that a non-PTF need driven by state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated, each PTO will prepare a scope and associated assumptions as part of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study. For those needs where a scope is available, a PTO may present the proposed scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study within its LSP and as part of its LSP presentation described in Section 1.6A. A stakeholder may provide written input to the scope within 30 days after the LSP presentation for the PTO to consider.

Each PTO will schedule a follow-up PAC meeting presentation for additional stakeholder input within 4 months after the PTO’s LSP presentation as described in Section 1.6A if the proposed scope for a Public Policy Local Transmission Study was not included in its annual LSP presentation. Within 30 days after
the follow-up meeting, a stakeholder may provide written input to the scope for the PTO to consider. Subsequently, the PTO will determine the study scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study and revise its annual LSP.

In preparation of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study that will be presented to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year, the PTO will undertake the following: First, the PTO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Local Transmission Study to develop an estimate of costs and benefits and post its preliminary results on a website. Second, the PTO will use good faith efforts to contact stakeholders and the appropriate state and/or local authorities informing them of the posting, requesting input on whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, and seeking recommendations about whether to proceed with further planning and construction of a Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade. Each PTO will then make a determination of whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, or will select its final solution, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary. Results of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study will be provided to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year.

2. **Posting of LSP Project List**

Each PTO shall develop, maintain and make available on a website, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions that may meet LSP needs (the “LSP Project List”). The LSP Project List will be updated at least annually. The LSP Project List shall also provide reasons for any new Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, any change in status of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, or any removal of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, from the LSP Project List. Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on a website in a format comparable to the manner in which RSP plans and projects are posted on the RSP Project List. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP Project List.

3. **Posting of Assumptions and Criteria**

Each PTO will make available on a website the planning criteria and assumptions used in its current LSP. A link to each PTO’s planning criteria and assumptions will be posted on the ISO website.
4. **Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades**

The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included in the LSP Project List of this Appendix 1 shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 21 of this OATT.

5. **LSP Dispute Resolution Procedures**

5.1 **Objective**

Section 5 of this Appendix 1 sets forth an LSP dispute resolution process (the "LSP Dispute Resolution Process") through which LSP-related transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

5.2 **Confidential Information and CEII Protections**

All information disclosed in the course of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

5.3 **Eligible Parties**

Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a PTO’s Reviewable Determination with respect to the LSP transmission planning process described in this Appendix 1 is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this LSP Dispute Resolution Process ("Disputing Party").

5.4 **Scope**

In order to ensure that the LSP transmission planning process set forth under this Appendix 1 moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the applicable PTO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the
Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) **Reviewable Determinations:**

The LSP determinations made by the applicable PTO that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 ("Reviewable LSP Determination") shall include certain procedural and substantive challenges at designated key decision points during the LSP transmission planning process for Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades ("Key LSP Decision Points"). Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a Key LSP Decision Point conform to the requirements set forth in this Appendix 1. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a Key LSP Decision Point was supported by adequate basis in fact. The Key LSP Decision Points shall be limited to the following:

(i) Results of an LSP Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by a PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1;

(ii) Updates to the LSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated Non-PTF transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in this Appendix 1;

(iii) Results of Non-PTF transmission solution studies, including any Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade studies, conducted and communicated by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1; and

(iv) Consideration of market responses in LSP Needs Assessments as specified in this Appendix 1.
(b) Material Adverse Impact
In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion made by the applicable PTO. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the PTO, and (iii) as a result thereof, the PTO made an incorrect decision or determination.

5.5 Notice and Comment
A Disputing Party aggrieved by a PTO’s Reviewable LSP Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable LSP Determination following the PTO’s presentation of such LSP Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the Applicable PTO ("Request for LSP Dispute Resolution").

A Request for LSP Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be provided to the applicable PTO and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by a PTO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the PTO, in coordination with the ISO, shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of a PTO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the PTO’s designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the PTO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The Disputing Party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the PTO’s designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The PTO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

5.6 Dispute Resolution Procedure
(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee
The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any LSP related dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the applicable PTO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners and the ISO (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) **Resolution Through Informal Negotiation**

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the Parties, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) **Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution**

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiations within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such LSP related dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the LSP related dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.

5.7 **Notice of Results of Dispute Resolution**

Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 5.6(b) or 5.6(c) of this Appendix 1, the PTO shall distribute to members of the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

5.8 **Rights under the Federal Power Act:**
Nothing in this Appendix 1 shall restrict the rights of any party to file a complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.
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ENTITIES
APPENDIX 2

ATTACHMENT K

LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

Town of Braintree Electric Light Department
Central Maine Power Company
Chicopee Municipal Lighting Department
Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative
The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department
Emera Maine
Green Mountain Power Corporation
The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department
Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company
Maine Electric Power Company
Middleborough Gas and Electric Department
New England Power Company
New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.
New Hampshire Transmission, LLC
Norwood Municipal Light Department
Town of Reading Municipal Light Department
Shrewsbury Electric and Cable Operations
Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant
The United Illuminating Company
Unitil Energy Systems, Inc. and Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company
Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc.
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority
Vermont Transco LLC
Town of Wallingford – Electric Division
New England Hydro-Transmission Electric Company Inc.
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III.13.1.4.6 Conversion of Active Demand Resources Defined at the Load Zone to Active Demand Resources Defined at Dispatch Zones.

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III.13.1.4.8 [Reserved.]


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III.13.4.6 [Reserved.]

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III.13.5.1.1.2 Application.

III.13.5.1.1.3 ISO Review.

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III.13.5.2.1 Process for Approval of Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.

III.13.5.2.1.1 Timing.
III.13.5.2.1.2 Application.
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III.13.5.3.2.1 Timing.
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III.13.6.1.1.2 Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Generating Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.
III.13.6.1.1.3 [Reserved.]
III.13.6.1.1.4 [Reserved.]
III.13.6.1.1.5 Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.
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III.13.6.1.2.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.
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III.13.6.1.3.3 Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.6.1.4 Intermittent Settlement Only Resources and Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.6.1.4.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.1.4.2 Additional Requirements for Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.6.1.5 Demand Resources.

III.13.6.1.5.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.1.5.2 Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Capacity Resource Operating Characteristics.

III.13.6.1.5.3 Additional Requirements for Demand Resources.

III.13.6.1.5.4 Demand Response Auditing.

III.13.6.1.5.4.1 General Auditing Requirements for Demand Resources Excluding Demand Response Capacity Resources.

III.13.6.1.5.4.2 General Auditing Requirements for Demand Response Capacity Resources.

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III.13.6.1.5.4.3.1 Seasonal DR Audit Requirement.

III.13.6.1.5.4.3.2 Failure to Request or Perform an Audit.

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III.13.6.1.5.4.3.3.1 Demand Response Capacity Resources.

III.13.6.1.5.4.4 Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit.

III.13.6.1.5.4.5 Additional Audits.

III.13.6.1.5.4.6 Audit Methodologies.

III.13.6.1.5.4.7 Requesting and Performing an Audit.

III.13.6.1.5.4.8 New Demand Response Asset Audits.

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III.13.6.1.5.5. Reporting of Forecast Hourly Demand Reduction.

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III.13.6.2 Resources Without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

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III.13.6.2.1.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.2.1.1.1 Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

III.13.6.2.1.1.2 Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

III.13.6.2.1.2 Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.2.2 [Reserved.]

III.13.6.2.3 Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.6.2.3.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.2.3.2 Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.6.2.4 Intermittent Settlement Only Resources and Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.6.2.4.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.2.4.2 Additional Requirements for Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.6.2.5 Demand Resources.

III.13.6.2.5.1 Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.2.5.1.1 Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.

III.13.6.2.5.1.2 Real-Time Energy Market Participation.

III.13.6.2.5.2 Additional Requirements for Demand Response Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.3 Exporting Resources.


III.13.6.4.1 Real-Time High Operating Limit.

III.13.7 Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

III.13.7.1 Performance Measures.
III.13.7.1 Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.7.1.1 Definition of Shortage Events.

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III.13.7.1.1.2 Hourly Availability Scores.

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III.13.7.1.1.4 Availability Adjustments.

III.13.7.1.2 Import Capacity on External Interfaces with Enhanced Scheduling

III.13.7.1.2.1 Availability Adjustments

III.13.7.1.1.5 Poorly Performing Resources.

III.13.7.1.2 Import Capacity.

III.13.7.1.2.1 Availability Adjustments.

III.13.7.1.3 Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.7.1.4 Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.1.4.1 Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.1.4.2 Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.1.5 Demand Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.1 Capacity Values of Demand Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.1.1 [Reserved.]

III.13.7.1.5.2 Capacity Values of Certain Distributed Generation.

III.13.7.1.5.3 Demand Reduction Values.

III.13.7.1.5.4 Calculation of Demand Reduction Values for On-Peak Demand Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.4.1 Summer Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.4.2 Winter Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.5 Calculation of Demand Reduction Values for Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.5.1 Summer Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.5.2 Winter Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.6 [Reserved.]
III.13.7.1.5.6.1  [Reserved.]

III.13.7.1.5.6.2  [Reserved.]

III.13.7.1.5.7  Demand Reduction Values for Real-Time Demand Response Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.7.1  Summer Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.7.2  Winter Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.7.3  Determination of Hourly Calculated Demand Response Resource Performance Values for Real-Time Demand Response Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.7.3.1  Determination of the Hourly Real-Time Demand Response Resource Deviation.

III.13.7.1.5.8  Demand Reduction Values for Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.8.1  Summer Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.8.2  Winter Seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.7.1.5.8.3  Determination of Hourly Calculated Demand Resource Performance Values for Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.8.3.1  Determination of the Hourly Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Deviation.

III.13.7.1.5.9  Determination of Hourly Calculated Demand Resource Performance Values for Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources starting with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2012.

III.13.7.1.5.10  Demand Response Capacity Resources.

III.13.7.1.5.10.1  Hourly Available MW.

III.13.7.1.5.10.1.1  Adjusted Audited Demand Reduction.

III.13.7.1.5.10.1.2  Hourly Adjusted Audited Demand Reduction.

III.13.7.1.5.10.2  Availability Adjustments.

III.13.7.1.6  Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.2  Payments and Charges to Resources.
III.13.7.2.1 Generating Capacity Resources.
III.13.7.2.1.1 Monthly Capacity Payments.
III.13.7.2.2 Import Capacity.
III.13.7.2.2.A Export Capacity.
III.13.7.2.3 Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.7.2.4 Settlement Only Resources.
III.13.7.2.4.1 Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
III.13.7.2.4.2 Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
III.13.7.2.5 Demand Resources.
III.13.7.2.5.1 Monthly Capacity Payments for All Resources Except Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.
III.13.7.2.5.2 Monthly Capacity Payments for Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.
III.13.7.2.5.3. Energy Settlement for Real-Time Demand Response Resources.
III.13.7.2.5.4. Energy Settlement for Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.
III.13.7.2.5.4.1 Adjustment for Net Supply Generator Assets.
III.13.7.2.6 Self-Supplied FCA Resources.
III.13.7.2.7 Adjustments to Monthly Capacity Payments.
III.13.7.2.7.1 Adjustments to Monthly Capacity Payments of Generating Capacity Resources.
III.13.7.2.7.1.1 Peak Energy Rents.
III.13.7.2.7.1.1.1 Hourly PER Calculations.
III.13.7.2.7.1.1.2 Monthly PER Application.
III.13.7.2.7.1.2 Availability Penalties.
III.13.7.2.7.1.3 Availability Penalty Caps.
III.13.7.2.7.1.4 Availability Credits for Capacity Generating Capacity Resources, Import Capacity Resources and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.
III.13.7.2.7.2 Import Capacity.
III.13.7.2.7.2.1  External Transaction Offer and Delivery Performance Adjustments.

III.13.7.2.7.2.2  Exceptions.

III.13.7.2.7.3  Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.7.2.7.4  Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.2.7.4.1  Non-Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.2.7.4.2  Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.7.2.7.5  Demand Resources.

III.13.7.2.7.5.1  Calculation of Monthly Capacity Variances.

III.13.7.2.7.5.2  Negative Monthly Capacity Variances.

III.13.7.2.7.5.3  Positive Monthly Capacity Variances.

III.13.7.2.7.5.4  Determination of Net Demand Resource Performance Penalties and Demand Resource Performance Incentives.

III.13.7.2.7.6  Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.3  Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.3.1  Calculations of Capacity Requirement and Capacity Load Obligation.

III.13.7.3.1.1  HQICC Used in the Calculation of Capacity Requirements.

III.13.7.3.1.2  Charges Associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.3.1.3  Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

III.13.7.3.2  Excess Revenues.

III.13.7.3.3  Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.3.3.1  Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.3.3.2  Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.3.3.3  Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.3.3.4  Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.

III.13.7.3.3.5  [Reserved.]

III.13.7.3.3.6  Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool Planned Units.
III.13.7.3.4   Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

III.13.8   Reporting and Price Finality

III.13.8.1   Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.

III.13.8.2   Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

III.13.8.3   [Reserved.]

III.13.8.4   [Reserved.]

III.14   Regulation Market.

III.14.1   Regulation Market System Requirements.

III.14.2   Regulation Market Eligibility.

III.14.3   Regulation Market Offers.

III.14.4   Regulation Market Administration.

III.14.5   Regulation Market Resource Selection.

III.14.6   Delivery of Regulation Market Products.

III.14.7   Performance Monitoring.

III.14.8   Regulation Market Settlement and Compensation.

III.12 Calculation of Capacity Requirements

III.12.1 Installed Capacity Requirement.
Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with this Section III.12.1.

The ISO shall determine the Installed Capacity Requirement such that the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiency, on average, will be no more than once in ten years. Compliance with this resource adequacy planning criterion shall be evaluated probabilistically, such that the Loss of Load Expectation (“LOLE”) of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiencies shall be no more than 0.1 day each year. The forecast Installed Capacity Requirement shall meet this resource adequacy planning criterion for each Capacity Commitment Period. The Installed Capacity Requirement shall be determined assuming all resources pursuant to Sections III.12.7 and III.12.9 will be deliverable to meet the forecasted demand determined pursuant to Section III.12.8.

If the Installed Capacity Requirement shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall make adjustments to the modeling assumptions and/or methodology through the stakeholder process to eliminate the bias in the Installed Capacity Requirement. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement are specified in Sections III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9. For the purpose of this Section III.12, a “resource” shall include generating resources, demand resources, and import capacity resources eligible to receive capacity payments in the Forward Capacity Market.

The ISO shall determine, by applying the same modeling assumptions and methodology used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, the capacity requirement value for each LOLE probability specified in Section III.13.2.2 for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

III.12.2 Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits.
Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the capacity requirements and limitations, accounting for relevant transmission interface limits which shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.5, for each modeled Capacity Zone (as described in Section III.12.4) for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity
Auction. The Local Sourcing Requirement shall represent the minimum amount of capacity that must be procured within an import-constrained Capacity Zone. The Maximum Capacity Limit shall represent the maximum amount of capacity that can be procured in an export-constrained Capacity Zone to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement.

The ISO shall use consistent assumptions and standards to establish a resource’s electrical location for purposes of qualifying a resource for the Forward Capacity Market and for purposes of calculating Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits. The methodology used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.2.1 and III.12.2.2, respectively. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.5, III.12.6, III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9.

### III.12.2.1 Calculation of Local Sourcing Requirements for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Local Sourcing Requirement shall be the amount needed to satisfy the higher of: (i) the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1; or (ii) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

#### III.12.2.1.1 Local Resource Adequacy Requirement.

The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement shall be calculated as follows:

(a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the unconstrained side of the interface, if any.

(b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
(c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for the import-constrained Capacity Zone Z shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

\[
LRA_Z = \text{Resources}_z + \text{Proxy Units}_z - (\text{Proxy Units Adjustment}_z(1 - \text{FOR}_z)) - (\text{Firm Load Adjustment}_z(1 - \text{FOR}_z))
\]

In which:

\[
LRA_Z = \text{MW of Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for Capacity Zone Z;}
\]

\[
\text{Resources}_z = \text{MW of resources electrically located within Capacity Zone Z, including import Capacity Resources on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any;}
\]

\[
\text{Proxy Units}_z = \text{MW of proxy unit additions in Load Zone Z;}
\]

\[
\text{Firm Load Adjustment}_z = \text{MW of firm load added (or subtracted) within Capacity Zone Z to make the LOLE of the New England Control Area equal to 0.105 days per year; and}
\]

\[
\text{FOR}_z = \text{Capacity weighted average of the forced outage rate modeled for all resources within Capacity Zone Z, including and proxy unit additions to Capacity Zone Z.}
\]

\[
\text{Proxy Units Adjustment} = \text{MW of firm load added to (or unforced}
\]
capacity subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z until the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

To determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, the firm load is adjusted within Capacity Zone Z until the LOLE of the New England Control Area reaches 0.105 days per year. The LOLE of 0.105 days per year includes an allowance for transmission related LOLE of 0.005 days per year associated with each interface. As firm load is added to (or subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z, an equal amount of firm load is removed from (or added to) the rest of New England Control Area.

III.12.2.1.2 Transmission Security Analysis Requirement.
A Transmission Security Analysis shall be used to determine the requirement of the zone being studied, and shall include the following features:

(a) The ISO shall perform a series of transmission load flow studies and/or a deterministic operable capacity analysis targeted at determining the performance of the system under stressed conditions, and at developing a resource requirement sufficient to allow the system to operate through those stressed conditions.

(b) The Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be set at a level sufficient to cover most reasonably anticipated events, but will not guarantee that every combination of obligated resources within the zone will meet system needs.

(c) In performing the Transmission Security Analysis, the ISO may establish static transmission interface transfer limits, as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5, as a reasonable representation of the transmission system’s capability to serve load with available existing resources.

(d) The Transmission Security Analysis may model the entire New England system and individual zones, for both the first contingency (N-1) and second contingency (N-1-1) conditions. First contingency conditions (N-1) shall include the loss of the most critical generator or most critical transmission element with respect to the zone. Second contingency conditions (N-1-1) shall include both: (i) the loss of the most critical generator with respect to the zone followed by the loss of the most critical transmission element (“Line-Gen”); and (ii) the loss of the most critical transmission element followed by the loss of the next most critical transmission element (“Line-Line”) with respect to the zone.
**III.12.2.2 Calculation of Maximum Capacity Limit for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Maximum Capacity Limit shall be calculated using the following method:

(a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area, which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits to the rest of the New England Control Area, if any.

(b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.

(c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Maximum Capacity Limit for the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

\[
\text{Maximum Capacity Limit}_Y = \text{ICR} - \text{LRA}_{\text{RestofNewEngland}}
\]

In which:

Maximum Capacity Limit\(_Y\) = Maximum MW amount of resources, including Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any, that can be procured in the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement;
ICR = MW of Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area, determined in accordance with Section III.12.1; and

\[ LRA_{\text{Rest of New England}} = \text{MW of Local Sourcing Requirement for the rest of the New England Control Area, which for the purposes of this calculation is treated as an import-constrained region, determined in accordance with Section III.12.2.1.} \]

### III.12.3 Consultation and Filing of Capacity Requirements.

At least two months prior to filing the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission, the ISO shall review the modeling assumptions and resulting Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve with the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. Following consultation with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO shall file the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act 90 days prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the proposed identification of a potential new Capacity Zone when the boundary of the potential new Capacity Zone differs from the boundaries of existing Load Zones or Capacity Zones. In order to be used in a given FCA, any new Capacity Zone must have received approval from the Commission prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable FCA.

### III.12.4 Capacity Zones.

For each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall, using the results of the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability conducted pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, determine the Capacity Zones to model as described below, and will include such designations in its filing with the Commission pursuant to Section III.13.8.1(c):
(a) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate export-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the Maximum Capacity Limit is less than the sum of the existing qualified capacity and proposed new capacity that could qualify to be procured in the export constrained Capacity Zone, including existing and proposed new Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface.

(b) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate import-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the second contingency transmission capability results in a line-line Transmission Security Analysis Requirement, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2 and pursuant to ISO New England Planning Procedures, that is greater than the Existing Qualified Capacity in the zone, with the largest generating station in the zone modeled as out-of-service. Each assessment will model out-of-service all Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids (including any received for the current FCA at the time of this calculation) as well as rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) Adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained shall be modeled together as the Rest of Pool Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.12.5 Transmission Interface Limits.
Transmission interface limits, used in the determination of Local Sourcing Requirements, shall be determined pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K using network models that include all resources, existing transmission lines and proposed transmission lines that the ISO determines, in accordance with Section III.12.6, will be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The transmission interface limits shall be established, using deterministic analyses, at levels that provide acceptable thermal, voltage and stability performance of the system both with all lines in service and after any criteria contingency occurs as specified in ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

III.12.6 Modeling Assumptions for Determining the Network Model.
The ISO shall determine, in accordance with this Section III.12.6, the generating units and transmission infrastructure to include in the network model that: (i) are expected to be in service no later than the first
day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) may have a material impact on the network model, a potential interface constraint, or on one or more Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall be used, among other purposes, (i) for the Forward Capacity Market qualification process and (ii) to calculate transmission interface limits in order to forecast the Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall include:

(a) For the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the network model shall include:

(i) all existing resources, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades that have not been approved to be retired for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3;

(ii) all new resources with Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades; and

(iii) in the case of an initial interconnection analysis that is conducted consistent with the Network Capability Interconnection Standard, any generating unit or External Elective Transmission Upgrade that has a valid Interconnection Request and is reasonably expected to declare commercial operation no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction and each annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall determine and publish a list of the transmission projects and elements of transmission projects that will be included in the network model. During the process of making the transmission infrastructure determinations, as described in Section III.12.6.1, the ISO shall consult with the Governance Participants, the Transmission Owners, any transmission project proponents, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies.

III.12.6.1 Process for Establishing the Network Model

(a) The ISO shall establish an initial network model prior to the Forward Capacity Auction that only includes transmission infrastructure, including Internal Elective Transmission Upgrades, that is already in service at the time that the initial network model is developed.

(b) After establishing the initial network model, the ISO shall compile a preliminary list of the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List, individually or in
combination with each other, as appropriate, to identify transmission projects that may achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and that will have a material impact on the network model, on a potential interface constraint or one or more Local Sourcing Requirements.

(c) For the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List that are included in the preliminary list developed pursuant to subsection (b), the ISO shall determine whether the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2 and will be considered for further evaluation pursuant to subsection (d).

(d) For those transmission projects or elements of transmission projects that meet the initial threshold milestones in subsection (c), the ISO shall use the evaluation criteria specified in Section III.12.6.3, and any other relevant information, to determine whether to include a transmission project or element of a transmission project in the final network model.

(e) If after completing its evaluation pursuant to Sections III.12.6.1 through III.12.6.3 and conferring with the transmission project proponents, the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO determines that the transmission project or a portion of the transmission project is reasonably expected to be in service no later than the first day for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then such transmission project or portion of transmission project shall be considered in service in the finalized network model to calculate the transmission interface limits pursuant to Section III.12.5.

**III.12.6.2 Initial Threshold to be Considered In-Service.**

The ISO shall determine whether transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the following initial threshold milestones:

(a) A critical path schedule for the transmission project has been furnished to ISO showing that the transmission project or the element of the transmission project will be in-service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule must be sufficiently detailed to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the schedule.

(b) At the time of the milestone review, siting and permitting processes, if required, are on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.
(c) At the time of the milestone review, engineering is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(d) At the time of the milestone review, land acquisition, if required, is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(e) Corporate intent to build the transmission project has been furnished to the ISO. An officer of the host Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer has submitted to the ISO a statement verifying that the officer has reviewed the proposal and critical path schedule submitted to the ISO, and the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer concurs that the schedule is achievable, and it is the intent of the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer to build the proposed transmission project in accordance with that schedule. The Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer may develop alternatives or modifications to the transmission project during the course of design of the transmission project that accomplish at least the same transfer capability. Such alternatives or modifications are acceptable, so long as the ISO determines that the alternative or modification is reasonably expected to achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The provision of an officer’s statement shall be with the understanding that the statement shall not create any liability on the officer and that any liability with respect to the Transmission Owner’s obligations shall be as set forth in the Transmission Operating Agreement and shall not be affected by such officer’s statement.

**III.12.6.3 Evaluation Criteria.**

For a transmission project or element of a transmission project that meets the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2, the ISO shall consider the following factors and any other relevant information to determine whether to include the transmission project or element of the transmission project in the network model for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Sufficient engineering to initiate construction is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(b) Approval under Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, if required, has been obtained or is on schedule to be obtained as shown on the critical path schedule.
(c) Significant permits, including local permits, if required to initiate construction have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(d) Easements, if required, have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule. Needed land purchases, if required, have been made or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(e) Any contracts required to procure or construct a transmission project are in place consistent with the critical path schedule. The ISO’s analysis may also take into account whether such contracts contain incentive and/or penalty clauses to encourage third parties to advance the delivery of material services to conform with the critical path schedule.

(f) Physical site work is on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(g) The transmission project is in a designated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor in accordance with Section 216 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p.

III.12.7 Resource Modeling Assumptions.

III.12.7.1 Proxy Units.
When the available resources are insufficient for the unconstrained New England Control Area to meet the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1, proxy units shall be used as additional capacity to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. The proxy units shall reflect resource capacity and outage characteristics such that when the proxy units are used in place of all other resources in the New England Control Area, the reliability, or LOLE, of the New England Control Area does not change. The outage characteristics are the summer capacity weighted average availability of the resources in the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.7.3. The capacity of the proxy unit is determined by adjusting the capacity of the proxy unit until the LOLE of the New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE calculated while using the capacity assumptions described in Section III.12.7.2.
When modeling transmission constraints for the determination of Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, the same proxy units may be added to the import-constrained zone or elsewhere in the rest of the New England Control Area depending on where system constraints exist.

III.12.7.2  Capacity.
The resources included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall include:

(a)  all Existing Generating Capacity Resources,

(b)  resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

(c)  all Existing Import Capacity Resources backed by a multiyear contract to provide capacity in the New England Control Area, where that multiyear contract requires delivery of capacity for the Commitment Period for which the Installed Capacity Requirement is being calculated, and

(d)  Existing Demand Resources that are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Market and New Demand Resources that have cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

but shall exclude:

(e)  capacity associated with Export Bids cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

(f)  capacity de-listed or retired as a result of Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids in previous Forward Capacity Auctions, and

(g)  capacity retired pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), unless the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1.
The rating of Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value of such resources for the relevant zone. The rating of Demand Resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value reduced by any reserve margin adjustment factor that is otherwise included in the summer Qualified Capacity value. The rating of resources, except for Demand Resources, cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period shall be based on the amount of Qualified Capacity that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Resources are located within the Capacity Zones in which they are electrically connected as determined during the qualification process.

III.12.7.2.1 [Reserved.]

III.12.7.3 Resource Availability.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be calculated taking resource availability into account and shall be determined as follows:

For Existing Generating Capacity Resources:

(a) The most recent five-year moving average of EFORd shall be used as the measure of resource availability used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. The most recent five-year moving average of EFORd shall be used as the measure of resource availability for non-peaking resources used in the calculation of Transmission Security Analysis Requirements. A deterministic adjustment factor, based on the operational experience of the ISO, shall be used as the measure of resource availability for peaking resources used in the calculation of Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, and will be reviewed periodically.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Once sufficient data are collected under the availability incentives in the Forward Capacity Market, a resource availability metric, which reflects resource availability in a manner that is consistent with the availability incentives in the Forward Capacity Market, shall be developed and reviewed with
Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies and used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

For resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period that do not have sufficient data to calculate an availability metric as defined in subsections (a) or (c) above, class average data for similar resource types shall be used. For Demand Resources, including Real-Time Emergency Generation, historical performance data for those resources will be used to develop an availability metric for use in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

III.12.7.4 Load and Capacity Relief.
Load and capacity relief expected from system-wide implementation of the following actions specified in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4. Action During a Capacity Deficiency, shall be included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve:

(a) **Implement voltage reduction.** The MW value of the load relief shall be equal to the percentage load reduction achieved in the most applicable voltage reduction tests multiplied by the forecasted seasonal peak loads.

(b) **Arrange for available Emergency energy from Market Participants or neighboring Control Areas.** These actions are included in the calculation through the use of tie benefits to meet system needs. The MW value of tie benefits is calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.

(c) **Maintain an adequate amount of ten-minute synchronized reserves.** The amount of system reserves included in the determination of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be consistent with those needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions. When modeling transmission constraints, the reserve requirement for a zone shall be the
zone’s pro rata share of the forecasted system peak load multiplied by the system reserves needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions.

**III.12.8 Load Modeling Assumptions.**

The ISO shall forecast load for the New England Control Area and for each Load Zone within the New England Control Area. The load forecasts shall be based on appropriate models and data inputs. Each year, the load forecasts and underlying methodologies, inputs and assumptions shall be reviewed with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. If the load forecast shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall propose adjustments to the load modeling methodology to the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies to eliminate the bias.

Demand Resources shall be reflected in the load forecast as specified below:

(a) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Resource not qualifying for or not participating in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The expected reduction from these resources will be included in the load forecast to the extent that they meet the qualification process rules, including monitoring and verification plan and financial assurance requirements. If no qualification process rules are in place for the expected reductions from these resources, they shall not be included within the load forecast.

(b) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Resource that qualifies to participate in the Forward Capacity Market, participates but does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, or has cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction and is expected to continue in the Forward Capacity Market shall not be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(c) [Reserved.]

(d) Any realized Demand Resource reductions in the historical period that received Forward Capacity Market payments for these reductions, or Demand Resource reductions that are expected to receive
Forward Capacity Market payments by participating in the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction or having cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, shall be added back into the appropriate historical loads to ensure that such resources are not reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.12.9  
Tie Benefits.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be calculated assuming appropriate tie benefits, if any, available from interconnections with neighboring Control Areas. Tie benefits shall be calculated only for interconnections (1) without Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service or (2) that have not requested Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service with directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas with which the ISO has in effect agreements providing for emergency support to New England, including but not limited to inter-Control Area coordination agreements, emergency aid agreements and the NPCC Regional Reliability Plan.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using a probabilistic multi-area reliability model, by comparing the LOLE for the New England system before and after interconnecting the system to the neighboring Control Areas. To quantify tie benefits, firm capacity equivalents shall be added until the LOLE of the isolated New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE of the interconnected New England Control Area.

III.12.9.1.  
Overview of Tie Benefits Calculation Procedure.

III.12.9.1.1.  
Tie Benefits Calculation for the Forward Capacity Auction and Annual Reconfiguration Auctions; Modeling Assumptions and Simulation Program.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, tie benefits shall be calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction and the third annual reconfiguration auction using the calculation methodology in this Section III.12.9. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions for a Capacity Commitment Period, the tie benefits calculated for the associated Forward Capacity Auction shall be utilized in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and capacity requirement values for the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve as adjusted to account for any changes
in import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas and changes in import capacity resources using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using the modeling assumptions developed in accordance with Section III.12.9.2 and using the General Electric Multi-area Reliability Simulation (MARS) program.

### III.12.9.1.2. Tie Benefits Calculation.

The total tie benefits to New England from all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas are calculated first using the methodology in Section III.12.9.3. Following the calculation of total tie benefits, individual tie benefits from each qualifying neighboring Control Area are calculated using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from each Control Area does not equal the total tie benefits to New England, then each Control Area’s tie benefits are adjusted based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits calculated for each Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.2. Following this calculation, tie benefits are calculated for each qualifying individual interconnection or group of interconnections using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from individual interconnections or groups of interconnections does not equal their associated Control Area’s tie benefits, then the tie benefits of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits within the Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.2.

### III.12.9.1.3. Adjustments to Account for Transmission Import Capability and Capacity Imports.

Once the initial calculation of tie benefits is performed, the tie benefits for each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted to account for capacity imports and any changes in the import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas, using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6. Once the import capability and capacity import adjustments are completed, the sum of the tie benefits of all individual interconnections and groups of interconnections for a Control Area, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the tie benefits associated with that Control Area, and the sum of the tie benefits from all Control Areas, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the total tie benefits available to New England.

III.12.9.2.1. Assumptions Regarding System Conditions.
In calculating tie benefits, “at criterion” system conditions shall be used to model the New England Control Area and all interconnected Control Areas.

In calculating tie benefits, all New England internal transmission constraints that (i) are modeled in the most recent Regional System Plan resource adequacy studies and assessments and (ii) are not addressed by either a Local Sourcing Requirement or a Maximum Capacity Limit calculation shall be modeled, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.3. Modeling Transmission Constraints in Neighboring Control Areas.
The ISO will review annually NPCC’s assumptions regarding transmission constraints in all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas that are modeled for the tie benefits calculations. In the event that NPCC models a transmission constraint in one of the modeled neighboring Control Areas, the ISO will perform an evaluation to determine which interfaces are most critical to the ability of the neighboring Control Area to reliably provide tie benefits to New England from both operational and planning perspectives, and will model those transmission constraints in the tie benefits calculation, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.4. Other Modeling Assumptions.
A. External transfer capability determinations. The transfer capability of all external interconnections with New England will be determined using studies that take account of the load, resource and other electrical system conditions that are consistent with those expected during the Capacity Commitment Period for which the calculation is being performed. Transfer capability studies will be performed using simulations that consider the contingencies enumerated in sub-section (iii) below.

(i) The transmission system will be modeled using the following conditions:

1. The forecast 90/10 peak load conditions for the Capacity Commitment Period;
2. Qualified Existing Generating Capacity Resources reflecting their output at their Capacity Network Resource level;
3. Qualified Existing Demand Resources reflecting their Capacity Supply Obligation received in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction;
4. Transfers on the transmission system that impact the transfer capability of
the interconnection under study.

(ii) The system will be modeled in a manner that reflects the design of the interconnection. If an interconnection and its supporting system upgrades were designed to provide incremental capacity into the New England Control Area, simulations will assume imports up to the level that the interconnection was designed to support. If the interconnection was not designed to be so comparably integrated, simulations will determine the amount of power that can be delivered into New England over the interconnection.

(iii) The simulations will take into account contingencies that address a fault on a generator or transmission facility, loss of an element without a fault, and circuit breaker failure following the loss of an element or an association with the operation of a special protection system.

B. In calculating tie benefits, New England capacity exports are removed from the internal capacity resources and are modeled as a resource in the receiving Control Area. The transfer capability of external interconnections is not adjusted to account for capacity exports.

III.12.9.2.5. Procedures for Adding or Removing Capacity from Control Areas to Meet the 0.1 Days Per Year LOLE Standard.

In calculating tie benefits, capacity shall be added or removed from the interconnected system of New England and its neighboring Control Areas, until the LOLE of New England and the LOLE of each Control Area of the interconnected system equals 0.1 days per year simultaneously. The following procedures shall be used to add or remove capacity within New England and the interconnected Control Areas to achieve that goal.

A. Adding Proxy Units within New England when the New England system is short of capacity. In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, proxy units (with the characteristics identified in Section III.12.7.1) will be added to the sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmission constraints within New England, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then proxy units will be added to the entire Control Area. If, as a result of the addition of one or more proxy units, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(b) will be used to remove the surplus capacity.
B. **Removing capacity from New England when the New England system is surplus of capacity.** In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in these surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the Existing Qualified Capacity, and any amount of proxy units added in that sub-area that is above its 50-50 peak load forecast. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratios described above for the removal of capacity surplus. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then the surplus capacity shall be removed from the entire Control Area.

C. **Adding capacity within neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, additional capacity will be added to the neighboring Control Area’s sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmissions constraints, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the Control Area, then capacity will be added to the entire Control Area. The process that the neighboring Control Area utilizes in its resource adequacy study to meet its resource adequacy criterion will be utilized to add capacity to that Control Area. In filing the Installed Capacity Requirement values pursuant to Section III.12.3, the ISO will provide citations to any resource adequacy studies relied upon for these purposes. If, as a result of the capacity addition, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(d) shall be used to remove the surplus capacity.

D. **Removing capacity from neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the neighboring Control Area’s sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its 50/50 peak load forecast. For a sub-area that has a
maximum locational resource requirement above its 50/50 peak load forecast, the amount of capacity surplus is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its minimum locational resource requirement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources from a sub-area will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the those remaining surplus sub-areas. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the neighboring Control Area, then the surplus capacity will be removed from the entire Control Area.

E. Maintaining the neighboring Control Area’s locational resource requirements. In modeling a neighboring Control Area with internal transmission constraints, all minimum locational resource requirements in the Control Area’s sub-areas as established by the neighboring Control Area’s installed capacity requirement calculations shall be observed.

III.12.9.3. Calculating Total Tie Benefits.

The total tie benefits with all qualifying directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas shall be calculated by comparing the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections to neighboring Control Areas connected with the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections with neighboring Control Areas disconnected. To calculate total tie benefits:

A. The New England system shall be interconnected with all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas and the New England Control Area, and each neighboring Control Area shall be brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE simultaneously by adjusting the capacity of each Control Area, utilizing the methods for adding or removing capacity in Section III.12.9.2.5.

B. Once the interconnected system is brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE, the LOLE of the New England Control Area shall be calculated a second time, with the New England system isolated from the rest of the interconnected system that was brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE.

C. Total tie benefits shall be the sum of the amounts of firm capacity that needs to be added to the isolated New England Control Area at the point at which each interconnection with neighboring Control Areas interconnects in New England to bring the New England LOLE back to 0.1 days per year. This value is subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.4. Calculating Each Control Area’s Tie Benefits.
III.12.9.4.1. Initial Calculation of a Control Area’s Tie Benefits.

Tie benefits from each neighboring Control Area shall be determined by calculating the tie benefits for every possible interconnection state that has an impact on the tie benefit value between the New England system and the target neighboring Control Area. If two or more interconnections between New England and the target neighboring Control Area exist, then all interconnections grouped together will be used to represent the state of interconnection between New England and the target neighboring Control Area. The tie benefits from the target neighboring Control Area shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.2.

III.12.9.4.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.

If the sum of the individual Control Area tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.1 is different than the total tie benefits from all Control Areas calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3, then each Control Area’s tie benefits shall be increased or decreased based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits for each individual Control Area, so that the sum of each Control Area’s tie benefits, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3. The pro-rated Control Area tie benefits are subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.5. Calculating Tie Benefits for Individual Ties.

Tie benefits shall be calculated for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the extent that a discrete and material transfer capability can be identified for the interconnection or group of interconnections. All interconnections or groups of interconnections shall have equal rights in calculating individual tie benefits, with no grandfathering or incremental tie capability treatment.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits, a group of interconnections refers to two or more AC lines that operate in parallel to form a transmission interface in which there are significant overlapping contributions of each line toward establishing the transfer limit, such that the individual lines in a group of interconnections cannot be assigned individual contributions.

III.12.9.5.1. Initial Calculation of Tie Benefits for an Individual Interconnection or Group of Interconnections.
Tie benefits for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be calculated by calculating tie benefits for each possible interconnection state between the New England system and the individual interconnection or group of interconnections. The tie benefits from that interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.5.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.
If the sum of the individual interconnection’s or group of interconnection’s tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.1 is different than the associated Control Area’s tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4, then the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in that Control Area, so that the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in the Control Area, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits for the Control Area calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4. The pro-rated tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections is subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.


III.12.9.6.1. Accounting for Capacity Imports.
In the initial tie benefits calculations, capacity imports are modeled as internal resources in New England, and the import capability of the interconnections with neighboring Control Areas is not reduced to reflect the impact of capacity imports. After the initial tie benefits calculations, total tie benefits, tie benefits for each Control Area, and tie benefits from each individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted to account for capacity imports using the methodology contained in this Section III.12.9.6.1. For the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefit values calculated in accordance with Sections III.12.9.3, III.12.9.4 and III.12.9.5 respectively. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefits values calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction.

A. Capacity imports shall be deducted from the import capability of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections to determine the available import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections prior to accounting for tie benefits from
those interconnections. The transfer capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections shall be determined using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.4.A.

B. If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections, as determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5, is greater than the remaining transmission import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections after accounting for capacity imports, the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the remaining transmission import capability (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2). If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections is not greater than the remaining transmission import capability after accounting for capacity imports, then the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the value determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5 (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2).

C. The tie benefits for each Control Area shall be the sum of the tie benefits from the individual interconnections or groups of interconnections with that Control Area, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.

D. The total tie benefits from all qualifying neighboring Control Areas shall be the sum of the Control Area tie benefits, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.

E. For purposes of determining the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under this Section III.12.9.6.1, the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Qualified Existing Import Capacity Resources for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the annual reconfiguration auctions are those Import Capacity Resources that hold Capacity Supply Obligations for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period as of the time the tie benefits calculation is being performed for the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.12.9.6.2. Changes in the Import Capability of Interconnections with Neighboring Control Areas.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, the most recent import capability values for an interconnection or group of interconnections with
a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the modeling of system conditions for the tie benefits calculation. In addition, for the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, any changes to the import capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under Section III.12.9.6.1.

III.12.9.7 Tie Benefits Over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF.
The tie benefits from the Quebec Control Area over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.1 shall be allocated to the Interconnection Rights Holders or their designees in proportion to their respective percentage shares of the HQ Phase I and the HQ Phase II facilities, in accordance with Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.12.10 Calculating the Maximum Amount of Import Capacity Resources that May be Cleared Over External Interfaces in the Forward Capacity Auction and Reconfiguration Auctions.
For external interfaces, Import Capacity Resources shall be allowed in the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions up to the interface limit minus the tie benefits, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.9.1 or 12.9.2 over the applicable interface.
III.13.1. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Resource. A Generating Capacity Resource and a Demand Resource may not both participate in the Forward Capacity Market if located at the same Retail Delivery Point, unless the Generating Capacity Resource is separately metered and its output is added to the metered load as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit.

III.13.1.1. **New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

III.13.1.1.1. **Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1. **Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**
A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or
(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output greater than 2 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff
(or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section does not cause the resource to exceed the megawatt amount approved in the resource’s Interconnection Agreement, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package but is not required to submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form for the incremental amount by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 causes the resource to exceed the megawatt amount approved in the resource’s Interconnection Agreement or MW amount approved pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.4. **De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the most recent Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.
III.13.1.1.5. **Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6. **Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to Commercial Operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to Commercial Operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 **Renewable Technology Resources.**

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;

(b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state’s mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as
in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state’s renewable
energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1,
2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the
state in which it is geographically located;

(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or
after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource pursuant to
Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section
III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export De-List Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating
Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity
Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must
make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show
of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project
Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification
Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project
Sponsor must also submit to the ISO, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify
with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, an Interconnection Request under Schedules
22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New
Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both
the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required
regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23
and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show
of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A
Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days
before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written
notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as
determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be
irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor’s contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the project’s expected Commercial Operation date; the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; the Economic Minimum Limit (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a
description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

### III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

### III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve Commercial Operation as qualified no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.
(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.2.2.2(d) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (d) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent Commercial Operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.
(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.**

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity at or above the Economic Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional
and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.
III.13.1.1.2.6. **Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.**

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource or the Intermittent Settlement Only Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.3. **Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity...
Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the
Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

(g) New Generating Capacity Resources, or portions thereof, shall not be considered to have met their Capacity Supply Obligation for the purposes of this Forward Capacity Market and shall not receive compensation if any upgrades to be completed by the Project Sponsor required to remove overlapping interconnection impacts as identified in (f) have not been completed, including, any upgrades identified in a restudy pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff in time for the Capacity Commitment Period unless the Capacity Supply Obligation is appropriately covered.

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.
The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:
(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;

(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified
Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4. **New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. **Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.

III.13.1.1.2.8. **Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.**
No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal
Market Monitor’s determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than five Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.2.5.3. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c) and (d) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than three Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Generating Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.
(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2020 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Generating Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.

III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.


Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Resource or Existing Demand Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each
year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.
The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.
Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources are defined as wind, solar, run of river hydro and other renewable resources that do not have control over their net power output. Wind and solar resources shall be qualified as Intermittent Power Resources or Intermittent Settlement Only Resources. The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that
is an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource has not been in Commercial Operation for the requisite five full summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource achieved Commercial Operation during a summer period. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource began Commercial Operation after the 2006 summer period and prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction, its summer Qualified Capacity shall be established pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e).

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which the ISO has declared a system-wide Shortage Event and if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Shortage Events in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. **Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.**
(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource has not been in Commercial Operation for the requisite five full winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource achieved Commercial Operation during a winter period.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s and Intermittent Settlement Only Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which the ISO has declared a system-wide Shortage Event and if the Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Shortage Events in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity
Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not a Settlement Only Resource, Intermittent Power Resource, or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW, then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent
summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. **Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not a Settlement Only Resource, meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window.

III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.2.5.2. **Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only
Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 20 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located. If the Lead Market Participant believes that an ISO-determined summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not accurately reflect the determination described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.
A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List
Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.
The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for a Forward Capacity Auction is $5.50/kW-month. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. When the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1 Static De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment
Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area other than an Intermittent Power Resource, an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no
case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource, an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating
Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Economic Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

A Non-Price Retirement Request is a binding request to retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource. Non-Price Retirement Requests will be approved subject to review for reliability impacts under Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Even if not approved, a resource that has submitted a Non-Price Retirement Request may retire in whole or in part, as applicable, pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(iii). Once submitted, a Non-Price Retirement Request may not be withdrawn. A Non-Price Retirement Request submitted in accordance with the timing requirements of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.2 supersedes any prior de-list bid for the same Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-approved Retirement De-List Bids that are above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market
Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee no later than 30 days after the ISO submits to the Commission the retirement filing described in Section III.13.8.1(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than 10 Business Days after being informed that a resource is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource
subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will be continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.


Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:
(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor–approved price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1. **Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request...
to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. **Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. **Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, that a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid is not consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid that is consistent with its determination of the foregoing. If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based
on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

After due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-approved Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-approved price based on the Internal Market Monitor review of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor, and shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report net going forward costs in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula. To the extent possible, all costs and operational data used in this calculation shall be the cumulative actual data for the Existing Capacity Resource from the most recent full Capacity Commitment Period available.

\[ GFC - (IMR - PER) \times \text{InfIndex} \]
\[(CQ_{\text{Summer}}, kw) \times (12, months)\]

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are costs that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period. To the extent that the Capacity Commitment Period data used to calculate these data do not reflect known and measurable costs that would or are likely to be incurred in the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Internal Market Monitor shall also consider adjustments submitted, provided the costs are based on known and measurable conditions and supported by appropriate documentation to reflect those costs.

\[CQ_{\text{Summer}}\ kW = \text{capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.}\]

IMR = annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative actual cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has not indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00. As soon as practicable, the resource’s total ISO market revenues used in this calculation shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.
PER = resource-specific annual peak energy rents, in dollars. As soon as practicable, this value shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

At the option of the Lead Market Participant, the cumulative production costs for each of the most recent three Capacity Commitment Periods may be submitted and the annual infra-marginal rents calculated for each year. The Lead Market Participant may then specify two of the three years to be averaged and subsequently used as the IMR value. Upon exercising such option, the PER value used shall be an average of the PER values for the two years selected.

\[ \text{InfIndex} = \text{inflation index} \quad \text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^t \]

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the
product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s
remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.**
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. **Expected Capacity Performance Payments.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. **Risk Premium.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. **Opportunity Costs.**

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has
additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.
A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.
Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1-(1+\text{Cost Of Capital})^{-\text{Remaining Life}})}
\]

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.
(a) No later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than ten Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and
Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external Demand Resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff
shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

### III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

### III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3 for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3, no later than 15 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: CMEEC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC 53.3 8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag 2.3 8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO 15.3 8/31/2025

VJO: Highgate — NE Up to 225 10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension) Up to 6 October 2020
(coming 11/01/2016)
VJO: Phase I/II — NE Up to 110 10/31/2016

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.
Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External
Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. **Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.**

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. **Documentation of Import.**

For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship.
If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

**III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the Capacity Supply Obligation, if an offer from the New Import Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, will be met.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the Capacity Supply Obligation, if an offer from the New Import Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, will be met.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

**III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing
sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. **Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**
The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.
III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.
The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).
III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Resources.

III.13.1.4.1. Demand Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1. No resource shall be permitted to participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Response Capacity Resource prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period. A Demand Response Capacity Resource with a Commercial Operation Date before June 1, 2018, or a Demand Response Capacity Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period, shall be considered a Real-Time Demand Response Resource for any Capacity Commitment Period commencing prior to June
1, 2018. No resource shall be permitted to participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Real-Time Demand Response Resource beginning with the Forward Capacity Auction for the 2017-2018 Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity offered by a Demand Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW aggregated in a Dispatch Zone. A Demand Resource may continue to offer capacity into Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods in an amount less than or equal to its remaining Measure Life. Demand Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Resource. Demand Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids.

For purposes of this Section III.13.1.4, references to the Lead Market Participant for a resource shall include the Enrolling Participant for a Demand Resource.

### III.13.1.4.1.1. Existing Demand Resources.

Demand Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Resources, shall be Existing Demand Resources. Existing Demand Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in Section III.13.1.4.1, Existing Demand Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An Existing Demand Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5, provided, however, that neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify assets associated with Existing Demand Resources as New Demand Resources. Existing Demand Resources may de-list consistent with Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Existing Demand Response Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.7.1.1.5.

### III.13.1.4.1.2. New Demand Resources.

A New Demand Resource is a Demand Resource that has not been in service prior to the applicable Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the Forward Capacity Auction, or Distributed Generation that has operated only to address an electric power outage due to failure of the electrical supply, on-site disaster, local equipment failure, or public service emergencies such as flood, fire, or natural disaster, or excessive deviations from standard voltage from the electrical supplier to the premises during the 12-
month period prior to the applicable Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the Forward Capacity Auction, and is not an Existing Demand Resource. A Demand Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Resource shall be considered a New Demand Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.

III.13.1.4.1.2.1. **Qualified Capacity of New Demand Resources.**
For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s Demand Reduction Values as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.

The documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.2.1 must be submitted as part of the Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.2.2. **Initial Analysis for Certain New Demand Resources**
For each New Demand Resource that is a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.3. **Special Provisions for Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.**
All Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be treated in the same manner as Existing Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources may: (i) submit Static De-list Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, (ii) submit Dynamic De-list Bids pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(d), or (iii) submit Permanent De-list Bids or Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Real-Time Emergency Generation
Resources may not submit an Export Bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 or an Administrative Export De-list Bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources may not import capacity pursuant to Section III.13.1.3. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource may not participate in a reconfiguration auction. Such resources may participate in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral as either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource, provided, however, that where a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource participates in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral as a Capacity Acquiring Resource, the Capacity Transferring Resource must also be a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource. Such resources may not be Supplemental Capacity Resources. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources that are New Demand Resources as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1.2 shall be subject to the qualification and financial assurance requirements applicable to New Demand Resources.

III.13.1.4.2. Show of Interest Form for New Demand Resources.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.2 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. The New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form is available on the ISO website.

(a) A completed New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Resource project will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter Demand Reduction Values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses) expected to be achieved five weeks prior to the first and second annual Forward Capacity Auctions after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award would be made, if applicable, and on the Commercial Operation date; estimated total summer and winter Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project; supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated Demand Reduction Values; Demand Resource type (On-Peak Demand Resource, Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource); brief Demand Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency,
Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; expected Commercial Operation date – i.e., the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to reach Commercial Operation (Commercial Operation for a Demand Resource shall mean the demonstration to the ISO by the Project Sponsor that the Demand Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full Demand Reduction Value); ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; and for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualification Package for Existing Demand Resources.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for an Existing Demand Resource shall conform to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.1. All Existing Demand Resources must provide a Measurement and Verification Plan which complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Qualification Package for New Demand Resources.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.2.2.2. Source of Funding.
The Project Sponsor must provide source of funding which includes, but is not limited to, the following information: The source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; A completed ISO credit application.
III.13.1.4.2.2.3. **Measurement and Verification Plan.**
For all Demand Resources other than Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide a Measurement and Verification Plan which complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3, Section III.8A and III.8B and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4. **Customer Acquisition Plan.**
A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must provide a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4.1. **Individual Distributed Generation Projects and Demand Resource Projects From a Single Facility With A Demand Reduction Value Greater Than or Equal to 5 MW.**
For individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value greater than or equal to 5 MW the critical path schedule requirements and the monitoring and milestones are the same as those required for New Generating Capacity Resources as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4.2. **Demand Resource Projects Involving Multiple Facilities and Demand Resource Projects From a Single Facility With A Demand Reduction Value Less Than 5 MW.**
A critical path schedule for Demand Resource projects installed at multiple facilities and Demand Resource projects from a single facility with a Demand Reduction Value of less than 5 MW shall be comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered Demand Reduction Value achieved as of target dates which are: (i) The cumulative percentage of total Demand Reduction Value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii) The cumulative percentage of total Demand Reduction Value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the
expected Commercial Operation date, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total Demand Reduction Value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.2.2.4.3. **Additional Requirement For Demand Resource Project Sponsor Proposing Total Demand Reduction Value of 30 Percent or Less by the Second Target Date.**

If a Demand Resource Project Sponsor proposes in its New Demand Resource Qualification Package a cumulative Percent of Total Demand Reduction Value Complete that is 30 percent or less by the second critical path schedule target date, then a pipeline analysis must be submitted to the ISO five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the award was made. A pipeline analysis demonstrates the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s ability to fulfill its obligation to deliver capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction by the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Such an analysis must list the customers that have made a commitment to participate in the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s program to deliver capacity to meet the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s Forward Capacity Auction obligations, and must include each customer’s projected summer and winter Demand Reduction Values, and expected measure installation date; provided, however, that a Demand Resource Project Sponsor targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility shall have the option of using a targeting and marketing plan based on past performance in that market to determine the Project Sponsor’s ability to fulfill its obligation by the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. To the extent that the Demand Resource Project Sponsor is unable to demonstrate through its pipeline analysis that it has sufficient customers to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall be subject to the ISO’s critical path schedule monitoring procedures, as specified in Section III.13.3 of Market Rule 1.

III.13.1.4.2.2.5. **Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

In the New Demand Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in
which the New Demand Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5.

III.13.1.4.2.6. Rationing Election.
The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Resource must indicate in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.2.3. Consistency of the New Demand Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form.
The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter Demand Reduction Value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); (vi) a change in the treatment as an Existing Demand Resource for the first Forward Capacity Auction; or (viii) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

III.13.1.4.2.4. Offers From New Demand Resources.
All New Demand Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

III.13.1.4.2.5. Notification of Qualification for Demand Resources.

III.13.1.4.2.5.1. Evaluation of Demand Resource Qualification Materials.
The ISO shall review the information submitted by Existing Demand Resources and New Demand Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by Existing Demand Resources and New Demand Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.2.5.2. Notification of Qualification for Existing Demand Resources.
For each Existing Demand Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 20 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: (i) Demand Resource type;
and (ii) summer and winter Demand Reduction Values and estimates of summer and winter Qualified Capacity as defined in Section III.13.1.4.3 and the Load Zone in which the Capacity Resource is located, and the Dispatch Zone within which a Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource, or Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is located. If the Lead Market Participant believes that an ISO-determined summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Demand Resource does not accurately reflect the determination described in Section III.13.1.4.3, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. If an Existing Demand Resource is not submitting a change in its Demand Resource type, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Static De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification, and may not elect to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction. If a Market Participant believes that the Demand Reduction Value or Qualified Capacity for an Existing Demand Resource is inaccurate or wishes to change its Demand Resource type, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within 5 Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification and submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its Demand Resource type, if applicable. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than 5 Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3. Notification of Qualification for New Demand Resources.
No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Resource indicating whether the New Demand Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3.1. Notification of Acceptance to Qualify of a New Demand Resource.
For a New Demand Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Resource’s summer and winter Demand Reduction Value and summer and winter Qualified Capacity. Designation of the Demand Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.5.3.2. Notification of Failure to Qualify of a New Demand Resource.
For a New Demand Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.3. **Measurement and Verification Applicable to All Demand Resources.**

To demonstrate the Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Resource project, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1, all Demand Resources participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Demand Resource project Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3, Sections III.8A and III.8B and the ISO New England Manuals. Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals or reconfiguration auctions must estimate Demand Reduction Values pursuant to the requirements of Sections III.8A, Section III.8B, Section III.13.6.1.5.4, and Section III.E1 and Section III.E2. To the extent that a Demand Response Capacity Resource consists, in whole or in part, of assets capable of delivering Net Supply, the estimated Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Response Capacity Resource may include an estimate of Net Supply. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3, Section III.8A, Section III.8B, and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. **Measurement and Verification Documents Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.**

Measurement and Verification Documents for On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources must demonstrate both availability and performance of Demand Resource projects in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly Demand Reduction Value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manual on Measurement and Verification of Demand Reduction Value from Demand Resources. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Resource project. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the Demand Resource project’s Demand Reduction Value for each month of the Capacity Commitment...
Period and over the expected Measure Life of the Demand Resource project. A Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s total Demand Reduction Value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total Demand Reduction Value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Demand Resource Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

At the option of the Demand Resource Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective Demand Reduction Value of the Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.

At the option of the Demand Resource Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated Demand Resource project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and
Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total Demand Reduction Value and the Demand Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Resource Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. **Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**
Demand Resource Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and Real-Time Demand Response Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. **Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**
For Demand Resource projects targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, Demand Resource Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly Demand Reduction Values. For Demand Resource projects targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of Demand Reduction Value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated Demand Reduction Value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Demand Resource Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. **Measurement and Verification Documentation of Demand Reduction Values Applicable to All Demand Resources.**
The Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall designate the specific methodology used to establish Demand Reduction Values, including the specification of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours for On-Peak Demand Resources, Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours for Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, or Real-Time Demand Response Event Hours for Real-Time Demand Response Resources, in its Measurement and Verification Plan pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3. For Demand Response Capacity Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources, the Demand Resource Project Sponsor shall provide an estimate of Demand Reduction Values consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8A and Section III.8B. To the extent that a Demand Response Capacity Resource consists, in whole or in part, of assets capable of delivering Net Supply, the estimated Demand Reduction Value of a Demand Response Capacity Resource may include an estimate of Net Supply. Distributed Generation, Demand Response Capacity Resource, Real-Time Demand Response, and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource projects must include individual metering or a metering protocol consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals to monitor and verify the Demand Reduction Values of the Demand Resource project.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, all Demand Response Assets must be metered at the Retail Delivery Point.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, if the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset cannot operate synchronized to the grid, and there is no Demand Response Asset at the same facility, the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset can be metered at the Retail Delivery Point or at the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset. If the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is capable of operating synchronized to the grid or there is a Demand Response Asset at the same facility then both the Retail Delivery Point and the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must be metered. For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets must utilize a remote terminal unit for communicating telemetry and receiving Dispatch Instructions, and the metering equipment used to measure the performance of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must meet the requirements of Section E2.2.1(a), (b), and (c), must be tested pursuant to Section E2.2.3, and are subject to auditing pursuant to Section E2.2.4.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing on or after June 1, 2018, if a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is metered at the generator, the associated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource’s Demand Reduction Value shall be calculated using the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset’s Average Hourly Output. If a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset is only metered at the
Retail Delivery Point, the associated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource’s Demand Reduction Value shall be calculated using the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset’s Average Hourly Load Reduction.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing before June 1, 2018, the output of the generators comprising a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset must be directly metered and reported to the ISO as a single set of interval meter data, provided that if there is no other Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, Real-Time Demand Response Asset or other generator whose output can be controlled at the same facility, the Market Participant may instead meter the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset at the retail delivery point. Meter data associated with the Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset shall be recorded and reported by the Market Participant to the ISO in Real-Time at an interval of five minutes.

For Capacity Commitment Periods commencing before June 1, 2018, the output of generators comprising a Real-Time Demand Response Asset located behind the retail delivery point must be directly metered and reported to the ISO in Real-Time as a single set of interval meter data at an interval of five minutes.

III.13.1.4.3.2.1. No Performance Data to Determine Demand Reduction Values.
Should a new Demand Resource, other than a Demand Response Capacity Resource, enter service at a time such that there is no performance data for June, July, August, December or January upon which to establish summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Values, and the Demand Resource has relieved itself of its Capacity Supply Obligation for those months through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or reconfiguration auction, then the summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Values will be the simple average of its Demand Reduction Values for those months with a Capacity Supply Obligation.
For a new Demand Resource, other than a Demand Response Capacity Resource, that enters service outside of the summer DR Auditing Period or winter DR Auditing Period and the Demand Resource has relieved itself of its Capacity Supply Obligation for those months through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or reconfiguration auction, the Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit results shall be used in the determination of the summer or winter seasonal Demand Reduction Value.

III.13.1.4.3.3. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.
The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek
clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.4.3.4. Measurement and Verification Costs.
Costs associated with measurement and verification of the Demand Resource project shall be borne by the Demand Resource Project Sponsor. Demand Resource Project Sponsors submitting application materials and Measurement and Verification Documents for review during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process shall be subject to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.4.4. Dispatch of Active Demand Resources During Event Hours.

III.13.1.4.4.1. Notification of Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours.
The ISO shall issue notice to Market Participants concerning Demand Resource Forecast Peak Hours on the day before the relevant Operating Day. The notice issued pursuant to this section is for informational purposes only and shall not constitute a Dispatch Instruction.

III.13.1.4.4.2. Dispatch of Demand Resources During Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours.
The ISO shall issue Dispatch Instructions to Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources to curtail and restore loads during Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hours. Dispatch Instructions shall apply to Real-Time Demand Response Resources. The amount of Demand Resources dispatched for each Real-Time Demand Resource Dispatch Hour will be the amount that the ISO determines is necessary to meet the reserve deficiency. The ISO may issue Dispatch Instructions that reduce or increase the amount dispatched in each hour.

III.13.1.4.4.3. Dispatch of Demand Resources During Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours.
The ISO shall issue Dispatch Instructions to Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources to curtail and restore loads during Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hours. Dispatch
Instructions shall apply to specific Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. The amount of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources dispatched for each Real-Time Emergency Generation Event Hour will be the amount the ISO determines is necessary to meet the reserve deficiency.

III.13.1.4.5. Selection of Active Demand Resources For Dispatch.


A Market Participant must manage its Real-Time Demand Response Assets that are registered as a component of a Real-Time Demand Response Resource as of the first of a month so that the Real-Time Demand Response Resource complies with Dispatch Instructions. If the operation or potential operation of Real-Time Demand Response Assets cause, or potentially cause, a reliability problem, the ISO may direct Market Participants to not dispatch such assets or to restore the loads of such assets that have already been dispatched. If the ISO directs a Market Participant to not dispatch a Real-Time Demand Response Asset or to restore the load of a dispatched Real-Time Demand Response Asset, an adjustment to the dispatch and/or settlement process will be made to reflect the exclusion of that asset from dispatch or the restoration of that asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Assets shall report to the ISO the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of each asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Demand Response Resources consisting of an aggregation of more than one Real-Time Demand Response Asset shall report the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of the resource, to the ISO as the sum of the load reduction, consumption, or generator output of the individual assets making up that resource. Real-Time Demand Response Resources shall be assigned a unique resource identification number. The load reduction and consumption, or generator output of a Real-Time Demand Response Resource is reported to the ISO as a single set of values. A Real-Time Demand Response Resource shall consist of one or more Real-Time Demand Response Assets that are located within the same Dispatch Zone.


A Market Participant must manage its Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets that are registered as a component of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource as of the first of a month so that the Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource complies with Dispatch Instructions. If the operation or potential operation of Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets causes, or potentially causes, a reliability problem, the ISO may direct Market Participants to not dispatch such assets or to discontinue the output of such
assets that have already been dispatched. If the ISO directs a Market Participant to not dispatch a Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or to discontinue the output of a dispatched Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset, an adjustment to the dispatch and/or settlement process will be made to reflect the exclusion of that asset from dispatch or the discontinued output of that asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets shall report to the ISO the load reduction and consumption, or generator output of each asset. Market Participants with Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources consisting of an aggregation of more than one Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset shall report the generator output of the resource to the ISO as the sum of the generator outputs of the individual assets making up that resource. Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be assigned a unique resource identification number. The generator output of a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource is reported to the ISO as a single set of values. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource shall consist of one or more Real-Time Emergency Generation Assets that are located within the same Dispatch Zone.

III.13.1.4.5.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.6. Conversion of Active Demand Resources Defined at the Load Zone to Active Demand Resources Defined at Dispatch Zones.

The ISO shall establish Dispatch Zones that reflect potential transmission constraints within a Load Zone that are expected to exist during each Capacity Commitment Period. Dispatch Zones shall be used to establish the geographic location and dispatch of Demand Response Capacity Resources, Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. Dispatch Zones shall not change during a Capacity Commitment Period. For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall establish and publish Dispatch Zones by the beginning of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. The ISO will review proposed Dispatch Zones with Market Participants prior to establishing and publishing final Dispatch Zones.

III.13.1.4.6.2. Disaggregation of Real-Time Demand Response Resources and Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources From Load Zones to Dispatch Zones.

Market Participants with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is being fulfilled using a Real-Time Demand Response Resource in a Load Zone shall, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,
disaggregate that Real-Time Demand Response Resource into one or more Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the original Load Zone. The sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the Load Zone must be equal to the initial Capacity Supply Obligation within the original Load Zone. If the sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Demand Response Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within a Load Zone is less than the initial Capacity Supply Obligation by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the Market Participant does not transfer the entire difference through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or an annual reconfiguration auction by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then the Market Participant will be deemed to have failed to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case the ISO shall terminate the Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation associated with the resource in the amount of the difference, terminate the Market Participant’s right to any payments associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation, and retain any applicable financial assurance associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.1.4.6.2.2. **Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Disaggregation.**

Market Participants with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is being fulfilled using a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource in a Load Zone shall, prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, disaggregate that Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource into one or more Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the original Load Zone. The sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within the Load Zone must be equal to the initial Capacity Supply Obligation within the original Load Zone. If the sum of the Capacity Values of the disaggregated Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources located within one or more Dispatch Zones within a Load Zone is less than the initial Capacity Supply Obligation by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the Market Participant does not transfer the entire difference through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or an annual reconfiguration auction by the beginning of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then the Market Participant will be deemed to have failed to meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in which case the ISO shall terminate the Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation associated with the resource in the amount of the difference, terminate the Market Participant’s right to any payments associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation, and retain any applicable financial assurance associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.1.4.7.  **[Reserved.]**
III.13.1.4.8.  [Reserved.]


A Market Participant may not register and, if previously registered, must retire in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.9.1, a Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or asset associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that is comprised of:

(a) the customers of Host Utilities that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year if the relevant electric retail regulatory authority prohibits such customers’ demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs, or

(b) the customers of Host Utilities that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year, unless the relevant electric retail regulatory authority permits such customers’ demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs.


A Market Participant must retire a previously registered Real-Time Demand Response Asset, Real-Time Emergency Generation Asset or asset associated with an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that is comprised of customers specified in subsections (a) or (b) of Section III.13.1.4.9 no later than 12 months from the date that the ISO receives notice that the relevant electric retail regulatory authority prohibits such customer’s demand response to be bid into the ISO-administered markets or programs or May 31, 2013, whichever is later.


If requested by a Market Participant with a registered Load Asset, the ISO will provide the following information about end-use customers served by the Market Participant: (a) whether the end-use customer’s facility is registered with the ISO as part of an asset and whether the asset is associated with a Demand Response Resource, Real-Time Demand Response Resource or Real-Time Emergency
Generation Resource, and; (b) the load reduction capability of the asset, as specified in the ISO’s asset registration system, to which the end-use customer’s facility is registered.

III.13.1.4.11. Assignment of Demand Assets to a Demand Resource.

The following mapping provisions apply to Demand Resources other than Demand Response Capacity Resources, the mapping for which is addressed in Appendix E to Market Rule 1.

(a) When a demand asset can be mapped to more than one Demand Resource, any demand assets shall be mapped to a commercial Demand Resource whose demand reduction capability is less than the lower of (i) its commercial capacity, as reflected in the resource’s highest audit value or (ii) its highest Capacity Supply Obligation acquired for the current Capacity Commitment Period or any future Capacity Commitment Period, before being mapped to a non-commercial Demand Resource or non-commercial increment of a Demand Resource.

(b) A demand asset cannot be unmapped from a Demand Resource if, following the unmapping, the sum of the audit values of the remaining demand assets that are mapped to the Demand Resource would be lower than the resource’s highest Capacity Supply Obligation acquired for the current Capacity Commitment Period or any future Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.2.4.5.3. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply
the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource or Intermittent Settlement Only Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the Local Sourcing Requirement in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(e) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the capacity requirement in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in a Capacity Zone that is not export-constrained.
(f) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is for capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located inside of the export-constrained Capacity Zone or be located in any non-export constrained Capacity Zone.

(g) A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources as a winter resource if the summer resource is also a Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource.

(h) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Resource of the resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.


Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not
required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.13.1.6.1. **Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.**

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. **Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.1.7. **Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy.
Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.4(b), III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.
Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.
If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its
Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c), it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource achieves Commercial Operation and is tested for its capacity rating, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]


Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone to replace that capacity.


A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3.

An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.
### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Generating Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</th>
<th>New Generating Resources &lt; 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW</th>
<th>Imports and New Demand Resources (including Distributed Generation)</th>
<th>New Generating Resources &lt; 2 MW</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</strong></td>
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<td>New</td>
<td>Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
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<td>$25,000</td>
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<td><strong>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$6500</td>
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### III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.
III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including
interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. **Crediting Of Reimbursements.**
Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.10. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**
Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

The table below shows this generic timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning in year “X”, where X is any year after 2015.
### III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

Except with respect to the first six Forward Capacity Auctions (as described in Section III.13.1.10), each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is defined as follows:

(a) For quantities less than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.200 LOLE, the price is max \[1.6 \times \text{Net CONE, CONE}\];

(b) For quantities equal to or greater than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.200 LOLE, but less than 0.011 LOLE, the price will be determined by a straight line between the price at 0.200 LOLE (which shall be max \[1.6 \times \text{Net CONE, CONE}\] and the price at 0.011 LOLE (which shall be zero);

(c) For quantities equal to or greater than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) at 0.011 LOLE, the price is zero.

III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Forward Capacity Auction shall be a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. Each Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is
concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources.**

   (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).
(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Economic Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} 
q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\
q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\
q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\
\vdots & \vdots \\
q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m.
\end{cases}$$

where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with
an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price,
the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be bid into the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be automatically entered into the first round of the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Permanent De-List Bid or Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import
Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Economic Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as
of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO
concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round. The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area (the “Total System Capacity”) shall reflect at each price the sum of (the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources)) plus (the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources)) plus (for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)) or the Capacity Zone’s Maximum Capacity Limit) plus (for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits) or the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources). In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. In no event shall the Capacity Clearing Price for a Capacity Zone be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:
(1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement; or

(2) the Total System Capacity, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which either of the two conditions above are satisfied, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.** For the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, if the Total System Capacity adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If the Total System Capacity exceeds the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.
(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.** For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if both of the following two conditions are met during the round:

(i) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or below the Capacity Zone’s Maximum Capacity Limit; and

(ii) the Total System Capacity, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction. The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which both of the conditions above are satisfied, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. If it is not the case that both of the two conditions above are satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of system-wide excess supply at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in all modeled Capacity Zones minus the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price) and the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone) and the quantity of capacity from Demand Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of
tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears against the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will
be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

(f) **Treatment of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources.** In determining when the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded, no more than 600 MW of capacity from Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be counted towards meeting the cleared amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve. If the sum of the Capacity Supply Obligations of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources exceeds 600 MW, the Capacity Clearing Price, or in the case of Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition, the payment as described in Section III.13.2.8, (as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.3(b)) paid to all Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources shall be adjusted by the ratio of 600 MW divided by the total of the final Capacity Supply Obligations of Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources. A Real-Time Emergency Generation Resource Static De-list Bid, Dynamic De-list Bid, Permanent De-list Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid shall clear based on the effective Capacity Clearing Price as described in Section III.13.2.7.

III.13.2.3.4. **Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.
(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.
The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is $14.04/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is $11.08/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated using updated data coincident with the recalculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e), except that the energy and ancillary services offset will be adjusted using publicly available data for Mass Hub On-Peak electricity futures through the commitment period of the FCA and will not be adjusted based on natural gas prices. Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by $0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.

III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources.

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and Section III.13.2.5.2.7, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the bid has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.
(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated if either of the following conditions is met in the initial auction clearing process: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation); or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) and the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price. The second run of the auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bid(s), (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the auction-clearing process, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that received a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the auction-clearing process. The second run of the auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the auction-clearing process).

Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price, as adjusted pursuant to Sections III.13.2.7.9 and III.13.2.8, during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5 and Section III.13.2.5.2.7, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the
associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Economic Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price and regardless of whether there is Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.
The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, and Dynamic De-List Bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The capacity shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. De-list bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on
the basis that acceptance of the de-list bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) Where a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its de-list bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the de-list bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).
(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability. Resources that submitted Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii)).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

In instances where an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement DE-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the
ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.
(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

**III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.**

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:
(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

### III.13.2.5.2.5.3. **Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Retirement De-List Bid was submitted, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: submitted a Retirement De-List Bid that was not included in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5(d); elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; was subject to conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction; or, for a resource, or portion thereof, that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.1.5.1. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section
III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: submitted a Permanent De-List Bid that was not included in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5(d); was subject to conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation
Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

III.13.2.5.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.5.2.7. Treatment of De-List and Export Bids When the Capacity Clearing Price is Set Administratively.

Where the Capacity Clearing Price is set pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.9 (Capacity Carry Forward Rule), or where payments are set pursuant to Section III.13.2.8 (Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition), and as a result a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Export Bid clears that would not otherwise have cleared, then the de-listed or exported capacity will not be replaced in the current Forward Capacity Auction (that is, the amount of capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Local Sourcing Requirement, as appropriate, minus the amount of the de-listed or exported capacity that results from the application of administratively determined prices).


Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A
resource may elect to be rationed to either its Economic Minimum Limit or a level above its Economic
Minimum Limit. These levels are submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3. Offers from New Import
Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing
would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export
Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential
rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a
price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the
Economic Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may
not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Economic Minimum
Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock
Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this
Section III.13.2.

III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity
Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the
Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price
in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be
paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated
Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity
Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the
Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone is higher than the Capacity Clearing
Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the export-constrained Capacity Zone
shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the
associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.3. Capacity Clearing Price Floor.
In the Forward Capacity Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2013, June 1, 2014, June 1, 2015, and June 1, 2016 only, the following additional provisions regarding the Capacity Clearing Price shall apply in all Capacity Zones (and in the application of Section III.13.2.3.3(d)(iii)):

(a)  [Reserved.]

(b)  The Capacity Clearing Price shall not fall below 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 below $3.15). Where the Capacity Clearing Price reaches 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 reaches $3.15), offers shall be prorated such that no more than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) is procured in the Forward Capacity Auction, as follows:

(i)  The total payment to all listed capacity resources during the associated Capacity Commitment Period shall be equal to 0.6 times CONE (or in the case of the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016 shall be equal to $3.15) times the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) applicable in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(ii)  Payments to individual listed resources shall be prorated based on the total number of MWs of capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction (receiving a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period).

(iii)  Suppliers may instead prorate their bid MWs of participation in the Forward Capacity Market by partially de-listing one or more resources. Regardless of any such proration, the full amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction will be ineligible for treatment as new capacity in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions (except as provided under Section III.13.1.1.1.2).

(iv)  Any proration shall be subject to reliability review. Where proration is rejected for reliability reasons, the resource’s payment shall not be prorated as described in subsection (ii) above, and the difference between its actual payment based on the Capacity Clearing Price and what its payment would have been had prorating not been rejected for reliability reasons shall
be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region. In this case, the total payment described in subsection (i) above will increase accordingly.

(v) Any election to prorate bid MWs associated with a New Capacity Offer that clears in the Forward Capacity Auction shall also apply in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5.

III.13.2.7.3A Treatment of Imports.
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.
III.13.2.7.4. **Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**
Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing a Capacity Zone at the precise amount of capacity required, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that result in procuring at least the amount of capacity required while seeking to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. In an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the clearing algorithm will not consider blocks of capacity not needed to meet the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement when price separation occurs between the import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. **Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**
Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. **Minimum Capacity Award.**
Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.2.7.7. **Tie-Breaking Rules.**
Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:
(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources) shall be cleared.

III.13.2.7.8. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.9 Capacity Carry Forward Rule.

III.13.2.7.9.1. Trigger.
The capacity carry forward rule shall be triggered in an import-constrained Capacity Zone if all of the following conditions are met:

(a) the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone is less than or equal to zero;

(b) there is not Inadequate Supply in the Forward Capacity Auction in the Capacity Zone; and

(c) at the Capacity Clearing Price, the sum of the amount of New Capacity Required plus the amount of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction plus the amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing is greater than zero. The amount of capacity carried forward due to rationing shall equal the amount of capacity above the Local Sourcing Requirement procured in that Capacity Zone in the previous Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule.
III.13.2.7.9.2. Pricing.
If the capacity carry forward rule is triggered, then the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone shall be the lesser of: (1) $0.01 below the price at which the last New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource in the Capacity Zone to withdraw withdrew from the Forward Capacity Auction; or (2) the applicable Net CONE value; provided, however, that if in the Capacity Zone there is Insufficient Competition and no capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources has been withdrawn from the Forward Capacity Auction, then the Capacity Clearing Price shall equal the applicable Net CONE value.

III.13.2.8. Inadequate Supply and Insufficient Competition.
In the case of either Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition, as defined in this Section III.13.2.8, the Forward Capacity Auction shall still be used to the extent possible; that is, the remedy for Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition shall be limited to import-constrained Capacity Zones having Inadequate Supply or Insufficient Competition.

III.13.2.8.1. Inadequate Supply.

III.13.2.8.1.1. Inadequate Supply in an Import-Constrained Capacity Zone.
An import-constrained Capacity Zone will be considered to have Inadequate Supply if at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price the amount of capacity offered in the import-constrained Capacity Zone through New Capacity Offers is less than the amount of New Capacity Required in that Capacity Zone. In an import-constrained Capacity Zone, “New Capacity Required” shall mean the Capacity Zone’s Local Sourcing Requirement minus (the total amount of capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources in the Capacity Zone (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period) plus the capacity of Proxy De-List Bids entered as result of a retirement election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a)) minus capacity otherwise obligated in the Capacity Zone for the Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Where an import-constrained Capacity Zone has Inadequate Supply, Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) in that Capacity Zone, other than such resources, or portions thereof, that have no Capacity Supply Obligation or are designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources for the
Capacity Commitment Period, shall be paid the max [applicable Net CONE value, Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone] during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction in that Capacity Zone shall be paid the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5).

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Inadequate Supply in one or more import-constrained Capacity Zones shall not affect Capacity Zones having adequate supply.

(d) Any availability penalty assessed during the associated Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2 on a resource in an import-constrained Capacity Zone having Inadequate Supply will be assessed at a rate equal to $7.025/kW-month.

III.13.2.8.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.8.2. Insufficient Competition.
The Forward Capacity Auction shall be considered to have Insufficient Competition in an import-constrained Capacity Zone if there is not Inadequate Supply and the following two conditions are both satisfied:

(a) at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the amount of capacity offered from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (that is not permanently de-listed for the Capacity Commitment Period), minus capacity otherwise obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period, is less than the Local Sourcing Requirement; and

(b) at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price:

(i) less than 300 MW of capacity is offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources (the ISO shall revisit the appropriateness of the 300 MW threshold in the case of an import-constrained Capacity Zone having a Local Sourcing Requirement of less than 5000 MW);
(ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Resources is less than twice the amount of New Capacity Required; or

(iii) any Market Participant’s total capacity from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources is pivotal. For purposes of this Section III.13.2.8.2, a Market Participant shall be considered pivotal if, at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, some capacity from that Market Participant’s potential New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, or New Demand Resources is required to satisfy the Local Sourcing Requirement.

If the Forward Capacity Auction has Insufficient Competition, New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Resources shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, and Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) shall be paid the lower of: (1) the Capacity Clearing Price; or (2) max [applicable Net CONE value, the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone] during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that cleared in the seventh Forward Capacity Auction in the NEMA Capacity Zone shall be paid $6.661/kW-month and Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.2.2.5) that cleared in the eighth Forward Capacity Auction in all Capacity Zones but the NEMA Capacity Zone shall be paid $7.025/kW-month. Any availability penalty assessed during the associated Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.7.2.7.1.2 on a resource in an import-constrained Capacity Zone having Insufficient Competition will be assessed at the payment rate for Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Resources under this Section III.13.2.8.2.

III.13.2.9. [Reserved.]
III.13.4. **Reconfiguration Auctions.**

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

III.13.4.1. **Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

III.13.4.2. **Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions, except Real-Time Emergency Generation Resources which may only submit demand bids. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of Appendix A of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource’s Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 10
Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated obligation month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability.

III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.
Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.
For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.
III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and where the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period
and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity.
(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the
Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined
pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 and the project has not become commercial.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. **Adjustment for Certain Intermittent Power Resources and Intermittent Settlement Only Resources.**

For an Intermittent Power Resource or an Intermittent Settlement Only Resource that was not part of an offer composed of separate resources and that has a winter Capacity Supply Obligation that was adjusted as described in Section III.13.2.7.6, if the difference between the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation and its Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction is greater than the difference between the resource’s summer Capacity Supply Obligation and Summer ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, then the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation shall be reduced such that the difference between the resource’s winter Capacity Supply Obligation and its Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction equals the difference between the resource’s summer Capacity Supply Obligation and Summer ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction. For settlement purposes, any such reduction in Capacity Supply Obligation shall be at the same payment rate applicable to the reduced MW, such that there is a net zero payment for the reduced MW.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:
(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (i) its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and (ii) its summer Seasonal DR Audit value in effect after the most recently completed summer season or its Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit performed during the most recently completed summer season, whichever is more recent.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (i) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (ii) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value in effect after the most recently completed winter season or its Demand Resource Commercial Operation Audit performed during the most recently completed winter season, whichever is more recent.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) has a Commercial Operation milestone date that is prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.
For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values, if the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is
subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by more than the lesser of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or 40 MW, then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price (or, in the case of a resource that cleared in the seventh Forward Capacity Auction, at $12.11/kW-month) on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3.

(c) If the ISO determines that the resource is not able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, and if the resource was part of an offer composed of separate resources when it qualified to participate in the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, then before a demand bid is entered for the resource pursuant to subsection (b) above, the resource may submit monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals to cover the deficiency for the months of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the Capacity Supply Obligation is associated with participation in an offer composed of separate resource prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, but in no case may such a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for a month be for an amount of capacity greater than the difference between the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the month and the resource’s lowest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period.
III.13.4.2.1.4. **Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.**

A resource that has not achieved Commercial Operation by the offer and bid deadline for a monthly reconfiguration auction may not submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2., as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month. However, a resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month.

III.13.4.2.1.5. **ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved generation or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

III.13.4.2.2. **Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**
Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

(a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.

(b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource’s capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.

(c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared demand bids to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved generation or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead
Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

**III.13.4.3. ISO Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**
The ISO shall not submit supply offers or demand bids in monthly reconfiguration auctions. The ISO shall submit supply offers and demand bids in annual reconfiguration auctions as appropriate to address year-to-year changes in the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, to procure capacity not purchased in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of Inadequate Supply, to procure any shortfall in capacity resulting from a resource’s achieving Commercial Operation at a level less than that resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation or other significant decreases in capacity, and to address any changes in external interface limits, as follows:

(a) For each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or before June 1, 2017, the ISO shall submit supply offers and demand bids in annual reconfiguration auctions as appropriate to ensure that the applicable Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, and external interface limits are respected. Where less capacity than needed is obligated, the ISO shall submit demand bids as appropriate to procure the additional needed capacity in each subsequent annual reconfiguration auction until the need is met. Where more capacity than needed is obligated, the ISO may in its discretion submit supply offers in subsequent annual reconfiguration auctions to release the excess capacity, but in any case the ISO shall be required to submit supply offers as appropriate in the third annual reconfiguration auction for a Capacity Commitment Period to release the excess capacity.

(b) For each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall submit demand bids for the amount of additional capacity needed to meet the Local Sourcing Requirements and shall submit supply offers in the third annual reconfiguration auction for a Capacity Commitment Period to release capacity exceeding the Maximum Capacity Limits or external interface limits.

(c) No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall provide notice regarding whether the ISO will be submitting supply offers or demand bids in that auction.
(d) Any demand bid submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, except for any demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions associated with the seventh Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be at $12.11/kW-month.

(e) Any supply offer submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be in the form of a supply curve having the following characteristics:

(i) at prices equal to or greater than 0.75 times the Capacity Clearing Price, as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.3(b), from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period covered by the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall offer the full amount of the surplus;

(ii) at prices between 0.75 times such Capacity Clearing Price and 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the amount of the surplus offered by the ISO shall decrease linearly (for example, at 0.5 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer half of the amount of the surplus); and

(iii) At prices equal to or below 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer no capacity.

(f) For purposes of this Section III.13.4.3, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

(g) Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not subject to the requirements and limitations described in Section III.13.4.2.

(h) Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not associated with a resource.

III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.
All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.

III.13.4.5. **Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**
Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each annual reconfiguration auction, the New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

III.13.4.5.1. **Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.**
Except for the first five Capacity Commitment Periods, the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. There shall be no first annual reconfiguration auction for the first five Capacity Commitment Periods. The table below illustrates the annual reconfiguration auction timing provisions stated above, providing the schedule of annual reconfiguration auctions for the first eight Capacity Commitment Periods.
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<th>Third Annual Reconfiguration</th>
<th>Capacity Commitment Period Begins</th>
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<td>June 2015</td>
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<td>March 2017</td>
<td>June 1, 2017</td>
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III.13.4.5.2. **Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.**

If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

III.13.4.6. **[Reserved.]**

III.13.4.7. **Monthly Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

III.13.4.8. **Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.**
For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality

III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

   (i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

   (ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) the multipliers applied in determining the Capacity Value of a Demand Resource, as described in Section III.13.7.1.5.1;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.2, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;
which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts.

Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity
Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

III.13.8.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.8.4. [Reserved.]
SECTION III

MARKET RULE 1

APPENDIX A

MARKET MONITORING,
REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION
APPENDIX A
MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

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EXHIBIT 5 ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. CODE OF CONDUCT
MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

III.A.1 Introduction and Purpose; Structure and Oversight: Independence.

The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this Appendix A.

III.A.1.2. Structure and Oversight.
The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this Appendix A shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this Appendix A. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor’s functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO’s contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor’s scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

III.A.1.3. Data Access and Information Sharing.
The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this Appendix A.
This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO’s electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.1.4. Interpretation.

In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this Appendix A, the provisions of Appendix A shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either Appendix A or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

III.A.1.5. Definitions.

Capitalized terms not defined in this Appendix A are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.


The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

(a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its
identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

(b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.

(c) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

(a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England
Markets, including the adequacy of this Appendix A, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.

(d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this Appendix A.

(f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.

(g) Review the ISO’s filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor’s assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this Appendix A, as appropriate.

(h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

III.A.2.3. Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:
(a) Maintain Appendix A and consider whether Appendix A requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.

(b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this Appendix A.

(c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this Appendix A.

(d) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this Appendix A.

(e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s functions.

(g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the
Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

(i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this Appendix A.

(j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this Appendix A are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

(i) **Economic withholding**, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.

(ii) **Uneconomic production from a Resource**, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.

(iii) **Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids**, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this Appendix A.

(iv) **Anti-competitive Demand Bids**, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A.

(v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend Appendix A as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of
the New England Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the Commission as may be appropriate.

(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

(i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
(ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
(iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
(iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
(v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this Appendix A, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
(vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this Appendix A. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

(l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.

(m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission in accordance with Appendix B of this Market Rule I.
(n) If and when established, participate in a committee of regional market monitors to review issues associated with interregional transactions, including any barriers to efficient trade and competition.

III.A.2.4. **Overview of the Internal Market Monitor’s Mitigation Functions.**

III.A.2.4.1. **Purpose.**

The mitigation measures set forth in this *Appendix A* for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule I (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this *Appendix A*. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied *ex ante*. Nothing in this *Appendix A*, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO’s authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential sanctions under *Appendix B* of this Market Rule 1.

III.A.2.4.2. **Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.**

(a) **Imposing Mitigation.** To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below:

(b) Despite the foregoing or any other provision of this *Appendix A*, and as more fully described in Section III.B.3.2.6 of *Appendix B* to this Market Rule 1, certain economic decisions shall not be deemed a form of withholding or otherwise inconsistent with competitive conduct.

III.A.2.4.3 **Applicability.**

Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.
III.A.2.4.4 Mitigation Not Provided for Under This Appendix A.
The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this Appendix A, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act (“§205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

III.A.2.4.5 Duration of Mitigation.
Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this Appendix A or in Appendix B to this Market Rule 1.

III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.
Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective. Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

III.A.3.1 Consultation Prior to Offer
If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4(c) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this Appendix A, the Market Participant may contact the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant’s submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources.
In evaluating bids or offers under this Appendix A for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:

(a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.

(b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.
If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five Business Days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.

For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource’s higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource’s Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

III.A.3.3. **Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.**
The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant’s Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO’s or Internal Market Monitor’s systems.

III.A.3.4. **Fuel Price Adjustments.**
(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource’s Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant’s expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

   (i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

   (ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

   (iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer
or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer plus $2.50/MMbtu.

(b) Within five Business Days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm’s length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

(c) If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

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<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)</th>
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III.A.4.1. Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.
This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

(a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
(b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
(c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
(d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

III.A.4.2. Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.

III.A.4.2.1. Initial Thresholds.
Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

(a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource’s capacity;
(b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant’s total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or
(c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO’s Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.
The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource’s available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.
A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.
Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.
Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.

III.A.5. Mitigation.

III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.
Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.
Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

(a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
(b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
(c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset’s Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource.

The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior.

III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.
There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

(a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation” apply, and;
(b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation” apply.

III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.
The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.

The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

### III.A.5.2.2. Constrained Area Test.

A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

(a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;

(b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource’s Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than $25/MWh.


The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource’s Node and the LMP at the Hub.


The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource’s Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for
Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:

(a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
(b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.

III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.

Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.

A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below $25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.

A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower.

III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.


III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource’s Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.
III.A.5.5.3.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.3.3. **Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.**
If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.4. **General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.**

III.A.5.5.4.1. **Applicability.**
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.4.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

III.A.5.5.4.3. **Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**
If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.5. **Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.**

III.A.5.5.5.1. **Applicability.**
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.5.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.
III.A.5.5.3. Consequence of Failing Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.6. Reliability Commitment Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.6.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are (a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

i. local first contingency;
ii. local second contingency;
iii. VAR or voltage;
iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

III.A.5.5.6.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.6.3. Consequence of Failing Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.

III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.

III.A.5.5.7.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.8. Low Load Cost.
Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

(a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
(b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
(c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.
III.A.5.6. **Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:

(a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
   i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
   ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.

(b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.7. **Duration of Commitment Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

III.A.5.8. **Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

III.A.5.9. **Correction of Mitigation.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as
part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.

The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

III.A.6.1. Time-Based Offer Parameters.
Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource’s Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the
Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or
No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-
Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.

III.A.6.3. Other Offer Parameters.
Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater,
for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum
values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per
day) compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject
to the provisions of this section.

III.A.7. Calculation of Resource Reference Levels for Physical Parameters and Financial
Parameters of Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is
expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the
basis of one or more of the following:

(a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all
Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and
fuel types.
(b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing
environmental regulatory body.
(c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or
Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation
related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.

Offers.
The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, and offer blocks will be calculated separately and
assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.
III.A.7.2.1. Order of Reference Level Calculation.
The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of a Supply Offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

(a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
(b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
(c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

III.A.7.2.2. Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.
In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

(a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
(b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
(c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
(d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
   (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
   (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.
   (iii) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4.

For the purposes of this subsection:
i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.

ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO’s or the Internal Market Monitor’s systems, telemetered values will be used.

iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.

iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.

(e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

(f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:

   (i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,
   (ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,
   (iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,
   (iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and
   (v) whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,

then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource’s Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller’s Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource’s Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant though the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3.

The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

(a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 “Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources”.
(b) Costs must be documented.
(c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible.
(d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.
(e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:
   i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected
natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and

ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.
The Internal Market Monitor’s determination of a Resource’s marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource’s incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy:
\[(\text{incremental heat rate} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{emissions rate} \times \text{emissions allowance price}) + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs}.\]

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

(a) emissions limits;
(b) water storage limits; and,
(c) other operating permits that limit production of energy.

No-Load:
\[(\text{no-load fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{no-load emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.\]

Start-Up:
\[(\text{start-up fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{start-up emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.\]

The Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate the competitiveness of the Supply Offer of each Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation that is off-line during a Shortage Event, as described below. The
evaluation for competitiveness shall be performed on Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and on Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market. For purposes of these evaluations, Reference Levels are calculated using the cost-based method specified in Section III.A.7.5. The Real-Time Energy Market evaluation uses the final Supply Offer in place for the hour.

(a) Hours Evaluated. For Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, competitiveness is evaluated for all hours of the Operating Day during which a Shortage Event occurs. For Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market competitiveness is evaluated for the last hour that the Resource could have been committed to be online at its Economic Minimum Limit at the start of the Shortage Event, taking into account the Resource’s Start-Up Time and Notification Time.

(b) Competitiveness Evaluation of Energy Offer At Low Load.
   (i) If the Resource is not in a constrained area as determined under Section III.A.5.2.2, then the Supply Offer is not competitive if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.
   (ii) If the Resource is in a constrained area as determined under Section III.A.5.2.2, then the Supply Offer is not competitive if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

(c) Competitiveness Evaluation of Energy Offer Above Low Load. If a Supply Offer evaluated for competitiveness pursuant to Section III.A.8 (b) above is competitive for an hour, then the energy price parameter for each incremental Supply Offer block above the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit shall be evaluated for competitiveness using the thresholds identified in Section III.A.5.5.1.2, for Resources not in a constrained area, and the thresholds identified in Section III.A.5.5.2.2, for Resources in a constrained area, in order of lowest energy price to highest energy price. If any Supply Offer block is non-competitive, then that block and all blocks above it shall be non-competitive, and all blocks below it shall be competitive.

(d) Low Load Cost test. Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit for its Minimum Run Time, is calculated as the sum of:

   i. The Start-Up Fee (cold start);
   ii. The sum of the No Load Fees for the Resource’s Minimum Run Time; and
   iii. The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Resource’s Minimum Run Time.
Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer Block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer Block.

The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.10. Demand Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor Demand Resources as outlined below:

(a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.

(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as: \((\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}} / \text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}) - 1\). The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.
(c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant’s bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.

III.A.11.1. Purpose.
The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.A.11.2. Implementation.

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:

\[(\text{LMP real time} / \text{LMP day ahead}) - 1.\]

The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

**III.A.11.3. Mitigation Measures.**

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.

(ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.

(iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

**III.A.11.4. Monitoring and Analysis of Market Design and Rules.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England
Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

III.A.12. **Cap on FTR Revenues.**

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.

III.A.13. **Additional Internal Market Monitor Functions Specified in Tariff.**

III.A.13.1. **Review of Offers and Bids in the Forward Capacity Market.**

In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor’s review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor’s determination following such review.

(a) [Reserved].
(b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.
(c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
(d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

Appendix G of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner’s scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.13.4. Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.
The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this Appendix A. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

III.A.13.5. Imposition of Sanctions.
Appendix B of Market Rule 1 sets forth the procedures and standards under which sanctions may be imposed for certain violations of Market Participants’ obligations under the ISO New England Filed Documents and other ISO New England System Rules. The Internal Market Monitor shall administer Appendix B in accordance with the provisions thereof.
III.A.14. **Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.**

Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in *Appendix I* to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.

III.A.15. **Request for Additional Cost Recovery.**

III.A.15.1. **Filing Right.**

If either

(a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this *Appendix A* for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or

(b) in the absence of mitigation, despite having submitted a Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap,

a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource for the hours of the Operating Day during which the Supply Offer was mitigated or during which the Resource was operated at the Energy Offer Cap, the Market Participant may, within sixty days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having submitted a Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the Energy Offer Cap.

III.A.15.2. **Contents of Filing.**

Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating
the Resource exceeded the costs as reflected in the Supply Offer at the Energy Offer Cap; (iii) the Internal
Market Monitor’s written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested
regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

III.A.15.3. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.
Within twenty days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable
Operating Day, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section
III.A.15 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the information and explanation detailed in Section
III.A.15.2 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of
a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that
resulted in the Section III.A.15 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include
the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section
III.A.15.

In the event that the Commission accepted a Market Participant’s filing for cost recovery under this
section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance
with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the
services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.


III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.
A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) review of any Internal
Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or
operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in
Appendix D to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment
requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to
review are:

• Imposition of a mitigation remedy.

• Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material
evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully
challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.

III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.
On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor’s mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor’s application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor’s action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

III.A.17. Reporting.

III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.
Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Appendix A, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant’s cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:

(a) the opportunity costs associated with Demand Reduction Offers;
(b) the accuracy of Demand Response Baselines;
(c) the method used to achieve a demand reduction, and;
(d) the accuracy of reported demand levels.

III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market’s performance in the most recent period.

III.A.17.2.2. Quarterly Report.
The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this Appendix A and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.3. Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.
The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion
of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO’s website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.4. Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.
The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO’s priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.
The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of Appendix A. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:
(i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

(ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of Appendix A and the administration of Appendix A by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of Appendix A.

(v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.

III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:
(a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;

(b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;

(c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,

(d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government
agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten Business Days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct attached hereto as Exhibit 5.

III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.
The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

III.A.18.2.2.  Prohibition on Compensation for Services.
No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

III.A.18.2.3.  Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.
In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of Appendix A, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.19.  Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.
(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the
Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

(B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information

(1) The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);

(2) The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;

(3) The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;

(4) The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;

(5) The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;

(6) If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;

(7) Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.
III.A.20. **Protocol on Referrals to the Commission of Perceived Market Design Flaws and Recommended Tariff Changes.**

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(B) All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral should be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.

1. A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
2. The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
3. The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
4. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.

III.A.21 **Review of Offers From New Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**
The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from new resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21.

III.A.21 Offer Review Trigger Prices.

For each new technology type, the Internal Market Monitor shall establish an Offer Review Trigger Price. Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are equal to or above the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price will not be subject to further review by the Internal Market Monitor. A request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must be submitted in advance of the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.2.4 and shall be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor as described in this Section III.A.21.


For resources other than New Import Capacity Resources, the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018) shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology Type</th>
<th>Offer Review Trigger Price ($/kW-month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generation Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combustion turbine</td>
<td>$13.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined cycle gas turbine</td>
<td>$8.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on-shore wind</td>
<td>$10.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Resources - Commercial and Industrial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Management and/or previously installed Distributed Generation</td>
<td>$1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new Distributed Generation</td>
<td>based on generation technology type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Resources – Residential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Management</td>
<td>$7.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Where a new resource is composed of assets having different technology types, the resource’s Offer Review Trigger Price will be calculated in accordance with the weighted average formula in Section III.A.21.2(c).

For purposes of determining the Offer Review Trigger Price of a Demand Resource composed in whole or in part of Distributed Generation, the Distributed Generation is considered new, rather than previously installed, if (1) the Project Sponsor for the new Demand Resource has participated materially in the development, installation or funding of the Distributed Generation during the five years prior to commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource is being qualified for participation, and (2) the Distributed Generation has not been assigned to a Demand Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation in a prior Capacity Commitment Period.

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, the Offer Review Trigger Prices in the table above shall apply, based on the technology type of the External Resource; provided that, if a New Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, it shall have an Offer Review Trigger Price of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.

For any other New Import Capacity Resource, the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.

**III.A.21.1.2 Calculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices.**

(a) The Offer Review Trigger Price for each of the technology types listed above shall be recalculated using updated data no less often than once every three years. Where any Offer Review Trigger Price is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.
and the new Offer Review Trigger Price shall be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Offer Review Trigger Price is to apply.

(b) For new generation resources, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is as follows. Capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues and operating costs, assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes and discount rate are input into a capital budgeting model which is used to calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Offer Review Trigger Price is set equal to the year-one capacity price output from the model. The model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two unrelated parties).

(c) For new Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above shall be the same as that used for new generation resources, with the following exceptions. First, the model takes account of all costs incurred by the utility and end-use customer to deploy the efficiency measure. Second, rather than energy revenues, the model recognizes end-use customer savings associated with the efficiency programs. Third, the model assumes that all costs are expensed as incurred. Fourth, the benefits realized by end-use customers are assumed to have no tax implications for the utility. Fifth, the model discounts cash flows over the Measure Life of the energy efficiency measure.

(d) For new Demand Resources other than Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is the same as that used for new generation resources, except that the model discounts cash flows over the contract life. For Demand Resources (other than those comprised of Energy Efficiency) that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include new equipment costs and annual operating costs such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions. For Demand Resources (other than Demand Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency) primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs.
For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to subsection (a) above, the Offer Review Trigger Prices will be adjusted as follows:

(1) Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be associated with the indices included in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Component</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gas turbines</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steam turbines</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Turbines and Turbine Generator Sets&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wind turbines</td>
<td>Bloomberg Wind Turbine Price Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Equipment</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;General Purpose Machinery and Equipment&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction labor</td>
<td>BLS “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages” 2371 Utility System Construction Average Annual Pay:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other labor</td>
<td>BLS “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages” 2211 Power Generation and Supply Average Annual Pay:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materials</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Materials and Components for Construction&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electric interconnection</td>
<td>BLS - PPI &quot;Electric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gas interconnection</td>
<td>BLS - PPI &quot;Natural Gas Distribution: Delivered to ultimate consumers for the account of others (transportation only)&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fuel inventories</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis “Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF)”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Each line item associated with fixed operating and maintenance costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be associated with the indices included in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Component</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>labor, administrative and general</td>
<td>BLS “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages” 2211 Power Generation and Supply Average Annual Pay:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Hampden County, Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- On-shore wind costs to be indexed to values corresponding to the location of Cumberland County, Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materials and contract services</td>
<td>BLS-PPI &quot;Materials and Components for Construction&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>site leasing costs</td>
<td>Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis “Gross Domestic Product: Implicit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) For each line item in (1) and (2) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the ninth FCA reflected in the table in Section III.A.21.1.1 above. The value of each line item associated with capital costs and fixed operating and maintenance costs included in the capital budgeting model for the ninth FCA will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(4) The energy and ancillary services offset values for each technology type in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the most recent Henry Hub natural gas futures prices from the time of the update through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA, and the Massachusetts Hub On-Peak electricity prices and the Algonquin City Gates natural gas prices for the 12 months following the time of the update, as published by the CME Group.

(5) Renewable energy credit values in the capital budgeting model shall be updated based on the most recent MA Class 1 REC price for the vintage closest to the first year of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA as published by SNL Financial.

(6) The capital budgeting model and the Offer Review Trigger Prices adjusted pursuant to this subsection (e) will be published on the ISO’s web site.

(7) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this subsection (e) are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

III.A.21.2  New Resource Offer Floor Prices and Offer Prices.

For every new resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price or offer prices, as described in this Section III.A.21.2.

(a) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does not submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.2.4, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be calculated as follows:
For a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be $0.00/kW-month.

For a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and New Demand Resource, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price.

A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 and III.13.1.4.2.4, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices in the case of a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be calculated as follows:

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be equal to the lower of (i) the requested offer price submitted to the ISO as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5; or (ii) the price revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

For any other New Capacity Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into the capital budgeting model used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the
requested offer price to this capacity price estimate and the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be determined as follows:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a new Demand Resource, the resource’s costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred by the Demand Response provider and end-use customers to acquire the Demand Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the Demand Resource, and expected costs avoided by the end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the Demand Resource.

(iii) For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing
market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.

(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource’s qualification package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this subsection (b). Such documentation should include all relevant financial estimates and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data. For a New Import Capacity Resource, such documentation should also include the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all relevant financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. If the supporting documentation and information required by this subsection (b) is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Offer Review Trigger Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price, subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s offer prices shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource’s qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in
Section III.13.8.1(c), subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vii) For New Import Capacity Resources that have been found to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7 to values that are below the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate established pursuant to subsection (v) or (vi), then the resource’s offer prices shall be equal to the revised offer prices.

(c) For a new capacity resource composed of assets having different technology types the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the weighted average of the Offer Review Trigger Prices of the asset technology types of the assets that comprise the resource, based on the expected capacity contribution from each asset technology type. Sufficient documentation must be included in the resource’s qualification package to permit the Internal Market Monitor to determine the weighted average Offer Review Trigger Price.


For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017), the provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and III.A.21.2 shall also apply to certain resources that cleared in the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2015) and/or the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2016), as follows:

(a) This Section III.A.21.3 shall apply to: (i) any capacity clearing in the sixth or seventh Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource; and (ii) any capacity clearing in the sixth or seventh Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Resource at prices found by the Internal Market Monitor to be not consistent with either: (a) the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues for a New Generating Capacity Resource and a New Demand Resource or (b) opportunity costs for a New Import Capacity Resource.
(b) For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity described in subsection (a) above shall receive Offer Review Trigger Prices as described in Section III.A.21.1 and New Resource Offer Floor Prices as described in Section III.A.21.2. These values will apply to such capacity in the conduct of the eighth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

(c) For the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for such capacity may be required to comply with some or all of the qualification provisions applicable to new resources described in Section III.13.1. These requirements will be determined by the ISO on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant.

(d) For any capacity described in subsection (a) above that does not clear in the eighth Forward Capacity Auction:

(i) any prior election to have a Capacity Clearing Price and Capacity Supply Obligation continue to apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.2.2.5 shall be terminated as of the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the eighth FCA (beginning June 1, 2017); and

(ii) after the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, such capacity will be deemed to have never been previously counted as capacity, such that it meets the definition, and must meet the requirements, of a new capacity resource for the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate.

III.A.22 [Reserved.]

III.A.23 Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.A.23.1 Pivotal Supplier Test
The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is
less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.

For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

(a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

(b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of: (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and; (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;

(c) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and; (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone, and;

(d) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:
(e) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity Zone; and

(f) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

III.A.23.2 Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.

FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

(a) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(b) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(c) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

III.A.23.3 Pivotal Supplier Test Notification of Results.

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.A.23.4 Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.

For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a New Import
Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.

III.A.24 Retirement Portfolio Test for Existing Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than

ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then

iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.
Where,

iv. the Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

The Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Q: Please state your name, position and business address.

A: Mr. Karl: My name is Mark G. Karl. I am the Vice President of Market Development for ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”). My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Mr. Gillespie: My name is Andrew G. Gillespie. I am employed by the ISO as a Principal Analyst in Market Development. My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Q: Mr. Karl, please describe your educational background and work experience.

A: I have 33 years of diverse experience in the electric utility industry, of which nearly 15 years have been with the ISO. I earned my Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical/Aerospace Engineering from the University of Pittsburgh in 1980,
and my Master’s Degree in Business Administration from the University of Pittsburgh in 1989, and I am a registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

I presently am Vice President of Market Development with complete responsibility for the design, analysis and development of all the wholesale markets operated by the ISO, as well as responsibility for the management of the external market stakeholder processes. Before becoming Vice President, I was Senior Director of Resource Adequacy, with responsibility for the Load Forecasting, Resource Adequacy, Forward Capacity Market Tariff and Auction Groups. These groups operate the Forward Capacity Market, perform the studies to set the New England capacity requirements, qualify generation and demand resources for participating in the market, and perform economic and production cost studies. Previously, I was Director of Market Development and Integration and Manager of Market Design, where I was extensively involved in development of the Resource Adequacy/Forward Capacity Market, the Forward Reserve Market, and the Long Term Transmission Rights process, and was responsible for development of the market rules and manuals for the ISO’s implementation of its Standard Market Design in 2003.

Prior to joining the ISO, I worked at the Duquesne Light Company in Pittsburgh in a number of areas including Fossil and Nuclear Generation Engineering and Operations, Risk Assessment, Regulatory Analysis, Finance, Structured
Transactions and System Planning, as well as several unregulated electric market related ventures. I had extensive involvement in the restructuring and deregulation of the electric industry in Pennsylvania, including development of retail choice pilot programs, asset valuation, stranded cost filings, and asset divestiture.

Q: Mr. Gillespie, please describe your educational background and work experience.

A: I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Northeastern University and a Masters of Business Administration degree from Emory University and I am a registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

I worked in the ISO’s market monitoring group from 2005 to 2008. In 2008, I joined the ISO’s Market Development Department as a Principal Analyst, with responsibilities for developing design improvements in New England’s electricity markets and drafting appropriate market rules and manuals to implement those improvements.

I have over twenty years of energy industry experience. Prior to joining the ISO, I worked for Eastern Utilities Associates, Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, and PSEG Energy Resources and Trade. Among other things, I have managed a portfolio of generation assets, supervised power plant engineering projects, monitored power plant performance, developed ways to improve resource
performance, and traded emission credits, energy, and capacity.

II. OVERVIEW, BACKGROUND, AND ORGANIZATION

Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?
A: The purpose of my testimony is to explain changes to the treatment of resources seeking to retire from the Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”) and other New England markets (the “Retirement Reforms”). The Retirement Reforms introduce, for the first time in New England, a mechanism for pricing a retirement (including its prospective capital costs), cost-review and, where necessary, mitigation of retirements, as well as important timing changes that give bidders time to react to potential retirements. My testimony explains the changes and additions to the Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”) design and mechanics; the accompanying testimony of Dr. Jeffry McDonald, vice president of Internal Market Monitoring, describes the necessity for and the components of the new mitigation mechanisms.

Q: Please provide a high-level overview of the Retirement Reforms.
A: Currently, a participant retires from the New England markets by submitting a Non-Price Retirement Request (“NPRR”). For reasons we explain below, the lack of a price makes Non-Price Retirement Requests crude, inefficient instruments. Under the Retirement Reforms, therefore, all retirements must be submitted with a price, either in the form of a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid. (For the purposes of my testimony, we will refer to Retirement De-List Bids
and Permanent De-List Bids jointly as “retirement bids.”) Each retirement bid will be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor and approved by the Commission.

Under the Retirement Reforms’ default path, the Commission-approved retirement bid price will be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction, and will be cleared based on the economics in the auction just as other bids are (that is, generally speaking, if the auction clears below the bid price, the resource will be retired or permanently de-listed; if the auction clears at or above the bid price, the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation).

Despite the inefficiency of unpriced retirements, because the ISO does not have the authority to prevent a resource’s retirement, the Retirement Reforms retain an unpriced retirement option, referred to in the rules as the Unconditional Retirement option. The Retirement Reforms include a third option, the so-called Conditional Treatment option, intended to further reduce the use of unpriced retirements.

As described in the accompanying testimony of Dr. McDonald, the Retirement Reforms introduce a mechanism by which to test for and, if necessary, mitigate, the potential exercise of market power via retirement. The Retirement Reforms rely on two mitigation mechanisms. The first is that only Commission-reviewed competitive retirement bid prices are used in Forward Capacity Auction price formation. The second form of mitigation applies in cases where a resource elects not to take on a CSO at the Commission-reviewed competitive retirement bid
price. In such a case, mitigation is accomplished by entering a Proxy De-List Bid ("proxy bid") in the FCA at the Commission-reviewed price in order to mitigate the effect of withholding on the auction clearing price and achieve a competitive outcome.

When the capacity associated with a proxy bid receives a Capacity Supply Obligation and the associated resource declines to take on the obligation, the FCA concludes with the region procuring less capacity than the demand curve indicates is optimal. The Retirement Reforms therefore introduce a second run of the FCA’s “clearing algorithm” (the process by which the FCA clears the market) immediately following the FCA to provide the region with the opportunity to procure capacity to meet the procurement quantity indicated via the demand curve. Rerunning the clearing algorithm following the FCA means that all the resources that were available in the FCA are still in the supply stack and available, if necessary, to replace the capacity associated with the proxy bid.

The Retirement Reforms include changes to the Forward Capacity Auction timeline in order to appropriately signal the need for new entry by making information about retiring resources available to the market earlier. The Retirement Reforms also make several changes to the reliability review process in order to accommodate the pricing of retirement bids and the changed timeline, to increase the likelihood that resources will be willing to go to auction at a price (rather than unconditionally retiring), and to reduce the likelihood that a resource
needed for reliability will opt to retire rather than provide capacity at its Commission-approved price.

Q: Please describe the retirement process today in New England.

A: Today, a resource that wishes to retire from the New England markets submits a Non-Price Retirement Request in the Forward Capacity Market. An NPRR must be submitted by October preceding the Forward Capacity Auction, which is roughly four months before the upcoming FCA. This is roughly seven months after the Show of Interest deadline (the date by which a resource developer must declare its intention to participate in the upcoming auction). Because an NPRR is not priced, a resource that submits an NPRR will be retired no matter the FCA clearing price.

Q: What are the drawbacks of the current retirement process?

A: There are three significant problems with the current retirement process: (1) the lack of a price makes NPRRs economically inefficient; (2) retirements can be used to exercise market power and there is no cost-review or mitigation in place to prevent this; and (3) the FCA timeline does not appropriately signal the need for new entry.

Q: Please describe the ISO’s objectives in designing the Retirement Reforms.

A. The objectives of the Retirement Reforms are to (1) reduce to the greatest extent possible the use of unpriced retirements; (2) provide cost-review and mitigation of
priced and unpriced retirements to prevent the exercise of market power from
inappropriately raising the auction clearing price; (3) maintain the option for any
resource to retire, even one that is still profitable; (4) allow for retirement bids to
reflect the multi-year nature of a retirement decision; and (5) adjust the FCA
timeline to appropriately signal the need for new entry.

Q: How is your testimony organized?
A: Following this introductory section, we have organized our testimony as follows:

In Section III, Elimination of Non-Priced Retirement Requests, we explain how
the lack of a price makes the current vehicle used by participants to retire from all
New England markets, the Non-Price Retirement Request, inefficient, and we
describe its consequent elimination under the Retirement Reforms.

In Section IV, Priced Retirement Bids, we describe the introduction of a new type
of priced de-list bid, the “Retirement De-List Bid,” which under the Retirement
Reforms must be submitted by any participant that wishes to retire from all New
England markets. The Market Monitor will discuss the cost-review process for
Retirement De-List Bids and parallel changes to the costs that may be included in
Permanent De-List Bids, the existing vehicle used by participants to retire from
just the FCM, which is updated and maintained under the Retirement Reforms.
In Section V, Unconditional Retirement Option, we explain that, despite the inefficiency of unpriced retirements, because Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) do not have the authority to prevent resource retirement, the Retirement Reforms retain a vehicle that allows participants to retire no matter the FCA clearing price—in other words, a vehicle that allows a resource to refuse to take on a CSO at any price. We describe the vehicle provided under the Retirement Reforms to do so, the Unconditional Retirement option. In his testimony, Dr. McDonald describes how he will determine if a resource that has elected not to take on a CSO at its competitive price (that is, a resource that has elected the Unconditional Retirement option) must be mitigated. We explain why, where a resource has elected not to take on a CSO at any price and where the IMM has determined that the resource’s potential exercise of market power must be mitigated, a proxy bid will be used in the Forward Capacity Auction to prevent an exercise of market power from impacting the clearing price.

In Section VI, Conditional Treatment Option, we describe the introduction of a tool that allows a resource to retire if it does not get its requested price in the FCA. We explain how the Conditional Treatment option reduces the likelihood that participants will use the Unconditional Retirement option. We explain how the Conditional Treatment option requires the use of a proxy bid in the FCA to act as a marker to determine whether the resource owner’s uncompetitive submitted price would affect the auction clearing price and to prevent the uncompetitive price or uneconomic retirement from impacting the clearing price. We describe
the three possible auction outcomes, and show how, in the auction outcome in
which the resource’s uncompetitive requested price would affect the clearing
price, the proxy bid protects the market clearing price.

In Section VII, Rerunning the Clearing Algorithm, we discuss how the use of a
proxy bid under the Unconditional Retirement option, and in some cases the use
of a proxy bid under the Conditional Treatment option, results in the ISO
procuring less capacity than the demand curve indicates is optimal. Where it does,
we explain how the ISO reruns the clearing algorithm immediately at the
conclusion of the auction in order to provide the region the opportunity to procure
additional capacity in place of the capacity associated with proxy bids.

In Section VIII, FCA Timeline Changes, we explain how, under the existing FCA
qualification process, retirement decisions are made and reported to the market as
late as four months prior to the FCA, which is approximately seven months after
the date by which a potential new entrant must declare its intention to enter the
market. We describe the revised FCA timeline under the Retirement Reforms, and
explain how it improves the signals for new entry. We also describe other benefits
of the timeline changes, including providing the Commission more time to issue
an order on the IMM’s retirement determinations.

In Section IX, Reliability Review Changes, we describe several changes to the
reliability review process that are included in the Retirement Reforms in order to
accommodate the pricing of retirement bids and the changed timeline, as well as to reduce the likelihood that a resource needed for reliability will opt to retire rather than provide capacity at its Commission-approved price.

III. ELIMINATION OF NON-PRICED RETIREMENT REQUESTS

Q: You describe Non-Price Retirement Requests as “crude, inefficient instruments.” Why?
A: As we mentioned, a resource currently retires from all New England markets by submitting a Non-Price Retirement Request in the Forward Capacity Auction. The submission of an NPRR results in the resource’s retirement roughly three years later, (as of the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period), regardless of the price at which the FCA clears. It is the lack of a price that makes NPRRs economically inefficient: the resource cannot signal its costs to the market, nor can the market select the least expensive set of resources that meet the region’s reliability needs. The lack of a price prevents an economic tradeoff between a resource seeking to retire and other existing or new capacity.

Q: Can’t a resource permanently exit the electricity markets through the existing de-list bid processes?
A: Not in an effective way. There are two reasons why the existing de-list bid process doesn’t create an effective means to permanently exit the markets. First, existing de-list bids (with the exception of Permanent De-List Bids) result in a resource’s exiting the market for only a single year, not for the remaining life of
the resource. Second, and most importantly, existing de-list bids, including Permanent De-List Bids in their current form, do not evaluate expected costs and revenues over a multi-year time horizon. Dr. McDonald explains in his testimony how the Retirement Reforms remedy this issue.

Q: Please provide an example of the inefficiency of a Non-Price Retirement Request.

A: A participant with an aging resource calculates that the resource needs $12.00/kW-month from the capacity market to remain viable. If the FCA were to clear at or above $12.0/kW-month, the participant would choose to continue to operate the resource and provide capacity. If the FCA were to clear below $12.00/kW-month, the participant would lose money on the resource, and would choose to retire it. The current rules do not provide an option for a resource to reflect this to the market. Instead, the participant must guess ahead of time what it thinks the FCA clearing price will be. If, for example, the participant is confident that the FCA will clear at $15.00/kW-month, it will choose to keep the resource in the market; if instead the participant fears that the FCA might clear at $9.00/kW-month, it would be forced to submit a Non-Price Retirement Request. The participant does not wish to retire the resource at any price. It only wishes to retire if the FCA clears below $12.00. But there is no way to signal that to the market.
Q: Has the ISO’s External Market Monitor opined on Non-Price Retirement Requests?

A: Yes. In its 2013 Assessment of the ISO New England Electricity Markets, the External Market Monitor recommended that the ISO limit the use of the NPRRs to situations in which there is no capacity clearing price at which a resource could remain viable:

[W]hen the desire to retire emanates from an economic concern, there is no reason why such a concern should not be embodied in a de-list bid. Hence, we recommend the ISO consider adopting appropriate eligibility rules for resources’ use of the Non-Price Retirement [Request] (i.e., that it be reserved for cases where the factor driving the decision to retire cannot reasonably be reflected in a de-list offer). [Pages 162-163.]

Q: Dr. McDonald’s testimony discusses a different problem with Non-Price Retirement Requests, related to mitigation. Please touch on that problem quickly.

A: Dr. McDonald’s testimony focuses on a different, but related problem with Non-Price Retirement Requests. Because Non-Price Retirement Requests do not have a price, they are difficult to assess for reasonableness. It is therefore difficult to determine whether an NPRR is being used as a device to exercise market power by withholding capacity from the market.
IV. PRICED RETIREMENT BIDS

Q: How will resources submit requests to retire under the Retirement Reforms?
A: Under the Retirement Reforms, NPRRs will be replaced by Retirement De-List Bids. Permanent De-List Bids will be retained, modified as described in the testimony of Dr. McDonald (most importantly, to allow the inclusion of some future capital costs, rather than only one year’s worth of going forward costs).

Q: Please provide an overview of how Retirement and Permanent De-List Bids will be treated in the FCA.
A: Permanent De-List Bids today, and Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids under the Retirement Reforms, function in the FCA just as other types of de-list bids function. A participant with an existing resource submits a de-list bid during the FCA qualification process if it wishes to indicate a price below which it is not willing to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation. A Retirement De-List Bid of $12.00/kW-month will signal that a resource cannot afford to continue to operate unless it receives $12.00/kW-month in capacity payments during the commitment period. The Forward Capacity Auction, as a “descending clock” auction, opens with the supply of all existing resources included in the supply stack. If a resource has submitted a de-list bid of any kind for $12.00/kW-month, its capacity will be included in the FCA supply stack until the auction clearing price drops below its $12.00/kW-month de-list bid, at which point the resource’s capacity will be removed from the supply stack. If the $12.00/kW-month de-list
bid was a Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid, the resource will be permanently de-listed from the capacity market. (If the bid was a Retirement De-List Bid, the resource’s interconnection rights will be terminated as of the beginning of the associated commitment period, and the resource removed from all New England markets.) On the other hand, if the auction clears above the resource’s de-list bid, say the auction clears at $13.00/kW-month, the resource’s capacity will still be in the supply stack at the close of the auction, and it will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated capacity commitment period.

Q: Please describe the efficiency benefits of pricing retirements.

A: Providing a tool that allows suppliers to represent their costs in the market improves efficiency: both suppliers and load will be better off. An important feature of markets is that resources bid their costs, rather than taking actions based on their guess about where the market will clear; providing a tool that allows suppliers to represent their retirement costs means that they will no longer be forced to make a retirement decision based on their expectations of market outcomes. A generator that would be willing to provide capacity at $12.00/kW-month or above but not at a price below $12.00/kW-month will have an instrument that enables it to do so. This allows the retiring resource to compete with other resources, potentially displacing one that is more expensive. This increased efficiency is good for load, too. Load will not be forced to pay for more expensive capacity in place of a resource whose incorrect expectations of the
capacity clearing price led it to retire prematurely. A priced retirement may
displace a more expensive resource and lead to a more efficient price and lower
costs; this economic tradeoff does not exist when an unpriced retirement is used.

Q: Please provide a mathematical example of the efficiency benefits of pricing
eretirements.

A: Assume that the resource described above, which wishes to retire if the capacity
clearing price is below $12.00/kW-month, does not have a vehicle by which to
signal this price to the market. Due to the risk that the FCA will clear below
$12/kW-month, the resource submits an NPRR. The resource’s capacity is
therefore not included in the FCA, and the FCA ends up clearing at $13.00/kW-
month. Assuming that the auction procures 33,000 MW, the total costs for the
commitment period would be $5.148 billion ($13/kW-month x 1000 kW-month/1
MW-month x 12 months x 33,000 MW).

Now imagine that the resource is instead able to submit a $12.00/kW-month
Retirement De-List Bid to signal its price to the market, and so is not forced into
an unpriced retirement. Assume that the inclusion of its megawatts in the FCA
means that the auction does not need the capacity of the more expensive,
$13.00/kW-month resource, to clear. Making the simplifying assumption that both
the $12.00/kW-month resource and the $13.00/kW-month resource are 500 MW
units, which, due to the assumed slope of the demand curve ($0.455/kW-month
per 100 MW) means that the auction again procures 33,000 MW, the resulting the
total costs for the commitment period would be $4.752 billion ($12/kW-month x 1000 kW-month/1 MW-month x 12 months x 33,000 MW). The difference between the $5.148 billion outcome and the $4.752 billion dollar outcome, a savings of $396 million, is a result of the efficiency gain resulting from the addition of a priced retirement vehicle. (This example relies on a number of assumptions. For example, if the $13.00/kW-month resource were a 600 MW unit instead of a 500 MW unit, it would not be taken under the demand curve, because the addition of a 600 MW resource would result in too much excess to be accepted by the FCA’s social maximizing function.)

Q: Are there other benefits to priced retirements?

A: The addition of prices to retirement requests provides the Internal Market Monitor and the Commission with a means to determine whether or not the retirement request is competitive, and, if the retirement is determined uncompetitive, provides a straightforward way to protect the market clearing price from the potential exercise of market power.

Q: Please describe the timing of retirement bid submission and Internal Market Monitor review under the Retirement Reforms.

A: Under the Retirement Reforms, participants will submit Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids to the ISO in March (and any updates to retirement bids that received Capacity Supply Obligations in the prior FCA). The IMM will have three months (90 days) during which to complete its consultative cost review.
of these bids (described in Dr. McDonald’s testimony). In June, following the
determination notification” to each participant that submitted a Retirement De-
List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid. The notification will include the IMM’s
determination of a competitive retirement bid, referred to in the tariff language as
the “Internal Market Monitor-approved Retirement De-List Bid” or “Internal
Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid.”

Q: Please describe the timing of participant elections under the Retirement
Reforms.

A: A participant has ten business days after receiving a retirement determination
notification in which to elect either Unconditional Retirement or Conditional
Treatment. If a participant makes no election during these ten days, its Retirement
De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid will be entered into the Forward Capacity
Auction at the Commission-approved price. The participant can protest its IMM-
approved price at the Commission, but in taking the priced retirement path, it
agrees to accept the Commission-approved price. (If the Commission-approved
de-list bid price is above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, then,
pending reliability review, the de-list bid will not be included in the Forward
Capacity Auction, just as is true today.) A resource that elects Unconditional
Retirement or Conditional Treatment during this ten day period may also opt to be
reviewed for reliability. We discuss reliability reviews in the final section of this
testimony.
Q: Please describe the timing of the ISO’s filing under the Retirement Reforms.

A: In July, ten business days after the election deadline (that is, 20 business days after the retirement determination notifications are provided), the ISO will make a filing to the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act that provides the Internal Market Monitor determinations (for ease of Commission review, the filing will also include the prices of all submitted retirement bids).

The contents of this filing are discussed in the testimony of Dr. McDonald.

V. UNCONDITIONAL RETIREMENT OPTION

Q: Please describe the Unconditional Retirement option and provide an example.

A: The Unconditional Retirement option is intended for use where the IMM and the participant disagree on the appropriate retirement bid and the participant declines to offer its resource at the price that will subsequently be determined by the Commission. In such a case, at the time of the elections we discussed earlier, the participant simply chooses to retire the resource regardless of price. For example, if in March a participant submits a $12.00/kW-month retirement bid and the IMM determines that the appropriate bid is $10/kW-month then the participant can choose not to agree and elect not to participate in the auction at a Commission-determined price. As we will explain later, in this situation if the unconditional retirement appears to be an exercise of market power, a Commission-approved proxy bid will be used in the auction.
Q: Given the desirability of priced retirements, why are you providing an Unconditional Retirement option?

A: RTOs do not have the authority to prevent a resource from retiring, even if the ISO and the Commission agree that a resource is still economic (that is, can still be operated profitably). While, as Dr. McDonald explains in his testimony, retiring a still-profitable resource may be an exercise of market power, the retirement itself cannot be prevented.

Because the ISO must allow for resource retirement in all cases, the Retirement Reforms provide for what in essence is a conversion from a priced to an “unpriced” retirement. This unpriced option is described in the tariff as the Unconditional Retirement option. A resource that elects to unconditionally retire will be retired whatever the FCA clearing price, in the same way that a resource that submits a Non-Price Retirement Request is retired today. This is true whether the resource initially submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid: electing to unconditionally retire results in the resource’s retirement from all New England markets.

Q: What is the drawback of providing an Unconditional Retirement option?

A: The drawback of providing an Unconditional Retirement option is that a participant may use such an option to engage in physical withholding, just as it can today with a Non-Price Retirement Request. The Retirement Reforms are
therefore designed to mitigate the market impact of this scenario while allowing participants full freedom to retire from all the New England markets should they so choose.

Q: What is the ISO’s solution to the potential for the exercise of market power inherent in the Unconditional Retirement option?

A: As discussed above and in the testimony of Dr. McDonald, a resource cannot elect the Unconditional Retirement option without first submitting a priced retirement bid and cost data to the IMM. The submission of a price and supporting data allow the IMM and the Commission to calculate a competitive bid price for the resource. This in turn provides for the protection of the market clearing price from the exercise of market power by use of a proxy bid entered in the FCA at the resource’s competitive, Commission-approved price.

As Dr. McDonald discusses in his testimony, the ISO will only use a proxy bid in the case of an Unconditional Retirement where the resource owner has a portfolio that can benefit from the retirement.

Q: What is a proxy bid?

A: A proxy bid is a Commission-approved bid that the ISO will enter into the supply stack of the FCA, just as a participant would enter (for example) a Static De-List Bid. The proxy bid is for the same megawatt quantity and is at the same location as the submitted Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid it represents,
but it will be at the competitive bid price for the resource (rather than at the submitted price).

Q: **How does a proxy bid protect the market clearing price?**

A: As is discussed in Dr. McDonald’s testimony, if an economic (that is, still-profitable) resource elects the Unconditional Retirement option and withdraws from the capacity market, the FCA clearing price may be inappropriately increased. But when a proxy bid is used at the price and quantity of the resource’s *competitive* bid price, the auction clearing price will not reflect market power resulting from an uneconomic (that is, premature) retirement.

The figure below depicts a simplified FCA supply curve in order to demonstrate this. Assume that each numbered bid or offer is from a separate resource, so that, for example, bid #2 comes from resource #2. Next assume that resource #4, which has an IMM-determined and Commission-approved price equal to $10.00/kW-month, wishes to retire no matter what the FCA clearing price proves to be. Because of this, rather than entering a retirement bid at bid #4, the resource physically withholds the capacity via the Unconditional Retirement option. Consequently, bids or offers from higher priced resources (#5 through #8) are shifted to the left and the clearing price is higher (set by #7 at $13/kW-month) than it would be without the unconditional retirement. This higher clearing price reflects the effects of the exercise of market power by resource #4. (As Dr. McDonald explains in his testimony, if resource #4 is not part of a portfolio that
can benefit from the clearing price increase caused by the withholding, the Internal Market Monitor assumes that the withholding of capacity is not an improper exercise of market power.)

But if a proxy bid at the Commission-approved price is used in place of the capacity withheld by resource #4, the supply curve is not shifted, and the clearing price is set by resource #6, at $12.00/kW-month. This $12.00/kW-month clearing price is free of the effects of the exercise of market power.

Under equivalent assumptions, the efficiency gain and concomitant cost savings resulting from the use of the proxy bid in this example are similar to those in my previous example (on pages 16 to 17) describing the efficiency benefits of providing a priced retirement vehicle. (If, as we describe below, a second run of the clearing algorithm procures additional capacity, the total costs may increase slightly.)
Q: If a supplier elects the Unconditional Retirement option and the IMM determines that the resource is part of a portfolio that can benefit from the retirement, what happens?

A: A supplier with a portfolio benefit that elects to unconditionally retire a resource will have the resource retired from all New England markets. The market clearing price will be protected from the price impact of improper withholding by means of a proxy bid, which eliminates the impact of the retirement on the market clearing price by representing the resource’s megawatt capacity and economic price in the auction.

Q: If a supplier elects the Unconditional Retirement option and the IMM determines that there is no portfolio benefit, what happens?

A: A participant with a single resource (or a portfolio that won’t be increased in value by a retirement) that elects to unconditionally retire a resource will have the resource retired from all New England markets with no further action, because such a participant cannot directly benefit from the resource’s retirement. For reasons explained in Dr. McDonald’s testimony, there will be no mitigation of either the resource or of the resulting market clearing price (even where the IMM and the Commission have determined that the resource is still profitable).
Q: Please describe the auction clearing process in the event that a proxy bid is used in the FCA under the Unconditional Retirement option.

A: If the auction clearing price is below the proxy bid price, no further action is taken. If the FCA clears above the proxy bid price and the megawatts associated with a proxy bid therefore “receive” a CSO, the process by which the auction is cleared will be repeated. This is necessary to allow the region the opportunity to replace the megawatts associated with the proxy bid, because a proxy bid does not represent real capacity deliverable in the commitment period. We explain this in greater detail in the section entitled “Rerunning the Clearing Algorithm.”

VI. CONDITIONAL TREATMENT OPTION

Q: Please describe the Conditional Treatment option and provide an example.

A: Like the Unconditional Retirement option, the Conditional Retirement option is intended for use where the IMM and the participant disagree on the appropriate retirement bid and the participant declines to offer a resource at the Internal Market Monitor determined price and does not want to risk too low a Commission-approved price. Unlike the Unconditional Retirement option, however, the participant elects to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation if the market clearing price is above its initially proffered retirement bid. Using the same example as above, if in March a participant submits a $12.00/kW-month retirement bid and the IMM determines that the appropriate bid is $10/kW-month then the participant elects to take on a CSO if the market clears above the $12.00/kW-month price. As we will explain, a proxy bid is always used when the
Conditional Retirement option is elected, but it will only impact the auction results in a limited number of situations.

Q: What is the purpose of the Conditional Treatment option?
   A: Under a design that includes IMM and Commission-reviewed priced retirement bids and an Unconditional Retirement option, a resource might elect to unconditionally retire over a disagreement with the IMM and the Commission as to how much it needs from the capacity market to remain viable. In order to reduce the use of unpriced retirements still further, the Retirement Reforms include the Conditional Treatment option.

Q: How was the Conditional Treatment option developed?
   A: The Conditional Treatment option was added to the overall design during the stakeholder discussion phase of development. When considering priced retirement bids and the Unconditional Retirement option, stakeholders pointed out that if a resource elects to unconditionally retire over a disagreement with the Internal Market Monitor regarding the resource’s competitive retirement bid, but the auction ends up clearing above even the resource’s submitted bid, the fact that the resource chose the unpriced retirement path would result in inefficient exit and a loss to the market, to the resource, and to load. The Conditional Retirement option was added to address this design shortcoming.
Q: Please provide an example of how a design with a priced retirement path and an unpriced retirement path can result in an inefficient outcome.

A: Continuing the example from above, after its cost review process, the Internal Market Monitor determines that a resource’s competitive retirement bid is $10.00/kW-month, but the resource insists it cannot survive with less than $12.00/kW-month from the capacity market. Such a resource does not wish to unconditionally retire, it only wishes to retire if the auction clears under $12.00/kW-month. But without the Conditional Retirement option, the resource would choose to unconditionally retire as a consequence of its disagreement with the Internal Market Monitor.

Suppose that the FCA ends up clearing at $15.00/kW-month. As a consequence, the resource that elected to unconditionally retire will be retired despite the fact its dispute with the Internal Market Monitor and Commission over the appropriate retirement bid price was immaterial. That is, whether the de-list bid had been included in the supply stack at the resource desired price of $12.00/kW-month or at the Commission-approved price of $10.00/kW-month, it would have been below the auction clearing price. And, moreover, the resource that unconditionally retired would have chosen not to retire had it known that the auction was going to clear at $15.00/kW-month; its retirement at that clearing price was uneconomic. Such a result is inefficient. This is a restatement of the problem with Non-Price Retirement Requests that we discussed earlier: a resource
might retire based on a bad guess at the clearing price and inefficiently increase auction costs.

Q: Please explain how the Conditional Treatment option helps solve this problem.

A: By improving the tools available to resources, the Conditional Treatment option reduces the likelihood that the FCA will produce an inefficient outcome (that is, retire a resource that would have been economic even at its submitted price).

As Dr. McDonald discusses in his testimony, under the Retirement Reforms, if a permanent or retirement de-list bid is sent to auction, it is always at the Internal Market Monitor-approved price, as approved or modified by the Commission. (“Sending a de-list bid to auction” is shorthand for including the capacity of a resource in the supply stack at a price when the clearing price is above the de-list bid price and removing the capacity from the supply stack when the clearing price drops below the de-list bid price.) In this example, then, it will be the Commission-approved $10.00/kW-month bid that will be sent to auction; thus the capacity of the resource will be included in the supply stack down to $10.00/kW-month and the $10.00/kW-month de-list bid will be used in determining the auction clearing price. But if the resource elected the Conditional Treatment option, it will not obtain a Capacity Supply Obligation below its submitted price of $12.00/kW-month.
The Conditional Treatment option, then, allows a resource to decouple the de-list bid price that is sent to auction and used for price formation from the resource’s requirement to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation. The de-list bid sent to auction will be the Commission-approved de-list bid, but for a resource choosing the Conditional Treatment option, it will be the *submitted* de-list bid price that dictates whether or not the resource will take on Capacity Supply Obligation. In this way, a resource electing Conditional Treatment will never be forced to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation below its submitted de-list bid price.

**Q:** Please describe the use of proxy bids under the Conditional Treatment option.

**A:** A proxy bid will be sent to auction any time a resource elects the Conditional Treatment option. As with the Unconditional Retirement option, the proxy bid is for the same quantity and at the same location as the submitted bid it represents, but is at the Commission-reviewed competitive retirement bid price. The proxy bid under the Conditional Treatment option serves as a marker to allow the ISO to determine whether the resource’s decision not to take on a CSO below its submitted price affects the auction clearing price and prevents the resource owner’s uneconomic price or retirement from impacting the auction clearing price. In the case where the resource’s decision not to take on a CSO below its submitted price does affect the auction clearing price, the resource is (at the resource’s own request) retired.
Q: Please describe the Forward Capacity Auction mechanics under the Conditional Treatment option.

A: As discussed, under the Conditional Treatment option, the resource’s submitted bid will not be sent to auction, but the submitted price will determine if the resource receives a CSO. As was also noted, the auction will be cleared using the proxy bid price, but whether the resource gets a CSO will depend on its submitted price. Because the rule revisions provide that no proxy bid will be used where the Commission-approved price is equal to the submitted price, the proxy price is always below the submitted bid price. There are therefore three possible auction outcomes. Continuing the example above, the outcomes are as follows:

(1) The auction clears below the submitted price and the proxy price, in which case the resource is retired or permanently de-listed. With a submitted bid of $12.00/kW-month, a Commission-approved proxy of $10/kW-month, and an auction clearing price of $7.00/kW-month, neither price provides a bid low enough to take on a CSO and the resource is retired or permanently de-listed. The proxy bid is irrelevant, so no further action is taken.

(2) The auction clears above the submitted price and the proxy price, in which case the resource receives a CSO. In this case, the auction clears at $13.00/kW-month, above both the $12.00/kW-month submitted price and the $10/kW-month proxy price. The resource has a CSO as it receives the $13.00/kW-month clearing price. Again, the proxy bid is irrelevant because the megawatts from the resource
it reflects took on the CSO. (In this case, as is discussed in the testimony of Dr. McDonald, the participant must submit a retirement bid of the same type in following FCA.)

(3) The auction clears **between** the submitted price and the proxy bid price, in which case the resource is again retired or permanently de-listed. Here, the auction clears at $11.00/kW-month, between the $10.00/kW-month Commission-approved price and the $12.00/kW-month submitted price. Since the participant declined to take on a CSO below $12, the resource is retired. In this case, however, the proxy of $10.00/kW-month is below the $11.00/kW-month clearing price and thus has a CSO; of course, these proxy megawatts cannot supply capacity and this requires rerunning the clearing algorithm, which we discuss below.

Q: **Do the Retirement Reforms hold together without the Conditional Treatment option?**

A: Yes, they do. Without the Conditional Treatment option, the Retirement Reforms largely meet all of the ISO’s design objectives, including reducing the use of unpriced retirements; providing for cost-review and mitigation of priced and unpriced retirements; maintaining the option for any resource to retire, even one that is still profitable; allowing for priced retirements to reflect the costs of permanently withdrawing from the market; and adjusting the FCA timeline to appropriately signal the need for new entry. The Conditional Treatment option
provides an additional tool for participants with the aim of further preventing
inefficient exit: it is necessary to meet the goal of reducing the use of unpriced
retirements to the “greatest extent possible” while still protecting the market
clearing price and allowing still-profitable resources to retire.

VII. RERUNNING THE CLEARING ALGORITHM

Q: What happens if, at the end of the FCA, a proxy bid has a CSO?
A: When the FCA concludes with a CSO assigned to proxy megawatts, there is no
resource to take on the CSO and provide actual capacity in the commitment
period. In effect, the resource that the proxy bid represented has declined to take
on a CSO by unconditionally retiring (declining to take on a CSO at any price) or
conditionally retiring (declining to take on a CSO at the price at which the auction
cleared).

In order to allow the region the opportunity to procure additional capacity to
replace the proxy megawatts, the ISO removes the proxy bids from the supply
stack and immediately reruns the clearing algorithm.

Q: Does “rerunning the clearing algorithm” mean you are running the FCA
twice?
A: No. The Forward Capacity Auction includes the following components: the
submission of offers and bids, the closing conditions (which together comprise the
descending clock auction), and the clearing algorithm. The only component that
will require two passes is the clearing algorithm, which will not impact either the submission of offers and bids or the closing conditions, and so will not require a rerun of the descending clock auction. The Retirement Reforms therefore call for conducting a typical Forward Capacity Auction, with the possible inclusion of proxy bids in place of resources that have declined to take on a CSO at their Commission-approved price, and then a possible second run of the clearing algorithm where there is no resource to take on the CSO of the proxy.

**Q:** Please describe the mechanics of the second run of the clearing algorithm.

**A:** The demand curve used in the second run of the clearing algorithm is the same curve that is used in the FCA. The supply curve used in the second run of the clearing algorithm differs from the supply curve used in the FCA in two respects. First, all proxy bids are removed. Second, offers and bids that received CSOs in the FCA (other than proxy bids where no resource was willing to take on the CSO) are included as price takers—that is, the capacity will be taken in the second run of the clearing algorithm no matter what the clearing price.

Note that, due to the sloped demand curve, rerunning the clearing algorithm will not necessarily procure additional capacity. That is, there will not be a one-for-one replacement of the proxies’ removed capacity – the second run of the clearing algorithm will only procure more capacity if doing so maximizes social welfare (the “objective function” of the clearing algorithm) given the demand curves and the submitted bids and offers.
Q: What price will resources be paid?

A: Capacity that clears in the FCA will be paid the capacity clearing price, with any adjustments that are required under the tariff. Capacity that clears only as a result of the second run of the clearing algorithm (if any such capacity is procured) will be paid the price that results from the second run of the clearing algorithm. The rule revisions require that the price resulting from the second run of the clearing algorithm be no less than the FCA clearing price. These pricing rules are appropriate because the FCA price reflects the competitive price not impacted by the exercise of market power.

Q: If the capacity assigned to a proxy bid receives a CSO in the FCA, will there always be a second run of the clearing algorithm?

A: Not necessarily. Anytime a proxy bid is used under the Unconditional Retirement option and the megawatts represented by the proxy bid receive a CSO in the FCA, there is no resource available to take on the CSO and so there will be a second run of the clearing algorithm. On the other hand, where the megawatts assigned to a proxy bid receive a CSO under the Conditional Treatment option, if the capacity clearing price is above both the proxy bid and the submitted bid, the resource takes on the CSO assigned to the proxy megawatts. Under the Conditional Treatment option, the clearing algorithm is only rerun in the case where the auction clears between the proxy bid and the submitted price so that there is no resource to take on the proxy’s CSO (because the clearing price was below the
submitted price and, the resource, having declined to take on a CSO below its submitted price, was retired or permanently de-listed).

Q: Which of the Retirement Reforms’ design objectives create the need for the second run of the clearing algorithm?

A: At the most basic level, the repeat of the clearing algorithm is necessitated by the ISO’s twin objectives of (1) protecting the market clearing price from withholding and (2) permitting a still-profitable resource to retire (thereby withholding). If the Commission could prevent the retirement of still-profitable resources, no rerun would be necessary and all resources would be paid the competitive price resulting from the FCA. If the ISO did not attempt to protect the market clearing price from physical withholding, no rerun would be necessary and all resources would receive the higher price resulting from the exercise of market power.

Under the Retirement Reforms, proxy bids protect the market clearing price from the exercise of market power, and the second run of the clearing algorithm provides the opportunity to procure any proxy capacity resulting from a still-profitable resource’s choice to retire.

Q: Did the ISO consider alternatives to rerunning the clearing algorithm?

A: Yes. The ISO considered doing without the second run of the clearing algorithm and simply waiting for the first annual reconfiguration auction to attempt to procure additional capacity, because the two serve nearly identical functions.
As a refresher, the ISO runs three annual reconfiguration auctions between each Forward Capacity Auction and the associated capacity commitment period three years later. The purpose of the reconfiguration auctions is to “true-up” the quantity of capacity procured to meet the procurement target, in order to, for example, replace new resources terminated after the FCA or meet any increase in the zonal or system-wide capacity requirements.

If the ISO elected not to rerun the clearing algorithm after the FCA, any incremental procurement would be deferred to the first annual reconfiguration auction, at which time the region would have the opportunity to replace any proxy megawatts where the associated resource had chosen not to take on the CSO. However, for reliability and efficiency reasons, the ISO believes that waiting until the first annual reconfiguration auction to attempt to replace this capacity is not appropriate. This is because not all resources that participated in the FCA will participate in the reconfiguration auction: new resources may elect not to participate, because waiting a year reduces the lead time required by new resources to develop their facilities, and existing resources with retirement bids that cleared (that is, resources that were retired or permanently de-listed) cannot participate in the reconfiguration auction as they are no longer qualified resources in the FCM. In addition, new resources clearing in the FCA are entitled to elect a seven year price lock, which is not available to new resources clearing in the reconfiguration auctions. As a result, new resources that participated in the FCA
are likely to decline to participate in the reconfiguration auction and would prefer instead to wait for the next FCA. This reduces the supply available in the reconfiguration auction, and reduces the probability that proxy megawatts will be replaced.

VIII. FCA TIMELINE CHANGES

Q: Why do the Retirement Reforms include changes to the FCA timeline?

A: The Forward Capacity Auction qualification process takes place during the year before the FCA, beginning roughly four years prior to the commitment period. During the qualification process, existing resources that intend to retire and prospective resources that intend to build (referred to as “New Capacity Resources” in the tariff) must provide notice to the ISO. Under the current rules, a prospective resource must declare its intention to enter the market (through a “Show of Interest” form) in the early March timeframe, well before the date that an existing resource must declare its intention to permanently exit the market (which can be as late as October). This timing is problematic because knowledge that a resource intends to retire may be instrumental to a participant’s decision to enter the market.
Q: Has the ISO’s External Market Monitor opined on the current FCA timeline?

A: Yes. In its 2014 Assessment of the ISO New England Electricity Markets, the External Market Monitor recommended that the ISO evaluate several changes to the FCA timeline to address the aforementioned problems. It wrote:

The deadline for existing resources to submit a Non-Price Retirement Request is four months before the FCA, so the ISO can review the request for reliability impacts. This deadline is not well-aligned with the new resource qualification process, since it is after the deadline for new resources to submit a Show of Interest.

Consequently, new resource developers must wait an extra year before they can respond to the retirement of an existing resource.

[We recommend that the ISO] [e]valuate whether it could enhance competition by changing the availability or timing of information about other supply before [] the auction [including] [e]xisting resources’ qualified capacity and non-price retirement requests.

[Pages 92-93.]

Q: Please describe the changes to the Forward Capacity Auction timeline.

A: The Retirement Reforms include three primary changes to the timeline: (1) the date by which the ISO must inform an existing resource of the quantity of capacity it has qualified to participate in the next FCA is moved earlier (from May to the prior March); (2) the date by which a resource must announce its intention to retire capacity is moved earlier; and (3) the date by which an existing resource must announce its intention to retire capacity is moved earlier.
to retire or permanently de-list is moved earlier (from June to the prior March for permanent de-lists and from October to the prior March for retirements); and (3) the date by which a new resource must submit its Show of Interest form announcing its intention to enter the market is moved later (from February to April).

Switching the respective timing of the Show of Interest and retirement deadlines provides retirement information to potential new entrants before they must declare their intention to enter the auction, giving resource developers the opportunity to consider intended retirements before making the decision to enter the FCA. This allows a potential new entrant to respond to a retirement in the same FCA; under the current rules, it must wait to respond to a retirement until the following FCA.

Q: Do the timeline revisions provide benefits in addition to improving the signals for new entry?

A: Yes. The timeline revisions provide several benefits in addition to improving the signals for new entry. The figure below depicts two alternate timelines leading up to FCA 11, which is to be held in February 2017. The top timeline shows simplified milestone dates for FCA 11 if the auction were to be held under the current tariff; the bottom timeline shows the equivalent simplified milestone dates for FCA 11 under the Retirement Reforms. As can be seen, not only do the Retirement Reforms provide retirement information to the market months before
the existing rules do, the revisions also provide retirement and permanent de-list information to the Commission months before the existing rules do.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 8, 2016</td>
<td>Show Of Interest deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 23, 2016</td>
<td>Retirement bid info shared with market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 22, 2016</td>
<td>Show of Interest deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 13, 2016</td>
<td>ISO filing to FERC on retirement bids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 9, 2016</td>
<td>NPRR deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 8, 2016</td>
<td>ISO filing to FERC on perm. delist bids &amp; NPRRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 23, 2017</td>
<td>FERC order on perm. delist bids &amp; NPRRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 6, 2017</td>
<td>FERC order on retirement bids*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the timeline changes are better aligned with the ISO’s capacity zone determination process, will allow resources that have chosen the Unconditional Retirement option to be considered in the Installed Capacity Requirement calculation and the New Capacity Resource interconnection studies (such as the overlapping impact analyses), and will help reduce the administrative burden to the ISO of “right sizing” the megawatt values of incremental increase projects associated with Existing Capacity Resources.
IX. RELIABILITY REVIEW CHANGES

Q: Please provide an overview of the changes to the reliability review process.

A: The Retirement Reforms include (1) changes to the timing of reliability reviews, (2) changes to the set of resources exiting the market (or potentially exiting the market) that will be reviewed, (3) changes to explicitly recognize that the ISO cannot retain a resource for reliability where it does not wish to be retained, (4) changes to what the ISO refers to as the reliability review “hierarchy,” and (5) changes to the treatment of a resource retained for reliability once the reliability need has been met. These changes are designed to conform the reliability review process with other aspects of the Retirement Reforms, including the addition of priced retirements and the changes to the FCA timeline, as well as to make it more likely that a retiring resource will agree to go to auction at a price in the first place, and will agree to provide capacity if it is needed for reliability.

Q: What is a reliability review, and what does it mean to “retain” a resource for reliability?

A: Under the FCM rules, the ISO conducts reliability reviews of all resources wishing to exit the capacity market (that is, all resources that have submitted a de-list bid or a Non-Price Retirement Request) to determine whether the resource will be needed for reliability reasons during the capacity commitment period (the review is conducted according to tariff Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 and III.13.2.5.2.5). If the ISO determines that a resource will be needed for reliability, the ISO can, in certain cases, “retain” the resource (“reject” the de-list bid), in
which case it will not permit the resource to de-list. Typically, the ISO retains resources during the FCA. If, for example, the auction price drops below a Static De-List Bid and the ISO has determined that the resource will be needed for reliability, the ISO will reject the de-list bid, thereby not allowing it to clear, and retain the resource. (In such a case, the retained resource is paid its Static De-List Bid price during the capacity commitment period.)

Q: Please describe the ISO’s current reliability review of resources exiting (or potentially exiting) the capacity market permanently.

A: Currently, there are two ways a resource can exit the market permanently: it can submit a Non-Price Retirement Request or it can submit a Permanent De-List Bid. Non-Price Retirement Requests are reviewed for reliability prior to the auction, during the qualification process, and Permanent De-List Bids, like other de-list bids, are reviewed for reliability, and possibly rejected for reliability, during the auction.

The ISO currently reviews NPRRs for reliability within 90 days of receipt of the NPRR. Because an NPRR can be submitted as late as October, the ISO currently concludes its retirement reliability reviews as late as January, a month prior to the auction. Because the ISO cannot retain a retiring resource against its wishes, the fact that the ISO finds a resource with an NPRR needed for reliability does not mean that the ISO will “retain” the resource. While the tariff permits the ISO to “reject” an NPRR if the ISO finds the resource is needed for reliability, this is
somewhat of a misnomer, because a resource with a “rejected” NPRR can decline to be retained for reliability.

Q: Under the Retirement Reforms, which resources will be reviewed for reliability, and possibly retained for reliability, during the auction?

A: As with Permanent De-List Bids today, under the Retirement Reforms, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that go to auction are reviewed for reliability, and if necessary, rejected for reliability, during the FCA. (The bids that go to auction are those with a Commission-approved price at or below the FCA starting price where the resource has stayed on the priced retirement bid track and not elected the unconditional or conditional option.) In the case of bids that go to auction, (as with Permanent De-List Bids currently), the ISO can reject a retirement and retain a resource for reliability, because the resource has indicated a price at which it would be willing to provide capacity (a price the resource can elect to be paid if retained for reliability).

Q: Under the Retirement Reforms, which resources will be reviewed for reliability, and possibly retained, during the qualification process?

A: Under the Retirement Reforms, the following Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids will be reviewed during the FCA qualification process:

(1) those that will not go to auction because they are priced above the FCA starting price and (2) those that will not go to auction because the participant has elected the unconditional or conditional option where the participant has opted to
be reviewed for reliability. If a participant has elected the Unconditional Retirement option or the Conditional Treatment option and has not opted to be reviewed for reliability, the ISO cannot retain the resource for reliability for the same reason that it cannot currently retain a resource with an NPRR if the resource does not wish to be retained: the ISO cannot prevent a resource from retiring that wishes to retire.

Q: Describe the timing of the ISO’s reliability reviews during qualification under the Retirement Reforms.

A: Because Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids will be submitted in March under the Retirement Reforms, the ISO is able to conduct these reliability reviews earlier, and share results in the August timeframe. Specifically, the rule revisions provide that the ISO will review its reliability review findings with the NEPOOL Reliability Committee no later than thirty days after the ISO submits its retirement filing with the Commission. Following this consultation with the NEPOOL Reliability Committee, the ISO will inform participants if their retiring or permanently de-listing resource is needed for reliability.

Q: What are a participant’s options after being informed that its resource is needed for reliability during the qualification process?

A: Following its consultation with the NEPOOL Reliability Committee, the ISO will inform participants if the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability. Within ten business days of
being informed that its resource is needed for reliability, the participant may
notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. In
such a case, the resource will be retired or permanently de-listed, or will continue
forward to participate in the auction under the Conditional Treatment option,
according to the bid type and the elections made previously by the participant.

Q: **What is the reliability review “hierarchy”?**

A: In order to perform reliability reviews, the ISO models the system assuming that
most existing resources are available (that is, assuming most existing resources
are switched “on”). It then assumes that the resource associated with the de-list
bid under review is “out of service.” This allows the ISO to determine whether,
without the capacity associated with the de-list bid under review, the system could
meet the requisite reliability standards.

The order in which the ISO “switches off” the resources with de-list bids and
Non-Price Retirement Requests under study is referred to as the review
“hierarchy” and can influence the outcome of the review. For example, assume
the ISO is studying two identical de-list bids, neither of which is needed for
reliability individually. After the ISO studies the first de-list bid, determines it is
not needed for reliability, and removes the associated capacity from its model of
available existing resources, the ISO’s study of the second de-list bid may find
that the second resource is needed for reliability. If the review hierarchy had been
reversed, the reliability review outcomes may have been reversed as well.
Q: What changes do the Retirement Reforms make to the reliability review hierarchy?

A: Currently, the ISO first reviews Non-Price Retirement Requests in the order in which they are received, and then reviews de-list bids in price order (highest to lowest). The Retirement Reforms add review hierarchy language to the tariff (review hierarchy language is currently found only in ISO New England Planning Procedure No. 10) and modify the review hierarchy to encompass the new priced retirement regime. The revisions provide that Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids from a resource that cannot continue to operate under any circumstance (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first. After that, the reliability review will be conducted in descending price order using the IMM-approved de-list bid price. If more than one bid is at the same price, ISO will review the bids in the order that produces least negative system impact; if bids are the same price and produce the same system impact, they will be reviewed in the order in which they were received.

Q: Please explain how the Retirement Reforms revise the way in which resources retained for reliability are treated once the reliability need has been met through other means.

A: Currently, the tariff provides that if a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Non-Price Retirement Request is retained for reliability, the ISO can, if the reliability need is resolved, terminate the resulting CSO at any time until June of
the year preceding the start of the capacity commitment period for which the resource was retained. (Which is more than two years after the resource’s bid or request was rejected for reliability.) The existing tariff also provides that, if the resource continues to be needed for reliability after the capacity commitment period for which the resource was retained, the ISO may terminate the Capacity Supply Obligation mid-commitment period with 120 day notice to the resource that it is no longer needed for reliability.

The Retirement Reforms modify these rules so that, once a resource is retained for reliability, the resource cannot be stripped of the resulting CSO if the ISO meets the reliability need before the start of the commitment period. (That is, the ISO can no longer terminate the CSO during the two years following the FCA in which the resource was retained for reliability.) The Retirement Reforms also eliminate the existing provisions that allow the ISO to terminate the CSO mid-commitment period should the resource no longer be needed for reliability after the commitment period for which it was retained.

Q: Why is this superior to the current treatment?

A: Under ordinary circumstances, once a resource receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in an FCA, the resource is obligated to provide capacity during the commitment period (approximately three years later) in exchange for payment at the agreed upon price. But under the current rules, when a resource agrees to provide capacity for reliability, the resource is not guaranteed a CSO in the
commitment period, because the ISO can terminate the CSO until one year prior
to its start. When a resource agrees to provide capacity for reliability, then, it
essentially provides the region with the *option* to assign it a Capacity Supply
Obligation, at no additional cost to the region. The Retirement Reforms eliminate
this free option – under the revisions, once a resource agrees to provide capacity
to meet a reliability need, the resource is guaranteed a CSO in the delivery year,
just as any resource is that receives a CSO in an FCA. This provides certainty to
participants with resources retained for reliability, which will enable them to take
appropriate actions to ensure that their resources are available to operate to meet
their CSO, and so they can better manage their operating costs or retirement
plans. This in turn should increase the probability that a resource that is found
needed for reliability will agree to be retained for reliability and also that
resources will agree to go to auction with priced retirements, since the risk of the
resource being retained in the auction and then being released no longer exists.
Q: Does this conclude your testimony?
A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 17, 2015

Mark G. Karl

Andrew G. Gillespie
I. **Witness Identification**

Q: Please state your name, position and business address.

A: My name is Jeffery D. McDonald. I am the Vice President of Market Monitoring for ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”), One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts, 01040-2841.

Q: Please describe your educational background and work experience.

A: I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Agriculture and Managerial Economics from the University of California, Davis (“UC Davis”); a Masters of Science degree in Natural Resource Economics from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst; and a Ph.D. degree in Agriculture and Natural Resource Economics from UC Davis. Before joining the ISO in April 2014, I worked at the California ISO as Manager of Market Analysis and Mitigation in the Market Monitoring Department. In the fourteen years I worked at the California ISO, I held positions of increasing responsibility within the Department of Market Monitoring. Before
the California ISO, I worked for the State of California as a Staff Economist in the Department of Industrial Relations and the Department of Transportation.

II. **Purpose and Organization of Testimony**

Q: **What is the purpose of your testimony?**

A: The general purpose of my testimony is to explain the need for and components of the new mitigation mechanisms that are included in the package of changes to the Forward Capacity Market rules that the ISO is filing in this proceeding (the “Retirement Reforms”). The accompanying testimony of Mark G. Karl, the ISO’s Vice President of Market Development, and Andrew G. Gillespie, Principal Analyst, Market Development, (the “Karl-Gillespie Testimony”) provides more detailed explanation of the changes and additions to the Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”) design and mechanics.

Q: **How is your testimony organized?**

A: I present testimony in four general areas: (1) overview of the problem with the existing treatment of capacity resource retirements and the Retirement Reform’s solution; (2) discussion of Market Monitoring’s review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids (together, “retirement bids”) under the Retirement Reforms; (3) description of Market Monitoring’s calculation of competitive retirement bids under the Retirement Reforms and (4) description of the use and calculation of the portfolio benefit test.
III. Overview of Problem and Solution

Q: Please provide an overview of your concerns with the existing retirement process.

A: The existing retirement process in New England does not include any mitigation measures to address the exercise of market power by way of the premature retirement of a resource – that is, through the retirement of a resource when it would be profitable to keep the resource operating and participating in the wholesale markets. I refer to this type of retirement as an “uneconomic retirement” in this testimony.

Q: How can a market participant benefit from the uneconomic retirement of a capacity resource?

A: A market participant can uneconomically retire a resource and, in so doing, increase the profitability of its portfolio. Retiring a resource permanently removes capacity from the supply available in the Forward Capacity Market to meet demand. With a significant reduction in supply, the capacity market will procure capacity from higher priced resources in order to meet demand. In such a case, the capacity market clearing price would be higher as a result of the retirement.

There is a direct cost to exercising market power in this fashion, since the retired resource will not receive any revenue from the market (because it has retired). However, the increase in clearing price that can result from the retirement may
increase the profitability of the supplier’s remaining portfolio in excess of the lost
profit associated with the uneconomic retirement.

Q: How do economic and uneconomic retirements each affect the capacity clearing price?

A: In the case of an economic retirement—by which I mean the retirement of a resource that is no longer profitable to operate—the cost to maintain the resource in order to honor a Capacity Supply Obligation is likely to be high, which would result in a high competitive bid price in the capacity market (perhaps near or above the auction starting price). Economically retiring a resource from the capacity market is less likely to have an impact on the capacity clearing price than uneconomically retiring a resource.

In contrast, in the case of an uneconomic retirement, where continued operation of the resource appears to be profitable, the resource would necessarily have a lower cost associated with maintaining operation, which would result in a lower competitive bid price in the capacity market. A lower competitive bid price is more likely to obtain a Capacity Supply Obligation in the capacity market. Consequently, removing a lower competitive bid price from the capacity auction via retirement is more likely to result in a higher auction clearing price because the market is likely to procure from a higher-priced resource to replace the lower-priced retired resource in order to meet demand. The price impact resulting from an uneconomic retirement can benefit the market participant’s remaining portfolio
in excess of the cost to that portfolio of retiring an otherwise profitable resource.

An example is provided later in my testimony in the section describing the portfolio benefit test.

Q: *Are there ways a participant can benefit from uneconomic retirement outside the capacity market?*

A: Yes. A market participant may have positions or interests outside of the New England capacity market that benefit from a higher capacity market price. For example, a participant might have contracts that settle on the New England capacity market price or might buy or sell generation assets located in the New England control area. A higher capacity market price can increase the value of such assets in a transaction since the higher price reflects positively on the potential future profitability of the assets. In addition, an economic asset may be uneconomically retired by the selling portfolio as a condition of a transaction involving multiple assets where the purchasing portfolio benefits from the increased revenue resulting from the retirement. In these cases, a market participant may choose to pursue an uneconomic retirement to increase the capacity market price if the financial benefit to positions outside of the New England capacity market is greater than the lost profit from uneconomically retiring.
Q: What is the potential for market harm in the case of an uneconomic retirement?

A: There is the potential for both financial harm to, and reduced confidence in, the market. The primary capacity auction, the Forward Capacity Auction, is performed only once each year and results in transactions valued at several billion dollars (roughly $4 billion in the auction that was completed in February 2015). Successfully manipulating the capacity market price can result in significant damage to the market in the form of excess cost due to uncompetitive pricing. As explained in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony, in a simple example considering only the system demand curve, an exercise of market power that results in an increase in price of $1.00/kW-month results in an increase in total annual cost of about $400 million. In addition to excess cost, market damage can also occur in the form of reduced market credibility. Uncompetitive outcomes that diminish confidence in the market can undermine willing participation in the market and overall support for wholesale markets.

Q: Please provide an overview of how the Retirement Reforms address your market power concerns.

A: The Retirement Reforms include three key elements to prevent the exercise of market power via priced or non-priced retirement.

First, the Retirement Reforms require that all retirement requests include a price. Second, the rules eliminate the potential for resources seeking to retire at a price
to economically withhold by substituting a Commission-approved competitive
price for the submitted retirement price if the submitted price is not competitive.
Third, the rule revisions also address the potential exercise of market power via
physical withholding by use of proxy bids in the capacity auction to represent
supply from certain resources seeking to retire without a price. The use of a
proxy bid at a just and reasonable competitive price to represent the quantity of
capacity from the resource seeking to retire eliminates the opportunity for
physical withholding by ensuring that capacity seeking to retire, which would
have been the instrument of the physical withholding, is included in the FCA
supply curve at a competitive price.

The Retirement Reforms employ a sound financial model and a robust process for
assessing the competitiveness of submitted retirement prices and for determining
just and reasonable prices for the proxy bids to be used in the auction, which I
describe later in my testimony. The process includes market participant
submission of financial data supporting the stated retirement price, a thorough
review of these data by Market Monitoring, review and final approval by the
Commission, and the opportunity for participant interaction during both reviews.
This robust process helps ensure that the final price used in the proxy bid reflects
a just and reasonable competitive offer.

The rule changes related to timing within the capacity auction process, also
described in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony, move the retirement deadline so that it
occurs roughly one month prior to the registration deadline for new entry, and
provides reporting of the amount of capacity registering to retire by capacity zone.
This provides a signal for new entry early enough in the process that new project
developers may see increased economic opportunity and choose to participate in
the current auction rather than wait until a subsequent auction. Without the
timeline change, project developers in this situation would not have had the
benefit of a market signal of a potential decrease in supply and so would have had
to wait until the subsequent auction to respond. Under the Retirement Reforms, a
project developer can choose to enter the current auction and contest the
registered retirements given that such information will now be available. This
signal may result in increased competition in the auction.

IV. Cost Review

Q: Please describe how your department’s cost review of Permanent De-List
Bids and Retirement De-List Bids under the Retirement Reforms differs
from your review of Static De-List Bids.

A: The key difference between our review of Static De-List Bids (which allow a
resource to exit the capacity market for a single year) and our review of
Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids under the Retirement
Reforms is that the cost review of retirement bids considers costs, revenue, and
risk over multiple years where the cost review of Static De-List Bids is limited to
the one year where the resource is seeking a temporary exit from the capacity
market. (Currently, our cost review of Permanent De-List Bids is also limited to a
Q: Which Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids will you review?
A: We will review Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids of every resource greater than 20 MW if the submitted price for the resource is greater than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold exemption will not apply in subsequent years for reasons I explain below.

Q: Why is there no cost review of Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids less than or equal to 20 MW or below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold?
A: These thresholds are intended to relieve the administrative burden on market participants of submitting cost, revenue, and risk information and working with my department through the review process in instances where the retirement is less likely to have an impact on the clearing price.

The 20 MW threshold is administratively derived and was chosen because it reflects a quantity of capacity that is not likely to have a material impact on the market price.
The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is an existing threshold that applies to delist bids under the current market rules. This threshold reflects the (derived) competitive Static De-List Bid price for older, more expensive, oil-fired resources and represents the expected price at which these resources would likely exit the auction and potentially set the auction clearing price if it were not set at a higher price by a new entrant. Based on this assumption, resources with bid prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are less likely to be material in setting the auction clearing price and therefore there is less need for them to be reviewed for competitiveness. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that a market participant with costs low enough to result in a competitive bid below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold would wish to submit a retirement bid for the first time at a price at or below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. A resource with such low costs is very likely to be priced below the auction clearing price and therefore less likely to be at or near the end of its economic life.

**Q:** Why will you review bids after the first year if the submitted price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold?

**A:** The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold was an established capacity market feature prior to the development of the Retirement Reforms. The Retirement Reforms look to maintain consistency with the role of this threshold in retirement bid submission. However, resource retirement is a permanent decision and can have a significant market impact. It is prudent to review retirement bids each year to account for changes in the financial aspects of continued operation and assess a
competitive bid price. Also, it is necessary to continually review retirement bids in order to assess whether it is appropriate for the resource to remain on the retirement track if it continues to receive Capacity Supply Obligations through the capacity market.

Q: What is the result of your cost review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids?

A: Our review will result in a recommended competitive bid price for all resources seeking to retire under any of the three options provided for in the Retirement Reforms. (These options are described in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony and are: the default priced option; the “unconditional retirement” option, and the “conditional treatment” option.) These prices will be provided to the market participant in June of the review year, and will be the basis upon which the filing to the Commission will be made; we will also provide the Commission with the original bid price submitted by the market participant and supporting documentation. The supporting documentation will include cost workbooks submitted by the market participant, those we used to arrive at the recommended competitive bid price, and documentation of any adjustments made to the data submitted by the market participant.
Q: Will you perform a structural test for market power for Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids?

A: No. A structural test for market power is used to limit the application of market power mitigation to Static De-List Bids to only those portfolios that have the ability to affect market price as determined by the test. However, no structural test will be used for applying mitigation in the case of uneconomic retirement because of the difficulty of performing such a test on a permanent exit (as opposed to single-year exit as with the Static De-List Bid), and because of the potentially significant, multi-year damage to the market if market power is exercised.

Unlike evaluating a supplier’s potential market power where it has submitted a Static De-List Bid, where it is retiring a resource it removes capacity from supply permanently and therefore can have an impact on the capacity market across multiple years. There have been considerable asset transactions among supply portfolios in the wholesale electricity markets, including the New England market. A structural test that would trigger or preempt mitigation would need to account for changes in portfolio composition across the time period in which the uneconomic retirement might impact the market. Changes in portfolio composition resulting from sale or acquisition, new entry, and retirements in subsequent years makes accurate measurement of a supplier’s market power over time difficult. In sum, a structural test for market power is not included in the Retirement Reforms due to the risk of under-identifying the potential to exercise
market power given the uncertainty of portfolio asset holdings in current and forward capacity years and the potential for significant market harm if market power is successfully exercised via uneconomic retirement.

Such a test, if applied, would only be applicable in the case of a market participant that chose the unconditional retirement option. As noted in my testimony and discussed in more detail in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony, a proxy bid is required for price formation purposes for all market participants choosing the conditional option. As such, use of a proxy bid would not be preempted by the results of a structural test for market power for conditional retirements. There is no need for a proxy bid in the case of the accepted offer option where the market participant and Market Monitoring agree on the competitive retirement price. The Retirement Reforms are structured to provide an incentive for market participants to leverage the priced retirement options over the unconditional, unpriced, retirement option which reduces the instances where a structural test for market power would be appropriately applied if sufficient information were available to perform such a test.

Q: Are there other instances in the New England capacity market in which mitigation is applied without first applying a structural test for market power?

A: Yes. A minimum offer price rule is applied to new entry as a mitigation measure to prevent the exercise of buyer-side market power. The rule is intended to
prevent parties with a net buying position from lowering the capacity market price that they will face on a larger settlement quantity by introducing new capacity into the auction at bid prices below the net cost of the new resource. The minimum offer price rule is applied to all new capacity (save for capacity that qualifies for the Renewable Technology Resource exemption) without the application of a structural market power test. Likewise here, the Retirement Reforms are designed to prevent the exercise of market power that would increase the capacity price above an economically efficient level.

Q: **Do you have concerns regarding resources moving into and out of retirement status?**

A: Yes. The capacity market procures a one-year obligation from existing resources. The basis for a competitive offer for Static De-List Bids from existing resources is, in essence, the cost to honor the Capacity Supply Obligation for one year. The method used to determine a competitive price for retirement bids considers the cost of maintaining operation over multiple years and should result in a retirement bid price greater than that resource’s Static De-List Bid price would have been. A market participant seeking priced retirement that is retained through the market will have the same one-year obligation as an existing resource that had a Static De-List Bid and obtained an obligation. While this multi-year view is appropriate for business decisions regarding retirement, it can result in a bid price that is inconsistent with the single-year obligation.
I am concerned that the priced retirement options in the Retirement Reforms may be used for resources that are not necessarily near the end of their economic life but may be able to submit higher-priced capacity market bids if they use one of the priced retirement options. There is risk to the participant in employing this strategy. If the market participant does not wish to retire the resource but is seeking to influence the capacity market price through a higher-priced retirement bid, the market may actually retire the resource through price when the market participant did not intend for that to happen. To help prevent the use of retirement bids for resources that are not near the end of their economic life, the Retirement Reforms require a resource that submits a priced retirement bid to remain on the “retirement track,” resubmitting its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bids every year until the resource is permanently de-listed or retired. This permanency, coupled with the risk that the resource may be retired through the market when the participant did not intend for that to happen, provides a disincentive to use the priced retirement options for the primary purpose of obtaining an inflated bid price. A market participant may request to remove a resource from the retirement track. We will consult with the participant to determine the appropriateness of exiting the retirement track and our determination will be reviewed by the Commission.
Q: How will you determine if it is appropriate for a resource to exit the retirement track and how will the exit be addressed?

A: The evaluation and determination will be based on the estimated economic life of the resource. Changes in circumstance that result in extended economic life of the resource, such that retirement in the short-term appears to be irrational, will be taken into consideration.

Q: Do the Retirement Reforms apply mitigation to all retirement bids?

A: No. Resources under the unconditional option will be tested to determine if their portfolio would benefit from the market impact of withdrawing their resource from the capacity market via non-priced retirement. No proxy bid is used in the auction for resources that unconditionally retire and are from a portfolio that will not benefit from the price impact of that retirement. I explain the portfolio benefit test in more detail later in this testimony.

Q: Why are proxy bids used for all resources subject to the conditional treatment option?

A: The primary purpose of the conditional treatment option is to provide an incentive for participants to avoid choosing to retire administratively via the unconditional option. Having a fuller supply curve in the auction improves price formation. The Proxy bid under the Conditional Treatment option serves as a marker to allow the ISO to determine whether the resource’s decision not to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation below its submitted price affects the auction clearing price.
This aspect of the conditional treatment option is discussed in the Karl-Gillespie Testimony. An outcome of using the competitive proxy bid for resources subject to the conditional treatment option is that it also provides mitigation of economic withholding.

Market power can be exercised through physical withholding. In the case of retirement, this would be done via the unconditional retirement option where a resource is retired without consideration of price. This is addressed in the Retirement Reforms through the use of proxy bids for resources that retire under the unconditional option and are associated with portfolios that would benefit financially from the unconditional retirement (without mitigation via the proxy bid). The portfolio benefit test weighs lost revenue from retiring the resource against the revenue increase to the remaining portfolio from the potential increase in clearing price from the reduction in supply. In the case of a single-resource portfolio there would be no portfolio benefit from the unconditional retirement since there is no remaining portfolio to benefit from the potential increase in clearing price.

Market power can also be exercised through economic withholding, which can be done even in the case of a portfolio having only one resource. Economic withholding could be accomplished through a priced retirement option that did not have review and bid mitigation. In this case, a participant with knowledge that existing capacity without the retiring resource would not be sufficient to meet
the requirement or intersect the demand curve could increase its Retirement De-
List Bid price above the competitive level for that resource but remain priced
below the likely price for new entry. This could result in the retiring resource
setting the clearing price above a competitive level and increasing the profit of the
single-resource portfolio.

The portfolio benefit test assumes the portfolio is reduced by the capacity of the
retiring resource. It assumes there is a cost, lost revenue, associated with
physically withholding a resource. In the case of the single-resource portfolio and
economic withholding, the true portfolio is not reduced by the retirement quantity
since the resource priced such that it would not retire but would set a higher
clearing price. In this case, the portfolio benefit test would return a false result of
no portfolio benefit and the resource would not be represented by a proxy bid in
the auction. This can also occur in cases of multiple-resource portfolios as well,
where the portion of the portfolio that is seeking priced retirement is sufficiently
large that the portfolio benefit test would not show a benefit to the retirement.
The portfolio benefit test, when used to determine if a proxy bid should be used,
is only appropriate when applied in the case of unconditional retirements. For this
reason, the Retirement Reforms apply a proxy bid for all resources under the
conditional treatment option.
Q: Are you concerned that the Retirement Reforms may result in over-mitigation since no structural test is applied to determine which portfolios have market power?

A: No. There are two relevant aspects to the concept of “over-mitigation.”

The first aspect is undue cost to the mitigated party if they are forced to accept a price below their actual competitive cost. It is not possible for any of the three retirement options to result in the participant obtaining a Capacity Supply Obligation at a price less than it finds agreeable. The default priced option results in a Commission-approved retirement bid price that was accepted by the participant, even if it is different from the originally submitted price. The conditional treatment option will result in a Capacity Supply Obligation for the retiring resource only when the auction clearing price is greater than the participant’s submitted price. The unconditional retirement option does not result in the resource obtaining a Capacity Supply Obligation. In each of these three cases, the retiring resource will not be forced to take on a Capacity Supply Obligation at a price less than the price they submitted or subsequently agreed to.

The second aspect is price formation. If mitigation results in bids that are priced below a competitive level in the auction (“over-mitigation”), the resulting clearing price may be suppressed. This can result in muting price signals for new capacity, under-valuing capacity transacted in the current auction, and can increase the
likelihood that the long-run price will be less than Net CONE and not meet the
“missing money” function for some resources.

The method we use to calculate a competitive offer and the process by which
proxy bids are derived is designed to ensure that the result is a just and reasonable
competitive price that is appropriate to use in the capacity auction.

The method for calculation uses the discounted cash flow ("DCF") model to
determine an appropriate competitive offer price for the resource that may be
retired. This approach accounts for expected costs, including capital
expenditures, expected market revenues in forward years, and risk. The bid price
that is determined by this model, in conjunction with the other financial inputs to
the model, provides the participant an opportunity to recover its costs.

The process by which a proxy bid is established involves evaluation by Market
Monitoring followed by review and approval by the Commission. During our
evaluation process, we have considerable interaction with the market participant
in order to arrive at a common understanding of the participant’s expected costs,
revenues, and risks, which are submitted in support of the participant’s submitted
Retirement De-List Bid price. We may adjust some of the financial inputs
provided by the participant during this process, however, would only do so in
cases where the inputs provided by the participant were insufficiently supported,
unreasonable, not reflective of market conditions, or determined through
consultation to be in error. The objective of our review process is to arrive at a reasonable competitive retirement bid price. Once our competitive price determinations are filed at the Commission, a second review process is undertaken. If a participant does not agree with the price determination from my department, it has the opportunity to intervene in the Commission review process and again make the case for the retirement bid price that was originally submitted. The Commission’s review serves as a second opportunity to identify and correct instances where I may not have appropriately accounted for relevant financial aspects of the resource’s costs.

The review process at the Commission will result in an order that contains the final determination of just and reasonable prices to be used in the auction. This process, including thorough review by my department, subsequent review by the Commission, and opportunities for the participant to interact in both review processes, results in a just and reasonable competitive price.

V. **Calculation of Competitive Retirement Bids**

Q: **Please provide an overview of how participants will derive Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids and how you will review them.**

A: A participant wishing to retire or permanently de-list a resource will perform a discounted cash flow analysis of the resource’s expected costs, revenues, and capital expenditures, from which it will derive a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. Market Monitoring will review the resource owner’s
analysis during the 90-day review period, in consultation with the resource owner, to determine if the resource owner’s assumptions are reasonable.

Q: Please provide an overview of the discounted cash flow analysis.

A: A discounted cash flow analysis is a method of valuing a project, company, or asset using the concept of the time value of money. All future cash flows are estimated and discounted using a cost of capital to give their present values. The sum of all future discounted cash flows, both incoming and outgoing (in other words, all prospective revenues and costs), is the net present value or “NPV,” which represents the value of the cash flows. The discounted cash flow analysis approach is widely used in investment finance.

The discounted cash flow analysis will use a discount rate that reflects the participant’s weighted average cost of capital and other risk factors. The cash flow analysis solves for the capacity price a resource must receive in the current auction to make the participant indifferent between retaining a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource in the instant auction and retiring the resource. It derives the minimum amount of capacity revenue required in the first commitment period to make the resource whole given the participant’s expectations about future capacity and energy market revenues and costs, cost of capital, and risk. This analysis will not include sunk costs, since it is not appropriate to include sunk costs when evaluating a going forward decision.
Q: Please describe each of the components of the discounted cash flow analysis.

A: There are five major components of the discounted cash flow analysis: expected net operating profit, expected capacity revenues, expected capital expenditures, expected terminal value, and risk-adjusted discount rate. All of these values will initially be provided by the participant and reviewed by my department.

Expected net operating profit is the expected revenues from the energy and ancillary markets minus expected operating costs such as cost of fuel, maintenance, staffing, etc. for the resource participating in New England wholesale markets. Expected capacity performance payments or charges are also included in the net operating profit.

Expected capacity revenues are the forecast of expected capacity prices for future capacity commitment periods multiplied by the estimate of qualified capacity of the resource with the retirement bid. The forecast of capacity prices beyond the instant auction are provided by the participant. The participant does not provide a forecast of expected capacity prices for the first capacity commitment period because that value will be determined through the analysis and reflects the competitive price for the bid for the current auction.

Expected capital expenditures are future expected capital costs that are avoidable in the absence of the resource maintaining a Capacity Supply Obligation.
Expected terminal value, for a resource with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the cash flows associated with the decommissioning or cleanup costs at the plant site and salvage value of the generating resource and other assets associated with the resource. If the resource has more than five years of remaining economic life, the terminal value can also include the NPV of expected cash flows from the sixth year through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life.

Risk-adjusted discount rate is the weighted-average cost of capital reflecting risks associated with the costs, revenues and capital expenditures included in the discounted cash flow analysis. The weights are determined by the relative size of debt and equity in financing the capital cost.

Q: Why are participants required to submit expected values for revenue and cost forecasts?

A: This approach allows us to more effectively identify and evaluate project risk. Expected values are those that are most likely to occur and consequently exclude risk. Risk valuation is to be done separately from the base expected cash flow and is included in the discount rate used in the DCF model. The submission of expected values for cash flows ensures that project risk is not double-counted and is reflected only in the discount rate.
Q: What is the time period for the discounted cash flow analysis?

A: The time period for the DCF analysis is the resource’s remaining economic life, that is, the period of time a resource is likely to remain profitable given its expected cash flows.

Q: How will you determine the resource’s remaining economic life?

A: We will determine the resource’s remaining economic life by conducting multiple discounted cash flow analyses for the resource, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. In the analysis, we assume that the capacity clearing price for the first year of the evaluation period is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction starting price, the maximum capacity price the resource could receive. We use a forecast of capacity prices for forward years.

There are five different, but overlapping, evaluation periods: year one, years one and two, years one through three, years one through four, and years one through five.

For each evaluation period, we calculate the net present value of future expected cash flows. If the net present value of future expected cash flows is positive, then it is economic for the resource to remain in the capacity market for that period because it is possible for the participant to receive sufficient capacity revenue to achieve its required discount rate. The resource’s remaining economic life is the
Q: **How does the discounted cash flow analysis, over the resource’s remaining economic life, determine the appropriate retirement bid?**

A: As I mention above, the DCF analysis is used to calculate the resource’s “break even” capacity price for the first year of the evaluation period. The “break even” capacity price represents a competitive price that is the minimum capacity revenue the participant requires in the capacity commitment period to achieve a zero net present value of future expected cash flows, over the remaining economic life, based on the risk-adjusted discount rate.

If the capacity market clearing price for the current auction is above the participant’s “break even” capacity price, the participant will retain a Capacity Supply Obligation for the resource and will receive sufficient capacity revenue from the current auction to achieve its risk-adjusted discount rate given the financial values used in the discounted cash flow model for forward years. This process, using the DCF model and updated financial values to determine a competitive price for the current auction, is repeated each year the resource remains in retirement status.
If the capacity market clearing price is below the “break even” capacity price, the resource should retire because there is insufficient market revenue to cover the resource’s costs over the evaluation period.

Q: Does the use of the discounted cash flow analysis to determine a competitive auction price guarantee the resource will recover all of its costs?

A: No, our analysis is not meant to provide a guarantee, but it does provide a reasonable opportunity for the resource owner to recover all its prospective costs. The competitive price for the current auction that is prescribed by the use of the DCF analysis will, by design, derive a value reflecting full future cost recovery for the resource provided conditions in future years are consistent with the forecasts used in the analysis.

However, it is difficult to forecast future market conditions with accuracy. Future conditions can change and deviate from the forecasts used in the evaluation of competitive price. These deviations can result in financial gain for the participant, but may also result in an inability to fully recover all future costs.

Q: Market Monitoring allows participants to include a “risk premium” in their Static De-List Bids. Why is the inclusion of a “risk premium” not permitted in Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids?

A: As noted earlier in my testimony, risk factors are allowed in the evaluation of a competitive retirement bid price. They are, however, accounted for in the
discount rate and not separately represented in the cash flow. For Static De-List Bids, various risks are monetized and included together as a separate cost component (a “risk premium” in the tariff) in the bid formulation. Risk, however, is not a cash flow. The DCF model’s risk-adjusted discount rate accommodates inclusion of various forms of risk and does not mix cash flow (revenue and cost) terms with non-cash elements such as risk. Using the risk-adjusted discount rate as the vehicle for representing risk in the DCF model will result in a monetization of risk in the calculated competitive retirement bid price.

Q: You state that the resource owner will initially submit its DCF analysis, which your department will review. Please explain what will happen in this review.

A: As I noted earlier, our role will be to evaluate the reasonableness of the assumptions provided by the resource owner and, where the assumptions are unreasonable, substitute reasonable assumptions and derive a new DCF analysis and appropriate bid. This process will be consultative between my department and the resource owner.

Q: When agreement on appropriate assumptions isn’t reached, what happens?

A: As is explained in the filing letter and the Karl-Gillespie Testimony, all Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids determined by my department are submitted to the Commission for review. The filing will provide the Commission with all of the materials submitted by the resource owner as well
as with our analysis and conclusions. Ultimately, the Commission will issue an order determining the appropriate bids.

VI. Assessing Portfolio Benefit

Q: What is the portfolio benefit test and why is it used?

A: A participant with a portfolio of capacity resources has the incentive to withhold otherwise economic capacity from the Forward Capacity Market if doing so results in a higher capacity price and overall higher capacity revenues for the balance of its portfolio. We use a portfolio benefit test to estimate if a participant will benefit from the increased capacity price resulting from its resource retirement. This test is applied to resources subject to the unconditional retirement option for reasons explained earlier in my testimony.

Q: Please explain how the portfolio test will be conducted.

A: The portfolio benefit test computes capacity revenues by estimating the capacity clearing price with and without the retired resource and calculating the change in the revenue of the retiring portfolio resulting from the estimated change in price. If the test reveals that the portfolio would receive higher revenue as a result of the unconditional retirement, then a proxy bid will be used for that resource in the capacity auction.

The test uses three components to estimate the revenue change: the total system-wide quantity of existing qualified capacity, the slope of the system demand
curve, and the size of the portfolio to which the retiring resource belongs. The clearing price is estimated under the assumption that all existing capacity resources act as price takers in the auction. This assumption is consistent with supplier behavior in perfectly competitive markets. Each step in the portfolio test is explained below.

1. **Estimate the capacity clearing price with the retiring resource in the market:** The portfolio test estimates the capacity clearing price assuming the participant’s resource does not retire. The capacity clearing price is estimated by simply identifying the price level on the demand curve that corresponds to the total quantity of existing qualified capacity. For illustrative purposes, assuming the total quantity of existing qualified capacity is 35,000 MW, the estimated capacity clearing price, given the slope of the system demand curve, is approximately $9.00/kW-month.

2. **Calculate the capacity market revenue of the portfolio associated with the retiring resource including the retiring resource** (assume it does not retire) at the corresponding estimated price calculated in Step 1: This is done by multiplying the estimated clearing price determined in Step 1 by the megawatt size of the participant’s portfolio assuming the participant’s resource does not retire. Continuing the example, if the participant had a portfolio of 4,000 MW, its annual capacity revenue would be $432 million.
3. **Estimate the capacity market clearing price assuming the retiring resource has exited the market:** Under this scenario, the capacity clearing price is estimated as in Step 1, except the retiring resource’s capacity is first subtracted from the total quantity of existing system-wide capacity. Using the same example as above, if the participant retired a 500 MW resource, the total quantity of existing qualified capacity would decline to 34,500 MW and the estimated capacity clearing price would increase to approximately $11.00/kW-month.

4. **Calculate the capacity market revenue of the retiring resource’s portfolio without the capacity of the retiring resource:** The estimated clearing price from Step 3 is multiplied by the portfolio size without the capacity from the retiring resource. This is the estimated capacity revenue the portfolio owner gets from the capacity market after retiring the resource. If the participant retired a 500 MW resource, reducing its portfolio to 3,500 MW, and the capacity clearing price increased to $11.00/kW-month, the participant’s annual capacity revenue would increase to $462 million.

5. **Decision Rule:** If the estimated amount of the portfolio’s capacity revenue with the resource retired ($462 million from Step 4) is greater than the portfolio’s estimated capacity market revenue without the resource retired ($432 million from Step 2), the participant’s portfolio benefits from the retirement through the higher market clearing price despite the reduction in cleared capacity and the portfolio fails the test.
Intuitively, the portfolio test compares two revenue components of the portfolio being tested. The first component is the loss of capacity revenue from the retiring resource and the second component is the gain in capacity revenue due to the higher price for the rest of the portfolio. When the second component is bigger than the first, the portfolio owner has an incentive to exercise market power by uneconomically retiring (that is, physically withholding) a resource from the capacity market.

Q: Does this conclude your testimony?
A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 17, 2015

Jeffrey D. McDonald
Connecticut

The Honorable Dannel P. Malloy
Office of the Governor
State Capitol
210 Capitol Ave.
Hartford, CT 06106
Liz.Donohue@ct.gov
Paul.Mounds@ct.gov

Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
10 Franklin Square
New Britain, CT 06051-2605
robert.luysterborghs@ct.gov
michael.coyle@ct.gov
clare.kindall@ct.gov

Maine

The Honorable Paul LePage
One State House Station
Office of the Governor
Augusta, ME 04333-0001
Kathleen.Newman@maine.gov

Maine Public Utilities Commission
18 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0018
Maine.puc@maine.gov

Massachusetts

The Honorable Charles Baker
Office of the Governor
State House
Boston, MA 02133

Massachusetts Attorney General Office
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
rebecca.tepper@state.ma.us

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
One South Station
Boston, MA 02110
Nancy.Stevens@state.ma.us
morgane.treanton@state.ma.us

New Hampshire

The Honorable Maggie Hassan
Office of the Governor
26 Capital Street
Concord NH 03301
kerry.mchugh@nh.gov
Meredith.Hatfield@nh.gov

New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
21 South Fruit Street, Ste. 10
Concord, NH 03301-2429
tom.frantz@puc.nh.gov
george.mccluskey@puc.nh.gov
F.Ross@puc.nh.gov
David.gooyette@puc.nh.gov
RegionalEnergy@puc.nh.gov
Robert.scott@puc.nh.gov

Rhode Island

The Honorable Gina Raimondo
Office of the Governor
82 Smith Street
Providence, RI 02903
eric.beane@governor.ri.gov
todd.bianco@puc.ri.gov
Marion.Gold@energy.ri.gov
christopher.kearns@energy.ri.gov
Danny.Musher@energy.ri.gov
nicholas.ucci@energy.ri.gov

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission
89 Jefferson Blvd.
Warwick, RI 02888
Margaret.curran@puc.ri.gov
paul.roberti@puc.ri.gov
todd.bianco@puc.ri.gov

Vermont
New England Governors, State Utility Regulators and Related Agencies*

The Honorable Peter Shumlin
Office of the Governor
109 State Street, Pavilion
Montpelier, VT 05609
Darren.Springer@state.vt.us
Justin.johnson@state.vt.us

Vermont Public Service Board
112 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05620-2701
mary-jo.krolewski@state.vt.us
sarah.d.hofmann@state.vt.us

Vermont Department of Public Service
112 State Street, Drawer 20
Montpelier, VT 05620-2601
bill.jordan@state.vt.us
chris.recchia@state.vt.us
Ed.McNamara@state.vt.us

New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners
89 Jefferson Boulevard
Warwick, RI 02888
margaret.curran@puc.ri.gov

Harvey L. Reiter, Esq.
Counsel for New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners, Inc.
c/o Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP
1150 18th Street, N.W., Ste. 800
Washington, DC 20036-3816
HReiter@stinson.com

New England Governors, Utility Regulatory and Related Agencies

Anne Stubbs
Coalition of Northeastern Governors
400 North Capitol Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
coneg@sso.org

Heather Hunt, Executive Director
New England States Committee on Electricity
655 Longmeadow Street
Longmeadow, MA 01106
HeatherHunt@nescoe.com
JasonMarshall@nescoe.com

Rachel Goldwasser, Executive Director
New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners
Concord, NH 03301
rgoldwasser@necpuc.org

Margaret “Meg” Curran, President

5/1/2015