



November 30, 2018

BY ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

RE: **Joint Filing of ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool
regarding Conforming Changes to ISO Tariff for CASPR; Docket No. ER19-
-000**

Dear Secretary Bose:

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (“Section 205”),¹ ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”), joined by the New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) Participants Committee² (together, the “Filing Parties”),³ hereby submits this transmittal letter and revised Tariff sections to make various enhancements and conforming changes to support the implementation of the ISO’s Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resource (“CASPR”) rules (the “CASPR-Related Changes”). The CASPR rules include financial incentives for existing resources to transfer their capacity obligations to new sponsored policy resources and to permanently exit the ISO-administered markets.⁴ The

¹ 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012).

² Capitalized terms used but not defined in this filing are intended to have the meaning given to such terms in the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, and the Participants Agreement. Section III of the Tariff is also sometimes referred to as “Market Rule 1.” Section II of the Tariff is the ISO New England Open Access Transmission Tariff, and is sometimes referred to as the “OATT.”

³ Under New England’s Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) arrangements, the rights to make this filing of changes to the Market Rule under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act are the ISO’s. NEPOOL, which pursuant to the Participants Agreement provides the sole Participant Processes for advisory voting on ISO matters, supported the changes reflected in this filing and, accordingly, joins in this Section 205 filing.

⁴ *ISO New England Inc., Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources*, Docket ER18-619-000 (filed January 8, 2018); 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (“core CASPR” filing or rules). The

(continued...)

thirteenth Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”) to be held in February 2019 (“FCA 13”) for the 2022-2023 Capacity Commitment Period is the first capacity auction for which CASPR will be in effect. The CASPR-Related Changes make enhancements and minor changes to conform various Tariff sections to the CASPR rules. The ISO is filing these changes at this time with the objective of having the majority of them effective in time for FCA 13. The ISO submits herewith the supporting testimony of Matthew C. Brewster and Christopher Geissler (the “Brewster-Geissler Testimony”), as well as the supporting testimony of Alan McBride (the “McBride Testimony”),⁵ which are sponsored solely by the ISO.

The CASPR-Related Changes comprise the following:

- Clarifications to the core CASPR rules. These include revisions to ensure the FCA qualification and substitution auction clearing rules are consistent with the underlying objective of the CASPR rules, to address an enhancement to rules governing how participants can adjust their substitution auction demand bids following the clearing of the primary auction, and to modify the process for performing the reliability review for resources that may retire via the substitution auction.
- The introduction of a “test price” mechanism that will apply to existing resources that are seeking to retire capacity through the substitution auction. The purpose of the test price is to thwart uneconomic bidding behavior in the primary auction of the FCA by participants that might otherwise “shade” down their primary auction bid price to gain entry to the substitution auction and retire with a severance payment.
- Revisions to the market settlement rules to account for CASPR capacity transfers under the ISO’s new Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”) cost allocation framework, and to address the settlement charges when a Capacity Supply Obligation acquired in the substitution auction at a negative clearing price is terminated.
- Revisions to the FCM Financial Assurance Policy rules to ensure that financial assurance requirements for participating in the substitution auction are consistent with the financial assurance requirements that apply to other FCM auctions and transactions.

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testimony of Christopher Geissler included with the base CASPR filing is referred to herein as the “CASPR Geissler Testimony.”

⁵ Mr. Brewster is a Lead Analyst in the Market Development Department for the ISO. Dr. Geissler is an Economist for the ISO. Mr. McBride is the ISO’s Director of Transmission Strategy and Services.

- Revisions to address how resources participating with substitution auction demand bids, as well as resources that have previously shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a substitution auction, are accounted for in rules addressing resource adequacy parameters for the FCA and the ISO's performance of various planning studies.
- An ancillary clarification to a provision of the Tariff that addresses an exemption from the ISO's minimum offer price rules in the Forward Capacity Market for certain renewable resources (the "RTR Exemption"); this clarification is necessary to permit off-shore wind resources located in federal waters to qualify for use of the exemption.

I. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE; COMMISSION ORDER

The ISO is requesting that the Commission accept the CASPR-Related Changes to be effective on January 29, 2019, which is 60 days from the date of this filing.

The requested effective date will mean that the proposed Tariff changes are in place prior to FCA 13, which will take place in early February 2019. However, some of the Tariff changes have been drafted to specify that they will not be utilized until a later date. Most of the changes to be utilized after FCA 13 indicate that they will be used starting with the qualification process for FCA 14, which begins in March 2019, for the 2023-2024 Capacity Commitment Period. A more specific breakdown of the implementation timelines is as follows:

- The changes to the FCM qualification rules will be first utilized for the qualification period for FCA 14, which will begin in March 2019; while the revisions do not expressly indicate as such, the qualification period for FCA 13 is already complete. These revisions are addressed in Section V.A.i. and ii. of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to the auction clearing and pricing rules will be first utilized for FCA 13 in February 2019. These revisions are addressed in Section V.A.iii. and iv. of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to address enhancements to the demand bid adjustment rule will first be utilized for FCA 14 as the Tariff changes indicate. These revisions are addressed in Section V.B of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to address enhancements to the manner in which reliability reviews will be performed for resources that submit demand bids to retire through the substitution auction will first be utilized for FCA 13. These revisions are addressed in Section V.C of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to address the application of the "test price" for resources submitting demand bids to retire in the substitution auction will first be utilized

for FCA 14, as the rule revisions contemplate; these rules implement an additional step in the FCM qualification process that could not be completed in time for FCA 13. These revisions are addressed in Section VI of this transmittal letter.

- The revisions to address conforming changes to the settlement rules will be implemented for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with FCA 13. These revisions are addressed in Section VII of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to the Financial Assurance Policy are applicable for FCA 13. These revisions are addressed in Section VIII of this transmittal letter.
- The revisions to the resource adequacy rules and various planning studies addressed in Section IX of this transmittal letter will be applicable for FCA 14; all resource adequacy determinations and planning studies relevant for FCA 13 have already been completed.
- The revisions to the Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption, addressed in Section X of this transmittal letter, will be effective for FCA 13. Section X explains, however, that in order to utilize these revisions for FCA 13 a participant will need to seek a waiver from the Commission of the application of certain other Tariff provisions related to the application of the exemption.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE FILING PARTIES; COMMUNICATIONS

The ISO is the private, non-profit entity that serves as the regional transmission organization (“RTO”) for New England. The ISO plans and operates the New England bulk power system and administers New England’s organized wholesale electricity market pursuant to the Tariff and the Transmission Operating Agreement with the New England Participating Transmission Owners. In its capacity as an RTO, the ISO has the responsibility to protect the short-term reliability of the New England Control Area and to operate the system according to reliability standards established by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (“NPCC”) and the North American Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”).

NEPOOL is a voluntary association organized in 1971 pursuant to the New England Power Pool Agreement, and it has grown to include more than 500 members. The Participants include all of the electric utilities rendering or receiving service under the Tariff, as well as independent power generators, marketers, load aggregators, brokers, consumer-owned utility systems, end users, demand resource providers, developers and a merchant transmission provider. Pursuant to revised governance provisions accepted by the Commission,⁶ the Participants act through the NEPOOL Participants Committee. The Participants Committee is authorized by Section 6.1 of the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement and Section 8.1.3(c) of the Participants Agreement to represent

⁶ *ISO New England Inc., et al.*, 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 (2004).

NEPOOL in proceedings before the Commission. Pursuant to Section 2.2 of the Participants Agreement, “NEPOOL provide[s] the sole Participant Processes for advisory voting on ISO matters and the selection of ISO Board members, except for input from state regulatory authorities and as otherwise may be provided in the Tariff, TOA and the Market Participant Services Agreement included in the Tariff.”

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

These Tariff changes are being submitted pursuant to Section 205,⁸ which “gives a utility the right to file rates and terms for services rendered with its assets.”⁹ Under

⁷ Due to the joint nature of this filing, the Filing Parties respectfully request a waiver of Section 385.203(b)(3) of the Commission’s regulations to allow the inclusion of more than two persons on the service list in this proceeding.

⁸ The ISO has the Section 205 rights to make changes to the relevant parts of the ISO Tariff. *See* Transmission Operating Agreement Section 3.04(c).

⁹ *Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC*, 295 F. 3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Section 205, the Commission “plays ‘an essentially passive and reactive role’”¹⁰ whereby it “can reject [a filing] only if it finds that the changes proposed by the public utility are not ‘just and reasonable.’”¹¹ The Commission limits this inquiry “into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable - and [this inquiry does not] extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative rate designs.”¹² The changes proposed herein “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most accurate.”¹³ As a result, even if an intervenor or the Commission develops an alternative proposal, the Commission must accept this Section 205 filing if it is just and reasonable.¹⁴

IV. OVERVIEW OF THE CASPR RULES

CASPR was developed by the ISO as a mechanism for accommodating in the Forward Capacity Market New England state-sponsored resources that receive subsidies through state procurement processes intended to help achieve renewable targets adopted by each of the New England states. As explained in the core CASPR filing,¹⁵ the existing minimum offer price rules (“MOPR”) largely prevent new resources that receive state sponsorship from clearing in the Forward Capacity Market, potentially leading to consumers “paying twice” for capacity—once for the capacity procured in the FCM and a second time for the capacity obtained out-of-market through the state procurement processes. While a Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption allows some amount of capacity from these new Sponsored Policy Resources to clear without application of the MOPR, the exemption is highly controversial on grounds that it results in price suppression. It is also viewed by some stakeholders as being insufficient to accommodate the increasing number of Sponsored Policy Resources.

The CASPR proposal addressed these issues through the introduction of a two-stage Forward Capacity Auction. In the first stage (the primary auction), the ISO clears the FCA in the same manner it has previously, with new resources subject to the MOPR. Demand in the primary auction is established by the sloped system and zonal marginal reliability impact (“MRI”)-based demand curves, and Capacity Supply Obligations (“CSO”s) are awarded to the set of capacity bids and offers that maximize social surplus.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 10 (quoting *City of Winnfield v. FERC*, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

¹¹ *Id.* at 9.

¹² *City of Bethany v. FERC*, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

¹³ *Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC*, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

¹⁴ *Cf. Southern California Edison Co., et al*, 73 FERC ¶ 61,219 at 61,608 n.73 (1995) (“Having found the Plan to be just and reasonable, there is no need to consider in any detail the alternative plans proposed by the Joint Protesters.” (citing *Bethany*)).

¹⁵ The following overview summarizes in relevant part the problem statement and overview of the core CASPR rules provided in the transmittal letter to the core CASPR filing, at pp. 2-7.

Existing resources that submit bids to provide capacity at prices below the FCA clearing price will acquire CSOs.

In the second stage, a new “substitution auction” is run immediately following the primary auction. This voluntary second auction provides existing resources that retained a CSO in the primary auction, but are willing to retire and exit the markets permanently, the opportunity to transfer their CSOs to Sponsored Policy Resources that did not acquire a CSO in the primary auction. The transferring resources (“demand” in the substitution auction) pay the Sponsored Policy Resources (“supply” in the substitution auction) a portion of their capacity revenue and then permanently retire from the wholesale markets.

The substitution auction mechanics work as follows. An existing resource bids at the price it is willing to pay to shed its CSO. Since no MOPR is applied, a new Sponsored Policy Resource is allowed to account for out-of-market revenues and offer at the lowest price at which it is willing to accept a CSO. The substitution auction serves to match all voluntary offers from participating supply (Sponsored Policy Resources) and demand (existing resources), using a sealed-bid auction. The substitution auction clearing objective is to maximize social surplus among the set of participating demand bids and supply offers, subject to certain network constraints. The market compensation structure applies the familiar two-settlement framework for sequential auctions: all resources that clear in the primary auction are credited at the primary auction clearing price, and then each resource that acquires or sheds an obligation in the substitution auction is credited or charged for the change (or deviation) in its CSO at the substitution auction’s clearing price.

Sponsored Policy Resources that clear in the substitution auction take on the same obligations and rights as resources that acquire a CSO in the primary auction. In future years they are treated as existing resources in the FCA and therefore are not subject to the MOPR provisions. Sponsored Policy Resources that do not clear in the substitution auction are free to participate as new capacity resources in the FCA (primary and substitution auctions) the following year.

Because the MOPR is not applied in the substitution auction, Sponsored Policy Resources will tend to offer at, and the substitution auction will tend to clear at, a lower price than the primary auction. Accordingly, existing resources that clear as demand in the substitution auction are generally able to shed their CSOs at a lower price than they receive in the primary auction and retain a one-time net payment equal to the difference between the primary auction clearing price and the substitution auction clearing price (much like a severance payment for permanently retiring).

By closely coordinating the entry (of sponsored) and exit (of retiring) capacity resources, CASPR is intended to maintain competitive FCM pricing and allow Sponsored Policy Resources to enter FCM over time. Because an existing resource that sheds its obligation in the substitution auction must permanently exit the capacity markets, the design will not allow these retiring resources to re-enter the capacity market through a later reconfiguration auction or in a subsequent commitment period; these resources must

retire and relinquish their interconnection capability. This restriction helps to prevent the system's aggregate obligated capacity level from increasing above the competitive level over time—and, therefore, helps prevent the primary auction's clearing price from decreasing below the competitive level. Furthermore, by allowing Sponsored Policy Resources to take on obligations via the substitution auction and become existing resources when they displace older resources that elect to retire, CASPR accommodates such resources into the FCM at a pace that should not adversely impact capacity prices.

During the development and stakeholder consideration of the core CASPR rules, the ISO identified that several conforming changes and related enhancements to the Tariff would be deferred until later in 2018. As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain, the deferral was pragmatic; it allowed the ISO to complete the core CASPR rules necessary to implement the substitution auction for FCA 13.¹⁶ This filing contains those additional changes, and other improvements and clean-ups to the CASPR rules identified during the implementation process. As explained above, many of the CASPR-Related Changes are important to conduct FCA 13 in February 2019. The bulk of the remaining changes will apply for the FCM auction-administration processes beginning with the fourteenth FCA, the administration of which will commence in March 2019.

V. CLARIFICATIONS AND ENHANCEMENTS TO THE CORE CASPR RULES

The CASPR-Related Changes include several clarifications and enhancements to the core CASPR rules. These include a number of technical clarifications to the core CASPR rules contained in Section III.13.2.8 of Market rule 1, specifically with respect to the qualification of resources to participate in the substitution auction and existing rules governing the administration of the Forward Capacity Auction, of which the substitution auction is a component. These technical clarifications are addressed in Section V.A below. In addition, Section V.B addresses an enhancement to rules that govern how demand bids may be adjusted to account for differences between the amount of capacity that is subject to the demand bid and the amount of capacity that receives a CSO in the primary auction. Finally, Section V.C addresses enhancements to the way in which the ISO will perform reviews of resources that submit demand bids to determine whether those resources should be retained (i.e., not allowed to retire) to address an identified reliability need.

A. Technical Clarifications to the FCA Qualification and Substitution Auction Conduct Rules

The CASPR-Related Changes include a number of clarifications pertaining to how resources may qualify to participate in the substitution auction as well as how the substitution auction will be conducted by the ISO. These revisions clarify how the CASPR rules apply in specific scenarios and add or correct details of the rules that the

¹⁶ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 5.

ISO identified during its process of developing business and software requirements to implement the substitution auction functionality.

The clarifications are grouped into four areas: (i) qualification criteria for Sponsored Policy Resources participating as supply in the substitution auction; (ii) qualification criteria for existing resources that may exit the markets via the substitution auction; (iii) substitution auction clearing and pricing rules; and (iv) the rules pertaining to the process of conducting the two auctions of the FCA (the primary auction and the substitution auction), including rules that address the “hand offs” of information between the auctions.

As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explains, these technical clarifications ensure the CASPR rules address the full range of possible resource qualification and auction scenarios identified, are clearly defined for participants, and are consistent with the ISO’s implementation of the CASPR design.¹⁷

*i. Qualification Criteria for Sponsored Policy Resources
Participating as New Supply in the Substitution Auction*

The CASPR-Related Changes contain three clarifications to the qualification rules for new supply, which pertain to the amount of capacity a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to sell in the substitution auction:

- Section III.13.2.8.2.1(b) is clarified to reflect that only capacity that qualifies as new capacity may acquire a CSO in the substitution auction. Therefore, a single resource with both “existing” and “new” qualified capacity can only offer its “new” capacity as supply to take on a capacity obligation in the substitution auction. As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explains, this clarification is consistent with the intent of the CASPR design, which is to permit Sponsored Policy Resources that are subject to the MOPR the opportunity to participate in the FCA at preferred supply offer prices that reflect out-of-market subsidies; in contrast, existing capacity is not subject to the MOPR and therefore does not face obstacles to offering at a low price to provide capacity in the primary auction.¹⁸
- A corollary change is also being made to Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to clarify that a single resource cannot participate as both supply and demand simultaneously in a substitution auction. It is technically feasible, albeit unlikely, for the new and existing portions of a single resource to otherwise satisfy all the criteria to participate as supply (with its new capacity) and demand (with its existing capacity) in a substitution auction. However, the CASPR design did not intend to

¹⁷ *Id.* at pp. 14-15.

¹⁸ *Id.* at pp. 15-16.

allow this type of participation where a participant could swap a capacity obligation on a single resource.¹⁹

- Section III.13.2.8.2.1(b) is also clarified to address a scenario where a single new resource is participating in the substitution auction and also is eligible for, and elects to utilize, the Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption for the primary auction.²⁰ The RTR exemption allows a limited quantity of new capacity that meets certain state environmental policy objectives to bypass the MOPR and offer at prices that may reflect out-of-market subsidies. In each auction, the amount of capacity that can qualify for the RTR exemption is capped, and pro-rationing is applied in the event the amount of capacity that qualifies for the exemption in an auction is greater than the cap. Nevertheless, in the event the capacity of a Sponsored Policy Resource is pro-rated under the RTR exemption rules, the participant should not be prohibited from acquiring a CSO for the amount of its qualified capacity in excess of the pro-rated capacity (i.e., the excess above that which qualified for the RTR exemption) in the substitution auction. The revisions in Section III.13.2.8.2.1(b) therefore clarify that this excess capacity may participate in the substitution auction.²¹

ii. Qualification Criteria for Existing Resources Participating as Demand in the Substitution Auction

The CASPR-Related Changes propose two clarifications to the rules pertaining to the qualification criteria for existing resources participating as demand in the substitution auction.

- Section III.13.2.8.3.1 is being modified to clarify the requirement that existing resources must be “commercial” in order to submit a demand bid to retire through the substitution auction. The CASPR design intent is achieved only if the existing resource relinquishes its interconnection service, thereby ensuring it permanently retires; however, a non-commercial resource does not yet have interconnection service.²² Section III.13.2.8.3.1 is being clarified to permit a demand bid for a resource only if it has achieved “FCM Commercial Operation,” and further to clarify that this status must apply to all of the resource’s existing and new qualified capacity.

¹⁹ *Id.* at p. 18.

²⁰ Sections III.13.1.1.1.7 and III.13.1.1.2.10 of Market Rule 1 address the RTR exemption.

²¹ See the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 17 for an example of the application of the clarified rule.

²² Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 19-21.

- Section III.13.2.8.3.1 is also being modified to address restrictions on using the “composite offer” mechanism for an existing resource that is participating in the substitution auction as demand. As described in Section III.13.1.5, multiple resources may join their excess summer and winter qualified capacity amounts (where seasonal capability can differ for a resource based on its operating capabilities or ambient conditions) into a single, annual offer in the primary auction in order to provide more capacity than each separate resource could deliver if it participated individually (“Composite FCM Transaction”). Under the existing qualification mechanism in Section III.13.1.1.3.A of the Tariff, the ISO will automatically match these differences in seasonal capability for a single resource that has both existing and new capacity to create the equivalent of a Composite FCM Transaction that involves just the capacity associated with the single resource (referred to as “auto-matches”). The existing CASPR rules prohibit resources with a substitution auction demand bid from joining a Composite FCM Transaction to prevent outcomes that would fail to coordinate MW-for-MW resource entry and exit in the substitution auction. Absent this prohibition, some capacity which was ostensibly retired in a composite transaction would be able to return to the market for future auctions.²³ The ISO’s proposed additional change simply extends this prohibition to cover (and therefore prohibit) auto-matches for resources that are submitting a demand bid in a substitution auction for existing capacity for the same reasons.²⁴

iii. Clarifications to the Substitution Auction Clearing and Pricing Rules

The CASPR-Related Changes propose three clarifications to the clearing and pricing rules for the substitution auction.

Section III.13.2.8.1.1 is being modified to clarify the treatment of “proxy demand bids” in the substitution auction. A proxy demand bid in a substitution auction is created by the ISO under certain scenarios in which a Proxy De-List Bid is used in the primary auction. Under the existing market rules that address the retirement of resources from the markets, the primary auction may use a Proxy De-List Bid as a stand-in for a resource that has elected to retire from the markets rather than participate in the FCA at the de-list bid price approved by the Internal Market Monitor.²⁵

²³ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 21-22.

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ See Market Rule 1, Sections III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii) and III.13.2.5.2.1. Proxy de-list bids are intended to help prevent the exercise of supply-side market power in cases where a participant may benefit by retiring an existing resource, thereby increasing the Capacity Clearing Price to the benefit of its remaining portfolio. Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 23.

In cases where a Proxy De-List Bid is utilized in the primary auction in place of a bid from a resource that has elected to retire, the existing retirement rules include a process to re-run the primary auction clearing to replace the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid (which is capacity that does not truly exist since the associated resource has elected to retire for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period) with offers to supply capacity from other resources that did not clear (acquire a CSO) in the first run of the primary auction. The core CASPR rules modified this process so that the substitution auction will occur between the first run of the primary auction and a possible second run of the primary auction. Within the substitution auction, the ISO represents a CSO retained by the Proxy De-List Bid in the primary auction using a proxy demand bid. This feature of the CASPR design maximizes the probability that proxy capacity could be cleared against (i.e., replaced by) a supply offer from a Sponsored Policy Resource. If the replacement of proxy capacity is not feasible in the substitution auction, then the ISO will conduct a second run of the primary auction to attempt to replace the proxy capacity with higher cost resources that did not clear in the first run of the primary auction.

The CASPR-Related Changes propose two clarifications to Section III.13.2.8.1.1 pertaining to proxy capacity:

- The first revision removes an unnecessary tie-breaking rule that was intended to apply in circumstances where multiple clearing outcomes would each achieve the substitution auction's objective to maximize social surplus. The relevant tie-breaking rule would have resolved such a case, where multiple proxy demand bids are involved, by clearing each such bid in proportion to its bid quantity. However, proxy demand bids are given priority to clear (in accordance with Section III.13.2.8.3.3) in the substitution auction and will therefore be cleared to the fullest extent possible. Because proxy capacity is not associated with an actual resource (or market participant) and the purpose for including these bids in the substitution auction is simply to replace the proxy capacity (if possible), it is irrelevant which proxy demand bids are cleared and in what proportions.²⁶
- The second related change clarifies that a CSO acquired using a Proxy De-List Bid in the primary auction is accounted for when setting the constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of CSOs between capacity zones in the substitution auction. The constraints governing inter-zonal transfers (included with the core CASPR rules) minimize the extent to which capacity transferred between zones in the substitution auction can impact subsequent years' primary auction clearing prices.²⁷ In practice, these network constraints limit the transfer of capacity into or out of constrained capacity zones, so that a transfer may occur only to the extent it has no net impact on system reliability. If capacity transfers were not

²⁶ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 24.

²⁷ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.D for an explanation of these network constraints.

limited by these network constraints in the substitution auction, it is possible that a transfer could alter the relative reliability value of capacity in different zones and thereby impact primary auction prices in future auctions.²⁸

The proposed revision clarifies that CSOs retained by Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction will be counted toward a constrained capacity zone's total CSO quantity for purposes of determining whether inter-zonal transfers are allowed (and, if so, the net transfer quantity allowed) in the substitution auction. As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explains, this revision is necessary to prevent unintended results with respect to capacity transfers between constrained zones.²⁹

The CASPR-Related Changes also propose two clarifications to Section III.13.2.8.1.1 pertaining to the substitution auction treatment of Intermittent Power Resources:

- Section III.13.2.8.1.1 is revised to add specificity to the treatment of an Intermittent Power Resource that is also a party to a Composite FCM Transaction. Generally, an Intermittent Power Resource may have different seasonal capabilities (summer and winter); like all other resources, the amount of capacity an Intermittent Power Resource is able to sell in the primary auction is based on its summer capability. Further, an Intermittent Power Resource that sells capacity in the primary auction will receive a winter period capacity obligation that is adjusted up or down to reflect its winter qualified capability (in proportion to the auction-cleared award for the resource's summer qualified capability). However, if some portion of the resource's winter capacity is assigned to a Composite FCM Transaction, then that capacity is first removed from the resource for purposes of performing the adjustment. This same treatment for Intermittent Power Resources taking on an obligation through the substitution auction is specified in the substitution auction clearing rules, in Section III.13.2.8.1.1. However, the provision fails to account for the removal of any winter capacity that is obligated

²⁸ See the CASPR Geissler Testimony, at Section VIII.D, pp. 165-166, for additional detail on the potential impact on future auction prices. As discussed above, a Proxy De-List Bid may retain a CSO in the primary auction and, therefore, contribute to the total capacity acquired in the system (and the associated resource's capacity zone) in the process of clearing and establishing prices in the primary auction.

²⁹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 25-26. Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain that "without this change, the dual mechanisms of (1) including proxy demand bids in the substitution auction and (2) the constraints on inter-zonal transfers of CSOs could cause unintended results, such as: 'locking in' a surplus of actual capacity (ignoring proxy resource CSOs) in an import-constrained zone even though additional capacity could be transferred out of the zone without affecting system reliability; or allowing capacity to be added in an export-constrained zone in excess of the intended limits on such transfers, thereby worsening system reliability. Such outcomes would not be consistent with the purpose for constraining the inter-zonal transfers of CSOs within the substitution auction." *Id.*

through a Composite FCM Transaction. The proposed revision therefore adds a sentence to address the removal of any such capacity before the adjustment to the winter CSO for the Intermittent Power Resource is performed.³⁰

- The second clarification pertaining to Intermittent Power Resources removes an incorrect statement that was intended to clarify the winter period award. Section 13.2.8.1.1 on substitution auction clearing includes a sentence that implies the winter period award for the intermittent resource will always be higher than, in absolute terms, the CSO award for the summer months that cleared in the auction. However, this may not always be the case. If an Intermittent Power Resource has a lower qualified winter capability than its summer qualified capability, the winter period CSO award will be lower (again, in absolute terms) than the summer period CSO award. The erroneous statement is therefore being removed.³¹

Finally, the CASPR-Related Changes include clarifications in the pricing rules contained in Section III.13.2.8.1.2 to provide additional detail on how price hierarchy relationships comparable to those applied in the primary auction are applied in the substitution auction. Under the clarified rules, unless the constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of CSOs prevent transfers into or out of a certain zone,³² an import-constrained zone's clearing price must be greater than or equal to the Rest-of-Pool clearing price and, conversely, an export-constrained zone's clearing price must be less than or equal to the Rest-of-Pool clearing price. As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explain, these price hierarchy relationships are an appropriate property of zonal pricing, in that they ensure locational prices are consistent with the relative reliability contributions of capacity in each location of the system.³³

iv. Clarifications to the Auction Conduct Rules for the Primary and Substitution Auctions

The Forward Capacity Auction is a process of first conducting the primary auction, then conducting the substitution auction, and finally, under specific conditions, repeating the process of clearing the primary auction to replace any CSOs that remain

³⁰ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 26-27.

³¹ *Id.* at pp. 27-28.

³² If an import- or export-constrained capacity zone is not able to transfer capacity with another zone in the substitution auction (i.e., because of the constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of CSOs in the substitution auction), then the clearing price for cleared supply offers and demand bids within that constrained zone will have no defined relationship to prices in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone (or other capacity zones). Such a zone is effectively cleared as a separate auction including only the supply offers and demand bids from resources located within that zone and therefore, the price hierarchy relationships to other capacity zones in the system are not applicable. Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 29-30.

³³ *Id.* at pp. 29-30.

associated with Proxy De-List Bids. This sequence of events involves a myriad of “hand-offs” of information from the earlier auction steps to the subsequent ones. The ISO has determined that two of the information hand-off provisions included in the initial CASPR rules in place today need modification, because they are either unnecessary or inaccurate.

- A change to Section III.13.2.8.3.1 regarding substitution auction demand bids removes an unnecessary parenthetical statement, which explains that a proxy demand bid entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a resource that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid (and therefore committed to retire only from the FCM) would not require the resource to also retire from the energy market. Generally, a Permanent De-List Bid only removes the resource from the FCM, whereas a substitution auction demand bid obligates the resource to retire from all markets. The parenthetical statement was meant to clarify that clearing a proxy demand bid in the substitution auction does not alter the rights and obligations of the underlying resource if it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid. However, the proxy demand bid for the substitution auction is an administrative construct that is independent of any such Permanent De-List Bid, and it is therefore unnecessary, and potentially confusing, to separately address the rights and obligations of the underlying resource in the substitution auction rules.³⁴
- The core CASPR revisions to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), which describes the auction events applicable for Proxy De-List Bids, incorrectly imply that de-list bids that *did not* receive a CSO in the primary auction will be adjusted to account for any portion of an obligation shed in the substitution auction. This is incorrect because a resource’s capacity that is associated with a primary auction de-list bid that did not receive a CSO in the primary auction cannot be entered into the substitution auction—an existing resource can only bid into the substitution auction to retire capacity that *received* a CSO in the primary auction. Therefore, it is incorrect to imply that a de-list bid that did not receive a CSO in the primary auction would be adjusted to account for a CSO shed in the substitution auction. Accordingly, the CASPR-Related Changes clarify this provision to remove the implication.³⁵

B. Enhancement to the Substitution Auction Demand Bid Adjustments

Section III.13.2.8.3.3 of the core CASPR rules applies an adjustment to demand bid quantities before the bid is entered into the auction if the demand bid quantity is greater than the amount of capacity for which the resource has received a CSO in the primary auction. This is necessary to respect the basic CASPR tenet that a participant with an existing resource may retire capacity in the substitution auction only if it acquired a CSO in the primary auction. The CASPR-Related Changes propose an enhancement to

³⁴ *Id.* at p. 31.

³⁵ *Id.* at pp. 32-33.

the demand bid adjustment rule to permit the participant to choose between one of two options in how the quantity reduction will be performed. This election treatment may be of particular benefit to participants that are attempting to retire only a portion of a resource through the substitution auction.

Under the current rule, Section III.13.2.8.3.3(a) reduces the resource's substitution auction demand bid quantity if the CSO acquired by the existing resource in the primary auction is less than the demand bid quantity. In this circumstance the demand bid quantity is reduced to equal the acquired CSO amount, with the reduction beginning with the highest-priced bid segment (if the bid contains more than one price-quantity pair).³⁶ In other words, bid segments are removed in descending price order.

As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain in their supporting testimony,³⁷ a participant's objective in retiring capacity through the substitution auction may not be achievable with the current adjustment mechanism. For example, a participant that is successful in retiring its most-costly (i.e., least valuable) capacity in the primary auction will want to ensure that this same capacity is not offered for retirement through the substitution auction; to accomplish this the participant will want to remove the highest-priced bid segments from its demand bid (i.e., from the top segment and down) so that the demand bid price reflects the higher value of its remaining capacity (which the participant is less inclined to retire, as reflected in the lower demand bid price). Alternatively, a participant may instead want to increase its chances of retiring its least-valuable capacity through the substitution auction even if it chooses to de-list some portion of its capacity in the primary auction. For example, it may de-list its least-costly (i.e., most valuable) capacity in the primary auction on a one-year basis, but will leave its more costly (i.e., less valuable) capacity available for retiring through the substitution auction. To accomplish this, the participant must be able to adjust its demand bid from the bottom up—i.e., deducting the amount of the capacity de-listed in the primary auction from the lowest-priced price-quantity demand bid segments.³⁸

To address these potential scenarios, the ISO is proposing to add flexibility for specifying demand bid adjustments in order to allow participants to more easily achieve their preferred outcomes. By creating two adjustment options, the proposed change allows participants additional flexibility to choose between a “top down” approach and a “bottom up” approach. The two approaches differ by both how the quantity of capacity

³⁶ A second provision, in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b), applies a price reduction as well; if any price-quantity pairs include segments with a price that exceeds the primary auction clearing price, then under Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) the bid price for those segments is reduced to equal the primary auction clearing price.

³⁷ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 34-35.

³⁸ These options are addressed in further detail in a set of examples provided in the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 37-43.

to be removed from the demand bid is calculated and, in the case of demand bids with multiple price-quantity segments, by the segments from which the capacity is removed:

- Under the top-down approach proposed in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(a)(i), the demand bid is reduced by the amount of qualified capacity that was de-listed and so did not receive a CSO in the primary auction.³⁹ If the demand bid includes multiple price-quantity segments, under the top-down approach the demand bid quantity is reduced beginning from the highest-priced segment. To use a simple example, a participant with a resource that has 100 MW of qualified capacity and a 70 MW substitution auction demand bid going into the FCA would have its demand bid reduced by 40 MW (to 30 MW) if its resource de-listed 40 MW of capacity (and, therefore, only received a CSO of 60 MW) in the primary auction. Those 40 MW of de-listed capacity would be removed from the highest-priced demand bid segments (in the event of multiple price-quantity bid segments).
- Under the bottom-up approach proposed in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(ii), the demand bid is reduced to an amount that equals the CSO received by the resource in the primary auction.⁴⁰ If the case of a demand bid with multiple price quantity segments, under the bottom-up approach the demand bid quantity is reduced beginning from the lowest-priced segment. In the above example, under the bottom-up treatment the demand bid would be reduced by 10 MW, so that it has a 60 MW demand bid remaining for the substitution auction, and those 10 MW would be taken from the lowest-priced demand bid segments.

The Brewster-Geissler Testimony contains a useful set of examples that illustrate the top-down and bottom-up approaches and further elaborates on when a participant may want to utilize these approaches.⁴¹

C. Enhancement to the Reliability Review Process for Substitution Auction Demand Bids

Under Section III.13.2.5.2.5 of the FCM rules, the ISO performs a review of resources that propose to retire from the markets to determine whether those resources should be retained to address a reliability need. The existing rules contemplate that this reliability review for substitution auction demand bids is to be performed in the same manner as the review for de-list bids in the primary auction.⁴² Under this approach, the reliability review is performed before the substitution auction is conducted, and existing

³⁹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 35-36.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at pp. 36-37.

⁴¹ *Id.* at pp. 37-43.

⁴² See Market Rule 1, Section III.13.2.5.2.5, which refers generally to “bids” and is intended to cover substitution auction demand bids.

resources that need to be retained to address the reliability need are not permitted to submit demand bids in the substitution auction. The CASPR-Related Changes propose modifications to the reliability review provisions so that the review is performed during the substitution auction. As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explains, this approach produces an outcome (i.e., auction clearing) that is consistent with the objective of maximizing social surplus among the set of eligible supply offers and demand bids.⁴³

Under the current rules, the pre-auction reliability review is conducted with demand bids reviewed in order of descending price.⁴⁴ Under this approach, the ISO performs a reliability analysis assuming the bid capacity is removed from the market. If reliability criterion violations are identified, the ISO withdraws the resource from the set of demand bids that would be entered into the substitution auction (meaning the resource would retain its CSO acquired in the primary auction for the period). The reliability evaluation then proceeds to the next resource through the price-ordered bid stack. In this evaluation, any higher-price demand that is evaluated and not deemed needed for reliability is treated as having retired. After completing the review of all resources, the demand bids for which no reliability criterion violations were identified are entered into the substitution auction.

While this approach is not unreasonable, the ISO has identified that it is possible to perform the review in a manner that accounts for a broader range of constraints that might impact whether it is necessary to retain a particular resource to address an identified reliability need. As the Brewster-Geissler Testimony explains, there are several potential constraints that may impact the clearing of the auction.⁴⁵ Of primary note, the constraints on inter-zonal transfers of CSOs in the substitution auction may limit or prevent the ability for supply and demand located in different capacity zones to be matched due to network constraints. Similarly, demand bids are non-rationable in the substitution auction (and so cannot partially clear), which means that in some instances a lower-priced demand bid for less capacity will clear rather than a higher-priced demand bid for a larger quantity of capacity if, for example, there is not sufficient supply to clear the entire bid quantity. The current method for performing the substitution auction reliability does not account for these additional constraints; instead it utilizes only bid prices to establish the order of review.⁴⁶

The CASPR-Related Changes propose to replace the existing process with an approach that employs an in-auction review process. Under the proposed approach—

⁴³ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 44-45.

⁴⁴ See Market Rule 1, Section III.13.2.5.2.5(a) and (b) for an explanation of the mechanics of the reliability review process.

⁴⁵ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 45-46.

⁴⁶ *Id.* See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.A for discussion of the non-rationable treatment of demand bids and the reasons this applies in the substitution auction.

which is accomplished by making a number of small adjustments to the language in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(a) and (b)—all eligible demand bids are entered into an initial, preliminary clearing of the substitution auction, to determine the set of demand bids and supply offers that maximize social surplus, subject to the various constraints that may apply in the auction as part of the normal clearing. The reliability review process is then applied to the set of demand bids that would clear absent a need for the ISO to retain a number of resources (i.e., reject their bids) to address a specified reliability need.

Under the proposed approach, demand bids are reviewed in order of their contribution to social surplus achieved in the initial, preliminary clearing of the substitution auction. Cleared demand bids for resources that make the largest contribution to social surplus (by transferring their CSO) in the substitution auction are reviewed first. If a resource's demand bid that would otherwise clear, in whole or in part, in the substitution auction is determined to be needed for reliability, then the resource's entire demand bid will be removed from the substitution auction (the resource will retain its CSO awarded in the primary auction for the commitment period).

When a resource's demand bid that would otherwise clear is identified as being needed for reliability, then the substitution auction clearing is re-run using the remaining demand bids to determine a new auction solution that maximizes social surplus. The reliability review of cleared demand bids then proceeds through these bids in the same manner as described above. This process is repeated until an auction-clearing solution does not result in a reliability criterion violation for an accepted demand bid and that auction case is approved as the substitution auction result.

As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain,⁴⁷ applying the reliability review as part of the auction allows the auction to first determine the optimal set of bids and offers that maximize social surplus, using the full range of constraints that apply to this determination. In addition, the in-auction reliability review process can take account of the reliability contributions of Sponsored Policy Resources that acquire a CSO in the substitution auction. These new resources will receive a CSO in the substitution auction and can, therefore, be included in the assessment of whether reliability needs remain after removing existing capacity. In contrast, the current pre-auction review performs the review solely based on bid price, and in so doing fails to consider factors that ultimately impact the optimal outcome.⁴⁸

In short, the proposed approach to the reliability review provides for a more nuanced consideration of the demand bids and the various conditions that might impact their clearing, and therefore increases the likelihood of producing an auction outcome

⁴⁷ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 48-49.

⁴⁸ See the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 49-50 for an example demonstrating how the proposed approach produces the more optimal outcome relative to the existing approach.

that both satisfies the reliability criteria and also achieves the auction goal of maximizing social surplus.

VI. THE CASPR TEST PRICE

A. Rationale for the CASPR Test Price Mechanism

The CASPR-Related Changes propose a test price mechanism that is intended to minimize the incentive for a participant to bid below its competitive price to supply capacity in the primary auction in order to increase its chance of retiring its resource in the substitution auction and receiving a severance payment. Selling capacity in the primary auction below a competitive price (referred to as “bid shading”) could produce an inefficient outcome in the primary auction.

The test price is an estimate of the resource’s competitive, break-even price to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation (instead of retiring). The test price serves as a screen for competitive behavior in the primary auction to determine whether the resource’s demand bid can enter the substitution auction. If the primary auction clearing price is below an existing resource’s test price (less a 10% margin to account for uncertainty), and it acquired a CSO at this primary auction clearing price, then the resource is excluded from the substitution auction. The test price, therefore, successfully counters the incentive for a participant to shade its primary auction de-list bid for purposes of entering the substitution auction.

The incentive for a participant to engage in bid shading is triggered by the ability to obtain a severance payment by retiring its capacity in the substitution auction. A severance payment is produced when the substitution auction clearing price is below the primary auction clearing price, which will normally be the case.⁴⁹ An existing resource that acquires a CSO in the primary auction at a higher price and then sheds the CSO in the substitution auction at a lower price will receive a positive FCM payment, on net, equal to this price difference. This net positive FCM payment is referred to as the “severance payment.”

As Dr. Geissler explained in his testimony in support of the core CASPR rules, the opportunity to obtain a severance payment in the substitution auction could incent bid

⁴⁹ See the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 52-53. Supply offers in the substitution auction will generally be at lower prices (relative to the primary auction), consistent with the fact that Sponsored Policy Resources seeking to sell capacity receive out-of-market payments that lower the price at which they are willing to acquire a CSO. Also, demand bids in the substitution auction will tend to be priced below the primary auction clearing price, because an existing resource would not tend to be willing to buy out of a CSO at a higher price than it is paid to acquire the CSO in the primary auction. These properties of offers and bids will tend to produce a substitution auction clearing price below the primary auction clearing price.

shading.⁵⁰ An existing resource nearing retirement may have an incentive to reduce its primary auction offer to sell capacity below its true break-even price (i.e., the price it must receive from the FCM to cover its expected going-forward costs). A participant would do this to increase the likelihood that its resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction and then can shed the CSO in the substitution auction to receive the severance payment in exchange for its retirement.

Dr. Geissler further explained that bid shading could reduce the primary auction clearing price below its competitively-based level.⁵¹ This could occur only if the resource in question would be either marginal or extra-marginal in the primary auction if it offered consistent with its true break-even price, but by shading its bid it is able to move itself down in the supply stack to become either marginal or infra-marginal in the primary auction. A participant may face an incentive to engage in bid shading if the expected severance payment in the substitution auction is sufficiently large, and concurrently the risk of failing to shed the CSO in the substitution auction is sufficiently remote. Otherwise, the participant faces the risk of retaining a CSO obligation at a price below its cost.

The ISO did not propose a mechanism in the CASPR filing to reduce the likelihood or impact of bid shading behavior, largely because of the limited risk this behavior poses to the competitiveness of the FCA and the limited time then available to develop comprehensive rules. The use of sloped demand curves in the primary auction tends to reduce the price impact associated with bid shading. Further, bid shading is financially risky; the possibility exists that the participant will acquire a CSO in the primary auction at a price below its true break-even point, and then be unable to clear its demand bid in the substitution auction. In such instances, the participant would retain a CSO for the resource at a price below its break-even cost to meet the obligation.⁵²

Nevertheless, the ISO indicated in the core CASPR filing that it would undertake additional analysis, and work with stakeholders, to determine whether it could devise an efficient process to remove the incentive to engage in bid shading.⁵³ The Commission recognized and encouraged such action in its order approving the core CASPR filing.⁵⁴ The proposed test price mechanism is the product of that analysis. The test price mechanism leverages the existing FCM market power mitigation construct applied to Retirement De-List Bids. The administration, timing and information collection requirements for the new CASPR test price mechanism build upon the existing construct for submitting Retirement De-List Bids. The test price mechanism can be implemented

⁵⁰ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at pp. 113, 119.

⁵¹ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at pp. 119-120.

⁵² See CASPR Geissler Testimony at pp. 122-125.

⁵³ See Core CASPR filing, transmittal letter at p. 9.

⁵⁴ 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, P 85 (2018).

with relative efficiency, and the consequences for failing the test price mechanism are straightforward: a participant is prevented from having its resource participate in the substitution auction. Losing access to the substitution auction (which is the only means to obtain the severance payment) should serve as an appropriate disincentive to engage in bid shading, as is explained below in more detail.⁵⁵

B. Overview of the Proposed Test Price Mechanism

The ISO's proposed test price mechanism evaluates whether a participant acquired a CSO in the primary auction at a price that is above or below the competitive break-even price for the resource to accept the capacity obligation rather than retire the resource. The primary components of the mechanism are contained in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A of Market Rule 1, and the consequences of bidding below the test price are addressed in III.13.2.8.3.3. The mechanism does not dictate the allowed de-list bid price at which a participant can offer its resource's capacity in the primary auction, and in this regard it is different from the market power mitigation applied to capacity market de-list bids. Instead, the resource-specific test price serves as a screen to determine whether the resource's demand bid can enter the substitution auction.

More specifically, if the existing resource acquires a CSO at a primary auction clearing price that is at or above its test price, then its demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction. If instead the primary auction clearing price is below the resource's test price, then the resource's demand bid will be excluded from the substitution auction.

The test price mechanism helps incentivize competitive bidding behavior in the primary auction by removing the potential benefit to a participant of engaging in bid shading. The expected value of a substitution auction severance payment will be zero (i.e., non-existent) at primary auction clearing prices below the resource's test price, which nullifies the potential benefit of remaining in the primary auction at clearing prices that are below this value.⁵⁶

C. Primary Elements of the Test Price

There are five primary elements to the test price design: (1) the timeline of activities and information provided during the FCA qualification period that will determine the applicable test price for a resource; (2) the methodology to calculate the test price; (3) the application of the test price in the FCA; (4) the relationship of the test price to a participant's preferred de-list price for its resource; and (5) conditions under which a test price will not be calculated or applied for a resource (i.e., a *de minimis* quantity rule).

⁵⁵ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 55-56.

⁵⁶ *Id.* at p. 57.

i. Timeline for Qualification

As specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, the test price mechanism will utilize the existing timeline for CASPR retirement elections, which is similar to the timeline for developing Retirement De-List Bids. The test price mechanism only applies to existing resources that elect to participate in the substitution auction. Participants that submit a Retirement De-List Bid (a “track 1” demand bid election), or that elect at that same deadline to submit a demand bid for participation in the substitution auction without a retirement bid (a “track 2” election), will utilize the Retirement De-List Bid calculation methodology in the Tariff to calculate a test price and include that value, and supporting documentation, with their qualification submission (typically in early March).

The Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”) will review the submitted test price and consult with the participant to establish an IMM-determined test price for the resource using the cost-evaluation framework applicable to the IMM’s review of Retirement De-List Bids. The IMM will notify the participant of the IMM-determined test price in the retirement determination notification (typically in June). The ISO will also file the test price with the Commission in its confidential filing of retirement and permanent de-list bid information (typically in July).⁵⁷ The test price values—as accepted or modified by the Commission in its order on the ISO’s retirements filing—will then apply in the FCA.

ii. Methodology for Calculating the Test Price

The test price will reflect the IMM’s estimate of the competitive price below which a participant would retire its capacity from the market rather than acquire a CSO, excluding the impact of a potential severance payment from the substitution auction. This price represents the break-even price of providing capacity from the resource rather than retiring in the primary auction. At prices below the test price, the participant cannot expect to recover its going-forward costs to continue participating in the wholesale markets, and therefore it should retire the resource rather than accept an obligation to provide capacity. A willingness to remain in the FCM below this break-even price may indicate the participant’s intent to utilize the substitution auction mechanism to retire with a severance payment, via a sub-competitively-priced de-list bid in the primary auction.⁵⁸

Under the current market rules, the break-even cost of supplying capacity rather than retiring is reflected in the Retirement De-List Bid calculation, and so, as specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(a), the test price mechanism leverages the existing rules by providing that the test price will be calculated in the same manner as a Retirement De-List Bid (Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1).

⁵⁷ The requirement to file the test price is included in revised Section III.13.8.1 of Market Rule 1.

⁵⁸ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 60-61.

Under Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), the IMM will review the participant-submitted test price using the same cost-review framework that is utilized for Retirement De-List Bids. As with the de-list bid review process, the IMM will evaluate the submitted cost information and review assumptions with the participant to assess whether an adjustment to the submitted test price value is necessary. Specifically, using the Retirement De-List Bid formula, an adjustment to the participant-submitted test price value is necessary if the submitted price is not “consistent with (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).”⁵⁹

As specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), if the participant-submitted test price is *lower* than the IMM-determined test price, then the participant’s price is replaced with the IMM-determined price. By replacing the lower participant-submitted price with the IMM-determined price in this case, the rules ensure that any attempt to “bid shade” a de-list bid below the competitive, break-even price for the resource will not be rewarded with the ability to participate in the substitution auction.⁶⁰ If the participant-submitted test price is *higher* than the IMM-determined test price, then the participant’s price is also replaced with the lower IMM-determined test price. This downward adjustment will permit the participant greater flexibility with respect to its participation in the substitution auction, and in doing so supports the CASPR objective to facilitate the coordinated exit of retiring existing resources and entry of Sponsored Policy Resources within the substitution auction.⁶¹

In its details, the test price calculation and evaluation differs from the method used for Retirement De-List Bids in three ways:

- First, the two calculation methods differ in terms of how the IMM accounts for uncertainty in its review of the submitted values (i.e., the test price and the de-list bid). Under the existing rules governing the IMM’s review of Retirement De-List Bids, the process accounts for uncertainty in the IMM’s estimation of a resource’s costs and revenues by applying a 10 percent tolerance before the IMM-determined de-list bid price would replace the participant-submitted price. Specifically, the IMM will replace a participant-submitted de-list bid price with the IMM-determined price only if the participant-submitted de-list bid price is more than 10 percent greater than the IMM-determined de-list bid price. In

⁵⁹ The Retirement De-List Bid formula is contained in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

⁶⁰ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 62. As discussed above, the test price does not directly control a participant’s conduct in the primary auction. Adjusting the resource’s test price upward to reflect the IMM’s higher estimate of the test price will not constrain the participant’s de-list bids for the primary auction.

⁶¹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 62.

contrast, for the test price mechanism, the IMM does not apply a tolerance in determining whether to replace the participant-submitted test price with its own estimate—the IMM-determined test price is used if it differs at all from the participant-submitted price. Instead, to account for uncertainty with respect to the estimation of the resource’s costs and revenues that comprise the test price, the final test price used in the auction will be set at 90 percent of the test price value that the IMM determines (or, more precisely, 90 percent of the value the Commission approves). This adjustment is made when the test price is applied in the auction, under Section III.13.2.8.3.3.

- Second, unlike a Retirement De-List Bid, a participant cannot submit multiple test prices for a single resource for multiple price-quantity segments, but must instead submit a single test price using total cost and revenue data.⁶² Although an existing resource may differentiate the costs for different quantities of its resource’s capacity with its de-list bid or demand bid, the test price does not allow for price segmentation. As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain, the underlying reason for not allowing segments in the test price is to avoid false precision that could prevent the test price from meeting its objective of preventing uncompetitive bidding behavior in the primary auction.⁶³ Using multiple test price values for different price-quantity bid segments would not prevent a participant from acquiring a CSO in the primary auction at a price that “passes” the test price screen for its lower-cost capacity, but then actually retiring its higher-cost capacity if it succeeds at clearing its demand bid in the substitution auction.⁶⁴ Other alternatives—such as setting the test price at either the highest segment price or the lower segment price—are either overly restrictive (in the case of the highest price) or overly permissive (in the case of the lowest price).⁶⁵

The ISO therefore chose the single test price approach that will be based on cost and revenue estimates for the entire amount of capacity included in the demand bid. Compared to the alternatives considered, a single test price value based on the entire demand bid quantity better meets the intended objective of the test price mechanism, avoids false precision issues, simplifies the administration and transparency of the test price, and minimizes incentives for participants to adjust their demand bid quantities to affect the test price.⁶⁶

- Third, Section III.13.2.8.3.1A requires that the expected value of a CASPR severance payment be removed from the test price calculation. The expected

⁶² This requirement is specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A.

⁶³ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 64-65.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at pp. 65-66.

⁶⁵ *Id.* at p. 66.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

value of a severance payment may prompt a participant to decrease its preferred de-list bid price for a resource below its competitively-based price in order to increase its chances of taking on a CSO in the primary auction and then obtaining a severance payment through participation in the substitution auction. While the rules do not prohibit a participant with an existing resource from taking account of this opportunity cost in its de-list bid, it is the purpose of the test price mechanism to remove the incentive for a participant to lower its de-list bid in order to obtain a severance payment in the substitution auction. Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude the participant's expected value of a CASPR severance payment when calculating its resource's test price. This serves the objective of establishing a competitive retirement bid price for a resource assuming that bidding behavior is unaffected by CASPR.⁶⁷

iii. Application of the Test Price in the FCA

The application of the test price in the auction is addressed in Section III.13.2.8.3.3 on demand bids entered into the substitution auction. This provision specifies that, "If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction."

iv. The Relationship of the Test Price to the Participant's Preferred De-List Bid Price

A participant may want to adjust its primary auction de-list bid price once it has learned the test price value the IMM determines. More specifically, if the participant has included in its de-list bid the expected value of a severance payment that it may obtain through the substitution auction, then it may want to adjust its de-list bid price once it learns of the IMM-determined test price. This is because the test price impacts the ability to participate in the substitution auction to obtain a severance payment. At primary auction clearing prices below the resource's test price, the expected value of the severance payment is zero for the coincident auction. However, because the participant must submit its Retirement De-List Bid (or Permanent De-List Bid) in advance of the time it learns of the IMM-determined test price, the proposed rules include a mechanism to permit the participant to update its de-list bid to account for the impact of the IMM-determined test price.⁶⁸

Under proposed revisions to Section III.13.1.2.4, once a participant is informed by the IMM of the test price value and related de-list bid values, it will have five business days to adjust its Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid to reflect the value of

⁶⁷ *Id.* at p. 67.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at pp. 68-69.

the IMM-determined test price.⁶⁹ The proposed rules provide that the participant will have the option to increase its Retirement De-List Bid price up to the resource's IMM-determined test price (less the 10 percent estimation uncertainty adjustment). A similar adjustment option will apply for a participant that submits a Permanent De-List Bid and also enters a demand bid to participate in the substitution auction. For either de-list bid type, the participant may have considered the expected value of a severance payment when setting its preferred de-list price, and may want to adjust that de-list bid upward to reflect any limits on the ability to obtain a severance payment as conditioned by the IMM-determined test price.

To apply the adjustment in a manner that is consistent with the function of the de-list bids mitigation rules (i.e., to prevent de-list bids above competitive-based levels), it is necessary to limit the upward adjustment flexibility to account for potential differences in the test price calculation relative to the de-list bid calculation. The need for this limitation is most apparent for adjustments to Permanent De-List Bids. A Permanent De-List Bid reflects a participant's option to remove its resource from the FCM, but not to remove the resource from other ISO-administered markets. The competitive price for a Permanent De-List Bid may therefore be different from the competitive price for a Retirement De-List Bid. It would therefore be inappropriate to allow the participant to raise its Permanent De-List Bid to the IMM-determined test price value, which is calculated using the formula for a Retirement De-List Bid. Therefore, any increase to the Permanent De-List Bid must be limited to an increase that is not higher than the IMM's estimate of the competitive Permanent De-List Bid price.⁷⁰

A limit on increases to a de-list price also applies to Retirement De-List Bids, though the rationale for the limitation is different. A participant may choose to submit a Retirement De-List Bid for only a portion of its capacity in the primary auction, and may choose to submit a demand bid in the substitution auction for a greater amount of the resource's capacity. The test price is calculated for the capacity that is subject to the demand bid, and the competitive price for that larger quantity of capacity may differ from the competitive price of the smaller quantity that is subject to the Retirement De-List Bid. To prevent the participant from raising its Retirement De-List Bid price to a value that is not reflective of the competitive price for the portion of the resource that is subject to the

⁶⁹ The same adjustment option would be appropriate for a Static De-List Bid or Export De-List Bid if there were uncertainty about the IMM-determined test price before these bids were submitted. Accordingly, the proposed rules include additional conforming changes to ensure that the deadline for the IMM to provide its approved test price is before the deadline for submitting Static De-List Bids and Export De-List Bids. These calendar adjustments ensure participants are able to adjust their preferred Static De-List Bid or Export De-List Bid in accordance with the resource's IMM-determined test price. These conforming adjustments are in Sections III.13.1.1.1.6(b), III.13.1.2.1.1, III.13.1.2.3(a) and (c), III.13.1.2.3.1, III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(b) and (d), III.13.1.2.4(a), III.13.1.2.4.1, III.13.1.3.3.A(c), III.13.1.4.2.1(a) and III.13.1.10(d).

⁷⁰ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 69-71.

de-list bid, the proposed adjustment flexibility rules also limit a participant's upward adjustment to a Retirement De-List Bid to the lower of (a) the competitive price for the Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the IMM-determined test price for the resource.⁷¹

Finally, an additional nuance applies to the adjustment rule for both Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids. Where a participant is prevented from raising its de-list bid to the full IMM-determined test price (for the reasons described above), the rule specifies that the participant may raise the bid to the price the IMM *would have* calculated *but for* the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid. This counterfactual condition is included in the rule to account for the fact that, under Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2, the IMM is not permitted to raise a participant's de-list bid; rather it is only permitted to lower the bid. Thus, the adjustment rule in Section III.13.1.2.4 must account for this by specifying that the cap is the hypothetical, or "but for" value, that the IMM would have calculated absent this restriction.⁷²

v. ***De Minimis Exemption to Test Price Application***

The test price rules also contain a "*de minimis* exemption" for small amounts of capacity that are unlikely to have material impacts on the primary auction results. Specifically, if the demand bid quantity for a resource is less than three MW, the resource will not be subject to the test price review, and no test price screen will be applied for the resource in the FCA. This *de minimis* exemption is intended to protect participants and the ISO from the burden of preparing, evaluating, and applying a test price value for a bid that is unlikely to have a material impact on the primary auction outcome.⁷³

To establish the three MW cut-off, the ISO performed an analysis of the frequency of FCM bids in different quantity ranges, and identified that a large number of resources in the zero to three MW range participate in the FCM and would be eligible to participate as demand in the substitution auction—comprising between 300 and 350 resources with an aggregate capacity value of approximately 215 MW.⁷⁴ Further, of these resources, the vast majority participated as "price-takers" in prior FCAs, indicating their willingness to remain in the auction to prices down to \$0 per kW-Month. In light of this, exempting these resources from the test price rules would not likely cause these resources to lower their de-list bid prices, as they are already indicating a willingness to

⁷¹ *Id.* at pp. 70-71.

⁷² *Id.* at pp. 71-72.

⁷³ *Id.* at p. 72.

⁷⁴ *Id.* at p. 73. At MW quantities above this range, the distribution of CSO amounts is much more disperse, indicating that if the *de minimis* limit was instead set at two MW, the number of resources excluded from the test price would rise significantly, and if the limit was set above three MW, the number of resources excluded from the test price would increase only minimally. *Id.*

remain in the auction at a price of \$0 per kW-Month. Therefore, there is limited risk that exempting these resources from the test price rules will adversely impact the FCA clearing prices.⁷⁵

VII. FORWARD CAPACITY MARKET SETTLEMENT

A. Substitution Auction Cost Allocation

The CASPR-Related Changes make revisions to the cost allocation rules for the Forward Capacity Market to incorporate allocation for credits and charges arising from the substitution auction. The proposed changes do not modify the manner in which costs (and credits) under the Forward Capacity Market will be allocated, but rather address the circumstances where the substitution auction has an impact on the costs that must be allocated.

Effective for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with FCA 13, the FCM cost allocation rules have been updated with a new allocation methodology.⁷⁶ The updated FCM cost allocation rules replace the prior Net Regional Clearing Price (“NRCP”)-based method for allocating the majority of FCM costs (i.e., payments for capacity supplied) with two new allocation methods. Since the CASPR rules are in effect starting with FCA 13, the CASPR-Related Changes revise the updated cost allocation rules.

Under the updated FCM cost allocation methodology, costs associated with capacity obligations awarded through the annual market auctions are allocated based on the locational marginal reliability impact (“MRI”) of capacity in order to be consistent with the auction-clearing principles of the MRI-based demand curves. This is referred to as the “marginal value” allocation method. The second allocator applies to costs that arise from special compensation provisions for certain participant elections (e.g., self-supply), resource types (e.g., intermittent resources), or assigned rights (e.g., Hydro-Quebec Interconnection Capability Credits). These non-annual and non-auction costs resulting from these special compensation provisions are allocated pro-rata to pool-wide Capacity Load Obligations.

⁷⁵ *Id.* at pp. 73-74.

⁷⁶ The cost allocation rules are contained in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1. Section III.13.7.5.1 addresses the rules that will be in effective up until the start of the thirteenth Capacity Commitment Period ending May 31, 2022. Section III.13.7.5.2, which is modified by the proposed changes addressed in this filing, addresses the updated rules that will be applied starting on June 1, 2022. *See ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee*, Filing re FCM Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (filed August 1, 2018); Letter Order Accepting Proposed Forward Capacity Market Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (issued September 26, 2018).

Consistent with the updated FCM cost allocation methodology, the allocation of costs arising directly from the auction-clearing solution for the substitution auction will utilize the marginal value allocation method. These changes are reflected in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.1.⁷⁷ Generally, the substitution auction transfers both CSOs and revenues between capacity suppliers, and as such the majority of the settlement activity is comprised of transfers between these suppliers and will not produce a separate charge or credit to participants responsible for Capacity Load Obligations. Where such credits or charges to third parties do arise, they result from settlement imbalances, which are either a property of the auction-clearing solution or are due to post-auction administrative adjustments.⁷⁸

In addition, there may be costs arising from the substitution auction that fall under the special compensation provisions, including for self-supply capacity obligations (Section III.13.7.5.1.1.5.) and intermittent resource seasonal capacity variances (Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6.). Such costs arising from the substitution auction will be allocated pro-rata to pool-wide Capacity Load Obligations in the same manner as when these costs arise in the primary auction.⁷⁹

B. Settlement Treatment of a Terminated CSO Acquired in the Substitution Auction

The CASPR-Related Changes address a clarification to the settlement treatment that will apply when a new Sponsored Policy Resource that has acquired a CSO at a negative clearing price subsequently withdraws or has its CSO terminated before the resource becomes commercial. Section III.13.3.4A of the FCM rules address the termination of a CSO held by a capacity resource that has not yet achieved commercial

⁷⁷ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 76. As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain, the MRI values that correspond to the primary auction result are the same that apply to the substitution auction result, because the limits on inter-zonal transfers in the substitution auction are applied to prevent the substitution auction from changing the marginal reliability benefit of capacity (in the system and each capacity zone) that was established in the primary auction. Accordingly, the market-based costs arising from the substitution auction will be apportioned to Capacity Load Obligations using the same marginal value cost allocation shares as are applied for the primary auction costs. Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 80-81.

⁷⁸ These settlement imbalances result from (1) locational price differences between the export- and import-constrained sides of a congested interface, (2) the presence of proxy demand bids in the substitution auction, (3) “side payments” for demand bids that clear at a substitution auction clearing price that exceeds the demand bid price, and (4) refunds resulting from the termination of a CSO acquired in the substitution auction at a positive clearing price. For additional discussion regarding these settlement imbalances (as well as a forth settlement imbalance addressed below), see the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 78-80.

⁷⁹ See the Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 81-83 for additional explanation of the allocation treatment of the special compensation costs.

operation.⁸⁰ These same rules apply to CSOs acquired through the substitution auction. The CASPR-Related Changes propose the clarification that when a CSO acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, “the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.”

This proposed treatment provides appropriate incentives for a participant that is willing to acquire a CSO for a Sponsored Policy Resource in the substitution auction at a negative price. As Mr. Brewster and Dr. Geissler explain,⁸¹ if the participant that chose to take on the CSO at a negative price was able to “walk away” from its settlement obligation, then load serving entities would be exposed to additional charges to fund the settlement of the corresponding cleared demand bids. Transferring these costs to those responsible for Capacity Load Obligations would reduce the risk to participants of offering at a negative price; they could simply walk away from the obligation without incurring a cost. To prevent incentives for such conduct, the proposed rules leave the cost of the terminated CSO with the participant that acquired the obligation in the substitution auction by offering to supply capacity at a negative price.

In contrast, in the event a CSO acquired in the substitution auction at a non-negative price is terminated, the participant foregoes the capacity obligation and the payment. The termination results in reduced charges to Capacity Load Obligations, which is appropriate since consumers are not receiving capacity for a terminated CSO.⁸²

VIII. FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

The CASPR-Related Changes propose two revisions to the Financial Assurance Policy to address collateral requirements for capacity obligations acquired or shed in the substitution auction, as well as one minor addition. First, the proposed changes update the collateral requirements that apply to Non-Commercial Capacity participating in the FCA (Section VII.B), to clarify the rate that will be used to calculate financial assurance for non-commercial resources that acquire a CSO in the substitution auction. Second, the proposed changes update the collateral requirements that apply to transfers of CSOs (Section VII.F) to account for substitution auction transfers that have the potential to produce a charge for the participant that acquires or sheds a CSO in the substitution auction. Additional detail regarding these changes is provided below.

⁸⁰ The ISO has submitted Tariff revisions to modify the termination rules, which the Commission has not yet accepted. *See ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee*, Filing Re CSO Cover Changes, Docket No. ER19-169-000 (filed October 23, 2018). The ISO’s proposed revisions in the instant filing are independent of the changes in Docket No. ER19-169-000 and apply regardless of whether those rule changes are accepted.

⁸¹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 84.

⁸² *Id.* at p. 86.

In addition, the CASPR-Related Changes update the list of consequences of participant suspension in Section III.3.a to clarify that suspension removes the ability to participate in substitution auctions.

A. Financial Assurance Requirements for Non-Commercial Capacity

The Non-Commercial Capacity collateral requirements in Section VII.B of the Financial Assurance Policy pertain to new capacity projects that are qualified to participate in the FCA and have not yet achieved commercial operation (which is typical for new projects). In concept, financial assurance for new non-commercial projects is intended to provide a financial obligation what will ensure the participant will meet its market obligation. The collateral is posted on a schedule before the FCA and is reset after the auction if the new project acquires a CSO. After the new project receives its qualification determination notification, it must begin satisfying this financial assurance requirement by posting a deposit of \$2 per kW of qualified Non-Commercial Capacity. Just before the FCA, the participant must increase the amount of assurance on deposit to the FCA Starting Price for each MW of qualified capacity. After the FCA is completed, a participant is required to maintain collateral for each MW of non-commercial capacity that acquired a CSO in the FCA. This collateral requirement remains in effect until the project becomes commercial, is subject to increases if the resource is late to deliver, and may be forfeited by the resource (and allocated to those with Capacity Load Obligations) if the CSO is ultimately terminated.

Because a Sponsored Policy Resource participating in the substitution auction is a new capacity project that must satisfy all of the FCM qualification rules, it is subject to the same financial assurance requirements in Section VII.B if the resource is non-commercial. No changes to the Financial Assurance Policy are necessary to reflect this treatment for such resources. However, a conforming change is required to specify the auction clearing price that will be used as the rate for setting the collateral requirement for CSOs acquired in either the primary or substitution auction by non-commercial resources. Currently, Section VII.B.2(b) of the Financial Assurance Policy specifies that the rate will be the “applicable capacity price” from the FCA in which the obligation was awarded. This language would require the use of the substitution auction clearing price in setting the rate for non-commercial resources acquiring a CSO in the substitution auction. The language is being revised to clarify that the primary auction Capacity Clearing Price will be used in setting the rate. Applying the primary auction Capacity Clearing Price to all non-commercial resources that acquire a CSO in the FCA will ensure a consistent financial assurance obligation based on the value of capacity established in the primary auction. In contrast, using the substitution auction clearing price could produce counter-intuitive results. Of particular note, the substitution auction clearing price could be zero or negative, which would mean that the participant would be

required to provide no collateral, or worse, that a credit would be applied toward the participant's remaining financial assurance requirements.⁸³

B. Financial Assurance Requirements for CSO Transfers

Under Section VII.F of the Financial Assurance Policy, any transaction to transfer a CSO that could potentially result in a settlement charge is subject to financial assurance requirements, including reconfiguration auctions, CSO bilaterals, and Annual Reconfiguration Transactions. Because it is possible a participant will accrue a settlement charge through participation in a substitution auction, these same financial assurance requirements should be extended to apply to CSOs transferred through substitution auctions.⁸⁴ Therefore, a new sub-section 4. to Section VII.F is being added to address financial assurance obligations for transfers through a substitution auction.

Under the new provision, financial assurance requirements will apply to a participant's supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction if the participant would incur a settlement charge as a result of having the offer or bid accepted. Specifically, before the substitution auction is conducted, a participant must provide sufficient financial assurance to cover the maximum potential charges it may incur if its supply offer or demand bid is accepted in the substitution auction. And then, after the auction is completed, the participant must maintain financial assurance on any offer or bid that was accepted in the auction to cover the settlement charges, if any, associated with its transactions (to acquire or shed CSO) in the substitution auction.

For participants with supply offers in the substitution auction, the collateral requirements will apply if the supply offer includes one or more negative-priced bid segments, which is an indication the participant is willing to be charged to acquire a CSO. Prior to the substitution auction, each supply offer that includes one or more negative-priced segments will be evaluated to determine the maximum potential charge if each segment of the supply offer were cleared in the auction at its offered price,⁸⁵ and collateral on that maximum potential charge will be required using the existing rates established in the Financial Assurance Policy.

For demand bids, additional collateral related to a transfer will be required only if the retiring resource holds a multi-year capacity obligation (i.e., to receive the clearing price from the FCA in which the resource originally acquired the CSO for the duration of the multi-year obligation), which is commonly referred to as a "rate-lock." In the event a participant submits a demand bid to retire capacity in a substitution auction at a price that is higher than the rate-lock price, it is possible that the substitution auction price at which

⁸³ *Id.* at p. 89.

⁸⁴ *Id.* at p. 90.

⁸⁵ The Brewster-Geissler Testimony, at pp. 91-92, provides an explanation of how the maximum potential charge will be calculated under Section VII.F.4.

the demand bid clears could exceed the rate-lock price, which would produce a charge for the participant. Therefore, in the case of a demand bid for a resource subject to a rate-lock, the ISO will calculate the largest potential charge if one or more segments of the bid are accepted in the substitution auction at the bid price, and a collateral requirement will be imposed to cover that additional exposure.⁸⁶

Any collateral required under Section VII.F.4 will be added to a participant's FCM financial assurance requirements beginning on the tenth business day prior to the FCA. Imposing this requirement beginning on the tenth business day before the FCA aligns with the existing timing of when participants must meet collateral requirements for Non-Commercial Capacity.⁸⁷ If a participant fails to post the necessary collateral and is therefore in default, the participant will be prohibited from participating in the substitution auction (see the revision to Section III.3.a of the Financial Assurance Policy noted above) unless the participant cures the default within the cure period. Under the existing rules, the cure period is defined by the credit test that the participant fails.⁸⁸ Section VII.F.4.c adds to the cure period deadline a requirement that the default be cured no later than 5 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the second Business Day prior to the start of the FCA, which is necessary to ensure the ISO has sufficient time to prepare the auction inputs.⁸⁹

Once the substitution auction takes place, as is the case with all other financial assurance requirements, the collateral requirements applicable to supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction are updated. The updated collateral requirement is set by the as-cleared transaction quantity and clearing price.⁹⁰ For example, if a supply offer included negative-priced segments (and therefore had to meet collateral requirements before the FCA), and the substitution auction clearing price is zero or positive, then the collateral requirement for this transaction would be removed from the participant's FCM financial assurance obligation.⁹¹

Finally, the proposed revisions in Section VII.F.4 for CSO transfers include so-called "netting rules," which allow the participant to offset charges with credits from all its resources' CSO positions in establishing a net financial assurance position for the participant. The netting rules are contained in Section VII.F.1 and are not modified by

⁸⁶ See the Brewster-Geissler Testimony, at pp. 93-94, for an explanation of this calculation.

⁸⁷ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 94.

⁸⁸ Therefore, cure periods are specified throughout the Financial Assurance Policy for the various credit tests specified therein.

⁸⁹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at p. 95.

⁹⁰ See proposed Section VII.F.4.d, which specifies that after the substitution auction the collateral requirements "shall be adjusted to reflect all charges and credits related to the sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the substitution auction."

⁹¹ Brewster-Geissler Testimony at pp. 95-96.

the CASPR-Related Changes. Instead, the proposed changes indicate that the netting rules will apply to financial assurance requirements calculated under the new Section VII.F.4 for negatively priced supply offers or demand bids subject to a multi-year rate lock (via a cross-reference to Section VII.F.1). The proposed changes also add specificity to account for the fact that (unlike in the case of the remaining transfer provisions addressed in Section VII.F.1) the collateral calculation is being done for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the instant Forward Capacity Action, and so charges arising from the instant FCA must be taken into consideration in calculating the collateral requirement.⁹²

IX. REVISIONS REGARDING RESOURCE ADEQUACY AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING

The CASPR-Related Changes include updates to the rules pertaining to various resource adequacy parameters used in the Forward Capacity Auction and in related transmission planning studies. These rules are contained in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and in Attachment K to the ISO's Open Access Transmission Tariff. The updates proposed herein generally provide that retirements through the CASPR substitution auction process will be included in relevant studies and requirements consistent with how retirements through the primary auction are currently addressed.

The CASPR-Related Changes address three revisions in this area:

- Revisions to the capacity zone modeling process that occurs annually for each FCA, including (1) revisions to the rules in Attachment K on identifying the potential zonal boundaries and the associated transmission transfer capability studies, and (2) revisions to the rules in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 that address the criteria used in determining whether to model an import-constrained zone in the next FCA.
- Revisions to the rules in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 on calculating the Installed Capacity Requirement for the next FCA, in order to account for substitution auction demand bids consistent with the accounting for other retirement bids.
- Revisions to Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Study assumptions in Attachment K to account for substitution auction demand bids.

A. Revisions to the Capacity Zone Modeling Rules

Section 14 of Attachment K to the OATT addresses the annual assessment of transmission transfer capability and zonal boundaries that is performed early in the

⁹² *Id.* at pp. 96-97.

qualification process for the next FCA.⁹³ Section 14 currently indicates that the ISO's annual assessment of transmission transfer capabilities and capacity zone boundaries will model as out-of-service all resources associated with non-price retirements (an out-of-date reference to a form of retirement that is no longer permitted under the FCM rules) and permanent de-list bids that have been submitted for the upcoming auction. The CASPR-Related Changes propose to modify this language by replacing the out-of-date language with the correct reference to a Retirement De-List Bid and by including an express reference to resources that are subject to a substitution auction demand bid that has been submitted for the next FCA. Further, rather than model all resources with retirement or demand bids as out-of-service, the revisions indicate that the study will model the resource as out-of-service only if it is considered likely the capacity will actually be removed in the upcoming FCA and only if the removal of that capacity would have an impact on transfer capabilities (and therefore the zonal boundary determinations). This change is intended to ensure that the calculated transfer capabilities and the capacity zones "best match the expected conditions that will be relevant for the commitment period" and "avoid[] modeling and analysis work that is not necessary."⁹⁴

Following the completion of the transfer capability and zonal boundary assessments, the ISO performs analyses in accordance with Section III.12.4(b) of Market Rule 1 to determine what import-constrained Capacity Zones must be modeled in the upcoming FCA. Section III.12.4(b) specifies that for these analyses the ISO will model as out-of-service all Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids, including those that have been submitted for the upcoming FCA. The CASPR-Related Changes update this language to make express reference to modeling out-of-service substitution auction demand bids that have been submitted for the current Forward Capacity Auction. The triggering criteria for modeling Capacity Zones is intentionally objective, resulting in the ISO using a more conservative standard for when it will model a resource as out-of-service than the standard explained above under Attachment K for transmission transfer capability analyses and zonal boundary determinations.⁹⁵ Therefore, since a resource retirement occurring in the substitution auction has the same effect on the relative surplus in the Capacity Zone as a retirement in the primary auction, the two bid forms (retirement bid in primary auction and demand bid in substitution auction) should have the same

⁹³ See the McBride Testimony at pp. 6-7 for an overview of the relevant aspects of the FCM qualification timeline.

⁹⁴ See the McBride Testimony at pp. 9-10 for an explanation of the evaluation the ISO will perform in determining whether a retirement is likely to occur and, if so, whether the resource's removal would have an impact on transfer capabilities and zonal boundary determinations.

⁹⁵ See Order Accepting Compliance Filing, 147 FERC ¶ 61,071 (2014), in which the Commission accepted the ISO's compliance filing that defined objective criteria for determining the number and boundaries of capacity zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction.

treatment for the determination of whether or not an import-constrained zone should be modeled for the FCA.⁹⁶

B. Revisions to the Installed Capacity Requirement Calculation Rules

Section III.12.7.2 addresses the resource modeling assumptions that are utilized in calculating the Installed Capacity Requirement and related resource adequacy values. The current rules exclude from these assumptions any capacity that has been permanently de-listed (from the capacity market) or retired altogether in a prior FCA,⁹⁷ as well as capacity that has made an election to unconditionally retire in the upcoming FCA.⁹⁸ The CASPR-Related Changes do not propose to change this treatment, but instead simply update the assumptions by excluding capacity that has retired through the substitution auction.

C. Revisions to the Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Studies

For transmission planning Needs Assessments, as well as for Public Policy Transmission Studies, the ISO currently models as out-of-service any capacity that is scheduled to be permanently de-listed or retired altogether.⁹⁹ Because, under the Forward Capacity Market rules, a resource that is subject to a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid in an FCA must continue to submit such bids in subsequent FCAs until it clears and the resource permanently de-lists or retires, a resource is modeled as out-of-service for the Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Studies once it is subject to such a de-list bid, even if that bid has not yet cleared. However, substitution auction demand bids do not have the same permanence as a de-list bid; that is, there is no obligation to re-submit a demand bid in a subsequent substitution auction if it does not clear in a prior substitution auction. Therefore, for purposes of these planning studies the CASPR-Related Changes only exclude resources subject to a demand bid that has cleared in a prior substitution auction.¹⁰⁰

The revision to Section 4.1 of Attachment K regarding Needs Assessments surgically adds reference to the indicated treatment of demand bids. In performing its review of Attachment K, the ISO noted that the sentence regarding the treatment of retiring resources reflected in Section 4.1 had been inadvertently omitted from Section 4A(3), which mimics Section 4.1. As part of this effort, the ISO is truing-up Section

⁹⁶ McBride Testimony at pp. 11-13.

⁹⁷ Market Rule 1, Section III.12.7.2(f).

⁹⁸ Market Rule 1, Section III.12.7.2(g).

⁹⁹ Needs assessments are addressed in Section 4.1 of Attachment K. Public policy transmission studies are addressed in Section 4A(3) of Attachment K.

¹⁰⁰ McBride Testimony at p. 14.

4A(3) so that it aligns with Section 4.1 by adding a sentence providing the conditions under which retiring and permanently de-listing resources will be modeled out of service for such studies.¹⁰¹

X. REVISION TO RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE EXEMPTION

The CASPR-Related Changes contain one final clarification that was added late in the process, in response to a stakeholder concern. As discussed above, Sections III.13.1.1.1.7 and III.13.1.1.2.10 of Market Rule 1 address an exemption from the application of the MOPR for a limited amount of capacity that meets specified criteria to qualify as a “Renewable Technology Resource” (referred to as the “RTR exemption”). Section III.13.1.1.1.7 addresses the criteria that a new capacity resource must meet to qualify as a Renewable Technology Resource that may be exempt from the MOPR. Section III.13.1.1.2.10 specifies the cap on the amount of capacity that may utilize the exemption in each auction, and further explains the pro-ration that will take place if the amount of capacity that qualifies for the RTR exemption in an auction is greater than the cap.

As Section III.13.1.1.2.10 explains, the RTR exemption is being phased out over the next three Forward Capacity Auctions. Specifically, the amount of capacity currently available to qualify for the RTR exemption is capped at 481 MW. Once the 481 MW of available exemption space are utilized, no additional capacity will be permitted to qualify for the RTR exemption. Further, if the available capacity is not all utilized by the end of FCA 15 (for the Capacity Commitment Period starting June 1, 2024), the remaining available capacity will be extinguished.

While the RTR exemption election deadline for all resources participating in FCA 13 has passed, the ISO has determined that some resources have been precluded from qualifying for the remaining available MW of the RTR exemption due to an oversight in drafting the RTR exemption qualification language in Section III.13.1.1.1.7. Specifically, the Renewable Technology Resource criteria indicates that a resource “must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource *in the state in which it is geographically located*.” It has come to the ISO’s attention that certain off-shore wind projects have been sited off the coast of New England in federal waters (which begin approximately ten miles off the shore), and therefore will not be “geographically located” in any particular New England state. In the ISO’s view, it was not the intent to preclude such resources from utilizing the RTR exemption, so long as they are located off the shore of New England and directly interconnect to the state where they qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource. The ISO is therefore proposing a clarification to the Renewable Technology Resource criteria to ensure that such resources may qualify for the exemption. The clarification adds the clause:

¹⁰¹ McBride Testimony at p. 15.

A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located;

Like the other CASPR-Related Changes, the ISO is proposing that this revision become effective 60 days from the date of this filing,¹⁰² and therefore prior to FCA 13 (which will take place in early February 2019). Nevertheless, it is important to note that an offshore wind resource seeking to utilize the RTR exemption for FCA 13 would need to receive a waiver from the Commission of the application of certain Tariff provisions in order to utilize the exemption.

The need for a waiver results from the fact that other resources that currently qualify to use the RTR exemption have taken action in accordance with the existing rules, and as a result it is not possible at this time to undo this conduct to allow another participant to utilize the exemption in a manner that is consistent with all applicable Tariff provisions.

Of particular note, as discussed above, in the event the 481 MW cap on the RTR exemption is reached, then pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a) the capacity attempting to qualify for the RTR exemption will be pro-rated. Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a) specifies that, in the event pro-ration is necessary, “the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting the Renewable Technology Resource elections.”

For FCA 13, the deadline for submitting an RTR exemption election request was October 2, 2018. At that time, the capacity that submitted requests to utilize the RTR exemption did not meet the 481 MW cap. Because the RTR cap was not reached, there was no proration for FCA 13. Resources that qualified for RTR treatment were therefore allowed under the Tariff to take additional actions *specifically* because the RTR cap was not reached. In particular, several Renewable Technology Resources were allowed to submit “composite offers” with other resources. Composite Offer submittals were due October 15, 2018 and affected the qualified capacity amounts (FCA Qualified Capacity) for participation in FCA 13. If the cap had been reached, Renewable Technology Resources *would not have been allowed* to composite with other resources (i.e., would not have been allowed to submit a composite offer), and their FCA Qualified Capacity

¹⁰² NEPOOL does not typically vote on proposed effective dates or implementation timing and did not vote on the ISO’s requested effective date for the CASPR-Related Changes, including the ISO’s requested effective date noted here for the modification to the RTR definitional language in the Tariff. Accordingly, NEPOOL has no affirmative position with respect to this requested January 29, 2019 effective date.

would have been lower.¹⁰³ Pursuant to Section III.13.1.5.A of the Tariff, resources were notified of their FCA Qualified Capacity on October 22, 2018.

Given that the ISO and participants have already taken actions based on the existing RTR cap, and because the above-referenced deadlines have passed, new resources seeking to utilize revised Section III.13.1.1.7(b) would need to seek a waiver from the Commission of Section III.13.1.2.10 of the Tariff, to address what should occur if, as a result of reliance on the revised rule, the RTR cap is reached. The ISO submits that, because other resources that have qualified for the exemption have taken action to utilize the composite offer rules that would not otherwise be available to them had proration taken place (i.e., they have submitted a composite offer, where they would not have been allowed to do so if the RTR cap had been reached),¹⁰⁴ the appropriate course of action is to apply the proration requirement *only* to new offshore wind resources located in federal waters seeking RTR treatment under the revised Section III.13.1.1.7 (b) of the Tariff. Any waiver request should clearly address this treatment.

XI. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

The CASPR-Related Changes were considered through the complete NEPOOL Participant Processes and received the support of the NEPOOL Participants Committee.

At its October 9-10, 2018 meeting, the NEPOOL Markets Committee voted to recommend that the NEPOOL Participants Committee support the revisions to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, with a 75.24% Vote in favor.¹⁰⁵ At its October 16, 2018 meeting, the NEPOOL Reliability Committee voted unanimously to recommend support for the revisions to Section III.12 of Market Rule 1. At its October 23, 2018 meeting, the NEPOOL Transmission Committee voted unanimously to recommend support for the revisions to Attachment K of the OATT.

¹⁰³ Specifically, Section III.13.1.5 (h) of the Tariff prohibits Renewable Technology Resources that have been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.10 from participating in composite offers. Moreover, under Section III.13.1.5 of the Tariff, composite offers may not be withdrawn or modified once they are submitted.

¹⁰⁴ As discussed above, for FCA 13, Renewable Technology Resources were allowed to composite with other resources because the RTR cap had not been reached. These resources were notified of their FCA Qualified Capacity on October 22, 2018, and the ISO included them in the Informational Filing submitted on November 6, 2018 (Docket No. ER19-295-000). They have submitted financial assurance to participate in FCA 13 based on the FCA Qualified Capacity value.

¹⁰⁵ The individual NEPOOL Sector votes at the October 9-10, 2018 Markets Committee meeting were Generation (8.55% in favor, 8.55% opposed, 6 abstentions), Transmission (17.10% in favor, 0% opposed, 1 abstention), Supplier (13.30% in favor, 3.80% opposed, 4 abstentions), Alternative Resources (11% in favor, 3.38% opposed, 5 abstentions), Publicly Owned Entity (8.18% in favor, 8.92% opposed), End User (17.10% in favor, 0% opposed, 6 abstentions), and Provisional (0% in favor, .11% opposed).

Following consideration and recommendation of the proposed changes by all three NEPOOL technical committees (as well as consideration by NEPOOL's Budget & Finance Subcommittee), the NEPOOL Participants Committee, at its November 2, 2018 meeting, voted to support the CASPR-Related Changes based on a show of hands, with oppositions and abstentions recorded.¹⁰⁶

XII. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations generally requires public utilities to file certain cost and other information related to an examination of traditional cost-of-service rates. However, the Tariff changes filed herewith do not modify a traditional "rate" and the ISO is not a traditional investor-owned utility. Therefore, to the extent necessary, the Filing Parties request waiver of Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations.¹⁰⁷ Notwithstanding its request for waiver, the Filing Parties submit the following additional information in substantial compliance with relevant provisions of Section 35.13 of the Commission's regulations:

35.13(b)(1) – Materials included herewith are as follows:

- This transmittal letter;
- Blacklined Tariff sections reflecting the revisions submitted in this filing;
- Clean Tariff sections reflecting the revisions submitted in this filing;
- Joint Testimony of Matthew C. Brewster and Christopher Geissler (the "Brewster-Geissler Testimony"), sponsored solely by the ISO;
- Testimony of Alan McBride (the "McBride Testimony"), sponsored solely by the ISO; and
- List of governors and utility regulatory agencies in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont to which a copy of this filing has been sent.

35.13(b)(2) – As set forth in Section I above, the ISO requests that the revisions become effective on January 29, 2019.

¹⁰⁶ During the November 2 NEPOOL Participants Committee vote, oppositions were registered by Publicly Owned Entity Sector and PSEG; and abstentions were noted by the AR Small RG Group Member, ConEd, CPV, Dominion, Great River Hydro, Industrial Energy Consumer Group, LIPA, and Maine Skiing.

¹⁰⁷ 18 C.F.R. § 35.13 (2011).

35.13(b)(3) – Pursuant to Section 17.11(e) of the Participants Agreement, Governance Participants are being served electronically rather than by paper copy. The names and addresses of the Governance Participants are posted on the ISO's website at <https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/participant-asset-listings/directory?id=1&type=committee>. A copy of this transmittal letter and the accompanying materials have also been sent to the governors and electric utility regulatory agencies for the six New England states that comprise the New England Control Area, the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, Inc., and to the New England States Committee on Electricity. Their names and addresses are shown in the attached listing. In accordance with Commission rules and practice, there is no need for the Governance Participants or the entities identified in the listing to be included on the Commission's official service list in the captioned proceeding unless such entities become intervenors in this proceeding.

35.13(b)(4) – A description of the materials submitted pursuant to this filing is contained in Section XII of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(5) – The reasons for this filing are discussed in Sections IV-X of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(6) – The ISO's approval of these changes is evidenced by this filing. These changes reflect the results of the Participant Processes required by the Participants Agreement and reflect the support of the NEPOOL Participants Committee.

35.13(b)(7) – Neither the ISO nor NEPOOL has knowledge of any relevant expenses or costs of service that have been alleged or judged in any administrative or judicial proceeding to be illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary costs that are demonstrably the product of discriminatory employment practices.

35.13(b)(8) – A form of notice and electronic media are no longer required for filings in light of the Commission's Combined Notice of Filings notice methodology.

35.13(c)(1) – The Tariff changes herein do not modify a traditional "rate," and the statement required under this Commission regulation is not applicable to the instant filing.

35.13(c)(2) – The ISO does not provide services under other rate schedules that are similar to the wholesale, resale and transmission services it provides under the Tariff.

35.13(c)(3) – No specifically assignable facilities have been or will be installed or modified in connection with the revisions filed herein.

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose

November 30, 2018

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XIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein and in the supporting testimony filed on behalf of the ISO, the Filing Parties request that the Commission accept the proposed CASPR-Related Changes to become effective on January 29, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

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EXHIBIT IA

ISO NEW ENGLAND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE POLICY

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EXHIBIT IA
ISO NEW ENGLAND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE POLICY

Overview

The procedures and requirements set forth in this ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall govern all Applicants, all Market Participants and all Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers. Capitalized terms used in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall have the meaning specified in Section I.

The purpose of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy is (i) to establish minimum criteria for participation in the New England Markets; (ii) to establish a financial assurance policy for Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers that includes commercially reasonable credit review procedures to assess the financial ability of an Applicant, a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to pay for service transactions under the Tariff and to pay its share of the ISO expenses, including amounts under Section IV of the Tariff, and including any applicable Participant Expenses; (iii) to set forth the requirements for alternative forms of security that will be deemed acceptable to the ISO and consistent with commercial practices established by the Uniform Commercial Code that protect the ISO and the Market Participants against the risk of non-payment by other, defaulting Market Participants or by Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers; (iv) to set forth the conditions under which the ISO will conduct business in a nondiscriminatory way so as to avoid the possibility of failure of payment for services rendered under the Tariff; and (v) to collect amounts past due, to collect amounts payable upon billing adjustments, to make up shortfalls in payments, to suspend Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers that fail to comply with the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, to terminate the membership of defaulting Market Participants and to terminate service to defaulting Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

I. GROUPS REGARDED AS SINGLE MARKET PARTICIPANTS

In the case of a group of Entities that are treated as a single Market Participant pursuant to Section 4.1 of the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement (the “RNA”), the group members shall be deemed to have elected to be jointly and severally liable for all debts to Market Participants, PTOs, Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, NEPOOL and the ISO of any of the group members. For the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the term “Market Participant” shall, in the case of a group of members that are treated as a single Market Participant pursuant to Section 4.1 of the RNA, be deemed to refer to the group of members as a whole, and any financial assurance provided

under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy will be credited to the account of the group member with the customer identification at the ISO.

II. MARKET PARTICIPANTS' REVIEW AND CREDIT LIMITS

Solely for purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy: a "Municipal Market Participant" is any Market Participant that is either (a) a Publicly Owned Entity except for an electric cooperative or an organization including one or more electric cooperatives as used in Section 1 of the RNA or (b) a municipality, an agency thereof, a body politic or a public corporation (i) that is created under the authority of any state or province that is adjacent to one of the New England states, (ii) that is authorized to own, lease and operate electric generation, transmission or distribution facilities and (iii) that has been approved for treatment as a Municipal Market Participant by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee. Market Participants that are not Municipal Market Participants are referred to as "Non-Municipal Market Participants."

A. Minimum Criteria for Market Participation

Any entity participating or seeking to participate in the New England Markets shall comply with the requirements of this Section II.A. For purposes of this Section II.A, the term "customer" shall refer to both Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers and the word "applicant" shall refer to both applicants for Market Participant status and applicants for transmission service from the ISO.

1. Information Disclosure

- (a) Each customer and applicant, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year) shall submit: (i) a list of Principals; (ii) a list of any material criminal or civil litigation involving the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant arising out of participation in any U.S. wholesale or retail energy market in the past five years; (iii) a list of sanctions involving the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets where such sanctions were either imposed in the past five years or, if imposed prior to that, are still in effect; (iv) a written summary of any bankruptcy, dissolution, merger or acquisition of the customer or applicant in the

preceding five years; and (v) a list of current retail and wholesale electricity markets-related operations in the United States, other than in the New England Markets. This information shall be treated as Confidential Information, but its disclosure pursuant to subsection (b) below is expressly permitted in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy. Customers and applicants may satisfy the requirements above by providing the ISO with filings made to the Securities and Exchange Commission or other similar regulatory agencies that include substantially similar information to that required above, provided, however, that the customer or applicant must clearly indicate where the specific information is located in those filings. An applicant that fails to provide this information will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this information by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the information to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.

- (b) The ISO will review the information provided pursuant to subsection (a) above, and will also review whether the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant are included on any relevant list maintained by the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control. If, based on these reviews, the ISO determines that the commencement or continued participation of such customer or applicant in the New England Markets may present an unreasonable risk to those markets or its Market Participants, the Chief Financial Officer of the ISO shall promptly forward to the Participants Committee or its delegate, for its input, such concerns, together with such background materials deemed by the ISO to be necessary for the Participants Committee or its delegate to develop an informed opinion with respect to the identified concerns, including any measures that the ISO may recommend imposing as a condition to the commencement or continued participation in the markets by such customer or applicant (including suspension) or the ISO's recommendation to prohibit or terminate participation by the customer or applicant in the New England Markets. The ISO shall consider the input of the Participants Committee or its delegate before taking any action to address the identified concerns. If the ISO chooses to impose measures other than prohibition (in the case of an applicant) or termination (in the case of a customer) of participation in the New England Markets,

then the ISO shall be required to make an informational filing with the Commission as soon as reasonably practicable after taking such action. If the ISO chooses to prohibit (in the case of an applicant) or terminate (in the case of a customer) participation in the New England Markets, then the ISO must file for Commission approval of such action, and the prohibition or termination shall become effective only upon final Commission ruling. No action by the ISO pursuant to this subsection (b) shall limit in any way the ISO's rights or authority under any other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy.

2. Risk Management

- (a) Each customer and applicant shall submit, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year), a certificate in the form of Attachment 3 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy stating that the customer or applicant has: (i) either established or contracted for risk management procedures that are applicable to participation in the New England Markets; and (ii) has established or contracted for appropriate training of relevant personnel that is applicable to its participation in the New England Markets. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer or applicant by a Senior Officer of the customer or applicant and must be notarized. An applicant that fails to provide this certificate will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this certificate by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.
- (b) Each applicant prior to commencing activity in the FTR market shall submit to the ISO or its designee the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls applicable to its participation in the FTR market relied upon by the Senior Officer of the applicant signing the certificate provided pursuant to Section II.A.2 (a). On an annual basis (by April 30 each year), each customer with FTR transactions in any currently open month that exceed 1,000 MW per month shall submit to the ISO or its designee a certificate in the form of Attachment 5 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy stating

that, since the customer's delivery of its risk management policies, procedures, and controls or its last certificate pursuant to this Section II.A.2(b), the customer either: (i) has not made any changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls; or (ii) that changes have been made to the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls and that all such changes are clearly identified and attached to such certificate. If any such applicant fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the FTR market. If any such customer fails to provide a certificate in the form of Attachment 5 by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer, and if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within two Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B.3.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) from entering into any future transactions in the FTR system.

The ISO, at its sole discretion, may also require any applicant or customer to submit to the ISO or its designee the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls that are applicable to its participation in the New England Markets relied upon by the Senior Officer of the applicant or customer signing the certificate provided pursuant to Section II.A.2(a). The ISO may require such submissions based on identified risk factors that include, but are not limited to, the markets in which the customer is transacting or the applicant seeks to transact, the magnitude of the customer's transactions or the applicant's potential transactions, or the volume of the customer's open positions. Where the ISO notifies an applicant or customer that such a submission is required, the submission shall be due within 5 Business Days of the notice. If an applicant fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls as required, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets. If a customer fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer, and if the customer fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls to the ISO or its designee within two Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

The applicant's or customer's written policies, procedures, and controls received by the ISO or its designee pursuant to this subsection (b) shall be treated as Confidential Information.

- (c) Where an applicant or customer submits risk management policies, procedures, and controls to the ISO or its designee pursuant to any provision of subsection (b) above, the ISO or its designee shall assess that those policies, procedures, and controls conform to prudent risk management practices, which include, but are not limited to: (i) addressing market, credit, and operational risk; (ii) segregating roles, responsibilities, and functions in the organization; (iii) establishing delegations of authority that specify which transactions traders are authorized to enter into; (iv) ensuring that traders have sufficient training in systems and the markets in which they transact; (v) placing risk limits to control exposure; (vi) requiring reports to ensure that risks are adequately communicated throughout the organization; (vii) establishing processes for independent confirmation of executed transactions; and (viii) establishing periodic valuation or mark-to-market of risk positions as appropriate.

Where, as a result of the assessment described above in this subsection (c), the ISO or its designee believes that the applicant's or customer's written policies, procedures, and controls do not conform to prudent risk management practices, then the ISO or its designee shall provide notice to the applicant or customer explaining the deficiencies. The applicant or customer shall revise its policies, procedures, and controls to address the deficiencies within 55 days after issuance of such notice. (If April 30 falls within that 55 day window, the ISO may choose not to require a separate submission on April 30 as described in subsection (b) above.) If an applicant's revised written policies, procedures, and controls do not adequately address the deficiencies identified in the notice, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets. If a customer's revised written policies, procedures, and controls do not adequately address the deficiencies identified in the notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

3. Communications

Each customer and applicant shall submit, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year), a certificate in the form of Attachment 3 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance

Policy stating that the customer or applicant has either established or contracted to establish procedures to effectively communicate with and respond to the ISO with respect to matters relating to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such procedures must ensure, at a minimum, that at least one person with the ability and authority to address matters related to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy on behalf of the customer or applicant, including the ability and authority to respond to requests for information and to arrange for additional financial assurance as necessary, is available from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on Business Days. Such procedures must also ensure that the ISO is kept informed about the current contact information (including phone numbers and e-mail addresses) for the person or people described above. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer or applicant by a Senior Officer of the customer or applicant and must be notarized. An applicant that fails to provide this certificate will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this certificate by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.

4. Capitalization

- (a) To be deemed as meeting the capitalization requirements, a customer or applicant shall either:
 - (i) be Rated and have a Governing Rating that is an Investment Grade Rating of BBB-/Baa3 or higher;
 - (ii) maintain a minimum Tangible Net Worth of one million dollars; or
 - (iii) maintain a minimum of ten million dollars in total assets, provided that, to meet this requirement, a customer or applicant may supplement total assets of less than ten million dollars with additional financial assurance in an amount equal to the difference between ten million dollars and the customer's or applicant's total assets in one of the forms described in Section X (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(a) shall not be counted toward

satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

- (b) Any customer or applicant that fails to meet these capitalization requirements will be suspended (as described in Section III.B.3.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) from entering into any future transactions of a duration greater than one month in the FTR system. Such a customer or applicant may enter into future transaction of a duration of one month or less in the FTR system. Any customer or applicant that fails to meet these capitalization requirements shall provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy equal to 25 percent of the customer's or applicant's FTR Financial Assurance Requirements. Any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(b) shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
- (c) For markets other than the FTR market:
 - (i) Where a customer or applicant fails to meet the capitalization requirements, the customer or applicant will be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy in an amount equal to 25 percent of the customer's or applicant's total financial assurance requirement (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements).
 - (ii) An applicant that fails to provide the full amount of additional financial assurance required as described in subsection (i) above will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. For a customer, failure to provide the full amount of additional financial assurance required as described in subsection (i) above will have the same effect and will trigger the same consequences as exceeding the "100 Percent Test" as described in Section III.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
 - (iii) Any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(c) shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

5. Additional Eligibility Requirements

All customers and applicants shall at all times be:

- (a) An “appropriate person,” as defined in sections 4(c)(3)(A) through (J) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.*);
- (b) An “eligible contract participant,” as defined in section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act and in 17 CFR § 1.3(m); or
- (c) A “person who actively participates in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy,” as defined in the Final Order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission published at 78 FR 19880 (April 2, 2013).

Each customer must demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 by submitting to the ISO on or before September 15, 2013 a certificate in the form of Attachment 4 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that (i) certifies that the customer is now and in good faith will seek to remain in compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 and (ii) further certifies that if it no longer satisfies these requirements it shall immediately notify the ISO in writing and shall immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets. If the customer is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F) of the Commodity Exchange Act, it shall accompany the certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the customer’s total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer by a Senior Officer of the customer and must be notarized. A customer that fails to provide this certificate by September 15, 2013 shall be immediately suspended and the ISO shall initiate termination proceedings against the customer.

Each applicant must submit with its membership application a certificate in the form of Attachment 4 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that (i) certifies that

the applicant is now and in good faith will seek to remain in compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 and (ii) further certifies that if it no longer satisfies these requirements it shall immediately notify the ISO in writing and shall immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets. If the applicant is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F) of the Commodity Exchange Act, it shall accompany the certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the applicant's total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the applicant by a Senior Officer of the applicant and must be notarized.

The ISO, at its sole discretion, may require any applicant or customer to submit to the ISO documentation in support of the certification provided pursuant to this Section II.A.5. If at any time the ISO becomes aware that a customer no longer satisfies the requirements of this Section II.A.5, the customer shall be immediately suspended and the ISO shall initiate termination proceedings against the customer.

B. Proof of Financial Viability for Applicants

Each Applicant must, with its membership application and at its own expense, submit proof of financial viability, as described below, satisfying the ISO requirements to demonstrate the Applicant's ability to meet its obligations. Each Applicant that intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or a Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 under Section II.D or Section II.E below must submit to the ISO all current rating agency reports from Standard and Poor's ("S&P"), Moody's and/or Fitch (collectively, the "Rating Agencies"). Each Applicant, whether or not it intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0, must submit to the ISO audited financial statements for the two most recent years, or the period of its existence, if less than two years, and unaudited financial statements for its last concluded fiscal quarter if they are not included in such audited annual financial statements. These unaudited statements must be certified as to their accuracy by a Senior Officer of such Applicant, which, for purposes of ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher,

or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer. These audited and unaudited statements must include in each case, but are not limited to, the following information to the extent available: balance sheets, income statements, statements of cash flows and notes to financial statements, annual and quarterly reports, and 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K Reports. If any of these financial statements are available on the internet, the Applicant may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such statement may be located and retrieved. If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO, at the ISO's sole discretion (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; or (iii) compiled statements).

In addition, each Applicant, whether or not it intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or a Transmission Credit Limit, must submit to the ISO: (i) at least one (1) bank reference and three (3) utility company credit references, or in those cases where an Applicant does not have three (3) utility company credit references, three (3) major trade payable vendor references may be substituted; and (ii) relevant information as to any known or anticipated material lawsuits, as well as any prior bankruptcy declarations by the Applicant, or by its predecessor(s), if any; and (iii) a completed ISO credit application. In the case of certain Applicants, some of the information and documentation described in items (i) and (ii) of the immediately preceding sentence may not be applicable or available, and alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO or its designee in its sole discretion.

The ISO will not begin its review of a Market Participant's credit application or the accompanying material described above until full and final payment of that Market Participant's application fee.

The ISO shall prepare a report, or cause a report to be prepared, concerning the financial viability of each Applicant. In its review of each Applicant, the ISO or its designee shall consider all of the information and documentation described in this Section II. All costs

incurred by the ISO in its review of the financial viability of an Applicant shall be borne by such Applicant and paid at the time that such Applicant is required to pay its first annual fee under the Participants Agreement. For an Applicant applying for transmission service from the ISO, all costs incurred by the ISO shall be paid prior to the ISO's filing of a Transmission Service Agreement. The report shall be provided to the Participants Committee or its designee and the affected Applicant within three weeks of the ISO's receipt of that Applicant's completed application, application fee, and Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement, unless the ISO notifies the Applicant that more time is needed to perform additional due diligence with respect to its application.

C. Ongoing Review and Credit Ratings

1. Rated and Credit Qualifying Market Participants

A Market Participant that (i) has a corporate rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (ii) has senior unsecured debt that is rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies, is referred to herein as "Rated." A Market Participant that is not Rated is referred to herein as "Unrated."

For all purposes in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, for a Market Participant that is Rated, the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant's senior unsecured debt, shall be the "Governing Rating."

A Market Participant that is: (i) Rated and whose Governing Rating is an Investment Grade Rating; or (ii) Unrated and that satisfies the Credit Threshold is referred to herein as "Credit Qualifying." A Market Participant that is not Credit Qualifying is referred to herein as "Non-Qualifying."

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, "Investment Grade Rating" for a Market Participant (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the

Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

2. Unrated Market Participants

Any Unrated Market Participant that (i) has not been a Market Participant in the ISO for at least the immediately preceding 365 days; or (ii) has defaulted on any of its obligations under the Tariff (including without limitation its obligations hereunder and under the ISO New England Billing Policy) during such 365-day period; or (iii) is an FTR-Only Customer; or (iv) does not have a Current Ratio of at least 1.0, a Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio of 0.6 or less, and an EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio of at least 2.0 must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section X below. An Unrated Market Participant that does not meet any of the conditions in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of this paragraph is referred to herein as satisfying the "Credit Threshold."

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, "Current Ratio" on any date is all of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO; "Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio" on any date is a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders' equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO; and "EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio" on any date is a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO. The "Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio" will not be considered for purposes of determining whether a Municipal Market Participant satisfies the Credit Threshold. Each of the ratios described in this paragraph shall be determined in accordance with international

accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States at the time of determination consistently applied.

3. Information Reporting Requirements for Market Participants

Each Market Participant having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis within 10 days of its becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Market Participant, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth. Unrated Market Participants having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero shall also provide additional financial statements, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to calculate such Unrated Market Participant's Current Ratio, Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio and EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio. In addition, each Market Participant having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of their becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Market Participant, balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available, then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). If any of this financial information is available on the internet, the Market Participant may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such information may be located and retrieved. If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; (iii) compiled statements; (iv) internally prepared statements; or (v) tax returns).

Except in the case of a Market Participant or Unrated Market Participant that submits audited financial statements to the ISO, financial statements submitted to the ISO pursuant to this Section II.C.3 shall be accompanied by a written statement from a Senior Officer of the Market Participant or Unrated Market Participant certifying the accuracy of those financial statements. If an attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then the written statement shall indicate the level of attestation made; if no attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then no such indication is required.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the ISO may require any Market Participant to submit the financial statements and other information described in this subsection. The Market Participant shall provide the requested statements and other information within 10 days of such request. If a Market Participant fails to provide financial statements or other information as requested and the ISO determines that the Market Participant poses an unreasonable risk to the New England Markets, then the ISO may request that the Market Participant provide additional financial assurance in an amount no greater than \$10 million, or take other measures to substantiate the Market Participant's ability to safely transact in the New England Markets (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.C.3 shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy). If the Market Participant fails to comply with such a request from the ISO, then the ISO may issue a notice of suspension or termination to the Market Participant. If the Market Participant fails to comply with the ISO's request within 5 Business Days from the date of issuance of the notice of suspension or termination, then the ISO may suspend or terminate the Market Participant.

A Market Participant may choose not to submit financial statements as described in this Section II.C.3, in which case the ISO shall use a value of \$0.00 for the Market Participant's total assets and Tangible Net Worth for purposes of the capitalization assessment described in Section II.A.4(a) and such Market Participant's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall be \$0.00.

A Market Participant may choose to provide additional financial assurance in an amount equal to \$10 million in lieu of providing financial statements under this Section II.C.3.

Such amount shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but shall be sufficient to meet the capitalization requirements in Section II.A.4(a)(iii).

D. Market Credit Limits

A credit limit for a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements (a "Market Credit Limit") shall be established for each Market Participant in accordance with this Section II.D.

1. Market Credit Limit for Non-Municipal Market Participants

A "Market Credit Limit" shall be established for each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant in accordance with subsection (a) below, and a Market Credit Limit shall be established for each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant in accordance with subsection (b) below.

a. Market Credit Limit for Rated Non-Municipal Market Participants

As reflected in the following table, the Market Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant (other than an FTR-Only Customer) shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table, (ii) \$50 million, or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers ("TADO").

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody's	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%

A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

An entity's "Tangible Net Worth" for purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy on any date is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity's assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity's intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

b. Market Credit Limit for Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participants

The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth, (ii) \$25 million or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of TADO. The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that does not satisfy the Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

2. Market Credit Limit for Municipal Market Participants

The Market Credit Limit for each Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be equal to the lesser of (i) 20 percent (20%) of TADO and (ii) \$25 million. The Market Credit Limit for each Non-Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be \$0. The sum

of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million.

E. Transmission Credit Limits

A “Transmission Credit Limit” shall be established for each Market Participant in accordance with this Section II.E, which Transmission Credit Limit shall apply in accordance with this Section II.E. A Transmission Credit Limit may not be used to meet FTR Financial Assurance Requirements.

1. Transmission Credit Limit for Rated Non-Municipal Market Participants

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant’s Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table or (ii) \$50 million:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody’s	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

2. Transmission Credit Limit for Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant’s Tangible Net

Worth or (ii) \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that does not satisfy the Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

3. Transmission Credit Limit for Municipal Market Participants

The Transmission Credit Limit for each Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be equal to \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit for each Non-Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be \$0. The sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million.

F. Credit Limits for FTR-Only Customers

The Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit of each FTR-Only Customer shall be \$0.

G. Total Credit Limit

The sum of a Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall not exceed \$50 million and the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million. No later than five Business Days prior to the first day of each calendar quarter, and no later than five Business Days after any Affiliate change, each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant that has a Market Credit Limit and a Transmission Credit Limit shall determine the amounts to be allocated to its Market Credit Limit (up to the limit set forth in Section II.D.1.a above) and its Transmission Credit Limit (up to the limit set forth in Section II.E.1 above) such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and its Transmission Credit Limit are equal to not more than \$50 million and such that the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates do not exceed \$50 million and shall provide the ISO with that determination in writing. Each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant may provide such determination for up to four consecutive calendar quarters. If a Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant does not provide such determination, then the ISO shall use the amounts provided for the previous calendar quarter. If no such determination is provided, then the ISO shall apply an allocation of \$25 million each to the Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit, which values shall also be used in allocating the \$50 million credit limit among Affiliates. If the sum of the amounts for Affiliates is greater than \$50 million, then the ISO shall reduce the amounts (proportionally to the amounts provided by each Affiliate,

or to the allocation applied by the ISO in the case of an Affiliate that provided no determination) such that the sum is no greater than \$50 million.

III. MARKET PARTICIPANTS' REQUIREMENTS

Each Market Participant that provides the ISO with financial assurance pursuant to this Section III must provide the ISO with financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below and in an amount equal to the amount required in order to avoid suspension under Section III.B below (the "Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement"). A Market Participant's Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement shall remain in effect as provided herein until the later of (a) 120 days after termination of the Market Participant's membership or (b) the end date of all FTRs awarded to the Market Participant and the final satisfaction of all obligations of the Market Participant providing that financial assurance; provided, however that financial assurances required by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy related to potential billing adjustments chargeable to a terminated Market Participant shall remain in effect until such billing adjustment request is finally resolved in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Billing Policy. Furthermore and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (i) any portion of any financial assurance provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that relates to a Disputed Amount shall not be terminated or returned prior to the resolution of such dispute, even if the Market Participant providing such financial assurance is terminated or voluntarily terminates its MPSA and otherwise satisfies all of its obligations to the ISO and (ii) the ISO shall not return or permit the termination of any financial assurance provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy by a Market Participant that has terminated its membership or been terminated to the extent that the ISO determines in its reasonable discretion that that financial assurance will be required under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy with respect to an unsettled liability or obligation owing from that Market Participant.

A Market Participant that knows that it is not satisfying its Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement shall notify the ISO immediately of that fact.

A. Determination of Financial Assurance Obligations

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy:

- (i) a Market Participant's "Hourly Requirements" at any time will be the sum of (x) the Hourly Charges for such Market Participant that have been invoiced but not paid (which amount shall not be less than \$0), plus (y) the Hourly Charges for such Market

Participant that have been settled but not invoiced, plus (z) the Hourly Charges for such Market Participant that have been cleared but not settled which amount shall be calculated by the Hourly Charges Estimator. The Hourly Charges Estimator (which amount shall not be less than \$0) shall be determined by the following formula:

$$\text{Hourly Charges Estimator} = \sum_{i=t-n+1}^t \text{HC}_i \times \text{LMP ratio} \times 1.15$$

Where:

- t = The last day that such Market Participant's Hourly Charges are fully settled;
- n = The number of days that such Market Participant's Day-Ahead Energy has been cleared but not settled;
- HC = The Hourly Charges for such Market Participant for a fully settled day; and
- LMP ratio = The average Day-Ahead Prices at the New England Hub over the period of cleared but not settled n days divided by the average Day-Ahead Prices at the New England Hub over the period of most recent fully settled n days. For purposes of this Section III.A.(i), the "New England Hub" shall mean the Hub located in Western and Central Massachusetts referred to as .H.INTERNAL_HUB;

- (ii) a Market Participant's "Non-Hourly Requirements" at any time will be determined by averaging that Market Participant's Non-Hourly Charges but not include: (A) the amount due from or to such Market Participant for FTR transactions, (B) any amounts due from such Market Participant for capacity transactions, (C) any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA, (D) any amounts due for NEPOOL GIS API Fees, and (E) the amount of any Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (including the annual true-up of that amount) due from such Market Participant) over the two most recently invoiced calendar months; provided that such Non-Hourly Requirements shall in no event be less than zero;
- (iii) a Market Participant's "Transmission Requirements" at any time will be determined by averaging that Market Participant's Transmission Charges over the two most recently

invoiced calendar months; provided that such Transmission Requirements shall in no event be less than \$0.

- (iv) a Market Participant's Virtual Requirements at any time will equal the amount of all unsettled Increment Offers and Decrement Bids submitted by such Market Participant at such time (which amount of unsettled Increment Offers and Decrement Bids will be calculated by the ISO according to a methodology approved from time to time by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and posted on the ISO's website);
- (v) a Market Participant's "Financial Assurance Obligations" at any time will be equal to the sum at such time of:
 - a. such Market Participant's Hourly Requirements; plus
 - b. such Market Participant's Virtual Requirements; plus
 - c. such Market Participant's Non-Hourly Requirements times 2.5-0 (subject to Section X.D with respect to Provisional Members); plus
 - d. such Market Participant's "FTR Financial Assurance Requirements" under Section VI below; plus
 - e. such Market Participant's "FCM Financial Assurance Requirements" under Section VII below; plus
 - f. the amount of any Disputed Amounts received by such Market Participant; and
- (vi) a Market Participant's "Transmission Obligations" at any time will be such Market Participant's Transmission Requirements times 2.50.

To the extent that the calculations of the components of a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations as described above produce positive and negative values, such components may offset each other; provided, however, that a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations shall never be less than zero.

B. Credit Test Calculations and Allocation of Financial Assurance, Notice and Suspension from the New England Markets

1. Credit Test Calculations and Allocation of Financial Assurance

The financial assurance provided by a Market Participant shall be applied as described in this Section.

- (a) “Market Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) divided by the sum of its Market Credit Limit and any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (b) “FTR Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s FTR Financial Assurance Requirements divided by any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (c) “Transmission Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s Transmission Obligations divided by the sum of its Transmission Credit Limit and any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (d) A Market Participant’s financial assurance shall be allocated as follows:
 - (i) financial assurance shall be first allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s Market Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (ii) any financial assurance that remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (i) shall be allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (iii) any financial assurance that remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (ii) shall be allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s Transmission Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (iv) if any financial assurance remains after the allocations described in subsection (d) (iii), then that remaining financial assurance shall be allocated by repeating the steps described in subsections (d) (i), (d) (ii), and (d) (iii) to ensure that the respective test percentages are no greater than 89.99%;
 - (v) if any financial assurance remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (iv), then that remaining financial assurance shall be allocated by repeating the steps described in subsections (d) (i), (d) (ii), and (d) (iii) to ensure that the respective test percentages are no greater than 79.99%;
 - (vi) any financial assurance that remains after the allocations described in subsection (d) (v) shall be allocated to the Market Credit Test Percentage.

2. Notices

a. 80 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%), the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant.

b. 90 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 90 percent (90%) , then, in addition to the actions to be taken when the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%), the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant. The ISO shall also issue a 90 percent (90%) notice to a Market Participant and take certain other actions under the circumstances described in Section III.B.2.c below.

c. 100 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) or when the sum of the financial assurance and credit limits of a Market Participant that has financial assurance requirements equal zero, then, in addition to the actions to be taken when the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%) and 90 percent (90%), (i) the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant, (ii) that Market Participant shall be immediately suspended from submitting Increment Offers and Decrement Bids until such time when its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are less than or equal to 100 percent (100%), and (iii) if sufficient financial assurance to lower the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 100 percent (100%) or, in the case of a Market Participant that has received one to five notices that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) in the previous 365 days (not including the instant notice), sufficient financial assurance to lower such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 90 percent (90%), is not provided by 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time on the next Business Day, (a)

the event shall be a Financial Assurance Default; (b) the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant, to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, to all members and alternates of the Participants Committee, to the New England governors and utility regulatory agencies and to the billing and credit contacts for all Market Participants, and (c) such Market Participant shall be suspended from: (1) the New England Markets, as provided below; (2) receiving transmission service under any existing or pending arrangements under the Tariff or scheduling any future transmission service under the Tariff; (3) voting on matters before the Participants Committee and NEPOOL Technical Committees; (4) entering into any future transactions in the FTR system; and (5) submitting an offer of Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or any reconfiguration auction in the Forward Capacity Market, in each case until such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are at 100 percent (100%) or less. In addition to all of the provisions above, any Market Participant that has received six or more notices in the previous 365 days that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) shall receive a notice thereof and shall be required to maintain sufficient financial assurance to keep such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage at less than or equal to 90 percent (90%). If such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 90 percent (90%), the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to such Market Participant. If sufficient financial assurance to lower such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 90 percent (90%) is not provided by 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time on the next Business Day, then the consequences described in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section III.B.2.c (iii) above shall apply until such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are at 90 percent (90%) or less.

However, when a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) or 90 percent (90%), as applicable under this Section III.B.2.c, solely because its Investment Grade Rating is downgraded by one grade and the resulting grade is BBB-/Baa3 or

higher, then (x) for five Business Days after such downgrade, such downgrade shall not by itself cause a change to such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage and (y) no notice shall be sent and none of the other actions described in this Section III.B shall occur with respect to such downgrade if such Market Participant cures such default within such five Business Day period. When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent solely because a letter of credit is valued at \$0 prior to the termination of that letter of credit, as described in Section X.B, then the ISO, in its sole discretion, may determine that: (x) for five Business Days after such change in the valuation of the letter of credit, such valuation shall not by itself cause a change to such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage; and/or (y) no notice shall be sent and none of the other actions described in this Section III.B shall occur with respect to such valuation if such Market Participant cures such default within such five Business Day period.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Participant shall neither (x) receive a notice that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) nor (y) be suspended under this Section III.B if (i) the amount of financial assurance necessary for that Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to get to 100 percent (100%) or lower is less than \$1,000 or (ii) that Market Participant's status with the ISO has been terminated.

3. Suspension from the New England Markets

a. General

The suspension of a Market Participant, and any resulting annulment, termination or removal of OASIS reservations, removal from the settlement system and the FTR system, suspension of the ability to offer Non-Commercial Capacity or participate in a substitution auction in the Forward Capacity Market, drawing down of financial assurance, rejection of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids, and rejection of bilateral transactions submitted to the ISO, shall not limit, in any way, the ISO's right to invoice or collect payment for any amounts owed (whether such amounts are due or becoming

due) by such suspended Market Participant under the Tariff or the ISO's right to administratively submit a bid or offer of a Market Participant's Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or any reconfiguration auction or to make other adjustments under Market Rule 1.

In addition to the notices provided herein, the ISO will provide any additional information required under the ISO New England Information Policy.

Each notice issued by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.B shall indicate whether the subject Market Participant has a registered load asset. If the ISO has issued a notice pursuant to this Section III.B and subsequently the subject Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are equal to or less than 100 percent (100%), such Market Participant may request the ISO to issue a notice stating such fact. However, the ISO shall not be obligated to issue such a notice unless, in its sole discretion, the ISO concludes that such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are equal to or less than 100 percent (100%).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 90 percent (90%) as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a notice will not be issued.

If a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the

ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a notice will be issued only to such Market Participant, and such Market Participant shall be “suspended” as described below.

Any such suspension as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by a Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, shall take effect immediately upon submission of such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions to remain in effect until such Market Participant is in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, notwithstanding any provision of this Section III.B to the contrary.

If a Market Participant is suspended from the New England Markets in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy, then the provisions of this Section III.B shall control notwithstanding any other provision of the Tariff to the contrary. A suspended Market Participant shall have no ability so long as it is suspended (i) to be reflected in the ISO’s settlement system, including any bilateral transactions, as either a purchaser or a seller of any products or services sold through the New England Markets (other than (A) Commercial Capacity and (B) Non-Commercial Capacity during the Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period) that cause such suspended Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO’s settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the Market Participants, (ii) to submit Demand Bids, Decrement Bids or Increment Offers in the New England Markets, ~~or~~ (iii) to submit offers for Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction or acquire Non-Commercial Capacity through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, or (iv) to submit supply offers or demand bids in any Forward Capacity Market substitution auction. Any transactions, including bilateral transactions with a suspended Market Participant (other than transactions for (A) Commercial Capacity and (B) Non-Commercial Capacity during the Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period) that cause such suspended Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO’s settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the other Market Participants and any Demand Bids, Decrement Bids, Increment Offers, and Export Transactions submitted by a suspended Market Participant shall be deemed to be terminated for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market clearing and the ISO’s settlement system. If a Market Participant has provided the financial

assurance required for a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, then that Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, respectively, will not be deemed to be terminated when that Market Participant is suspended.

b. Load Assets

Any load asset registered to a suspended Market Participant shall be terminated, and the obligation to serve the load associated with such load asset shall be assigned to the relevant unmetered load asset(s) unless and until the host Market Participant for such load assigns the obligation to serve such load to another asset. If the suspended Market Participant is responsible for serving an unmetered load asset, such suspended Market Participant shall retain the obligation to serve such unmetered load asset. If a suspended Market Participant has an ownership share of a load asset, such ownership share shall revert to the Market Participant that assigned such ownership share to such suspended Market Participant. If a suspended Market Participant has the obligation under the Tariff or otherwise to offer any of its supply or to bid any pumping load to provide products or services sold through the New England Markets, that obligation shall continue, but only in Real-Time, notwithstanding the Market Participant's suspension, and such offer or bid, if cleared under the Tariff, shall be effective.

c. FTRs

If a Market Participant is suspended from entering into future transactions in the FTR system, such Market Participant shall retain all FTRs held by it but shall be prohibited from acquiring any additional FTRs during the course of its suspension. It is intended that any suspension under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy will occur promptly, and the definitive timing of any such suspension shall be determined by the ISO from time to time as reported to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, and shall be posted on the ISO website.

d. Virtual Transactions

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Market Participant is suspended in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, then such suspension shall be limited to (i) the immediate "last in, first out" rejection of pending individual uncleared Increment Offers and Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant (it

being understood that Increment Offers and Decrement Bids are batched by the ISO in accordance with the time, and that Increment Offers and Decrement Bids will be rejected by the batch); and (ii) the suspension of that Market Participant's ability to submit additional Increment Offers and Decrement Bids unless and until it has complied with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, and the determination of compliance for these purposes will take into account the level of aggregate outstanding obligations of that Market Participant after giving effect to the immediate rejection of that Market Participant's Increment Offers and Decrement Bids described in clause (i).

e. Bilateral Transactions

If the sum of the financial assurance and credit limits of a Market Participant that has financial assurance requirements equals zero and that Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but for the submission of bilateral transactions to the ISO to which the Market Participant is a party, or if a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent as a result of one or more bilateral transactions submitted to the ISO to which the Market Participant is a party, then the consequences described in subsection (a) above shall be limited to: (i) rejection of any pending bilateral transactions to which a Market Participant is a party that cause the Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO's settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the Market Participants, such that the aggregate value of the pending bilateral transactions submitted by all Market Participants is maximized (recognizing the downstream effect that rejection of a bilateral transaction may have on the Market Credit Test Percentages, FTR Credit Test Percentages, or Transmission Credit Test Percentages of other Market Participants), while ensuring that the financial assurance requirements of each Market Participant are satisfied; and (ii) suspension of that Market Participant's ability to submit additional bilateral transactions until it has complied with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (the determination of compliance for these purposes will take into account the level of aggregate outstanding obligations of the Market Participant after giving effect to the immediate rejection of the bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party as described in clause (i) above). In the case of a bilateral transaction associated with the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the ISO will provide notice to a Market Participant that would be in default of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as a result of the bilateral transaction, and the consequences described in clauses (i) and (ii) above shall only apply if the

Market Participant fails to cure its default by 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time of that same Business Day. In the case of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the consequences described in clauses (i) and (ii) above shall apply if the Market Participant does not cure its default within one Business Day after notification that a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral caused the default. Bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations and Supplemental Availability Bilaterals are not subject to the provisions of this Section III.B.3(e).

4. Serial Notice and Suspension Penalties

If either (x) a Market Participant is suspended from the New England Markets because of a failure to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirements in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (y) a Market Participant receives more than five notices that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) in any rolling 365-day period, then such Market Participant shall pay a \$1,000 penalty for such suspension and for each notice after the fifth notice in a rolling 365-day period. If a Market Participant receives a notice that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) in the same day, then only one of those notices will count towards the five notice limit. All penalties paid under this paragraph shall be deposited in the Late Payment Account maintained under the ISO New England Billing Policy.

C. Additional Financial Assurance Requirements for Certain Municipal Market Participants

Notwithstanding the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and in addition to the other obligations hereunder, a Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant that is not a municipality (which, for purposes of this Section III.C, does not include an agency or subdivision of a municipality) must provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below in an amount equal to its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements at the time of calculation, unless either: (1) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant has a corporate Investment Grade Rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies; or (2) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant has an Investment Grade Rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies for all of its rated indebtedness; or (3) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market

Participant provides the ISO with an opinion of counsel that is acceptable to the ISO confirming that amounts due to the ISO under the Tariff have priority over, or have equal priority with, payments due on the debt on which the Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant's Investment Grade Rating is based. Each legal opinion provided under clause (3) of this Section III.C will be updated no sooner than 60 days and no later than 30 days before each reconfiguration auction that precedes a Capacity Commitment Period to which such legal opinion relates, and if that update is not provided or that update is not acceptable to the ISO, the applicable Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant must either satisfy one of the other clauses of this Section III.C or provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below in an amount equal to its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements at the time of calculation.

IV. CERTAIN NEW AND RETURNING MARKET PARTICIPANTS REQUIREMENTS

A new Market Participant or a Market Participant other than an FTR-Only Customer, or a Governance Only Member whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months (a "Returning Market Participant") is required to provide the ISO, for three months in the case of a new Market Participant and six months in the case of a Returning Market Participant, financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below equal to any amount of additional financial assurance required to meet the capitalization requirements described in Section II.A.4 plus the greater of (a) its Financial Assurance Requirement or (b) its "Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement." A new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement must be provided to the ISO no later than one Business Day before commencing activity in the New England Markets or commencing transmission service under the Tariff, and shall be determined by the following formula:

$$FAR = G + T + L + E$$

Where FAR is the Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement and G, T, L and E are determined by the following formulas:

$$G = (MW_g \times Hr_{DA} \times D \times 3.25) + (MW_g \times Hr_{MIS} \times S_2 \times 3.25);$$

Where:

$MW_g =$	Total nameplate capacity of the Market Participant's generation units that have achieved commercial operation;
$Hr_{DA} =$	The number of hours of generation that any such generation unit could be bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market before it could be removed if such unit tripped, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;
$D =$	The maximum observed differential between Energy prices in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets during the prior calendar year ("Maximum Energy Price Differential"), as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;
$Hr_{MIS} =$	The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial Market Information Server ("MIS") settlement reports including projected generation activity for such units, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion; and
$S_2 =$	The per MW amount assessed pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of this Tariff, as determined by the ISO.
$T =$	$MW_t \times Hr_{MIS} \times (D + S_{2-3}) \times 3.25;$

Where: MW_t = Number of MWs to be traded in the New England Markets as reasonably projected by the new Market Participant or the Returning Market Participant;

Hr_{MIS} = The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial MIS settlement reports including projected generation activity, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

D = Maximum Energy Price Differential; and

S_{2-3} = The per MWh amount assessed pursuant to Schedules 2 and 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, as determined annually by the ISO.

$$L = (MW_1 \times LF \times Hr_{MIS} \times (EP + S_{2-3}) \times 3.25) + (MW_1 \times Hr_{MIS} \times TC \times 3.25)$$

Where:

MW_1 = MWs of Real-Time Load Obligation (as defined in Market Rule 1) of the new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant;

LF = Average load factor in New England, as determined annually by the ISO in its sole discretion;

Hr_{MIS} = The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial MIS settlement reports including projected generation activity, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

EP = The average price of Energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the most recent calendar year for which information is available from the Annual Reports published by the ISO, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

S_{2-3} = The per MW amount assessed pursuant to Schedules 2 and 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, as determined annually by the ISO; and

TC = The hourly transmission charges per MW_1 assessed under the Tariff (other than Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of Section II of the Tariff), as determined annually by the ISO.

$$E = (SE) \times 3.25$$

Where:

SE = Average monthly share of Participant Expenses for the applicable Sector.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV is 80 percent or more of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test

Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equaled or exceeded 80 percent (80%) under Section III.B above.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV is 90 percent or more of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equaled or exceeded 90 percent (90%) under Section III.B above.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV exceeds 100 percent of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeded 100 percent (100%) under Section III.B above.

V. NON-MARKET PARTICIPANT TRANSMISSION CUSTOMERS REQUIREMENTS

A. Ongoing Financial Review and Credit Ratings

1. Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and Transmission Customers

Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not currently have an Investment Grade Rating must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section X below.

2. Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Any Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that (i) has defaulted on any of its obligations under the Tariff (including without limitation its obligations hereunder and under the ISO New England Billing Policy) during the immediately preceding 365-day period; or (ii) does not have a Current Ratio of at least 1.0, a Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio of 0.6 or less, and an EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio of at least 2.0 must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section

X below. An Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not meet either of the conditions described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this paragraph is referred to herein as satisfying the “NMPTC Credit Threshold.”

B. NMPTC Credit Limits

1. NMPTC Market Credit Limit

A Market Credit Limit shall be established for each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer as set forth in this Section V.B.1.

The Market Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall at any time be equal to the least of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s Tangible Net Worth (as reflected in the following table); (ii) \$50 million; or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of TADO:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody’s	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the least of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s Tangible Net Worth, (ii) \$25 million or (iii) 20 percent (20%)

of TADO. The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not satisfy the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

2. NMPTC Transmission Credit Limit

A Transmission Credit Limit shall be established for each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with this Section V.B.2.

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table or (ii) \$50 million:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody's	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth or (ii) \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not satisfy the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

3. NMPTC Total Credit Limit

The sum of a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall not exceed \$50 million and the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million. No later than five Business Days prior to the first day of each calendar quarter, and no later than five Business Days after any Affiliate change, each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that has a Market Credit Limit and a Transmission Credit Limit shall determine the amounts to be allocated to its Market Credit Limit (up to the amount set forth in Section V.B.1 above) and its Transmission Credit Limit (up to the amount set forth in Section V.B.2 above) such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and its Transmission Credit Limit are equal to not more than \$50 million and such that the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates do not exceed \$50 million and shall provide the ISO with that determination in writing. Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide such determination for up to four consecutive calendar quarters. If a Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not provide such determination, then the ISO shall use the amounts provided for the previous calendar quarter. If no such determination is provided, then the ISO shall apply an allocation of \$25 million each to the Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit, which values shall also be used in allocating the \$50 million credit limit among Affiliates. If the sum of the amounts for Affiliates is greater than \$50 million, then the ISO shall reduce the amounts (proportionally to the amounts provided by each Affiliate, or to the allocation applied by the ISO in the case of an Affiliate that provided no determination) such that the sum is no greater than \$50 million.

C. Information Reporting Requirements for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis, within 10 days of their becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth. In addition, each Rated Non-Market

Participant Transmission Customer that has an Investment Grade Rating having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of their becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available, then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). If any of this financial information is available on the internet, the Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such information may be located and retrieved.

Each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis, within 10 days of their becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth. Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than \$0 shall also provide additional financial statements, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to calculate such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Current Ratio, Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio and EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio. In addition, each such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the Credit Threshold and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available,

then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). Where any of the above financial information is available on the internet, the Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide the ISO with a letter stating where such information may be located and retrieved.

If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; (iii) compiled statements; (iv) internally prepared statements; or (v) tax returns).

Except in the case of a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that submits audited financial statements to the ISO, financial statements submitted to the ISO pursuant to this Section V.C shall be accompanied by a written statement from a Senior Officer of the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer certifying the accuracy of those financial statements. If an attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then the written statement shall indicate the level of attestation made; if no attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then no such indication is required.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the ISO may require any Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to submit the financial statements and other information described in this subsection. The Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall provide the requested statements and other information within 10 days of such request. If a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to provide financial statements or other information as requested and the ISO determines that the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer poses an unreasonable risk to the New England Markets, then the ISO may request that the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer provide additional financial assurance in an amount no greater than \$10 million, or take other measures to substantiate the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's ability to safely transact in the New England Markets (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section V.C shall not be counted

toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy). If the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with such a request from the ISO, then the ISO may issue a notice of suspension or termination to the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer. If the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with the ISO's request within 5 Business Days from the date of issuance of the notice of suspension or termination, then the ISO may suspend or terminate the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may choose not to submit financial statements as described in this Section V.C, in which case the ISO shall use a value of \$0.00 for the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total assets and Tangible Net Worth for purposes of the capitalization assessment described in Section II.A.4(a) and such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall be \$0.00.

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may choose to provide additional financial assurance in an amount equal to \$10 million in lieu of providing financial statements under this Section V.C. Such amount shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but shall be sufficient to meet the capitalization requirements in Section II.A.4(a)(iii).

D. Financial Assurance Requirement for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that provides additional financial assurance pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy must provide the ISO with financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below and in the amount described in this Section V.D (the "NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement").

1. Financial Assurance for ISO Charges

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer must provide the ISO with additional financial assurance such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and that additional financial assurance shall at all times be at least equal to the sum of:

- (i) two and one-half (2.5) times the average monthly Non-Hourly Charges for such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over the two most recently invoiced calendar months (which amount shall not in any event be less than \$0); plus
- (ii) amount of any unresolved Disputed Amounts received by such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

2. Financial Assurance for Transmission Charges

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer must provide the ISO with additional financial assurance hereunder such that the sum of (x) its Transmission Credit Limit and (y) the excess of (A) the available amount of the additional financial assurance provided by that Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over (B) the amount of that additional financial assurance needed to satisfy the requirements of Section V.D.1 above is equal to two and one-half (2.5) times the average monthly Transmission Charges for such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over the two most recently invoiced calendar months (which amount shall not in any event be less than \$0)

3. Notice of Failure to Satisfy NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that knows or can reasonably be expected to know that it is not satisfying its NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement shall notify the ISO immediately of that fact. Without limiting the availability of any other remedy or right hereunder, failure by any Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to comply with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (including failure to satisfy its NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement) may result in the commencement of termination of service proceedings against that non-complying Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FTR TRANSACTIONS

Market Participants must complete an ISO-prescribed training course prior to participating in the FTR Auction. All Market Participants transacting in the FTR Auction that are otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including all FTR-Only Customers (“Designated FTR Participants”) are required to provide financial assurance in an amount equal to the sum of the FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance, the FTR Bid Financial Assurance, the FTR Award Financial Assurance and the Settlement Financial Assurance, each as

described in this Section VI (such sum being referred to in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as the “FTR Financial Assurance Requirements”).

A. FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to provide “FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance” for each bid it submits into an FTR Auction and for each bid that is awarded to it in an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance for each FTR bid or awarded FTR bid shall be based upon the node(s)-specific on-peak and off-peak proxy value to which such FTR bid or awarded FTR bid relates (the “Nodal Amount”) multiplied by the number of MW-months included in the Designated FTR Participant’s bid or remaining in the awarded FTR bid. The Nodal Amount for each node shall be determined from time to time by the ISO based on historical data for that node according to a methodology approved from time to time by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and shall be posted on the ISO’s website. Such Nodal Amounts may be adjusted from time to time. In no event will the FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance be less than \$0.

B. FTR Bid Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to provide “FTR Bid Financial Assurance” for each bid it submits into an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Bid Financial Assurance for any FTR Auction is the maximum dollar value of the bids submitted by such Designated FTR Participant in such FTR Auction at the time such FTR Auction closes. For purposes of calculating FTR Bid Financial Assurance, negative bids are treated as having a value of \$0.

C. FTR Award Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to maintain, at all times, “FTR Award Financial Assurance” for each FTR awarded to it in an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Award Financial Assurance shall be the total dollar amount of any FTRs awarded to that Designated FTR Participant in any FTR Auctions. Once an FTR is awarded, the FTR Bid Financial Assurance that relates to the bid for that FTR will be converted to the FTR Award Financial Assurance related to such awarded FTR. The required amount of the FTR Award Financial Assurance will be based on the amount of the awarded FTR, not the FTR Bid Financial Assurance, and will decrease

proportionately as the amount due with respect to such awarded FTR decreases in a manner approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee from time to time. Unpaid credits due to a Designated FTR Participant for short-term FTR awards, and unpaid credits due to a Designated FTR Participant for long-term FTR awards for the current month only, may offset other FTR obligations for purposes of calculating that Designated FTR Participant's FTR Award Financial Assurance. In the event that, as a result of those offsets, a Designated FTR Participant's FTR Award Financial Assurance is less than \$0, those offsets may be used to reduce that Designated FTR Participant's FTR Financial Assurance Requirements or remaining Financial Assurance Requirement.

D. Settlement Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant that has been awarded a bid in an FTR Auction is required to provide "Settlement Financial Assurance." The amount of a Designated FTR Participant's Settlement Financial Assurance shall be equal to the amount of any settled but uninvoiced Charges incurred by such Designated FTR Participant for FTR transactions less the settled but uninvoiced amounts due to such Market Participant for FTR transactions.

E. Consequences of Failure to Satisfy FTR Financial Assurance Requirements

If a Designated FTR Participant does not have additional financial assurance equal to its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements (in addition to its other financial assurance obligations hereunder) in place at the time an FTR Auction into which it has bid closes, then, in addition to the other consequences described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, all bids submitted by that Designated FTR Participant for that FTR Auction will be rejected. The Designated FTR Participant will be allowed to participate in the next FTR Auction held provided it meets all requirements for such participation, including without limitation those set forth herein. Each Designated FTR Participant must maintain the requisite additional financial assurance equal to its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements for the duration of the FTRs awarded to it. The amount of any additional financial assurance provided by a Designated FTR Participant in connection with an unsuccessful bid in an FTR Auction which, as a result of such bid being unsuccessful, is in excess of its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements will be held by the ISO and will be applied against future FTR bids by and awards to that Designated FTR Participant unless that Designated FTR Participant requests in writing to have such

excess financial assurance returned to it. Prior to returning any financial assurance to a Designated FTR Participant, the ISO shall use such financial assurance to satisfy any overdue obligations of that Designated FTR Participant. The ISO shall only return to that Designated FTR Participant the balance of such financial assurance after all such overdue obligations have been satisfied.

VII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FORWARD CAPACITY MARKETS

Any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in the Forward Capacity Market that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (each a “Designated FCM Participant”), is required to provide additional financial assurance meeting the requirements of Section X below in the amounts described in this Section VII (such amounts being referred to in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as the “FCM Financial Assurance Requirements”). If the Lead Market Participant for a Resource changes, then the new Lead Market Participant for the Resource shall become the Designated FCM Participant.

A. FCM Delivery Financial Assurance

A Designated FCM Participant must include FCM Delivery Financial Assurance in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a Designated FCM Participant’s FCM Delivery Financial Assurance is negative, it will be used to reduce the Designated FCM Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements), but not to less than zero. FCM Delivery Financial Assurance is calculated according to the following formula:

$$\text{FCM Delivery Financial Assurance} = [\text{DFAMW} \times \text{PE} \times \max[(\text{ABR} - \text{CWAP}), 0.1] \times \text{SF} \times \text{DF}] - \text{MCC}$$

Where:

MCC (monthly capacity charge) equals Monthly Capacity Payments incurred in previous months, but not yet billed. The MCC is estimated from the first day of the current delivery month until it is replaced by the actual settled MCC value when settlement is complete.

DFAMW (delivery financial assurance MW) equals the sum of the Capacity Supply Obligations of each resource in the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio for the month, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation of any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures. If the calculated DFAMW is less than zero, then the DFAMW will be set equal to zero.

PE (potential exposure) is a monthly value calculated for the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio as the difference between the Capacity Supply Obligation weighted average Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation weighted average capacity price for the portfolio, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation of any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures. The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall correspond to that used in the Forward Capacity Auction corresponding to the instant Capacity Commitment Period and the capacity prices shall correspond to those used in the calculation of the Capacity Base Payment for each Capacity Supply Obligation in the delivery month.

In the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 of Market Rule 1, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall be replaced with the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) in the above calculation until the multi-year election period expires.

ABR (average balancing ratio) is the duration-weighted average of all of the system-wide Capacity Balancing Ratios calculated for each system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition occurring in the relevant group of months in the three Capacity Commitment Periods immediately preceding the instant Capacity Commitment Period. Three separate groups of months shall be used for this purpose: June through September, December through February, and all other months. Until data exists to calculate this number, the temporary

ABR for June through September shall equal 0.90; the temporary ABR for December through February shall equal 0.70; and the temporary ABR for all other months shall equal 0.60. As actual data becomes available for each relevant group of months, calculated values for the relevant group of months will replace the temporary ABR values after the end of each group of months each year until all three years reflect actual data.

CWAP (capacity weighted average performance) is the capacity weighted average performance of the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio. For each resource in the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio, excluding any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures, and excluding from the remaining resources the resource having the largest Capacity Supply Obligation in the month, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation shall be multiplied by the average performance of the resource. The CWAP shall be the sum of all such values, divided by the Designated FCM Participant's DFAMW. If the DFAMW is zero, then the CWAP is set equal to one.

The average performance of a resource is the Actual Capacity Provided during Capacity Scarcity Conditions divided by the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the equivalent hours of Capacity Scarcity Conditions in the relevant group of months in the three Capacity Commitment Periods immediately preceding the instant Capacity Commitment Period. Three separate groups of months shall be used for this purpose: June through September, December through February, and all other months. Until data exists to calculate this number, the temporary average performance for gas-fired steam generating resources, combined-cycle combustion turbines and simple-cycle combustion turbines shall equal 0.90; the temporary average performance for coal-fired steam generating resources shall equal 0.85; the temporary average performance for oil-fired steam generating resources shall equal 0.65; the temporary average performance for all other resources shall equal 1.00. As actual data for each resource becomes available for each relevant group of months, calculated values for the relevant group of months will replace the temporary average performance values after the end of each group of months each year until all three years reflect actual data. The applicable temporary average

performance value will be used for new and existing resources until actual performance data is available.

SF (scaling factor) is a month-specific multiplier, as follows:

June	2.000;
December and July	1.732;
January and August	1.414;
All other months	1.000.

DF(discount factor) is a multiplier that for the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, DF shall equal 0.75; and thereafter, DF shall equal 1.00.

B. Non-Commercial Capacity

Notwithstanding any provision of this Section VII to the contrary, a Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity for a Resource that elected existing Resource treatment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2010 will not be subject to the provisions of this Section VII.B with respect to that Resource (other than financial assurance obligations relating to transfers of Capacity Supply Obligations).

1. FCM Deposit

A Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity into any upcoming Forward Capacity Auction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the fifth (5th) Business Day after its qualification for such auction under Market Rule 1, an amount equal to \$2/kW times the Non-Commercial Capacity qualified for such Forward Capacity Auction by such Designated FCM Participant (the “FCM Deposit”).

2. Non-Commercial Capacity in Forward Capacity Auctions

a. Non-Commercial Capacity Participating in a Forward Capacity Auction Up To and Including the Eighth Forward Capacity Auction

For Non-Commercial Capacity participating in a Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, a Designated FCM Participant that had its supply offer of Non-Commercial Capacity accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction must include in the calculation of its Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy the following amounts at the following times:

- (i) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the fifth (5th) Business Day following announcement of the awarded supply offers in that Forward Capacity Auction, an amount equal to \$5.737 (on a \$/kW-month basis) multiplied by the number of kW of capacity awarded to that Designated FCM Participant in that Forward Capacity Auction (such amount being referred to herein as the “Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount”);
- (ii) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth (10th) Business Day prior to the next annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which such supply offer was awarded, an additional amount required to make the total amount included in the calculation of the Financial Assurance Requirement with respect to that Non-Commercial Capacity equal to two (2) times the Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount; and
- (iii) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth (10th) Business Day prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which such supply offer was accepted, an additional amount required to make the total amount included in the calculation of the Financial Assurance Requirement with respect to that Non-Commercial Capacity equal to three (3) times the Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount.

b. Non-Commercial Capacity Participating in the Ninth Forward Capacity Auction and All Forward Capacity Auctions Thereafter

A Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity into the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction an amount equal to the difference between the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price times the Non-Commercial Capacity qualified for such Forward Capacity Auction and the FCM Deposit.

Upon completion of the Forward Capacity Auction, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be recalculated according to the following formula:

Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount = NCC x NCCFCA\$ x Multiplier

Where:

NCC = the Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the Forward Capacity Auction minus any Commercial Capacity

NCCFCA\$ = the ~~applicable capacity price from~~ Capacity Clearing Price from the first run of the auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded

Multiplier = one at the completion of the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded; two beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the next Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded; and three beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded.

In the case of Non-Commercial Capacity that fails to become commercial by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which it was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be recalculated as follows: beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the first Business Day of the second month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded, the Multiplier in the recalculation of the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be four. The Multiplier in the recalculation of the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall increase by one every six months thereafter until the Non-Commercial Capacity becomes commercial or the Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated.

c. Non-Commercial Capacity Deferral

Where the Commission approves a request to defer a Capacity Supply Obligation filed pursuant to Section III.13.3.7 of Market Rule 1, the Designated FCM Participant must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request to defer, an amount equal to the amount that would apply to a resource that has not achieved commercial operation one year after the start of a Capacity Commitment Period in which it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as calculated pursuant to Section VII.B.2.a or Section VII.B.2.b, as applicable.

3. Return of Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance

Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the eighth Forward Capacity Auction that is declared commercial and has had its capacity rating verified by the ISO or otherwise becomes a Resource meeting the definition of Commercial Capacity, or that is declared commercial and had a part of its capacity rating verified by the ISO and the applicable Designated FCM Participant indicates no additional portions of that Resource will become commercial, that portion of the Resource shall no longer be considered Non-Commercial Capacity under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and will instead become subject to the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy relating to Commercial Capacity; provided that in either such case, the Designated FCM Participant will need to include in the calculation of its Financial Assurance Requirement an amount attributable to any remaining Non-Commercial Capacity.

Once Non-Commercial Capacity associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter becomes commercial, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount for any remaining Non-Commercial Capacity shall be recalculated according to the process outlined above for Non-Commercial Capacity participating in the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter.

4. Credit Test Percentage Consequences for Provisional Members

If a Provisional Member is required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy solely in connection with (A) a supply offer of Non-Commercial Capacity into any Forward Capacity Auction and (B) its

obligation to pay Participant Expenses as a Provisional Member, and that Provisional Member is maintaining the amount of additional financial assurance required under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, then the provisions of Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy relating to the consequences of that Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage equaling 80 percent (80%) or 90 percent (90%) shall not apply to that Provisional Member.

C. FCM Capacity Charge Requirements

The FCM Capacity Charge Requirements shall be calculated for the current month and all previously unbilled months. The FCM Capacity Charge Requirements shall be the product of the Estimated Capacity Load Obligation times the FCM Charge Rate for the applicable Capacity Zone. For purposes of this calculation, the FCM Charge Rate for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 for a Capacity Zone will be calculated using the same methodology described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1 for deriving the Net Regional Clearing Price, with the exceptions that the FCM Charge Rate: will not subtract PER adjustments as described in such section; and will include the balance of the CTR fund after the value of specifically allocated CTRs has been paid, as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1 of Market Rule 1, but without the adjustments for PER described in such section. For purposes of this calculation, the FCM Charge Rate for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after to June 1, 2022 for a Capacity Zone will be calculated as the sum of the charge and adjustment rates specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

D. Loss of Capacity and Forfeiture of Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance

If a Designated FCM Participant that has acquired Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Non-Commercial Capacity is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy and does not cure such default within the appropriate cure period, or if a Designated FCM Participant is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy during the period between the day that is three Business Days before the FCM Deposit is required and the first day of the Forward Capacity Auction and does not cure such default within the appropriate cure period, then: (i) beginning with the first Business Day following the end of such cure period that Designated FCM Participant will be assessed a default charge of one percent (1%) of its total Non-Commercial Capacity

Financial Assurance Amount at that time for each Business Day that elapses until it cures its default; and (ii) if such default is not cured by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the sooner of (x) the fifth Business Day following the end of such cure period or (y) the second Business Day prior to the start of the next scheduled Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction or annual Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submission (such period being referred to herein as the “Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period”), then, in addition to the other actions described in this Section VII, (A) all Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Non-Commercial Capacity that were awarded to the defaulting Designated FCM Participant in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions and that the defaulting Designated FCM Participant acquired by entering into Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be terminated; (B) the defaulting Designated FCM Participant shall be precluded from acquiring any Capacity Supply Obligation that would be associated with Non-Commercial Capacity for which the defaulting Designated FCM Participant has submitted an FCM Deposit; (C) the ISO will (1) draw down the entire amount of the FCM Deposit and the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligations and (2) issue an Invoice to the Designated FCM Participant if there is a shortfall resulting from that Designated FCM Participant’s failure to maintain adequate financial assurance hereunder or if the Designated FCM Participant used a Market Credit Limit to meet its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements; and (D) the default charges described in clause (i) above shall not be assessed to that Designated FCM Participant. All default charges collected under clause (i) above will be deposited in the Late Payment Account in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy.

If a Designated FCM Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated under Market Rule 1, the ISO will draw down the entire Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount provided by such Designated FCM Participant with respect to such terminated Capacity Supply Obligation. If the Designated FCM Participant has not provided enough financial assurance to cover the amount due (or that would have been due but for the Designated FCM Participant’s positive Market Credit Limit) with respect to such Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount, then the ISO will issue an Invoice to the Designated FCM Participant for the amount due.

E. Composite FCM Transactions

For separate resources that seek to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide that capacity (collectively, a “Composite FCM Transaction”), each Designated FCM Participant participating in that Composite FCM Transaction will be responsible for providing the financial assurance required as follows:

1. the FCM Financial Assurance Requirements for each Designated FCM Participant shall be determined solely with respect to the capacity being provided, or sought to be provided, by that Designated FCM Participant;
2. [reserved];
3. if the Composite FCM Transaction involves one or more Resources seeking to provide or providing Non-Commercial Capacity, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount under Section VII.B for each Designated FCM Participant with respect to that Composite FCM Transaction will be calculated based on the commercial status of the Non-Commercial Capacity cleared through the Forward Capacity Auction;
4. any Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount provided under Section VII.B by each Designated FCM Participant with respect to each Resource providing Non-Commercial Capacity in the Composite FCM Transaction will be recalculated according to Section VII.B.3 as the corresponding Resource becomes commercial; and
5. in the event that the Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated, Section VII.D shall apply only to the Non-Commercial Capacity of the Designated FCM Participant participating in the Composite FCM Transaction that has failed to satisfy its obligations, and any Invoice issued thereunder will be issued only to that Designated FCM Participant.
6. the FCM Delivery Financial Assurance calculated under Section VII.A for each Designated FCM Participant contributing resources to a Composite FCM Transaction shall be based on the Capacity Supply Obligation that is provided by that Designated FCM Participant in the current month of the Capacity Commitment Period, provided that the FCM charges incurred in previous months, but not yet paid, shall increase the FCM

Financial Assurance Requirements only of the Designated FCM Participant that incurred the charges.

F. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations

1. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations in Reconfiguration Auctions

A Designated FCM Participant that seeks to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation in a reconfiguration auction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of bidding in that reconfiguration auction, the amounts described in subsections (a) and (b) below.

- (a) For the 12 month period beginning with the current month, the sum of that Designated FCM Participant's net monthly FCM charges for each month in which the net FCM revenue results in a charge. For purposes of this subsection (a), months in this period in which that Designated FCM Participant's net FCM revenue results in a credit are disregarded (i.e., the net credits from such months are not used to reduce the amount described in this subsection (a)). The amount described in this subsection (a), if any, will increase the Designated FCM Participant's FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.
- (b) For the period including each month that is after the period described in subsection (a) above and that is included in a Capacity Commitment Period for which a Forward Capacity Auction has been conducted, the sum of that Designated FCM Participant's net monthly FCM charges for each month in which the net FCM revenue results in a charge. For this period, the sum of such charges may be offset by net credits from months in which the net FCM revenue results in a credit, but in no case will the amount described in this subsection (b) be less than zero. The amount described in this subsection (b), if any, will increase the Designated FCM Participant's FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

For purposes of these calculations, the net FCM revenue for a month shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations, demand bids and Annual Reconfiguration Transactions in the Forward Capacity Market, exclusive of any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held. Upon the completion of each reconfiguration auction, the amount to be included in the calculation of any FCM Financial Assurance

Requirements of that Designated FCM Participant shall be adjusted to reflect the cleared quantities at the zonal clearing price for all activity in that reconfiguration auction and accepted Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

2. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals

A Designated FCM Participant that seeks to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of the period for submission of that Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above, as applicable. If a Designated FCM Participant fails to provide the required additional financial assurance for its Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, all of those transactions will be rejected. If the Designated FCM Participant's request to transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is not accepted, it will no longer include amounts related to that Capacity Supply Obligation in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

3. Financial Assurance for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions

A Designated FCM Participant that submits an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of the period for submission of that Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above, as applicable. If a Designated FCM Participant fails to provide the required additional financial assurance for its Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, all of those transactions will be rejected. If a transaction is rejected, the Designated FCM Participant is no longer required to include amounts related to that transaction in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

4. Substitution Auctions

A Designated FCM Participant that participates in a substitution auction must include the following charges and credits in its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

- a. For any supply offer with at least one price-quantity pair priced less than zero must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction, amounts calculated as described in

Section VII.F.1 above. For purposes of these calculations, the maximum charge that would result from clearing any price-quantity pairs priced less than zero for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction shall be included in the amount calculated as described in Section VII.F.1(b) above, the net FCM revenue for all other months in the defined periods shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Forward Capacity Market, and any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held are excluded.

b. A Designated FCM Participant (i) that submits a demand bid into a substitution auction for a resource that is subject to a multi-year rate pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.4 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4, (ii) for which the maximum charge that would result from clearing the capacity subject to the multi-year rate election would exceed the revenue the Designated FCM Participant will receive for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period under its multi-year rate election for the resource, (iii) must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above. For purposes of these calculations, the maximum charge that would result from clearing the capacity subject to the multi-year rate election shall be included in the amount calculated as described in Section VII.F.1(b) above, the net FCM revenue for all other months in the defined periods shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Forward Capacity Market, and any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held are excluded.

c. If a Designated FCM Participant is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and does not cure such default by the earlier of (i) the end of the appropriate cure period and (ii) 5 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the second Business Day prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction, then the defaulting Designated FCM Participant shall be precluded from submitting a supply offer or demand bid that is subject to this Section VII.F.4.

d. Upon the completion of the substitution auction, the amount to be included in the calculation of the FCM Financial Assurance Requirements for a Designated FCM Participant as described in Section VII.F.1 above shall be adjusted to reflect all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the substitution auction.

VIII. [Reserved]

IX. THIRD-PARTY CREDIT PROTECTION

The ISO shall obtain third-party credit protection, in the form of credit insurance coverage, a performance or surety bond, or a combination thereof (“Credit Coverage”), on terms acceptable to the ISO in its reasonable discretion covering collectively the Credit Qualifying Rated Market Participants. The amount of the Credit Coverage shall be adjusted monthly and shall be equal to at least the sum of (x) 3.5 times the average Hourly Charges for all Credit Qualifying Market Participants within the previous fifty-two calendar weeks plus (y) 3.5 times the sum of the average Non-Hourly Charges and the average Transmission Charges for all Credit Qualifying Market Participants within the previous twelve calendar months. The Credit Coverage shall be provided by an insurance company rated “A-” or better by A.M. Best & Co. or “A” or better by S&P. The cost of the Credit Coverage obtained for each calendar year shall be allocated to all Credit Qualifying Market Participants pro rata based, for each Credit Qualifying Market Participant, on the average amount of the Invoices issued to that Credit Qualifying Market Participant under the ISO New England Billing Policy in the preceding calendar year. Each Credit Qualifying Market Participant shall provide the ISO with such information as may be reasonably necessary for the ISO to obtain the Credit Coverage at the lowest possible cost.

X. ACCEPTABLE FORMS OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

Provided that the requirements set forth herein are satisfied, acceptable forms of financial assurance include shares of registered or private mutual funds held in a shareholder account or a letter of credit, each in accordance with the provisions of this Section X. All costs associated with obtaining financial security and meeting the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy are the responsibility of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing that security (each a “Posting Entity”). Any Posting Entity requesting a change to one of the model forms attached to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy which would be specific to such Posting Entity (as opposed to a generic improvement to such form) shall, at the time of making that request, pay a

\$1,000 change fee, which fee shall be deposited into the Late Payment Account maintained under the ISO New England Billing Policy.

A. Shares of Registered or Private Mutual Funds in a Shareholder Account

Shares of registered or private mutual funds in a shareholder account are an acceptable form of financial assurance provided that the Posting Entity providing such collateral (i) completes all required documentation to open an account with the financial institution selected by the ISO, after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, (ii) completes and executes a security agreement (“Security Agreement”) in the form of Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and is in compliance with the Security Agreement, and (iii) completes and executes a Control Agreement in the form posted on the ISO website and is in compliance with the Control Agreement. Any material variation from the form of Security Agreement included in Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the form of Control Agreement posted on the ISO website must be approved by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and, in the case of the Security Agreement, filed with the Commission. To the extent any amount of shares contained in the shareholder account is no longer required hereunder, the ISO shall return such collateral to the Posting Entity providing it within four (4) Business Days of a request to do so.

If the amount of collateral maintained in the shareholder account is below the required level (including by reason of losses on investments), the Posting Entity shall immediately replenish or increase the amount to the required level. The collateral will be held in an account maintained in the name of the Posting Entity and invested in the investment selected by that Posting Entity from a menu of investment options listed at the time on the ISO’s website, which menu will be approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, with discounts applied to the investments in certain of such options if and as determined by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee. If a Posting Entity does not select an investment for its collateral, that collateral will be invested in the “default” investment option selected by the ISO and approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee from time to time. Any dividends and distribution on such investment will accrue to the benefit of the Posting Entity. The ISO may sell or otherwise liquidate such investments at its discretion to meet the Posting Entity’s

obligations to the ISO. In no event will the ISO or NEPOOL or any NEPOOL Participant have any liability with respect to the investment of collateral under this Section X.A.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an investment in shares of a registered fund in a shareholder account shall not be an acceptable form of financial assurance for a Posting Entity that is not a U.S. Person, as defined in Regulation S under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, unless the financial institution selected by the ISO allows such Posting Entity to invest in the investment options listed at the time on the ISO's website or the Posting Entity is invested in the investment options listed on the ISO's website as of March 19, 2015.

B. Letter of Credit

An irrevocable standby letter of credit provides an acceptable form of financial assurance to the ISO. For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the letter of credit shall be valued at \$0 at the end of the Business Day that is 30 days prior to the termination of such letter of credit. If the letter of credit amount is below the required level, the Posting Entity shall immediately replenish or increase the letter of credit amount or obtain a substitute letter of credit. The account party on a letter of credit must be either the Posting Entity whose obligations are secured by that letter of credit or an Affiliate of that Posting Entity.

1. Requirements for Banks

Each bank issuing a letter of credit that serves as additional financial assurance must meet the requirements of this Section X.B.1. Each such bank must be on the ISO's "List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers." The ISO will post the current List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers on its website, and update that List and posting no less frequently than quarterly. To be included on the List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers, the bank must be organized under the laws of the United States or any state thereof, or be the United States branch of a foreign bank and either: (i) be recognized by the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") as an approved letter of credit bank; or (ii) have a minimum long-term debt rating (or, if the bank does not have minimum long-term debt rating, than a minimum corporate rating) of "A-" by S&P, or "A3" by Moody's or "A-" by Fitch so long as its letter of credit is confirmed by

a bank that is recognized by NYMEX or CME as an approved letter of credit issuer as described in clause (i) above; or (iii) have a minimum long-term debt rating (or, if the bank does not have minimum long-term debt rating, than a minimum corporate rating) of “A-” by S&P, or “A3” by Moody’s, or “A-” by Fitch and be approved by the ISO in its sole discretion (the ISO will promptly advise the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee of any additional bank approved by it under this provision). Because the ratings described in clauses (ii) and (iii) are minimum ratings, a bank will not be considered to have satisfied the requirement of those clauses if any applicable rating from the Rating Agencies falls below the levels listed in those clauses. In addition, no Posting Entity may provide a letter of credit that has been issued or confirmed by a bank that is an Affiliate of that Market Participant. If a bank that is included on the List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers fails to satisfy any of the criteria set forth above, the applicable Posting Entity will have five (5) Business Days from the date on which the ISO provides notice of such failure to replace the letter of credit with a letter of credit from a bank satisfying those criteria or provide other financial assurance satisfying the requirements of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. In the case of a bank that is removed from the NYMEX or CME list of approved letter of credit banks, the ISO may extend that cure period to twenty (20) Business Days in its sole discretion. The ISO must promptly advise the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee of any extension of a cure period beyond five (5) Business Days under this provision. No letter of credit bank may issue or confirm letters of credit under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy in an amount exceeding either: (i) \$100 million in the aggregate for any single Posting Entity; or (ii) \$150 million in aggregate for a group of Posting Entities that are Affiliates.

The following provisions shall apply when a bank fails to honor the terms of one or more letters of credit issued or confirmed by the bank in favor of the ISO: (i) if the bank fails to honor the terms of one letter of credit in a rolling seven hundred and thirty day period, then the ISO will issue a notice of such failure to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, to all members and alternates of the Participants Committee, to the New England governors and utility regulatory agencies and to the billing and credit contracts for all Market Participants; (ii) if the bank fails to honor either the terms of one letter of credit twice or the terms of two letters of credit in a rolling seven hundred and thirty day period, then the bank will no longer be eligible to issue or confirm letters of credit in

favor of the ISO and any letters of credit issued or confirmed by such bank in favor of the ISO will not be renewed. Any letter of credit provided for a new Posting Entity for the purpose of covering the Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement must have a minimum term of 120 days.

2. Form of Letter of Credit

Attachment 2 provides a generally acceptable sample “clean” letter of credit, and all letters of credit provided by Posting Entities shall be in this form (with only minor, non-material changes), unless a variation therefrom is approved by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and filed with the Commission. Any letter of credit provided for a new Posting Entity must have a minimum term of 120 days. All costs incurred by the ISO in collecting on a letter of credit provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall be paid, or reimbursed to the ISO, by the Posting Entity providing that letter of credit.

C. Special Provisions for Provisional Members

Notwithstanding any other provision of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy to the contrary, due to the temporary nature of a Market Participant’s status as a Provisional Member and the relatively small amounts due from Provisional Members, any Provisional Member required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy may only satisfy the portion of that requirement attributable to Participant Expenses under the RNA by providing a cash deposit in accordance with Section X.A. Provisional Members will not have any other Non-Hourly Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a Provisional Member uses a standing instruction to pay its Invoices pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy, in order to avoid a default and/or a Late Payment Charge, the total amount of the cash deposited by that Provisional Member should be equal to the sum of (x) the Provisional Member’s Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that is attributable to Participant Expenses under the RNA and (y) the amount due from that Provisional Member on its next Invoice under that ISO New England Billing Policy (not including the amount of any Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (including the annual true-up of that amount) due from such Provisional Member). Provisional Members are also required to satisfy all other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, and any

additional financial assurance required to be provided by a Provisional Member that is not attributable to Participant Expenses may be satisfied by providing a cash deposit or letter of credit in accordance with this Section X but shall not be satisfied through the provision of the cash deposit described in this Section X.C. Without limiting or reducing in any way the requirements of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that apply to a Provisional Member, the amount of the cash deposit initially provided by a Provisional Member that is attributable to Participant Expenses (including any amounts provided in connection with the standing instruction under the ISO New England Billing Policy described above) shall be at least \$2,500, and each Provisional Member will replenish that cash deposit to at least that \$2,500 level on December 31 of each year.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A. Obligation to Report Material Adverse Changes

Each Market Participant and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is responsible for informing the ISO in writing within five (5) Business Days of any Material Adverse Change in its financial status. A “Material Adverse Change” in financial status includes, but is not limited to, the following: a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency; being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating; a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency; a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings; the resignation of key officer(s); the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principals imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; or a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s market capitalization. A Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to timely disclose a Material Adverse Change in its financial status may result in termination proceedings by the ISO. If the ISO determines that there is a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of a Market Participant- or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, then the ISO

shall provide to that Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer a signed written notice two Business Days before taking any of the actions described below. The notice shall explain the reasons for the ISO's determination of the Material Adverse Change. After providing notice, the ISO may take one or more of the following actions: (i) require that, within two Business Days of receipt of the notice of Material Adverse Change, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer provide one of the forms of financial assurance described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and/or an additional amount of financial assurance in one of the forms of financial assurance described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy; (ii) require that the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer cease one or more transactions in the New England Markets; or (iii) require that the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer take other measures to restore the ISO's confidence in its ability to safely transact in the New England Markets. Any additional amount of financial assurance required as a result of a Material Adverse Change shall be sufficient, as reasonably determined by the ISO, to cover the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's potential settled and unsettled liability or obligation, provided, however, that if the additional amount of financial assurance required as a result of a Material Adverse Change is equal to or greater than \$25 million, then the Chief Financial Officer shall first consult, to the extent practicable, with the ISO's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and General Counsel. If the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with any of the requirements imposed as a result of a Material Adverse Change, then the ISO may initiate termination proceedings against the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

B. Weekly Payments

A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may request that, in lieu of providing the entire amount of one of the financial assurances set forth above to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirement, a weekly billing schedule be implemented for its Non-Hourly Charges and its Transmission Charges. The ISO may, in its discretion, agree to such a request; provided, however, that any weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges will terminate no more than six (6) months after the date on which such arrangement begins unless the Market

Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer requests an extension of such arrangement and demonstrates to the ISO's satisfaction in its sole discretion that the termination of such arrangement and compliance with the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (including providing the full amount of its Financial Assurance Requirement) will impose a substantial hardship on the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer. Such demonstration of a substantial hardship shall be made every six (6) months after the initial demonstration, and a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges will be terminated if it fails to demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction in its sole discretion at any such six (6) month interval that compliance with the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy will impose a substantial hardship on it. If the ISO agrees to implement a weekly billing schedule for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges for a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall be billed weekly for such Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. The Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall pay with respect to each weekly Invoice for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges an administrative fee, determined by the ISO, to reimburse the ISO for the costs it incurs as a result of that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement.

If a weekly billing schedule is implemented for a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges under this Section XI.B, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may be required to provide the full amount of its Financial Assurance Requirement at any time if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to pay when due any weekly Invoice. In addition, upon the termination of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall either satisfy the applicable rating requirements set forth herein, satisfy the Credit Threshold, or provide the full amount of one of the other forms of financial assurance set forth herein.

C. Use of Transaction Setoffs

In the event that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer has failed to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirement hereunder, the ISO may retain payments due to such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, up to the amount of such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's unsatisfied Financial Assurance Requirement, as a cash deposit securing such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's obligations to the ISO, NEPOOL, the Market Participants, the PTOs and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, provided, however, that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer will not be deemed to have satisfied its Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy because the ISO is retaining amounts due to it hereunder unless such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer has satisfied all of the requirements of Section X with respect to such amounts.

D. Reimbursement of Costs

Each Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that fails to perform any of its obligations under the Tariff, including without limitation those arising under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, shall reimburse the ISO, NEPOOL and each Market Participant, PTO and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer for all of the fees, costs and expenses that they incur as a result of such failure.

E. Notification of Default

In the event that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (a "Financial Assurance Default"), such failure continues for at least two days and notice of that failure has not previously been given, the ISO may (but shall not be required to) notify such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in writing, electronically and by first class mail sent in each case to such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's billing and credit contacts or such Market Participant's member or alternate member on the Participants Committee (it being understood that the ISO will use reasonable efforts to contact all three where

applicable), of such Financial Assurance Default. Either simultaneously with the giving of the notice described in the preceding sentence or within two days thereafter (unless the Financial Assurance Default is cured during such period), the ISO shall notify each other member and alternate on the Participants Committee and each Market Participant's and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's billing and credit contacts of the identity of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer receiving such notice, whether such notice relates to a Financial Assurance Default, and the actions the ISO plans to take and/or has taken in response to such Financial Assurance Default. In addition to the notices provided for herein, the ISO will provide any additional information required under the ISO New England Information Policy.

F. Remedies Not Exclusive

No remedy for a Financial Assurance Default is or shall be deemed to be exclusive of any other available remedy or remedies. Each such remedy shall be distinct, separate and cumulative, shall not be deemed inconsistent with or in exclusion of any other available remedy, and shall be in addition to and separate and distinct from every other remedy. A Financial Assurance Default may result in suspension of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or the commencement of termination proceedings by the ISO.

G. Inquiries and Contests

A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may request a written explanation of the ISO's determination of its Market Credit Limit, Transmission Credit Limit, Financial Assurance Requirement or Transmission Obligations, including any change thereto, by submitting that request in writing to the ISO's Credit Department, either by email at CreditDepartment@iso-ne.com or by facsimile at (413) 540-4569.

That request must include the Market Participant's customer identification number, the name of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and the specific information for which the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer would like an explanation and must be submitted by the designated credit contact for that Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer as on file with the ISO. In addition, since Financial Assurance Requirements are updated at least daily, any request for an explanation relating to the calculation of, or a change in, a Financial Assurance Requirement must be submitted on

the same day as that calculation or change. The ISO's response to any request under this Section XI.G shall include an explanation of how the applicable calculation or determination was performed using the formulas and criteria in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may contest any calculation or determination by the ISO under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy using the dispute resolution provisions of Section I.6 of the Tariff.

H. Forward Contract/Swap Agreement

All FTR transactions constitute "forward contracts" and/or "swap agreements" within the meaning of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and the ISO shall be deemed to be a "forward contract merchant" and/or "swap participant" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of those FTR transactions. Pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the ISO Tariff and the Market Participant Service Agreement with each Market Participant, the ISO already has, and shall continue to have, the following rights (among other rights) in respect of a Market Participant default under those documents (including the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy): A) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant; B) the right to immediately proceed against any additional financial assurance provided by that Market Participant; C) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement or similar agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement or similar agreement, such arrangement to constitute a "master netting agreement" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code; and D) the right to suspend that Market Participant from entering into future transactions in the FTR system. For the avoidance of doubt, upon the commencement of a voluntary or involuntary proceeding for a Market Participant under the Bankruptcy Code, and without limiting any other rights of the ISO or obligations of any Market Participant under the Tariff (including the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy) or any Market Participant Service Agreement, the ISO may exercise any of its rights against such Market Participant, including, without limitation 1) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant, 2) the right to immediately proceed against any additional financial assurance provided by that

Market Participant, 3) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement and/or master netting agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant with respect to an FTR transaction including as a result of the actions taken by the ISO pursuant to 1) above, and 4) the right to suspend that Market Participant from entering into future transactions in the FTR system.

ATTACHMENT 1
SECURITY AGREEMENT

THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT (the “Security Agreement”) is effective as of this [__] day of [____], 20[___], by and between [INSERT NAME], a [____], having its principal office and place of business at [_____] (the “Debtor”), and ISO New England Inc., a Delaware nonprofit corporation (the “Secured Party” and collectively with the Debtor, the “Parties”).

WITNESSETH:

In consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained, the Parties agree as follows:

1. Definitions.

a. In this Security Agreement:

- i. “Code” shall mean the Uniform Commercial Code, as enacted in the State of Connecticut and as amended from time to time.
- ii. “Collateral” shall mean (a) all cash provided, submitted, wired or otherwise transferred or deposited by the Debtor to or with the Secured Party or a financial institution, investment firm, or other designee selected by the Secured Party or acting on the Secured Party’s behalf, to hold or invest such cash deposit, from time to time in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; (b) all securities or other investment property (as defined in the Code) of the Debtor, whether or not purchased with such cash deposit, submitted, wired or otherwise transferred, deposited or maintained by the Debtor to or with the Secured Party or its designee, in each case in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; (c) all other property of Debtor submitted, pledged, assigned or otherwise transferred by the Debtor to the Secured Party or its designee, in each case, in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; and (d) the products and proceeds of each of the foregoing.
- iii. “ISO Financial Assurance Policy” shall mean the Financial Assurance Policy in the Tariff, as amended, supplemented or restated from time to time, including but not limited to the Financial Assurance Policy in Exhibit 1A to Section I of the Tariff.

- iv. “Tariff” shall mean the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as amended, supplemented and/or restated from time to time.
 - v. “Obligations” shall mean any and all amounts due from Debtor from time to time under the Tariff.
 - vi. “Market Participants” shall have the meaning set forth in the Tariff.
 - b. Any capitalized term not defined herein that is defined in the Code shall have the meaning as defined in the Code.
2. Security Interest. To secure the payment of all Obligations of the Debtor, Debtor hereby grants and conveys to the Secured Party a security interest in the Collateral. The Debtor hereby irrevocably authorizes the Secured Party at any time and from time to time to file in any applicable filing office any initial financing statements and amendments thereto that provide any information required by part 5 of Article 9 of the Code for the sufficiency or filing office acceptance of any financing statement or amendment.
3. Debtor’s Covenants. The Debtor warrants, covenants and agrees with the Secured Party as follows:
- a. The Debtor shall perform all of the Debtor’s obligations under this Security Agreement according to its terms.
 - b. The Debtor shall defend the title to the Collateral against any and all persons and against all claims.
 - c. The Debtor shall at any time and from time to time take such steps as the Secured Party may reasonably request to ensure the continued perfection and priority of the Secured Party’s security interest in the Collateral and the preservation of its rights therein.
 - d. The Debtor acknowledges and agrees that this Security Agreement grants, and is intended to grant, a security interest in the Collateral. If the Debtor is a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or other Registered Organization (as that term is defined in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in Connecticut) the Debtor shall, at its expense, furnish to Secured Party a certified copy of Debtor’s organization documents verifying its correct legal name or, at Secured Party’s election, shall permit the Secured Party to obtain such certified copy at Debtor’s expense. From

time to time at Secured Party's election, the Secured Party may obtain a certified copy of Debtor's organization documents and a search of such Uniform Commercial Code filing offices, as it shall deem appropriate, at Debtor's expense, to verify Debtor's compliance with the terms of this Security Agreement.

- e. The Debtor authorizes the Secured Party, if the Debtor fails to do so, to do all things required of the Debtor herein and charge all expenses incurred by the Secured Party to the Debtor together with interest thereon, which expenses and interest will be added to the Obligations.
4. Debtor's Representations and Warranties. The Debtor represents and warrants to the Secured Party as follows:
- a. The exact legal name of the Debtor is as first stated above.
 - b. Except for the security interest of the Secured Party, Debtor is the owner of the Collateral free and clear of any encumbrance of any nature.
5. Non-Waiver. Waiver of or acquiescence in any default by the Debtor or failure of the Secured Party to insist upon strict performance by the Debtor of any warranties, covenants, or agreements in this Security Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of any subsequent or other default or failure. No failure to exercise or delay in exercising any right, power or remedy of the Secured Party under this Security Agreement shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any partial exercise of any right, power or remedy preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy. The failure of the Secured Party to insist upon the strict observance or performance of any provision of this Security Agreement shall not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment of such provision. The rights and remedies provided herein are cumulative and not exclusive of any other rights or remedies provided at law or in equity.
6. Events of Default. Any one of the following shall constitute an "Event of Default" hereunder by the Debtor:
- a. Failure by the Debtor to comply with or perform any provision of this Security Agreement or to pay any Obligation; or

- b. Any representation or warranty made or given by the Debtor in connection with this Security Agreement proves to be false or misleading in any material respect; or
 - c. Any part of the Collateral is attached, seized, subjected to a writ or distress warrant, or is levied upon, or comes within the possession of any receiver, trustee, custodian or assignee for the benefit of creditors.
- 7. Remedy upon the Occurrence of an Event of Default. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default the Secured Party shall, immediately and without notice, be entitled to use, sell, or otherwise liquidate the Collateral to pay all Obligations owed by the Debtor.
- 8. Attorneys' Fees, etc. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default, the Secured Party's reasonable attorneys' fees and the legal and other expenses for pursuing, receiving, taking, keeping, selling, and liquidating the Collateral and enforcing the Security Agreement shall be chargeable to the Debtor.
- 9. Other Rights.
 - a. In addition to all rights and remedies herein and otherwise available at law or in equity, upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, the Secured Party shall have such other rights and remedies as are set forth in the Tariff and ISO Financial Assurance Policy.
 - b. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy, as amended, supplemented or restated from time to time (the "ISO New England Information Policy"), Debtor hereby (i) authorizes the Secured Party to disclose any information concerning Debtor to any court, agency or entity which is necessary or desirable, in the sole discretion of the Secured Party, to establish, maintain, perfect or secure the Secured Party's rights and interest in the Collateral (the "Debtor Information"); and (ii) waives any rights it may have under the ISO New England Information Policy to prevent, impair or limit the Secured Party from disclosing such information concerning the Debtor.
- 10. PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY. DEBTOR ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT AND THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS GIVING RISE HERETO CONSTITUTE COMMERCIAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITHIN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. IN THE EVENT OF ANY LEGAL ACTION BETWEEN DEBTOR AND

THE SECURED PARTY HEREUNDER, DEBTOR HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVES ANY RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO NOTICE, PRIOR HEARING AND ANY OTHER RIGHTS IT MAY HAVE UNDER THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES, CHAPTER 903a, AS NOW CONSTITUTED OR HEREAFTER AMENDED, OR OTHER STATUTE OR STATUTES, STATE OR FEDERAL, AFFECTING PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES, AND THE SECURED PARTY MAY INVOKE ANY PREJUDGMENT REMEDY AVAILABLE TO IT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, GARNISHMENT, ATTACHMENT, FOREIGN ATTACHMENT AND REPLEVIN, WITH RESPECT TO ANY TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY (WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL) OF DEBTOR TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT, WITHOUT GIVING DEBTOR ANY NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING.

11. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL. THE DEBTOR AND THE SECURED PARTY HEREBY EACH KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM, CROSSCLAIM AND/OR ANY FORM OF PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT OR RELATING TO ANY OBLIGATIONS SECURED HEREBY.
12. Additional Waivers. Demand, presentment, protest and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived by Debtor. Debtor also waives the benefit of all valuation, appraisal and exemption laws.
13. Binding Effect. The terms, warranties and agreements herein contained shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective Parties hereto, and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns.
14. Assignment. The Secured Party may, upon notice to the Debtor, assign without limitation its security interest in the Collateral.
15. Amendment. This Security Agreement may not be altered or amended except by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.
16. Term.

- a. This Security Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until all Obligations owed by the Debtor have been paid in full.
 - b. No termination of this Security Agreement shall in any way affect or impair the rights and liabilities of the Parties hereto relating to any transaction or events prior to such termination date, or to the Collateral in which the Secured Party has a security interest, and all agreements, warranties and representations of the Debtor shall survive such termination.
17. Choice of Law. The laws of the State of Connecticut shall govern the rights and duties of the Parties herein contained without giving effect to any conflict-of-law principles.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed and sealed this Security Agreement as of the day and year first above written.

[INSERT NAME]

By: _____

Name:

Title:

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

By: _____

Name:

Title:

ATTACHMENT 2
SAMPLE LETTER OF CREDIT

[DATE PROVIDED]

IRREVOCABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT NO.

[EXPIRATION DATE] AT OUR COUNTERS

WE DO HEREBY ISSUE AN IRREVOCABLE NON-TRANSFERABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT BY ORDER OF AND FOR THE ACCOUNT OF ON BEHALF OF [POSTING ENTITY] ("ACCOUNT PARTY") IN FAVOR OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. ("ISO") IN AN AMOUNT NOT EXCEEDING US\$ _____.00 (UNITED STATES DOLLARS _____ AND 00/100) AGAINST PRESENTATION TO US OF A DRAWING CERTIFICATE SIGNED BY A PURPORTED OFFICER OR AUTHORIZED AGENT OF THE ISO AND DATED THE DATE OF PRESENTATION CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES TO [BANK] ("BANK"), WITH REFERENCE TO IRREVOCABLE NON-TRANSFERABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT NO. ISSUED BY [BANK] IN FAVOR OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. ("ISO"), THAT [POSTING ENTITY] HAS FAILED TO PAY THE ISO, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF FILED BY THE ISO, AND THUS THE ISO IS DRAWING UPON THE LETTER OF CREDIT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO \$_____."

IF PRESENTATION OF ANY DRAWING CERTIFICATE IS MADE ON A BUSINESS DAY AND SUCH PRESENTATION IS MADE AT OUR COUNTERS ON OR BEFORE 10:00 A.M. _____ TIME, WE SHALL SATISFY SUCH DRAWING REQUEST ON THE SAME BUSINESS DAY. IF THE DRAWING CERTIFICATE IS RECEIVED AT OUR COUNTERS AFTER 10:00 A.M. _____ TIME, WE WILL SATISFY SUCH DRAWING REQUEST ON THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, A BUSINESS DAY MEANS A DAY, OTHER THAN A SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, ON WHICH THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK IS NOT AUTHORIZED OR REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED. DISBURSEMENTS SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ISO.

THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPLY:

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL EXPIRE AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS [DATE] [AT LEAST 120 DAYS AFTER ISSUANCE FOR NEW POSTING ENTITIES].

THE AMOUNT WHICH MAY BE DRAWN BY YOU UNDER THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF ANY DRAWINGS HEREUNDER AT OUR COUNTERS. ANY NUMBER OF PARTIAL DRAWINGS ARE PERMITTED FROM TIME TO TIME HEREUNDER.

ALL COMMISSIONS AND CHARGES WILL BE BORNE BY THE ACCOUNT PARTY.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT IS NOT TRANSFERABLE OR ASSIGNABLE. THIS LETTER OF CREDIT DOES NOT INCORPORATE AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED MODIFIED, AMENDED OR AMPLIFIED BY REFERENCE TO ANY DOCUMENT, INSTRUMENT OR AGREEMENT (A) THAT IS REFERRED TO HEREIN (EXCEPT FOR THE UCP, AS DEFINED BELOW) OR (B) IN WHICH THIS LETTER OF CREDIT IS REFERRED TO OR TO WHICH THIS LETTER OF CREDIT RELATES.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, 2007 REVISION, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PUBLICATION NO. 600 (THE "UCP"), EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT TERMS HEREOF ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UCP, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ARTICLES 14(b) AND 36 OF THE UCP, IN WHICH CASE THE TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL GOVERN.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT MAY NOT BE AMENDED, CHANGED OR MODIFIED WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE ISO AND US.

WE HEREBY ENGAGE WITH YOU THAT DOCUMENTS DRAWN UNDER AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE DULY HONORED UPON PRESENTATION AS SPECIFIED AND WE REPRESENT THAT THE ACCOUNT PARTY IS NOT AN AFFILIATE OF THE BANK.

PRESENTATION OF ANY DRAWING CERTIFICATE UNDER THIS STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT MAY BE SENT TO US BY COURIER, CERTIFIED MAIL, REGISTERED MAIL, TELEGRAM, OR FACSIMILE WITH A CONFIRMING COPY OF SUCH FACSIMILE SENT AFTER THE DRAWING BY CERTIFIED MAIL TO THE ADDRESS SET FORTH BELOW, OR SUCH OTHER ADDRESS AS MAY HEREAFTER BE FURNISHED BY US. OTHER NOTICES CONCERNING THIS STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT MAY BE SENT BY SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY TO THE RESPECTIVE ADDRESSES SET FORTH BELOW. ALL SUCH NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE WHEN ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY THE INTENDED RECIPIENT PARTY.

IF TO THE BENEFICIARY OF THIS LETTER OF CREDIT:

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.
ATTENTION: CREDIT DEPARTMENT
1 SULLIVAN RD. HOLYOKE, MA 01040
FAX: 413-540-4569

IF TO THE ACCOUNT PARTY:

[NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[FAX]
[PHONE]

IF TO US:

[NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[FAX]
[PHONE]

[signature]

[signature]

ATTACHMENT 3

**ISO NEW ENGLAND MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR MARKET PARTICIPATION OFFICER
CERTIFICATION FORM**

Certifying Entity:	
---------------------------	--

I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of
_____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New
England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the minimum criteria
for market participation requirements set forth in Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3 of the ISO New England
Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I of the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and
Services Tariff), hereby certify that I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as
follows:

1. Certifying Entity has established or contracted for written policies, procedures, and controls
applicable to participation in the New England Markets, approved by Certifying Entity’s
independent risk management function¹, which provide an appropriate, comprehensive risk management framework that, at a minimum, clearly
identifies and documents the range of risks to which Certifying Entity is exposed, including, but
not limited to, credit risk, liquidity risk, concentration risk, default risk, operation risk, and market
risk.
2. Certifying Entity has established or contracted for appropriate training of relevant personnel that is
applicable to its participation in the New England Markets.
3. Certifying Entity has appropriate operating procedures and technical abilities to promptly and
effectively respond to all ISO New England communications and directions.

Date: _____ (Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of

¹ As used in this certification, a Certifying Entity’s “independent risk management function” can include appropriate
corporate persons or bodies that are independent of the Certifying Entity’s trading functions, such as a risk
management committee, a risk officer, a Certifying Entity’s board or board committee, or a board or committee of
the Certifying Entity’s parent company.

_____, in and for the County of _____, this _____
day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

ATTACHMENT 4

**ISO NEW ENGLAND ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
CERTIFICATION FORM**

Certifying Entity:	
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I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of _____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the additional eligibility requirements set forth in Section II.A.5 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) (the “Policy”), hereby certify that I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as follows:

1. Certifying Entity is now and in good faith will seek to remain (check applicable box(es)):

☐ an “appropriate person,” as defined in section(s) [_____] of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.*) (specify which section(s) of Commodity Exchange Act sections 4(c)(3)(A) through (J) apply)) (if Certifying Entity is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F), it shall accompany this certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the Certifying Entity’s total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy);

☐ an “eligible contract participant,” as defined in section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act and in 17 CFR § 1.3(m); or

☐ a “person who actively participates in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy,” as defined in the Final Order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission published at 78 FR 19880 (April 2, 2013).

2. If at any time Certifying Entity no longer satisfies the criteria in paragraph 1 above, Certifying Entity will immediately notify ISO New England in writing and will immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets.

(Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of _____, in and for the County of _____, this _____ day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

ATTACHMENT 5

**ISO NEW ENGLAND CERTIFICATE REGARDING CHANGES TO SUBMITTED RISK
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR FTR PARTICIPATION**

Certifying Entity:	
---------------------------	--

I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of
_____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New
England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the annual certification
requirement for FTR market participation regarding its risk management policies, procedures, and controls
set forth in Section II.A.2(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I
of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) (the “Policy”), hereby certify that
I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as follows (check applicable box):

1. ☐ There have been no changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies,
procedures, and controls applicable to the Certifying Entity’s participation in the FTR market.

OR

2. ☐ There have been changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies,
procedures, and controls applicable to the Certifying Entity’s participation in the FTR market and
such changes are clearly identified and attached hereto.*

(Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of
_____, in and for the County of _____, this _____
day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

* As used in this certificate, “clearly identified” changes may include a redline comparing the current written risk management policies, procedures, and controls and the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls; or resubmission of the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls with a bulleted list of all changes, including section and/or page numbers.

ATTACHMENT K
REGIONAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

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APPENDIX 1 – ATTACHMENT K – LOCAL: LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS

1. Overview

This Attachment describes the regional system planning process conducted by the ISO, as well as the coordination with transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems to ensure the reliability of the New England Transmission System and compliance with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures, while accounting for market performance, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as may be agreed upon from time to time. The New England Transmission System is comprised of PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF within the New England Control Area that is under the ISO's operational authority or control pursuant to the ISO Tariff and/or various transmission operating agreements. This Attachment describes the regional system planning process for the PTF conducted by the ISO, and local system planning process conducted by the PTOs, pursuant to their responsibilities defined in the Tariff, the various transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. Additional details regarding the regional system planning process are also provided in the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, which are available on the ISO's website.

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems, consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the Tariff, applicable transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. As described in this Attachment's Section 6 and Appendix 1, entitled "Attachment K -Local System Planning Process", the PTOs are responsible for the Local System Planning ("LSP") process for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. As also described in Section 6, and pursuant to the Tariff and/or transmission operating agreements, the OTOs and MTOs are required to participate in the ISO's regional system planning process for reliability purposes and to perform and/or support studies of the impact of regional system planning projects on their respective OTF and MTF.

The regional system planning process described in this Attachment provides for the ISO to undertake assessments of the needs of the PTF system on a systemwide or specific area basis. These assessments shall be referred to as Needs Assessments, as described in Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The ISO shall incorporate market responses that have met the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment into the Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the Regional System Plan ("RSP"), described below. Where market responses incorporated into the Needs Assessments or Public Policy

Transmission Studies do not eliminate or address the needs identified by the ISO in Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the RSP, the ISO shall develop or evaluate, pursuant to Sections 4.2(b) or 4.3 of this Attachment, as applicable, regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified by the ISO.

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of this Attachment, the ISO shall develop the RSP for approval by the ISO Board of Directors following stakeholder input through the Planning Advisory Committee established pursuant to Section 2 of this Attachment. The RSP is a compilation of the regional system planning process activities conducted by the ISO. The RSP shall address needs of the PTF system determined by the ISO through Needs Assessments initiated and updated on an ongoing basis by the ISO to: (i) account for changes in the PTF system conditions; (ii) ensure reliability of the PTF system; (iii) comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures; and (iv) account for market performance, economic, environmental and other considerations as may be agreed upon from time to time.

As more fully described in Section 3 of this Attachment, the RSP shall identify:

- (i) PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs,
- (ii) the requirements and characteristics of the types of resources that may satisfy PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs to provide stakeholders an opportunity to develop and propose efficient market responses to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments;
- (iii) regulated transmission solutions to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments where market responses do not address such needs or additional transmission infrastructure may be required to comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures or provide market efficiency benefits in accordance with Attachment N of this OATT; and
- (iv) those projects identified through the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K.

In addition, the RSP shall also provide information on a broad variety of power system requirements that serves as input for reviewing the design of the markets and the overall economic performance of the

system. The RSP shall also describe the coordination of the ISO's regional system plans with regional, local and inter-area planning activities.

Pursuant to Section 3.6 of this Attachment, the ISO shall also develop, maintain and post on its website a cumulative list reflecting the regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to Needs Assessments (the "RSP Project List"). The RSP Project List shall be a cumulative representation of the regional transmission planning expansion efforts ongoing in New England.

1.1 Enrollment

For purposes of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to this Attachment K, and distinct from Transmission Providers as defined in Section I of this Tariff, an entity chooses to enroll by executing (or having already executed) a: (i) transmission operating agreement with the ISO, or (ii) a Market Participant Service Agreement coupled with a written notification to the ISO that the entity desires to be a transmission provider in the New England region. Such enrollment in the transmission planning region is not necessary to participate in the Planning Advisory Committee, which is open to any entity as described in Section 2.3 of this Attachment K.

1.2 A List of Entities Enrolled in the Planning Region

A list of entities enrolled in the transmission planning region as transmission providers as described in Section 1.1. above, is included as Appendix 2 of this Attachment K.

2. Planning Advisory Committee

2.1 Establishment

A Planning Advisory Committee shall be established by the ISO to perform the functions set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. It shall have a Chair and Secretary, who shall be appointed by the chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee. Before appointing an individual to the position of the Chair or Secretary, the ISO shall notify the Planning Advisory Committee of the proposed assignment and, consistent with its personnel practices, provide any other information about the individual reasonably requested by the Planning Advisory Committee. The chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee shall consider the input of the members of the Planning Advisory Committee in selecting, removing or replacing such officers. The Planning Advisory Committee shall be advisory only and shall have no formal voting protocol.

The ISO may form subcommittees that, at the discretion of the ISO, may report to the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.2 Role of Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee may provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning the regional system planning process, including the development of and review of Needs Assessments, the conduct of Solutions Studies, the development of the RSP, and updates to the RSP Project List. Specifically, the Planning Advisory Committee serves to review and provide input and comment on: (i) the development of the RSP, (ii) assumptions for studies, (iii) the results of Needs Assessments, Solutions Studies, and competitive solutions developed pursuant to Section 4.3 of this Attachment, (iv) potential market responses to the needs identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, and (v) Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrades Regional Planning Studies. The Planning Advisory Committee, with the assistance of and in coordination with the ISO, serves also to identify and prioritize requests for Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO, and provides input and feedback to the ISO concerning the conduct of Economic Studies and Public Policy Transmission Studies, including the criteria and assumptions for such studies. Based on input and feedback related to the regional system planning process provided by the Planning Advisory Committee to the ISO, the ISO shall consult with the appropriate NEPOOL technical committees, including but not limited to, the Markets, Reliability and Transmission Committees, on issues and concerns identified by the Planning Advisory Committee as requiring further investigation and consideration of potential changes to ISO New England Operating Documents.

2.3 Membership

Any entity, including State regulators or agencies and NESCOE, as specified in Attachment N of the OATT, may designate a member to the Planning Advisory Committee by providing written notice to the Secretary of that Committee identifying the name of the entity represented by the member and the member's name, address, telephone number, facsimile number and electronic mail address. The entity may remove or replace such member at any time by written notice to the Secretary of the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.4 Procedures

(a) Notice of Meetings

Prior to the beginning of each year, the ISO shall list on the ISO Calendar, which is available on the ISO's website, the proposed meeting dates for the Planning Advisory Committee for each month of the year. Prior to a Planning Advisory Committee meeting, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee by electronic email with the date, time, format for the meeting (i.e., in person or teleconference), and the purpose for the meeting.

(b) Frequency of Meetings

Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be held as frequently as necessary to serve the purposes stated in Section 2.2 of this Attachment and as further specified elsewhere in this Attachment, generally expected to be no less than four (4) times per year.

(c) Availability of Meeting Materials

The ISO shall post materials for Planning Advisory Committee meetings on the Planning Advisory Committee section on the ISO's website prior to meetings. The materials for the Planning Advisory Committee meetings shall be made available to the members of the Planning Advisory Committee subject to protections warranted by confidentiality requirements of the ISO New England Information Policy set forth in Attachment D of the ISO Tariff and Critical Energy Infrastructure Information ("CEII") policy as further described in Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment.

(d) Access to Planning-Related Materials that Contain CEII

CEII is defined as specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure (physical or virtual) that:

- (i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy;
- (ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;
- (iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and

- (iv) Does not simply give the location of critical infrastructure.

CEII pertains to existing and proposed system and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. CEII does not include information that is otherwise publicly available. Simplified maps and general information on engineering, vulnerability, or design that relate to production, generation, transportation, transmission or distribution of energy shall not constitute CEII.

Planning-related materials determined to be CEII will be posted on the ISO's password-protected website. To obtain access to planning-related materials determined to be CEII, the entity seeking to obtain such access must contact the ISO's Customer Service department. Authorized Market Participants or their representatives, such as consultants, are bound by the ISO New England Information Policy and will be able to access CEII materials through the ISO's password-protected website. State and federal governmental agency employees and their consultants will be able to access such materials through the ISO's password-protected website upon submittal of a signed non-disclosure agreement, which is available on the ISO's website. Personnel of the ERO, NPCC, other regional transmission organizations or independent system operators, and transmission owners from neighboring regions will be able to access CEII materials pursuant to governing agreements, rules and protocols. All external requests by other persons for planning-related materials determined to be CEII shall be recorded and tracked by ISO's Customer Services staff. Such requestors will be able to obtain access to CEII documents filed with the Commission pursuant to the Commission's regulations governing access to CEII. To the extent a requestor seeks access to planning-related material that is not filed with the Commission, such requestor shall comply with the requirements provided in the CEII procedures of the ISO, available on the ISO's website, prior to receiving access to CEII information. Upon compliance with the ISO's CEII procedures, the ISO shall grant the requestor access to the planning-related CEII document through direct distribution or access to the ISO password-protected website.

2.5 Local System Planning Process

The LSP process described in Appendix 1 to this Attachment applies to the transmission system planning for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. The PTOs will utilize interested members of the Planning Advisory Committee for advisory stakeholder input in the LSP process that will meet, as needed, at the conclusion of, or independent of, scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. The LSP meeting agenda and meeting materials will be developed by representatives of the pertinent PTOs and PTO representatives will chair the LSP meeting. The ISO will post the LSP agenda and materials for LSP.

3. RSP: Principles, Scope, and Contents

3.1 Description of RSP

The ISO shall develop the RSP based on periodic comprehensive assessments (conducted not less than every third year) of the PTF systemwide needs to maintain the reliability of the New England Transmission System while accounting for market efficiency, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as agreed upon from time to time. The ISO shall update the RSP to reflect the results of ongoing Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The RSP shall also account for projected improvements to the PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability in accordance with national and regional standards and the operation of efficient markets under a set of planning assumptions.

The RSP shall, among other things:

- (i) describe, in a consolidated manner, the assessment of the PTF system needs, the results of such assessments, and the projected improvements;
- (ii) provide the projected annual and peak demands for electric energy for a five-to ten-year horizon, the needs for resources over this period and how such resources are expected to be provided;
- (iii) specify the physical characteristics of the physical solutions that can meet the needs defined in the Needs Assessments and include information on market responses that can address them; and

- (iv) provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations, operating characteristics and required availability criteria of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

The RSP shall also include a description of proposed regulated transmission solutions that, based on the Solutions Studies described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment and the competitive solution process described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, may meet the needs identified in the Needs Assessments. To this end, as further described in Section 3.6 below, the ISO shall develop and maintain a RSP Project List, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions classified, to the extent known, as Reliability Transmission Upgrades, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, and Public Policy Transmission Upgrades (which, for the foregoing types of upgrades, may include the portions of Interregional Transmission Projects located within the New England Control Area) and of External Transmission Projects. The RSP shall also provide reasons for any new regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP Project List, any change in status of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade in the RSP Project List, or for any removal of regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades from the RSP Project List that are known as of that time.

Each RSP shall be built upon the previous RSP.

3.2 Baseline of RSP

The RSP shall account for: (i) all projects that have met milestones, including market responses and regulated transmission solutions (e.g., planned demand-side projects, generation and transmission projects and Elective Transmission Upgrades) as determined by the ISO, in collaboration with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of this Attachment; and (ii) the requirements for system operation and restoration services, not including the development of a system operations or restoration plan, which is outside the scope of the regional system planning process.

3.3 RSP Planning Horizon and Parameters

The RSP shall be based on a five-to ten-year planning horizon, and reflect five-to ten-year capacity and load forecasts.

The RSP shall conform to: Good Utility Practice; applicable Commission compliance requirements related to the regional system planning process; applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of the ERO, NPCC, and any of their successors; planning criteria adopted and/or developed by the ISO; Transmission Owner criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies developed by the Transmission Owner for its facilities consistent with the ISO planning criteria, the applicable criteria of the ERO and NPCC; local transmission planning criteria; and the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, as they may be amended from time to time (collectively, the “Planning and Reliability Criteria”).

The revisions to this Attachment K submitted to comply with FERC’s Order No. 1000 shall not apply to any Proposed or Planned project included in an RSP approved by the ISO Board of Directors (or in an RSP Project List update) prior to the effective date of the Order No. 1000 compliance filing of the ISO and the PTOs, unless the ISO is re-evaluating the solution design for such project as of that effective date, or subsequently determines that the solution design for such project requires re-evaluation.

3.4 Other RSP Principles

The RSP shall be designed and implemented to: (i) avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities; (ii) identify facilities that are necessary to meet Planning and Reliability Criteria; (iii) avoid the imposition of unreasonable costs upon any Transmission Owner, Transmission Customer or other user of a transmission facility; (iv) take into account the legal and contractual rights and obligations of the Transmission Owners and the transmission-related legal and contractual rights and obligations of any other entity; (v) provide for coordination with existing transmission systems and with appropriate inter-area and local expansion plans; and (vi) properly coordinate with market responses, including, but not limited to generation, merchant transmission and demand-side responses.

3.5 Market Responses in RSP

Market responses shall include investments in resources (e.g., demand-side projects, generation and distributed generation) and Elective Transmission Upgrades and shall be evaluated by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1(f) and 7 of this Attachment.

In developing the RSP, the ISO shall account for market responses: (i) proposed by Market Participants as addressing needs (and any critical time constraints for addressing such needs) identified in an RSP, Needs Assessment, or Public Policy Transmission Study; and (ii) that have proved to be viable by meeting the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) or 4A.3(b) of this Attachment, as applicable.

Specifically, market responses that are identified to the ISO and are determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to be sufficient to alleviate the need for a particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, based on the criteria specified in the pertinent Needs Assessment or RSP, and are judged by the ISO to be achievable within the required time period, shall be reflected in the next RSP and/or in a new or updated Needs Assessment. That particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade may continue to be included in the appropriate category on the RSP Project List (as described in Section 3.6 below), subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the project should proceed at a later date or it may be removed if it is determined to be no longer needed. If the market response does not fully address the defined needs, or if additional transmission infrastructure is required to facilitate the efficient operation of the market, the RSP shall also include that particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the Transmission Upgrade or regulated transmission solution should proceed at a later date and be modified, if necessary.

3.6 The RSP Project List

(a) Elements of the RSP Project List

The RSP Project List shall identify regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified in a RSP or Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, and shall identify Public Policy Transmission Upgrades identified pursuant to Section 4A of this Attachment. The RSP Project List shall identify the proposed regulated transmission solutions separately as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

With regard to Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, the following subcategories will be utilized to indicate the status of each

proposed regulated transmission solution in the evaluation process. These subcategories include: (i) Concept; (ii) Proposed; (iii) Planned; (iv) Under Construction; and (v) In-Service. A Public Policy Transmission Upgrade will be identified in the RSP Project List as (i) Proposed; (ii) Planned; (iii) Under Construction; or (iv) In-Service.

The regulated transmission solution subcategories are defined as follows:

(i) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Concept” shall include a transmission project that is being considered by its proponent as a potential solution to meet a need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but for which there is little or no analysis available to support the transmission project.

(ii) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” shall include a regulated transmission solution that (a) has been proposed in response to a specific need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP and (b) has been evaluated or further defined and developed in a Solutions Study, as specified in Section 4.2(a) of this Attachment, or in the competitive solutions process specified in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, such that there is significant analysis that supports a determination by the ISO, as communicated to the Planning Advisory Committee, that the proposed regulated transmission solution would likely meet the need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but has not received approval by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

For purposes of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” means that the ISO has included the project in the RSP Project List pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K, but that the project has not yet been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iii) “Planned” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has met the requirements for a Proposed project and has been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iv) “Under Construction” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has received the approvals required under the Tariff and engineering and construction is underway.

(v) “In Service” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has been placed in commercial operation.

The RSP Project List shall also list External Transmission Projects for which cost allocation and, if applicable, operating agreements have been accepted by the Commission, and indicate whether such External Transmission Projects are proposed, under construction or in service.

Each Reliability Transmission Upgrade and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced to the specific systemwide or area needs identified in a Needs Assessment or RSP. Each proposed Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced in the RSP Project List to a specific Public Policy Transmission Study.

For completeness, the RSP Project List shall also include Elective Transmission Upgrades and transmission facilities (as determined under the ISO interconnection process specified in this OATT) to be built to accommodate new generation, and Elective Transmission Upgrades that have satisfied the requirements of this OATT.

An Interregional Transmission Project developed pursuant to Section 6.3 of this Attachment K may displace a regional Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade on the RSP Project List where the ISO has determined that the Interregional Transmission Project is a more efficient or cost-effective solution. In the case of an Interregional Transmission Project that could meet the needs met by a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade, the associated Public Policy Transmission Upgrade may be removed from the RSP Project List in the circumstances described, and using the procedures specified, in Section 4A of Attachment K.

(b) Periodic Updating of RSP Project List

The RSP Project List will be updated by the ISO periodically by adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee.

Updating of the RSP Project List shall be considered an update of the RSP to be reflected in the next RSP, as appropriate, pursuant to Section 3.1 of this Attachment.

(c) RSP Project List Updating Procedures and Criteria

As part of the periodic updating of the RSP Project List, the ISO: (i) shall modify (in accordance with the provisions of this Attachment) regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades to reflect changes to the PTF system configurations, including ongoing investments by Market Participants or other stakeholders; (ii) may add to and classify accordingly, regulated transmission solutions; (iii) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades previously identified in the RSP Project List if the ISO determines that the need for the proposed regulated transmission solution or the approved Transmission Upgrade no longer exists or is no longer feasible; and (iv) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades that have been displaced by an Interregional Transmission Project in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment. With regard to (iii) above, this may include a removal of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade because a market response meeting the need reaches the maturity specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment and has been determined, pursuant to Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment, to meet the need described in the pertinent Needs Assessment, Public Policy Transmission Study or RSP, as applicable. In doing so, the ISO shall consult with and consider the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee. In addition, the ISO shall remove from the RSP Project List any Public Policy Transmission Upgrade if the ISO determines, with input from the Planning Advisory Committee, that the need to which the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade responds no longer exists.

If a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO, the entity responsible for the construction of the regulated

transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade proposed for removal from the RSP Project List. The provisions of Schedule 12 of this OATT shall apply to any cost reimbursement under this Section. Prior to finalizing the RSP, the ISO shall provide the Planning Advisory Committee with written information explaining the reasons for any removal under this Section.

(d) Posting of LSP Project Status

Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on its company website. The ISO's posting of the RSP Project Lists will include links to each PTO's specific LSP posting to be provided to the ISO by the PTOs.

4. Procedures for the Conduct of Needs Assessments, Treatment of Market Responses and Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions

4.1 Non-Applicability of Sections 4.1 through 4.3; Needs Assessments

The reliability planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a reliability need. The market efficiency planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a market efficiency need. The public policy planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a public policy need. For needs identified initially as reliability, market efficiency or public policy needs, the collateral benefits of potential solutions to those needs shall not change the planning process applicable to those identified needs; notwithstanding the foregoing, the ISO shall report its views as to whether a project or preferred solution may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system as described in Sections 4A.5(e) or 4A.7, respectively, of this Attachment K. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 of this Attachment are not applicable to the planning of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, which is governed instead by Section 4A of this Attachment.

On a regular and ongoing basis, the ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall conduct assessments (i.e., Needs Assessments) of the adequacy of the PTF system, as a whole or in part, to maintain the reliability of such facilities while promoting the operation of efficient wholesale electric markets in New England. A Needs Assessment shall analyze whether the PTF in the New England Transmission System: (i) meet applicable reliability standards; (ii) have adequate transfer capability to support local, regional, and inter-regional reliability; (iii) support the efficient operation of the wholesale electric markets; (iv) are sufficient to integrate new resources and loads on an aggregate or regional basis; or (v) otherwise examine various aspects of its performance and capability. A Needs Assessment shall also identify: (i) the location and nature of any potential problems with respect to the PTF and (ii) situations that significantly affect the reliable and efficient operation of the PTF along with any critical time constraints for addressing the needs of the PTF to facilitate the development of market responses and to initiate the pursuit of regulated transmission solutions.

(a) Triggers for Needs Assessments

The ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall perform Needs Assessments, inter alia, if:

- (i) a need for additional transfer capability is identified by the ISO in its ongoing evaluation of the PTF's adequacy and performance;
- (ii) a need for additional transfer capability is identified as a result of an ERO and/or NPCC reliability assessment or more stringent publicly available local reliability criteria, if any;
- (iii) constraints or available transfer capability limitations that are identified possibly as a result of generation additions or retirements, evaluation of load forecasts or proposals for the addition of transmission facilities in the New England Control Area;
- (iv) as requested by a stakeholder pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; or
- (v) as otherwise deemed appropriate by the ISO as warranting such an assessment.

(b) Requests by Stakeholders for Needs Assessments for Economic Considerations

The ISO's stakeholders may request the ISO to initiate a Needs Assessment to examine situations where potential regulated transmission solutions or market responses or investments could result in (i) a net reduction in total production cost to supply system load based on the factors specified in Attachment N of this OATT, (ii) reduced congestion, or (iii) the integration of new resources and/or loads on an aggregate or regional basis (an "Economic Study").

Requests for Economic Studies shall be submitted, considered and prioritized as follows:

- (i) By no later than April 1 of each year, any stakeholder may submit to the ISO for public posting on the ISO's website a request for an Economic Study.
- (ii) The ISO shall thereafter add any of its own proposals for Economic Studies. The ISO shall also develop a rough work scope and cost estimate for all requested Economic Studies, and develop preliminary prioritization based on the ISO's perceived regional and/or, as coordinated with the applicable neighboring system, inter-area benefits to assist stakeholders in the prioritization of Economic Studies.
- (iii) By no later than May 1 of each year, the ISO shall provide the foregoing information to the Planning Advisory Committee, and a Planning Advisory Committee meeting shall be held at which Economic Study proponents will provide an explanation of their request.
- (iv) By no later than June 1 of each year, the ISO shall hold a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee for the members of the Planning Advisory Committee to discuss, identify and prioritize, as further facilitated by the ISO's preparation of a straw priority list to be further discussed at such meeting, up to two (2) Economic Studies (the costs of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff) to be performed by the ISO in a given year taking into consideration their impact on the ISO budget and other priorities. The ISO may consider performing up to three (3) Economic Studies if a Public Policy Transmission Study will not be concurrently performed.

- (v) The ISO and the Planning Advisory Committee may agree to hold additional meetings to further discuss and resolve any issue concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.
- (vi) If the Planning Advisory Committee, after discussions between the Planning Advisory Committee and ISO management, is not able to prioritize the Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO in a given year, any member of the Planning Advisory Committee must submit a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process pursuant to Section 12 of this Attachment, such request to be submitted no later than August 30, to resolve the issues concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.
- (vii) The ISO will issue a notice to the Planning Advisory Committee detailing the prioritization of the Economic Studies as identified by the Planning Advisory Committee or, if a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process is submitted pursuant to Section 4.1.(b)(vi), as determined through that Process.

The foregoing timelines are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee. The ISO will provide periodic updates on the status of Economic Studies to the Planning Advisory Committee.

Economic Study requests not within the three studies identified in Section 4.1(b)(iv) to be performed in a given year may be requested and paid for by the study proponent.

(c) Conduct of a Needs Assessment for Rejected De-List Bids

- (i) Where a Needs Assessment is underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the Needs Assessment will represent the resource with the rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid as being interconnected, but unavailable for reliability purposes in the base representation being used to assess the system to identify reliability needs that must be addressed.

- (ii) Where there is not a Needs Assessment underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the ISO will initiate a Needs Assessment for that area.
- (iii) In the case of a rejected Static De-List Bid or Dynamic De-List Bid, the ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, examine the unavailability of the resource(s) with the rejected bid as a sensitivity in a Needs Assessment, or examine the unavailability of the resource(s) in the base representation in a Needs Assessment. The ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, initiate a Needs Assessment for the purpose of modeling rejected Static De-List Bids or Dynamic De-List Bids where the ISO believes that the initiation of such a study is warranted.
- (iv) Prior to the start of each New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall present to the Reliability Committee the status of any prior rejected Dynamic De-List Bids, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids being studied in the regional system planning process.

(d) Notice of Initiation of Needs Assessments

Prior to its commencement, the ISO shall provide notice of the initiation of a Needs Assessment to the Planning Advisory Committee consistent with Section 2 of this Attachment.

(e) Preparation of Needs Assessment

Needs Assessments may examine resource adequacy, transmission adequacy, projected congestion levels and other relevant factors as may be agreed upon from time to time. Needs Assessments shall also consider the views, if any, of the Planning Advisory Committee, State regulators or agencies, NESCOE, the Market Advisor to the ISO Board of Directors, and the ISO Board of Directors. A corresponding assessment shall be performed by the PTOs to identify any needs relating to the Non-PTF transmission facilities (of whatever voltage) that could affect the provision of Regional Transmission Service over the PTF.

(f) Treatment of Market Solutions in Needs Assessments

The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the regional system planning process. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding resources in Needs Assessments that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids, ~~and~~ submitted Permanent De-List Bids, and demand bids that have cleared in a substitution auction, and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding a proposed Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff. In the case where the Elective Transmission Upgrades are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, these Elective Transmission Upgrades shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Needs Assessment provided that the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff.

(g) Needs Assessment Support

For the development of the Needs Assessments, the ISO will coordinate with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee to support the ISO's performance of Needs Assessments. To facilitate this support, the ISO will post on its website the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used to perform Needs Assessments. The ISO may establish requirements that any PTO or member of the Planning Advisory Committee must satisfy in order

to access certain information used to perform Needs Assessments, due to ISO New England Information Policy and CEII constraints. The ISO may ask PTOs or Planning Advisory Committee members with special expertise to provide technical support or perform studies required to assess one or more potential needs that will be considered in the Needs Assessments process. These entities will provide, and the ISO will post on its website, the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used by those entities to perform studies. The ISO will post the draft results of any such Needs Assessment studies on its website. The ISO will convene meetings open to any representative of an entity that is a member of the Planning Advisory Committee to facilitate input on draft Needs Assessments studies and the inputs to those studies prior to the ISO's completion of a draft Needs Assessment report to be reviewed by the entire Planning Advisory Committee pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment. All provisions of this subsection (g) relating to the provision and sharing of information shall be subject to the ISO-NE Information Policy.

(h) Input from the Planning Advisory Committee

Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be convened to identify additional considerations relating to a Needs Assessment that were not identified in support of initiating the assessment, and to provide input on the Needs Assessment's scope, assumptions and procedures, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

(i) Publication of Needs Assessment and Response Thereto

The ISO shall report the results of Needs Assessments to the Planning Advisory Committee, subject to CEII constraints. Needs Assessments containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's password-protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. Needs Assessments will identify high-level functional requirements and characteristics for regulated transmission solutions and market responses that can meet the needs described in the assessment. The ISO will also present the Needs Assessments in appropriate market forums to facilitate market responses. Where the ISO forecasts that a solution is needed to solve reliability criteria violations in three years or less from the completion of a Needs Assessment (unless the solution to the Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade), and the requirements of Section 4.1(j) of this Attachment have been met or where there is only one Phase

One Proposal or Stage One Proposal submitted in response to a public notice issued under Sections 4.3(a) or 4A.5(a) of this Attachment, respectively, or only one proposed solution that is selected to move on to Phase Two or Stage Two, the ISO will evaluate the adequacy of proposed regulated solutions by performing Solutions Studies, as described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment. Where the solution to a Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or where the forecast year of need for a solution that is likely to be a Reliability Transmission Upgrade is more than three years from the completion of a Needs Assessment, the ISO will conduct a solution process based on a two-stage competition, as described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment.

(j) Requirements for Use of Solution Studies Rather than Competitive Process for Projects Based on Year of Need

The following requirements must be met in order for the ISO to use Solution Studies in the circumstances described in Section 4.1(i) based on the solution's year of need:

- (i) The ISO shall separately identify and post on its website an explanation of the reliability criteria violations and system conditions that the region has a time-sensitive need to solve within three years of the completion of the relevant Needs Assessment. The explanation shall be in sufficient detail to allow stakeholders to understand the need and why it is time-sensitive.
- (ii) In deciding whether to utilize Solutions Studies, such that the regulated transmission solution will be developed through a process led by the ISO and built by the PTO(s), the ISO shall:
 - (A) Provide to the Planning Advisory Committee and post on its website a full and supported written description explaining the decision to designate a Participating Transmission Owner as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the reliability project, including an explanation of other transmission or non-transmission options that the region considered but concluded would not sufficiently address the immediate reliability need, and the circumstances that generated the reliability need and an explanation of why that reliability need was not identified earlier.

- (B) Provide a 30-day period during which comments from stakeholders on the posted description may be sent to the ISO, which comments will be posted on the website, as well.
- (iii) The ISO shall maintain and post on its website a list of prior year designations of all projects in the limited category of transmission projects for which the PTO(s) was designated as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the project following the performance of Solution Studies. The list must include the project's need-by date and the date the PTO(s) actually energized the project, i.e., placed the project into service. The ISO shall file such list with the Commission as an informational filing in January of each calendar year covering the designations of the prior calendar year, when applicable.

4.2 Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies, Where Competitive Solution Process of Section 4.3 Is Not Applicable

The procedures described in this Section 4.2 shall be utilized for the evaluation of regulated transmission solutions for reliability and market efficiency needs where the requirements of Sections 4.1(i) and/or (j) of this Attachment are satisfied. Otherwise, the procedures of Section 4.3 shall be utilized for that purpose.

(a) Evaluation and Development of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades

In the case of Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades, the ISO, in coordination with the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders, shall conduct or participate in studies ("Solutions Studies") to evaluate whether proposed regulated transmission solutions meet the PTF system needs identified in Needs Assessments. The ISO, in coordination with affected stakeholders shall also identify regulated transmission projects for addressing the needs identified in Needs Assessments.

The ISO may form ISO-led targeted study groups to conduct Solutions Studies. Such study groups will include representatives of the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and

other interested or affected stakeholders. Through this process, the ISO may identify the solutions for the region that offer the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability, and feasibility to meet a need identified in a Needs Assessment in the required time frame. These solutions may differ from a transmission solution proposed by a transmission owner.

Proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to Needs Assessments shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the PTF system needs.

(b) Notice of Initiation of a Solutions Study

The ISO shall provide notice of the initiation and scope of a Solutions Study to the Planning Advisory Committee.

(c) Classification of Regulated Transmission Solutions as Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades or Reliability Transmission Upgrades

As described in Section 3.1 and 3.6(a) of this Attachment, proposed regulated transmission solutions determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to address needs identified in Needs Assessments shall be classified as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade and/or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the standards set forth in Attachment N of this OATT.

(d) Identification of the Preferred Solution and Inclusion of Results of Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades in the RSP

The results of Solutions Studies related to Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades will be reported to the Planning Advisory Committee. After receiving feedback from the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO will identify the preferred solution. The ISO will inform the appropriate Transmission Owners in writing regarding the identification of the preferred solution.

Once identified, the preferred solution, as appropriate, will be reflected (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

4.3 Competitive Solution Process for Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades

(a) Public Notice Initiating Competitive Solution Process

The ISO will issue a public notice with respect to each Needs Assessment for which, pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment, a competitive solution process will be utilized. The notice will indicate that Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors may submit Phase One Proposals offering solutions that comprehensively address the identified needs.

A PTO or PTOs shall submit an individual or joint Phase One Proposal as a Backstop Transmission Solution for any need that would be solved by a project located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, and which it/they would therefore have an obligation to build under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA. Such PTOs may recover the costs of preparing Phase One Proposals in accordance with the mechanisms reflected in the OATT and the terms of the TOA.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Phase One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Needs Assessment (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must, before the deadline for the submission of Phase One Proposals, identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Phase One Proposal and Phase Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Phase One. Upon request by the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a

detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Phase One.

(b) Use and Control of Right of Way

Neither the submission of a project by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor nor the selection by the ISO of a project submitted by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor for inclusion in the RSP Project List shall alter a PTO's use and control of an existing right of way, the retention, modification, or transfer of which remain subject to the relevant law or regulation, including property or contractual rights, that granted the right-of-way. Nothing in the processes described in this Attachment K requires a PTO to relinquish any of its rights-of-way in order to permit a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor to develop, construct or own a project.

(c) Information Required for Phase One Proposals; Study Deposit; Timing

Phase One Proposals shall provide the following information:

- (i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
- (ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
- (iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;

- (iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
- (v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a \$100,000 study deposit per submitted proposal to support the cost of Phase One and Phase Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of \$100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Phase One and Phase Two proposal.

Phase One Proposals must be submitted by the deadline specified in the posting by the ISO of the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment, which shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the notice. The ISO may reject submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

(d) LSP Coordination

Sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(e) Preliminary Review by ISO

If the sole Phase One Proposal in response to a given Needs Assessment has been submitted by PTO(s), proposing a project that would be located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, the ISO shall proceed under Section 4.2(a)-(d) of this Attachment, rather than pursuant to the procedures set forth in the remainder of this Section 4.3.

If more than one Phase One Proposal has been submitted in response to the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment K, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

- (i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4.3(c) of this Attachment;
- (ii) appears to satisfy the needs described in the Needs Assessment;
- (iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and
- (iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities, or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(f) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any minor deficiencies in meeting the requirements of Section 4.3(a) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Phase One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Phase One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO's evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Phase One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (f), or in Phase Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Phase Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Phase One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(g) Listing of Qualifying Phase One Proposals

For each Needs Assessment, the ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO's website, a listing of Phase One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4.3(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input on the listing, and the listed proposals. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Phase Two,

based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Phase One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input. The ISO shall post on its website an explanation of why it has determined to exclude a Phase One Proposal from consideration in Phase Two.

(h) Information Required for Phase Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Phase Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects reflected on the final listing developed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Phase Two Solutions:

- (i) updates of the information provided in Phase One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;
- (ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;
- (iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Phase Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;
- (iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Phase One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;
- (v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;
- (vi) design standards to be used;
- (vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;
- (viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

- (ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;
- (x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;
- (xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and
- (xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Phase Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4.3(g).

The deadline for submittal of Phase Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Phase Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will identify the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe as the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution in response to each Needs Assessment. The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution, together with explanatory materials, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solution.

(i) Reimbursement of Phase Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) for review as Phase Two Solutions shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff (and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA), all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Phase Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs' existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor's study deposit and the actual

cost of the Phase One and Phase Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the ISO Tariff.

(j) Inclusion of Preferred Phase Two Solution in RSP and/or RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Phase Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO's identification will select the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Phase Two Solution that its project has been selected for development. The ISO will include the project as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as appropriate, in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(k) Milestone Schedules

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4.3(j) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information, as specified by the ISO, showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall request the applicable PTO(s) to implement the Backstop Transmission Solution, and prepare a report explaining why it has reassigned the project. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO's proposed course of action. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

4A. Public Policy Transmission Studies; Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

4A.1 NESCOE Requests for Public Policy Transmission Studies

No less often than every three years, by January 15 of that year, the ISO will post a notice indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee may, no later than 45 days after the posting of the notice: (i) provide NESCOE, via the process described below, with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements, and (ii) provide the ISO with input regarding local (e.g., municipal and county) Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee may be held for this purpose. Members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall direct all such input related to state, federal, and local Public Policy Requirements that drive transmission needs to the ISO and the ISO will post such input on the ISO's website. By no later than May 1 of that year, NESCOE may submit to the ISO in writing a request for a new Public Policy Transmission Study, or an update of a previously conducted study. The request will identify the Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and may identify particular NESCOE-identified public policy-related transmission needs as well. Along with any such request, NESCOE will provide the ISO with a written explanation

of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate for potential solutions in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. The ISO will post the NESCOE request and explanation on the ISO's website. If NESCOE does not provide that listing of identified transmission needs (which may consist of a NESCOE statement of its determination that no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process) and that explanation (which may consist of a NESCOE explanation of why no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process), the ISO will note on its website that a NESCOE listing and explanation have not been provided. In that circumstance, the ISO will determine subsequently (after opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee input), and post on its website an explanation of, which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated.

4A.1.1 Study of Federal Public Policy Requirements Not Identified by NESCOE; Local Public Policy Requirements

If a stakeholder believes that a federal Public Policy Requirement that may drive transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System has not been appropriately addressed by NESCOE, it may file with the ISO, no later than 15 days after the posting of NESCOE's explanation as described in Section 4A.1 of this Attachment, a written request that explains the stakeholder's reasoning and that seeks reconsideration by the ISO of NESCOE's position regarding that requirement. The ISO will post the stakeholder's written request on the ISO's website. Where the ISO agrees with a stated stakeholder position, or on its own finding, the ISO may perform an evaluation under Sections 4A.2 through 4A.4 of this Attachment of a federal Public Policy Requirement not otherwise identified by NESCOE. The ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE will not be evaluated. In addition, the ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional

system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will not be evaluated.

4A.2 Preparation for Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input

Upon receipt of the NESCOE request, or as the result of the ISO's consideration of a federal or local Public Policy Requirement pursuant to Section 4A.1.1, the ISO will prepare and post on its website a proposed scope for the Public Policy Transmission Study, and associated parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions), and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee by no later than September 1 of the request year. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the study's scope, parameters and assumptions.

4A.3 Public Policy Transmission Studies

(a) Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input

With input from Planning Advisory Committee and potentially impacted PTOs, the ISO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study to develop a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of high-level concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The study's results will be posted on the ISO's website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input on the results of the initial phase of the study, and the scope, parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions) for any follow-on phase of the study. The ISO may – as a follow-on phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study – perform more detailed analysis and engineering work on the high-level concepts.

(b) Treatment of Market Solutions in Public Policy Transmission Studies

The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the Public Policy Transmission Study. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), Merchant Transmission Facilities and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate in the Public Policy Transmission Study information regarding resources that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually

bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids, submitted Permanent De-List Bids, and demand bids that have cleared in a substitution auction, and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate information regarding a proposed Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), and a commercial operation date has been ascertained, with the exception of Elective Transmission Upgrades that are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, which shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Public Policy Transmission Study.

4A.4 Response to Public Policy Transmission Studies

The results of the Public Policy Transmission Study will be provided to the Planning Advisory Committee and posted on the ISO's website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on those results, including any updates from the states on any methods by which they are satisfying their respective Public Policy Requirements included in the Public Policy Transmission Study. The ISO's costs of performing the Public Policy Transmission Study described in Section 4A.3 will be collected by the ISO pursuant to Schedule 1 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. Any prudently incurred PTO costs for assistance requested by the ISO to support the Public Policy Transmission Study will be recovered by the applicable PTO(s) in accordance with Attachment F and Schedule 21 of the Tariff.

The ISO will evaluate the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and provide the results of the Public Policy Transmission Study to Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for their use in preparing Stage One Proposals to develop, build and operate one or more projects consistent with the general design requirements identified by the ISO in the study.

4A.5 Stage One Proposals

(a) Information Required for Stage One Proposals

The ISO will post on its website a notice inviting, for each high-level general project concept identified by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.3(a) above, Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors to submit (by the deadline specified in the public notice, which shall be not less than 60 days from the date of posting the public notice) a Stage One Proposal providing the following information:

- (i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
- (ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
- (iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;
- (iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
- (v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Stage One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Public Policy Transmission Study (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Stage One. Upon request of the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission

Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Stage One.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a \$100,000 study deposit per submitted project to support the cost of Stage One and Stage Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of \$100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Stage One and Stage Two proposal.

(b) LSP Coordination

Sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(c) Preliminary Review by ISO

Upon receipt of Stage One Proposals, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

- (i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4A.5(a);
- (ii) appears to satisfy the needs driven by Public Policy Requirements, as reflected in the Public Policy Transmission Study;
- (iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and;
- (iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(d) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any deficiencies (compared with the requirements of Section 4A.5(a)) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Stage One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Stage One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO's evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Stage One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (d), or in Stage Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Stage Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Stage One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(e) List of Qualifying Stage One Proposals

The ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO's website, a list of Stage One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4A.5(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on that list. The ISO shall also indicate whether any of the projects may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Stage Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Stage One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input.

4A.6 Reimbursement of Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors that are requested by NESCOE in writing or by one or more states' governors or regulatory authorities directly to submit a Stage One Proposal shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and the TOA, their prudently incurred costs from the Regional Network Load of the states identified by NESCOE in the written communication as having made the request or from the

Regional Network Load of the states that made the request directly. Stage One Proposal costs shall otherwise not be subject to recovery under the ISO Tariff.

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA, all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Stage Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs' existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor's study deposit and the actual cost of the Stage One and Stage Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the Tariff.

4A.7 Information Required for Stage Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Stage Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects listed pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Stage Two Solutions:

- (i) updates of the information provided in Stage One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;
- (ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

- (iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Stage Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;
- (iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Stage One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;
- (v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;
- (vi) design standards to be used;
- (vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;
- (viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;
- (ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;
- (x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;
- (xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and
- (xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Stage Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4A.5(e). The deadline for submittal of Stage Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Stage Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Stage Two Solution(s), along with its views as to whether the preferred solution(s) also satisfies identified reliability needs of the system, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solutions.

4A.8 Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List; Milestone Schedules; Removal from RSP Project List

(a) Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Stage Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO's identification will select the project that best addresses the identified Public Policy Requirement while utilizing the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Stage Two Solution that its project has been selected for development, and include the project as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional Public Policy Transmission Upgrades are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(b) Milestone Schedules

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4A.8(a) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be

completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information (as specified by the ISO) showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report, including a proposed course of action. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO's proposed course of action. The proposed course of action may include, for example, a consideration and selection of another Stage Two Proposal relating to the pertinent Public Policy Requirement, or the re-solicitation of Stage One Proposals to meet the pertinent Public Policy Requirement. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

(c) Removal from RSP Project List

If a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO pursuant to Section 3.6(c), the entity responsible for the construction of the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of that Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4A.9 Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

The costs of Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade(s) that are required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional

System Plan in accordance with Section 4A.8 shall be allocated in accordance with Schedule 21 of the ISO OATT.

4B. Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors

4B.1 Periodic Evaluation of Applications

The ISO will periodically evaluate applications submitted by an entity that seeks to qualify as a sponsor of a proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4B.2 Information To Be Submitted

The application to be submitted to the ISO by an entity desiring to be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor will include the following information:

- (i) the current and expected capabilities of the applicant to finance and construct a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade and operate and maintain it for the life of the project;
- (ii) the financial resources of the applicant;
- (iii) the technical and engineering qualifications and experience of the applicant;
- (iv) if applicable, the previous record of the applicant regarding construction and maintenance of transmission facilities;
- (v) demonstrated capability of the applicant to adhere to construction, maintenance and operating Good Utility Practices, including the capability to respond to outages;
- (vi) the ability of the applicant to comply with all applicable reliability standards; and
- (vii) demonstrated ability of the applicant to meet development and completion schedules.

4B.3 Review of Qualifications

The ISO shall review each application for completeness. The ISO will notify each applicant within 30 calendar days of receipt of such application whether the application is complete, or identify any deficiencies in provision of the information required by Section 4B.2 of this Attachment. An applicant notified of deficiencies must provide any remedial information within 30 calendar days of the receipt of such notice. Thereafter, the ISO will determine whether the applicant is physically, technically, legally, and financially capable of constructing a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission

Upgrade in a timely and competent manner, and operating and maintaining the facilities consistent with Good Utility Practice and applicable reliability criteria for the life of the project, and use its best efforts to inform the applicant within 90 days from the date on which it has a completed application on file with the ISO whether it has met all of these criteria. A PTO determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. A non-PTO entity determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will, upon its execution of the Non-incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (in the form specified in Attachment O of the OATT) and the Market Participant Service Agreement, be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

4B.4 List of Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors; Annual Certification

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors are listed in Appendix 3 of this Attachment K. Each Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO annually a certification that the information initially submitted in response to Section 4B.2 of this Attachment K has not changed adversely in a material fashion, or (if a material adverse change has occurred in the intervening year) submit instead a new application for qualification as a project sponsor. In the latter case, the entity shall not be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor unless and until the ISO approves its new application.

5. Supply of Information and Data Required for Regional System Planning

The Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, Transmission Customers, Market Participants and other entities requesting transmission or interconnection service or proposing the integration of facilities to PTF in the New England Transmission System or alternatives to such facilities, and stakeholders requesting a Needs Assessment pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, shall supply, as required by the Tariff, the Participants Agreement, MPSAs, applicable transmission operating agreements, and/or other existing agreements, protocols and procedures, or upon request by the ISO, and subject to required CEII and confidentiality protections as specified in Section 2.4 of this Attachment, any information (including cost estimates) and data that is reasonably required to prepare an RSP or to perform a Needs Assessment or Solutions Study.

6. Regional, Local and Interregional Coordination

6.1 Regional Coordination

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the ISO OATT, applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, and/or this Attachment. Pursuant to Section II.49 of this OATT and Sections 3.02, 3.05 and 3.09 of the TOA, the ISO has Operating Authority or control over all PTF and Non-PTF within the New England Control Area, which are utilized for the provision of transmission service under this OATT. The ISO also has Operating Authority or control over the United States portions of the HVDC ties to Quebec and over Merchant Transmission Facilities and Other Transmission Facilities, pursuant to this OATT or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols. The ISO, however, is not responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF, OTF and MTF. As provided in Section 6.2 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, the PTOs are responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF and coordinating such planning efforts with the ISO. Pursuant to the OATT and/or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, the transmission owners of OTF and MTF are required to participate in the ISO's regional system planning process and perform and/or support studies of the impacts of regional system projects on their respective facilities.

6.2 Local Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the RSP shall be developed in coordination with the local system plans of the PTOs. In accordance with the TOA and OATT provisions identified in Section 6.1 of this Attachment, the PTOs have responsibility for planning Non-PTF. The PTOs conduct planning of Non-PTF using the LSP process outlined in Section 2.5 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, in coordination with the ISO, other entities interconnected with the New England Transmission System, Transmission Customers and stakeholders, and in accordance with the provisions in the TOA, the OATT and the Planning and Reliability Criteria. The openness and transparency of the LSP process is intended to be consistent with the regional system planning process.

6.3 Interregional Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the RSP shall be developed in coordination with the similar plans of the surrounding ISOs/RTOs and Control Areas pursuant to the Northeastern Planning Protocol and other agreements with neighboring systems (including entities that are not Parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) and NPCC.

(a) Interregional Coordination and Cost Allocation Among ISO, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) Under Order No. 1000

Pursuant to Section 7 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol (which is posted on the web at www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc, the Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (“JIPC”) reviews regional needs and solutions identified in the regional planning processes of the ISO, NYISO and PJM in order to identify, with input from the Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (“IPSAC”), the potential for Interregional Transmission Projects that could meet regional needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than regional transmission projects. All members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be considered IPSAC members. The JIPC will coordinate studies deemed necessary to allow the effective consideration by the regions, in the same general timeframe, of a proposed Interregional Transmission Project in comparison to regional transmission solutions. Any stakeholder may propose in the New England planning process, for evaluation under Section 4.2, 4.3, or 4A (as applicable) of Attachment K, an Interregional Transmission Project (or project concept) that may be more efficient or cost-effective than a regional transmission solution. If a proposed Interregional Transmission Project is approved in each region in which the project is located, the corresponding New England regional transmission project(s) will be displaced in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment, and the costs of the Interregional Transmission Project will be allocated among the regions based on the formula provided in Schedule 15 of this OATT, or in accordance with another funding arrangement filed with and accepted by the Commission. The amount of the costs of an Interregional Transmission Project allocated as the responsibility of New England pursuant to the methodology referenced in Section 6.3(a) of this Attachment shall be allocated within New England as specified in Schedule 15 of the ISO OATT.

(b) Other Interregional Assessments and Other Interregional Transmission Projects

Interregional system assessments and/or interregional system expansion planning studies may be performed periodically by the ISO with Planning Authorities who are not parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or with the JIPC pursuant to Section 6 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or both. The ISO shall convene periodic meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee (which may be combined with meetings of the IPSAC), to provide input and feedback

to the ISO concerning such assessments and studies. To the extent that an Interregional Transmission Project is agreed to by ISO and by another region (not a Party to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) in which a portion of the project is located, the related cost allocation and operating agreements will be filed with the Commission (and, as applicable, with Canadian jurisdictional agencies) in accordance with existing filing rights.

7. Procedures for Development and Approval of the RSP

7.1 Initiation of RSP

No less often than once every three years, the ISO shall initiate an effort to develop its RSP and solicit input on regional system needs for the RSP from the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee shall meet to perform its respective functions in connection with the preparation of the RSP, as specified in Section 2 of this Attachment. The ISO shall issue the periodic planning reports that support the RSP, such as Needs Assessments, as those reports are completed.

7.2 Draft RSP; Public Meeting

The ISO shall provide a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee and input from that Committee shall be received and considered in preparing and revising subsequent drafts. The ISO shall post the draft RSP and provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of a meeting to review the draft RSP as specified in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

After the ISO has provided a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO shall issue a second draft of the RSP to be presented by the ISO staff to the ISO Board of Directors for approval. The draft RSP shall incorporate the results of any Needs Assessment, and corresponding Solutions Studies, performed since the last RSP was approved. A subcommittee of that Board shall hold a public meeting, at their discretion, to receive input directly and to discuss any proposed revisions to the RSP. The final recommended RSP shall be presented to the ISO Board of Directors and shall be acted on by the ISO Board of Directors within 60 days of receipt. The foregoing timeframes are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee.

7.3 Action by the ISO Board of Directors on RSP; Request for Alternative Proposals

(a) Action by ISO Board of Directors on RSP

The ISO Board of Directors may approve the recommended draft RSP as submitted, modify the RSP or remand all or any portion of it back with guidance for development of a revised recommendation. The Board of Directors may consider the RSP in executive session, and shall consider in its deliberations the views of the subcommittee of the Board of Directors reflecting the public meeting held pursuant to Section 7.2 of this Attachment. In considering whether to approve the draft RSP, the Board of Directors may, if it finds a proposed Reliability Benefit Upgrade not to be viable, or if no Reliability Benefit Upgrade has been proposed, direct the ISO staff to meet with the affected load serving entities and State entities in order to develop an interim solution. Should that effort fail, and as a last resort, the Board of Directors may direct the ISO to issue a Request For Alternative Proposal (“RFAP”), subject to the procedures described below, and may withhold approval of the draft RSP, or portions thereof, pending the results of that RFAP and any Commission action on any resulting jurisdictional contract or funding mechanism. The ISO shall provide a written explanation as to any subsequent changes or modification made in the final version of the RSP.

(b) Requests For Alternative Proposals

- (i) The RFAP shall seek generation, demand-side and merchant transmission alternatives that can be implemented rapidly and provide substantial reliability benefits over the period solicited in the RFAP, and normally will focus on an interim (“gap”) solution until an identified Reliability Transmission Upgrade has been placed in-service. The ISO will file a proposed RFAP with the Commission for approval at least 60 days prior to its issuance. The filing shall explain why the issuance of an RFAP is necessary.
- (ii) The ISO staff shall provide the Board of Directors and subject to confidentiality requirements, the Planning Advisory Committee with an analysis of the alternatives offered in response to the RFAP, and provide a recommendation together with a funding mechanism reflecting input from the Planning Advisory Committee.
- (iii) The ISO may enter into contracts awarded pursuant to an RFAP process, and/or propose a funding mechanism. Bidders that are awarded contracts through the RFAP process shall file those contracts with the Commission for approval of the rates to be charged thereunder to the extent that such contracts are for services that are jurisdictional

to the Commission. The ISO shall file related or separate funding mechanisms with the Commission as well. All other contracts entered into pursuant to an RFAP shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes.

(iv) The Board of Directors will reflect the results of the RFAP process in the approved RSP.

8. Obligations of PTOs to Build; PTOs' Obligations, Conditions and Rights

In accordance with the TOA, PTOs designated by the ISO as the appropriate entities to construct and own or finance Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP shall construct and own or finance such facilities or enter into appropriate contracts to fulfill such obligations. In the event that a PTO: (i) does not construct or indicates in writing that it does not intend to construct a Transmission Upgrade included in the RSP; or (ii)

demonstrates that it has failed (after making a good faith effort) to obtain necessary approvals or property rights under applicable law, the ISO shall promptly file with the Commission a report on the results of the planning process, which report shall include a report from the PTO responsible for the planning, design or construction of such No. 3 Open Access Transmission Tariff Section II – Attachment K – Regional System Planning Process Transmission Upgrade, in order to permit the Commission to determine what action, if any, it should take.

In connection with regional system planning, the ISO will not propose to impose on any PTO obligations or conditions that are inconsistent with the explicit provisions of the TOA or deprive any PTO of any of the rights set forth in the TOA.

Subject to necessary approvals and compliance with Section 2.06 of the TOA, nothing in this OATT shall affect the right of any PTO to expand or modify its transmission facilities in the New England Transmission System on its own initiative or in response to an order of an appropriate regulatory authority. Such expansions or modifications shall conform with: (a) Good Utility Practice; (b) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of national, regional, and local reliability councils that may be in existence; and (c) the ISO and relevant PTO criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies. The ISO reserves its right to challenge the permitting of such expansions or modifications.

9. Merchant Transmission Facilities

9.1 General

Subject to compliance with the requirements of the Tariff and any other applicable requirements with respect to the interconnection of bulk power facilities with the New England Transmission System, any entity shall have the right to propose and construct the addition of transmission facilities (“Merchant Transmission Facilities”), none of the costs of which shall be covered under the cost allocation provisions of this OATT. Any such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the requirements of Section 9.2 of this Attachment. In performing studies in connection with the RSP, the prospect that proposed Merchant Transmission Facilities will be completed shall be accounted for as will the prospect that proposed generating units will be completed.

9.2 Operation and Integration

All Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to: (i) an agreement to transfer to the ISO operational control authority over any facilities which constitute part of the Merchant Transmission Facilities that are to be integrated with, or that will affect, the New England Transmission System; and (ii) taking such other action as may be required to make the facility available for use as part of the New England Transmission System.

9.3 Control and Coordination

Until such time as a Merchant Transmission Owner has transferred operational control over its Merchant Transmission Facilities to the ISO pursuant to Section 9.2(i), all such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the operational control, scheduling and maintenance coordination of the System Operator in accordance with the Tariff.

10. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades

The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included with the status of “Planned” in the RSP Project List as defined in Section 3.6 of this Attachment shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 12 of this OATT.

11. Allocation of ARRs

The allocation of ARR in connection with Transmission Upgrades is addressed in Section III.C.8 of the Tariff.

12. Dispute Resolution Procedures

12.1 Objective

Section 12 of this Attachment sets forth a dispute resolution process (the “Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process”) through which regional transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

12.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections

All information disclosed in the course of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

12.3 Eligible Parties

Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a Reviewable Determination, defined in Section 12.4(a) of this Attachment, with respect to the regional system planning process described in this Attachment is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this Dispute Resolution Process (“Disputing Party”).

12.4 Scope

In order to ensure that the regional transmission planning process set forth under this Attachment moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the ISO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any

matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) Reviewable Determinations

The determinations that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 that include certain procedural and substantive challenges that may arise at limited designated key decision points in the regional transmission planning process for PTF. Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a designated key decision point conform to the requirements set forth in this Attachment. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a designated key decision point was supported by adequate basis in fact.

The designated key decision points for Reviewable Determinations shall be limited to the following:

- (i) Results of a Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.1 of this Attachment;
- (ii) Updates to the RSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in Section 3.6 of this Attachment;
- (iii) Results of Solutions Studies conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.2 of this Attachment;
- (iv) Consideration of market responses in Needs Assessments as specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment;
- (v) Substance of Economic Studies to be conducted by the ISO in a given year as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; and

- (vi) Prioritization of Economic Studies to be performed in a given year where the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to prioritize them as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment.

(b) Material Adverse Impact

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the ISO, and (iii) as a result the ISO made an incorrect decision or determination.

12.5 Notice and Comment

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a Reviewable Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable Determination following the ISO's presentation of such Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the ISO ("Request for Dispute Resolution"). A Request for Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be addressed to the ISO's Chair of the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by the ISO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the ISO shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of an ISO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the ISO's designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the ISO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the ISO's designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The ISO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

12.6 Dispute Resolution Procedures

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiations

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiation within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.

12.7 Notice of Dispute Resolution Process Results

Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 12.6(b) or Section 12.6(c) of this Attachment, the ISO shall distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

13. Rights Under The Federal Power Act

Nothing in this Attachment shall restrict the rights of any party to file a Complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.

14. Annual Assessment of Transmission Transfer Capability

Each year, the ISO shall issue the results of the annual assessment of transmission transfer capability, conducted pursuant to applicable NERC, NPCC and ISO New England standards and criteria and the identification of potential future transmission system weaknesses and limiting facilities that could impact the transmission system's ability to reliably transfer energy in the planning horizon. Each annual assessment will identify those portions of the New England system, along with the associated interface boundaries, that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market pursuant to ISO Tariff Section III.12. This report will be posted on the ISO website.

Each annual assessment will model out-of-service resources associated with the following bids, if the ISO determines the removal of the resource is likely to have an impact on the transmission transfer limits for the relevant period: ~~all Non-Price Retirement Requests-Retirement De-List Bids, and~~ Permanent De-List Bids, demand bids submitted for the upcoming substitution auction, and as well as rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction.

15. Procedures for the Conduct of Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrades Regional Planning Study

The purpose of this Section 15 is to support the conduct of Interconnection Studies under the Interconnection Procedures set forth in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff. Other than Section 2 of this Attachment K regarding the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee and this Section 15, none of the other provisions in this Attachment K apply to the conduct of the Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study or the results of the study.

15.1 Notice of Initiation of Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study in Support of Cluster Studies under the Interconnection Procedures.

Pursuant to Section 4.2.2 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.2 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.2 of Schedule 25 of Section II of this Tariff, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of the initiation of a cluster for studying certain Interconnection Requests. The cluster study process, known as

Clustering, shall consist of two phases. This notice shall trigger the first phase of Clustering, during which the ISO shall conduct a Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (“CETU”) Regional Planning Study (“CRPS”) (the cost of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff). In the second phase of Clustering, the ISO shall conduct Interconnection System Impact Studies and Interconnection Facilities Studies in clusters pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

15.2 Preparation for Conduct of CRPS; Stakeholder Input

The purpose of the CRPS shall be to identify the new transmission infrastructure and any associated system upgrades to enable the interconnection of potentially all of the resources proposed in the Interconnection Requests for which the conditions identified in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff have been triggered. The ISO will prepare and post on its website, consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment K, a proposed scope of the CRPS and associated parameters and assumptions, and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the CRPS’s scope, parameters and assumptions, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. As part of the CRPS’s scope, the ISO will describe the circumstances that triggered the conditions in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. In addition, the ISO will identify: (i) the Interconnection Requests, to be referenced by Queue Position, that are expected to be eligible to participate in the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study, and (ii) the preliminary transmission upgrade concepts proposed to be considered in the CRPS. The preliminary transmission upgrade concepts may account for previously conducted transmission reinforcement studies and previously identified concepts for transmission upgrades in the relevant electrical area, including Elective Transmission Upgrades with Interconnection Requests pending in the interconnection queue prior to the initiation of the CRPS.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee or an Interconnection Customer may make a written submission to the ISO, requesting that Clustering be considered for specific Interconnection Requests in the ISO New England interconnection queue. In response to such a request, the ISO will either develop a notice of initiation of a cluster pursuant to Section 15.1 of this Attachment K, or identify, in writing, to

the Planning Advisory Committee why the conditions in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff have not been triggered.

15.3 Conduct of the CRPS

The CRPS will consist of analyses performed under the conditions used in the conduct of an Interconnection System Impact Study under the Interconnection Procedures. The CRPS will consist of steady state thermal analysis, voltage and transient stability analysis, and, as appropriate, other analysis, such as weak-grid-related analyses. The ISO will use Reasonable Efforts to complete the CRPS within twelve (12) months from the notice of the cluster initiation to the Planning Advisory Committee. If less than two (2) Interconnection Requests identified pursuant to Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff remain in the interconnection queue prior to the completion of the CRPS, the ISO will terminate the CRPS.

15.4 Publication of the CRPS

The ISO shall post a draft report of the CRPS to the Planning Advisory Committee, consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment K, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to discuss the results of the CRPS. A comment period will follow the Planning Advisory Committee meeting. The ISO will post on its website any comments received and the ISO's responses to those comments.

The CRPS report will provide:

- (i) a planning level description of the CETU(s) and a non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimate, developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), of the costs for the CETU(s);
- (ii) a list of other facilities that may be needed in addition to the CETU(s) and a non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimate, developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), of the costs for those facilities (the CRPS will not provide descriptions of expected Interconnection Facilities for specific Interconnection Requests in the cases where the Interconnection Facilities cannot be finalized until the actual Interconnection Requests that will be moving forward in the cluster are known);

- (iii) the approximate megawatt quantity (or quantities if more than one level of megawatt injection was studied in the CRPS) of resources that could be interconnected in a manner that meets the Network Capability Interconnection Standard and the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff; and,
- (iv) a list of the Interconnection Requests, to be referenced by Queue Position, that at the sole discretion of the ISO are identified as eligible to participate in the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study that will be conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. The list shall include the expected cost allocation for the eligible Interconnection Requests, calculated in accordance with Schedule 11 of Section II of the Tariff.

The non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimates under Section 15.4(i)-(ii) of this Attachment will be developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), and the costs of developing such estimates shall be recovered as specified in Sections 3.3.1, 6.1 and 7.2 of Schedule 22, Section 3.3.1, 3.4.2, and Attachment 1 of Schedule 23, and Section 3.3.1, 6.1 and 7.2 of Schedule 25.

The posting, consistent with Section 2.4 (d) of this Attachment K, of the final CRPS report on the ISO website will trigger the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study Entry Deadline specified in Section 4.2.3.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. The Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study Entry Deadline shall be 30 days from the posting of the final CRPS report.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section 15, the final Maine Resource Integration Study shall be the first CRPS and will form the basis for the first Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study to be conducted in accordance with Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 1
ATTACHMENT K -LOCAL
LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

APPENDIX 1
ATTACHMENT K -LOCAL
LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

1. Local System Planning Process

1.1 General

In circumstances where transmission system planning for Non-Pool Transmission Facilities (“Non-PTF”)², including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, is taking place in New England that is not incorporated into the RSP planning process, the following Local System Plan (“LSP”) process will be utilized for transmission planning purposes. The purpose of the LSP is to enable formal stakeholder input to planning for Non-PTF that is not incorporated into the RSP. The LSP shall ensure the opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee participation in the LSP process. The LSP will not be subject to approval by the ISO or the ISO Board under the RSP.

1.2 Planning Advisory Committee Review

The Planning Advisory Committee shall periodically provide input and feedback to the PTOs concerning the development of the LSP and the conduct of associated system enhancement and expansion studies. It is contemplated that LSP issues for identified local areas will be periodically addressed at the end of regularly scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. Regular meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be extended as necessary to serve the purposes of this section. Each PTO contemplating the addition of new Non-PTF will present its respective LSP to the Planning Advisory Committee not less than once per year. Not less than every three years, each PTO will post a notice as part of its LSP process indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee, NESCOE, or any state may provide the PTO with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to Non-PTF and regarding particular local transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The PTO will provide a written explanation, to be posted on the ISO website, of why suggested transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements will or will not be evaluated for potential solutions in the LSP planning process.

1.3 Role of the PTOs

² For absence of doubt, the PTOs clarify that Non-PTF is meant to include Category B and Local Area Facilities as defined by the TOA.

Each PTO will be responsible for administering the LSP process pertaining to its own Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, by presenting LSP information to the Planning Advisory Committee, developing an appropriate needs analysis and addressing LSP needs within its local area. In developing its LSP, each PTO will ensure comparable treatment of similarly situated customers or potential customers and will take into consideration data, comments and specific requests supplied by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders. To the extent that generation and/or demand resources are identified that could impact planning for Non-PTF, each PTO will take such resources into account when developing the LSP for its facilities, consistent with Good Utility Practice. Each PTO will also be responsible for addressing issues or concerns arising out of Planning Advisory Committee review of its proposed LSP and posting its LSP and the LSP Project List.

1.4 Description of LSP

The LSP shall describe the projected improvements to Non-PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability or as Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, and shall reflect the results of such reviews within the limited geographical areas that pertain to the LSP, as determined by each PTO (“LSP Needs Assessments”), and corresponding system planning and expansion studies. The LSP Needs Assessments will be coordinated with the RSP and include the information that the ISO-NE incorporates into the RSP plans, as applicable. The proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to LSP Needs Assessments shall also identify any RSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the Non-PTF system needs.

The LSP shall identify the planning process, criteria, data, and assumptions used to develop the LSP. To the extent the current LSP utilizes data, assumptions or criteria used by the ISO in the RSP, any such data, assumptions or criteria will also be identified in the LSP.

Each PTO shall consult with NESCOE and applicable states, local authorities and stakeholders to consider their views prior to including a Local Public Transmission Upgrade in its LSP, as described in Section 1.6.

Each PTO’s LSP will be made available on a website for review by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders, subject to the ISO New England Information Policy and

CEII restrictions or requirements. The ISO's posting of the RSP and the RSP Project List will include links to each PTO's specific LSP posting.

The LSP of a particular PTO shall be posted not less than 3 business days prior to its presentation by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers, and other stakeholders will have 30 days from the date of the PTO's presentation to the Planning Advisory Committee to provide any written comments for consideration by the PTO. The LSP shall specify the physical characteristics of the solutions that can meet the needs identified in the LSP. The LSP shall provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations and operating characteristics of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

Each year's LSP shall be based upon the LSP completed in the prior year by either recertifying the results of the prior LSP or providing specific updates.

1.5 Economic Studies

To the extent that the ISO selects any Economic Studies pursuant to Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K or otherwise performs Economic Studies that will impact Non-PTF, the PTOs will coordinate with the ISO in the performance of such Economic Studies.

1.6 Public Policy Studies

As part of the LSP process, each PTO will evaluate potential transmission solutions on its Non-PTF system that are likely to be both efficient and cost-effective for meeting Public Policy Requirements.

1.6A Process to Identify Public Policy Requirements Driving Non-PTF Transmission Needs

Within six months of publication, each PTO will review the Public Policy Requirements posted by the ISO to determine and evaluate at a high level any public policy needs potentially driving transmission needs on their respective Non-PTF systems. Such evaluations will also include potential public policy needs suggested by third parties. Each PTO will review NESCOE's written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. If NESCOE does not provide a listing

of identified transmission needs and explanation, each PTO will review the ISO's explanations of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. In addition, each PTO will review the ISO's explanation of which transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated in the regional system planning process and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy requirements will not be evaluated. Each PTO will then determine if any of the posted state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements are driving a need on its Non-PTF transmission system and will include the non-PTF needs in its local planning process.

As part of the local planning process, each PTO will list the identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated, and provide an explanation of why any identified transmission needs will not be evaluated as part of its LSP. The list will be posted in the PTO's LSP and presented at the annual PAC meeting. The PTO will seek input at the PAC meeting from stakeholders about whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs and seek recommendations about whether to proceed with such studies. A stakeholder may provide written input on the list within 30 days from the date of presentation for consideration by the PTO. Each PTO will then confirm, or modify if appropriate, its determination of which identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated and which will not be evaluated, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary.

1.6B Procedure for Evaluating Potential Public Policy Solutions on the Non-PTF

Once it has been determined that a non-PTF need driven by state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated, each PTO will prepare a scope and associated assumptions as part of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study. For those needs where a scope is available, a PTO may present the proposed scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study within its LSP and as part of its LSP presentation described in Section 1.6A. A stakeholder may provide written input to the scope within 30 days after the LSP presentation for the PTO to consider.

Each PTO will schedule a follow-up PAC meeting presentation for additional stakeholder input within 4 months after the PTO's LSP presentation as described in Section 1.6A if the proposed scope for a Public Policy Local Transmission Study was not included in its annual LSP presentation. Within 30 days after

the follow-up meeting, a stakeholder may provide written input to the scope for the PTO to consider. Subsequently, the PTO will determine the study scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study and revise its annual LSP.

In preparation of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study that will be presented to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year, the PTO will undertake the following: First, the PTO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Local Transmission Study to develop an estimate of costs and benefits and post its preliminary results on a website. Second, the PTO will use good faith efforts to contact stakeholders and the appropriate state and/or local authorities informing them of the posting, requesting input on whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, and seeking recommendations about whether to proceed with further planning and construction of a Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade. Each PTO will then make a determination of whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, or will select its final solution, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary. Results of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study will be provided to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year.

2. Posting of LSP Project List

Each PTO shall develop, maintain and make available on a website, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions that may meet LSP needs (the “LSP Project List”). The LSP Project List will be updated at least annually. The LSP Project List shall also provide reasons for any new Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, any change in status of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, or any removal of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, from the LSP Project List. Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on a website in a format comparable to the manner in which RSP plans and projects are posted on the RSP Project List. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP Project List.

3. Posting of Assumptions and Criteria

Each PTO will make available on a website the planning criteria and assumptions used in its current LSP. A link to each PTO’s planning criteria and assumptions will be posted on the ISO website.

4. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades

The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included in the LSP Project List of this Appendix 1 shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 21 of this OATT.

5. LSP Dispute Resolution Procedures

5.1 Objective

Section 5 of this Appendix 1 sets forth an LSP dispute resolution process (the "LSP Dispute Resolution Process") through which LSP-related transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

5.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections

All information disclosed in the course of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

5.3 Eligible Parties

Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a PTO's Reviewable Determination with respect to the LSP transmission planning process described in this Appendix 1 is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this LSP Dispute Resolution Process ("Disputing Party").

5.4 Scope

In order to ensure that the LSP transmission planning process set forth under this Appendix 1 moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the applicable PTO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the

Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) Reviewable Determinations:

The LSP determinations made by the applicable PTO that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 ("Reviewable LSP Determination") shall include certain procedural and substantive challenges at designated key decision points during the LSP transmission planning process for Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades ("Key LSP Decision Points"). Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a Key LSP Decision Point conform to the requirements set forth in this Appendix 1. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a Key LSP Decision Point was supported by adequate basis in fact. The Key LSP Decision Points shall be limited to the following:

- (i) Results of an LSP Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by a PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1;
- (ii) Updates to the LSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated Non-PTF transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in this Appendix 1;
- (iii) Results of Non-PTF transmission solution studies, including any Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade studies, conducted and communicated by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1; and
- (iv) Consideration of market responses in LSP Needs Assessments as specified in this Appendix 1.

(b) Material Adverse Impact

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion made by the applicable PTO. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the PTO, and (iii) as a result thereof, the PTO made an incorrect decision or determination.

5.5 Notice and Comment

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a PTO's Reviewable LSP Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable LSP Determination following the PTO's presentation of such LSP Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the Applicable PTO ("Request for LSP Dispute Resolution").

A Request for LSP Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be provided to the applicable PTO and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by a PTO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the PTO, in coordination with the ISO, shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of a PTO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the PTO's designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the PTO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The Disputing Party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the PTO's designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The PTO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

5.6 Dispute Resolution Procedure

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any LSP related dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the applicable PTO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners and the ISO (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiation

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the Parties, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiations within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such LSP related dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the LSP related dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction

5.7 Notice of Results of Dispute Resolution

Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 5.6(b) or 5.6(c) of this Appendix 1, the PTO shall distribute to members of the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

5.8 Rights under the Federal Power Act:

Nothing in this Appendix 1 shall restrict the rights of any party to file a complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 2
LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION
ENTITIES

APPENDIX 2

ATTACHMENT K

LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

The entities listed in this Appendix 2 are those enrolled for the purpose of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to Attachment K as of the date the revisions to this Appendix 2 were filed with the Commission. The most current list of entities enrolled for the purpose of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to Attachment K is available on the ISO-NE website. This Appendix 2 will be updated to reflect any subsequent enrollments as part of unrelated OATT filings at the time ISO-NE undertakes such unrelated filings.

Town of Braintree Electric Light Department

Central Maine Power Company

The City of Chicopee Municipal Lighting Department

The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department

The Connecticut Light and Power Company

Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative

Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative

Cross-Sound Cable Company, LLC

Emera Maine

Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company

Green Mountain Power Corporation

Hudson Light & Power Department

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company

Maine Electric Power Company

Middleborough Gas and Electric Department

New England Electric Transmission Corporation

New England Energy Connection, LLC

New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation

New England Hydro-Transmission Electric Company Inc.

New England Power Company

New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.

New Hampshire Transmission, LLC

Eversource Energy Service Company as agent for: The Connecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, and Western Massachusetts Electric Company

Norwood Municipal Light Department

NSTAR Electric Company

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

Shrewsbury Electric & Cable Operations

Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant

Town of Reading Municipal Light Department

The United Illuminating Company

Unitil Energy Systems, Inc.

Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc.

Vermont Electric Transmission Company

Vermont Public Power Supply Authority

Vermont Transco LLC

Town of Wallingford CT Dept of Public Utilities – Electric Division

Western Massachusetts Electric Company

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 3

LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS

The entities listed in this Appendix 3 are those approved by ISO-NE as Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors as of the date the revisions to this Appendix 3 were filed with the Commission. The most current list of entities approved as Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors is available on the ISO-NE website. This Appendix 3 will be updated to reflect any subsequent enrollments as part of unrelated OATT filings at the time ISO-NE undertakes such unrelated filings.

Braintree Electric Light Department

Central Maine Power Company

City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department

The Connecticut Light and Power Company

The Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Cooperative

Emera Maine

Eversource Energy Transmission Ventures, Inc.

Grid America Holdings, Inc.

Hudson Light and Power Department

Maine Electric Power Company

Middleboro Gas & Electric Department

New England Energy Connection, LLC

New England Power Company

New Hampshire Transmission, LLC

Norwood Municipal Light Department

NSTAR Electric Company

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

Taunton Municipal Light Plant

United Illuminating Company

Vermont Transco, LLC

Western Massachusetts Electric Company

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III.12. Calculation of Capacity Requirements.

III.12.1. Installed Capacity Requirement.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with this Section III.12.1.

The ISO shall determine the Installed Capacity Requirement such that the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiency, on average, will be no more than once in ten years. Compliance with this resource adequacy planning criterion shall be evaluated probabilistically, such that the Loss of Load Expectation (“LOLE”) of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiencies shall be no more than 0.1 day each year. The forecast Installed Capacity Requirement shall meet this resource adequacy planning criterion for each Capacity Commitment Period. The Installed Capacity Requirement shall be determined assuming all resources pursuant to Sections III.12.7 and III.12.9 will be deliverable to meet the forecasted demand determined pursuant to Section III.12.8.

If the Installed Capacity Requirement shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall make adjustments to the modeling assumptions and/or methodology through the stakeholder process to eliminate the bias in the Installed Capacity Requirement. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement are specified in Sections III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9. For the purpose of this Section III.12, a “resource” shall include generating resources, demand resources, and import capacity resources eligible to receive capacity payments in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.12.1.1. System-Wide Marginal Reliability Impact Values.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity at various capacity levels for the New England Control Area. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement.

III.12.2. Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the capacity requirements and limitations, accounting for relevant transmission interface limits which shall be determined pursuant to Section

III.12.5, for each modeled Capacity Zone (as described in Section III.12.4) for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall use consistent assumptions and standards to establish a resource's electrical location for purposes of qualifying a resource for the Forward Capacity Market and for purposes of calculating Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits. The methodology used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.2.1 and III.12.2.2, respectively. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.5, III.12.6, III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9.

III.12.2.1. Calculation of Local Sourcing Requirements for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Local Sourcing Requirement shall be the amount needed to satisfy the higher of: (i) the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1; or (ii) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

III.12.2.1.1. Local Resource Adequacy Requirement.

The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement shall be calculated as follows:

- (a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the unconstrained side of the interface, if any.
- (b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
- (c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area

meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for the import-constrained Capacity Zone Z shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

$$LRA_Z = Resources_Z + Proxy Units_Z - (Proxy Units Adjustment_Z(1-FOR_Z)) - (Firm Load Adjustment_Z(1-FOR_Z))$$

In which:

$$LRA_Z = \text{MW of Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for Capacity Zone Z;}$$

$$Resources_Z = \text{MW of resources electrically located within Capacity Zone Z, including import Capacity Resources on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any;}$$

$$Proxy Units_Z = \text{MW of proxy unit additions in Load Zone Z;}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Firm Load} \\ &Adjustment_Z = \text{MW of firm load added (or subtracted) within Capacity Zone Z to make the LOLE of the New England Control Area equal to 0.105 days per year; and} \end{aligned}$$

$$FOR_Z = \text{Capacity weighted average of the forced outage rate modeled for all resources within Capacity Zone Z, including and proxy unit additions to Capacity Zone Z.}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Proxy Units} \\ &Adjustment = \text{MW of firm load added to (or unforced capacity subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z until the system LOLE equals 0.1} \end{aligned}$$

days/year.

To determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, the firm load is adjusted within Capacity Zone Z until the LOLE of the New England Control Area reaches 0.105 days per year. The LOLE of 0.105 days per year includes an allowance for transmission related LOLE of 0.005 days per year associated with each interface. As firm load is added to (or subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z, an equal amount of firm load is removed from (or added to) the rest of New England Control Area.

III.12.2.1.2. Transmission Security Analysis Requirement.

A Transmission Security Analysis shall be used to determine the requirement of the zone being studied, and shall include the following features:

- (a) The ISO shall perform a series of transmission load flow studies and/or a deterministic operable capacity analysis targeted at determining the performance of the system under stressed conditions, and at developing a resource requirement sufficient to allow the system to operate through those stressed conditions.
- (b) The Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be set at a level sufficient to cover most reasonably anticipated events, but will not guarantee that every combination of obligated resources within the zone will meet system needs.
- (c) In performing the Transmission Security Analysis, the ISO may establish static transmission interface transfer limits, as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5, as a reasonable representation of the transmission system's capability to serve load with available existing resources.
- (d) The Transmission Security Analysis may model the entire New England system and individual zones, for both the first contingency (N-1) and second contingency (N-1-1) conditions. First contingency conditions (N-1) shall include the loss of the most critical generator or most critical transmission element with respect to the zone. Second contingency conditions (N-1-1) shall include both: (i) the loss of the most critical generator with respect to the zone followed by the loss of the most critical transmission element ("Line-Gen"); and (ii) the loss of the most critical transmission element followed by the loss of the next most critical transmission element ("Line-Line") with respect to the zone.

III.12.2.1.3. Marginal Reliability Impact Values for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity, at various capacity levels, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used to determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1, except that the capacity transfer capability between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1(b) shall be reduced by the greater of: (i) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement minus the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, and; (ii) zero.

III.12.2.2. Calculation of Maximum Capacity Limit for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Maximum Capacity Limit shall be calculated using the following method:

- (a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area, which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits to the rest of the New England Control Area, if any.
- (b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
- (c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.
- (d) The Maximum Capacity Limit for the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

$$\text{Maximum Capacity Limit}_Y = \text{ICR} - \text{LRA}_{\text{Rest of New England}}$$

In which:

Maximum Capacity Limit_Y = Maximum MW amount of resources , including Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any, that can be procured in the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement;

ICR = MW of Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area, determined in accordance with Section III.12.1; and

LRA_{Rest of New England} = MW of Local Sourcing Requirement for the rest of the New England Control Area, which for the purposes of this calculation is treated as an import-constrained region, determined in accordance with Section III.12.2.1.

III.12.2.2.1. Marginal Reliability Impact Values for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity, at various capacity levels, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used to determine the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Maximum Capacity Limit.

III.12.3 Consultation and Filing of Capacity Requirements.

At least two months prior to filing the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission, the ISO shall review the modeling assumptions and resulting Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves with the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. Following consultation with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO shall file the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves

for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act 90 days prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the proposed identification of a potential new Capacity Zone when the boundary of the potential new Capacity Zone differs from the boundaries of existing Load Zones or Capacity Zones. In order to be used in a given FCA, any new Capacity Zone must have received approval from the Commission prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable FCA.

III.12.4. Capacity Zones.

For each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall, using the results of the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability conducted pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, determine the Capacity Zones to model as described below, and will include such designations in its filing with the Commission pursuant to Section III.13.8.1(c):

(a) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate export-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the Maximum Capacity Limit is less than the sum of the existing ~~e~~Qualified ~~e~~Capacity and proposed new capacity that could qualify to be procured in the export constrained Capacity Zone, including existing and proposed new Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface.

(b) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate import-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the second contingency transmission capability results in a line-line Transmission Security Analysis Requirement, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2 and pursuant to ISO New England Planning Procedures, that is greater than the ~~E~~existing Qualified Capacity in the zone, with the largest generating station in the zone modeled as out-of-service. Each assessment will model out-of-service all Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids (including any received for the current Forward Capacity Auction at the time of this calculation), substitution auction demand bids submitted for the current Forward Capacity Auction, as well as rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction, and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) Adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained shall be modeled together as the Rest of Pool Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.12.4A. Dispatch Zones.

The ISO shall establish Dispatch Zones that reflect potential transmission constraints within a Load Zone that are expected to exist during each Capacity Commitment Period. Dispatch Zones shall be used to establish the geographic location of Active Demand Capacity Resources. Dispatch Zones shall not change during a Capacity Commitment Period. For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall establish and publish Dispatch Zones by the beginning of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. The ISO will review proposed Dispatch Zones with Market Participants prior to establishing and publishing final Dispatch Zones.

III.12.5. Transmission Interface Limits.

Transmission interface limits, used in the determination of Local Sourcing Requirements, shall be determined pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K using network models that include all resources, existing transmission lines and proposed transmission lines that the ISO determines, in accordance with Section III.12.6, will be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The transmission interface limits shall be established, using deterministic analyses, at levels that provide acceptable thermal, voltage and stability performance of the system both with all lines in service and after any criteria contingency occurs as specified in ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

III.12.6. Modeling Assumptions for Determining the Network Model.

The ISO shall determine, in accordance with this Section III.12.6, the generating units and transmission infrastructure to include in the network model that: (i) are expected to be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) may have a material impact on the network model, a potential interface constraint, or on one or more Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall be used, among other purposes, (i) for the Forward Capacity Market qualification process and (ii) to calculate transmission interface limits in order to forecast the Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall include:

(a) For the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the network model shall include:

(i) all existing resources, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades that have not been approved to be retired for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.3 and III.13.2.8.3;

(ii) all new resources with Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades; and

~~(iii)-~~ in the case of an initial interconnection analysis that is conducted consistent with the Network Capability Interconnection Standard, any generating unit or External Elective Transmission Upgrade that has a valid Interconnection Request and is reasonably expected to declare commercial operation no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction and each annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall determine and publish a list of the transmission projects and elements of transmission projects that will be included in the network model. During the process of making the transmission infrastructure determinations, as described in Section III.12.6.1, the ISO shall consult with the Governance Participants, the Transmission Owners, any transmission project proponents, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies.

III.12.6.1. Process for Establishing the Network Model.

(a) The ISO shall establish an initial network model prior to the Forward Capacity Auction that only includes transmission infrastructure, including Internal Elective Transmission Upgrades, that is already in service at the time that the initial network model is developed.

(b) After establishing the initial network model, the ISO shall compile a preliminary list of the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List, individually or in combination with each other, as appropriate, to identify transmission projects that may achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and that will have a material impact on the network model, on a potential interface constraint or one or more Local Sourcing Requirements.

(c) For the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List that are included in the preliminary list developed pursuant to subsection (b), the ISO shall determine whether the

transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2 and will be considered for further evaluation pursuant to subsection (d).

(d) For those transmission projects or elements of transmission projects that meet the initial threshold milestones in subsection (c), the ISO shall use the evaluation criteria specified in Section III.12.6.3, and any other relevant information, to determine whether to include a transmission project or element of a transmission project in the final network model.

(e) If after completing its evaluation pursuant to Sections III.12.6.1 through III.12.6.3 and conferring with the transmission project proponents, the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO determines that the transmission project or a portion of the transmission project is reasonably expected to be in service no later than the first day for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then such transmission project or portion of transmission project shall be considered in service in the finalized network model to calculate the transmission interface limits pursuant to Section III.12.5.

III.12.6.2. Initial Threshold to be Considered In-Service.

The ISO shall determine whether transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the following initial threshold milestones:

(a) A critical path schedule for the transmission project has been furnished to ISO showing that the transmission project or the element of the transmission project will be in-service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule must be sufficiently detailed to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the schedule.

(b) At the time of the milestone review, siting and permitting processes, if required, are on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) At the time of the milestone review, engineering is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(d) At the time of the milestone review, land acquisition, if required, is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(e) Corporate intent to build the transmission project has been furnished to the ISO. An officer of the host Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer has submitted to the ISO a statement verifying that the officer has reviewed the proposal and critical path schedule submitted to the ISO, and the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer concurs that the schedule is achievable, and it is the intent of the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer to build the proposed transmission project in accordance with that schedule. The Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer may develop alternatives or modifications to the transmission project during the course of design of the transmission project that accomplish at least the same transfer capability. Such alternatives or modifications are acceptable, so long as the ISO determines that the alternative or modification is reasonably expected to achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The provision of an officer's statement shall be with the understanding that the statement shall not create any liability on the officer and that any liability with respect to the Transmission Owner's obligations shall be as set forth in the Transmission Operating Agreement and shall not be affected by such officer's statement.

III.12.6.3. Evaluation Criteria.

For a transmission project or element of a transmission project that meets the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2, the ISO shall consider the following factors and any other relevant information to determine whether to include the transmission project or element of the transmission project in the network model for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Sufficient engineering to initiate construction is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(b) Approval under Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, if required, has been obtained or is on schedule to be obtained as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) Significant permits, including local permits, if required to initiate construction have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(d) Easements, if required, have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule. Needed land purchases, if required, have been made or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

- (e) Any contracts required to procure or construct a transmission project are in place consistent with the critical path schedule. The ISO's analysis may also take into account whether such contracts contain incentive and/or penalty clauses to encourage third parties to advance the delivery of material services to conform with the critical path schedule.
- (f) Physical site work is on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.
- (g) The transmission project is in a designated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor in accordance with Section 216 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p.

III.12.7. Resource Modeling Assumptions.

III.12.7.1. Proxy Units.

When the available resources are insufficient for the unconstrained New England Control Area to meet the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1, proxy units shall be used as additional capacity to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values. The proxy units shall reflect resource capacity and outage characteristics such that when the proxy units are used in place of all other resources in the New England Control Area, the reliability, or LOLE, of the New England Control Area does not change. The outage characteristics are the summer capacity weighted average availability of the resources in the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.7.3. The capacity of the proxy unit is determined by adjusting the capacity of the proxy unit until the LOLE of the New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE calculated while using the capacity assumptions described in Section III.12.7.2.

When modeling transmission constraints for the determination of Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, the same proxy units may be added to the import-constrained zone or elsewhere in the rest of the New England Control Area depending on where system constraints exist.

III.12.7.2. Capacity.

The resources included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall include:

- (a) all Existing Generating Capacity Resources,
- (b) resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,
- (c) all Existing Import Capacity Resources backed by a multiyear contract to provide capacity in the New England Control Area, where that multiyear contract requires delivery of capacity for the Commitment Period for which the Installed Capacity Requirement is being calculated, and
- (d) Existing Demand Capacity Resources that are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Market and New Demand Capacity Resources that have cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

but shall exclude:

- (e) capacity associated with Export Bids cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,
- (f) capacity de-listed or retired as a result of Permanent De-List Bids, ~~or~~ Retirement De-List Bids, or substitution auction demand bids that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions, and
- (g) capacity retired pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), unless the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1.

The rating of Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value of such resources for the relevant zone. The rating of Demand Capacity Resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value reduced by any reserve margin adjustment factor that is otherwise included in the summer Qualified Capacity value. The rating of resources, except for Demand Capacity Resources, cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period shall be based on the amount of Qualified Capacity that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Resources are located within the Capacity Zones in which they are electrically connected as determined during the qualification process.

III.12.7.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.12.7.3. Resource Availability.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be calculated taking resource availability into account and shall be determined as follows:

For Existing Generating Capacity Resources:

(a) The most recent five-year moving average of EFORD shall be used as the measure of resource availability used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values.

(b) [Reserved.]

For resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period that do not have sufficient data to calculate an availability metric as defined in subsection (a) above, class average data for similar resource types shall be used.

For existing Active Demand Capacity Resources:

Historical performance data for those resources will be used to develop an availability metric for use in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values.

III.12.7.4. Load and Capacity Relief.

Load and capacity relief expected from system-wide implementation of the following actions specified in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4. Action During a Capacity Deficiency, shall be included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values:

(a) **Implement voltage reduction.** The MW value of the load relief shall be equal to 1% of (the 90/10 forecasted seasonal net peak loads minus all Existing Demand Capacity Resources).

(b) **Arrange for available Emergency energy from Market Participants or neighboring Control Areas.** These actions are included in the calculation through the use of tie benefits to meet system needs. The MW value of tie benefits is calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.

(c) **Maintain an adequate amount of ten-minute synchronized reserves.** The amount of system reserves included in the determination of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be consistent with those needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions. When modeling transmission constraints, the reserve requirement for a zone shall be the zone's pro rata share of the forecasted system peak load multiplied by the system reserves needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions.

III.12.8. Load Modeling Assumptions.

The ISO shall forecast load for the New England Control Area and for each Load Zone within the New England Control Area. The load forecasts shall be based on appropriate models and data inputs. Each year, the load forecasts and underlying methodologies, inputs and assumptions shall be reviewed with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. If the load forecast shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall propose adjustments to the load modeling methodology to the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies to eliminate the bias. Demand Capacity Resources shall be reflected in the load forecast as specified below:

- (a) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Capacity Resource not qualifying for or not participating in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The expected reduction from these resources will be included in the load forecast to the extent that they meet the qualification process rules, including monitoring and verification plan and financial assurance requirements. If no qualification process rules are in place for the expected reductions from these resources, they shall not be included within the load forecast.
- (b) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Capacity Resource that qualifies to participate in the Forward Capacity Market, participates but does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, or has cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction and is expected to continue in the

Forward Capacity Market shall not be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(c) [Reserved.]

(d) Any realized Demand Capacity Resource reductions in the historical period that received Forward Capacity Market payments for these reductions, or Demand Capacity Resource reductions that are expected to receive Forward Capacity Market payments by participating in the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction or having cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, shall be added back into the appropriate historical loads to ensure that such resources are not reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.12.9. Tie Benefits.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be calculated assuming appropriate tie benefits, if any, available from interconnections with neighboring Control Areas. Tie benefits shall be calculated only for interconnections (1) without Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service or (2) that have not requested Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service with directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas with which the ISO has in effect agreements providing for emergency support to New England, including but not limited to inter-Control Area coordination agreements, emergency aid agreements and the NPCC Regional Reliability Plan.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using a probabilistic multi-area reliability model, by comparing the LOLE for the New England system before and after interconnecting the system to the neighboring Control Areas. To quantify tie benefits, firm capacity equivalents shall be added until the LOLE of the isolated New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE of the interconnected New England Control Area.

III.12.9.1. Overview of Tie Benefits Calculation Procedure.

III.12.9.1.1. Tie Benefits Calculation for the Forward Capacity Auction and Annual Reconfiguration Auctions; Modeling Assumptions and Simulation Program.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, tie benefits shall be calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction and the third annual reconfiguration auction using the calculation methodology in this Section III.12.9.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions for a Capacity Commitment Period, the tie benefits calculated for the associated Forward Capacity Auction shall be utilized in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values as adjusted to account for any changes in import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas and changes in import capacity resources using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using the modeling assumptions developed in accordance with Section III.12.9.2 and using the General Electric Multi-area Reliability Simulation (MARS) program.

III.12.9.1.2. Tie Benefits Calculation.

The total tie benefits to New England from all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas are calculated first using the methodology in Section III.12.9.3. Following the calculation of total tie benefits, individual tie benefits from each qualifying neighboring Control Area are calculated using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from each Control Area does not equal the total tie benefits to New England, then each Control Area's tie benefits are adjusted based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits calculated for each Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.2. Following this calculation, tie benefits are calculated for each qualifying individual interconnection or group of interconnections using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from individual interconnections or groups of interconnections does not equal their associated Control Area's tie benefits, then the tie benefits of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits within the Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.1.3. Adjustments to Account for Transmission Import Capability and Capacity Imports.

Once the initial calculation of tie benefits is performed, the tie benefits for each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted to account for capacity imports and any changes in the import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas, using the methodologies in Section

III.12.9.6. Once the import capability and capacity import adjustments are completed, the sum of the tie benefits of all individual interconnections and groups of interconnections for a Control Area, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the tie benefits associated with that Control Area, and the sum of the tie benefits from all Control Areas, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the total tie benefits available to New England.

III.12.9.2. Modeling Assumptions and Procedures for the Tie Benefits Calculation.

III.12.9.2.1. Assumptions Regarding System Conditions.

In calculating tie benefits, “at criterion” system conditions shall be used to model the New England Control Area and all interconnected Control Areas.

III.12.9.2.2. Modeling Internal Transmission Constraints in New England.

In calculating tie benefits, all New England internal transmission constraints that (i) are modeled in the most recent Regional System Plan resource adequacy studies and assessments and (ii) are not addressed by either a Local Sourcing Requirement or a Maximum Capacity Limit calculation shall be modeled, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.3. Modeling Transmission Constraints in Neighboring Control Areas.

The ISO will review annually NPCC’s assumptions regarding transmission constraints in all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas that are modeled for the tie benefits calculations. In the event that NPCC models a transmission constraint in one of the modeled neighboring Control Areas, the ISO will perform an evaluation to determine which interfaces are most critical to the ability of the neighboring Control Area to reliably provide tie benefits to New England from both operational and planning perspectives, and will model those transmission constraints in the tie benefits calculation, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.4. Other Modeling Assumptions.

- A. External transfer capability determinations. The transfer capability of all external interconnections with New England will be determined using studies that take account of the load, resource and other electrical system conditions that are consistent with those expected during the Capacity Commitment Period for which the calculation is being performed. Transfer capability studies will be performed using simulations that consider the contingencies enumerated in sub-section (iii) below.

- (i) The transmission system will be modeled using the following conditions:
 - 1. The forecast 90/10 peak load conditions for the Capacity Commitment Period;
 - 2. Qualified Existing Generating Capacity Resources reflecting their output at their Capacity Network Resource level;
 - 3. Qualified Existing Demand Capacity Resources reflecting their Capacity Supply Obligation received in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction;
 - 4. Transfers on the transmission system that impact the transfer capability of the interconnection under study.
- (ii) The system will be modeled in a manner that reflects the design of the interconnection. If an interconnection and its supporting system upgrades were designed to provide incremental capacity into the New England Control Area, simulations will assume imports up to the level that the interconnection was designed to support. If the interconnection was not designed to be so comparably integrated, simulations will determine the amount of power that can be delivered into New England over the interconnection.
- (iii) The simulations will take into account contingencies that address a fault on a generator or transmission facility, loss of an element without a fault, and circuit breaker failure following the loss of an element or an association with the operation of a special protection system.

B. In calculating tie benefits, New England capacity exports are removed from the internal capacity resources and are modeled as a resource in the receiving Control Area. The transfer capability of external interconnections is not adjusted to account for capacity exports.

III.12.9.2.5. Procedures for Adding or Removing Capacity from Control Areas to Meet the 0.1 Days Per Year LOLE Standard.

In calculating tie benefits, capacity shall be added or removed from the interconnected system of New England and its neighboring Control Areas, until the LOLE of New England and the LOLE of each Control Area of the interconnected system equals 0.1 days per year simultaneously. The following procedures shall be used to add or remove capacity within New England and the interconnected Control Areas to achieve that goal.

A. Adding Proxy Units within New England when the New England system is short of capacity. In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is

short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, proxy units (with the characteristics identified in Section III.12.7.1) will be added to the sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmission constraints within New England, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then proxy units will be added to the entire Control Area. If, as a result of the addition of one or more proxy units, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(b) will be used to remove the surplus capacity.

- B. Removing capacity from New England when the New England system is surplus of capacity.** In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in these surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the ~~Existing~~ Qualified Capacity, and any amount of proxy units added in that sub-area that is above its 50-50 peak load forecast. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratios described above for the removal of capacity surplus. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then the surplus capacity shall be removed from the entire Control Area.
- C. Adding capacity within neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, additional capacity will be added to the neighboring Control Area's sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmissions constraints, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the Control Area, then capacity will be added to the entire Control Area. The process that the neighboring Control Area utilizes in its resource adequacy study to meet its resource adequacy criterion will be utilized to add capacity to that Control Area. In filing the Installed Capacity Requirement values pursuant to Section III.12.3, the ISO will provide citations to any resource adequacy studies relied upon for these purposes. If, as a result of the capacity addition, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(d) shall be used to remove the surplus capacity.

D. Removing capacity from neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control

Area is surplus of capacity. In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the neighboring Control Area's sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its 50/50 peak load forecast. For a sub-area that has a minimum locational resource requirement above its 50/50 peak load forecast, the amount of capacity surplus is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its minimum locational resource requirement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources from a sub-area will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the those remaining surplus sub-areas. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the neighboring Control Area, then the surplus capacity will be removed from the entire Control Area.

E. Maintaining the neighboring Control Area's locational resource requirements. In modeling a neighboring Control Area with internal transmission constraints, all minimum locational resource requirements in the Control Area's sub-areas as established by the neighboring Control Area's installed capacity requirement calculations shall be observed.

III.12.9.3. Calculating Total Tie Benefits.

The total tie benefits with all qualifying directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas shall be calculated by comparing the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections to neighboring Control Areas connected with the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections with neighboring Control Areas disconnected. To calculate total tie benefits:

- A.** The New England system shall be interconnected with all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas and the New England Control Area, and each neighboring Control Area shall be brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE simultaneously by adjusting the capacity of each Control Area, utilizing the methods for adding or removing capacity in Section III.12.9.2.5.
- B.** Once the interconnected system is brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE, the LOLE of the New England Control Area shall be calculated a second time, with the New England system

isolated from the rest of the interconnected system that was brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE.

- C. Total tie benefits shall be the sum of the amounts of firm capacity that needs to be added to the isolated New England Control Area at the point at which each interconnection with neighboring Control Areas interconnects in New England to bring the New England LOLE back to 0.1 days per year. This value is subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.4. Calculating Each Control Area's Tie Benefits.

III.12.9.4.1. Initial Calculation of a Control Area's Tie Benefits.

Tie benefits from each neighboring Control Area shall be determined by calculating the tie benefits for every possible interconnection state that has an impact on the tie benefit value between the New England system and the target neighboring Control Area. If two or more interconnections between New England and the target neighboring Control Area exist, then all interconnections grouped together will be used to represent the state of interconnection between New England and the target neighboring Control Area. The tie benefits from the target neighboring Control Area shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.2.

III.12.9.4.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.

If the sum of the individual Control Area tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.1 is different than the total tie benefits from all Control Areas calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3, then each Control Area's tie benefits shall be increased or decreased based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits for each individual Control Area, so that the sum of each Control Area's tie benefits, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3. The pro-rated Control Area tie benefits are subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.5. Calculating Tie Benefits for Individual Ties.

Tie benefits shall be calculated for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the extent that a discrete and material transfer capability can be identified for the interconnection or group of interconnections. All interconnections or groups of interconnections shall have equal rights in calculating individual tie benefits, with no grandfathering or incremental tie capability treatment.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits, a group of interconnections refers to two or more AC lines that operate in parallel to form a transmission interface in which there are significant overlapping contributions of each line toward establishing the transfer limit, such that the individual lines in a group of interconnections cannot be assigned individual contributions.

III.12.9.5.1. Initial Calculation of Tie Benefits for an Individual Interconnection or Group of Interconnections.

Tie benefits for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be calculated by calculating tie benefits for each possible interconnection state between the New England system and the individual interconnection or group of interconnections. The tie benefits from that interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.5.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.

If the sum of the individual interconnection's or group of interconnection's tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.1 is different than the associated Control Area's tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4, then the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in that Control Area, so that the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in the Control Area, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits for the Control Area calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4. The pro-rated tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections is subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.6. Accounting for Capacity Imports and Changes in External Transmission Facility Import Capability.

III.12.9.6.1. Accounting for Capacity Imports.

In the initial tie benefits calculations, capacity imports are modeled as internal resources in New England, and the import capability of the interconnections with neighboring Control Areas is not reduced to reflect the impact of capacity imports. After the initial tie benefits calculations, total tie benefits, tie benefits for each Control Area, and tie benefits from each individual interconnection or group of interconnections

shall be adjusted to account for capacity imports using the methodology contained in this Section III.12.9.6.1. For the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefit values calculated in accordance with Sections III.12.9.3, III.12.9.4 and III.12.9.5 respectively. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefits values calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction.

- A.** Capacity imports shall be deducted from the import capability of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections to determine the available import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections prior to accounting for tie benefits from those interconnections. The transfer capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections shall be determined using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.4.A.
- B.** If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections, as determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5, is greater than the remaining transmission import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections after accounting for capacity imports, the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the remaining transmission import capability (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2). If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections is not greater than the remaining transmission import capability after accounting for capacity imports, then the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the value determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5 (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2).
- C.** The tie benefits for each Control Area shall be the sum of the tie benefits from the individual interconnections or groups of interconnections with that Control Area, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.
- D.** The total tie benefits from all qualifying neighboring Control Areas shall be the sum of the Control Area tie benefits, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.
- E.** For purposes of determining the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under this Section III.12.9.6.1, the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Qualified Existing Import Capacity Resources for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the annual reconfiguration auctions are those Import Capacity

Resources that hold Capacity Supply Obligations for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period as of the time the tie benefits calculation is being performed for the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.12.9.6.2. Changes in the Import Capability of Interconnections with Neighboring Control Areas.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, the most recent import capability values for an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the modeling of system conditions for the tie benefits calculation. In addition, for the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, any changes to the import capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under Section III.12.9.6.1.

III.12.9.7. Tie Benefits Over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

The tie benefits from the Quebec Control Area over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.1 shall be allocated to the Interconnection Rights Holders or their designees in proportion to their respective percentage shares of the HQ Phase I and the HQ Phase II facilities, in accordance with Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.12.10. Calculating the Maximum Amount of Import Capacity Resources that May be Cleared Over External Interfaces in the Forward Capacity Auction and Reconfiguration Auctions.

For external interfaces, Import Capacity Resources shall be allowed in the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions up to the interface limit minus the tie benefits, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.9.1 or 12.9.2 over the applicable interface.

III.13.1. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity

Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than \$100 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource's winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than ~~45~~10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

- (a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;
- (b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state's mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state's renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located;

(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export De-List Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

III.13.1.1.2. Qualification Process for New Generating Capacity Resources.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor's ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the

proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the

major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is

expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific

regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.2.2.

III.13.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

- (a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.2.2.6(b);
- (b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

III.13.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

- (a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection

analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest

Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

- (a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource's claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer

to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

- (a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;
- (b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;
- (c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);
- (d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;
- (e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated

resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall

- be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- (b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.
 - (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.
 - (d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.
 - (e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.

III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.2.1. Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource's status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 25-20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity

Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2 Rationing Minimum Limit.

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating

Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
 - (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
 - (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than ~~20~~15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource's Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than ~~10~~five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than ~~15~~10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid,

Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for a Forward Capacity Auction is \$4.30/kW-month. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. When the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its

Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction

Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee ~~no later than 30 days after the ISO submits to the Commission the retirement filing~~

~~described in Section III.13.8.1(a) during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).~~ The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO's consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than ~~10 Business Days after being informed that a resource is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1~~ the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6. Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

- (i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

- (ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.
- (iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.
- (iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor-accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the

Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, that a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid is not consistent with the sum of the resource's net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid that is consistent with its determination of the foregoing. If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification

described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report net going forward costs in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid

at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula. To the extent possible, all costs and operational data used in this calculation shall be the cumulative actual data for the Existing Capacity Resource from the most recent full Capacity Commitment Period available.

$$\frac{[GFC - (IMR - PER)] \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer, kW}) \times (12, months)}$$

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are costs that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period. To the extent that the Capacity Commitment Period data used to calculate these data do not reflect known and measurable costs that would or are likely to be incurred in the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Internal Market Monitor shall also consider adjustments submitted, provided the costs are based on known and measurable conditions and supported by appropriate documentation to reflect those costs.

$CQ_{Summer, kW}$ = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative actual cost of production (total expenses related to the

production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has not indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be \$0.00. As soon as practicable, the resource's total ISO market revenues used in this calculation shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

PER = resource-specific annual peak energy rents, in dollars. As soon as practicable, this value shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

At the option of the Lead Market Participant, the cumulative production costs for each of the most recent three Capacity Commitment Periods may be submitted and the annual infra-marginal rents calculated for each year. The Lead Market Participant may then specify two of the three years to be averaged and subsequently used as the IMR value. Upon exercising such option, the PER value used shall be an average of the PER values for the two years selected

InfIndex = inflation index. $\text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4$

Where: "i" is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant's submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or

do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows over the resource's remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource's expected terminal value, using the resource's discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource's Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

Expected net operating profit, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant's expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

Expected capacity revenues, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market

Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor's estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life.

Expected capital expenditures, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant's expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

Expected terminal value, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource's economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource's remaining economic life, using the resource's discount rate.

Discount rate is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant's weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource's remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource's performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and

performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource's risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource's participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant's corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

Age of Existing Resource (years)	Remaining Life (years)	Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery
1 to 5	30	0.106
6 to 10	25	0.110
11 to 15	20	0.117
16 to 20	15	0.131
21 to 25	10	0.163
25 plus	5	0.264

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted

average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1 - (1 + \text{Cost Of Capital})^{-\text{Remaining Life}})}$$

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.

(a) No later than ~~90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline~~ five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid ~~and~~ Retirement De-List Bid and substitution auction test price concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:

(i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;

(ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than ~~ten~~five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones

pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New

Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than ~~45~~10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also

submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

Contract Description	MW	Contract End Date
NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC	13.2	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC	53.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag	2.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO	15.3	8/31/2025
	84.1	
VJO: Highgate — NE	Up to 225	10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)	Up to 6	October 2020
VJO: Phase I/II — NE	Up to 110	10/31/2016

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed

import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a) , III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.

The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the

Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource's estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value

of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; and for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.

A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

In the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.4. Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.5. Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

- (a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

- (a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and

winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its demand reduction value a measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource's Lead Market Participant no later than 2015 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity (which shall be the summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses); the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO's assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO's notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the

ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from eligible pre-

existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the

Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the Local Sourcing Requirement in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(e) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the capacity requirement in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in a Capacity Zone that is not export-constrained.

(f) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is for capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located inside of the export-constrained Capacity Zone or be located in any non-export constrained Capacity Zone.

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource's final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource's financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA

Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.1.7. Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource's summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

III.13.1.9. Financial Assurance.

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.1. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource's financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource's offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource's offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply

Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.1.9.2.2. Release of Financial Assurance.

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

New Generating Capacity Resources \geq 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff	New Generating Capacity Resources < 20 MW and \geq 2 MW	Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources (including Distributed Generation)		New Generating Capacity Resources < 2 MW
<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance & Intermittent Power Resources</i>	<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance & Intermittent Power Resources</i>			
\$25,000	\$7,500	\$1,000		\$500
<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>	<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>			
\$15,000	\$6,500	n/a		n/a

III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected

Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO's consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.10. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;
- (b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April-, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be ~~in June~~ 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and
- (f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

The table below shows this generic timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning in year “X”, where X is any year after 2015.

Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline	New Capacity Show-of Interest Submission Window	Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline	New Capacity Qualification Deadline	First Day of Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period	Capacity Commitment Period Begins
March (X-4)	April (X-4)	June (X-4)	June/July (X-4)	Feb. (X-3)	June X

III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

III.13.2. Annual Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.1. Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

III.13.2.2. Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

- (i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);
- (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at \$7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

- (iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

- (1) at prices above \$7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;
- (2) at prices below \$7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between \$7.03/kW-month and \$0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
 - (a) At the price of \$0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
 - (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 35,437 MW; and
 - 2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
 - (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 35,090 MW; and
 - 2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
 - (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 34,865 MW; and
 - 2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of \$7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.

- (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an

investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round's prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be P_S and P_E , respectively. Let the m prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m , where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \dots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m . Then the Project Sponsor's supply curve, for all prices strictly less than P_S but greater than or equal to P_E , shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$

where, in the first round, q_0 is the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, q_0 is the resource's quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five

prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) Bids from Existing Capacity Resources

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above;

capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to

Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same

manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

- (1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
 - (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
 - (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
- (4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
 - (i) that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
 - (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price, and also shall publish the quantity of capacity from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.** For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if both of the following two conditions are met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero, and;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If it is not the case that both of the two conditions above are satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-

constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-

TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is \$11.35/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is \$8.04/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by \$0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO's web site.

III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process ~~but,~~ excluding the offers ~~and bids~~, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired ~~or shed~~ a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or

greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.

A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid -to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. ~~Bids-De-list bids~~ with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be

reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability

Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO's filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel

security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified

as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource's Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as

follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the

Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource's cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights

for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

III.13.2.6. Capacity Rationing Rule.

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.

The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.

The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.

The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone is higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.3A. Treatment of Imports.

At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

- (a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and
- (b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and

Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

- (a) [Reserved.]
- (b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.
- (c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.
- (d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

III.13.2.8. Capacity Substitution Auctions.

III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

III.13.2.8.1.1. Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

- (i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.

- (ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
- (iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
- (iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to ~~either the Rest of Pool Capacity Zone or an import constrained Capacity Zone~~ another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction's objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers ~~and demand bids associated with Proxy De List Bids~~ will be cleared in proportion to their offer ~~or bid~~ quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource's cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction. ~~Provided the resource's winter Qualified Capacity is not zero, the pro-rata adjustment will add to the amount of the cleared offer or bid award for the months in the winter period.~~

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource's total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a) regardless of whether the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity was prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) Any portion of a resource's FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource's substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource's Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved all of the milestones specified in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2. FCM Commercial Operation no

later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction ~~and~~, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets ~~(except that a resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid that is associated with a Proxy De-List Bid and a Permanent De-List Bid which has not been elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) shall be retired only from the capacity market)~~ at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.

(a) Participant-Submitted Test Price. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

The test price for the capacity associated with a resource's demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is \$0.00/kW-month.

(b) **IMM-Determined Test Price.** The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding a Market Participant-submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant-submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor's filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).

III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction ~~may will~~ be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource's demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

(i) The portion of a resource's capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

(ii) Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

~~(b)(c)~~ After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.

III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource's compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

III.13.3.1.2. New Resources Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical

path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.1.4) is being met.

III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.

(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
- (ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.

(iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource's monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New

Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

Failure to Cover Charge Rate

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource's Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource's Capacity Supply Obligation.

Maximum Demonstrated Output

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.

At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after to June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

Generator Assets: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial

Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

Import Capacity Resources: For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

III.13.3.4A Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.

If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource's right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource's qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and instead

permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity

Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor's notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO's written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource's ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO's right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource's settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource's (or a portion of the resource's) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO's verification of the resource's summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.

III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.

III.13.7.1.1. Monthly Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction.** For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the appropriate Capacity Zone in the New England Control Area as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for

up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

III.13.7.1.2 Peak Energy Rents.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.

III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [(\text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price}) * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

$$\text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} = \text{Strike Price} + \text{Hourly PER Adjustment}$$

$$\text{Hourly PER Adjustment} = \text{average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values}$$

$$\text{Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment} = \text{MAX (Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$500/\text{MWh, 0)} + \text{MAX (Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price} - \text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$850/\text{MWh, 0)}.$$

Strike Price = as defined below

Scaling Factor = as defined below

Availability Factor = as defined below

For all other hours:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [\text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price}] * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

Strike Price = the heat rate x fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.

Scaling Factor = the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market)

and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.7.1.2.2. Monthly PER Application.

The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource's PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or greater than the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the interface} - Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the resource}] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located = [Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the interface} - Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the resource}] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.

III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWs of reduction, other than MWs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the applicable reported monthly performance value; if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

- (ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
 - (iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
 - (iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.
- (i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
 - (ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time

demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

$$(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement}) / \text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}$$

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, (i) if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score; and (ii) for any Energy Efficiency, Load Management, or Distributed Generation measures reflected as a reduction in the load forecast as described in Section III.12.8 the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$5455/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$$\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \text{ months} \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \text{ months} \times \text{FCAcp})]$$

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCACP = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCASP = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be

applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to ~~or shed by~~ resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any ~~additional~~ obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs. ~~Capacity Clearing Price.~~

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), -III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (~~adjusted-excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated~~ pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded ~~Capacity Clearing Price~~.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), -III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b),

III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded~~Capacity Clearing Price~~.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the -FCA Qualified Capacity procured or shed by from Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction; process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded~~Capacity Clearing Price~~.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity

Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the

year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with pumping of pumped hydro generators, if the resource was pumping; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as an Asset Related Demand or discrete load asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource

following AGC dispatch instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource.

The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of:

(i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone

from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained

Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine Export Interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades. Each municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as a Pool-Planned Unit in Maine shall receive specifically allocated CTRs across the Maine Export Interface equal to the applicable seasonal claimed capability of its ownership entitlements in such unit as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity

minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and
(ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

Millstone 3		Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4	Summer (MW)	Winter (MW)
Nominal Summer (MW)	1155.001	1244.275	104.000	100.000	104.000	67.400	65.300	586.725		
Nominal Winter (MW)	1155.481	1244.275	119.000	116.000	119.000	87.400	85.300	608.575		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%	58.26	63.73
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%	5.04	5.55
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.93	2.37
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%	15.49	15.64
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%	10.40	11.07
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	57.69	60.26
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%	82.98	92.77
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%	30.53	32.64
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%	4.53	5.22
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%	4.71	5.35
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	7.63	7.63
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%	5.81	6.61
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%	26.40	30.36
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%	17.01	19.33
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%	15.34	16.63

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%	24.05	24.12
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%	10.70	12.28
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%	11.67	13.63
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%	36.93	42.17
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%	21.48	24.45
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%	25.58	29.49
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.33	1.33
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%	4.82	5.53
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%	24.33	26.23
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	10.89	10.90
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%	6.60	7.38
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.25	1.25
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%	10.67	12.27
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%	6.97	7.99
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%	10.18	11.69
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%	67.51	77.27

This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (“MMWEC”) and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant (“WRC”) any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price, or, if applicable, the lower of (1) the Capacity Clearing Price and (2) the administratively-determined payment rate (due to “Inadequate Supply” or “Insufficient Competition”) that applies to certain resources for Forward Capacity Auctions conducted prior to June 2015 for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price, or, if applicable, minus the lower of (1) the Capacity Clearing Price and (2) the administratively-determined payment rate (due to “Inadequate Supply” or “Insufficient Competition”) that applies to certain resources for Forward Capacity Auctions conducted prior to June 2015 for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality

III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid, ~~and~~ Retirement De-List Bid, and substitution auction test price, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction) , with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;

(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) [reserved];

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor's determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource's long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO's determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which

resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO's filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

EXHIBIT IA

ISO NEW ENGLAND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE POLICY

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ATTACHMENT 2 - SAMPLE LETTER OF CREDIT

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EXHIBIT IA
ISO NEW ENGLAND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE POLICY

Overview

The procedures and requirements set forth in this ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall govern all Applicants, all Market Participants and all Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers. Capitalized terms used in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall have the meaning specified in Section I.

The purpose of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy is (i) to establish minimum criteria for participation in the New England Markets; (ii) to establish a financial assurance policy for Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers that includes commercially reasonable credit review procedures to assess the financial ability of an Applicant, a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to pay for service transactions under the Tariff and to pay its share of the ISO expenses, including amounts under Section IV of the Tariff, and including any applicable Participant Expenses; (iii) to set forth the requirements for alternative forms of security that will be deemed acceptable to the ISO and consistent with commercial practices established by the Uniform Commercial Code that protect the ISO and the Market Participants against the risk of non-payment by other, defaulting Market Participants or by Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers; (iv) to set forth the conditions under which the ISO will conduct business in a nondiscriminatory way so as to avoid the possibility of failure of payment for services rendered under the Tariff; and (v) to collect amounts past due, to collect amounts payable upon billing adjustments, to make up shortfalls in payments, to suspend Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers that fail to comply with the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, to terminate the membership of defaulting Market Participants and to terminate service to defaulting Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

I. GROUPS REGARDED AS SINGLE MARKET PARTICIPANTS

In the case of a group of Entities that are treated as a single Market Participant pursuant to Section 4.1 of the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement (the “RNA”), the group members shall be deemed to have elected to be jointly and severally liable for all debts to Market Participants, PTOs, Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, NEPOOL and the ISO of any of the group members. For the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the term “Market Participant” shall, in the case of a group of members that are treated as a single Market Participant pursuant to Section 4.1 of the RNA, be deemed to refer to the group of members as a whole, and any financial assurance provided

under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy will be credited to the account of the group member with the customer identification at the ISO.

II. MARKET PARTICIPANTS' REVIEW AND CREDIT LIMITS

Solely for purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy: a "Municipal Market Participant" is any Market Participant that is either (a) a Publicly Owned Entity except for an electric cooperative or an organization including one or more electric cooperatives as used in Section 1 of the RNA or (b) a municipality, an agency thereof, a body politic or a public corporation (i) that is created under the authority of any state or province that is adjacent to one of the New England states, (ii) that is authorized to own, lease and operate electric generation, transmission or distribution facilities and (iii) that has been approved for treatment as a Municipal Market Participant by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee. Market Participants that are not Municipal Market Participants are referred to as "Non-Municipal Market Participants."

A. Minimum Criteria for Market Participation

Any entity participating or seeking to participate in the New England Markets shall comply with the requirements of this Section II.A. For purposes of this Section II.A, the term "customer" shall refer to both Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers and the word "applicant" shall refer to both applicants for Market Participant status and applicants for transmission service from the ISO.

1. Information Disclosure

- (a) Each customer and applicant, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year) shall submit: (i) a list of Principals; (ii) a list of any material criminal or civil litigation involving the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant arising out of participation in any U.S. wholesale or retail energy market in the past five years; (iii) a list of sanctions involving the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets where such sanctions were either imposed in the past five years or, if imposed prior to that, are still in effect; (iv) a written summary of any bankruptcy, dissolution, merger or acquisition of the customer or applicant in the

preceding five years; and (v) a list of current retail and wholesale electricity markets-related operations in the United States, other than in the New England Markets. This information shall be treated as Confidential Information, but its disclosure pursuant to subsection (b) below is expressly permitted in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy. Customers and applicants may satisfy the requirements above by providing the ISO with filings made to the Securities and Exchange Commission or other similar regulatory agencies that include substantially similar information to that required above, provided, however, that the customer or applicant must clearly indicate where the specific information is located in those filings. An applicant that fails to provide this information will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this information by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the information to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.

- (b) The ISO will review the information provided pursuant to subsection (a) above, and will also review whether the customer or applicant or any of the Principals of the customer or applicant are included on any relevant list maintained by the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control. If, based on these reviews, the ISO determines that the commencement or continued participation of such customer or applicant in the New England Markets may present an unreasonable risk to those markets or its Market Participants, the Chief Financial Officer of the ISO shall promptly forward to the Participants Committee or its delegate, for its input, such concerns, together with such background materials deemed by the ISO to be necessary for the Participants Committee or its delegate to develop an informed opinion with respect to the identified concerns, including any measures that the ISO may recommend imposing as a condition to the commencement or continued participation in the markets by such customer or applicant (including suspension) or the ISO's recommendation to prohibit or terminate participation by the customer or applicant in the New England Markets. The ISO shall consider the input of the Participants Committee or its delegate before taking any action to address the identified concerns. If the ISO chooses to impose measures other than prohibition (in the case of an applicant) or termination (in the case of a customer) of participation in the New England Markets,

then the ISO shall be required to make an informational filing with the Commission as soon as reasonably practicable after taking such action. If the ISO chooses to prohibit (in the case of an applicant) or terminate (in the case of a customer) participation in the New England Markets, then the ISO must file for Commission approval of such action, and the prohibition or termination shall become effective only upon final Commission ruling. No action by the ISO pursuant to this subsection (b) shall limit in any way the ISO's rights or authority under any other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy.

2. Risk Management

- (a) Each customer and applicant shall submit, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year), a certificate in the form of Attachment 3 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy stating that the customer or applicant has: (i) either established or contracted for risk management procedures that are applicable to participation in the New England Markets; and (ii) has established or contracted for appropriate training of relevant personnel that is applicable to its participation in the New England Markets. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer or applicant by a Senior Officer of the customer or applicant and must be notarized. An applicant that fails to provide this certificate will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this certificate by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.
- (b) Each applicant prior to commencing activity in the FTR market shall submit to the ISO or its designee the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls applicable to its participation in the FTR market relied upon by the Senior Officer of the applicant signing the certificate provided pursuant to Section II.A.2 (a). On an annual basis (by April 30 each year), each customer with FTR transactions in any currently open month that exceed 1,000 MW per month shall submit to the ISO or its designee a certificate in the form of Attachment 5 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy stating

that, since the customer's delivery of its risk management policies, procedures, and controls or its last certificate pursuant to this Section II.A.2(b), the customer either: (i) has not made any changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls; or (ii) that changes have been made to the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls and that all such changes are clearly identified and attached to such certificate. If any such applicant fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the FTR market. If any such customer fails to provide a certificate in the form of Attachment 5 by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer, and if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within two Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B.3.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) from entering into any future transactions in the FTR system.

The ISO, at its sole discretion, may also require any applicant or customer to submit to the ISO or its designee the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls that are applicable to its participation in the New England Markets relied upon by the Senior Officer of the applicant or customer signing the certificate provided pursuant to Section II.A.2(a). The ISO may require such submissions based on identified risk factors that include, but are not limited to, the markets in which the customer is transacting or the applicant seeks to transact, the magnitude of the customer's transactions or the applicant's potential transactions, or the volume of the customer's open positions. Where the ISO notifies an applicant or customer that such a submission is required, the submission shall be due within 5 Business Days of the notice. If an applicant fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls as required, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets. If a customer fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer, and if the customer fails to submit the relevant written policies, procedures, and controls to the ISO or its designee within two Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

The applicant's or customer's written policies, procedures, and controls received by the ISO or its designee pursuant to this subsection (b) shall be treated as Confidential Information.

- (c) Where an applicant or customer submits risk management policies, procedures, and controls to the ISO or its designee pursuant to any provision of subsection (b) above, the ISO or its designee shall assess that those policies, procedures, and controls conform to prudent risk management practices, which include, but are not limited to: (i) addressing market, credit, and operational risk; (ii) segregating roles, responsibilities, and functions in the organization; (iii) establishing delegations of authority that specify which transactions traders are authorized to enter into; (iv) ensuring that traders have sufficient training in systems and the markets in which they transact; (v) placing risk limits to control exposure; (vi) requiring reports to ensure that risks are adequately communicated throughout the organization; (vii) establishing processes for independent confirmation of executed transactions; and (viii) establishing periodic valuation or mark-to-market of risk positions as appropriate.

Where, as a result of the assessment described above in this subsection (c), the ISO or its designee believes that the applicant's or customer's written policies, procedures, and controls do not conform to prudent risk management practices, then the ISO or its designee shall provide notice to the applicant or customer explaining the deficiencies. The applicant or customer shall revise its policies, procedures, and controls to address the deficiencies within 55 days after issuance of such notice. (If April 30 falls within that 55 day window, the ISO may choose not to require a separate submission on April 30 as described in subsection (b) above.) If an applicant's revised written policies, procedures, and controls do not adequately address the deficiencies identified in the notice, then the applicant will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets. If a customer's revised written policies, procedures, and controls do not adequately address the deficiencies identified in the notice, then the customer will be suspended (as described in Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

3. Communications

Each customer and applicant shall submit, on an annual basis (by April 30 each year), a certificate in the form of Attachment 3 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance

Policy stating that the customer or applicant has either established or contracted to establish procedures to effectively communicate with and respond to the ISO with respect to matters relating to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such procedures must ensure, at a minimum, that at least one person with the ability and authority to address matters related to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy on behalf of the customer or applicant, including the ability and authority to respond to requests for information and to arrange for additional financial assurance as necessary, is available from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on Business Days. Such procedures must also ensure that the ISO is kept informed about the current contact information (including phone numbers and e-mail addresses) for the person or people described above. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer or applicant by a Senior Officer of the customer or applicant and must be notarized. An applicant that fails to provide this certificate will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. If a customer fails to provide this certificate by end of business on April 30, then the ISO shall issue a notice of such failure to the customer on the next Business Day and, if the customer does not provide the certificate to the ISO within 5 Business Days after issuance of such notice, then the customer will be suspended as described in Section III.B.3 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy until the deficiency is rectified.

4. Capitalization

- (a) To be deemed as meeting the capitalization requirements, a customer or applicant shall either:
 - (i) be Rated and have a Governing Rating that is an Investment Grade Rating of BBB-/Baa3 or higher;
 - (ii) maintain a minimum Tangible Net Worth of one million dollars; or
 - (iii) maintain a minimum of ten million dollars in total assets, provided that, to meet this requirement, a customer or applicant may supplement total assets of less than ten million dollars with additional financial assurance in an amount equal to the difference between ten million dollars and the customer's or applicant's total assets in one of the forms described in Section X (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(a) shall not be counted toward

satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy).

- (b) Any customer or applicant that fails to meet these capitalization requirements will be suspended (as described in Section III.B.3.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) from entering into any future transactions of a duration greater than one month in the FTR system. Such a customer or applicant may enter into future transaction of a duration of one month or less in the FTR system. Any customer or applicant that fails to meet these capitalization requirements shall provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy equal to 25 percent of the customer's or applicant's FTR Financial Assurance Requirements. Any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(b) shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
- (c) For markets other than the FTR market:
 - (i) Where a customer or applicant fails to meet the capitalization requirements, the customer or applicant will be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy in an amount equal to 25 percent of the customer's or applicant's total financial assurance requirement (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements).
 - (ii) An applicant that fails to provide the full amount of additional financial assurance required as described in subsection (i) above will be prohibited from participating in the New England Markets until the deficiency is rectified. For a customer, failure to provide the full amount of additional financial assurance required as described in subsection (i) above will have the same effect and will trigger the same consequences as exceeding the "100 Percent Test" as described in Section III.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
 - (iii) Any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.A.4(c) shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

5. Additional Eligibility Requirements

All customers and applicants shall at all times be:

- (a) An “appropriate person,” as defined in sections 4(c)(3)(A) through (J) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.*);
- (b) An “eligible contract participant,” as defined in section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act and in 17 CFR § 1.3(m); or
- (c) A “person who actively participates in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy,” as defined in the Final Order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission published at 78 FR 19880 (April 2, 2013).

Each customer must demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 by submitting to the ISO on or before September 15, 2013 a certificate in the form of Attachment 4 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that (i) certifies that the customer is now and in good faith will seek to remain in compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 and (ii) further certifies that if it no longer satisfies these requirements it shall immediately notify the ISO in writing and shall immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets. If the customer is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F) of the Commodity Exchange Act, it shall accompany the certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the customer’s total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the customer by a Senior Officer of the customer and must be notarized. A customer that fails to provide this certificate by September 15, 2013 shall be immediately suspended and the ISO shall initiate termination proceedings against the customer.

Each applicant must submit with its membership application a certificate in the form of Attachment 4 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that (i) certifies that

the applicant is now and in good faith will seek to remain in compliance with the requirements of this Section II.A.5 and (ii) further certifies that if it no longer satisfies these requirements it shall immediately notify the ISO in writing and shall immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets. If the applicant is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F) of the Commodity Exchange Act, it shall accompany the certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the applicant's total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. The certificate must be signed on behalf of the applicant by a Senior Officer of the applicant and must be notarized.

The ISO, at its sole discretion, may require any applicant or customer to submit to the ISO documentation in support of the certification provided pursuant to this Section II.A.5. If at any time the ISO becomes aware that a customer no longer satisfies the requirements of this Section II.A.5, the customer shall be immediately suspended and the ISO shall initiate termination proceedings against the customer.

B. Proof of Financial Viability for Applicants

Each Applicant must, with its membership application and at its own expense, submit proof of financial viability, as described below, satisfying the ISO requirements to demonstrate the Applicant's ability to meet its obligations. Each Applicant that intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or a Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 under Section II.D or Section II.E below must submit to the ISO all current rating agency reports from Standard and Poor's ("S&P"), Moody's and/or Fitch (collectively, the "Rating Agencies"). Each Applicant, whether or not it intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0, must submit to the ISO audited financial statements for the two most recent years, or the period of its existence, if less than two years, and unaudited financial statements for its last concluded fiscal quarter if they are not included in such audited annual financial statements. These unaudited statements must be certified as to their accuracy by a Senior Officer of such Applicant, which, for purposes of ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher,

or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer. These audited and unaudited statements must include in each case, but are not limited to, the following information to the extent available: balance sheets, income statements, statements of cash flows and notes to financial statements, annual and quarterly reports, and 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K Reports. If any of these financial statements are available on the internet, the Applicant may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such statement may be located and retrieved. If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO, at the ISO's sole discretion (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; or (iii) compiled statements).

In addition, each Applicant, whether or not it intends to establish a Market Credit Limit or a Transmission Credit Limit, must submit to the ISO: (i) at least one (1) bank reference and three (3) utility company credit references, or in those cases where an Applicant does not have three (3) utility company credit references, three (3) major trade payable vendor references may be substituted; and (ii) relevant information as to any known or anticipated material lawsuits, as well as any prior bankruptcy declarations by the Applicant, or by its predecessor(s), if any; and (iii) a completed ISO credit application. In the case of certain Applicants, some of the information and documentation described in items (i) and (ii) of the immediately preceding sentence may not be applicable or available, and alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO or its designee in its sole discretion.

The ISO will not begin its review of a Market Participant's credit application or the accompanying material described above until full and final payment of that Market Participant's application fee.

The ISO shall prepare a report, or cause a report to be prepared, concerning the financial viability of each Applicant. In its review of each Applicant, the ISO or its designee shall consider all of the information and documentation described in this Section II. All costs

incurred by the ISO in its review of the financial viability of an Applicant shall be borne by such Applicant and paid at the time that such Applicant is required to pay its first annual fee under the Participants Agreement. For an Applicant applying for transmission service from the ISO, all costs incurred by the ISO shall be paid prior to the ISO's filing of a Transmission Service Agreement. The report shall be provided to the Participants Committee or its designee and the affected Applicant within three weeks of the ISO's receipt of that Applicant's completed application, application fee, and Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement, unless the ISO notifies the Applicant that more time is needed to perform additional due diligence with respect to its application.

C. Ongoing Review and Credit Ratings

1. Rated and Credit Qualifying Market Participants

A Market Participant that (i) has a corporate rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (ii) has senior unsecured debt that is rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies, is referred to herein as "Rated." A Market Participant that is not Rated is referred to herein as "Unrated."

For all purposes in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, for a Market Participant that is Rated, the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant's senior unsecured debt, shall be the "Governing Rating."

A Market Participant that is: (i) Rated and whose Governing Rating is an Investment Grade Rating; or (ii) Unrated and that satisfies the Credit Threshold is referred to herein as "Credit Qualifying." A Market Participant that is not Credit Qualifying is referred to herein as "Non-Qualifying."

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, "Investment Grade Rating" for a Market Participant (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the

Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

2. Unrated Market Participants

Any Unrated Market Participant that (i) has not been a Market Participant in the ISO for at least the immediately preceding 365 days; or (ii) has defaulted on any of its obligations under the Tariff (including without limitation its obligations hereunder and under the ISO New England Billing Policy) during such 365-day period; or (iii) is an FTR-Only Customer; or (iv) does not have a Current Ratio of at least 1.0, a Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio of 0.6 or less, and an EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio of at least 2.0 must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section X below. An Unrated Market Participant that does not meet any of the conditions in clauses (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of this paragraph is referred to herein as satisfying the "Credit Threshold."

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, "Current Ratio" on any date is all of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO; "Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio" on any date is a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders' equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO; and "EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio" on any date is a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO. The "Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio" will not be considered for purposes of determining whether a Municipal Market Participant satisfies the Credit Threshold. Each of the ratios described in this paragraph shall be determined in accordance with international

accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States at the time of determination consistently applied.

3. Information Reporting Requirements for Market Participants

Each Market Participant having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis within 10 days of its becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Market Participant, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth. Unrated Market Participants having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero shall also provide additional financial statements, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to calculate such Unrated Market Participant's Current Ratio, Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio and EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio. In addition, each Market Participant having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of their becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Market Participant, balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available, then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). If any of this financial information is available on the internet, the Market Participant may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such information may be located and retrieved. If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; (iii) compiled statements; (iv) internally prepared statements; or (v) tax returns).

Except in the case of a Market Participant or Unrated Market Participant that submits audited financial statements to the ISO, financial statements submitted to the ISO pursuant to this Section II.C.3 shall be accompanied by a written statement from a Senior Officer of the Market Participant or Unrated Market Participant certifying the accuracy of those financial statements. If an attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then the written statement shall indicate the level of attestation made; if no attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then no such indication is required.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the ISO may require any Market Participant to submit the financial statements and other information described in this subsection. The Market Participant shall provide the requested statements and other information within 10 days of such request. If a Market Participant fails to provide financial statements or other information as requested and the ISO determines that the Market Participant poses an unreasonable risk to the New England Markets, then the ISO may request that the Market Participant provide additional financial assurance in an amount no greater than \$10 million, or take other measures to substantiate the Market Participant's ability to safely transact in the New England Markets (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section II.C.3 shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy). If the Market Participant fails to comply with such a request from the ISO, then the ISO may issue a notice of suspension or termination to the Market Participant. If the Market Participant fails to comply with the ISO's request within 5 Business Days from the date of issuance of the notice of suspension or termination, then the ISO may suspend or terminate the Market Participant.

A Market Participant may choose not to submit financial statements as described in this Section II.C.3, in which case the ISO shall use a value of \$0.00 for the Market Participant's total assets and Tangible Net Worth for purposes of the capitalization assessment described in Section II.A.4(a) and such Market Participant's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall be \$0.00.

A Market Participant may choose to provide additional financial assurance in an amount equal to \$10 million in lieu of providing financial statements under this Section II.C.3.

Such amount shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but shall be sufficient to meet the capitalization requirements in Section II.A.4(a)(iii).

D. Market Credit Limits

A credit limit for a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements (a "Market Credit Limit") shall be established for each Market Participant in accordance with this Section II.D.

1. Market Credit Limit for Non-Municipal Market Participants

A "Market Credit Limit" shall be established for each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant in accordance with subsection (a) below, and a Market Credit Limit shall be established for each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant in accordance with subsection (b) below.

a. Market Credit Limit for Rated Non-Municipal Market Participants

As reflected in the following table, the Market Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant (other than an FTR-Only Customer) shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table, (ii) \$50 million, or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers ("TADO").

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody's	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%

A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

An entity's "Tangible Net Worth" for purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy on any date is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity's assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity's intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

b. Market Credit Limit for Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participants

The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Tangible Net Worth, (ii) \$25 million or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of TADO. The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that does not satisfy the Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

2. Market Credit Limit for Municipal Market Participants

The Market Credit Limit for each Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be equal to the lesser of (i) 20 percent (20%) of TADO and (ii) \$25 million. The Market Credit Limit for each Non-Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be \$0. The sum

of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million.

E. Transmission Credit Limits

A “Transmission Credit Limit” shall be established for each Market Participant in accordance with this Section II.E, which Transmission Credit Limit shall apply in accordance with this Section II.E. A Transmission Credit Limit may not be used to meet FTR Financial Assurance Requirements.

1. Transmission Credit Limit for Rated Non-Municipal Market Participants

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant’s Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table or (ii) \$50 million:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody’s	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

2. Transmission Credit Limit for Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant’s Tangible Net

Worth or (ii) \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Municipal Market Participant that does not satisfy the Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

3. Transmission Credit Limit for Municipal Market Participants

The Transmission Credit Limit for each Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be equal to \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit for each Non-Qualifying Municipal Market Participant shall be \$0. The sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million.

F. Credit Limits for FTR-Only Customers

The Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit of each FTR-Only Customer shall be \$0.

G. Total Credit Limit

The sum of a Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall not exceed \$50 million and the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million. No later than five Business Days prior to the first day of each calendar quarter, and no later than five Business Days after any Affiliate change, each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant that has a Market Credit Limit and a Transmission Credit Limit shall determine the amounts to be allocated to its Market Credit Limit (up to the limit set forth in Section II.D.1.a above) and its Transmission Credit Limit (up to the limit set forth in Section II.E.1 above) such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and its Transmission Credit Limit are equal to not more than \$50 million and such that the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates do not exceed \$50 million and shall provide the ISO with that determination in writing. Each Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant may provide such determination for up to four consecutive calendar quarters. If a Rated Non-Municipal Market Participant does not provide such determination, then the ISO shall use the amounts provided for the previous calendar quarter. If no such determination is provided, then the ISO shall apply an allocation of \$25 million each to the Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit, which values shall also be used in allocating the \$50 million credit limit among Affiliates. If the sum of the amounts for Affiliates is greater than \$50 million, then the ISO shall reduce the amounts (proportionally to the amounts provided by each Affiliate,

or to the allocation applied by the ISO in the case of an Affiliate that provided no determination) such that the sum is no greater than \$50 million.

III. MARKET PARTICIPANTS' REQUIREMENTS

Each Market Participant that provides the ISO with financial assurance pursuant to this Section III must provide the ISO with financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below and in an amount equal to the amount required in order to avoid suspension under Section III.B below (the "Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement"). A Market Participant's Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement shall remain in effect as provided herein until the later of (a) 120 days after termination of the Market Participant's membership or (b) the end date of all FTRs awarded to the Market Participant and the final satisfaction of all obligations of the Market Participant providing that financial assurance; provided, however that financial assurances required by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy related to potential billing adjustments chargeable to a terminated Market Participant shall remain in effect until such billing adjustment request is finally resolved in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Billing Policy. Furthermore and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (i) any portion of any financial assurance provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that relates to a Disputed Amount shall not be terminated or returned prior to the resolution of such dispute, even if the Market Participant providing such financial assurance is terminated or voluntarily terminates its MPSA and otherwise satisfies all of its obligations to the ISO and (ii) the ISO shall not return or permit the termination of any financial assurance provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy by a Market Participant that has terminated its membership or been terminated to the extent that the ISO determines in its reasonable discretion that that financial assurance will be required under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy with respect to an unsettled liability or obligation owing from that Market Participant.

A Market Participant that knows that it is not satisfying its Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement shall notify the ISO immediately of that fact.

A. Determination of Financial Assurance Obligations

For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy:

- (i) a Market Participant's "Hourly Requirements" at any time will be the sum of (x) the Hourly Charges for such Market Participant that have been invoiced but not paid (which amount shall not be less than \$0), plus (y) the Hourly Charges for such Market

Participant that have been settled but not invoiced, plus (z) the Hourly Charges for such Market Participant that have been cleared but not settled which amount shall be calculated by the Hourly Charges Estimator. The Hourly Charges Estimator (which amount shall not be less than \$0) shall be determined by the following formula:

$$\text{Hourly Charges Estimator} = \sum_{i=t-n+1}^t \text{HC}_i \times \text{LMP ratio} \times 1.15$$

Where:

- t = The last day that such Market Participant's Hourly Charges are fully settled;
- n = The number of days that such Market Participant's Day-Ahead Energy has been cleared but not settled;
- HC = The Hourly Charges for such Market Participant for a fully settled day; and
- LMP ratio = The average Day-Ahead Prices at the New England Hub over the period of cleared but not settled n days divided by the average Day-Ahead Prices at the New England Hub over the period of most recent fully settled n days. For purposes of this Section III.A.(i), the "New England Hub" shall mean the Hub located in Western and Central Massachusetts referred to as .H.INTERNAL_HUB;

- (ii) a Market Participant's "Non-Hourly Requirements" at any time will be determined by averaging that Market Participant's Non-Hourly Charges but not include: (A) the amount due from or to such Market Participant for FTR transactions, (B) any amounts due from such Market Participant for capacity transactions, (C) any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA, (D) any amounts due for NEPOOL GIS API Fees, and (E) the amount of any Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (including the annual true-up of that amount) due from such Market Participant) over the two most recently invoiced calendar months; provided that such Non-Hourly Requirements shall in no event be less than zero;
- (iii) a Market Participant's "Transmission Requirements" at any time will be determined by averaging that Market Participant's Transmission Charges over the two most recently

invoiced calendar months; provided that such Transmission Requirements shall in no event be less than \$0.

- (iv) a Market Participant's Virtual Requirements at any time will equal the amount of all unsettled Increment Offers and Decrement Bids submitted by such Market Participant at such time (which amount of unsettled Increment Offers and Decrement Bids will be calculated by the ISO according to a methodology approved from time to time by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and posted on the ISO's website);
- (v) a Market Participant's "Financial Assurance Obligations" at any time will be equal to the sum at such time of:
 - a. such Market Participant's Hourly Requirements; plus
 - b. such Market Participant's Virtual Requirements; plus
 - c. such Market Participant's Non-Hourly Requirements times 2.5-0 (subject to Section X.D with respect to Provisional Members); plus
 - d. such Market Participant's "FTR Financial Assurance Requirements" under Section VI below; plus
 - e. such Market Participant's "FCM Financial Assurance Requirements" under Section VII below; plus
 - f. the amount of any Disputed Amounts received by such Market Participant; and
- (vi) a Market Participant's "Transmission Obligations" at any time will be such Market Participant's Transmission Requirements times 2.50.

To the extent that the calculations of the components of a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations as described above produce positive and negative values, such components may offset each other; provided, however, that a Market Participant's Financial Assurance Obligations shall never be less than zero.

B. Credit Test Calculations and Allocation of Financial Assurance, Notice and Suspension from the New England Markets

1. Credit Test Calculations and Allocation of Financial Assurance

The financial assurance provided by a Market Participant shall be applied as described in this Section.

- (a) “Market Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) divided by the sum of its Market Credit Limit and any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (b) “FTR Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s FTR Financial Assurance Requirements divided by any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (c) “Transmission Credit Test Percentage” is equal to a Market Participant’s Transmission Obligations divided by the sum of its Transmission Credit Limit and any financial assurance allocated as described in subsection (d) below.
- (d) A Market Participant’s financial assurance shall be allocated as follows:
 - (i) financial assurance shall be first allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s Market Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (ii) any financial assurance that remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (i) shall be allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s FTR Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (iii) any financial assurance that remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (ii) shall be allocated so as to ensure that the Market Participant’s Transmission Credit Test Percentage is no greater than 100%;
 - (iv) if any financial assurance remains after the allocations described in subsection (d) (iii), then that remaining financial assurance shall be allocated by repeating the steps described in subsections (d) (i), (d) (ii), and (d) (iii) to ensure that the respective test percentages are no greater than 89.99%;
 - (v) if any financial assurance remains after the allocation described in subsection (d) (iv), then that remaining financial assurance shall be allocated by repeating the steps described in subsections (d) (i), (d) (ii), and (d) (iii) to ensure that the respective test percentages are no greater than 79.99%;
 - (vi) any financial assurance that remains after the allocations described in subsection (d) (v) shall be allocated to the Market Credit Test Percentage.

2. Notices

a. 80 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%), the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant.

b. 90 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 90 percent (90%) , then, in addition to the actions to be taken when the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%), the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant. The ISO shall also issue a 90 percent (90%) notice to a Market Participant and take certain other actions under the circumstances described in Section III.B.2.c below.

c. 100 Percent Test

When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) or when the sum of the financial assurance and credit limits of a Market Participant that has financial assurance requirements equal zero, then, in addition to the actions to be taken when the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 80 percent (80%) and 90 percent (90%), (i) the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant, (ii) that Market Participant shall be immediately suspended from submitting Increment Offers and Decrement Bids until such time when its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are less than or equal to 100 percent (100%), and (iii) if sufficient financial assurance to lower the Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 100 percent (100%) or, in the case of a Market Participant that has received one to five notices that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) in the previous 365 days (not including the instant notice), sufficient financial assurance to lower such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 90 percent (90%), is not provided by 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time on the next Business Day, (a)

the event shall be a Financial Assurance Default; (b) the ISO shall issue notice thereof to such Market Participant, to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, to all members and alternates of the Participants Committee, to the New England governors and utility regulatory agencies and to the billing and credit contacts for all Market Participants, and (c) such Market Participant shall be suspended from: (1) the New England Markets, as provided below; (2) receiving transmission service under any existing or pending arrangements under the Tariff or scheduling any future transmission service under the Tariff; (3) voting on matters before the Participants Committee and NEPOOL Technical Committees; (4) entering into any future transactions in the FTR system; and (5) submitting an offer of Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or any reconfiguration auction in the Forward Capacity Market, in each case until such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are at 100 percent (100%) or less. In addition to all of the provisions above, any Market Participant that has received six or more notices in the previous 365 days that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) shall receive a notice thereof and shall be required to maintain sufficient financial assurance to keep such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage at less than or equal to 90 percent (90%). If such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 90 percent (90%), the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to such Market Participant. If sufficient financial assurance to lower such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to less than or equal to 90 percent (90%) is not provided by 8:30 a.m. Eastern Time on the next Business Day, then the consequences described in subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section III.B.2.c (iii) above shall apply until such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are at 90 percent (90%) or less.

However, when a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) or 90 percent (90%), as applicable under this Section III.B.2.c, solely because its Investment Grade Rating is downgraded by one grade and the resulting grade is BBB-/Baa3 or

higher, then (x) for five Business Days after such downgrade, such downgrade shall not by itself cause a change to such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage and (y) no notice shall be sent and none of the other actions described in this Section III.B shall occur with respect to such downgrade if such Market Participant cures such default within such five Business Day period. When a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent solely because a letter of credit is valued at \$0 prior to the termination of that letter of credit, as described in Section X.B, then the ISO, in its sole discretion, may determine that: (x) for five Business Days after such change in the valuation of the letter of credit, such valuation shall not by itself cause a change to such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage; and/or (y) no notice shall be sent and none of the other actions described in this Section III.B shall occur with respect to such valuation if such Market Participant cures such default within such five Business Day period.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Participant shall neither (x) receive a notice that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) nor (y) be suspended under this Section III.B if (i) the amount of financial assurance necessary for that Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage to get to 100 percent (100%) or lower is less than \$1,000 or (ii) that Market Participant's status with the ISO has been terminated.

3. Suspension from the New England Markets

a. General

The suspension of a Market Participant, and any resulting annulment, termination or removal of OASIS reservations, removal from the settlement system and the FTR system, suspension of the ability to offer Non-Commercial Capacity or participate in a substitution auction in the Forward Capacity Market, drawing down of financial assurance, rejection of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids, and rejection of bilateral transactions submitted to the ISO, shall not limit, in any way, the ISO's right to invoice or collect payment for any amounts owed (whether such amounts are due or becoming

due) by such suspended Market Participant under the Tariff or the ISO's right to administratively submit a bid or offer of a Market Participant's Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or any reconfiguration auction or to make other adjustments under Market Rule 1.

In addition to the notices provided herein, the ISO will provide any additional information required under the ISO New England Information Policy.

Each notice issued by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.B shall indicate whether the subject Market Participant has a registered load asset. If the ISO has issued a notice pursuant to this Section III.B and subsequently the subject Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are equal to or less than 100 percent (100%), such Market Participant may request the ISO to issue a notice stating such fact. However, the ISO shall not be obligated to issue such a notice unless, in its sole discretion, the ISO concludes that such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, and Transmission Credit Test Percentage are equal to or less than 100 percent (100%).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equals or exceeds 90 percent (90%) as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a notice will not be issued.

If a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent (100%) as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the

ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a notice will be issued only to such Market Participant, and such Market Participant shall be “suspended” as described below.

Any such suspension as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by a Market Participant, or as a result of the submission to the ISO of one or more bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party, shall take effect immediately upon submission of such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids or such bilateral transactions to remain in effect until such Market Participant is in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, notwithstanding any provision of this Section III.B to the contrary.

If a Market Participant is suspended from the New England Markets in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy, then the provisions of this Section III.B shall control notwithstanding any other provision of the Tariff to the contrary. A suspended Market Participant shall have no ability so long as it is suspended (i) to be reflected in the ISO’s settlement system, including any bilateral transactions, as either a purchaser or a seller of any products or services sold through the New England Markets (other than (A) Commercial Capacity and (B) Non-Commercial Capacity during the Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period) that cause such suspended Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO’s settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the Market Participants, (ii) to submit Demand Bids, Decrement Bids or Increment Offers in the New England Markets, (iii) to submit offers for Non-Commercial Capacity in any Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction or acquire Non-Commercial Capacity through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, or (iv) to submit supply offers or demand bids in any Forward Capacity Market substitution auction. Any transactions, including bilateral transactions with a suspended Market Participant (other than transactions for (A) Commercial Capacity and (B) Non-Commercial Capacity during the Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period) that cause such suspended Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO’s settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the other Market Participants and any Demand Bids, Decrement Bids, Increment Offers, and Export Transactions submitted by a suspended Market Participant shall be deemed to be terminated for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market clearing and the ISO’s settlement system. If a Market Participant has provided the financial

assurance required for a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, then that Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral or Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, respectively, will not be deemed to be terminated when that Market Participant is suspended.

b. Load Assets

Any load asset registered to a suspended Market Participant shall be terminated, and the obligation to serve the load associated with such load asset shall be assigned to the relevant unmetered load asset(s) unless and until the host Market Participant for such load assigns the obligation to serve such load to another asset. If the suspended Market Participant is responsible for serving an unmetered load asset, such suspended Market Participant shall retain the obligation to serve such unmetered load asset. If a suspended Market Participant has an ownership share of a load asset, such ownership share shall revert to the Market Participant that assigned such ownership share to such suspended Market Participant. If a suspended Market Participant has the obligation under the Tariff or otherwise to offer any of its supply or to bid any pumping load to provide products or services sold through the New England Markets, that obligation shall continue, but only in Real-Time, notwithstanding the Market Participant's suspension, and such offer or bid, if cleared under the Tariff, shall be effective.

c. FTRs

If a Market Participant is suspended from entering into future transactions in the FTR system, such Market Participant shall retain all FTRs held by it but shall be prohibited from acquiring any additional FTRs during the course of its suspension. It is intended that any suspension under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy will occur promptly, and the definitive timing of any such suspension shall be determined by the ISO from time to time as reported to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, and shall be posted on the ISO website.

d. Virtual Transactions

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Market Participant is suspended in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as a result of one or more Increment Offers or Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant and, but for such Increment Offers and/or Decrement Bids, such Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, then such suspension shall be limited to (i) the immediate "last in, first out" rejection of pending individual uncleared Increment Offers and Decrement Bids submitted by that Market Participant (it

being understood that Increment Offers and Decrement Bids are batched by the ISO in accordance with the time, and that Increment Offers and Decrement Bids will be rejected by the batch); and (ii) the suspension of that Market Participant's ability to submit additional Increment Offers and Decrement Bids unless and until it has complied with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, and the determination of compliance for these purposes will take into account the level of aggregate outstanding obligations of that Market Participant after giving effect to the immediate rejection of that Market Participant's Increment Offers and Decrement Bids described in clause (i).

e. Bilateral Transactions

If the sum of the financial assurance and credit limits of a Market Participant that has financial assurance requirements equals zero and that Market Participant would be in compliance with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but for the submission of bilateral transactions to the ISO to which the Market Participant is a party, or if a Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeds 100 percent as a result of one or more bilateral transactions submitted to the ISO to which the Market Participant is a party, then the consequences described in subsection (a) above shall be limited to: (i) rejection of any pending bilateral transactions to which a Market Participant is a party that cause the Market Participant to incur a financial obligation in the ISO's settlement system or any liability to the ISO, NEPOOL, or the Market Participants, such that the aggregate value of the pending bilateral transactions submitted by all Market Participants is maximized (recognizing the downstream effect that rejection of a bilateral transaction may have on the Market Credit Test Percentages, FTR Credit Test Percentages, or Transmission Credit Test Percentages of other Market Participants), while ensuring that the financial assurance requirements of each Market Participant are satisfied; and (ii) suspension of that Market Participant's ability to submit additional bilateral transactions until it has complied with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (the determination of compliance for these purposes will take into account the level of aggregate outstanding obligations of the Market Participant after giving effect to the immediate rejection of the bilateral transactions to which the Market Participant is a party as described in clause (i) above). In the case of a bilateral transaction associated with the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the ISO will provide notice to a Market Participant that would be in default of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as a result of the bilateral transaction, and the consequences described in clauses (i) and (ii) above shall only apply if the

Market Participant fails to cure its default by 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time of that same Business Day. In the case of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the consequences described in clauses (i) and (ii) above shall apply if the Market Participant does not cure its default within one Business Day after notification that a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral caused the default. Bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations and Supplemental Availability Bilaterals are not subject to the provisions of this Section III.B.3(e).

4. Serial Notice and Suspension Penalties

If either (x) a Market Participant is suspended from the New England Markets because of a failure to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirements in accordance with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (y) a Market Participant receives more than five notices that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) in any rolling 365-day period, then such Market Participant shall pay a \$1,000 penalty for such suspension and for each notice after the fifth notice in a rolling 365-day period. If a Market Participant receives a notice that its Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage has exceeded 100 percent (100%) in the same day, then only one of those notices will count towards the five notice limit. All penalties paid under this paragraph shall be deposited in the Late Payment Account maintained under the ISO New England Billing Policy.

C. Additional Financial Assurance Requirements for Certain Municipal Market Participants

Notwithstanding the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and in addition to the other obligations hereunder, a Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant that is not a municipality (which, for purposes of this Section III.C, does not include an agency or subdivision of a municipality) must provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below in an amount equal to its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements at the time of calculation, unless either: (1) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant has a corporate Investment Grade Rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies; or (2) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant has an Investment Grade Rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies for all of its rated indebtedness; or (3) that Credit Qualifying Municipal Market

Participant provides the ISO with an opinion of counsel that is acceptable to the ISO confirming that amounts due to the ISO under the Tariff have priority over, or have equal priority with, payments due on the debt on which the Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant's Investment Grade Rating is based. Each legal opinion provided under clause (3) of this Section III.C will be updated no sooner than 60 days and no later than 30 days before each reconfiguration auction that precedes a Capacity Commitment Period to which such legal opinion relates, and if that update is not provided or that update is not acceptable to the ISO, the applicable Credit Qualifying Municipal Market Participant must either satisfy one of the other clauses of this Section III.C or provide additional financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below in an amount equal to its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements at the time of calculation.

IV. CERTAIN NEW AND RETURNING MARKET PARTICIPANTS REQUIREMENTS

A new Market Participant or a Market Participant other than an FTR-Only Customer, or a Governance Only Member whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months (a "Returning Market Participant") is required to provide the ISO, for three months in the case of a new Market Participant and six months in the case of a Returning Market Participant, financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below equal to any amount of additional financial assurance required to meet the capitalization requirements described in Section II.A.4 plus the greater of (a) its Financial Assurance Requirement or (b) its "Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement." A new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement must be provided to the ISO no later than one Business Day before commencing activity in the New England Markets or commencing transmission service under the Tariff, and shall be determined by the following formula:

$$FAR = G + T + L + E$$

Where FAR is the Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement and G, T, L and E are determined by the following formulas:

$$G = (MW_g \times Hr_{DA} \times D \times 3.25) + (MW_g \times Hr_{MIS} \times S_2 \times 3.25);$$

Where:

$MW_g =$	Total nameplate capacity of the Market Participant's generation units that have achieved commercial operation;
$Hr_{DA} =$	The number of hours of generation that any such generation unit could be bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market before it could be removed if such unit tripped, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;
$D =$	The maximum observed differential between Energy prices in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Energy Markets during the prior calendar year ("Maximum Energy Price Differential"), as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;
$Hr_{MIS} =$	The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial Market Information Server ("MIS") settlement reports including projected generation activity for such units, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion; and
$S_2 =$	The per MW amount assessed pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of this Tariff, as determined by the ISO.
$T =$	$MW_t \times Hr_{MIS} \times (D + S_{2-3}) \times 3.25;$

Where: MW_t = Number of MWs to be traded in the New England Markets as reasonably projected by the new Market Participant or the Returning Market Participant;

Hr_{MIS} = The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial MIS settlement reports including projected generation activity, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

D = Maximum Energy Price Differential; and

S_{2-3} = The per MWh amount assessed pursuant to Schedules 2 and 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, as determined annually by the ISO.

$$L = (MW_1 \times LF \times Hr_{MIS} \times (EP + S_{2-3}) \times 3.25) + (MW_1 \times Hr_{MIS} \times TC \times 3.25)$$

Where:

MW_1 = MWs of Real-Time Load Obligation (as defined in Market Rule 1) of the new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant;

LF = Average load factor in New England, as determined annually by the ISO in its sole discretion;

Hr_{MIS} = The standard number of hours between generation and the issuance of initial MIS settlement reports including projected generation activity, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

EP = The average price of Energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the most recent calendar year for which information is available from the Annual Reports published by the ISO, as determined by the ISO in its sole discretion;

S_{2-3} = The per MW amount assessed pursuant to Schedules 2 and 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, as determined annually by the ISO; and

TC = The hourly transmission charges per MW_1 assessed under the Tariff (other than Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of Section II of the Tariff), as determined annually by the ISO.

$$E = (SE) \times 3.25$$

Where:

SE = Average monthly share of Participant Expenses for the applicable Sector.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV is 80 percent or more of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test

Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equaled or exceeded 80 percent (80%) under Section III.B above.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV is 90 percent or more of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage equaled or exceeded 90 percent (90%) under Section III.B above.

If a new Market Participant's or a Returning Market Participant's Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement during the time period that it is subject to this Section IV exceeds 100 percent of the available amount of the financial assurance provided by that new Market Participant or Returning Market Participant, it shall have the same effect as if such Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage, FTR Credit Test Percentage, or Transmission Credit Test Percentage exceeded 100 percent (100%) under Section III.B above.

V. NON-MARKET PARTICIPANT TRANSMISSION CUSTOMERS REQUIREMENTS

A. Ongoing Financial Review and Credit Ratings

1. Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and Transmission Customers

Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not currently have an Investment Grade Rating must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section X below.

2. Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Any Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that (i) has defaulted on any of its obligations under the Tariff (including without limitation its obligations hereunder and under the ISO New England Billing Policy) during the immediately preceding 365-day period; or (ii) does not have a Current Ratio of at least 1.0, a Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio of 0.6 or less, and an EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio of at least 2.0 must provide an appropriate form of financial assurance as described in Section

X below. An Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not meet either of the conditions described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this paragraph is referred to herein as satisfying the “NMPTC Credit Threshold.”

B. NMPTC Credit Limits

1. NMPTC Market Credit Limit

A Market Credit Limit shall be established for each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer as set forth in this Section V.B.1.

The Market Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall at any time be equal to the least of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s Tangible Net Worth (as reflected in the following table); (ii) \$50 million; or (iii) 20 percent (20%) of TADO:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody’s	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the least of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s Tangible Net Worth, (ii) \$25 million or (iii) 20 percent (20%)

of TADO. The Market Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not satisfy the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

2. NMPTC Transmission Credit Limit

A Transmission Credit Limit shall be established for each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with this Section V.B.2.

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) the applicable percentage of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth as listed in the following table or (ii) \$50 million:

<u>Investment Grade Rating</u>		<u>Percentage of Tangible Net Worth</u>
S&P/Fitch	Moody's	
AAA	Aaa	5.50%
AA+	Aa1	5.50%
AA	Aa2	4.50%
AA-	Aa3	4.00%
A+	A1	3.05%
A	A2	2.85%
A-	A3	2.60%
BBB+	Baa1	2.30%
BBB	Baa2	1.90%
BBB-	Baa3	1.20%
Below BBB-	Below Baa3	0.00%

The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall at any time be equal to the lesser of: (i) 0.50 percent (0.50% or ½ of 1%) of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth or (ii) \$25 million. The Transmission Credit Limit of each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that does not satisfy the NMPTC Credit Threshold shall be \$0.

3. NMPTC Total Credit Limit

The sum of a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall not exceed \$50 million and the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates shall not exceed \$50 million. No later than five Business Days prior to the first day of each calendar quarter, and no later than five Business Days after any Affiliate change, each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that has a Market Credit Limit and a Transmission Credit Limit shall determine the amounts to be allocated to its Market Credit Limit (up to the amount set forth in Section V.B.1 above) and its Transmission Credit Limit (up to the amount set forth in Section V.B.2 above) such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and its Transmission Credit Limit are equal to not more than \$50 million and such that the sum of the Market Credit Limits and Transmission Credit Limits of entities that are Affiliates do not exceed \$50 million and shall provide the ISO with that determination in writing. Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide such determination for up to four consecutive calendar quarters. If a Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not provide such determination, then the ISO shall use the amounts provided for the previous calendar quarter. If no such determination is provided, then the ISO shall apply an allocation of \$25 million each to the Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit, which values shall also be used in allocating the \$50 million credit limit among Affiliates. If the sum of the amounts for Affiliates is greater than \$50 million, then the ISO shall reduce the amounts (proportionally to the amounts provided by each Affiliate, or to the allocation applied by the ISO in the case of an Affiliate that provided no determination) such that the sum is no greater than \$50 million.

C. Information Reporting Requirements for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Each Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis, within 10 days of their becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth. In addition, each Rated Non-Market

Participant Transmission Customer that has an Investment Grade Rating having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of their becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available, then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). If any of this financial information is available on the internet, the Rated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide instead a letter to the ISO stating where such information may be located and retrieved.

Each Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than zero or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, on a quarterly basis, within 10 days of their becoming available and within 65 days after the end of the applicable fiscal quarter of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, its balance sheet, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to assess the Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Tangible Net Worth. Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers having a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit greater than \$0 shall also provide additional financial statements, which shall show sufficient detail for the ISO to calculate such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Current Ratio, Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio and EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio. In addition, each such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that satisfies the Credit Threshold and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than \$0 or meeting the capitalization requirements by maintaining a minimum Tangible Net Worth or minimum total assets as described in Section II.A.4(a) shall submit to the ISO, annually within 10 days of becoming available and within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year of such Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer balance sheets and income statements (balance sheets and income statements that are part of audited financial statements shall be submitted if available; if such balance sheets and income statements are not available,

then another alternative form of financial statements accepted by the ISO as described below may be submitted). Where any of the above financial information is available on the internet, the Unrated Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may provide the ISO with a letter stating where such information may be located and retrieved.

If any of the information or documentation required by this section is not available, alternate requirements may be specified by the ISO (such alternate requirements may include, but are not limited to: (i) consolidating statements or other financial statements (in the case of a stand-alone subsidiary) that are certified as to their accuracy and basis of accounting (in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States) by an officer of the entity with the title of chief financial officer or equivalent position; (ii) reviewed statements; (iii) compiled statements; (iv) internally prepared statements; or (v) tax returns).

Except in the case of a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that submits audited financial statements to the ISO, financial statements submitted to the ISO pursuant to this Section V.C shall be accompanied by a written statement from a Senior Officer of the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer certifying the accuracy of those financial statements. If an attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then the written statement shall indicate the level of attestation made; if no attestation was made by an independent accounting firm, then no such indication is required.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this subsection, the ISO may require any Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to submit the financial statements and other information described in this subsection. The Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall provide the requested statements and other information within 10 days of such request. If a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to provide financial statements or other information as requested and the ISO determines that the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer poses an unreasonable risk to the New England Markets, then the ISO may request that the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer provide additional financial assurance in an amount no greater than \$10 million, or take other measures to substantiate the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's ability to safely transact in the New England Markets (any additional financial assurance provided pursuant to this Section V.C shall not be counted

toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy). If the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with such a request from the ISO, then the ISO may issue a notice of suspension or termination to the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer. If the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with the ISO's request within 5 Business Days from the date of issuance of the notice of suspension or termination, then the ISO may suspend or terminate the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may choose not to submit financial statements as described in this Section V.C, in which case the ISO shall use a value of \$0.00 for the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's total assets and Tangible Net Worth for purposes of the capitalization assessment described in Section II.A.4(a) and such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Market Credit Limit and Transmission Credit Limit shall be \$0.00.

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may choose to provide additional financial assurance in an amount equal to \$10 million in lieu of providing financial statements under this Section V.C. Such amount shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy but shall be sufficient to meet the capitalization requirements in Section II.A.4(a)(iii).

D. Financial Assurance Requirement for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that provides additional financial assurance pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy must provide the ISO with financial assurance in one of the forms described in Section X below and in the amount described in this Section V.D (the "NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement").

1. Financial Assurance for ISO Charges

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer must provide the ISO with additional financial assurance such that the sum of its Market Credit Limit and that additional financial assurance shall at all times be at least equal to the sum of:

- (i) two and one-half (2.5) times the average monthly Non-Hourly Charges for such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over the two most recently invoiced calendar months (which amount shall not in any event be less than \$0); plus
- (ii) amount of any unresolved Disputed Amounts received by such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

2. Financial Assurance for Transmission Charges

Each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer must provide the ISO with additional financial assurance hereunder such that the sum of (x) its Transmission Credit Limit and (y) the excess of (A) the available amount of the additional financial assurance provided by that Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over (B) the amount of that additional financial assurance needed to satisfy the requirements of Section V.D.1 above is equal to two and one-half (2.5) times the average monthly Transmission Charges for such Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer over the two most recently invoiced calendar months (which amount shall not in any event be less than \$0)

3. Notice of Failure to Satisfy NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement

A Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that knows or can reasonably be expected to know that it is not satisfying its NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement shall notify the ISO immediately of that fact. Without limiting the availability of any other remedy or right hereunder, failure by any Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to comply with the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (including failure to satisfy its NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement) may result in the commencement of termination of service proceedings against that non-complying Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

VI. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FTR TRANSACTIONS

Market Participants must complete an ISO-prescribed training course prior to participating in the FTR Auction. All Market Participants transacting in the FTR Auction that are otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including all FTR-Only Customers (“Designated FTR Participants”) are required to provide financial assurance in an amount equal to the sum of the FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance, the FTR Bid Financial Assurance, the FTR Award Financial Assurance and the Settlement Financial Assurance, each as

described in this Section VI (such sum being referred to in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as the “FTR Financial Assurance Requirements”).

A. FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to provide “FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance” for each bid it submits into an FTR Auction and for each bid that is awarded to it in an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance for each FTR bid or awarded FTR bid shall be based upon the node(s)-specific on-peak and off-peak proxy value to which such FTR bid or awarded FTR bid relates (the “Nodal Amount”) multiplied by the number of MW-months included in the Designated FTR Participant’s bid or remaining in the awarded FTR bid. The Nodal Amount for each node shall be determined from time to time by the ISO based on historical data for that node according to a methodology approved from time to time by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and shall be posted on the ISO’s website. Such Nodal Amounts may be adjusted from time to time. In no event will the FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance be less than \$0.

B. FTR Bid Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to provide “FTR Bid Financial Assurance” for each bid it submits into an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Bid Financial Assurance for any FTR Auction is the maximum dollar value of the bids submitted by such Designated FTR Participant in such FTR Auction at the time such FTR Auction closes. For purposes of calculating FTR Bid Financial Assurance, negative bids are treated as having a value of \$0.

C. FTR Award Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant is required to maintain, at all times, “FTR Award Financial Assurance” for each FTR awarded to it in an FTR Auction. The amount of a Designated FTR Participant’s FTR Award Financial Assurance shall be the total dollar amount of any FTRs awarded to that Designated FTR Participant in any FTR Auctions. Once an FTR is awarded, the FTR Bid Financial Assurance that relates to the bid for that FTR will be converted to the FTR Award Financial Assurance related to such awarded FTR. The required amount of the FTR Award Financial Assurance will be based on the amount of the awarded FTR, not the FTR Bid Financial Assurance, and will decrease

proportionately as the amount due with respect to such awarded FTR decreases in a manner approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee from time to time. Unpaid credits due to a Designated FTR Participant for short-term FTR awards, and unpaid credits due to a Designated FTR Participant for long-term FTR awards for the current month only, may offset other FTR obligations for purposes of calculating that Designated FTR Participant's FTR Award Financial Assurance. In the event that, as a result of those offsets, a Designated FTR Participant's FTR Award Financial Assurance is less than \$0, those offsets may be used to reduce that Designated FTR Participant's FTR Financial Assurance Requirements or remaining Financial Assurance Requirement.

D. Settlement Financial Assurance

A Designated FTR Participant that has been awarded a bid in an FTR Auction is required to provide "Settlement Financial Assurance." The amount of a Designated FTR Participant's Settlement Financial Assurance shall be equal to the amount of any settled but uninvoiced Charges incurred by such Designated FTR Participant for FTR transactions less the settled but uninvoiced amounts due to such Market Participant for FTR transactions.

E. Consequences of Failure to Satisfy FTR Financial Assurance Requirements

If a Designated FTR Participant does not have additional financial assurance equal to its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements (in addition to its other financial assurance obligations hereunder) in place at the time an FTR Auction into which it has bid closes, then, in addition to the other consequences described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, all bids submitted by that Designated FTR Participant for that FTR Auction will be rejected. The Designated FTR Participant will be allowed to participate in the next FTR Auction held provided it meets all requirements for such participation, including without limitation those set forth herein. Each Designated FTR Participant must maintain the requisite additional financial assurance equal to its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements for the duration of the FTRs awarded to it. The amount of any additional financial assurance provided by a Designated FTR Participant in connection with an unsuccessful bid in an FTR Auction which, as a result of such bid being unsuccessful, is in excess of its FTR Financial Assurance Requirements will be held by the ISO and will be applied against future FTR bids by and awards to that Designated FTR Participant unless that Designated FTR Participant requests in writing to have such

excess financial assurance returned to it. Prior to returning any financial assurance to a Designated FTR Participant, the ISO shall use such financial assurance to satisfy any overdue obligations of that Designated FTR Participant. The ISO shall only return to that Designated FTR Participant the balance of such financial assurance after all such overdue obligations have been satisfied.

VII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FORWARD CAPACITY MARKETS

Any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in the Forward Capacity Market that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (each a “Designated FCM Participant”), is required to provide additional financial assurance meeting the requirements of Section X below in the amounts described in this Section VII (such amounts being referred to in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy as the “FCM Financial Assurance Requirements”). If the Lead Market Participant for a Resource changes, then the new Lead Market Participant for the Resource shall become the Designated FCM Participant.

A. FCM Delivery Financial Assurance

A Designated FCM Participant must include FCM Delivery Financial Assurance in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a Designated FCM Participant’s FCM Delivery Financial Assurance is negative, it will be used to reduce the Designated FCM Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (excluding FTR Financial Assurance Requirements), but not to less than zero. FCM Delivery Financial Assurance is calculated according to the following formula:

$$\text{FCM Delivery Financial Assurance} = [\text{DFAMW} \times \text{PE} \times \max[(\text{ABR} - \text{CWAP}), 0.1] \times \text{SF} \times \text{DF}] - \text{MCC}$$

Where:

MCC (monthly capacity charge) equals Monthly Capacity Payments incurred in previous months, but not yet billed. The MCC is estimated from the first day of the current delivery month until it is replaced by the actual settled MCC value when settlement is complete.

DFAMW (delivery financial assurance MW) equals the sum of the Capacity Supply Obligations of each resource in the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio for the month, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation of any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures. If the calculated DFAMW is less than zero, then the DFAMW will be set equal to zero.

PE (potential exposure) is a monthly value calculated for the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio as the difference between the Capacity Supply Obligation weighted average Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation weighted average capacity price for the portfolio, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation of any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures. The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall correspond to that used in the Forward Capacity Auction corresponding to the instant Capacity Commitment Period and the capacity prices shall correspond to those used in the calculation of the Capacity Base Payment for each Capacity Supply Obligation in the delivery month.

In the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 of Market Rule 1, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall be replaced with the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) in the above calculation until the multi-year election period expires.

ABR (average balancing ratio) is the duration-weighted average of all of the system-wide Capacity Balancing Ratios calculated for each system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition occurring in the relevant group of months in the three Capacity Commitment Periods immediately preceding the instant Capacity Commitment Period. Three separate groups of months shall be used for this purpose: June through September, December through February, and all other months. Until data exists to calculate this number, the temporary

ABR for June through September shall equal 0.90; the temporary ABR for December through February shall equal 0.70; and the temporary ABR for all other months shall equal 0.60. As actual data becomes available for each relevant group of months, calculated values for the relevant group of months will replace the temporary ABR values after the end of each group of months each year until all three years reflect actual data.

CWAP (capacity weighted average performance) is the capacity weighted average performance of the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio. For each resource in the Designated FCM Participant's portfolio, excluding any resource that has reached the annual stop-loss as described in Section III.13.7.3.2 of Market Rule 1 and, during February through May and September through November, excluding the Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures, and excluding from the remaining resources the resource having the largest Capacity Supply Obligation in the month, the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation shall be multiplied by the average performance of the resource. The CWAP shall be the sum of all such values, divided by the Designated FCM Participant's DFAMW. If the DFAMW is zero, then the CWAP is set equal to one.

The average performance of a resource is the Actual Capacity Provided during Capacity Scarcity Conditions divided by the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the equivalent hours of Capacity Scarcity Conditions in the relevant group of months in the three Capacity Commitment Periods immediately preceding the instant Capacity Commitment Period. Three separate groups of months shall be used for this purpose: June through September, December through February, and all other months. Until data exists to calculate this number, the temporary average performance for gas-fired steam generating resources, combined-cycle combustion turbines and simple-cycle combustion turbines shall equal 0.90; the temporary average performance for coal-fired steam generating resources shall equal 0.85; the temporary average performance for oil-fired steam generating resources shall equal 0.65; the temporary average performance for all other resources shall equal 1.00. As actual data for each resource becomes available for each relevant group of months, calculated values for the relevant group of months will replace the temporary average performance values after the end of each group of months each year until all three years reflect actual data. The applicable temporary average

performance value will be used for new and existing resources until actual performance data is available.

SF (scaling factor) is a month-specific multiplier, as follows:

June	2.000;
December and July	1.732;
January and August	1.414;
All other months	1.000.

DF(discount factor) is a multiplier that for the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, DF shall equal 0.75; and thereafter, DF shall equal 1.00.

B. Non-Commercial Capacity

Notwithstanding any provision of this Section VII to the contrary, a Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity for a Resource that elected existing Resource treatment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2010 will not be subject to the provisions of this Section VII.B with respect to that Resource (other than financial assurance obligations relating to transfers of Capacity Supply Obligations).

1. FCM Deposit

A Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity into any upcoming Forward Capacity Auction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the fifth (5th) Business Day after its qualification for such auction under Market Rule 1, an amount equal to \$2/kW times the Non-Commercial Capacity qualified for such Forward Capacity Auction by such Designated FCM Participant (the “FCM Deposit”).

2. Non-Commercial Capacity in Forward Capacity Auctions

a. Non-Commercial Capacity Participating in a Forward Capacity Auction Up To and Including the Eighth Forward Capacity Auction

For Non-Commercial Capacity participating in a Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the eighth Forward Capacity Auction, a Designated FCM Participant that had its supply offer of Non-Commercial Capacity accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction must include in the calculation of its Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy the following amounts at the following times:

- (i) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the fifth (5th) Business Day following announcement of the awarded supply offers in that Forward Capacity Auction, an amount equal to \$5.737 (on a \$/kW-month basis) multiplied by the number of kW of capacity awarded to that Designated FCM Participant in that Forward Capacity Auction (such amount being referred to herein as the “Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount”);
- (ii) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth (10th) Business Day prior to the next annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which such supply offer was awarded, an additional amount required to make the total amount included in the calculation of the Financial Assurance Requirement with respect to that Non-Commercial Capacity equal to two (2) times the Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount; and
- (iii) beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth (10th) Business Day prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which such supply offer was accepted, an additional amount required to make the total amount included in the calculation of the Financial Assurance Requirement with respect to that Non-Commercial Capacity equal to three (3) times the Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount.

b. Non-Commercial Capacity Participating in the Ninth Forward Capacity Auction and All Forward Capacity Auctions Thereafter

A Designated FCM Participant offering Non-Commercial Capacity into the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction an amount equal to the difference between the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price times the Non-Commercial Capacity qualified for such Forward Capacity Auction and the FCM Deposit.

Upon completion of the Forward Capacity Auction, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be recalculated according to the following formula:

Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount = NCC x NCCFCA\$ x Multiplier

Where:

NCC = the Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the Forward Capacity Auction minus any Commercial Capacity

NCCFCA\$ = the Capacity Clearing Price from the first run of the auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded

Multiplier = one at the completion of the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded; two beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the next Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded; and three beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded.

In the case of Non-Commercial Capacity that fails to become commercial by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which it was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be recalculated as follows: beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the first Business Day of the second month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Capacity Supply Obligation was awarded, the Multiplier in the recalculation of the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall be four. The Multiplier in the recalculation of the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount shall increase by one every six months thereafter until the Non-Commercial Capacity becomes commercial or the Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated.

c. Non-Commercial Capacity Deferral

Where the Commission approves a request to defer a Capacity Supply Obligation filed pursuant to Section III.13.3.7 of Market Rule 1, the Designated FCM Participant must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request to defer, an amount equal to the amount that would apply to a resource that has not achieved commercial operation one year after the start of a Capacity Commitment Period in which it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as calculated pursuant to Section VII.B.2.a or Section VII.B.2.b, as applicable.

3. Return of Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance

Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the eighth Forward Capacity Auction that is declared commercial and has had its capacity rating verified by the ISO or otherwise becomes a Resource meeting the definition of Commercial Capacity, or that is declared commercial and had a part of its capacity rating verified by the ISO and the applicable Designated FCM Participant indicates no additional portions of that Resource will become commercial, that portion of the Resource shall no longer be considered Non-Commercial Capacity under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and will instead become subject to the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy relating to Commercial Capacity; provided that in either such case, the Designated FCM Participant will need to include in the calculation of its Financial Assurance Requirement an amount attributable to any remaining Non-Commercial Capacity.

Once Non-Commercial Capacity associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter becomes commercial, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount for any remaining Non-Commercial Capacity shall be recalculated according to the process outlined above for Non-Commercial Capacity participating in the ninth Forward Capacity Auction and all Forward Capacity Auctions thereafter.

4. Credit Test Percentage Consequences for Provisional Members

If a Provisional Member is required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy solely in connection with (A) a supply offer of Non-Commercial Capacity into any Forward Capacity Auction and (B) its

obligation to pay Participant Expenses as a Provisional Member, and that Provisional Member is maintaining the amount of additional financial assurance required under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, then the provisions of Section III.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy relating to the consequences of that Market Participant's Market Credit Test Percentage equaling 80 percent (80%) or 90 percent (90%) shall not apply to that Provisional Member.

C. FCM Capacity Charge Requirements

The FCM Capacity Charge Requirements shall be calculated for the current month and all previously unbilled months. The FCM Capacity Charge Requirements shall be the product of the Estimated Capacity Load Obligation times the FCM Charge Rate for the applicable Capacity Zone. For purposes of this calculation, the FCM Charge Rate for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 for a Capacity Zone will be calculated using the same methodology described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1 for deriving the Net Regional Clearing Price, with the exceptions that the FCM Charge Rate: will not subtract PER adjustments as described in such section; and will include the balance of the CTR fund after the value of specifically allocated CTRs has been paid, as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1 of Market Rule 1, but without the adjustments for PER described in such section. For purposes of this calculation, the FCM Charge Rate for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after to June 1, 2022 for a Capacity Zone will be calculated as the sum of the charge and adjustment rates specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

D. Loss of Capacity and Forfeiture of Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance

If a Designated FCM Participant that has acquired Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Non-Commercial Capacity is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy and does not cure such default within the appropriate cure period, or if a Designated FCM Participant is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy during the period between the day that is three Business Days before the FCM Deposit is required and the first day of the Forward Capacity Auction and does not cure such default within the appropriate cure period, then: (i) beginning with the first Business Day following the end of such cure period that Designated FCM Participant will be assessed a default charge of one percent (1%) of its total Non-Commercial Capacity

Financial Assurance Amount at that time for each Business Day that elapses until it cures its default; and (ii) if such default is not cured by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the sooner of (x) the fifth Business Day following the end of such cure period or (y) the second Business Day prior to the start of the next scheduled Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction or annual Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submission (such period being referred to herein as the “Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period”), then, in addition to the other actions described in this Section VII, (A) all Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Non-Commercial Capacity that were awarded to the defaulting Designated FCM Participant in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions and that the defaulting Designated FCM Participant acquired by entering into Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be terminated; (B) the defaulting Designated FCM Participant shall be precluded from acquiring any Capacity Supply Obligation that would be associated with Non-Commercial Capacity for which the defaulting Designated FCM Participant has submitted an FCM Deposit; (C) the ISO will (1) draw down the entire amount of the FCM Deposit and the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligations and (2) issue an Invoice to the Designated FCM Participant if there is a shortfall resulting from that Designated FCM Participant’s failure to maintain adequate financial assurance hereunder or if the Designated FCM Participant used a Market Credit Limit to meet its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements; and (D) the default charges described in clause (i) above shall not be assessed to that Designated FCM Participant. All default charges collected under clause (i) above will be deposited in the Late Payment Account in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy.

If a Designated FCM Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated under Market Rule 1, the ISO will draw down the entire Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount provided by such Designated FCM Participant with respect to such terminated Capacity Supply Obligation. If the Designated FCM Participant has not provided enough financial assurance to cover the amount due (or that would have been due but for the Designated FCM Participant’s positive Market Credit Limit) with respect to such Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount, then the ISO will issue an Invoice to the Designated FCM Participant for the amount due.

E. Composite FCM Transactions

For separate resources that seek to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide that capacity (collectively, a “Composite FCM Transaction”), each Designated FCM Participant participating in that Composite FCM Transaction will be responsible for providing the financial assurance required as follows:

1. the FCM Financial Assurance Requirements for each Designated FCM Participant shall be determined solely with respect to the capacity being provided, or sought to be provided, by that Designated FCM Participant;
2. [reserved];
3. if the Composite FCM Transaction involves one or more Resources seeking to provide or providing Non-Commercial Capacity, the Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount under Section VII.B for each Designated FCM Participant with respect to that Composite FCM Transaction will be calculated based on the commercial status of the Non-Commercial Capacity cleared through the Forward Capacity Auction;
4. any Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount provided under Section VII.B by each Designated FCM Participant with respect to each Resource providing Non-Commercial Capacity in the Composite FCM Transaction will be recalculated according to Section VII.B.3 as the corresponding Resource becomes commercial; and
5. in the event that the Capacity Supply Obligation is terminated, Section VII.D shall apply only to the Non-Commercial Capacity of the Designated FCM Participant participating in the Composite FCM Transaction that has failed to satisfy its obligations, and any Invoice issued thereunder will be issued only to that Designated FCM Participant.
6. the FCM Delivery Financial Assurance calculated under Section VII.A for each Designated FCM Participant contributing resources to a Composite FCM Transaction shall be based on the Capacity Supply Obligation that is provided by that Designated FCM Participant in the current month of the Capacity Commitment Period, provided that the FCM charges incurred in previous months, but not yet paid, shall increase the FCM

Financial Assurance Requirements only of the Designated FCM Participant that incurred the charges.

F. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations

1. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations in Reconfiguration Auctions

A Designated FCM Participant that seeks to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation in a reconfiguration auction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of bidding in that reconfiguration auction, the amounts described in subsections (a) and (b) below.

- (a) For the 12 month period beginning with the current month, the sum of that Designated FCM Participant's net monthly FCM charges for each month in which the net FCM revenue results in a charge. For purposes of this subsection (a), months in this period in which that Designated FCM Participant's net FCM revenue results in a credit are disregarded (i.e., the net credits from such months are not used to reduce the amount described in this subsection (a)). The amount described in this subsection (a), if any, will increase the Designated FCM Participant's FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.
- (b) For the period including each month that is after the period described in subsection (a) above and that is included in a Capacity Commitment Period for which a Forward Capacity Auction has been conducted, the sum of that Designated FCM Participant's net monthly FCM charges for each month in which the net FCM revenue results in a charge. For this period, the sum of such charges may be offset by net credits from months in which the net FCM revenue results in a credit, but in no case will the amount described in this subsection (b) be less than zero. The amount described in this subsection (b), if any, will increase the Designated FCM Participant's FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

For purposes of these calculations, the net FCM revenue for a month shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations, demand bids and Annual Reconfiguration Transactions in the Forward Capacity Market, exclusive of any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held. Upon the completion of each reconfiguration auction, the amount to be included in the calculation of any FCM Financial Assurance

Requirements of that Designated FCM Participant shall be adjusted to reflect the cleared quantities at the zonal clearing price for all activity in that reconfiguration auction and accepted Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

2. Transfer of Capacity Supply Obligations in Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals

A Designated FCM Participant that seeks to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of the period for submission of that Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above, as applicable. If a Designated FCM Participant fails to provide the required additional financial assurance for its Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, all of those transactions will be rejected. If the Designated FCM Participant's request to transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation in a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is not accepted, it will no longer include amounts related to that Capacity Supply Obligation in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

3. Financial Assurance for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions

A Designated FCM Participant that submits an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, prior to the close of the period for submission of that Annual Reconfiguration Transaction, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above, as applicable. If a Designated FCM Participant fails to provide the required additional financial assurance for its Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, all of those transactions will be rejected. If a transaction is rejected, the Designated FCM Participant is no longer required to include amounts related to that transaction in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

4. Substitution Auctions

A Designated FCM Participant that participates in a substitution auction must include the following charges and credits in its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements.

- a. For any supply offer with at least one price-quantity pair priced less than zero must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction, amounts calculated as described in

Section VII.F.1 above. For purposes of these calculations, the maximum charge that would result from clearing any price-quantity pairs priced less than zero for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction shall be included in the amount calculated as described in Section VII.F.1(b) above, the net FCM revenue for all other months in the defined periods shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Forward Capacity Market, and any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held are excluded.

- b. A Designated FCM Participant (i) that submits a demand bid into a substitution auction for a resource that is subject to a multi-year rate pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.4 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4, (ii) for which the maximum charge that would result from clearing the capacity subject to the multi-year rate election would exceed the revenue the Designated FCM Participant will receive for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period under its multi-year rate election for the resource, (iii) must include in the calculation of its FCM Financial Assurance Requirements, beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction, amounts calculated as described in Section VII.F.1 above. For purposes of these calculations, the maximum charge that would result from clearing the capacity subject to the multi-year rate election shall be included in the amount calculated as described in Section VII.F.1(b) above, the net FCM revenue for all other months in the defined periods shall be determined by accounting for all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Forward Capacity Market, and any accrued Capacity Performance Payments on positions currently or previously held are excluded.
- c. If a Designated FCM Participant is in default under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the ISO New England Billing Policy beginning at 8 a.m. (Eastern Time) on the tenth Business Day prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and does not cure such default by the earlier of (i) the end of the appropriate cure period and (ii) 5 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the second Business Day prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction, then the defaulting Designated FCM Participant shall be precluded from submitting a supply offer or demand bid that is subject to this Section VII.F.4.

- d. Upon the completion of the substitution auction, the amount to be included in the calculation of the FCM Financial Assurance Requirements for a Designated FCM Participant as described in Section VII.F.1 above shall be adjusted to reflect all charges and credits related to the purchase or sale of Capacity Supply Obligations in the substitution auction.

VIII. [Reserved]

IX. THIRD-PARTY CREDIT PROTECTION

The ISO shall obtain third-party credit protection, in the form of credit insurance coverage, a performance or surety bond, or a combination thereof (“Credit Coverage”), on terms acceptable to the ISO in its reasonable discretion covering collectively the Credit Qualifying Rated Market Participants. The amount of the Credit Coverage shall be adjusted monthly and shall be equal to at least the sum of (x) 3.5 times the average Hourly Charges for all Credit Qualifying Market Participants within the previous fifty-two calendar weeks plus (y) 3.5 times the sum of the average Non-Hourly Charges and the average Transmission Charges for all Credit Qualifying Market Participants within the previous twelve calendar months. The Credit Coverage shall be provided by an insurance company rated “A-” or better by A.M. Best & Co. or “A” or better by S&P. The cost of the Credit Coverage obtained for each calendar year shall be allocated to all Credit Qualifying Market Participants pro rata based, for each Credit Qualifying Market Participant, on the average amount of the Invoices issued to that Credit Qualifying Market Participant under the ISO New England Billing Policy in the preceding calendar year. Each Credit Qualifying Market Participant shall provide the ISO with such information as may be reasonably necessary for the ISO to obtain the Credit Coverage at the lowest possible cost.

X. ACCEPTABLE FORMS OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

Provided that the requirements set forth herein are satisfied, acceptable forms of financial assurance include shares of registered or private mutual funds held in a shareholder account or a letter of credit, each in accordance with the provisions of this Section X. All costs associated with obtaining financial security and meeting the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy are the responsibility of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing that security (each a “Posting Entity”). Any Posting Entity requesting a change to one of the model forms attached to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy which would be specific to such Posting Entity (as opposed to a generic improvement to such form) shall, at the time of making that request, pay a \$1,000 change fee, which fee shall be deposited into the Late Payment Account maintained under the ISO New England Billing Policy.

A. Shares of Registered or Private Mutual Funds in a Shareholder Account

Shares of registered or private mutual funds in a shareholder account are an acceptable form of financial assurance provided that the Posting Entity providing such collateral (i) completes all required documentation to open an account with the financial institution selected by the ISO, after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, (ii) completes and executes a security agreement (“Security Agreement”) in the form of Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and is in compliance with the Security Agreement, and (iii) completes and executes a Control Agreement in the form posted on the ISO website and is in compliance with the Control Agreement. Any material variation from the form of Security Agreement included in Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or the form of Control Agreement posted on the ISO website must be approved by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and, in the case of the Security Agreement, filed with the Commission. To the extent any amount of shares contained in the shareholder account is no longer required hereunder, the ISO shall return such collateral to the Posting Entity providing it within four (4) Business Days of a request to do so.

If the amount of collateral maintained in the shareholder account is below the required level (including by reason of losses on investments), the Posting Entity shall immediately replenish or increase the amount to the required level. The collateral will be held in an account maintained in the name of the Posting Entity and invested in the investment selected by that Posting Entity from a menu of investment options listed at the time on the ISO’s website, which menu will be approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, with discounts applied to the investments in certain of such options if and as determined by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee. If a Posting Entity does not select an investment for its collateral, that collateral will be invested in the “default” investment option selected by the ISO and approved by the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee from time to time. Any dividends and distribution on such investment will accrue to the benefit of the Posting Entity. The ISO may sell or otherwise liquidate such investments at its discretion to meet the Posting Entity’s obligations to the ISO. In no event will the ISO or NEPOOL or any NEPOOL

Participant have any liability with respect to the investment of collateral under this Section X.A.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, an investment in shares of a registered fund in a shareholder account shall not be an acceptable form of financial assurance for a Posting Entity that is not a U.S. Person, as defined in Regulation S under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, unless the financial institution selected by the ISO allows such Posting Entity to invest in the investment options listed at the time on the ISO's website or the Posting Entity is invested in the investment options listed on the ISO's website as of March 19, 2015.

B. Letter of Credit

An irrevocable standby letter of credit provides an acceptable form of financial assurance to the ISO. For purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the letter of credit shall be valued at \$0 at the end of the Business Day that is 30 days prior to the termination of such letter of credit. If the letter of credit amount is below the required level, the Posting Entity shall immediately replenish or increase the letter of credit amount or obtain a substitute letter of credit. The account party on a letter of credit must be either the Posting Entity whose obligations are secured by that letter of credit or an Affiliate of that Posting Entity.

1. Requirements for Banks

Each bank issuing a letter of credit that serves as additional financial assurance must meet the requirements of this Section X.B.1. Each such bank must be on the ISO's "List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers." The ISO will post the current List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers on its website, and update that List and posting no less frequently than quarterly. To be included on the List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers, the bank must be organized under the laws of the United States or any state thereof, or be the United States branch of a foreign bank and either: (i) be recognized by the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") as an approved letter of credit bank; or (ii) have a minimum long-term debt rating (or, if the bank does not have minimum long-term debt rating, than a minimum corporate rating) of "A-" by S&P, or "A3" by Moody's or "A-" by Fitch so long as its letter of credit is confirmed by a bank that is recognized by NYMEX or CME as an approved letter of credit issuer as

described in clause (i) above; or (iii) have a minimum long-term debt rating (or, if the bank does not have minimum long-term debt rating, than a minimum corporate rating) of “A-” by S&P, or “A3” by Moody’s, or “A-” by Fitch and be approved by the ISO in its sole discretion (the ISO will promptly advise the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee of any additional bank approved by it under this provision). Because the ratings described in clauses (ii) and (iii) are minimum ratings, a bank will not be considered to have satisfied the requirement of those clauses if any applicable rating from the Rating Agencies falls below the levels listed in those clauses. In addition, no Posting Entity may provide a letter of credit that has been issued or confirmed by a bank that is an Affiliate of that Market Participant. If a bank that is included on the List of Eligible Letter of Credit Issuers fails to satisfy any of the criteria set forth above, the applicable Posting Entity will have five (5) Business Days from the date on which the ISO provides notice of such failure to replace the letter of credit with a letter of credit from a bank satisfying those criteria or provide other financial assurance satisfying the requirements of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. In the case of a bank that is removed from the NYMEX or CME list of approved letter of credit banks, the ISO may extend that cure period to twenty (20) Business Days in its sole discretion. The ISO must promptly advise the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee of any extension of a cure period beyond five (5) Business Days under this provision. No letter of credit bank may issue or confirm letters of credit under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy in an amount exceeding either: (i) \$100 million in the aggregate for any single Posting Entity; or (ii) \$150 million in aggregate for a group of Posting Entities that are Affiliates.

The following provisions shall apply when a bank fails to honor the terms of one or more letters of credit issued or confirmed by the bank in favor of the ISO: (i) if the bank fails to honor the terms of one letter of credit in a rolling seven hundred and thirty day period, then the ISO will issue a notice of such failure to the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee, to all members and alternates of the Participants Committee, to the New England governors and utility regulatory agencies and to the billing and credit contracts for all Market Participants; (ii) if the bank fails to honor either the terms of one letter of credit twice or the terms of two letters of credit in a rolling seven hundred and thirty day period, then the bank will no longer be eligible to issue or confirm letters of credit in favor of the ISO and any letters of credit issued or confirmed by such bank in favor of the

ISO will not be renewed. Any letter of credit provided for a new Posting Entity for the purpose of covering the Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement must have a minimum term of 120 days.

2. Form of Letter of Credit

Attachment 2 provides a generally acceptable sample “clean” letter of credit, and all letters of credit provided by Posting Entities shall be in this form (with only minor, non-material changes), unless a variation therefrom is approved by the ISO after consultation with the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee and filed with the Commission. Any letter of credit provided for a new Posting Entity must have a minimum term of 120 days. All costs incurred by the ISO in collecting on a letter of credit provided under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy shall be paid, or reimbursed to the ISO, by the Posting Entity providing that letter of credit.

C. Special Provisions for Provisional Members

Notwithstanding any other provision of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy to the contrary, due to the temporary nature of a Market Participant’s status as a Provisional Member and the relatively small amounts due from Provisional Members, any Provisional Member required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy may only satisfy the portion of that requirement attributable to Participant Expenses under the RNA by providing a cash deposit in accordance with Section X.A. Provisional Members will not have any other Non-Hourly Requirements under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a Provisional Member uses a standing instruction to pay its Invoices pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy, in order to avoid a default and/or a Late Payment Charge, the total amount of the cash deposited by that Provisional Member should be equal to the sum of (x) the Provisional Member’s Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that is attributable to Participant Expenses under the RNA and (y) the amount due from that Provisional Member on its next Invoice under that ISO New England Billing Policy (not including the amount of any Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (including the annual true-up of that amount) due from such Provisional Member). Provisional Members are also required to satisfy all other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, and any additional financial assurance required to be provided by a Provisional Member that is

not attributable to Participant Expenses may be satisfied by providing a cash deposit or letter of credit in accordance with this Section X but shall not be satisfied through the provision of the cash deposit described in this Section X.C. Without limiting or reducing in any way the requirements of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy that apply to a Provisional Member, the amount of the cash deposit initially provided by a Provisional Member that is attributable to Participant Expenses (including any amounts provided in connection with the standing instruction under the ISO New England Billing Policy described above) shall be at least \$2,500, and each Provisional Member will replenish that cash deposit to at least that \$2,500 level on December 31 of each year.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A. Obligation to Report Material Adverse Changes

Each Market Participant and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is responsible for informing the ISO in writing within five (5) Business Days of any Material Adverse Change in its financial status. A “Material Adverse Change” in financial status includes, but is not limited to, the following: a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency; being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating; a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency; a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings; the resignation of key officer(s); the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principals imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; or a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s market capitalization. A Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to timely disclose a Material Adverse Change in its financial status may result in termination proceedings by the ISO. If the ISO determines that there is a Material Adverse Change in the financial condition of a Market Participant- or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, then the ISO shall provide to that Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission

Customer a signed written notice two Business Days before taking any of the actions described below. The notice shall explain the reasons for the ISO's determination of the Material Adverse Change. After providing notice, the ISO may take one or more of the following actions: (i) require that, within two Business Days of receipt of the notice of Material Adverse Change, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer provide one of the forms of financial assurance described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and/or an additional amount of financial assurance in one of the forms of financial assurance described in Section X of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy; (ii) require that the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer cease one or more transactions in the New England Markets; or (iii) require that the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer take other measures to restore the ISO's confidence in its ability to safely transact in the New England Markets. Any additional amount of financial assurance required as a result of a Material Adverse Change shall be sufficient, as reasonably determined by the ISO, to cover the Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's potential settled and unsettled liability or obligation, provided, however, that if the additional amount of financial assurance required as a result of a Material Adverse Change is equal to or greater than \$25 million, then the Chief Financial Officer shall first consult, to the extent practicable, with the ISO's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and General Counsel. If the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with any of the requirements imposed as a result of a Material Adverse Change, then the ISO may initiate termination proceedings against the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

B. Weekly Payments

A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may request that, in lieu of providing the entire amount of one of the financial assurances set forth above to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirement, a weekly billing schedule be implemented for its Non-Hourly Charges and its Transmission Charges. The ISO may, in its discretion, agree to such a request; provided, however, that any weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges will terminate no more than six (6) months after the date on which such arrangement begins unless the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer requests an extension of

such arrangement and demonstrates to the ISO's satisfaction in its sole discretion that the termination of such arrangement and compliance with the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (including providing the full amount of its Financial Assurance Requirement) will impose a substantial hardship on the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer. Such demonstration of a substantial hardship shall be made every six (6) months after the initial demonstration, and a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges will be terminated if it fails to demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction in its sole discretion at any such six (6) month interval that compliance with the other provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy will impose a substantial hardship on it. If the ISO agrees to implement a weekly billing schedule for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges for a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall be billed weekly for such Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. The Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall pay with respect to each weekly Invoice for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges an administrative fee, determined by the ISO, to reimburse the ISO for the costs it incurs as a result of that Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement.

If a weekly billing schedule is implemented for a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges under this Section XI.B, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may be required to provide the full amount of its Financial Assurance Requirement at any time if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to pay when due any weekly Invoice. In addition, upon the termination of a Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's weekly billing arrangement for Non-Hourly Charges and Transmission Charges, the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer shall either satisfy the applicable rating requirements set forth herein, satisfy the Credit Threshold, or provide the full amount of one of the other forms of financial assurance set forth herein.

C. Use of Transaction Setoffs

In the event that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer has failed to satisfy its Financial Assurance Requirement hereunder, the ISO may retain payments due to such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, up to the amount of such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's unsatisfied Financial Assurance Requirement, as a cash deposit securing such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's obligations to the ISO, NEPOOL, the Market Participants, the PTOs and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, provided, however, that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer will not be deemed to have satisfied its Financial Assurance Requirement under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy because the ISO is retaining amounts due to it hereunder unless such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer has satisfied all of the requirements of Section X with respect to such amounts.

D. Reimbursement of Costs

Each Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that fails to perform any of its obligations under the Tariff, including without limitation those arising under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, shall reimburse the ISO, NEPOOL and each Market Participant, PTO and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer for all of the fees, costs and expenses that they incur as a result of such failure.

E. Notification of Default

In the event that a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer fails to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (a "Financial Assurance Default"), such failure continues for at least two days and notice of that failure has not previously been given, the ISO may (but shall not be required to) notify such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in writing, electronically and by first class mail sent in each case to such Market Participant's or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's billing and credit contacts or such Market Participant's member or alternate member on the Participants Committee (it being understood that the ISO will use reasonable efforts to contact all three where applicable), of such Financial Assurance Default. Either simultaneously with the giving

of the notice described in the preceding sentence or within two days thereafter (unless the Financial Assurance Default is cured during such period), the ISO shall notify each other member and alternate on the Participants Committee and each Market Participant's and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer's billing and credit contacts of the identity of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer receiving such notice, whether such notice relates to a Financial Assurance Default, and the actions the ISO plans to take and/or has taken in response to such Financial Assurance Default. In addition to the notices provided for herein, the ISO will provide any additional information required under the ISO New England Information Policy.

F. Remedies Not Exclusive

No remedy for a Financial Assurance Default is or shall be deemed to be exclusive of any other available remedy or remedies. Each such remedy shall be distinct, separate and cumulative, shall not be deemed inconsistent with or in exclusion of any other available remedy, and shall be in addition to and separate and distinct from every other remedy. A Financial Assurance Default may result in suspension of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or the commencement of termination proceedings by the ISO.

G. Inquiries and Contests

A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may request a written explanation of the ISO's determination of its Market Credit Limit, Transmission Credit Limit, Financial Assurance Requirement or Transmission Obligations, including any change thereto, by submitting that request in writing to the ISO's Credit Department, either by email at CreditDepartment@iso-ne.com or by facsimile at (413) 540-4569. That request must include the Market Participant's customer identification number, the name of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and the specific information for which the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer would like an explanation and must be submitted by the designated credit contact for that Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer as on file with the ISO. In addition, since Financial Assurance Requirements are updated at least daily, any request for an explanation relating to the calculation of, or a change in, a Financial Assurance Requirement must be submitted on the same day as that calculation or change. The ISO's response to any request under this

Section XI.G shall include an explanation of how the applicable calculation or determination was performed using the formulas and criteria in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. A Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer may contest any calculation or determination by the ISO under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy using the dispute resolution provisions of Section I.6 of the Tariff.

H. Forward Contract/Swap Agreement

All FTR transactions constitute “forward contracts” and/or “swap agreements” within the meaning of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), and the ISO shall be deemed to be a “forward contract merchant” and/or “swap participant” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of those FTR transactions. Pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the ISO Tariff and the Market Participant Service Agreement with each Market Participant, the ISO already has, and shall continue to have, the following rights (among other rights) in respect of a Market Participant default under those documents (including the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy): A) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant; B) the right to immediately proceed against any additional financial assurance provided by that Market Participant; C) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement or similar agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement or similar agreement, such arrangement to constitute a “master netting agreement” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code; and D) the right to suspend that Market Participant from entering into future transactions in the FTR system. For the avoidance of doubt, upon the commencement of a voluntary or involuntary proceeding for a Market Participant under the Bankruptcy Code, and without limiting any other rights of the ISO or obligations of any Market Participant under the Tariff (including the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy) or any Market Participant Service Agreement, the ISO may exercise any of its rights against such Market Participant, including, without limitation 1) the right to terminate and/or liquidate any FTR transaction held by that Market Participant, 2) the right to immediately proceed against any additional financial assurance provided by that Market Participant, 3) the right to set off any obligations due and owing to that Market

Participant pursuant to any forward contract, swap agreement and/or master netting agreement against any amounts due and owing by that Market Participant with respect to an FTR transaction including as a result of the actions taken by the ISO pursuant to 1) above, and 4) the right to suspend that Market Participant from entering into future transactions in the FTR system.

ATTACHMENT 1
SECURITY AGREEMENT

THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT (the “Security Agreement”) is effective as of this [__] day of [____], 20[___], by and between [INSERT NAME], a [____], having its principal office and place of business at [____] (the “Debtor”), and ISO New England Inc., a Delaware nonprofit corporation (the “Secured Party” and collectively with the Debtor, the “Parties”).

WITNESSETH:

In consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein contained, the Parties agree as follows:

1. Definitions.

a. In this Security Agreement:

- i. “Code” shall mean the Uniform Commercial Code, as enacted in the State of Connecticut and as amended from time to time.
- ii. “Collateral” shall mean (a) all cash provided, submitted, wired or otherwise transferred or deposited by the Debtor to or with the Secured Party or a financial institution, investment firm, or other designee selected by the Secured Party or acting on the Secured Party’s behalf, to hold or invest such cash deposit, from time to time in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; (b) all securities or other investment property (as defined in the Code) of the Debtor, whether or not purchased with such cash deposit, submitted, wired or otherwise transferred, deposited or maintained by the Debtor to or with the Secured Party or its designee, in each case in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; (c) all other property of Debtor submitted, pledged, assigned or otherwise transferred by the Debtor to the Secured Party or its designee, in each case, in satisfaction of, pursuant to, or in compliance with, the ISO Financial Assurance Policy; and (d) the products and proceeds of each of the foregoing.
- iii. “ISO Financial Assurance Policy” shall mean the Financial Assurance Policy in the Tariff, as amended, supplemented or restated from time to time, including but not limited to the Financial Assurance Policy in Exhibit 1A to Section I of the Tariff.

- iv. “Tariff” shall mean the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as amended, supplemented and/or restated from time to time.
 - v. “Obligations” shall mean any and all amounts due from Debtor from time to time under the Tariff.
 - vi. “Market Participants” shall have the meaning set forth in the Tariff.
 - b. Any capitalized term not defined herein that is defined in the Code shall have the meaning as defined in the Code.
2. Security Interest. To secure the payment of all Obligations of the Debtor, Debtor hereby grants and conveys to the Secured Party a security interest in the Collateral. The Debtor hereby irrevocably authorizes the Secured Party at any time and from time to time to file in any applicable filing office any initial financing statements and amendments thereto that provide any information required by part 5 of Article 9 of the Code for the sufficiency or filing office acceptance of any financing statement or amendment.
3. Debtor’s Covenants. The Debtor warrants, covenants and agrees with the Secured Party as follows:
- a. The Debtor shall perform all of the Debtor’s obligations under this Security Agreement according to its terms.
 - b. The Debtor shall defend the title to the Collateral against any and all persons and against all claims.
 - c. The Debtor shall at any time and from time to time take such steps as the Secured Party may reasonably request to ensure the continued perfection and priority of the Secured Party’s security interest in the Collateral and the preservation of its rights therein.
 - d. The Debtor acknowledges and agrees that this Security Agreement grants, and is intended to grant, a security interest in the Collateral. If the Debtor is a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or other Registered Organization (as that term is defined in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in Connecticut) the Debtor shall, at its expense, furnish to Secured Party a certified copy of Debtor’s organization documents verifying its correct legal name or, at Secured Party’s election, shall permit the Secured Party to obtain such certified copy at Debtor’s expense. From

time to time at Secured Party's election, the Secured Party may obtain a certified copy of Debtor's organization documents and a search of such Uniform Commercial Code filing offices, as it shall deem appropriate, at Debtor's expense, to verify Debtor's compliance with the terms of this Security Agreement.

- e. The Debtor authorizes the Secured Party, if the Debtor fails to do so, to do all things required of the Debtor herein and charge all expenses incurred by the Secured Party to the Debtor together with interest thereon, which expenses and interest will be added to the Obligations.
4. Debtor's Representations and Warranties. The Debtor represents and warrants to the Secured Party as follows:
- a. The exact legal name of the Debtor is as first stated above.
 - b. Except for the security interest of the Secured Party, Debtor is the owner of the Collateral free and clear of any encumbrance of any nature.
5. Non-Waiver. Waiver of or acquiescence in any default by the Debtor or failure of the Secured Party to insist upon strict performance by the Debtor of any warranties, covenants, or agreements in this Security Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of any subsequent or other default or failure. No failure to exercise or delay in exercising any right, power or remedy of the Secured Party under this Security Agreement shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any partial exercise of any right, power or remedy preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy. The failure of the Secured Party to insist upon the strict observance or performance of any provision of this Security Agreement shall not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment of such provision. The rights and remedies provided herein are cumulative and not exclusive of any other rights or remedies provided at law or in equity.
6. Events of Default. Any one of the following shall constitute an "Event of Default" hereunder by the Debtor:
- a. Failure by the Debtor to comply with or perform any provision of this Security Agreement or to pay any Obligation; or

- b. Any representation or warranty made or given by the Debtor in connection with this Security Agreement proves to be false or misleading in any material respect; or
 - c. Any part of the Collateral is attached, seized, subjected to a writ or distress warrant, or is levied upon, or comes within the possession of any receiver, trustee, custodian or assignee for the benefit of creditors.
- 7. Remedy upon the Occurrence of an Event of Default. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default the Secured Party shall, immediately and without notice, be entitled to use, sell, or otherwise liquidate the Collateral to pay all Obligations owed by the Debtor.
- 8. Attorneys' Fees, etc. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default, the Secured Party's reasonable attorneys' fees and the legal and other expenses for pursuing, receiving, taking, keeping, selling, and liquidating the Collateral and enforcing the Security Agreement shall be chargeable to the Debtor.
- 9. Other Rights.
 - a. In addition to all rights and remedies herein and otherwise available at law or in equity, upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, the Secured Party shall have such other rights and remedies as are set forth in the Tariff and ISO Financial Assurance Policy.
 - b. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy, as amended, supplemented or restated from time to time (the "ISO New England Information Policy"), Debtor hereby (i) authorizes the Secured Party to disclose any information concerning Debtor to any court, agency or entity which is necessary or desirable, in the sole discretion of the Secured Party, to establish, maintain, perfect or secure the Secured Party's rights and interest in the Collateral (the "Debtor Information"); and (ii) waives any rights it may have under the ISO New England Information Policy to prevent, impair or limit the Secured Party from disclosing such information concerning the Debtor.
- 10. PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY. DEBTOR ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT AND THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS GIVING RISE HERETO CONSTITUTE COMMERCIAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITHIN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. IN THE EVENT OF ANY LEGAL ACTION BETWEEN DEBTOR AND

THE SECURED PARTY HEREUNDER, DEBTOR HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVES ANY RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO NOTICE, PRIOR HEARING AND ANY OTHER RIGHTS IT MAY HAVE UNDER THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES, CHAPTER 903a, AS NOW CONSTITUTED OR HEREAFTER AMENDED, OR OTHER STATUTE OR STATUTES, STATE OR FEDERAL, AFFECTING PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES, AND THE SECURED PARTY MAY INVOKE ANY PREJUDGMENT REMEDY AVAILABLE TO IT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, GARNISHMENT, ATTACHMENT, FOREIGN ATTACHMENT AND REPLEVIN, WITH RESPECT TO ANY TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY (WHETHER REAL OR PERSONAL) OF DEBTOR TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT, WITHOUT GIVING DEBTOR ANY NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING.

11. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL. THE DEBTOR AND THE SECURED PARTY HEREBY EACH KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM, CROSSCLAIM AND/OR ANY FORM OF PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS SECURITY AGREEMENT OR RELATING TO ANY OBLIGATIONS SECURED HEREBY.
12. Additional Waivers. Demand, presentment, protest and notice of nonpayment are hereby waived by Debtor. Debtor also waives the benefit of all valuation, appraisal and exemption laws.
13. Binding Effect. The terms, warranties and agreements herein contained shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective Parties hereto, and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns.
14. Assignment. The Secured Party may, upon notice to the Debtor, assign without limitation its security interest in the Collateral.
15. Amendment. This Security Agreement may not be altered or amended except by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.
16. Term.

- a. This Security Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until all Obligations owed by the Debtor have been paid in full.
 - b. No termination of this Security Agreement shall in any way affect or impair the rights and liabilities of the Parties hereto relating to any transaction or events prior to such termination date, or to the Collateral in which the Secured Party has a security interest, and all agreements, warranties and representations of the Debtor shall survive such termination.
17. Choice of Law. The laws of the State of Connecticut shall govern the rights and duties of the Parties herein contained without giving effect to any conflict-of-law principles.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed and sealed this Security Agreement as of the day and year first above written.

[INSERT NAME]

By: _____

Name:

Title:

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

By: _____

Name:

Title:

ATTACHMENT 2
SAMPLE LETTER OF CREDIT

[DATE PROVIDED]

IRREVOCABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT NO.

[EXPIRATION DATE] AT OUR COUNTERS

WE DO HEREBY ISSUE AN IRREVOCABLE NON-TRANSFERABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT BY ORDER OF AND FOR THE ACCOUNT OF ON BEHALF OF [POSTING ENTITY] ("ACCOUNT PARTY") IN FAVOR OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. ("ISO") IN AN AMOUNT NOT EXCEEDING US\$ _____.00 (UNITED STATES DOLLARS _____ AND 00/100) AGAINST PRESENTATION TO US OF A DRAWING CERTIFICATE SIGNED BY A PURPORTED OFFICER OR AUTHORIZED AGENT OF THE ISO AND DATED THE DATE OF PRESENTATION CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES TO [BANK] ("BANK"), WITH REFERENCE TO IRREVOCABLE NON-TRANSFERABLE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT NO. ISSUED BY [BANK] IN FAVOR OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC. ("ISO"), THAT [POSTING ENTITY] HAS FAILED TO PAY THE ISO, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF FILED BY THE ISO, AND THUS THE ISO IS DRAWING UPON THE LETTER OF CREDIT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO \$_____."

IF PRESENTATION OF ANY DRAWING CERTIFICATE IS MADE ON A BUSINESS DAY AND SUCH PRESENTATION IS MADE AT OUR COUNTERS ON OR BEFORE 10:00 A.M. _____ TIME, WE SHALL SATISFY SUCH DRAWING REQUEST ON THE SAME BUSINESS DAY. IF THE DRAWING CERTIFICATE IS RECEIVED AT OUR COUNTERS AFTER 10:00 A.M. _____ TIME, WE WILL SATISFY SUCH DRAWING REQUEST ON THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, A BUSINESS DAY MEANS A DAY, OTHER THAN A SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, ON WHICH THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK IS NOT AUTHORIZED OR REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED. DISBURSEMENTS SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ISO.

THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPLY:

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL EXPIRE AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS [DATE] [AT LEAST 120 DAYS AFTER ISSUANCE FOR NEW POSTING ENTITIES].

THE AMOUNT WHICH MAY BE DRAWN BY YOU UNDER THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT OF ANY DRAWINGS HEREUNDER AT OUR COUNTERS. ANY NUMBER OF PARTIAL DRAWINGS ARE PERMITTED FROM TIME TO TIME HEREUNDER.

ALL COMMISSIONS AND CHARGES WILL BE BORNE BY THE ACCOUNT PARTY.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT IS NOT TRANSFERABLE OR ASSIGNABLE. THIS LETTER OF CREDIT DOES NOT INCORPORATE AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED MODIFIED, AMENDED OR AMPLIFIED BY REFERENCE TO ANY DOCUMENT, INSTRUMENT OR AGREEMENT (A) THAT IS REFERRED TO HEREIN (EXCEPT FOR THE UCP, AS DEFINED BELOW) OR (B) IN WHICH THIS LETTER OF CREDIT IS REFERRED TO OR TO WHICH THIS LETTER OF CREDIT RELATES.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, 2007 REVISION, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PUBLICATION NO. 600 (THE "UCP"), EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT TERMS HEREOF ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UCP, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ARTICLES 14(b) AND 36 OF THE UCP, IN WHICH CASE THE TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL GOVERN.

THIS LETTER OF CREDIT MAY NOT BE AMENDED, CHANGED OR MODIFIED WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE ISO AND US.

WE HEREBY ENGAGE WITH YOU THAT DOCUMENTS DRAWN UNDER AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE DULY HONORED UPON PRESENTATION AS SPECIFIED AND WE REPRESENT THAT THE ACCOUNT PARTY IS NOT AN AFFILIATE OF THE BANK.

PRESENTATION OF ANY DRAWING CERTIFICATE UNDER THIS STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT MAY BE SENT TO US BY COURIER, CERTIFIED MAIL, REGISTERED MAIL, TELEGRAM, OR FACSIMILE WITH A CONFIRMING COPY OF SUCH FACSIMILE SENT AFTER THE DRAWING BY CERTIFIED MAIL TO THE ADDRESS SET FORTH BELOW, OR SUCH OTHER ADDRESS AS MAY HEREAFTER BE FURNISHED BY US. OTHER NOTICES CONCERNING THIS STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT MAY BE SENT BY SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY TO THE RESPECTIVE ADDRESSES SET FORTH BELOW. ALL SUCH NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE WHEN ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY THE INTENDED RECIPIENT PARTY.

IF TO THE BENEFICIARY OF THIS LETTER OF CREDIT:

ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.
ATTENTION: CREDIT DEPARTMENT
1 SULLIVAN RD. HOLYOKE, MA 01040
FAX: 413-540-4569

IF TO THE ACCOUNT PARTY:

[NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[FAX]
[PHONE]

IF TO US:

[NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[FAX]
[PHONE]

[signature]

[signature]

ATTACHMENT 3

**ISO NEW ENGLAND MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR MARKET PARTICIPATION OFFICER
CERTIFICATION FORM**

Certifying Entity:	
---------------------------	--

I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of
_____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New
England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the minimum criteria
for market participation requirements set forth in Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3 of the ISO New England
Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I of the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and
Services Tariff), hereby certify that I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as
follows:

1. Certifying Entity has established or contracted for written policies, procedures, and controls
applicable to participation in the New England Markets, approved by Certifying Entity’s
independent risk management function¹, which provide an appropriate, comprehensive risk management framework that, at a minimum, clearly
identifies and documents the range of risks to which Certifying Entity is exposed, including, but
not limited to, credit risk, liquidity risk, concentration risk, default risk, operation risk, and market
risk.
2. Certifying Entity has established or contracted for appropriate training of relevant personnel that is
applicable to its participation in the New England Markets.
3. Certifying Entity has appropriate operating procedures and technical abilities to promptly and
effectively respond to all ISO New England communications and directions.

Date: _____ (Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of

¹ As used in this certification, a Certifying Entity’s “independent risk management function” can include appropriate
corporate persons or bodies that are independent of the Certifying Entity’s trading functions, such as a risk
management committee, a risk officer, a Certifying Entity’s board or board committee, or a board or committee of
the Certifying Entity’s parent company.

_____, in and for the County of _____, this _____
day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

ATTACHMENT 4

**ISO NEW ENGLAND ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
CERTIFICATION FORM**

Certifying Entity:	
---------------------------	--

I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of _____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the additional eligibility requirements set forth in Section II.A.5 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) (the “Policy”), hereby certify that I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as follows:

1. Certifying Entity is now and in good faith will seek to remain (check applicable box(es)):

☐ an “appropriate person,” as defined in section(s) [_____] of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 *et seq.*) (specify which section(s) of Commodity Exchange Act sections 4(c)(3)(A) through (J) apply)) (if Certifying Entity is relying on section 4(c)(3)(F), it shall accompany this certification with supporting documentation reasonably acceptable to the ISO, provided that letters of credit shall be in the form of Attachment 2 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and shall be in an amount equal to the difference between five million dollars and the Certifying Entity’s total assets. Any such supporting documentation shall serve to establish eligibility under this Section II.A.5 and shall not be counted toward satisfaction of the total financial assurance requirements as calculated pursuant to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy);

☐ an “eligible contract participant,” as defined in section 1a(18)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act and in 17 CFR § 1.3(m); or

☐ a “person who actively participates in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy,” as defined in the Final Order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission published at 78 FR 19880 (April 2, 2013).

2. If at any time Certifying Entity no longer satisfies the criteria in paragraph 1 above, Certifying Entity will immediately notify ISO New England in writing and will immediately cease all participation in the New England Markets.

(Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of _____, in and for the County of _____, this _____ day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

ATTACHMENT 5

**ISO NEW ENGLAND CERTIFICATE REGARDING CHANGES TO SUBMITTED RISK
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR FTR PARTICIPATION**

Certifying Entity:	
---------------------------	--

I, _____, a duly authorized Senior Officer of
_____ (“Certifying Entity”), understanding that ISO New
England Inc. is relying on this certification as evidence that Certifying Entity meets the annual certification
requirement for FTR market participation regarding its risk management policies, procedures, and controls
set forth in Section II.A.2(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy (Exhibit IA to Section I
of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) (the “Policy”), hereby certify that
I have full authority to bind Certifying Entity and further certify as follows (check applicable box):

1. ☐ There have been no changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies,
procedures, and controls applicable to the Certifying Entity’s participation in the FTR market.

OR

2. ☐ There have been changes to the previously submitted written risk management policies,
procedures, and controls applicable to the Certifying Entity’s participation in the FTR market and
such changes are clearly identified and attached hereto.*

(Signature)

Print Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Subscribed and sworn before me _____, a notary public of the State of
_____, in and for the County of _____, this _____
day of _____, 20_____.

(Notary Public Signature)

My commission expires: ____/____/____

* As used in this certificate, “clearly identified” changes may include a redline comparing the current written risk management policies, procedures, and controls and the previously submitted written risk management policies, procedures, and controls; or resubmission of the written risk management policies, procedures, and controls with a bulleted list of all changes, including section and/or page numbers.

ATTACHMENT K
REGIONAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

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APPENDIX 1 – ATTACHMENT K – LOCAL: LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS

1. Overview

This Attachment describes the regional system planning process conducted by the ISO, as well as the coordination with transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems to ensure the reliability of the New England Transmission System and compliance with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures, while accounting for market performance, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as may be agreed upon from time to time. The New England Transmission System is comprised of PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF within the New England Control Area that is under the ISO's operational authority or control pursuant to the ISO Tariff and/or various transmission operating agreements. This Attachment describes the regional system planning process for the PTF conducted by the ISO, and local system planning process conducted by the PTOs, pursuant to their responsibilities defined in the Tariff, the various transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. Additional details regarding the regional system planning process are also provided in the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, which are available on the ISO's website.

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System and neighboring systems, consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the Tariff, applicable transmission operating agreements and this Attachment. As described in this Attachment's Section 6 and Appendix 1, entitled "Attachment K -Local System Planning Process", the PTOs are responsible for the Local System Planning ("LSP") process for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. As also described in Section 6, and pursuant to the Tariff and/or transmission operating agreements, the OTOs and MTOs are required to participate in the ISO's regional system planning process for reliability purposes and to perform and/or support studies of the impact of regional system planning projects on their respective OTF and MTF.

The regional system planning process described in this Attachment provides for the ISO to undertake assessments of the needs of the PTF system on a systemwide or specific area basis. These assessments shall be referred to as Needs Assessments, as described in Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The ISO shall incorporate market responses that have met the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment into the Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the Regional System Plan ("RSP"), described below. Where market responses incorporated into the Needs Assessments or Public Policy

Transmission Studies do not eliminate or address the needs identified by the ISO in Needs Assessments, Public Policy Transmission Studies or the RSP, the ISO shall develop or evaluate, pursuant to Sections 4.2(b) or 4.3 of this Attachment, as applicable, regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified by the ISO.

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 7 of this Attachment, the ISO shall develop the RSP for approval by the ISO Board of Directors following stakeholder input through the Planning Advisory Committee established pursuant to Section 2 of this Attachment. The RSP is a compilation of the regional system planning process activities conducted by the ISO. The RSP shall address needs of the PTF system determined by the ISO through Needs Assessments initiated and updated on an ongoing basis by the ISO to: (i) account for changes in the PTF system conditions; (ii) ensure reliability of the PTF system; (iii) comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures; and (iv) account for market performance, economic, environmental and other considerations as may be agreed upon from time to time.

As more fully described in Section 3 of this Attachment, the RSP shall identify:

- (i) PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs,
- (ii) the requirements and characteristics of the types of resources that may satisfy PTF system reliability and market efficiency needs to provide stakeholders an opportunity to develop and propose efficient market responses to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments;
- (iii) regulated transmission solutions to meet the needs identified in Needs Assessments where market responses do not address such needs or additional transmission infrastructure may be required to comply with national and regional planning standards, criteria and procedures or provide market efficiency benefits in accordance with Attachment N of this OATT; and
- (iv) those projects identified through the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K.

In addition, the RSP shall also provide information on a broad variety of power system requirements that serves as input for reviewing the design of the markets and the overall economic performance of the

system. The RSP shall also describe the coordination of the ISO's regional system plans with regional, local and inter-area planning activities.

Pursuant to Section 3.6 of this Attachment, the ISO shall also develop, maintain and post on its website a cumulative list reflecting the regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to Needs Assessments (the "RSP Project List"). The RSP Project List shall be a cumulative representation of the regional transmission planning expansion efforts ongoing in New England.

1.1 Enrollment

For purposes of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to this Attachment K, and distinct from Transmission Providers as defined in Section I of this Tariff, an entity chooses to enroll by executing (or having already executed) a: (i) transmission operating agreement with the ISO, or (ii) a Market Participant Service Agreement coupled with a written notification to the ISO that the entity desires to be a transmission provider in the New England region. Such enrollment in the transmission planning region is not necessary to participate in the Planning Advisory Committee, which is open to any entity as described in Section 2.3 of this Attachment K.

1.2 A List of Entities Enrolled in the Planning Region

A list of entities enrolled in the transmission planning region as transmission providers as described in Section 1.1. above, is included as Appendix 2 of this Attachment K.

2. Planning Advisory Committee

2.1 Establishment

A Planning Advisory Committee shall be established by the ISO to perform the functions set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. It shall have a Chair and Secretary, who shall be appointed by the chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee. Before appointing an individual to the position of the Chair or Secretary, the ISO shall notify the Planning Advisory Committee of the proposed assignment and, consistent with its personnel practices, provide any other information about the individual reasonably requested by the Planning Advisory Committee. The chief executive officer of the ISO or his or her designee shall consider the input of the members of the Planning Advisory Committee in selecting, removing or replacing such officers. The Planning Advisory Committee shall be advisory only and shall have no formal voting protocol.

The ISO may form subcommittees that, at the discretion of the ISO, may report to the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.2 Role of Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee may provide input and feedback to the ISO concerning the regional system planning process, including the development of and review of Needs Assessments, the conduct of Solutions Studies, the development of the RSP, and updates to the RSP Project List. Specifically, the Planning Advisory Committee serves to review and provide input and comment on: (i) the development of the RSP, (ii) assumptions for studies, (iii) the results of Needs Assessments, Solutions Studies, and competitive solutions developed pursuant to Section 4.3 of this Attachment, (iv) potential market responses to the needs identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, and (v) Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrades Regional Planning Studies. The Planning Advisory Committee, with the assistance of and in coordination with the ISO, serves also to identify and prioritize requests for Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO, and provides input and feedback to the ISO concerning the conduct of Economic Studies and Public Policy Transmission Studies, including the criteria and assumptions for such studies. Based on input and feedback related to the regional system planning process provided by the Planning Advisory Committee to the ISO, the ISO shall consult with the appropriate NEPOOL technical committees, including but not limited to, the Markets, Reliability and Transmission Committees, on issues and concerns identified by the Planning Advisory Committee as requiring further investigation and consideration of potential changes to ISO New England Operating Documents.

2.3 Membership

Any entity, including State regulators or agencies and NESCOE, as specified in Attachment N of the OATT, may designate a member to the Planning Advisory Committee by providing written notice to the Secretary of that Committee identifying the name of the entity represented by the member and the member's name, address, telephone number, facsimile number and electronic mail address. The entity may remove or replace such member at any time by written notice to the Secretary of the Planning Advisory Committee.

2.4 Procedures

(a) Notice of Meetings

Prior to the beginning of each year, the ISO shall list on the ISO Calendar, which is available on the ISO's website, the proposed meeting dates for the Planning Advisory Committee for each month of the year. Prior to a Planning Advisory Committee meeting, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee by electronic email with the date, time, format for the meeting (i.e., in person or teleconference), and the purpose for the meeting.

(b) Frequency of Meetings

Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be held as frequently as necessary to serve the purposes stated in Section 2.2 of this Attachment and as further specified elsewhere in this Attachment, generally expected to be no less than four (4) times per year.

(c) Availability of Meeting Materials

The ISO shall post materials for Planning Advisory Committee meetings on the Planning Advisory Committee section on the ISO's website prior to meetings. The materials for the Planning Advisory Committee meetings shall be made available to the members of the Planning Advisory Committee subject to protections warranted by confidentiality requirements of the ISO New England Information Policy set forth in Attachment D of the ISO Tariff and Critical Energy Infrastructure Information ("CEII") policy as further described in Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment.

(d) Access to Planning-Related Materials that Contain CEII

CEII is defined as specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about proposed or existing critical infrastructure (physical or virtual) that:

- (i) Relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy;
- (ii) Could be useful to a person in planning an attack on critical infrastructure;
- (iii) Is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; and

- (iv) Does not simply give the location of critical infrastructure.

CEII pertains to existing and proposed system and assets, whether physical or virtual, the incapacity or destruction of which would negatively affect security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. CEII does not include information that is otherwise publicly available. Simplified maps and general information on engineering, vulnerability, or design that relate to production, generation, transportation, transmission or distribution of energy shall not constitute CEII.

Planning-related materials determined to be CEII will be posted on the ISO's password-protected website. To obtain access to planning-related materials determined to be CEII, the entity seeking to obtain such access must contact the ISO's Customer Service department. Authorized Market Participants or their representatives, such as consultants, are bound by the ISO New England Information Policy and will be able to access CEII materials through the ISO's password-protected website. State and federal governmental agency employees and their consultants will be able to access such materials through the ISO's password-protected website upon submittal of a signed non-disclosure agreement, which is available on the ISO's website. Personnel of the ERO, NPCC, other regional transmission organizations or independent system operators, and transmission owners from neighboring regions will be able to access CEII materials pursuant to governing agreements, rules and protocols. All external requests by other persons for planning-related materials determined to be CEII shall be recorded and tracked by ISO's Customer Services staff. Such requestors will be able to obtain access to CEII documents filed with the Commission pursuant to the Commission's regulations governing access to CEII. To the extent a requestor seeks access to planning-related material that is not filed with the Commission, such requestor shall comply with the requirements provided in the CEII procedures of the ISO, available on the ISO's website, prior to receiving access to CEII information. Upon compliance with the ISO's CEII procedures, the ISO shall grant the requestor access to the planning-related CEII document through direct distribution or access to the ISO password-protected website.

2.5 Local System Planning Process

The LSP process described in Appendix 1 to this Attachment applies to the transmission system planning for the Non-PTF in the New England Transmission System. The PTOs will utilize interested members of the Planning Advisory Committee for advisory stakeholder input in the LSP process that will meet, as needed, at the conclusion of, or independent of, scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. The LSP meeting agenda and meeting materials will be developed by representatives of the pertinent PTOs and PTO representatives will chair the LSP meeting. The ISO will post the LSP agenda and materials for LSP.

3. RSP: Principles, Scope, and Contents

3.1 Description of RSP

The ISO shall develop the RSP based on periodic comprehensive assessments (conducted not less than every third year) of the PTF systemwide needs to maintain the reliability of the New England Transmission System while accounting for market efficiency, economic, environmental, and other considerations, as agreed upon from time to time. The ISO shall update the RSP to reflect the results of ongoing Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment. The RSP shall also account for projected improvements to the PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability in accordance with national and regional standards and the operation of efficient markets under a set of planning assumptions.

The RSP shall, among other things:

- (i) describe, in a consolidated manner, the assessment of the PTF system needs, the results of such assessments, and the projected improvements;
- (ii) provide the projected annual and peak demands for electric energy for a five-to ten-year horizon, the needs for resources over this period and how such resources are expected to be provided;
- (iii) specify the physical characteristics of the physical solutions that can meet the needs defined in the Needs Assessments and include information on market responses that can address them; and

- (iv) provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations, operating characteristics and required availability criteria of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

The RSP shall also include a description of proposed regulated transmission solutions that, based on the Solutions Studies described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment and the competitive solution process described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, may meet the needs identified in the Needs Assessments. To this end, as further described in Section 3.6 below, the ISO shall develop and maintain a RSP Project List, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions classified, to the extent known, as Reliability Transmission Upgrades, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, and Public Policy Transmission Upgrades (which, for the foregoing types of upgrades, may include the portions of Interregional Transmission Projects located within the New England Control Area) and of External Transmission Projects. The RSP shall also provide reasons for any new regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP Project List, any change in status of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade in the RSP Project List, or for any removal of regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades from the RSP Project List that are known as of that time.

Each RSP shall be built upon the previous RSP.

3.2 Baseline of RSP

The RSP shall account for: (i) all projects that have met milestones, including market responses and regulated transmission solutions (e.g., planned demand-side projects, generation and transmission projects and Elective Transmission Upgrades) as determined by the ISO, in collaboration with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of this Attachment; and (ii) the requirements for system operation and restoration services, not including the development of a system operations or restoration plan, which is outside the scope of the regional system planning process.

3.3 RSP Planning Horizon and Parameters

The RSP shall be based on a five-to ten-year planning horizon, and reflect five-to ten-year capacity and load forecasts.

The RSP shall conform to: Good Utility Practice; applicable Commission compliance requirements related to the regional system planning process; applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of the ERO, NPCC, and any of their successors; planning criteria adopted and/or developed by the ISO; Transmission Owner criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies developed by the Transmission Owner for its facilities consistent with the ISO planning criteria, the applicable criteria of the ERO and NPCC; local transmission planning criteria; and the ISO New England Planning Procedures and ISO New England Operating Procedures, as they may be amended from time to time (collectively, the “Planning and Reliability Criteria”).

The revisions to this Attachment K submitted to comply with FERC’s Order No. 1000 shall not apply to any Proposed or Planned project included in an RSP approved by the ISO Board of Directors (or in an RSP Project List update) prior to the effective date of the Order No. 1000 compliance filing of the ISO and the PTOs, unless the ISO is re-evaluating the solution design for such project as of that effective date, or subsequently determines that the solution design for such project requires re-evaluation.

3.4 Other RSP Principles

The RSP shall be designed and implemented to: (i) avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities; (ii) identify facilities that are necessary to meet Planning and Reliability Criteria; (iii) avoid the imposition of unreasonable costs upon any Transmission Owner, Transmission Customer or other user of a transmission facility; (iv) take into account the legal and contractual rights and obligations of the Transmission Owners and the transmission-related legal and contractual rights and obligations of any other entity; (v) provide for coordination with existing transmission systems and with appropriate inter-area and local expansion plans; and (vi) properly coordinate with market responses, including, but not limited to generation, merchant transmission and demand-side responses.

3.5 Market Responses in RSP

Market responses shall include investments in resources (e.g., demand-side projects, generation and distributed generation) and Elective Transmission Upgrades and shall be evaluated by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, pursuant to Sections 4.1(f) and 7 of this Attachment.

In developing the RSP, the ISO shall account for market responses: (i) proposed by Market Participants as addressing needs (and any critical time constraints for addressing such needs) identified in an RSP, Needs Assessment, or Public Policy Transmission Study; and (ii) that have proved to be viable by meeting the criteria specified in Section 4.1(f) or 4A.3(b) of this Attachment, as applicable.

Specifically, market responses that are identified to the ISO and are determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to be sufficient to alleviate the need for a particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, based on the criteria specified in the pertinent Needs Assessment or RSP, and are judged by the ISO to be achievable within the required time period, shall be reflected in the next RSP and/or in a new or updated Needs Assessment. That particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade may continue to be included in the appropriate category on the RSP Project List (as described in Section 3.6 below), subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the project should proceed at a later date or it may be removed if it is determined to be no longer needed. If the market response does not fully address the defined needs, or if additional transmission infrastructure is required to facilitate the efficient operation of the market, the RSP shall also include that particular regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade, subject to the ISO having the flexibility to indicate that the Transmission Upgrade or regulated transmission solution should proceed at a later date and be modified, if necessary.

3.6 The RSP Project List

(a) Elements of the RSP Project List

The RSP Project List shall identify regulated transmission solutions proposed in response to the needs identified in a RSP or Needs Assessments conducted pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, and shall identify Public Policy Transmission Upgrades identified pursuant to Section 4A of this Attachment. The RSP Project List shall identify the proposed regulated transmission solutions separately as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

With regard to Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, the following subcategories will be utilized to indicate the status of each

proposed regulated transmission solution in the evaluation process. These subcategories include: (i) Concept; (ii) Proposed; (iii) Planned; (iv) Under Construction; and (v) In-Service. A Public Policy Transmission Upgrade will be identified in the RSP Project List as (i) Proposed; (ii) Planned; (iii) Under Construction; or (iv) In-Service.

The regulated transmission solution subcategories are defined as follows:

(i) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Concept” shall include a transmission project that is being considered by its proponent as a potential solution to meet a need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but for which there is little or no analysis available to support the transmission project.

(ii) For purposes of Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” shall include a regulated transmission solution that (a) has been proposed in response to a specific need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP and (b) has been evaluated or further defined and developed in a Solutions Study, as specified in Section 4.2(a) of this Attachment, or in the competitive solutions process specified in Section 4.3 of this Attachment, such that there is significant analysis that supports a determination by the ISO, as communicated to the Planning Advisory Committee, that the proposed regulated transmission solution would likely meet the need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment or the RSP, but has not received approval by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

For purposes of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, “Proposed” means that the ISO has included the project in the RSP Project List pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of this Attachment K, but that the project has not yet been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iii) “Planned” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has met the requirements for a Proposed project and has been approved by the ISO under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff.

(iv) “Under Construction” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has received the approvals required under the Tariff and engineering and construction is underway.

(v) “In Service” shall include a Transmission Upgrade that has been placed in commercial operation.

The RSP Project List shall also list External Transmission Projects for which cost allocation and, if applicable, operating agreements have been accepted by the Commission, and indicate whether such External Transmission Projects are proposed, under construction or in service.

Each Reliability Transmission Upgrade and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced to the specific systemwide or area needs identified in a Needs Assessment or RSP. Each proposed Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be cross-referenced in the RSP Project List to a specific Public Policy Transmission Study.

For completeness, the RSP Project List shall also include Elective Transmission Upgrades and transmission facilities (as determined under the ISO interconnection process specified in this OATT) to be built to accommodate new generation, and Elective Transmission Upgrades that have satisfied the requirements of this OATT.

An Interregional Transmission Project developed pursuant to Section 6.3 of this Attachment K may displace a regional Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade on the RSP Project List where the ISO has determined that the Interregional Transmission Project is a more efficient or cost-effective solution. In the case of an Interregional Transmission Project that could meet the needs met by a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade, the associated Public Policy Transmission Upgrade may be removed from the RSP Project List in the circumstances described, and using the procedures specified, in Section 4A of Attachment K.

(b) Periodic Updating of RSP Project List

The RSP Project List will be updated by the ISO periodically by adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee.

Updating of the RSP Project List shall be considered an update of the RSP to be reflected in the next RSP, as appropriate, pursuant to Section 3.1 of this Attachment.

(c) RSP Project List Updating Procedures and Criteria

As part of the periodic updating of the RSP Project List, the ISO: (i) shall modify (in accordance with the provisions of this Attachment) regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades to reflect changes to the PTF system configurations, including ongoing investments by Market Participants or other stakeholders; (ii) may add to and classify accordingly, regulated transmission solutions; (iii) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades previously identified in the RSP Project List if the ISO determines that the need for the proposed regulated transmission solution or the approved Transmission Upgrade no longer exists or is no longer feasible; and (iv) may remove from the RSP Project List regulated transmission solutions or Transmission Upgrades that have been displaced by an Interregional Transmission Project in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment. With regard to (iii) above, this may include a removal of a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade because a market response meeting the need reaches the maturity specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment and has been determined, pursuant to Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment, to meet the need described in the pertinent Needs Assessment, Public Policy Transmission Study or RSP, as applicable. In doing so, the ISO shall consult with and consider the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the Reliability Committee. In addition, the ISO shall remove from the RSP Project List any Public Policy Transmission Upgrade if the ISO determines, with input from the Planning Advisory Committee, that the need to which the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade responds no longer exists.

If a regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO, the entity responsible for the construction of the regulated

transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of the regulated transmission solution or Transmission Upgrade proposed for removal from the RSP Project List. The provisions of Schedule 12 of this OATT shall apply to any cost reimbursement under this Section. Prior to finalizing the RSP, the ISO shall provide the Planning Advisory Committee with written information explaining the reasons for any removal under this Section.

(d) Posting of LSP Project Status

Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on its company website. The ISO's posting of the RSP Project Lists will include links to each PTO's specific LSP posting to be provided to the ISO by the PTOs.

4. Procedures for the Conduct of Needs Assessments, Treatment of Market Responses and Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions

4.1 Non-Applicability of Sections 4.1 through 4.3; Needs Assessments

The reliability planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a reliability need. The market efficiency planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a market efficiency need. The public policy planning process established in this Attachment K shall apply to all transmission solutions adopted to resolve a public policy need. For needs identified initially as reliability, market efficiency or public policy needs, the collateral benefits of potential solutions to those needs shall not change the planning process applicable to those identified needs; notwithstanding the foregoing, the ISO shall report its views as to whether a project or preferred solution may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system as described in Sections 4A.5(e) or 4A.7, respectively, of this Attachment K. Sections 4.1 through 4.3 of this Attachment are not applicable to the planning of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, which is governed instead by Section 4A of this Attachment.

On a regular and ongoing basis, the ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall conduct assessments (i.e., Needs Assessments) of the adequacy of the PTF system, as a whole or in part, to maintain the reliability of such facilities while promoting the operation of efficient wholesale electric markets in New England. A Needs Assessment shall analyze whether the PTF in the New England Transmission System: (i) meet applicable reliability standards; (ii) have adequate transfer capability to support local, regional, and inter-regional reliability; (iii) support the efficient operation of the wholesale electric markets; (iv) are sufficient to integrate new resources and loads on an aggregate or regional basis; or (v) otherwise examine various aspects of its performance and capability. A Needs Assessment shall also identify: (i) the location and nature of any potential problems with respect to the PTF and (ii) situations that significantly affect the reliable and efficient operation of the PTF along with any critical time constraints for addressing the needs of the PTF to facilitate the development of market responses and to initiate the pursuit of regulated transmission solutions.

(a) Triggers for Needs Assessments

The ISO, in coordination with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall perform Needs Assessments, inter alia, if:

- (i) a need for additional transfer capability is identified by the ISO in its ongoing evaluation of the PTF's adequacy and performance;
- (ii) a need for additional transfer capability is identified as a result of an ERO and/or NPCC reliability assessment or more stringent publicly available local reliability criteria, if any;
- (iii) constraints or available transfer capability limitations that are identified possibly as a result of generation additions or retirements, evaluation of load forecasts or proposals for the addition of transmission facilities in the New England Control Area;
- (iv) as requested by a stakeholder pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; or
- (v) as otherwise deemed appropriate by the ISO as warranting such an assessment.

(b) Requests by Stakeholders for Needs Assessments for Economic Considerations

The ISO's stakeholders may request the ISO to initiate a Needs Assessment to examine situations where potential regulated transmission solutions or market responses or investments could result in (i) a net reduction in total production cost to supply system load based on the factors specified in Attachment N of this OATT, (ii) reduced congestion, or (iii) the integration of new resources and/or loads on an aggregate or regional basis (an "Economic Study").

Requests for Economic Studies shall be submitted, considered and prioritized as follows:

- (i) By no later than April 1 of each year, any stakeholder may submit to the ISO for public posting on the ISO's website a request for an Economic Study.
- (ii) The ISO shall thereafter add any of its own proposals for Economic Studies. The ISO shall also develop a rough work scope and cost estimate for all requested Economic Studies, and develop preliminary prioritization based on the ISO's perceived regional and/or, as coordinated with the applicable neighboring system, inter-area benefits to assist stakeholders in the prioritization of Economic Studies.
- (iii) By no later than May 1 of each year, the ISO shall provide the foregoing information to the Planning Advisory Committee, and a Planning Advisory Committee meeting shall be held at which Economic Study proponents will provide an explanation of their request.
- (iv) By no later than June 1 of each year, the ISO shall hold a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee for the members of the Planning Advisory Committee to discuss, identify and prioritize, as further facilitated by the ISO's preparation of a straw priority list to be further discussed at such meeting, up to two (2) Economic Studies (the costs of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff) to be performed by the ISO in a given year taking into consideration their impact on the ISO budget and other priorities. The ISO may consider performing up to three (3) Economic Studies if a Public Policy Transmission Study will not be concurrently performed.

- (v) The ISO and the Planning Advisory Committee may agree to hold additional meetings to further discuss and resolve any issue concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.
- (vi) If the Planning Advisory Committee, after discussions between the Planning Advisory Committee and ISO management, is not able to prioritize the Economic Studies to be performed by the ISO in a given year, any member of the Planning Advisory Committee must submit a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process pursuant to Section 12 of this Attachment, such request to be submitted no later than August 30, to resolve the issues concerning the substance of the Economic Studies themselves and/or their prioritization.
- (vii) The ISO will issue a notice to the Planning Advisory Committee detailing the prioritization of the Economic Studies as identified by the Planning Advisory Committee or, if a request for Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process is submitted pursuant to Section 4.1.(b)(vi), as determined through that Process.

The foregoing timelines are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee. The ISO will provide periodic updates on the status of Economic Studies to the Planning Advisory Committee.

Economic Study requests not within the three studies identified in Section 4.1(b)(iv) to be performed in a given year may be requested and paid for by the study proponent.

(c) Conduct of a Needs Assessment for Rejected De-List Bids

- (i) Where a Needs Assessment is underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the Needs Assessment will represent the resource with the rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid as being interconnected, but unavailable for reliability purposes in the base representation being used to assess the system to identify reliability needs that must be addressed.

- (ii) Where there is not a Needs Assessment underway for an area affected by a rejected Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, the ISO will initiate a Needs Assessment for that area.
- (iii) In the case of a rejected Static De-List Bid or Dynamic De-List Bid, the ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, examine the unavailability of the resource(s) with the rejected bid as a sensitivity in a Needs Assessment, or examine the unavailability of the resource(s) in the base representation in a Needs Assessment. The ISO may as warranted, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, initiate a Needs Assessment for the purpose of modeling rejected Static De-List Bids or Dynamic De-List Bids where the ISO believes that the initiation of such a study is warranted.
- (iv) Prior to the start of each New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall present to the Reliability Committee the status of any prior rejected Dynamic De-List Bids, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids being studied in the regional system planning process.

(d) Notice of Initiation of Needs Assessments

Prior to its commencement, the ISO shall provide notice of the initiation of a Needs Assessment to the Planning Advisory Committee consistent with Section 2 of this Attachment.

(e) Preparation of Needs Assessment

Needs Assessments may examine resource adequacy, transmission adequacy, projected congestion levels and other relevant factors as may be agreed upon from time to time. Needs Assessments shall also consider the views, if any, of the Planning Advisory Committee, State regulators or agencies, NESCOE, the Market Advisor to the ISO Board of Directors, and the ISO Board of Directors. A corresponding assessment shall be performed by the PTOs to identify any needs relating to the Non-PTF transmission facilities (of whatever voltage) that could affect the provision of Regional Transmission Service over the PTF.

(f) Treatment of Market Solutions in Needs Assessments

The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the regional system planning process. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding resources in Needs Assessments that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids, submitted Permanent De-List Bids, and demand bids that have cleared in a substitution auction, and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate or update information regarding a proposed Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff. In the case where the Elective Transmission Upgrades are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, these Elective Transmission Upgrades shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Needs Assessment provided that the studies corresponding to the Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), a commercial operation date has been ascertained, and for which the certification has been accepted in accordance with Section III.12 of the Tariff.

(g) Needs Assessment Support

For the development of the Needs Assessments, the ISO will coordinate with the PTOs and the Planning Advisory Committee to support the ISO's performance of Needs Assessments. To facilitate this support, the ISO will post on its website the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used to perform Needs Assessments. The ISO may establish requirements that any PTO or member of the Planning Advisory Committee must satisfy in order

to access certain information used to perform Needs Assessments, due to ISO New England Information Policy and CEII constraints. The ISO may ask PTOs or Planning Advisory Committee members with special expertise to provide technical support or perform studies required to assess one or more potential needs that will be considered in the Needs Assessments process. These entities will provide, and the ISO will post on its website, the models, files, cases, contingencies, assumptions and other information used by those entities to perform studies. The ISO will post the draft results of any such Needs Assessment studies on its website. The ISO will convene meetings open to any representative of an entity that is a member of the Planning Advisory Committee to facilitate input on draft Needs Assessments studies and the inputs to those studies prior to the ISO's completion of a draft Needs Assessment report to be reviewed by the entire Planning Advisory Committee pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment. All provisions of this subsection (g) relating to the provision and sharing of information shall be subject to the ISO-NE Information Policy.

(h) Input from the Planning Advisory Committee

Meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be convened to identify additional considerations relating to a Needs Assessment that were not identified in support of initiating the assessment, and to provide input on the Needs Assessment's scope, assumptions and procedures, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

(i) Publication of Needs Assessment and Response Thereto

The ISO shall report the results of Needs Assessments to the Planning Advisory Committee, subject to CEII constraints. Needs Assessments containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's password-protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. Needs Assessments will identify high-level functional requirements and characteristics for regulated transmission solutions and market responses that can meet the needs described in the assessment. The ISO will also present the Needs Assessments in appropriate market forums to facilitate market responses. Where the ISO forecasts that a solution is needed to solve reliability criteria violations in three years or less from the completion of a Needs Assessment (unless the solution to the Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade), and the requirements of Section 4.1(j) of this Attachment have been met or where there is only one Phase

One Proposal or Stage One Proposal submitted in response to a public notice issued under Sections 4.3(a) or 4A.5(a) of this Attachment, respectively, or only one proposed solution that is selected to move on to Phase Two or Stage Two, the ISO will evaluate the adequacy of proposed regulated solutions by performing Solutions Studies, as described in Section 4.2 of this Attachment. Where the solution to a Needs Assessment will likely be a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, or where the forecast year of need for a solution that is likely to be a Reliability Transmission Upgrade is more than three years from the completion of a Needs Assessment, the ISO will conduct a solution process based on a two-stage competition, as described in Section 4.3 of this Attachment.

(j) Requirements for Use of Solution Studies Rather than Competitive Process for Projects Based on Year of Need

The following requirements must be met in order for the ISO to use Solution Studies in the circumstances described in Section 4.1(i) based on the solution's year of need:

- (i) The ISO shall separately identify and post on its website an explanation of the reliability criteria violations and system conditions that the region has a time-sensitive need to solve within three years of the completion of the relevant Needs Assessment. The explanation shall be in sufficient detail to allow stakeholders to understand the need and why it is time-sensitive.
- (ii) In deciding whether to utilize Solutions Studies, such that the regulated transmission solution will be developed through a process led by the ISO and built by the PTO(s), the ISO shall:
 - (A) Provide to the Planning Advisory Committee and post on its website a full and supported written description explaining the decision to designate a Participating Transmission Owner as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the reliability project, including an explanation of other transmission or non-transmission options that the region considered but concluded would not sufficiently address the immediate reliability need, and the circumstances that generated the reliability need and an explanation of why that reliability need was not identified earlier.

- (B) Provide a 30-day period during which comments from stakeholders on the posted description may be sent to the ISO, which comments will be posted on the website, as well.
- (iii) The ISO shall maintain and post on its website a list of prior year designations of all projects in the limited category of transmission projects for which the PTO(s) was designated as the entity responsible for construction and ownership of the project following the performance of Solution Studies. The list must include the project's need-by date and the date the PTO(s) actually energized the project, i.e., placed the project into service. The ISO shall file such list with the Commission as an informational filing in January of each calendar year covering the designations of the prior calendar year, when applicable.

4.2 Evaluation of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies, Where Competitive Solution Process of Section 4.3 Is Not Applicable

The procedures described in this Section 4.2 shall be utilized for the evaluation of regulated transmission solutions for reliability and market efficiency needs where the requirements of Sections 4.1(i) and/or (j) of this Attachment are satisfied. Otherwise, the procedures of Section 4.3 shall be utilized for that purpose.

(a) Evaluation and Development of Regulated Transmission Solutions in Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades

In the case of Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades, the ISO, in coordination with the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and other interested or affected stakeholders, shall conduct or participate in studies ("Solutions Studies") to evaluate whether proposed regulated transmission solutions meet the PTF system needs identified in Needs Assessments. The ISO, in coordination with affected stakeholders shall also identify regulated transmission projects for addressing the needs identified in Needs Assessments.

The ISO may form ISO-led targeted study groups to conduct Solutions Studies. Such study groups will include representatives of the proponents of regulated transmission solutions and

other interested or affected stakeholders. Through this process, the ISO may identify the solutions for the region that offer the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability, and feasibility to meet a need identified in a Needs Assessment in the required time frame. These solutions may differ from a transmission solution proposed by a transmission owner.

Proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to Needs Assessments shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the PTF system needs.

(b) Notice of Initiation of a Solutions Study

The ISO shall provide notice of the initiation and scope of a Solutions Study to the Planning Advisory Committee.

(c) Classification of Regulated Transmission Solutions as Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades or Reliability Transmission Upgrades

As described in Section 3.1 and 3.6(a) of this Attachment, proposed regulated transmission solutions determined by the ISO, in consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, to address needs identified in Needs Assessments shall be classified as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade and/or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the standards set forth in Attachment N of this OATT.

(d) Identification of the Preferred Solution and Inclusion of Results of Solutions Studies for Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades in the RSP

The results of Solutions Studies related to Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades and Reliability Transmission Upgrades will be reported to the Planning Advisory Committee. After receiving feedback from the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO will identify the preferred solution. The ISO will inform the appropriate Transmission Owners in writing regarding the identification of the preferred solution.

Once identified, the preferred solution, as appropriate, will be reflected (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

4.3 Competitive Solution Process for Reliability Transmission Upgrades and Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrades

(a) Public Notice Initiating Competitive Solution Process

The ISO will issue a public notice with respect to each Needs Assessment for which, pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of this Attachment, a competitive solution process will be utilized. The notice will indicate that Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors may submit Phase One Proposals offering solutions that comprehensively address the identified needs.

A PTO or PTOs shall submit an individual or joint Phase One Proposal as a Backstop Transmission Solution for any need that would be solved by a project located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, and which it/they would therefore have an obligation to build under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA. Such PTOs may recover the costs of preparing Phase One Proposals in accordance with the mechanisms reflected in the OATT and the terms of the TOA.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Phase One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Needs Assessment (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must, before the deadline for the submission of Phase One Proposals, identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Phase One Proposal and Phase Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Phase One. Upon request by the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a

detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Phase One.

(b) Use and Control of Right of Way

Neither the submission of a project by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor nor the selection by the ISO of a project submitted by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor for inclusion in the RSP Project List shall alter a PTO's use and control of an existing right of way, the retention, modification, or transfer of which remain subject to the relevant law or regulation, including property or contractual rights, that granted the right-of-way. Nothing in the processes described in this Attachment K requires a PTO to relinquish any of its rights-of-way in order to permit a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor to develop, construct or own a project.

(c) Information Required for Phase One Proposals; Study Deposit; Timing

Phase One Proposals shall provide the following information:

- (i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
- (ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
- (iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;

- (iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
- (v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a \$100,000 study deposit per submitted proposal to support the cost of Phase One and Phase Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of \$100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Phase One and Phase Two proposal.

Phase One Proposals must be submitted by the deadline specified in the posting by the ISO of the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment, which shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the notice. The ISO may reject submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

(d) LSP Coordination

Sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(e) Preliminary Review by ISO

If the sole Phase One Proposal in response to a given Needs Assessment has been submitted by PTO(s), proposing a project that would be located within or connected to its/their existing electric system, the ISO shall proceed under Section 4.2(a)-(d) of this Attachment, rather than pursuant to the procedures set forth in the remainder of this Section 4.3.

If more than one Phase One Proposal has been submitted in response to the public notice described in Section 4.3(a) of this Attachment K, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

- (i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4.3(c) of this Attachment;
- (ii) appears to satisfy the needs described in the Needs Assessment;
- (iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and
- (iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities, or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(f) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any minor deficiencies in meeting the requirements of Section 4.3(a) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Phase One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Phase One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Phase One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO's evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Phase One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (f), or in Phase Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Phase Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Phase One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(g) Listing of Qualifying Phase One Proposals

For each Needs Assessment, the ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO's website, a listing of Phase One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4.3(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input on the listing, and the listed proposals. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Phase Two,

based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Phase One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input. The ISO shall post on its website an explanation of why it has determined to exclude a Phase One Proposal from consideration in Phase Two.

(h) Information Required for Phase Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Phase Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects reflected on the final listing developed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Phase Two Solutions:

- (i) updates of the information provided in Phase One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;
- (ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;
- (iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Phase Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;
- (iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Phase One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;
- (v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;
- (vi) design standards to be used;
- (vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;
- (viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;

- (ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;
- (x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;
- (xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and
- (xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Phase Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4.3(g).

The deadline for submittal of Phase Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Phase Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will identify the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe as the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution in response to each Needs Assessment. The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Phase Two Solution, together with explanatory materials, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solution.

(i) Reimbursement of Phase Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed pursuant to Section 4.3(g) for review as Phase Two Solutions shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff (and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA), all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Phase Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs' existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor's study deposit and the actual

cost of the Phase One and Phase Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the ISO Tariff.

(j) Inclusion of Preferred Phase Two Solution in RSP and/or RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Phase Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO's identification will select the project that offers the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Phase Two Solution that its project has been selected for development. The ISO will include the project as a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as appropriate, in the RSP and/or its Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional projects are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(k) Milestone Schedules

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4.3(j) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information, as specified by the ISO, showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall request the applicable PTO(s) to implement the Backstop Transmission Solution, and prepare a report explaining why it has reassigned the project. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO's proposed course of action. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

4A. Public Policy Transmission Studies; Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

4A.1 NESCOE Requests for Public Policy Transmission Studies

No less often than every three years, by January 15 of that year, the ISO will post a notice indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee may, no later than 45 days after the posting of the notice: (i) provide NESCOE, via the process described below, with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements, and (ii) provide the ISO with input regarding local (e.g., municipal and county) Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and regarding particular transmission needs driven by those Public Policy Requirements. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee may be held for this purpose. Members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall direct all such input related to state, federal, and local Public Policy Requirements that drive transmission needs to the ISO and the ISO will post such input on the ISO's website. By no later than May 1 of that year, NESCOE may submit to the ISO in writing a request for a new Public Policy Transmission Study, or an update of a previously conducted study. The request will identify the Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System, and may identify particular NESCOE-identified public policy-related transmission needs as well. Along with any such request, NESCOE will provide the ISO with a written explanation

of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate for potential solutions in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. The ISO will post the NESCOE request and explanation on the ISO's website. If NESCOE does not provide that listing of identified transmission needs (which may consist of a NESCOE statement of its determination that no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process) and that explanation (which may consist of a NESCOE explanation of why no transmission needs are driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements identified during the stakeholder process), the ISO will note on its website that a NESCOE listing and explanation have not been provided. In that circumstance, the ISO will determine subsequently (after opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee input), and post on its website an explanation of, which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements the ISO will evaluate in the regional planning process, including why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated.

4A.1.1 Study of Federal Public Policy Requirements Not Identified by NESCOE; Local Public Policy Requirements

If a stakeholder believes that a federal Public Policy Requirement that may drive transmission needs relating to the New England Transmission System has not been appropriately addressed by NESCOE, it may file with the ISO, no later than 15 days after the posting of NESCOE's explanation as described in Section 4A.1 of this Attachment, a written request that explains the stakeholder's reasoning and that seeks reconsideration by the ISO of NESCOE's position regarding that requirement. The ISO will post the stakeholder's written request on the ISO's website. Where the ISO agrees with a stated stakeholder position, or on its own finding, the ISO may perform an evaluation under Sections 4A.2 through 4A.4 of this Attachment of a federal Public Policy Requirement not otherwise identified by NESCOE. The ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by federal Public Policy Requirements not identified by NESCOE will not be evaluated. In addition, the ISO will post on its website an explanation of those transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated for potential transmission solutions in the regional

system planning process, and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will not be evaluated.

4A.2 Preparation for Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input

Upon receipt of the NESCOE request, or as the result of the ISO's consideration of a federal or local Public Policy Requirement pursuant to Section 4A.1.1, the ISO will prepare and post on its website a proposed scope for the Public Policy Transmission Study, and associated parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions), and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee by no later than September 1 of the request year. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the study's scope, parameters and assumptions.

4A.3 Public Policy Transmission Studies

(a) Conduct of Public Policy Transmission Studies; Stakeholder Input

With input from Planning Advisory Committee and potentially impacted PTOs, the ISO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study to develop a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of high-level concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The study's results will be posted on the ISO's website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input on the results of the initial phase of the study, and the scope, parameters and assumptions (including resource assumptions) for any follow-on phase of the study. The ISO may – as a follow-on phase of the Public Policy Transmission Study – perform more detailed analysis and engineering work on the high-level concepts.

(b) Treatment of Market Solutions in Public Policy Transmission Studies

The ISO shall reflect proposed market responses in the Public Policy Transmission Study. Market responses may include, but are not limited to, resources (e.g., demand-side projects and distributed generation), Merchant Transmission Facilities and Elective Transmission Upgrades.

Specifically, the ISO shall incorporate in the Public Policy Transmission Study information regarding resources that have been proposed and (i) have cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Market Rule 1 of the ISO Tariff, (ii) have been selected in, and are contractually

bound by, a state-sponsored Request For Proposals, or (iii) have a financially binding obligation pursuant to a contract. The ISO will model out-of-service all submitted Retirement De-List Bids, submitted Permanent De-List Bids, and demand bids that have cleared in a substitution auction, and may model out-of-service rejected-for-reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected-for-reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction. With respect to (ii) or (iii) above, the proponent of the market response shall inform the ISO, in writing, of its selection or its assumption of financially binding obligations, respectively. The ISO shall incorporate information regarding a proposed Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade in a Needs Assessment at a time after the studies corresponding to the Merchant Transmission Facility or Elective Transmission Upgrade are completed (including receipt of approval under Section I.3.9 of the Tariff), and a commercial operation date has been ascertained, with the exception of Elective Transmission Upgrades that are proposed in conjunction with the interconnection of a resource, which shall be considered at the same time as the proposed resource is considered in the Public Policy Transmission Study.

4A.4 Response to Public Policy Transmission Studies

The results of the Public Policy Transmission Study will be provided to the Planning Advisory Committee and posted on the ISO's website, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on those results, including any updates from the states on any methods by which they are satisfying their respective Public Policy Requirements included in the Public Policy Transmission Study. The ISO's costs of performing the Public Policy Transmission Study described in Section 4A.3 will be collected by the ISO pursuant to Schedule 1 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. Any prudently incurred PTO costs for assistance requested by the ISO to support the Public Policy Transmission Study will be recovered by the applicable PTO(s) in accordance with Attachment F and Schedule 21 of the Tariff.

The ISO will evaluate the input from the Planning Advisory Committee and provide the results of the Public Policy Transmission Study to Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for their use in preparing Stage One Proposals to develop, build and operate one or more projects consistent with the general design requirements identified by the ISO in the study.

4A.5 Stage One Proposals

(a) Information Required for Stage One Proposals

The ISO will post on its website a notice inviting, for each high-level general project concept identified by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.3(a) above, Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors to submit (by the deadline specified in the public notice, which shall be not less than 60 days from the date of posting the public notice) a Stage One Proposal providing the following information:

- (i) a detailed description of the proposed solution, in the manner specified by the ISO, including an identification of the proposed route for the solution and technical details of the project;
- (ii) a detailed explanation of how the proposed solution addresses the identified need;
- (iii) the proposed schedule, including key high-level milestones, for development, siting, procurement of real estate rights, permitting, construction and completion of the proposed solution;
- (iv) right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that would contribute to the proposed solution or the means and timeframe by which such would be obtained; and
- (v) the estimated lifecycle cost of the proposed solution, including a high-level itemization of the components of the cost estimate.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee that is not a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor but would like the ISO to consider a Stage One Proposal reflecting its concept for a project in response to a Public Policy Transmission Study (that is, a project that is “unsponsored”) must identify a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor willing to submit a corresponding Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Proposal (and to develop and construct the project, if selected in the competitive process) in order for the unsponsored project to be submitted in response to an ISO solicitation in Stage One. Upon request of the pertinent Planning Advisory Committee member for assistance in identifying a sponsor, the ISO shall post on its website and distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a notice that solicits expressions of interest by Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors for sponsorship of the member’s conceptual project. All expressions of interest shall include a detailed explanation of why the Qualified Transmission

Project Sponsor is best qualified to construct, own and operate the unsponsored project. If only one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the ISO shall designate it as the project sponsor. If more than one Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the Planning Advisory Committee member shall select the sponsor. In either case, the designated sponsor shall thereafter comply with the requirements of this Attachment K and the ISO Tariff with respect to the project. If no Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor expresses interest, the unsponsored project may not be submitted in Stage One.

With each proposal, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor must include payment of a \$100,000 study deposit per submitted project to support the cost of Stage One and Stage Two study work by the ISO. The deposit of \$100,000 shall be applied towards the costs incurred by the ISO associated with the study of the Stage One and Stage Two proposal.

(b) LSP Coordination

Sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall also identify any LSP plans that require coordination with their proposals.

(c) Preliminary Review by ISO

Upon receipt of Stage One Proposals, the ISO shall perform a preliminary feasibility review of each proposal to determine whether the proposed solution:

- (i) provides sufficient data and that the data is of sufficient quality to satisfy Section 4A.5(a);
- (ii) appears to satisfy the needs driven by Public Policy Requirements, as reflected in the Public Policy Transmission Study;
- (iii) is technically practicable and indicates possession of, or an approach to acquiring, the necessary rights of way, property and facilities that will make the proposal reasonably feasible in the required timeframe; and;
- (iv) is eligible to be constructed only by an existing PTO in accordance with Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA because the proposed solution is an upgrade to existing PTO facilities or because the costs of the proposed solution are not eligible for regional cost allocation under the OATT and will be allocated only to the local customers of a PTO.

(d) Proposal Deficiencies; Further Information

If the ISO identifies any deficiencies (compared with the requirements of Section 4A.5(a)) in the information provided in connection with a proposed Stage One Proposal, the ISO will notify the Stage One Proposal sponsor and provide an opportunity for the sponsor to cure the deficiencies within the timeframe specified by the ISO. Upon request, sponsors of Stage One Proposals shall provide the ISO with additional information reasonably necessary for the ISO's evaluation of the proposed solutions. This identification and notification will occur prior to the publication by the ISO of any Stage One Proposals. In providing information under this subsection (d), or in Stage Two, the sponsor may not modify its project materially or submit a new project, but instead may clarify its project. Stage Two Proposals reflecting a material modification to a Stage One Proposal or representing a new project will be rejected.

(e) List of Qualifying Stage One Proposals

The ISO will provide the Planning Advisory Committee with, and post on the ISO's website, a list of Stage One Proposals that meet the criteria of Section 4A.5(c). A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit input for the ISO on that list. The ISO shall also indicate whether any of the projects may also satisfy identified reliability needs of the system. The ISO with input from the Planning Advisory Committee may exclude projects from the list, and from consideration in Stage Two, based on a determination that the project is not competitive with other projects that have been submitted in terms of cost, electrical performance, future system expandability, or feasibility. Information on Stage One Proposals containing CEII will be posted on the ISO's protected website consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment. The ISO may amend its listing based on stakeholder input.

4A.6 Reimbursement of Stage One Proposal and Stage Two Solution Costs; Collection and Refund of ISO Study Costs

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors that are requested by NESCOE in writing or by one or more states' governors or regulatory authorities directly to submit a Stage One Proposal shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and the TOA, their prudently incurred costs from the Regional Network Load of the states identified by NESCOE in the written communication as having made the request or from the

Regional Network Load of the states that made the request directly. Stage One Proposal costs shall otherwise not be subject to recovery under the ISO Tariff.

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors whose projects are listed by the ISO pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff and, as applicable, the TOA and NTDOA, all prudently incurred costs associated with developing a Stage Two Solution. PTOs shall be entitled to recover, pursuant to rates and appropriate financial arrangements set forth in the Tariff, all prudently incurred study costs and costs associated with developing any upgrades or modifications to such PTOs' existing facilities necessary to facilitate the development of a listed project proposed by any other Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Any difference between a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor's study deposit and the actual cost of the Stage One and Stage Two studies for a project shall be paid by or refunded to the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, as appropriate, with interest calculated in accordance with Section 35.19a(a)(2) of the FERC regulations. Any refund payment shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any invoice to collect funds in addition to the deposit shall be accompanied by a detailed and itemized accounting of the actual study costs incurred. Any disputes arising from the study process shall be addressed under the dispute resolution process specified in Section I.6 of the Tariff.

4A.7 Information Required for Stage Two Solutions; Identification and Reporting of Preliminary Preferred Stage Two Solution

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors of projects listed pursuant to Section 4A.5(e) of this Attachment shall provide the following information in their proposed Stage Two Solutions:

- (i) updates of the information provided in Stage One Proposals, or a certification that the information remains current and correct;
- (ii) list of required major Federal, State and local permits;

- (iii) description of construction sequencing, a conceptual plan for the anticipated transmission and generation outages necessary to construct the Stage Two Solution and their respective durations, and possible constraints;
- (iv) project schedule, with additional detail compared with Stage One Proposals, as specified by the ISO;
- (v) detailed cost component itemization and life-cycle costs;
- (vi) design standards to be used;
- (vii) description of the authority the sponsor has to acquire necessary rights of way;
- (viii) experience of the sponsor in acquiring rights of way;
- (ix) status of acquisition of right, title, and interest in rights of way, substations, and other property or facilities, if any, that are necessary for the proposed solution;
- (x) detailed explanation of project feasibility and potential constraints and challenges;
- (xi) description of the means by which the sponsor proposes to satisfy state legal or regulatory requirements for siting, constructing, owning and operating transmission projects; and
- (xii) detailed explanation of potential future expandability.

Stage Two Solutions must be submitted to the ISO by the deadline specified in the posting of the final listing (following stakeholder input) of Phase One Proposals described in Section 4A.5(e). The deadline for submittal of Stage Two Solutions shall not be less than 60 days from the posting date of the final listing. The ISO may reject Stage Two Solution submittals which are insufficient or not adequately supported.

The ISO will report the preliminary preferred Stage Two Solution(s), along with its views as to whether the preferred solution(s) also satisfies identified reliability needs of the system, to the Planning Advisory Committee and seek stakeholder input on the preliminary preferred solutions.

4A.8 Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List; Milestone Schedules; Removal from RSP Project List

(a) Inclusion of Public Policy Transmission Upgrades in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List

Following receipt of stakeholder input, the ISO will identify the preferred Stage Two Solution (with an overview of why the solution is preferred) by a posting on its website. The ISO's identification will select the project that best addresses the identified Public Policy Requirement while utilizing the best combination of electrical performance, cost, future system expandability and feasibility to meet the need in the required timeframe. The ISO will also notify the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the preferred Stage Two Solution that its project has been selected for development, and include the project as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List, as it is updated from time to time in accordance with this Attachment. Where external impacts of regional Public Policy Transmission Upgrades are identified through coordination by the ISO with neighboring entities, those impacts will be identified in the RSP. Costs associated with such impacts will be addressed as set forth in Schedule 15.

(b) Milestone Schedules

Within 30 Business Days of its receiving notification pursuant to Section 4A.8(a) of this Attachment, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO (and shall update periodically) a schedule that indicates the dates by which applications for siting and other approvals necessary to develop and construct the project by the required in-service date shall be submitted. Within 30 Business Days of its receiving all necessary siting and other approvals, the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO its acceptance of responsibility to proceed with the project, and a schedule acceptable to the ISO of dates by which typical project construction phases will be

completed. The Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO on a monthly basis thereafter, until the project is placed into service, a report that provides updated information (as specified by the ISO) showing the progress of the project.

If the ISO finds, after consultation with a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor, that the sponsor is failing to pursue approvals or construction in a reasonably diligent fashion, or that the sponsor is unable to proceed with the project due to forces beyond its reasonable control, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report, including a proposed course of action. If the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is failing or unable to proceed is a PTO, the ISO shall, after consultation with the Planning Advisory Committee, prepare a report consistent with the provisions of Section 1.1(e) of Schedule 3.09(a) of the Transmission Operating Agreement, including the ISO's proposed course of action. The proposed course of action may include, for example, a consideration and selection of another Stage Two Proposal relating to the pertinent Public Policy Requirement, or the re-solicitation of Stage One Proposals to meet the pertinent Public Policy Requirement. If prepared with respect to a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that is not a PTO, the report shall include a report from that sponsor. The ISO shall file its report (whether with respect to a PTO or a non-PTO Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor) with the Commission.

(c) Removal from RSP Project List

If a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is removed from the RSP Project List by the ISO pursuant to Section 3.6(c), the entity responsible for the construction of the Public Policy Transmission Upgrade shall be reimbursed for any costs prudently incurred or prudently committed to be incurred (plus a reasonable return on investment at existing Commission-approved ROE levels) in connection with the planning, designing, engineering, siting, permitting, procuring and other preparation for construction, and/or construction of that Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4A.9 Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades

The costs of Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade(s) that are required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional

System Plan in accordance with Section 4A.8 shall be allocated in accordance with Schedule 21 of the ISO OATT.

4B. Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors

4B.1 Periodic Evaluation of Applications

The ISO will periodically evaluate applications submitted by an entity that seeks to qualify as a sponsor of a proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade.

4B.2 Information To Be Submitted

The application to be submitted to the ISO by an entity desiring to be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor will include the following information:

- (i) the current and expected capabilities of the applicant to finance and construct a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission Upgrade and operate and maintain it for the life of the project;
- (ii) the financial resources of the applicant;
- (iii) the technical and engineering qualifications and experience of the applicant;
- (iv) if applicable, the previous record of the applicant regarding construction and maintenance of transmission facilities;
- (v) demonstrated capability of the applicant to adhere to construction, maintenance and operating Good Utility Practices, including the capability to respond to outages;
- (vi) the ability of the applicant to comply with all applicable reliability standards; and
- (vii) demonstrated ability of the applicant to meet development and completion schedules.

4B.3 Review of Qualifications

The ISO shall review each application for completeness. The ISO will notify each applicant within 30 calendar days of receipt of such application whether the application is complete, or identify any deficiencies in provision of the information required by Section 4B.2 of this Attachment. An applicant notified of deficiencies must provide any remedial information within 30 calendar days of the receipt of such notice. Thereafter, the ISO will determine whether the applicant is physically, technically, legally, and financially capable of constructing a Reliability Transmission Upgrade, Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade or Public Policy Transmission

Upgrade in a timely and competent manner, and operating and maintaining the facilities consistent with Good Utility Practice and applicable reliability criteria for the life of the project, and use its best efforts to inform the applicant within 90 days from the date on which it has a completed application on file with the ISO whether it has met all of these criteria. A PTO determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. A non-PTO entity determined by the ISO to meet all of these criteria will, upon its execution of the Non-incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (in the form specified in Attachment O of the OATT) and the Market Participant Service Agreement, be deemed a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

4B.4 List of Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors; Annual Certification

Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors are listed in Appendix 3 of this Attachment K. Each Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor shall submit to the ISO annually a certification that the information initially submitted in response to Section 4B.2 of this Attachment K has not changed adversely in a material fashion, or (if a material adverse change has occurred in the intervening year) submit instead a new application for qualification as a project sponsor. In the latter case, the entity shall not be a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor unless and until the ISO approves its new application.

5. Supply of Information and Data Required for Regional System Planning

The Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, Transmission Customers, Market Participants and other entities requesting transmission or interconnection service or proposing the integration of facilities to PTF in the New England Transmission System or alternatives to such facilities, and stakeholders requesting a Needs Assessment pursuant to Section 4.1 of this Attachment, shall supply, as required by the Tariff, the Participants Agreement, MPSAs, applicable transmission operating agreements, and/or other existing agreements, protocols and procedures, or upon request by the ISO, and subject to required CEII and confidentiality protections as specified in Section 2.4 of this Attachment, any information (including cost estimates) and data that is reasonably required to prepare an RSP or to perform a Needs Assessment or Solutions Study.

6. Regional, Local and Interregional Coordination

6.1 Regional Coordination

The ISO shall conduct the regional system planning process for the PTF in coordination with the transmission-owning entities in, or other entities interconnected to, the New England Transmission System consistent with the rights and obligations defined in the ISO OATT, applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, and/or this Attachment. Pursuant to Section II.49 of this OATT and Sections 3.02, 3.05 and 3.09 of the TOA, the ISO has Operating Authority or control over all PTF and Non-PTF within the New England Control Area, which are utilized for the provision of transmission service under this OATT. The ISO also has Operating Authority or control over the United States portions of the HVDC ties to Quebec and over Merchant Transmission Facilities and Other Transmission Facilities, pursuant to this OATT or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols. The ISO, however, is not responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF, OTF and MTF. As provided in Section 6.2 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, the PTOs are responsible for the planning of the Non-PTF and coordinating such planning efforts with the ISO. Pursuant to the OATT and/or applicable transmission operating agreements or protocols, the transmission owners of OTF and MTF are required to participate in the ISO's regional system planning process and perform and/or support studies of the impacts of regional system projects on their respective facilities.

6.2 Local Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the RSP shall be developed in coordination with the local system plans of the PTOs. In accordance with the TOA and OATT provisions identified in Section 6.1 of this Attachment, the PTOs have responsibility for planning Non-PTF. The PTOs conduct planning of Non-PTF using the LSP process outlined in Section 2.5 and Appendix 1 of this Attachment, in coordination with the ISO, other entities interconnected with the New England Transmission System, Transmission Customers and stakeholders, and in accordance with the provisions in the TOA, the OATT and the Planning and Reliability Criteria. The openness and transparency of the LSP process is intended to be consistent with the regional system planning process.

6.3 Interregional Coordination

The regional system planning process shall be conducted and the RSP shall be developed in coordination with the similar plans of the surrounding ISOs/RTOs and Control Areas pursuant to the Northeastern Planning Protocol and other agreements with neighboring systems (including entities that are not Parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) and NPCC.

(a) Interregional Coordination and Cost Allocation Among ISO, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) Under Order No. 1000

Pursuant to Section 7 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol (which is posted on the web at www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc, the Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (“JIPC”) reviews regional needs and solutions identified in the regional planning processes of the ISO, NYISO and PJM in order to identify, with input from the Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (“IPSAC”), the potential for Interregional Transmission Projects that could meet regional needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than regional transmission projects. All members of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be considered IPSAC members. The JIPC will coordinate studies deemed necessary to allow the effective consideration by the regions, in the same general timeframe, of a proposed Interregional Transmission Project in comparison to regional transmission solutions. Any stakeholder may propose in the New England planning process, for evaluation under Section 4.2, 4.3, or 4A (as applicable) of Attachment K, an Interregional Transmission Project (or project concept) that may be more efficient or cost-effective than a regional transmission solution. If a proposed Interregional Transmission Project is approved in each region in which the project is located, the corresponding New England regional transmission project(s) will be displaced in the circumstances described in Section 3.6(a) of this Attachment, and the costs of the Interregional Transmission Project will be allocated among the regions based on the formula provided in Schedule 15 of this OATT, or in accordance with another funding arrangement filed with and accepted by the Commission. The amount of the costs of an Interregional Transmission Project allocated as the responsibility of New England pursuant to the methodology referenced in Section 6.3(a) of this Attachment shall be allocated within New England as specified in Schedule 15 of the ISO OATT.

(b) Other Interregional Assessments and Other Interregional Transmission Projects

Interregional system assessments and/or interregional system expansion planning studies may be performed periodically by the ISO with Planning Authorities who are not parties to the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or with the JIPC pursuant to Section 6 of the Northeastern Planning Protocol, or both. The ISO shall convene periodic meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee (which may be combined with meetings of the IPSAC), to provide input and feedback

to the ISO concerning such assessments and studies. To the extent that an Interregional Transmission Project is agreed to by ISO and by another region (not a Party to the Northeastern Planning Protocol) in which a portion of the project is located, the related cost allocation and operating agreements will be filed with the Commission (and, as applicable, with Canadian jurisdictional agencies) in accordance with existing filing rights.

7. Procedures for Development and Approval of the RSP

7.1 Initiation of RSP

No less often than once every three years, the ISO shall initiate an effort to develop its RSP and solicit input on regional system needs for the RSP from the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee shall meet to perform its respective functions in connection with the preparation of the RSP, as specified in Section 2 of this Attachment. The ISO shall issue the periodic planning reports that support the RSP, such as Needs Assessments, as those reports are completed.

7.2 Draft RSP; Public Meeting

The ISO shall provide a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee and input from that Committee shall be received and considered in preparing and revising subsequent drafts. The ISO shall post the draft RSP and provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of a meeting to review the draft RSP as specified in Section 2.2 of this Attachment.

After the ISO has provided a draft of the RSP to the Planning Advisory Committee, the ISO shall issue a second draft of the RSP to be presented by the ISO staff to the ISO Board of Directors for approval. The draft RSP shall incorporate the results of any Needs Assessment, and corresponding Solutions Studies, performed since the last RSP was approved. A subcommittee of that Board shall hold a public meeting, at their discretion, to receive input directly and to discuss any proposed revisions to the RSP. The final recommended RSP shall be presented to the ISO Board of Directors and shall be acted on by the ISO Board of Directors within 60 days of receipt. The foregoing timeframes are subject to adjustment as determined by the ISO in coordination with the Planning Advisory Committee.

7.3 Action by the ISO Board of Directors on RSP; Request for Alternative Proposals

(a) Action by ISO Board of Directors on RSP

The ISO Board of Directors may approve the recommended draft RSP as submitted, modify the RSP or remand all or any portion of it back with guidance for development of a revised recommendation. The Board of Directors may consider the RSP in executive session, and shall consider in its deliberations the views of the subcommittee of the Board of Directors reflecting the public meeting held pursuant to Section 7.2 of this Attachment. In considering whether to approve the draft RSP, the Board of Directors may, if it finds a proposed Reliability Benefit Upgrade not to be viable, or if no Reliability Benefit Upgrade has been proposed, direct the ISO staff to meet with the affected load serving entities and State entities in order to develop an interim solution. Should that effort fail, and as a last resort, the Board of Directors may direct the ISO to issue a Request For Alternative Proposal (“RFAP”), subject to the procedures described below, and may withhold approval of the draft RSP, or portions thereof, pending the results of that RFAP and any Commission action on any resulting jurisdictional contract or funding mechanism. The ISO shall provide a written explanation as to any subsequent changes or modification made in the final version of the RSP.

(b) Requests For Alternative Proposals

- (i) The RFAP shall seek generation, demand-side and merchant transmission alternatives that can be implemented rapidly and provide substantial reliability benefits over the period solicited in the RFAP, and normally will focus on an interim (“gap”) solution until an identified Reliability Transmission Upgrade has been placed in-service. The ISO will file a proposed RFAP with the Commission for approval at least 60 days prior to its issuance. The filing shall explain why the issuance of an RFAP is necessary.
- (ii) The ISO staff shall provide the Board of Directors and subject to confidentiality requirements, the Planning Advisory Committee with an analysis of the alternatives offered in response to the RFAP, and provide a recommendation together with a funding mechanism reflecting input from the Planning Advisory Committee.
- (iii) The ISO may enter into contracts awarded pursuant to an RFAP process, and/or propose a funding mechanism. Bidders that are awarded contracts through the RFAP process shall file those contracts with the Commission for approval of the rates to be charged thereunder to the extent that such contracts are for services that are jurisdictional

to the Commission. The ISO shall file related or separate funding mechanisms with the Commission as well. All other contracts entered into pursuant to an RFAP shall be filed with the Commission for informational purposes.

(iv) The Board of Directors will reflect the results of the RFAP process in the approved RSP.

8. Obligations of PTOs to Build; PTOs' Obligations, Conditions and Rights

In accordance with the TOA, PTOs designated by the ISO as the appropriate entities to construct and own or finance Transmission Upgrades included in the RSP shall construct and own or finance such facilities or enter into appropriate contracts to fulfill such obligations. In the event that a PTO: (i) does not construct or indicates in writing that it does not intend to construct a Transmission Upgrade included in the RSP; or (ii)

demonstrates that it has failed (after making a good faith effort) to obtain necessary approvals or property rights under applicable law, the ISO shall promptly file with the Commission a report on the results of the planning process, which report shall include a report from the PTO responsible for the planning, design or construction of such No. 3 Open Access Transmission Tariff Section II – Attachment K – Regional System Planning Process Transmission Upgrade, in order to permit the Commission to determine what action, if any, it should take.

In connection with regional system planning, the ISO will not propose to impose on any PTO obligations or conditions that are inconsistent with the explicit provisions of the TOA or deprive any PTO of any of the rights set forth in the TOA.

Subject to necessary approvals and compliance with Section 2.06 of the TOA, nothing in this OATT shall affect the right of any PTO to expand or modify its transmission facilities in the New England Transmission System on its own initiative or in response to an order of an appropriate regulatory authority. Such expansions or modifications shall conform with: (a) Good Utility Practice; (b) applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of national, regional, and local reliability councils that may be in existence; and (c) the ISO and relevant PTO criteria, rules, standards, guides and policies. The ISO reserves its right to challenge the permitting of such expansions or modifications.

9. Merchant Transmission Facilities

9.1 General

Subject to compliance with the requirements of the Tariff and any other applicable requirements with respect to the interconnection of bulk power facilities with the New England Transmission System, any entity shall have the right to propose and construct the addition of transmission facilities (“Merchant Transmission Facilities”), none of the costs of which shall be covered under the cost allocation provisions of this OATT. Any such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the requirements of Section 9.2 of this Attachment. In performing studies in connection with the RSP, the prospect that proposed Merchant Transmission Facilities will be completed shall be accounted for as will the prospect that proposed generating units will be completed.

9.2 Operation and Integration

All Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to: (i) an agreement to transfer to the ISO operational control authority over any facilities which constitute part of the Merchant Transmission Facilities that are to be integrated with, or that will affect, the New England Transmission System; and (ii) taking such other action as may be required to make the facility available for use as part of the New England Transmission System.

9.3 Control and Coordination

Until such time as a Merchant Transmission Owner has transferred operational control over its Merchant Transmission Facilities to the ISO pursuant to Section 9.2(i), all such Merchant Transmission Facilities shall be subject to the operational control, scheduling and maintenance coordination of the System Operator in accordance with the Tariff.

10. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades

The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included with the status of “Planned” in the RSP Project List as defined in Section 3.6 of this Attachment shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 12 of this OATT.

11. Allocation of ARRs

The allocation of ARR in connection with Transmission Upgrades is addressed in Section III.C.8 of the Tariff.

12. Dispute Resolution Procedures

12.1 Objective

Section 12 of this Attachment sets forth a dispute resolution process (the “Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process”) through which regional transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

12.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections

All information disclosed in the course of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

12.3 Eligible Parties

Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a Reviewable Determination, defined in Section 12.4(a) of this Attachment, with respect to the regional system planning process described in this Attachment is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this Dispute Resolution Process (“Disputing Party”).

12.4 Scope

In order to ensure that the regional transmission planning process set forth under this Attachment moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the ISO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any

matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) Reviewable Determinations

The determinations that may be subject to the Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 12 that include certain procedural and substantive challenges that may arise at limited designated key decision points in the regional transmission planning process for PTF. Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a designated key decision point conform to the requirements set forth in this Attachment. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a designated key decision point was supported by adequate basis in fact.

The designated key decision points for Reviewable Determinations shall be limited to the following:

- (i) Results of a Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.1 of this Attachment;
- (ii) Updates to the RSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in Section 3.6 of this Attachment;
- (iii) Results of Solutions Studies conducted and communicated by the ISO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in Section 4.2 of this Attachment;
- (iv) Consideration of market responses in Needs Assessments as specified in Section 4.1(f) of this Attachment;
- (v) Substance of Economic Studies to be conducted by the ISO in a given year as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment; and

- (vi) Prioritization of Economic Studies to be performed in a given year where the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to prioritize them as specified in Section 4.1(b) of this Attachment.

(b) Material Adverse Impact

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the ISO, and (iii) as a result the ISO made an incorrect decision or determination.

12.5 Notice and Comment

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a Reviewable Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable Determination following the ISO's presentation of such Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the ISO ("Request for Dispute Resolution"). A Request for Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be addressed to the ISO's Chair of the Planning Advisory Committee and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by the ISO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the ISO shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of an ISO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the ISO's designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the ISO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the ISO's designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the ISO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The ISO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

12.6 Dispute Resolution Procedures

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiations

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Attachment involving a Reviewable Determination, as defined in Section 12.4 of this Attachment, between and among the ISO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, the affected Transmission Owner, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiation within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction.

12.7 Notice of Dispute Resolution Process Results

Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 12.6(b) or Section 12.6(c) of this Attachment, the ISO shall distribute to the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

13. Rights Under The Federal Power Act

Nothing in this Attachment shall restrict the rights of any party to file a Complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.

14. Annual Assessment of Transmission Transfer Capability

Each year, the ISO shall issue the results of the annual assessment of transmission transfer capability, conducted pursuant to applicable NERC, NPCC and ISO New England standards and criteria and the identification of potential future transmission system weaknesses and limiting facilities that could impact the transmission system's ability to reliably transfer energy in the planning horizon. Each annual assessment will identify those portions of the New England system, along with the associated interface boundaries, that should be considered in the assessment of Capacity Zones to be modeled in the Forward Capacity Market pursuant to ISO Tariff Section III.12. This report will be posted on the ISO website. Each annual assessment will model out-of-service resources associated with the following bids, if the ISO determines the removal of the resource is likely to have an impact on the transmission transfer limits for the relevant period: Retirement De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, demand bids submitted for the upcoming substitution auction, and rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent Forward Capacity Auction.

15. Procedures for the Conduct of Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrades Regional Planning Study

The purpose of this Section 15 is to support the conduct of Interconnection Studies under the Interconnection Procedures set forth in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff. Other than Section 2 of this Attachment K regarding the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee and this Section 15, none of the other provisions in this Attachment K apply to the conduct of the Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study or the results of the study.

15.1 Notice of Initiation of Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study in Support of Cluster Studies under the Interconnection Procedures.

Pursuant to Section 4.2.2 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.2 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.2 of Schedule 25 of Section II of this Tariff, the ISO shall provide notice to the Planning Advisory Committee of the initiation of a cluster for studying certain Interconnection Requests. The cluster study process, known as Clustering, shall consist of two phases. This notice shall trigger the first phase of Clustering, during

which the ISO shall conduct a Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (“CETU”) Regional Planning Study (“CRPS”) (the cost of which will be recovered by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A of the Tariff). In the second phase of Clustering, the ISO shall conduct Interconnection System Impact Studies and Interconnection Facilities Studies in clusters pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

15.2 Preparation for Conduct of CRPS; Stakeholder Input

The purpose of the CRPS shall be to identify the new transmission infrastructure and any associated system upgrades to enable the interconnection of potentially all of the resources proposed in the Interconnection Requests for which the conditions identified in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff have been triggered. The ISO will prepare and post on its website, consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment K, a proposed scope of the CRPS and associated parameters and assumptions, and provide the foregoing to the Planning Advisory Committee. A meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to solicit stakeholder input for consideration by the ISO on the CRPS’s scope, parameters and assumptions, consistent with the responsibilities of the Planning Advisory Committee as set forth in Section 2.2 of this Attachment. As part of the CRPS’s scope, the ISO will describe the circumstances that triggered the conditions in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. In addition, the ISO will identify: (i) the Interconnection Requests, to be referenced by Queue Position, that are expected to be eligible to participate in the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study, and (ii) the preliminary transmission upgrade concepts proposed to be considered in the CRPS. The preliminary transmission upgrade concepts may account for previously conducted transmission reinforcement studies and previously identified concepts for transmission upgrades in the relevant electrical area, including Elective Transmission Upgrades with Interconnection Requests pending in the interconnection queue prior to the initiation of the CRPS.

A member of the Planning Advisory Committee or an Interconnection Customer may make a written submission to the ISO, requesting that Clustering be considered for specific Interconnection Requests in the ISO New England interconnection queue. In response to such a request, the ISO will either develop a notice of initiation of a cluster pursuant to Section 15.1 of this Attachment K, or identify, in writing, to

the Planning Advisory Committee why the conditions in Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff have not been triggered.

15.3 Conduct of the CRPS

The CRPS will consist of analyses performed under the conditions used in the conduct of an Interconnection System Impact Study under the Interconnection Procedures. The CRPS will consist of steady state thermal analysis, voltage and transient stability analysis, and, as appropriate, other analysis, such as weak-grid-related analyses. The ISO will use Reasonable Efforts to complete the CRPS within twelve (12) months from the notice of the cluster initiation to the Planning Advisory Committee. If less than two (2) Interconnection Requests identified pursuant to Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff remain in the interconnection queue prior to the completion of the CRPS, the ISO will terminate the CRPS.

15.4 Publication of the CRPS

The ISO shall post a draft report of the CRPS to the Planning Advisory Committee, consistent with Section 2.4(d) of this Attachment K, and a meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee will be held promptly thereafter in order to discuss the results of the CRPS. A comment period will follow the Planning Advisory Committee meeting. The ISO will post on its website any comments received and the ISO's responses to those comments.

The CRPS report will provide:

- (i) a planning level description of the CETU(s) and a non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimate, developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), of the costs for the CETU(s);
- (ii) a list of other facilities that may be needed in addition to the CETU(s) and a non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimate, developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), of the costs for those facilities (the CRPS will not provide descriptions of expected Interconnection Facilities for specific Interconnection Requests in the cases where the Interconnection Facilities cannot be finalized until the actual Interconnection Requests that will be moving forward in the cluster are known);

- (iii) the approximate megawatt quantity (or quantities if more than one level of megawatt injection was studied in the CRPS) of resources that could be interconnected in a manner that meets the Network Capability Interconnection Standard and the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Tariff; and,
- (iv) a list of the Interconnection Requests, to be referenced by Queue Position, that at the sole discretion of the ISO are identified as eligible to participate in the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study that will be conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. The list shall include the expected cost allocation for the eligible Interconnection Requests, calculated in accordance with Schedule 11 of Section II of the Tariff.

The non-binding good faith order-of-magnitude estimates under Section 15.4(i)-(ii) of this Attachment will be developed by the applicable Transmission Owner(s), and the costs of developing such estimates shall be recovered as specified in Sections 3.3.1, 6.1 and 7.2 of Schedule 22, Section 3.3.1, 3.4.2, and Attachment 1 of Schedule 23, and Section 3.3.1, 6.1 and 7.2 of Schedule 25.

The posting, consistent with Section 2.4 (d) of this Attachment K, of the final CRPS report on the ISO website will trigger the Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study Entry Deadline specified in Section 4.2.3.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3.1 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff. The Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study Entry Deadline shall be 30 days from the posting of the final CRPS report.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section 15, the final Maine Resource Integration Study shall be the first CRPS and will form the basis for the first Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study to be conducted in accordance with Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5.3.3 of Schedule 23, and Section 4.2.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Tariff.

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 1
ATTACHMENT K -LOCAL
LOCAL SYSTEM PLANNING PROCESS

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1. Local System Planning Process

1.1 General

In circumstances where transmission system planning for Non-Pool Transmission Facilities (“Non-PTF”)², including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, is taking place in New England that is not incorporated into the RSP planning process, the following Local System Plan (“LSP”) process will be utilized for transmission planning purposes. The purpose of the LSP is to enable formal stakeholder input to planning for Non-PTF that is not incorporated into the RSP. The LSP shall ensure the opportunity for Planning Advisory Committee participation in the LSP process. The LSP will not be subject to approval by the ISO or the ISO Board under the RSP.

1.2 Planning Advisory Committee Review

The Planning Advisory Committee shall periodically provide input and feedback to the PTOs concerning the development of the LSP and the conduct of associated system enhancement and expansion studies. It is contemplated that LSP issues for identified local areas will be periodically addressed at the end of regularly scheduled Planning Advisory Committee meetings. Regular meetings of the Planning Advisory Committee shall be extended as necessary to serve the purposes of this section. Each PTO contemplating the addition of new Non-PTF will present its respective LSP to the Planning Advisory Committee not less than once per year. Not less than every three years, each PTO will post a notice as part of its LSP process indicating that members of the Planning Advisory Committee, NESCOE, or any state may provide the PTO with input regarding state and federal Public Policy Requirements identified as driving transmission needs relating to Non-PTF and regarding particular local transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements. The PTO will provide a written explanation, to be posted on the ISO website, of why suggested transmission needs driven by Public Policy Requirements will or will not be evaluated for potential solutions in the LSP planning process.

1.3 Role of the PTOs

² For absence of doubt, the PTOs clarify that Non-PTF is meant to include Category B and Local Area Facilities as defined by the TOA.

Each PTO will be responsible for administering the LSP process pertaining to its own Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, by presenting LSP information to the Planning Advisory Committee, developing an appropriate needs analysis and addressing LSP needs within its local area. In developing its LSP, each PTO will ensure comparable treatment of similarly situated customers or potential customers and will take into consideration data, comments and specific requests supplied by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders. To the extent that generation and/or demand resources are identified that could impact planning for Non-PTF, each PTO will take such resources into account when developing the LSP for its facilities, consistent with Good Utility Practice. Each PTO will also be responsible for addressing issues or concerns arising out of Planning Advisory Committee review of its proposed LSP and posting its LSP and the LSP Project List.

1.4 Description of LSP

The LSP shall describe the projected improvements to Non-PTF that are needed to maintain system reliability or as Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, and shall reflect the results of such reviews within the limited geographical areas that pertain to the LSP, as determined by each PTO (“LSP Needs Assessments”), and corresponding system planning and expansion studies. The LSP Needs Assessments will be coordinated with the RSP and include the information that the ISO-NE incorporates into the RSP plans, as applicable. The proponents of regulated transmission proposals in response to LSP Needs Assessments shall also identify any RSP plans that require coordination with their regulated transmission proposals addressing the Non-PTF system needs.

The LSP shall identify the planning process, criteria, data, and assumptions used to develop the LSP. To the extent the current LSP utilizes data, assumptions or criteria used by the ISO in the RSP, any such data, assumptions or criteria will also be identified in the LSP.

Each PTO shall consult with NESCOE and applicable states, local authorities and stakeholders to consider their views prior to including a Local Public Transmission Upgrade in its LSP, as described in Section 1.6.

Each PTO’s LSP will be made available on a website for review by the Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers and other stakeholders, subject to the ISO New England Information Policy and

CEII restrictions or requirements. The ISO's posting of the RSP and the RSP Project List will include links to each PTO's specific LSP posting.

The LSP of a particular PTO shall be posted not less than 3 business days prior to its presentation by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee. The Planning Advisory Committee, Transmission Customers, and other stakeholders will have 30 days from the date of the PTO's presentation to the Planning Advisory Committee to provide any written comments for consideration by the PTO. The LSP shall specify the physical characteristics of the solutions that can meet the needs identified in the LSP. The LSP shall provide sufficient information to allow Market Participants to assess the quantity, general locations and operating characteristics of the type of incremental supply or demand-side resources, or merchant transmission projects, that would satisfy the identified needs or that may serve to modify, offset or defer proposed regulated transmission upgrades.

Each year's LSP shall be based upon the LSP completed in the prior year by either recertifying the results of the prior LSP or providing specific updates.

1.5 Economic Studies

To the extent that the ISO selects any Economic Studies pursuant to Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K or otherwise performs Economic Studies that will impact Non-PTF, the PTOs will coordinate with the ISO in the performance of such Economic Studies.

1.6 Public Policy Studies

As part of the LSP process, each PTO will evaluate potential transmission solutions on its Non-PTF system that are likely to be both efficient and cost-effective for meeting Public Policy Requirements.

1.6A Process to Identify Public Policy Requirements Driving Non-PTF Transmission Needs

Within six months of publication, each PTO will review the Public Policy Requirements posted by the ISO to determine and evaluate at a high level any public policy needs potentially driving transmission needs on their respective Non-PTF systems. Such evaluations will also include potential public policy needs suggested by third parties. Each PTO will review NESCOE's written explanation of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. If NESCOE does not provide a listing

of identified transmission needs and explanation, each PTO will review the ISO's explanations of which transmission needs driven by state or federal Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated by the ISO and why other suggested transmission needs will not be evaluated. In addition, each PTO will review the ISO's explanation of which transmission needs driven by local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated in the regional system planning process and why other suggested transmission needs driven by local Public Policy requirements will not be evaluated. Each PTO will then determine if any of the posted state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements are driving a need on its Non-PTF transmission system and will include the non-PTF needs in its local planning process.

As part of the local planning process, each PTO will list the identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements that will be evaluated, and provide an explanation of why any identified transmission needs will not be evaluated as part of its LSP. The list will be posted in the PTO's LSP and presented at the annual PAC meeting. The PTO will seek input at the PAC meeting from stakeholders about whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs and seek recommendations about whether to proceed with such studies. A stakeholder may provide written input on the list within 30 days from the date of presentation for consideration by the PTO. Each PTO will then confirm, or modify if appropriate, its determination of which identified transmission needs on its non-PTF transmission system driven by state, federal, or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated and which will not be evaluated, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary.

1.6B Procedure for Evaluating Potential Public Policy Solutions on the Non-PTF

Once it has been determined that a non-PTF need driven by state, federal or local Public Policy Requirements will be evaluated, each PTO will prepare a scope and associated assumptions as part of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study. For those needs where a scope is available, a PTO may present the proposed scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study within its LSP and as part of its LSP presentation described in Section 1.6A. A stakeholder may provide written input to the scope within 30 days after the LSP presentation for the PTO to consider.

Each PTO will schedule a follow-up PAC meeting presentation for additional stakeholder input within 4 months after the PTO's LSP presentation as described in Section 1.6A if the proposed scope for a Public Policy Local Transmission Study was not included in its annual LSP presentation. Within 30 days after

the follow-up meeting, a stakeholder may provide written input to the scope for the PTO to consider. Subsequently, the PTO will determine the study scope for the Public Policy Local Transmission Study and revise its annual LSP.

In preparation of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study that will be presented to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year, the PTO will undertake the following: First, the PTO will perform the initial phase of the Public Policy Local Transmission Study to develop an estimate of costs and benefits and post its preliminary results on a website. Second, the PTO will use good faith efforts to contact stakeholders and the appropriate state and/or local authorities informing them of the posting, requesting input on whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, and seeking recommendations about whether to proceed with further planning and construction of a Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade. Each PTO will then make a determination of whether further study is warranted to identify solutions for local transmission system needs, or will select its final solution, and revise its annual LSP accordingly. If the potential Non-PTF transmission needs identified would affect the Non-PTF facilities of more than one PTO, the affected PTOs will coordinate their efforts with other affected PTOs, as necessary. Results of a Public Policy Local Transmission Study will be provided to the PAC as part of the LSP for the following year.

2. Posting of LSP Project List

Each PTO shall develop, maintain and make available on a website, a cumulative listing of proposed regulated transmission solutions that may meet LSP needs (the “LSP Project List”). The LSP Project List will be updated at least annually. The LSP Project List shall also provide reasons for any new Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, any change in status of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, or any removal of proposed Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades, from the LSP Project List. Each PTO will be individually responsible for publicly posting and updating the status of its respective LSP and the transmission projects arising therefrom on a website in a format comparable to the manner in which RSP plans and projects are posted on the RSP Project List. The ISO’s posting of the RSP and RSP Project List will include links to each PTO’s specific LSP Project List.

3. Posting of Assumptions and Criteria

Each PTO will make available on a website the planning criteria and assumptions used in its current LSP. A link to each PTO’s planning criteria and assumptions will be posted on the ISO website.

4. Cost Responsibility for Transmission Upgrades

The cost responsibility for each upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system in New England that is included in the LSP Project List of this Appendix 1 shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 21 of this OATT.

5. LSP Dispute Resolution Procedures

5.1 Objective

Section 5 of this Appendix 1 sets forth an LSP dispute resolution process (the "LSP Dispute Resolution Process") through which LSP-related transmission planning-related disputes may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

5.2 Confidential Information and CEII Protections

All information disclosed in the course of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process shall be subject to the protection of confidential information and CEII consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and CEII policy.

5.3 Eligible Parties

Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee that has been adversely affected by a PTO's Reviewable Determination with respect to the LSP transmission planning process described in this Appendix 1 is eligible to raise its dispute, as appropriate, under this LSP Dispute Resolution Process ("Disputing Party").

5.4 Scope

In order to ensure that the LSP transmission planning process set forth under this Appendix 1 moves expeditiously forward, the scope of issues that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 shall be limited to certain key procedural and substantive decisions made by the applicable PTO within its authority as specified in documents on file with the Commission. That is, decisions not subject to resolution within the jurisdiction of the Commission are not within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Examples of matters not within the scope of the LSP Dispute Resolution Process include planning to serve retail native load or state siting issues. Additionally, the

Tariff already explicitly provides specific dispute resolution procedures for various matters. To this end, any matter regarding the review and approval of applications pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Tariff, which is subject to the dispute resolution process under Section I.6 of the Tariff, shall not be within the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process. Similarly, any matter regarding Transmission Cost Allocation shall be governed by the dispute resolution process under Schedule 12 of the OATT, and shall be outside the scope of this LSP Dispute Resolution Process.

(a) Reviewable Determinations:

The LSP determinations made by the applicable PTO that may be subject to the LSP Dispute Resolution Process under this Section 5 ("Reviewable LSP Determination") shall include certain procedural and substantive challenges at designated key decision points during the LSP transmission planning process for Non-PTF, including Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrades ("Key LSP Decision Points"). Procedural challenges will be limited to whether or not the steps taken up to a Key LSP Decision Point conform to the requirements set forth in this Appendix 1. Substantive challenges will be limited to whether or not a determination or conclusion rendered at a Key LSP Decision Point was supported by adequate basis in fact. The Key LSP Decision Points shall be limited to the following:

- (i) Results of an LSP Needs Assessment conducted and communicated by a PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1;
- (ii) Updates to the LSP Project List, including adding, removing or revising regulated Non-PTF transmission solutions included thereunder, as presented at the Planning Advisory Committee and as specified in this Appendix 1;
- (iii) Results of Non-PTF transmission solution studies, including any Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade studies, conducted and communicated by the PTO to the Planning Advisory Committee as specified in this Appendix 1; and
- (iv) Consideration of market responses in LSP Needs Assessments as specified in this Appendix 1.

(b) Material Adverse Impact

In order to prevail in a challenge to a procedural-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that the alleged procedural error had a material adverse impact on the determination or conclusion made by the applicable PTO. In order to prevail in a challenge to a substantive-based Reviewable LSP Determination, the Disputing Party must show that either (i) the determination is based on incorrect data or assumptions or (ii) incorrect analysis was performed by the PTO, and (iii) as a result thereof, the PTO made an incorrect decision or determination.

5.5 Notice and Comment

A Disputing Party aggrieved by a PTO's Reviewable LSP Determination shall have fifteen (15) calendar days upon learning of the Reviewable LSP Determination following the PTO's presentation of such LSP Reviewable Determination at the Planning Advisory Committee to request dispute resolution by giving notice to the Applicable PTO ("Request for LSP Dispute Resolution").

A Request for LSP Dispute Resolution shall be in writing and shall be provided to the applicable PTO and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners. Within three (3) Business Days of the receipt by a PTO of a Request for Dispute Resolution, the PTO, in coordination with the ISO, shall prepare and distribute to all members of the Planning Advisory Committee a notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution including, subject to the protection of Confidential Information and CEII, the specifics of the Request for Dispute Resolution and providing the name of a PTO representative to whom any comments may be sent. Any member of the Planning Advisory Committee may submit to the PTO's designated representative, on or before the tenth (10th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution, written comments to the PTO with respect to the Request for Dispute Resolution. The Disputing Party filing the Request for Dispute Resolution may respond to any such comments by submitting a written response to the PTO's designated representative and to the commenting party on or before the fifteenth (15th) Business Day following the date the PTO distributes the notice of the Request for Dispute Resolution. The PTO may, but is not required to, consider any written comments.

5.6 Dispute Resolution Procedure

(a) Resolution Through the Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee shall discuss and resolve any LSP related dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the applicable PTO, the Disputing Party, and, as appropriate, other affected Transmission Owners and the ISO (collectively, “Parties”) (excluding applications for rate changes or other changes to the Tariff, or to any Service Agreement entered into under the Tariff, which shall be presented directly to the Commission for resolution).

(b) Resolution Through Informal Negotiation

To the extent that the Planning Advisory Committee is not able to resolve a dispute arising under this Appendix 1 involving a Reviewable LSP Determination, as defined in Section 5.4 of this Appendix 1, between and among the Parties, such dispute shall be the subject of good-faith negotiations among the Parties. Each Party shall designate a fully authorized senior representative for resolution on an informal basis as promptly as practicable.

(c) Resolution Through Alternative Dispute Resolution

In the event the designated representatives are unable to resolve the dispute through informal negotiations within thirty (30) days, or such other period as the Parties may agree upon, by mutual agreement of the Parties, such LSP related dispute may be submitted to mediation or any other form of alternative dispute resolution upon the agreement of all Parties to participate in such mediation or other alternative dispute resolution process. Such form of alternative dispute resolution shall not include binding arbitration.

If a Party identifies exigent circumstances reasonably requiring expedited resolution of the LSP related dispute, such Party may file a Complaint with the Commission or seek other appropriate redress before a court of competent jurisdiction

5.7 Notice of Results of Dispute Resolution

Within three (3) Business Days following the resolution of a dispute pursuant to either Section 5.6(b) or 5.6(c) of this Appendix 1, the PTO shall distribute to members of the Planning Advisory Committee a document reflecting the resolution.

5.8 Rights under the Federal Power Act:

Nothing in this Appendix 1 shall restrict the rights of any party to file a complaint with the Commission under relevant provisions of the Federal Power Act.

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 2
LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION
ENTITIES

APPENDIX 2

ATTACHMENT K

LIST OF ENTITIES ENROLLED IN THE TRANSMISSION PLANNING REGION

The entities listed in this Appendix 2 are those enrolled for the purpose of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to Attachment K as of the date the revisions to this Appendix 2 were filed with the Commission. The most current list of entities enrolled for the purpose of participating as a transmission provider in the New England transmission planning region pursuant to Attachment K is available on the ISO-NE website. This Appendix 2 will be updated to reflect any subsequent enrollments as part of unrelated OATT filings at the time ISO-NE undertakes such unrelated filings.

Town of Braintree Electric Light Department

Central Maine Power Company

The City of Chicopee Municipal Lighting Department

The City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department

The Connecticut Light and Power Company

Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative

Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative

Cross-Sound Cable Company, LLC

Emera Maine

Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company

Green Mountain Power Corporation

Hudson Light & Power Department

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company

Maine Electric Power Company

Middleborough Gas and Electric Department

New England Electric Transmission Corporation

New England Energy Connection, LLC

New England Hydro-Transmission Corporation

New England Hydro-Transmission Electric Company Inc.

New England Power Company

New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.

New Hampshire Transmission, LLC

Eversource Energy Service Company as agent for: The Connecticut Light and Power Company, NSTAR Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, and Western Massachusetts Electric Company

Norwood Municipal Light Department

NSTAR Electric Company

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

Shrewsbury Electric & Cable Operations

Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant

Town of Reading Municipal Light Department

The United Illuminating Company

Unitil Energy Systems, Inc.

Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc.

Vermont Electric Transmission Company

Vermont Public Power Supply Authority

Vermont Transco LLC

Town of Wallingford CT Dept of Public Utilities – Electric Division

Western Massachusetts Electric Company

ATTACHMENT K APPENDIX 3

LIST OF QUALIFIED TRANSMISSION PROJECT SPONSORS

The entities listed in this Appendix 3 are those approved by ISO-NE as Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors as of the date the revisions to this Appendix 3 were filed with the Commission. The most current list of entities approved as Qualified Transmission Project Sponsors is available on the ISO-NE website. This Appendix 3 will be updated to reflect any subsequent enrollments as part of unrelated OATT filings at the time ISO-NE undertakes such unrelated filings.

Braintree Electric Light Department

Central Maine Power Company

City of Holyoke Gas and Electric Department

The Connecticut Light and Power Company

The Connecticut Transmission Municipal Electric Cooperative

Emera Maine

Eversource Energy Transmission Ventures, Inc.

Grid America Holdings, Inc.

Hudson Light and Power Department

Maine Electric Power Company

Middleboro Gas & Electric Department

New England Energy Connection, LLC

New England Power Company

New Hampshire Transmission, LLC

Norwood Municipal Light Department

NSTAR Electric Company

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

Taunton Municipal Light Plant

United Illuminating Company

Vermont Transco, LLC

Western Massachusetts Electric Company

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III.12. Calculation of Capacity Requirements.

III.12.1. Installed Capacity Requirement.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with this Section III.12.1.

The ISO shall determine the Installed Capacity Requirement such that the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiency, on average, will be no more than once in ten years. Compliance with this resource adequacy planning criterion shall be evaluated probabilistically, such that the Loss of Load Expectation (“LOLE”) of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiencies shall be no more than 0.1 day each year. The forecast Installed Capacity Requirement shall meet this resource adequacy planning criterion for each Capacity Commitment Period. The Installed Capacity Requirement shall be determined assuming all resources pursuant to Sections III.12.7 and III.12.9 will be deliverable to meet the forecasted demand determined pursuant to Section III.12.8.

If the Installed Capacity Requirement shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall make adjustments to the modeling assumptions and/or methodology through the stakeholder process to eliminate the bias in the Installed Capacity Requirement. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement are specified in Sections III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9. For the purpose of this Section III.12, a “resource” shall include generating resources, demand resources, and import capacity resources eligible to receive capacity payments in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.12.1.1. System-Wide Marginal Reliability Impact Values.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity at various capacity levels for the New England Control Area. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement.

III.12.2. Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall calculate the capacity requirements and limitations, accounting for relevant transmission interface limits which shall be determined pursuant to Section

III.12.5, for each modeled Capacity Zone (as described in Section III.12.4) for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall use consistent assumptions and standards to establish a resource's electrical location for purposes of qualifying a resource for the Forward Capacity Market and for purposes of calculating Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits. The methodology used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.2.1 and III.12.2.2, respectively. The modeling assumptions used in determining the Local Sourcing Requirements and the Maximum Capacity Limits are specified in Sections III.12.5, III.12.6, III.12.7, III.12.8 and III.12.9.

III.12.2.1. Calculation of Local Sourcing Requirements for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Local Sourcing Requirement shall be the amount needed to satisfy the higher of: (i) the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1; or (ii) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement as determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

III.12.2.1.1. Local Resource Adequacy Requirement.

The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement shall be calculated as follows:

- (a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the unconstrained side of the interface, if any.
- (b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
- (c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area

meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.

(d) The Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for the import-constrained Capacity Zone Z shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

$$LRA_Z = Resources_Z + Proxy Units_Z - (Proxy Units Adjustment_Z(1-FOR_Z)) - (Firm Load Adjustment_Z(1-FOR_Z))$$

In which:

$$LRA_Z = \text{MW of Local Resource Adequacy Requirement for Capacity Zone Z;}$$

$$Resources_Z = \text{MW of resources electrically located within Capacity Zone Z, including import Capacity Resources on the import-constrained side of the interface, if any;}$$

$$Proxy Units_Z = \text{MW of proxy unit additions in Load Zone Z;}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Firm Load Adjustment}_Z = \text{MW of firm load added (or subtracted) within Capacity Zone Z to make the LOLE of the New England Control Area equal to 0.105 days per year; and} \\ &FOR_Z = \text{Capacity weighted average of the forced outage rate modeled for all resources within Capacity Zone Z, including and proxy unit additions to Capacity Zone Z.} \end{aligned}$$

$$FOR_Z = \text{Capacity weighted average of the forced outage rate modeled for all resources within Capacity Zone Z, including and proxy unit additions to Capacity Zone Z.}$$

$$Proxy Units Adjustment = \text{MW of firm load added to (or unforced capacity subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z until the system LOLE equals 0.1}$$

days/year.

To determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, the firm load is adjusted within Capacity Zone Z until the LOLE of the New England Control Area reaches 0.105 days per year. The LOLE of 0.105 days per year includes an allowance for transmission related LOLE of 0.005 days per year associated with each interface. As firm load is added to (or subtracted from) Capacity Zone Z, an equal amount of firm load is removed from (or added to) the rest of New England Control Area.

III.12.2.1.2. Transmission Security Analysis Requirement.

A Transmission Security Analysis shall be used to determine the requirement of the zone being studied, and shall include the following features:

- (a) The ISO shall perform a series of transmission load flow studies and/or a deterministic operable capacity analysis targeted at determining the performance of the system under stressed conditions, and at developing a resource requirement sufficient to allow the system to operate through those stressed conditions.
- (b) The Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be set at a level sufficient to cover most reasonably anticipated events, but will not guarantee that every combination of obligated resources within the zone will meet system needs.
- (c) In performing the Transmission Security Analysis, the ISO may establish static transmission interface transfer limits, as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5, as a reasonable representation of the transmission system's capability to serve load with available existing resources.
- (d) The Transmission Security Analysis may model the entire New England system and individual zones, for both the first contingency (N-1) and second contingency (N-1-1) conditions. First contingency conditions (N-1) shall include the loss of the most critical generator or most critical transmission element with respect to the zone. Second contingency conditions (N-1-1) shall include both: (i) the loss of the most critical generator with respect to the zone followed by the loss of the most critical transmission element ("Line-Gen"); and (ii) the loss of the most critical transmission element followed by the loss of the next most critical transmission element ("Line-Line") with respect to the zone.

III.12.2.1.3. Marginal Reliability Impact Values for Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity, at various capacity levels, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used to determine the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1, except that the capacity transfer capability between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1(b) shall be reduced by the greater of: (i) the Transmission Security Analysis Requirement minus the Local Resource Adequacy Requirement, and; (ii) zero.

III.12.2.2. Calculation of Maximum Capacity Limit for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Maximum Capacity Limit shall be calculated using the following method:

- (a) Two areas shall be modeled: (i) the Capacity Zone under study which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the Capacity Zone, including external Control Area support from tie benefits on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any; and (ii) the rest of the New England Control Area, which includes all load and all resources electrically located within the rest of the New England Control Area, including external Control Area support from tie benefits to the rest of the New England Control Area, if any.
- (b) The only transmission constraint to be modeled shall be the transmission interface limit between the Capacity Zone under study and the rest of the New England Control Area as identified pursuant to Section III.12.5.
- (c) Any proxy units that are required in the New England Control Area pursuant to Section III.12.7.1 shall be modeled as specified in Section III.12.7.1, in order to ensure that the New England Control Area meets the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1. If the system LOLE is less than 0.1 days/year, firm load is added (or unforced capacity is subtracted) so that the system LOLE equals 0.1 days/year.
- (d) The Maximum Capacity Limit for the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:

$$\text{Maximum Capacity Limit}_Y = \text{ICR} - \text{LRA}_{\text{Rest of New England}}$$

In which:

Maximum Capacity Limit_Y = Maximum MW amount of resources , including Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface, if any, that can be procured in the export-constrained Capacity Zone Y to meet the Installed Capacity Requirement;

ICR = MW of Installed Capacity Requirement for the New England Control Area, determined in accordance with Section III.12.1; and

LRA_{Rest of New England} = MW of Local Sourcing Requirement for the rest of the New England Control Area, which for the purposes of this calculation is treated as an import-constrained region, determined in accordance with Section III.12.2.1.

III.12.2.2.1. Marginal Reliability Impact Values for Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall determine the Marginal Reliability Impact of incremental capacity, at various capacity levels, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone. For purposes of calculating these Marginal Reliability Impact values, the ISO shall apply the same modeling assumptions and methodology used to determine the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Maximum Capacity Limit.

III.12.3 Consultation and Filing of Capacity Requirements.

At least two months prior to filing the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission, the ISO shall review the modeling assumptions and resulting Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves with the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. Following consultation with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO shall file the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves

for each upcoming Capacity Commitment Period through the relevant Capacity Commitment Period with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act 90 days prior to the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period. The ISO shall file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the proposed identification of a potential new Capacity Zone when the boundary of the potential new Capacity Zone differs from the boundaries of existing Load Zones or Capacity Zones. In order to be used in a given FCA, any new Capacity Zone must have received approval from the Commission prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable FCA.

III.12.4. Capacity Zones.

For each Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall, using the results of the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability conducted pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, determine the Capacity Zones to model as described below, and will include such designations in its filing with the Commission pursuant to Section III.13.8.1(c):

- (a) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate export-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the Maximum Capacity Limit is less than the sum of the existing Qualified Capacity and proposed new capacity that could qualify to be procured in the export constrained Capacity Zone, including existing and proposed new Import Capacity Resources on the export-constrained side of the interface.
- (b) The ISO shall model in the Forward Capacity Auction, as separate import-constrained Capacity Zones, those zones identified in the most recent annual assessment of transmission transfer capability pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K, for which the second contingency transmission capability results in a line-line Transmission Security Analysis Requirement, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2 and pursuant to ISO New England Planning Procedures, that is greater than the existing Qualified Capacity in the zone, with the largest generating station in the zone modeled as out-of-service. Each assessment will model out-of-service all Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids (including any received for the current Forward Capacity Auction at the time of this calculation), substitution auction demand bids submitted for the current Forward Capacity Auction, rejected for reliability Static De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction, and rejected for reliability Dynamic De-List Bids from the most recent previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) Adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained shall be modeled together as the Rest of Pool Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.12.4A. Dispatch Zones.

The ISO shall establish Dispatch Zones that reflect potential transmission constraints within a Load Zone that are expected to exist during each Capacity Commitment Period. Dispatch Zones shall be used to establish the geographic location of Active Demand Capacity Resources. Dispatch Zones shall not change during a Capacity Commitment Period. For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall establish and publish Dispatch Zones by the beginning of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. The ISO will review proposed Dispatch Zones with Market Participants prior to establishing and publishing final Dispatch Zones.

III.12.5. Transmission Interface Limits.

Transmission interface limits, used in the determination of Local Sourcing Requirements, shall be determined pursuant to ISO Tariff Section II, Attachment K using network models that include all resources, existing transmission lines and proposed transmission lines that the ISO determines, in accordance with Section III.12.6, will be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The transmission interface limits shall be established, using deterministic analyses, at levels that provide acceptable thermal, voltage and stability performance of the system both with all lines in service and after any criteria contingency occurs as specified in ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

III.12.6. Modeling Assumptions for Determining the Network Model.

The ISO shall determine, in accordance with this Section III.12.6, the generating units and transmission infrastructure to include in the network model that: (i) are expected to be in service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) may have a material impact on the network model, a potential interface constraint, or on one or more Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall be used, among other purposes, (i) for the Forward Capacity Market qualification process and (ii) to calculate transmission interface limits in order to forecast the Local Sourcing Requirements. The network model shall include:

(a) For the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the network model shall include:

- (i) all existing resources, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades that have not been approved to be retired for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.3 and III.13.2.8.3;
 - (ii) all new resources with Qualified Capacity for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, along with any associated interconnection facilities and/or Elective Transmission Upgrades; and
 - (iii) in the case of an initial interconnection analysis that is conducted consistent with the Network Capability Interconnection Standard, any generating unit or External Elective Transmission Upgrade that has a valid Interconnection Request and is reasonably expected to declare commercial operation no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.
- (b) Prior to each Forward Capacity Auction and each annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall determine and publish a list of the transmission projects and elements of transmission projects that will be included in the network model. During the process of making the transmission infrastructure determinations, as described in Section III.12.6.1, the ISO shall consult with the Governance Participants, the Transmission Owners, any transmission project proponents, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies.

III.12.6.1. Process for Establishing the Network Model.

- (a) The ISO shall establish an initial network model prior to the Forward Capacity Auction that only includes transmission infrastructure, including Internal Elective Transmission Upgrades, that is already in service at the time that the initial network model is developed.
- (b) After establishing the initial network model, the ISO shall compile a preliminary list of the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List, individually or in combination with each other, as appropriate, to identify transmission projects that may achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and that will have a material impact on the network model, on a potential interface constraint or one or more Local Sourcing Requirements.
- (c) For the transmission projects or elements of transmission projects in the RSP Project List that are included in the preliminary list developed pursuant to subsection (b), the ISO shall determine whether the

transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2 and will be considered for further evaluation pursuant to subsection (d).

(d) For those transmission projects or elements of transmission projects that meet the initial threshold milestones in subsection (c), the ISO shall use the evaluation criteria specified in Section III.12.6.3, and any other relevant information, to determine whether to include a transmission project or element of a transmission project in the final network model.

(e) If after completing its evaluation pursuant to Sections III.12.6.1 through III.12.6.3 and conferring with the transmission project proponents, the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies, the ISO determines that the transmission project or a portion of the transmission project is reasonably expected to be in service no later than the first day for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, then such transmission project or portion of transmission project shall be considered in service in the finalized network model to calculate the transmission interface limits pursuant to Section III.12.5.

III.12.6.2. Initial Threshold to be Considered In-Service.

The ISO shall determine whether transmission projects or elements of transmission projects meet all of the following initial threshold milestones:

(a) A critical path schedule for the transmission project has been furnished to ISO showing that the transmission project or the element of the transmission project will be in-service no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule must be sufficiently detailed to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the schedule.

(b) At the time of the milestone review, siting and permitting processes, if required, are on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) At the time of the milestone review, engineering is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(d) At the time of the milestone review, land acquisition, if required, is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(e) Corporate intent to build the transmission project has been furnished to the ISO. An officer of the host Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer has submitted to the ISO a statement verifying that the officer has reviewed the proposal and critical path schedule submitted to the ISO, and the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer concurs that the schedule is achievable, and it is the intent of the Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer to build the proposed transmission project in accordance with that schedule. The Transmission Owner or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer may develop alternatives or modifications to the transmission project during the course of design of the transmission project that accomplish at least the same transfer capability. Such alternatives or modifications are acceptable, so long as the ISO determines that the alternative or modification is reasonably expected to achieve an in-service date no later than the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The provision of an officer's statement shall be with the understanding that the statement shall not create any liability on the officer and that any liability with respect to the Transmission Owner's obligations shall be as set forth in the Transmission Operating Agreement and shall not be affected by such officer's statement.

III.12.6.3. Evaluation Criteria.

For a transmission project or element of a transmission project that meets the initial threshold milestones specified in Section III.12.6.2, the ISO shall consider the following factors and any other relevant information to determine whether to include the transmission project or element of the transmission project in the network model for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(a) Sufficient engineering to initiate construction is on schedule as shown on the critical path schedule.

(b) Approval under Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, if required, has been obtained or is on schedule to be obtained as shown on the critical path schedule.

(c) Significant permits, including local permits, if required to initiate construction have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

(d) Easements, if required, have been obtained or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule. Needed land purchases, if required, have been made or are on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.

- (e) Any contracts required to procure or construct a transmission project are in place consistent with the critical path schedule. The ISO's analysis may also take into account whether such contracts contain incentive and/or penalty clauses to encourage third parties to advance the delivery of material services to conform with the critical path schedule.
- (f) Physical site work is on schedule consistent with the critical path schedule.
- (g) The transmission project is in a designated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor in accordance with Section 216 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824p.

III.12.7. Resource Modeling Assumptions.

III.12.7.1. Proxy Units.

When the available resources are insufficient for the unconstrained New England Control Area to meet the resource adequacy planning criterion specified in Section III.12.1, proxy units shall be used as additional capacity to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values. The proxy units shall reflect resource capacity and outage characteristics such that when the proxy units are used in place of all other resources in the New England Control Area, the reliability, or LOLE, of the New England Control Area does not change. The outage characteristics are the summer capacity weighted average availability of the resources in the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.7.3. The capacity of the proxy unit is determined by adjusting the capacity of the proxy unit until the LOLE of the New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE calculated while using the capacity assumptions described in Section III.12.7.2.

When modeling transmission constraints for the determination of Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, the same proxy units may be added to the import-constrained zone or elsewhere in the rest of the New England Control Area depending on where system constraints exist.

III.12.7.2. Capacity.

The resources included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall include:

- (a) all Existing Generating Capacity Resources,
- (b) resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,
- (c) all Existing Import Capacity Resources backed by a multiyear contract to provide capacity in the New England Control Area, where that multiyear contract requires delivery of capacity for the Commitment Period for which the Installed Capacity Requirement is being calculated, and
- (d) Existing Demand Capacity Resources that are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Market and New Demand Capacity Resources that have cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,

but shall exclude:

- (e) capacity associated with Export Bids cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period,
- (f) capacity de-listed or retired as a result of Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, or substitution auction demand bids that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions, and
- (g) capacity retired pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), unless the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1.

The rating of Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value of such resources for the relevant zone. The rating of Demand Capacity Resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity value reduced by any reserve margin adjustment factor that is otherwise included in the summer Qualified Capacity value. The rating of resources, except for Demand Capacity Resources, cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions and obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period shall be based on the amount of Qualified Capacity that cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. Resources are located within the Capacity Zones in which they are electrically connected as determined during the qualification process.

III.12.7.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.12.7.3. Resource Availability.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be calculated taking resource availability into account and shall be determined as follows:

For Existing Generating Capacity Resources:

(a) The most recent five-year moving average of EFORD shall be used as the measure of resource availability used in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Transmission Security Analysis Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values.

(b) [Reserved.]

For resources cleared in previous Forward Capacity Auctions or obligated for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period that do not have sufficient data to calculate an availability metric as defined in subsection (a) above, class average data for similar resource types shall be used.

For existing Active Demand Capacity Resources:

Historical performance data for those resources will be used to develop an availability metric for use in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values.

III.12.7.4. Load and Capacity Relief.

Load and capacity relief expected from system-wide implementation of the following actions specified in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 4. Action During a Capacity Deficiency, shall be included in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Resource Adequacy Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values:

(a) **Implement voltage reduction.** The MW value of the load relief shall be equal to 1% of (the 90/10 forecasted seasonal net peak loads minus all Existing Demand Capacity Resources).

(b) **Arrange for available Emergency energy from Market Participants or neighboring Control Areas.** These actions are included in the calculation through the use of tie benefits to meet system needs. The MW value of tie benefits is calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.

(c) **Maintain an adequate amount of ten-minute synchronized reserves.** The amount of system reserves included in the determination of the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be consistent with those needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions. When modeling transmission constraints, the reserve requirement for a zone shall be the zone's pro rata share of the forecasted system peak load multiplied by the system reserves needed for reliable system operations during Emergency Conditions.

III.12.8. Load Modeling Assumptions.

The ISO shall forecast load for the New England Control Area and for each Load Zone within the New England Control Area. The load forecasts shall be based on appropriate models and data inputs. Each year, the load forecasts and underlying methodologies, inputs and assumptions shall be reviewed with Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies. If the load forecast shows a consistent bias over time, either high or low, the ISO shall propose adjustments to the load modeling methodology to the Governance Participants, the state utility regulatory agencies in New England and, as appropriate, other state agencies to eliminate the bias. Demand Capacity Resources shall be reflected in the load forecast as specified below:

- (a) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Capacity Resource not qualifying for or not participating in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The expected reduction from these resources will be included in the load forecast to the extent that they meet the qualification process rules, including monitoring and verification plan and financial assurance requirements. If no qualification process rules are in place for the expected reductions from these resources, they shall not be included within the load forecast.
- (b) Expected reductions from an installed or forecast Demand Capacity Resource that qualifies to participate in the Forward Capacity Market, participates but does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, or has cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction and is expected to continue in the

Forward Capacity Market shall not be reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

(c) [Reserved.]

(d) Any realized Demand Capacity Resource reductions in the historical period that received Forward Capacity Market payments for these reductions, or Demand Capacity Resource reductions that are expected to receive Forward Capacity Market payments by participating in the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction or having cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, shall be added back into the appropriate historical loads to ensure that such resources are not reflected as a reduction in the load forecast that will be used to determine the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.12.9. Tie Benefits.

The Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values shall be calculated assuming appropriate tie benefits, if any, available from interconnections with neighboring Control Areas. Tie benefits shall be calculated only for interconnections (1) without Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service or (2) that have not requested Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service or Network Import Interconnection Service with directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas with which the ISO has in effect agreements providing for emergency support to New England, including but not limited to inter-Control Area coordination agreements, emergency aid agreements and the NPCC Regional Reliability Plan.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using a probabilistic multi-area reliability model, by comparing the LOLE for the New England system before and after interconnecting the system to the neighboring Control Areas. To quantify tie benefits, firm capacity equivalents shall be added until the LOLE of the isolated New England Control Area is equal to the LOLE of the interconnected New England Control Area.

III.12.9.1. Overview of Tie Benefits Calculation Procedure.

III.12.9.1.1. Tie Benefits Calculation for the Forward Capacity Auction and Annual Reconfiguration Auctions; Modeling Assumptions and Simulation Program.

For each Capacity Commitment Period, tie benefits shall be calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction and the third annual reconfiguration auction using the calculation methodology in this Section III.12.9.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions for a Capacity Commitment Period, the tie benefits calculated for the associated Forward Capacity Auction shall be utilized in determining the Installed Capacity Requirement, Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits and Marginal Reliability Impact values as adjusted to account for any changes in import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas and changes in import capacity resources using the methodologies in Section III.12.9.6.

Tie benefits shall be calculated using the modeling assumptions developed in accordance with Section III.12.9.2 and using the General Electric Multi-area Reliability Simulation (MARS) program.

III.12.9.1.2. Tie Benefits Calculation.

The total tie benefits to New England from all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas are calculated first using the methodology in Section III.12.9.3. Following the calculation of total tie benefits, individual tie benefits from each qualifying neighboring Control Area are calculated using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from each Control Area does not equal the total tie benefits to New England, then each Control Area's tie benefits are adjusted based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits calculated for each Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.4.2. Following this calculation, tie benefits are calculated for each qualifying individual interconnection or group of interconnections using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.1. If the sum of the tie benefits from individual interconnections or groups of interconnections does not equal their associated Control Area's tie benefits, then the tie benefits of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits within the Control Area using the methodology in Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.1.3. Adjustments to Account for Transmission Import Capability and Capacity Imports.

Once the initial calculation of tie benefits is performed, the tie benefits for each individual interconnection or group of interconnections is adjusted to account for capacity imports and any changes in the import capability of interconnections with neighboring Control Areas, using the methodologies in Section

III.12.9.6. Once the import capability and capacity import adjustments are completed, the sum of the tie benefits of all individual interconnections and groups of interconnections for a Control Area, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the tie benefits associated with that Control Area, and the sum of the tie benefits from all Control Areas, with the import capability and capacity import adjustments, represents the total tie benefits available to New England.

III.12.9.2. Modeling Assumptions and Procedures for the Tie Benefits Calculation.

III.12.9.2.1. Assumptions Regarding System Conditions.

In calculating tie benefits, “at criterion” system conditions shall be used to model the New England Control Area and all interconnected Control Areas.

III.12.9.2.2. Modeling Internal Transmission Constraints in New England.

In calculating tie benefits, all New England internal transmission constraints that (i) are modeled in the most recent Regional System Plan resource adequacy studies and assessments and (ii) are not addressed by either a Local Sourcing Requirement or a Maximum Capacity Limit calculation shall be modeled, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.3. Modeling Transmission Constraints in Neighboring Control Areas.

The ISO will review annually NPCC’s assumptions regarding transmission constraints in all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas that are modeled for the tie benefits calculations. In the event that NPCC models a transmission constraint in one of the modeled neighboring Control Areas, the ISO will perform an evaluation to determine which interfaces are most critical to the ability of the neighboring Control Area to reliably provide tie benefits to New England from both operational and planning perspectives, and will model those transmission constraints in the tie benefits calculation, using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.5.

III.12.9.2.4. Other Modeling Assumptions.

- A. External transfer capability determinations. The transfer capability of all external interconnections with New England will be determined using studies that take account of the load, resource and other electrical system conditions that are consistent with those expected during the Capacity Commitment Period for which the calculation is being performed. Transfer capability studies will be performed using simulations that consider the contingencies enumerated in sub-section (iii) below.

- (i) The transmission system will be modeled using the following conditions:
 - 1. The forecast 90/10 peak load conditions for the Capacity Commitment Period;
 - 2. Qualified Existing Generating Capacity Resources reflecting their output at their Capacity Network Resource level;
 - 3. Qualified Existing Demand Capacity Resources reflecting their Capacity Supply Obligation received in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction;
 - 4. Transfers on the transmission system that impact the transfer capability of the interconnection under study.
- (ii) The system will be modeled in a manner that reflects the design of the interconnection. If an interconnection and its supporting system upgrades were designed to provide incremental capacity into the New England Control Area, simulations will assume imports up to the level that the interconnection was designed to support. If the interconnection was not designed to be so comparably integrated, simulations will determine the amount of power that can be delivered into New England over the interconnection.
- (iii) The simulations will take into account contingencies that address a fault on a generator or transmission facility, loss of an element without a fault, and circuit breaker failure following the loss of an element or an association with the operation of a special protection system.

B. In calculating tie benefits, New England capacity exports are removed from the internal capacity resources and are modeled as a resource in the receiving Control Area. The transfer capability of external interconnections is not adjusted to account for capacity exports.

III.12.9.2.5. Procedures for Adding or Removing Capacity from Control Areas to Meet the 0.1 Days Per Year LOLE Standard.

In calculating tie benefits, capacity shall be added or removed from the interconnected system of New England and its neighboring Control Areas, until the LOLE of New England and the LOLE of each Control Area of the interconnected system equals 0.1 days per year simultaneously. The following procedures shall be used to add or remove capacity within New England and the interconnected Control Areas to achieve that goal.

A. Adding Proxy Units within New England when the New England system is short of capacity. In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is

short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, proxy units (with the characteristics identified in Section III.12.7.1) will be added to the sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmission constraints within New England, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then proxy units will be added to the entire Control Area. If, as a result of the addition of one or more proxy units, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(b) will be used to remove the surplus capacity.

- B. Removing capacity from New England when the New England system is surplus of capacity.** In modeling New England as part of the interconnected system, if New England is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in these surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the existing Qualified Capacity, and any amount of proxy units added in that sub-area that is above its 50-50 peak load forecast. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratios described above for the removal of capacity surplus. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the New England Control Area, then the surplus capacity shall be removed from the entire Control Area.
- C. Adding capacity within neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity.** In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is short of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, additional capacity will be added to the neighboring Control Area's sub-areas that are created by any modeled internal transmissions constraints, beginning with the sub-area with the highest LOLE. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the Control Area, then capacity will be added to the entire Control Area. The process that the neighboring Control Area utilizes in its resource adequacy study to meet its resource adequacy criterion will be utilized to add capacity to that Control Area. In filing the Installed Capacity Requirement values pursuant to Section III.12.3, the ISO will provide citations to any resource adequacy studies relied upon for these purposes. If, as a result of the capacity addition, the system is surplus of capacity, then the methodology in Section III.12.9.2.5(d) shall be used to remove the surplus capacity.

D. Removing capacity from neighboring Control Areas when the neighboring Control

Area is surplus of capacity. In modeling neighboring Control Areas as part of the interconnected system, if the neighboring Control Area is surplus of capacity to meet the 0.1 days per year LOLE, the surplus capacity will be removed from the neighboring Control Area's sub-areas as follows. Resources will be removed from sub-areas with capacity surplus based on the ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the surplus sub-areas. The amount of capacity surplus for a sub-area is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its 50/50 peak load forecast. For a sub-area that has a minimum locational resource requirement above its 50/50 peak load forecast, the amount of capacity surplus is the amount of the installed capacity in the sub-area above its minimum locational resource requirement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if removing resources from a sub-area will exacerbate a binding transmission constraint, then capacity will not be removed from that sub-area and will instead be removed from the remaining sub-areas using the same ratio of capacity surplus in the sub-area to the total capacity surplus in the those remaining surplus sub-areas. If there are no modeled internal transmission constraints in the neighboring Control Area, then the surplus capacity will be removed from the entire Control Area.

E. Maintaining the neighboring Control Area's locational resource requirements. In modeling a neighboring Control Area with internal transmission constraints, all minimum locational resource requirements in the Control Area's sub-areas as established by the neighboring Control Area's installed capacity requirement calculations shall be observed.

III.12.9.3. Calculating Total Tie Benefits.

The total tie benefits with all qualifying directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas shall be calculated by comparing the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections to neighboring Control Areas connected with the interconnection state of the New England system with all interconnections with neighboring Control Areas disconnected. To calculate total tie benefits:

- A.** The New England system shall be interconnected with all directly interconnected neighboring Control Areas and the New England Control Area, and each neighboring Control Area shall be brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE simultaneously by adjusting the capacity of each Control Area, utilizing the methods for adding or removing capacity in Section III.12.9.2.5.
- B.** Once the interconnected system is brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE, the LOLE of the New England Control Area shall be calculated a second time, with the New England system

isolated from the rest of the interconnected system that was brought to 0.1 days per year LOLE.

- C. Total tie benefits shall be the sum of the amounts of firm capacity that needs to be added to the isolated New England Control Area at the point at which each interconnection with neighboring Control Areas interconnects in New England to bring the New England LOLE back to 0.1 days per year. This value is subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.4. Calculating Each Control Area's Tie Benefits.

III.12.9.4.1. Initial Calculation of a Control Area's Tie Benefits.

Tie benefits from each neighboring Control Area shall be determined by calculating the tie benefits for every possible interconnection state that has an impact on the tie benefit value between the New England system and the target neighboring Control Area. If two or more interconnections between New England and the target neighboring Control Area exist, then all interconnections grouped together will be used to represent the state of interconnection between New England and the target neighboring Control Area. The tie benefits from the target neighboring Control Area shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.2.

III.12.9.4.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.

If the sum of the individual Control Area tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4.1 is different than the total tie benefits from all Control Areas calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3, then each Control Area's tie benefits shall be increased or decreased based on the ratio of the individual Control Area tie benefits to the sum of the tie benefits for each individual Control Area, so that the sum of each Control Area's tie benefits, after the pro-ratio, is equal to the total tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.3. The pro-rated Control Area tie benefits are subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.5. Calculating Tie Benefits for Individual Ties.

Tie benefits shall be calculated for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the extent that a discrete and material transfer capability can be identified for the interconnection or group of interconnections. All interconnections or groups of interconnections shall have equal rights in calculating individual tie benefits, with no grandfathering or incremental tie capability treatment.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits, a group of interconnections refers to two or more AC lines that operate in parallel to form a transmission interface in which there are significant overlapping contributions of each line toward establishing the transfer limit, such that the individual lines in a group of interconnections cannot be assigned individual contributions.

III.12.9.5.1. Initial Calculation of Tie Benefits for an Individual Interconnection or Group of Interconnections.

Tie benefits for an individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be calculated by calculating tie benefits for each possible interconnection state between the New England system and the individual interconnection or group of interconnections. The tie benefits from that interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the simple average of the tie benefits calculated from all possible interconnection states, subject to adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.2.

III.12.9.5.2. Pro Ration Based on Total Tie Benefits.

If the sum of the individual interconnection's or group of interconnection's tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.5.1 is different than the associated Control Area's tie benefits calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4, then the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be adjusted based on the ratio of the tie benefits of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections to the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in that Control Area, so that the sum of the tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections in the Control Area, after the pro-ration, is equal to the total tie benefits for the Control Area calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.4. The pro-rated tie benefits for each interconnection or group of interconnections is subject to further adjustment in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.

III.12.9.6. Accounting for Capacity Imports and Changes in External Transmission Facility Import Capability.

III.12.9.6.1. Accounting for Capacity Imports.

In the initial tie benefits calculations, capacity imports are modeled as internal resources in New England, and the import capability of the interconnections with neighboring Control Areas is not reduced to reflect the impact of capacity imports. After the initial tie benefits calculations, total tie benefits, tie benefits for each Control Area, and tie benefits from each individual interconnection or group of interconnections

shall be adjusted to account for capacity imports using the methodology contained in this Section III.12.9.6.1. For the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefit values calculated in accordance with Sections III.12.9.3, III.12.9.4 and III.12.9.5 respectively. For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, this adjustment shall be applied to the tie benefits values calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction.

- A.** Capacity imports shall be deducted from the import capability of each individual interconnection or group of interconnections to determine the available import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections prior to accounting for tie benefits from those interconnections. The transfer capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections shall be determined using the procedures in Section III.12.9.2.4.A.
- B.** If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections, as determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5, is greater than the remaining transmission import capability of the interconnection or group of interconnections after accounting for capacity imports, the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the remaining transmission import capability (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2). If the tie benefits value of an individual interconnection or group of interconnections is not greater than the remaining transmission import capability after accounting for capacity imports, then the tie benefit value of the individual interconnection or group of interconnections shall be equal to the value determined in accordance with Section III.12.9.5 (taking into account any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2).
- C.** The tie benefits for each Control Area shall be the sum of the tie benefits from the individual interconnections or groups of interconnections with that Control Area, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.
- D.** The total tie benefits from all qualifying neighboring Control Areas shall be the sum of the Control Area tie benefits, after accounting for any adjustment for capacity imports and any further adjustments to transmission import capability in accordance with Section III.12.9.6.2.
- E.** For purposes of determining the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under this Section III.12.9.6.1, the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction shall be the Qualified Existing Import Capacity Resources for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and the capacity imports applicable for determining tie benefits for the annual reconfiguration auctions are those Import Capacity

Resources that hold Capacity Supply Obligations for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period as of the time the tie benefits calculation is being performed for the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.12.9.6.2. Changes in the Import Capability of Interconnections with Neighboring Control Areas.

For purposes of calculating tie benefits for the Forward Capacity Auction and third annual reconfiguration auction, the most recent import capability values for an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the modeling of system conditions for the tie benefits calculation. In addition, for the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions, any changes to the import capability of an interconnection or group of interconnections with a neighboring Control Area shall be reflected in the adjustment to tie benefits to account for capacity imports under Section III.12.9.6.1.

III.12.9.7. Tie Benefits Over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

The tie benefits from the Quebec Control Area over the HQ Phase I/II HVDC-TF calculated in accordance with Section III.12.9.1 shall be allocated to the Interconnection Rights Holders or their designees in proportion to their respective percentage shares of the HQ Phase I and the HQ Phase II facilities, in accordance with Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.12.10. Calculating the Maximum Amount of Import Capacity Resources that May be Cleared Over External Interfaces in the Forward Capacity Auction and Reconfiguration Auctions.

For external interfaces, Import Capacity Resources shall be allowed in the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions up to the interface limit minus the tie benefits, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.9.1 or 12.9.2 over the applicable interface.

III.13.1. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity

Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than \$100 per kilowatt of the whole resource's summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The \$100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

- (a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and
- (b) will be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.
- (c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource's winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than \$200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The \$200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

- (a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;
- (b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state's mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state's renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located;

(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export De-List Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

III.13.1.1.2. Qualification Process for New Generating Capacity Resources.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor's ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the

proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the

major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is

expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

- (a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.
- (b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific

regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.2.2.

III.13.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

- (a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.2.2.6(b);
- (b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

III.13.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

- (a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection

analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource's Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest

Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

- (a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource's claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource's summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4. New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer

to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO's final determination and notification of qualification.

III.13.1.1.2.8. Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

- (a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;
- (b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource's New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;
- (c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);
- (d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;
- (e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated

resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

- (a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall

- be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.
- (b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.
 - (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.
 - (d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.
 - (e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.

III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.2.1. Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource's status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity

Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2 Rationing Minimum Limit.

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1. Summer Qualified Capacity.

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource's net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating

Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource's capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource's FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section

III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

- (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
- (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
 - (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
 - (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource's positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

- (a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource's Lead Market Participant of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.
- (b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.
- (c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid,

Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for a Forward Capacity Auction is \$4.30/kW-month. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. When the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its

Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction

Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource's full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination

notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO's consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6. Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

- (i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.
- (ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor-accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity

Resource's net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource's reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information

on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, that a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid is not consistent with the sum of the resource's net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid that is consistent with its determination of the foregoing. If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable

expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report net going forward costs in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource's net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula. To

the extent possible, all costs and operational data used in this calculation shall be the cumulative actual data for the Existing Capacity Resource from the most recent full Capacity Commitment Period available.

$$\frac{[GFC - (IMR - PER)] \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer, kW}) \times (12, months)}$$

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are costs that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period. To the extent that the Capacity Commitment Period data used to calculate these data do not reflect known and measurable costs that would or are likely to be incurred in the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, the Internal Market Monitor shall also consider adjustments submitted, provided the costs are based on known and measurable conditions and supported by appropriate documentation to reflect those costs.

$CQ_{SummerkW}$ = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource's summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative actual cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource's total ISO market

revenues. In the case of a resource that has not indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be \$0.00. As soon as practicable, the resource's total ISO market revenues used in this calculation shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

PER = resource-specific annual peak energy rents, in dollars. As soon as practicable, this value shall be calculated by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant upon request.

At the option of the Lead Market Participant, the cumulative production costs for each of the most recent three Capacity Commitment Periods may be submitted and the annual infra-marginal rents calculated for each year. The Lead Market Participant may then specify two of the three years to be averaged and subsequently used as the IMR value. Upon exercising such option, the PER value used shall be an average of the PER values for the two years selected

InfIndex = inflation index. $\text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^4$

Where: "i" is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant's submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall

determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows over the resource's remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource's expected terminal value, using the resource's discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource's Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life is the resource's expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

Expected net operating profit, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant's expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

Expected capacity revenues, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any

other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor's estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource's remaining economic life.

Expected capital expenditures, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant's expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

Expected terminal value, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant's expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource's economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource's net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource's remaining economic life, using the resource's discount rate.

Discount rate is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant's weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant's assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource

adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant's discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource's remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource's net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource's performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs

described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource's risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource's participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant's corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

Age of Existing Resource (years)	Remaining Life (years)	Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery
1 to 5	30	0.106
6 to 10	25	0.110
11 to 15	20	0.117
16 to 20	15	0.131
21 to 25	10	0.163
25 plus	5	0.264

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource's annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1 - (\text{Cost Of Capital})^{\text{Remaining Life}})}$$

Where:

Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid and substitution auction test price concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:

- (i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;
- (ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution

auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor's de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may

opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous

Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

- (a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
- (b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.
- (c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing

Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

Contract Description	MW	Contract End Date
NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC	13.2	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC	53.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag	2.3	8/31/2025
NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO	15.3	8/31/2025
	84.1	
VJO: Highgate — NE	Up to 225	10/31/2016
VJO: Highgate — NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)	Up to 6	October 2020
VJO: Phase I/II — NE	Up to 110	10/31/2016

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area's native load. For each

New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project's equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a) , III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not

achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource's potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import

Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.

The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity

pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource's estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource's Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be

consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; and for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification

Plan that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.

A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

In the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource's costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without

such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.4. Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.5. Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and

whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

- (a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;
- (b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
- (c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
- (d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
- (e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

- (a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource's summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its demand reduction value a measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource's Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity (which shall be the summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses); the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO's assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after

receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO's measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO's notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource's or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor's total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO

New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO's specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor's offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer's address, the customer's utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even

where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the Local Sourcing Requirement in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(e) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is intended to meet the capacity requirement in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located in a Capacity Zone that is not export-constrained.

(f) If an offer is composed of separate resources, and is for capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone, then each resource comprising the offer must be located inside of the export-constrained Capacity Zone or be located in any non-export constrained Capacity Zone.

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource's final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource's financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is

required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity's Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.13.1.6.1. Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity's projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity's most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource's summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.1.7. Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource's summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission's Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

III.13.1.9. Financial Assurance.

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.1. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet

the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource's financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2. Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource's offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource's offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.1.9.2.2. Release of Financial Assurance.

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the

ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such

deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project's critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

New Generating Capacity Resources \geq 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff	New Generating Capacity Resources $<$ 20 MW and \geq 2 MW	Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources (including Distributed Generation)		New Generating Capacity Resources $<$ 2 MW
<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance & Intermittent Power Resources</i>	<i>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance & Intermittent Power Resources</i>			
\$25,000	\$7,500	\$1,000		\$500
<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>	<i>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</i>			
\$15,000	\$6,500	n/a		n/a

III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the

affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO's consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.10. Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;
- (b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
- (e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and
- (f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New

Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource's multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

III.13.2. Annual Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.1. Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

III.13.2.2. Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

- (i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);
- (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at \$7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

- (iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

- (1) at prices above \$7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;
- (2) at prices below \$7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between \$7.03/kW-month and \$0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
 - (a) At the price of \$0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
 - (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 35,437 MW; and
 - 2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
 - (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 35,090 MW; and
 - 2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month;
 - (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at \$7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
 - 1. 34,865 MW; and
 - 2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of \$7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of \$7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone's Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative \$0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.13.2.3. Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.

- (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an

investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round's prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be P_S and P_E , respectively. Let the m prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m , where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \dots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be q_1, q_2, \dots, q_m . Then the Project Sponsor's supply curve, for all prices strictly less than P_S but greater than or equal to P_E , shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$

where, in the first round, q_0 is the resource's full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, q_0 is the resource's quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource's offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England's import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic Delist Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round's prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five

prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) Bids from Existing Capacity Resources

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface's transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above;

capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to

Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource's capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource's New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource's designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round's relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource's Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same

manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource's location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO's satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

- (1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
- (3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
 - (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
 - (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
- (4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
 - (i) that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
 - (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price, and also shall publish the quantity of capacity from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.** For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if both of the following two conditions are met during the round:

- (1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero, and;
- (2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If it is not the case that both of the two conditions above are satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-

constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-

TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is \$11.35/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is \$8.04/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by \$0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO's web site.

III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or

greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.

A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an

order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource's New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability

Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO's filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel

security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified

as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource's Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as

follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the

Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource's cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights

for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

III.13.2.6. Capacity Rationing Rule.

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource's Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.

The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.

The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.

The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone is higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.3A. Treatment of Imports.

At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

- (a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and
- (b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and

Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

- (a) [Reserved.]
- (b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.
- (c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource's location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.
- (d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

III.13.2.8. Capacity Substitution Auctions.

III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

III.13.2.8.1.1. Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

- (i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.

- (ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
- (iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
- (iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction's objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource's cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource's winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone's total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone's net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface's approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in

the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone's threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

- (a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource's total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution

auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource's FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) Any portion of a resource's FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource's substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource's Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM

Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.

(a) **Participant-Submitted Test Price.** For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

The test price for the capacity associated with a resource's demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is \$0.00/kW-month.

(b) **IMM-Determined Test Price.** The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource's expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The Internal Market Monitor's determination regarding a Market Participant-submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant-submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor's filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).

III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource's test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource's demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

- (a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.
- (b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource's demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:
 - (i) The portion of a resource's capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.
 - (ii) Any portion of a resource's demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.
- (c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource's substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity

Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource's Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.

III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource's compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

III.13.3.1.2. New Resources Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource's compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.

III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical

path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment's suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO's critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource's compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.

(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier's capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer's Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO's evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.1.4) is being met.

III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.

If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.

(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

- (i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
- (ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.

(iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource's monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New

Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

Failure to Cover Charge Rate

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource's Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource's Capacity Supply Obligation.

Maximum Demonstrated Output

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.

At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after to June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

Generator Assets: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial

Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

Import Capacity Resources: For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

III.13.3.4A Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.

If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource's right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource's qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and instead

permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO's right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource's Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or

of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor's notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO's written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource's ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO's right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource's settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource's (or a portion of the resource's) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO's verification of the resource's summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.

III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.

III.13.7.1. Capacity Base Payments.

Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.

III.13.7.1.1. Monthly Payments and Charges Reflecting Capacity Supply Obligations.

Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

(a) **Forward Capacity Auction.** For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the appropriate Capacity Zone in the New England Control Area as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for

up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

III.13.7.1.2 Peak Energy Rents.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.

III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [(\text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price}) * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

$$\text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} = \text{Strike Price} + \text{Hourly PER Adjustment}$$

$$\text{Hourly PER Adjustment} = \text{average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values}$$

$$\text{Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment} = \text{MAX (Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$500/\text{MWh, 0)} + \text{MAX (Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price} - \text{Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price} - \$850/\text{MWh, 0)}.$$

Strike Price = as defined below

Scaling Factor = as defined below

Availability Factor = as defined below

For all other hours:

$$\text{Hourly PER}(\$/\text{kW}) = [\text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price}] * [\text{Scaling Factor}] * [\text{Availability Factor}]$$

Where:

Strike Price = the heat rate x fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.

Scaling Factor = the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market)

and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.7.1.2.2. Monthly PER Application.

The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource's PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or greater than the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.

If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-list Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

Charge Amount to Resource Exporting = [Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the interface} - Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the resource}] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid]

Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located= [Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the interface} - Capacity Clearing Price_{location of the resource}] x Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE's Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.

III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.

III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource's output during the interval plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource's output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource's Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource's Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWs of reduction, other than MWs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the applicable reported monthly performance value; if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

- (ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
 - (iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.
 - (iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.
- (d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.
- (i) A Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource's Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource's Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
 - (ii) The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time

demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

$$(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement}) / \text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}$$

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.

(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.

Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource's Actual Capacity Provided during the interval minus the product of the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, (i) if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score; and (ii) for any Energy Efficiency, Load Management, or Distributed Generation measures reflected as a reduction in the load forecast as described in Section III.12.8 the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource's Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.

For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be \$5455/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource's Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource's Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource's Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

$$\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \text{ months} \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \text{ months} \times \text{FCAcp})]$$

Where:

MaxCSO = the resource's highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

FCACP = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

FCASP = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource's Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource's Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource's Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource's cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.

For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be

applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources in proportion to each resource's Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.

The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.

The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.

The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.

The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.

The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured or shed by from Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(c)), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.

The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5 (b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.

The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.

The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with pumping of pumped hydro generators, if the resource was pumping; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as an Asset Related Demand or discrete load asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC dispatch instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone's Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity's annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities' annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant's Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.

A Market Participant's share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity's Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource.

The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.

(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section

III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone's Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone's Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total

Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.

This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.

(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.

(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine Export Interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades. Each municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as a Pool-Planned Unit in Maine shall receive specifically allocated CTRs across the Maine Export Interface equal to the applicable seasonal claimed capability of its ownership entitlements in such unit as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.

Millstone 3		Seabrook	Stonybrook GT 1A	Stonybrook GT 1B	Stonybrook GT 1C	Stonybrook 2A	Stonybrook 2B	Wyman 4	Summer (MW)	Winter (MW)
Nominal Summer (MW)	1155.001	1244.275	104.000	100.000	104.000	67.400	65.300	586.725		
Nominal Winter (MW)	1155.481	1244.275	119.000	116.000	119.000	87.400	85.300	608.575		
Danvers	0.2627%	1.1124%	8.4569%	8.4569%	8.4569%	11.5551%	11.5551%	0.0000%	58.26	63.73
Georgetown	0.0208%	0.0956%	0.7356%	0.7356%	0.7356%	1.0144%	1.0144%	0.0000%	5.04	5.55
Ipswich	0.0608%	0.1066%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.2934%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.93	2.37
Marblehead	0.1544%	0.1351%	2.6840%	2.6840%	2.6840%	1.5980%	1.5980%	0.2793%	15.49	15.64
Middleton	0.0440%	0.3282%	0.8776%	0.8776%	0.8776%	1.8916%	1.8916%	0.1012%	10.40	11.07
Peabody	0.2969%	1.1300%	13.0520%	13.0520%	13.0520%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	57.69	60.26
Reading	0.4041%	0.6351%	14.4530%	14.4530%	14.4530%	19.5163%	19.5163%	0.0000%	82.98	92.77
Wakefield	0.2055%	0.3870%	3.9929%	3.9929%	3.9929%	6.3791%	6.3791%	0.4398%	30.53	32.64
Ashburnham	0.0307%	0.0652%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.6922%	0.9285%	0.9285%	0.0000%	4.53	5.22
Boylston	0.0264%	0.0849%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.5933%	0.9120%	0.9120%	0.0522%	4.71	5.35
Braintree	0.0000%	0.6134%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	7.63	7.63
Groton	0.0254%	0.1288%	0.8034%	0.8034%	0.8034%	1.0832%	1.0832%	0.0000%	5.81	6.61
Hingham	0.1007%	0.4740%	3.9815%	3.9815%	3.9815%	5.3307%	5.3307%	0.0000%	26.40	30.36
Holden	0.0726%	0.3971%	2.2670%	2.2670%	2.2670%	3.1984%	3.1984%	0.0000%	17.01	19.33
Holyoke	0.3194%	0.3096%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.8342%	2.8342%	0.6882%	15.34	16.63

Hudson	0.1056%	1.6745%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.3395%	24.05	24.12
Hull	0.0380%	0.1650%	1.4848%	1.4848%	1.4848%	2.1793%	2.1793%	0.1262%	10.70	12.28
Littleton	0.0536%	0.1093%	1.5115%	1.5115%	1.5115%	3.0607%	3.0607%	0.1666%	11.67	13.63
Mansfield	0.1581%	0.7902%	5.0951%	5.0951%	5.0951%	7.2217%	7.2217%	0.0000%	36.93	42.17
Middleborough	0.1128%	0.5034%	2.0657%	2.0657%	2.0657%	4.9518%	4.9518%	0.1667%	21.48	24.45
North Attleborough	0.1744%	0.3781%	3.2277%	3.2277%	3.2277%	5.9838%	5.9838%	0.1666%	25.58	29.49
Pascoag	0.0000%	0.1068%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.33	1.33
Paxton	0.0326%	0.0808%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.6860%	0.9979%	0.9979%	0.0000%	4.82	5.53
Shrewsbury	0.2323%	0.5756%	3.9105%	3.9105%	3.9105%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.4168%	24.33	26.23
South Hadley	0.5755%	0.3412%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	10.89	10.90
Sterling	0.0294%	0.2044%	0.7336%	0.7336%	0.7336%	1.1014%	1.1014%	0.0000%	6.60	7.38
Taunton	0.0000%	0.1003%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0000%	1.25	1.25
Templeton	0.0700%	0.1926%	1.3941%	1.3941%	1.3941%	2.3894%	2.3894%	0.0000%	10.67	12.27
Vermont Public Power Supply Authority	0.0000%	0.0000%	2.2008%	2.2008%	2.2008%	0.0000%	0.0000%	0.0330%	6.97	7.99
West Boylston	0.0792%	0.1814%	1.2829%	1.2829%	1.2829%	2.3041%	2.3041%	0.0000%	10.18	11.69
Westfield	1.1131%	0.3645%	9.0452%	9.0452%	9.0452%	13.5684%	13.5684%	0.7257%	67.51	77.27

This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (“MMWEC”) and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant (“WRC”) any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price, or, if applicable, the lower of (1) the Capacity Clearing Price and (2) the administratively-determined payment rate (due to “Inadequate Supply” or “Insufficient Competition”) that applies to certain resources for Forward Capacity Auctions conducted prior to June 2015 for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price, or, if applicable, minus the lower of (1) the Capacity Clearing Price and (2) the administratively-determined payment rate (due to “Inadequate Supply” or “Insufficient Competition”) that applies to certain resources for Forward Capacity Auctions conducted prior to June 2015 for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.

III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality

III.13.8.1. Filing of Certain Determinations Made By the ISO Prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and Challenges Thereto.

(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, and substitution auction test price, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction) , with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;

(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) [reserved];

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor's determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource's long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor's determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource's net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO's submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO's determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which

resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO's filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2 BEFORE THE

3 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
4
5

6 ISO New England Inc. and) Docket No. ER19-____-000
7 New England Power Pool)
8

9 PREPARED TESTIMONY OF
10 MATTHEW C. BREWSTER AND CHRISTOPHER GEISSLER
11 ON BEHALF OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

12 I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

13
14 Q: Please state your name, position and business address.

15 A: *Mr. Brewster:* My name is Matthew Brewster. I am a Lead Analyst in the Market
16 Development department at ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”). My business
17 address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.
18

19 *Dr. Geissler:* My name is Christopher Geissler. I am an Economist for the ISO.
20 My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.
21

22 Q: Mr. Brewster, please describe your responsibilities, work experience and
23 educational background.

24 A: My responsibilities include improving the design and operational performance of
25 the wholesale electricity markets, advancing proposals through the stakeholder
26 process, and supporting the implementation of market changes. My work focuses

1 primarily on the ISO's Forward Capacity Market ("FCM").¹ I assisted in the
2 development of the prior system-wide sloped demand curve design and related
3 changes that the Commission accepted in 2014 in Docket No. ER14-1639-000.² I
4 also worked on the ISO's related compliance changes pertaining to the Renewable
5 Technology Resource ("RTR") exemption. I led the project to revise the FCM's
6 annual reconfiguration auctions to reflect the use of the system-wide sloped
7 demand curve, which the Commission accepted in 2015 in Docket No. ER15-
8 2404-000.³

9
10 I have been employed by the ISO since 2008. Between 2008 and 2011, I worked
11 in the Market Analysis and Settlements Department in analyst roles focused on
12 settlement accuracy and software and procedural changes. In 2011, I joined the
13 Market Development department in an analyst position equivalent to my current
14 position. For a period between 2015 and 2017, I worked as an analyst for the
15 Internal Market Monitor with responsibilities for evaluating and reporting on the
16 performance of the wholesale electric markets. In 2017, I rejoined the Market
17 Development department in my current position.

18

¹ Capitalized terms used but not defined in this testimony are intended to have the meaning given to such terms in the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the "Tariff"), the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement and the Participants Agreement. Market rule 1 is Section III of the Tariff. The Financial Assurance Policy is Exhibit IA to the Tariff.

² 147 FERC ¶ 61,173 (2014).

³ 153 FERC ¶ 61,017 (2015).

1 I hold a B.B.A. in Operations Management from the University of Massachusetts
2 Amherst and a M.S. in Engineering Management from Western New England
3 University.

4
5 **Q: Dr. Geissler, please describe your responsibilities, work experience and**
6 **educational background.**

7 A: My primary responsibilities include wholesale electricity market design and
8 development, with an emphasis on the FCM. In addition to other projects, I
9 served as the project lead for the ISO's Competitive Auctions with Sponsored
10 Policy Resources ("CASPR") proposal that the Commission accepted earlier this
11 year in Docket No. ER18-619-000.⁴ Prior to that, I led the project to develop the
12 current capacity market demand curves, which helped to align the region's
13 procurement of capacity with its marginal reliability impact. The Commission
14 accepted those Tariff changes in 2016 in Docket No. ER16-1434.⁵

15
16 I am an instructor for numerous market-related sections of the ISO's Wholesale
17 Energy Markets courses for ISO staff and Market Participants. Prior to joining
18 the ISO in 2013, I received an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics from Duke
19 University, where I conducted research on competition in regulated industries.

⁴ *ISO New England Inc.*, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources, Docket ER18-619-000 (filed January 8, 2018); 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) ("core CASPR" filing, design or rules). The testimony of Christopher Geissler included with the core CASPR filing is referred to herein as the "CASPR Geissler Testimony."

⁵ 155 FERC ¶ 61,319 (2016).

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Q: What role did you play in the development of the conforming changes and enhancements to the CASPR rules addressed in this testimony?

A: *Mr. Brewster:* I served as the ISO’s project lead for identifying the impacted rules and processes that would require modifications to reflect the core CASPR design, and for developing these changes. I worked with a team of engineers, economists, analysts, project managers, and information technology experts to accomplish this effort. I also presented and discussed the details of these changes with stakeholders over the course of a five-month stakeholder process.

Dr. Geissler: I worked directly with Mr. Brewster to evaluate and develop these changes, and to prepare the associated stakeholder materials. My efforts focused primarily on ensuring that these changes are consistent with the principles of the CASPR design and with good market design principles generally.

II. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF TESTIMONY

Q: What is the purpose of this testimony?

A: The purpose of this testimony is to explain the various conforming changes and enhancements to the market rules that the ISO is proposing in order to integrate the CASPR substitution auctions into the overall FCM design and administration.

1 **Q: Please provide a high-level overview of the proposed changes.**

2 A: As the Commission is aware, the ISO submitted the core CASPR rules in January
3 2018 to modify the FCM to better accommodate the entry of state-supported
4 policy resources over time and maintain competitive capacity pricing. The
5 Commission accepted the core CASPR rules in March 2018,⁶ and the bulk of
6 these rules were implemented in March 2018 to be effective for the thirteenth
7 Forward Capacity Auction, which is scheduled for February 2019.

8
9 During the development and stakeholder consideration of the core CASPR rules,
10 the ISO identified that the development of several conforming changes and
11 enhancements to the FCM rules would be deferred until later in 2018. The
12 deferral was pragmatic; it allowed the ISO to complete the core changes necessary
13 to implement the substitution auction for FCA 13. This filing contains the
14 additional changes that the ISO was aware of previously, and other improvements
15 and clean-ups to the core CASPR rules identified during the implementation
16 process.

17
18 Many of the proposed clean-up changes are necessary to conduct FCA 13 in
19 February 2019. The remainder of the changes will apply for the FCM auction-
20 administration processes beginning with the fourteenth FCA, the administration of
21 which will commence in March 2019.

22

⁶ *ISO New England Inc.*, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018).

1 **Q: Please summarize the purpose and objectives of the CASPR design.**

2 A: The purpose of the CASPR design is to help the region meet competing objectives
3 to accommodate the entry of new sponsored resources into the FCM over time
4 *and* maintain competitive capacity prices. The New England states are enacting
5 policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and meet climate-responsibility goals
6 through mechanisms outside of the ISO-administered competitive wholesale
7 markets, often by directly supporting the development of state-preferred energy
8 resources. The states’ out-of-market actions could have adverse consequences on
9 the wholesale markets. Specifically, new resources that reflect these out-of-
10 market contract revenues in their offer prices can depress market prices, possibly
11 for many years. This can affect the competitive market’s ability to retain and
12 justly-compensate existing resources and new competitive resources that are
13 essential to achieving the region’s resource adequacy over the long term.

14
15 To preserve competitive pricing in the FCM, new capacity resources are subject
16 to a Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”), which requires the new sponsored
17 resources to offer into the primary auction at their (typically higher) unsubsidized
18 cost. The states’ concern with the MOPR is that it may cause electricity
19 consumers to “pay twice:” once for the capacity procured in the FCM, and a
20 second time for additional capacity obtained through out-of-market contracts with
21 preferred policy resources. In other words, the region could develop more
22 capacity than the ISO requires to reliably operate the power system, at an
23 unnecessarily high total cost to consumers. The region previously attempted to

1 resolve the MOPR constraint using the RTR exemption, but that mechanism
2 ultimately proved unworkable and, as part of the core CASPR rules filing, is
3 being phased out by the fifteenth FCA.
4

5 CASPR was developed in response to the regional stakeholders' express desire to
6 resolve the tensions between competitive markets and public policy goals. The
7 ISO based the CASPR design on four principle design objectives: (1) maintaining
8 competitively-based capacity auction prices; (2) accommodating the entry of new
9 sponsored resources into the FCM over time; (3) avoiding cost shifts where one
10 state's consumers would bear the cost of other states' subsidies; and (4) using a
11 transparent, market-based approach that fit within the FCM framework. The
12 fundamental tension between these objectives (particularly, objectives 1 and 2)
13 required making detailed design decisions about how to balance them—and,
14 wherever possible, the ISO elected to preserve competitive capacity prices.⁷
15

16 **Q: Please explain how CASPR functions to achieve these objectives.**

17 A: The core CASPR rules introduced a second “substitution auction” into the
18 Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”). The substitution auction is a voluntary
19 secondary market that is held as part of the FCA, immediately following the
20 primary auction. In the substitution auction, existing resources that acquired a
21 CSO in the primary auction and that are willing to permanently exit the markets
22 can submit demand bids to shed their CSO. Sponsored Policy Resources that did

⁷ See the Core CASPR rules filing, transmittal letter at p. 5 and CASPR Geissler testimony on p. 80.

1 not acquire a CSO (for their total qualified capacity) in the primary auction can
2 submit supply offers to sell their capacity in the substitution auction. A new
3 sponsored resource's supply offer in the substitution auction is not subject to the
4 MOPR. The substitution auction matches the voluntary offers from participating
5 supply (new sponsored resources) and demand (existing resources), using a
6 sealed-bid auction and the clearing objective to maximize social surplus among
7 the set of offers and bids, and respecting specific network constraints.

8

9 An existing resource that shed its CSO in the substitution auction must pay the
10 substitution auction clearing price to the Sponsored Policy Resource that is
11 acquiring the CSO. Further, the existing resource must permanently exit the
12 wholesale markets. This helps to prevent the system's aggregate obligated
13 capacity level from increasing above the competitive level determined in the
14 primary auction and, therefore, helps prevent the primary auction's clearing price
15 from decreasing below the competitive level over time.

16

17 Sponsored Policy Resources that acquire a CSO in the substitution auction are
18 paid the substitution auction clearing price for the commitment period and take on
19 the same obligations and rights as resources that acquire a CSO in the primary
20 auction. In future years' FCAs, these resources are qualified as existing
21 resources. Sponsored Policy Resources that do not acquire a CSO in the
22 substitution auction can again participate as new capacity resources in the primary
23 and substitution auctions in subsequent years.

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By closely coordinating the entry and exit of capacity resources, the substitution auction meets the two most significant objectives of the CASPR design explained above—maintaining competitive FCM pricing and allowing Sponsored Policy Resources into the FCM. Further, by requiring that the entry of new sponsored resources and exit of existing resources are matched MW-for-MW, the substitution auction accommodates the entry of state policy resources at a pace that should not adversely impact competitively-based capacity prices.

A final, key feature of the substitution auction mechanics is its settlement. A resource’s final FCA payment is determined by a familiar, well-established process—the two-settlement system for sequential auctions. Resources that clear in the primary auction are credited at the primary auction clearing price, and each resource that sheds (as demand) or acquires (as supply) a CSO in the substitution auction is charged or credited for the change (or deviation) in its obligation at the substitution auction clearing price. Because the MOPR does not apply in the substitution auction, new sponsored resources can offer at, and the substitution auction will tend to clear at, a lower price than the primary auction. Accordingly, an existing resource that sheds its CSO in the substitution auction is generally able to retain a one-time net payment equal to the difference between the (higher) primary auction clearing price and the (lower) substitution auction clearing price for the commitment period (much like a severance payment for retiring).

1 **Q: Please explain the proposed Tariff revisions addressed in your testimony.**

2 A: Following this introductory section, our testimony addresses the following
3 proposed Tariff revisions:
4

5 • Section III discusses several changes to the core CASPR rules. These include
6 (1) various technical clarifications of the existing rules pertaining to the
7 qualification of resources to participate in the substitution auction and existing
8 rules governing the administration of the FCA, of which the substitution
9 auction is a component, (2) an enhancement pertaining to how participants can
10 adjust their demand bids for the substitution auction following the clearing of
11 the primary auction, and (3) an enhancement to the process the ISO will
12 employ to conduct reliability reviews (i.e., reviews to determine whether a
13 resource should be retained to address a reliability need) for resources seeking
14 to retire in the substitution auction.

15
16 • Section IV explains the CASPR “test price” rule that will apply to existing
17 resources that are seeking to retire capacity through the substitution auction.
18 The purpose of the test price is to thwart uneconomic bidding behavior in the
19 primary auction by participants that might otherwise “shade” down their
20 primary auction bid price in order to gain entry to the substitution auction and
21 prematurely exit the market with a severance payment. This section details
22 the rationale for introducing this mechanism, the administrative mechanics,

1 and related conforming changes to the process of developing primary auction
2 de-list bids.

- 3
- 4 • Section V addresses conforming changes pertaining to the market settlement
5 of the substitution auction cleared supply offers and demand bids. The FCM
6 Cost Allocation Improvements that were recently accepted by the
7 Commission for implementation at the start of the thirteenth Capacity
8 Commitment Period in June 2022 overhauled the FCM cost allocation
9 structure.⁸ These rules must now be modified to account for cost allocation
10 for cleared offers and bids in the substitution auction. There is also a change
11 to the CSO termination provisions to ensure a participant remains obligated to
12 pay the settlement charge for a CSO acquired in the substitution auction at a
13 negative clearing price even if the CSO is terminated.

- 14
- 15 • Finally, Section VI discusses conforming changes to the FCM Financial
16 Assurance Policy rules to ensure that financial assurance requirements for
17 participating in the substitution auction are consistent with the financial
18 assurance requirements that apply to other FCM auctions and transactions.

19

20 **III. FORWARD CAPACITY AUCTION**

21

⁸ See *ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee*, Filing re FCM Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (filed August 1, 2018); Letter Order Accepting Proposed Forward Capacity Market Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (issued September 26, 2018).

1 **A. Technical Clarifications to the Substitution Auction Rules**

2

3 **Q: Please explain how the substitution auction fits within the construct of the**
4 **Forward Capacity Auction administration process.**

5 A: As we explained above, CASPR introduced a second stage to the FCA (the
6 substitution auction) that follows immediately after the first stage (the primary
7 auction). In many respects, qualification for both demand and supply to
8 participate in a substitution auction is identical to qualification for participation in
9 the primary auction. This is not surprising, since the substitution auction is
10 clearing bids and offers from resources that participated in the primary auction.
11 However, there are aspects of the qualification process that are unique for
12 resources that choose to participate in the substitution auction. Additionally,
13 because the substitution auction is a different auction format than the primary
14 auction (i.e., a sealed-bid, two-sided auction), there are particular rules for
15 clearing and pricing that are applied to the substitution auction.

16

17 **Q: What are the special requirements to qualify for participation as supply in a**
18 **substitution auction?**

19 A: New supply can participate in a substitution auction only if it qualifies as a
20 Sponsored Policy Resource, under criteria specified in Market Rule 1. New
21 projects that meet these criteria must also indicate in advance of the FCA their
22 intent to participate in the substitution auction (if they are unable to acquire an
23 obligation for all their capacity in the primary auction) by meeting three
24 additional milestones: (1) make a binding initial election to participate within the

1 New Capacity Show of Interest Window (typically in April); (2) certify that the
2 resource meets the definition of a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the New
3 Capacity Qualification Package (typically in June); and (3) provide its supply
4 offer price-quantity segments within five Business Days after the deadline for
5 submission of composite offers (typically in October).

6

7 **Q: What are the special requirements to qualify for participation as demand in**
8 **a substitution auction?**

9 A: An existing resource participating as demand is subject to various procedural
10 requirements. It must: (1) elect to participate in the substitution auction by
11 specifying its demand quantity or submitting a Retirement De-List Bid by the
12 Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline (typically in March); (2) demonstrate that
13 all of its qualified capacity has achieved commercial operation by no later than
14 seven days after the issuance of the qualification determination notifications
15 (typically in October); and (3) provide its demand bid price-quantity segments
16 within five Business Days after the deadline for submission of composite offers
17 (typically in October).

18

19 Regarding requirement (1) above, there are two distinct tracks by which existing
20 capacity resources can elect to participate (as demand) in the substitution auction.
21 Under the first track, an existing resource that submits a Retirement De-List Bid
22 for the primary auction and retains its CSO is required to submit a demand bid in
23 the substitution auction. This enables such resources to exit the FCM via either

1 the primary auction or the substitution auction, as market conditions warrant.
2 Under the second track, an existing capacity resource that does not submit a
3 retirement bid in the primary auction may choose to submit a demand bid in the
4 substitution auction. Regardless of which “track” the existing resource follows, if
5 the resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction and has its demand bid (to
6 shed that CSO) cleared in the substitution auction, the resource (or the portion of
7 its capacity that clears) must then retire—permanently exiting all New England
8 wholesale electricity markets as of the start of the relevant commitment period.
9

10 **Q: Please provide an overview of the proposed technical clarifications to the**
11 **qualification and auction conduct rules.**

12 A: The proposed technical clarifications address how resources may qualify to
13 participate in the substitution auction as well as how the substitution auction will
14 be conducted by the ISO. The revisions seek to clarify how the CASPR rules
15 apply in specific scenarios, as well as to add or correct details of the rules that
16 were identified during the development of business and software requirements to
17 implement the substitution auction.
18

19 The technical clarifications can be grouped into four areas based on the
20 substitution auction activities to which the revisions apply: (1) qualification
21 criteria for Sponsored Policy Resources participating as supply in the substitution
22 auction; (2) qualification criteria for existing resources looking to exit the markets
23 via the substitution auction; (3) substitution auction clearing and pricing rules;

1 and (4) the rules pertaining to the process of conducting the two auctions of the
2 FCA, including rules that address the “hand off” of information between the
3 primary and substitution auctions.
4

5 These technical clarifications ensure the CASPR rules are complete to the full
6 range of possible resource qualification and auction scenarios, are clearly defined
7 for participants, and are consistent with the ISO’s implementation of the CASPR
8 design.
9

10 **Q: Please first explain the clarifications pertaining to the qualification criteria**
11 **for Sponsored Policy Resources that are eligible to participate as new supply**
12 **in the substitution auction.**

13 A: The ISO is proposing clarifications pertaining to the amount of capacity a
14 Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to sell (i.e., acquire a CSO) in the
15 substitution auction. First, the Tariff revisions clarify in Section III.13.2.8.2.1(b)
16 that only capacity that qualifies as new capacity may acquire a CSO in the
17 substitution auction. This clarification is to address a scenario where a single
18 resource has both “existing” and “new” qualified capacity; the latter being
19 capacity that has not yet acquired a CSO in a FCA. In this scenario, only the
20 portion of the resource’s capacity that is qualified as new capacity may participate
21 in the substitution auction.
22

1 This clarification is consistent with the intent of the CASPR design, which is to
2 permit Sponsored Policy Resources (that may not otherwise be able to acquire a
3 CSO in the primary auction due to the MOPR) the opportunity to participate in
4 the substitution auction at preferred supply offer prices that reflect out-of-market
5 subsidies. In contrast, existing qualified capacity is not subject to the MOPR and
6 therefore does not face obstacles to offering at a low price to acquire a CSO in the
7 primary auction.

8
9 The second clarification pertains to a scenario where a single new resource is
10 participating in the substitution auction and also is eligible for, and elects to
11 utilize, the pre-existing Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption for
12 the primary auction. The RTR exemption (which is being phased out by the
13 fifteenth FCA) allows a quantity of new capacity that meets certain state
14 environmental policy objectives to bypass the MOPR and offer to acquire a CSO
15 in the primary auction at a price that may reflect out-of-market subsidies. Under
16 the existing Tariff rules, the amount of capacity that can qualify for the RTR
17 exemption is capped, and pro-rationing of eligible qualified capacity is applied in
18 the event the amount of capacity that qualifies for the exemption in an auction is
19 greater than the cap. Nevertheless, in the event the qualified capacity of a
20 Sponsored Policy Resource is pro-rated under the RTR exemption rules, the
21 participant will not be prohibited from acquiring a CSO for the amount of its
22 qualified capacity in excess of the pro-rated capacity (i.e., the excess above the
23 amount that qualified for the RTR exemption) in the substitution auction. The

1 revisions in Section III.13.2.8.2.1(b) therefore clarify that this excess capacity
2 may participate in the substitution auction.

3

4 **Q: Can you provide a numerical example that demonstrates how a Sponsored**
5 **Policy Resource may offer into the substitution auction the amount of its new**
6 **qualified capacity that was reduced due to RTR prorationing?**

7 A: Yes. Suppose there is a new sponsored resource that has 100 MW of qualified
8 capacity and is both eligible to participate in the primary auction using the RTR
9 exemption and in the substitution auction with a supply offer. Further, suppose
10 the cap on the amount of RTR capacity is 300 MW and a total of 400 MW of
11 capacity have elected to utilize the RTR exemption.

12

13 This hypothetical new resource (with 100 MW of qualified capacity) will have its
14 total eligible capacity for the primary auction pro-rated to 75 MW ($= 100 \text{ MW} \times$
15 $300 \text{ MW} / 400 \text{ MW}$). Thus, this resource can only acquire as much as 75 MW of
16 CSO in the primary auction. However, the participant will be able to provide a
17 substitution auction supply offer for the entire 100 MW of qualified capacity. If
18 this resource does acquire 75 MW of CSO in the primary auction, then the offer
19 for its remaining 25 MW of unobligated qualified capacity will be entered into the
20 substitution auction (subject to any further adjustments to supply offers required
21 under the market rules).

22

1 **Q: Are you proposing any other clarifications for the qualification rules for**
2 **resources that participate as supply in the substitution auction?**

3 A: Yes, the ISO is proposing one additional limitation in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 of
4 Market Rule 1 to clarify that a single resource cannot participate as supply (i.e., to
5 acquire a CSO) and demand (i.e., to shed a CSO) simultaneously in a substitution
6 auction. As we discussed above, a resource may have both new and existing
7 qualified capacity. It is technically feasible, albeit unlikely, for the new and
8 existing portions of a single resource to otherwise satisfy all the criteria to
9 participate as supply (with its new capacity) and demand (with its existing
10 capacity) in a substitution auction. However, the CASPR design did not intend to
11 allow this type of participation where a participant could swap a capacity
12 obligation on a single resource as a means to retire a portion of its facility.

13

14 **Q: Turning to the qualification criteria for existing resources that are**
15 **participating in the substitution auction as demand, what changes are you**
16 **proposing at this time?**

17 A: The technical revisions regarding the participation of existing resources in the
18 substitution auction are to (1) clarify that only commercially-operating capacity
19 can be retired through the substitution auction and (2) address restrictions on
20 utilizing the “composite offer” qualification rules if an existing resource is
21 qualifying to participate in the substitution auction.

22

1 **Q: Please explain the requirement that resources be “commercial” if they want**
2 **to retire through the substitution auction.**

3 A: Only resources that have achieved commercial operation and have demonstrated
4 they can deliver energy output consistent with their capacity obligation have a
5 capacity network interconnection service agreement—a critical feature for a
6 resource that chooses to retire through the substitution auction. Achieving the
7 CASPR design objective (to match the amount of CSO transferred from retiring
8 existing resources to new sponsored resources) is wholly dependent on the ability
9 of the existing resource to permanently retire by terminating its interconnection
10 service. The removal of interconnection service from the retiring resource is how,
11 administratively, the ISO determines that each MW of CSO retired through the
12 substitution auction is removed from the market and replaced by a new resource
13 (that will subsequently acquire its own interconnection service). If a retiring
14 resource has not yet achieved commercial operation, it will not have capacity
15 network interconnection service to relinquish.

16
17 Accordingly, Section III.13.2.8.3.1 of the core CASPR rules requires a resource to
18 have achieved commercial operation status if it is to participate as demand in a
19 substitution auction. The proposed changes make three supporting Tariff
20 clarifications in Section III.13.2.8.3.1:

21
22 First, the appropriate defined term to address achieving commercial operation in
23 the capacity market, “FCM Commercial Operation,” is being used in place of

1 cross-references to the Tariff provision that addresses criteria to achieve
2 commercial operation.

3

4 Second, under the core CASPR rules, a substitution auction demand bid is
5 automatically created for all resources that have submitted a Retirement De-List
6 Bid. This rule is being clarified to state that the demand bid will be created only
7 if the resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

8

9 Third, the rules are being clarified to state that the FCM Commercial Operation
10 status must apply to all of a resource's "existing" and "new" qualified capacity.
11 For a single auction a resource may be qualified to participate with both new and
12 existing capacity. As we have explained, the amount of capacity a resource can
13 bid in the substitution auction (i.e., to retire capacity) is limited to the amount of
14 its existing qualified capacity. The proposed changes further clarify that any
15 projects associated with the resource's new qualified capacity must also have
16 achieved FCM Commercial Operation by the relevant deadline.

17

18 **Q: On this third clarification, does this rule in effect preclude a participant from**
19 **qualifying new capacity projects for the same auction in which its existing**
20 **capacity is participating in the substitution auction?**

21 A: No. In the case where the new capacity project(s) associated with an existing
22 resource will not meet the commercial operation requirement and, therefore, the
23 demand bid for the resource's existing capacity would be excluded from the

1 substitution auction, the participant has the option to either (1) withdraw the new
2 capacity project and participate in the substitution auction with a demand bid for
3 the resource's existing capacity, or (2) continue with the new capacity project and
4 participate in the primary auction with a supply offer for the resource's new
5 qualified capacity. Under the latter option, the resource's existing qualified
6 capacity also may participate in the primary auction, but it will not participate as
7 demand in the substitution auction.

8

9 **Q: Please explain the change to address restrictions on using the “composite**
10 **offer” qualification treatment for existing resources that are participating in**
11 **the substitution auction as demand (i.e., retirements).**

12 A: A “Composite FCM Transaction” allows multiple resources to join their excess
13 summer and winter qualified capacity amounts (where seasonal capability can
14 differ for a resource based on its operating capabilities or ambient conditions) into
15 a single, annual offer in the FCA in order to provide more capacity than each
16 separate resource could deliver if it participated individually. Under the existing
17 qualification mechanism in Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A of the Tariff, the ISO will
18 automatically match-up these differences in seasonal capability for a single
19 resource that has both existing and new qualified capacity to create the equivalent
20 of a Composite FCM Transaction that involves just the capacity associated with
21 the single resource. For short-hand, these are referred to as “auto-matches.”

22

1 Section III.13.2.8.3.1 of the core CASPR rules prohibits resources with a
2 substitution auction demand bid from joining a Composite FCM Transaction to
3 prevent outcomes that would fail to coordinate MW-for-MW resource entry and
4 exit in the substitution auction. If composite transactions were not prohibited,
5 some capacity that was ostensibly retired in a composite transaction would
6 actually be able to return to the market for future auctions. The ISO's proposed
7 additional change simply extends this prohibition to cover (and therefore prohibit)
8 auto-matches for resources that are submitting a demand bid in a substitution
9 auction for existing capacity, for the same reasons.

10

11 **Q: Turning to the clarifications pertaining to the clearing and pricing rules,**
12 **please provide a brief overview of the changes.**

13 A: The ISO is proposing a number of clarifications pertaining to the technical rules
14 for clearing supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction and
15 establishing the substitution auction's clearing price(s). These revisions (1) make
16 clarifying changes to the treatment of so-called "proxy demand bids" in the
17 substitution auction clearing process, (2) correct the rules describing how auction
18 awards are set for Intermittent Power Resources, and (3) provide additional detail
19 for the substitution auction pricing rules that characterize the price hierarchy
20 relationships for constrained capacity zones.

21

22

23

1 **Q: With respect to the first clarification, what is a proxy demand bid?**

2 A: A proxy demand bid is a substitution auction demand bid created by the ISO
3 under certain scenarios in which the primary auction retains proxy supply as part
4 of its clearing of Retirement De-List Bids or Permanent De-List Bids.

5
6 Under the existing market rules that address the retirement of resources from the
7 markets, the primary auction may use a Proxy De-List Bid as a stand-in for a
8 resource that has elected to retire from the markets rather than participate in the
9 FCA at the de-list bid price approved by the Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”).
10 Proxy De-List Bids are intended to help prevent the exercise of supply-side
11 market power in cases where a participant may benefit by retiring an existing
12 resource and, thereby, increasing the Capacity Clearing Price to the benefit of its
13 remaining portfolio.

14
15 In cases where a Proxy De-List Bid is utilized in the primary auction in place of a
16 de-list bid from a resource that has elected to retire, the retirement rules include a
17 process to re-run the primary auction clearing calculations to replace the capacity
18 associated with the Proxy De-List Bid (which is capacity that does not truly exist
19 since the associated resource has elected to retire for the relevant Capacity
20 Commitment Period) with offers to supply capacity from other resources that did
21 not clear (acquire a CSO) in the first run of the primary auction. The core
22 CASPR rules modified this process so that the substitution auction will occur
23 between the primary auction and a possible second run of the primary auction

1 clearing. Further, within the substitution auction the ISO represents the CSO
2 retained by the Proxy De-List Bid in the primary auction using a “proxy demand
3 bid.” This feature of the CASPR design maximizes the probability that proxy
4 capacity could be cleared against (i.e., replaced by) a supply offer from a
5 Sponsored Policy Resource. If the replacement of proxy capacity is not feasible
6 in the substitution auction, then the ISO will conduct a second run of the primary
7 auction clearing to attempt to replace the proxy capacity with higher-cost
8 resources that did not clear in the first run of the primary auction.

9

10 **Q: What changes are proposed pertaining to these proxy demand bids?**

11 A: There are two technical revisions to the substitution auction clearing rules that
12 pertain to proxy capacity. The first is to remove an unnecessary tie-breaking rule
13 (in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 of Market Rule 1) that was intended to apply in
14 circumstances where multiple clearing outcomes would each achieve the
15 substitution auction’s objective to maximize social surplus. The relevant tie-
16 breaking rule would have resolved such a case, where multiple proxy demand
17 bids are involved, by clearing each such bid in proportion to its bid quantity.
18 However, proxy demand bids are given priority to clear (in accordance with
19 Section III.13.2.8.3.3) in the substitution auction and will therefore be cleared to
20 the fullest extent possible. Because proxy capacity is not associated with an
21 actual resource (or participant), and the purpose for including these bids in the
22 substitution auction is to replace the proxy capacity to the extent possible, it is
23 irrelevant which proxy demand bids are cleared and in what amounts.

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The second related change is to clarify that a CSO acquired using a Proxy De-List Bid in the primary auction is accounted for when setting the constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of CSOs between capacity zones in the substitution auction. The constraints governing inter-zonal transfers (included with the core CASPR rules) minimize the extent to which capacity transferred between zones in the substitution auction can impact subsequent years’ primary auction clearing prices.⁹ In practice, these network constraints limit the transfer of capacity into or out of constrained capacity zones, so that a transfer may occur only to the extent that it has no net impact on system reliability (as measured by the capacity’s Marginal Reliability Impact value in each capacity zone). If capacity transfers were not limited by these network constraints in the substitution auction, it is possible that a transfer could alter the relative reliability value of capacity in different zones and thereby impact primary auction prices in future auctions.¹⁰ As discussed above, a Proxy De-List Bid may retain a CSO in the primary auction and, therefore, contribute to the total capacity acquired in the system (and the associated resource’s capacity zone) in the process of clearing and establishing prices in the primary auction.

⁹ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.D for an explanation of these network constraints.

¹⁰ See the CASPR Geissler Testimony, at Section VIII.D, pp. 165-166, for additional detail on the potential impact on future auction prices.

1 The proposed revision makes clear that CSOs retained by Proxy De-List Bids in
2 the primary auction will be counted toward a constrained capacity zone's total
3 CSO quantity for purposes of determining whether inter-zonal transfers are
4 allowed (and, if so, the net transfer quantity allowed) in the substitution auction.

5
6 Without this change, the dual mechanisms of (1) including proxy demand bids in
7 the substitution auction and (2) the constraints on inter-zonal transfers of CSOs
8 could cause unintended results, such as: "locking in" a surplus of actual capacity
9 (ignoring proxy resource CSOs) in an import-constrained zone even though
10 additional capacity could be transferred out of the zone without affecting system
11 reliability; or allowing capacity to be added in an export-constrained zone in
12 excess of the intended limits on such transfers, thereby worsening system
13 reliability. Such outcomes would not be consistent with the purpose for
14 constraining the inter-zonal transfers of CSOs within the substitution auction.

15
16 **Q: What technical clarifications are proposed to the rules describing how**
17 **substitution auction awards are set for Intermittent Power Resources?**

18 A: Two clarifications are being proposed related to how substitution auction awards
19 are set for intermittent resources. The first is to add specificity regarding a
20 potential scenario where a Sponsored Policy Resource (that is an Intermittent
21 Power Resource) is also a party to a Composite FCM Transaction. Generally, an
22 intermittent resource may have different seasonal capabilities (summer and
23 winter), but, like all other resources, the amount of capacity an intermittent

1 resource is able to sell in the FCA is based on its summer capability. Under the
2 existing FCM rules, an intermittent resource that sells capacity in the FCA will
3 receive a winter period capacity obligation that is adjusted up or down to reflect
4 its winter qualified capability (in proportion to the auction-cleared award for the
5 resource's summer qualified capability). However, if some portion of the
6 resource's winter capacity is assigned to a Composite FCM Transaction, then that
7 capacity is first removed from the resource for purposes of performing the winter
8 period capacity obligation adjustment.

9
10 This same treatment for intermittent resources that acquire or shed a CSO through
11 the substitution auction is specified in the substitution auction clearing rules, in
12 Section III.13.2.8.1.1 of Market Rule 1. However, the provision fails to account
13 for the removal of any winter capacity belonging to a Sponsored Policy Resource
14 that is obligated through a Composite FCM Transaction. The proposed revision
15 therefore adds a sentence to address the removal of any such capacity before the
16 adjustment to the winter period CSO award for the intermittent resource is
17 applied.

18
19 The second clarification pertaining to Intermitting Power Resource awards from
20 the substitution auction is to remove a statement that was intended to clarify the
21 winter period award, but that is actually incorrect. The existing CASPR rules
22 include a sentence that implies the winter period award for the intermittent
23 resource will always be higher than, in absolute terms, the CSO award for the

1 summer months that cleared in the auction (Section III.13.2.8.1.1). However, this
2 may not always be the case. If an intermittent resource has a lower qualified
3 winter capability than its summer qualified capability, the winter period CSO
4 award will be lower (again, in absolute terms) than the summer period CSO
5 award. The erroneous statement is therefore being removed.

6

7 **Q: Can you provide a simple numerical example that illustrates how the winter**
8 **period CSO award could be lower than the summer period CSO award for a**
9 **resource that clears to acquire a CSO in the substitution auction?**

10 A: Yes. Assume the intermittent resource has a qualified summer capability of 10
11 MW and a qualified winter capability of 8 MW. This resource will be qualified to
12 participate in the auction to acquire up to 10 MW of capacity. If this resource
13 only sells 5 MW of capacity in the auction, then its summer period CSO award is
14 5 MW (corresponding to its cleared offer quantity) and its winter period CSO
15 award will be 4 MW ($= 8 \text{ MW} \times 5 \text{ MW} / 10 \text{ MW}$). As an alternative example,
16 suppose this same resource sold all 10 MW of its capacity in the auction: its
17 summer period CSO award would be 10 MW and its winter period CSO award
18 would be 8 MW ($= 8 \text{ MW} \times 10 \text{ MW} / 10 \text{ MW}$). In either case, the winter period
19 CSO award is assigned in equivalent proportion (i.e., using the auction cleared
20 award relative to summer qualified capacity), but in absolute terms the winter
21 CSO award is less than the CSO award for the summer months.

22

1 **Q: Please describe the clarifications proposed for the substitution auction**
2 **pricing rules to define price hierarchy relationships for capacity zones.**

3 A: These clarifications in the pricing rules (Section III.13.2.8.1.2) provide additional
4 detail on how price hierarchy relationships (comparable to those applied in the
5 primary auction) are applied in the substitution auction. With the proposed
6 clarifications for the substitution auction, unless certain conditions are met, an
7 import-constrained capacity zone's clearing price will be greater than or equal to
8 the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone's clearing price and, conversely, an export-
9 constrained capacity zone's clearing price will be less than or equal to the Rest-
10 of-Pool Capacity Zone's clearing price. The price hierarchy relationships are an
11 appropriate property of zonal pricing, which ensures that locational prices are
12 consistent with the relative reliability contributions of capacity in each location of
13 the system.

14

15 **Q: You note that under the proposed revisions these price hierarchy**
16 **relationships apply “unless certain conditions are met.” Can you describe**
17 **those conditions?**

18 A: Yes. If an import- or export-constrained capacity zone is not able to transfer
19 capacity with another zone in the substitution auction (i.e., because of the
20 constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of CSOs in the substitution auction),
21 then the clearing price for cleared supply offers and demand bids within that
22 constrained zone will have no defined relationship to prices in the Rest-of-Pool
23 Capacity Zone (or other capacity zones). Such a zone is effectively cleared as a

1 separate auction including only the supply offers and demand bids from resources
2 located within that zone and therefore, the price hierarchy relationships to other
3 capacity zones in the system are not applicable.
4

5 **Q: Turning now to the final set of technical clarifications, please summarize the**
6 **clarifications to the rules that address the conduct of the primary and**
7 **substitution auctions in the FCA.**

8 A: As we have discussed, the FCA is a process of first conducting the primary
9 auction, then conducting the substitution auction, and finally, under specific
10 conditions, repeating the process of clearing the primary auction to replace any
11 CSOs that remain associated with Proxy De-List Bids. This sequence of events
12 involves a myriad of information “hand-offs” from the earlier auction steps to the
13 subsequent ones. The ISO has determined that two of the information hand-off
14 provisions included in the core CASPR rules need modification, because they are
15 either unnecessary or inaccurate.
16

17 The first Tariff revision removes language about the impact a cleared proxy
18 demand bid may have on the rights and obligations of the associated resource
19 (Section III.13.2.8.3.1), and the second pertains to the definition of bids and offers
20 in the event the primary auction must be run a second time after the substitution
21 auction (Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d)).
22

1 **Q: Please explain the change pertaining to the impact a cleared proxy demand**
2 **bid may have on the rights and obligations of the associated resource.**

3 A: This proposed change to Section III.13.2.8.3.1 removes unnecessary provisions
4 included with the core CASPR rules. In this instance, a parenthetical statement
5 was included in the core CASPR rules to explain that if a proxy demand bid was
6 entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a resource that submitted a
7 Permanent De-List Bid in the primary auction (and therefore committed to retire
8 only from the FCM), the resource would not also have to retire from the energy
9 market. Generally, a cleared Permanent De-List Bid only removes the associated
10 capacity from the FCM, but a cleared substitution auction demand bid obligates
11 the resource to retire from all markets.

12
13 The parenthetical statement, which is being removed, was meant to clarify that the
14 process of clearing a proxy demand bid in the substitution auction does not alter
15 the rights and obligations of the underlying resource if it has submitted a
16 Permanent De-List Bid. However, the proxy demand bid for the substitution
17 auction is an administrative construct that exists for reasons separate from
18 determining the FCA result for the resource (which has submitted a Permanent
19 De-List Bid) associated with the Proxy De-List Bid. It is therefore unnecessary,
20 and potentially confusing, to separately address these rights and obligations in the
21 substitution auction rules.

1 **Q: Please explain the second clarification regarding bids and offers included in**
2 **the potential second run of the primary auction after the substitution auction**
3 **is completed.**

4 A: The core CASPR rule revisions to incorporate the substitution auction into the
5 FCA process made an error in describing the bid and offer hand-offs from the
6 substitution auction to a second run of the primary auction. As described above, a
7 second run of the primary auction is required under the retirement rules if a CSO
8 is retained by a Proxy De-List Bid after the primary auction. This second run
9 allows the market an opportunity to replace proxy capacity from resources that
10 did not receive a CSO in the primary auction. The core CASPR rules modified
11 this process so that a second run of the primary auction is required only when the
12 proxy demand bid (created for a Proxy De-List Bid that retained a CSO in the
13 primary auction) does not fully clear (i.e., is not fully replaced by new sponsored
14 resources) in the substitution auction.

15
16 However, the Tariff revisions to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d) made as part of the core
17 CASPR rules incorrectly imply that de-list bids that *did not* receive a CSO in the
18 primary auction will be modified by the associated resource's participation in the
19 substitution auction (more specifically, that the de-list bid would be adjusted to
20 account for any amount of CSO shed in the substitution auction). This is
21 incorrect because a resource's capacity that is associated with a primary auction
22 de-list bid that did not receive a CSO (in the primary auction clearing) cannot be
23 entered into the substitution auction—an existing resource can only participate in

1 the substitution auction to shed qualified capacity for which it acquired a CSO in
2 the primary auction. Therefore, it is incorrect to imply that a de-list bid that did
3 not receive a CSO in the primary auction would be adjusted to account for a CSO
4 shed in the substitution auction. Accordingly, the ISO proposes to clarify this
5 provision (by striking references to de-list bids that shed a CSO in the substitution
6 auction) to remove the erroneous implication.

7
8 **B. Enhancement to the Substitution Auction Demand Bid Adjustments**

9
10 **Q: Please describe the purpose for the demand bid adjustment process that**
11 **occurs between the primary auction and the substitution auction.**

12 A: The core CASPR rules include a demand bid adjustment mechanism in Section
13 III.13.2.8.3.3 of Market Rule 1 to address that the demand bid quantity and/or bid
14 price may have to be adjusted. It may be necessary to adjust a resource's demand
15 bid for the substitution auction based on the results of the primary auction for two
16 reasons.

17
18 First, an existing resource may only retire capacity in the substitution auction if it
19 receives a CSO in the primary auction. Therefore, if a resource's CSO award
20 from the primary auction is less than its demand bid quantity, then the demand bid
21 quantity will be reduced to the lesser amount of the capacity that was awarded a
22 CSO in the primary auction. Second, demand bid prices are "capped" at the
23 primary auction clearing price to prevent a retiring resource from clearing in the
24 substitution auction at a price that exceeds the price at which it acquired the CSO

1 in the primary auction. The bid price cap avoids the risk that a retiring resource
2 would receive a net charge for the capacity retired in the substitution auction.

3

4 **Q: How do the existing CASPR rules define the demand bid adjustment?**

5 A: The existing CASPR rules specify that the demand bid adjustment process will
6 occur in two steps. First, under Section III.13.2.8.3.3(a) the resource's
7 substitution auction demand bid quantity is reduced if the CSO acquired by the
8 existing resource in the primary auction is less than the demand bid quantity. In
9 this circumstance, the demand bid quantity is reduced to equal the acquired CSO
10 amount, with the reduction beginning from the highest-priced bid segment (if the
11 bid contains more than one price-quantity pair). Second, if the remaining price-
12 quantity pairs include segments with a price that exceeds the primary auction
13 clearing price, then under Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) the bid price for those
14 segments is reduced ("capped") to equal the primary auction clearing price.

15

16 **Q: Why is the ISO proposing enhancements to these rules?**

17 A: The existing demand bid adjustment rules may limit the ability of participants to
18 manage a partial resource retirement (where a resource may retire a portion of its
19 capacity, but not the whole resource). Generally, the existing demand bid
20 adjustment treatment is adequate to manage a full resource retirement, but the
21 proposed enhancements improve the flexibility to manage a full retirement as
22 well.

23

1 **Q: Please elaborate on why the existing demand bid adjustment rules may limit**
2 **flexibility for participants to manage a resource’s participation in the**
3 **substitution auction.**

4 A: The existing demand bid adjustment rules do not permit a participant the
5 flexibility to specify how much capacity will be removed from a demand bid
6 based on primary auction results, and do not permit flexibility to specify how
7 demand bid prices are adjusted when the bid quantity is reduced. Suppliers may
8 have different preferences for the relationship between primary auction results
9 and their substitution auction demand bid. The ISO is proposing to add flexibility
10 for specifying how a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted to allow a participant
11 to better manage its resource’s participation in the substitution auction.

12
13 **Q: Please describe the enhanced demand bid adjustment rules that are proposed**
14 **with this filing.**

15 A: The enhanced demand bid adjustment rules allow for two distinct demand bid
16 adjustment treatments, and the ability for a participant to choose which treatment
17 will apply to its resource. These treatments differ in terms of: (1) how they adjust
18 substitution auction demand bid quantities based on the primary auction clearing
19 outcomes; and (2) which demand bid price segments are adjusted (i.e., reduced).

20
21 The first of these is referred to as a “top-down” adjustment. Under the top-down
22 adjustment treatment, a resource’s substitution auction demand bid quantity is
23 reduced by an amount equivalent to the amount of qualified capacity the resource

1 withdrew in the primary auction. In other words, each MW of qualified capacity
2 that did not acquire a CSO in the primary auction (using a de-list bid) corresponds
3 to a MW removed from the resource's substitution auction demand bid before the
4 substitution auction. As a brief example of the top-down adjustment: if a resource
5 with 100 MW of existing qualified capacity submits a 70 MW demand bid and
6 de-lists 40 MW of qualified capacity in the primary auction, then its demand bid
7 will be reduced to 30 MW for the substitution auction ($30 \text{ MW} = 70 \text{ MW} - 40$
8 MW). If the demand bid includes multiple price-quantity segments, then under
9 the top-down adjustment the demand bid quantity is reduced beginning from the
10 highest priced segment. In this way, the substitution auction demand bid also
11 does not exceed the 60 MW of CSO acquired by the resource in the primary
12 auction ($60 \text{ MW} = 100 \text{ MW} - 40 \text{ MW}$).

13
14 The second bid adjustment treatment is referred to as a "bottom-up" adjustment,
15 where the resource's substitution auction demand bid quantity may be reduced to
16 equal the amount of the resource's capacity that acquired a CSO in the primary
17 auction. This is comparable to how the existing demand bid adjustment rule
18 functions. Using the same simple example to illustrate the bottom-up adjustment:
19 if the resource with 100 MW of existing qualified capacity submits a 70 MW
20 demand bid and acquires a CSO for 60 MW in the primary auction (because it de-
21 lists 40 MW of its capacity), then its demand bid will be reduced to 60 MW for
22 the substitution auction (because 60 MW is the minimum of (a) the 70 MW
23 demand bid and (b) the 60 MW of CSO). If the demand bid includes multiple

1 price-quantity segments, then under the bottom-up adjustment the demand bid
2 quantity is reduced beginning from the lowest priced segment.

3


4 **Q: Can you provide an example that demonstrates the top-down demand bid**
5 **adjustment treatment?**

6 A: Yes. The substitution auction demand bid curve illustrated in Figure III.1 below
7 will provide the background to demonstrate how the bid adjustment functions. As
8 shown in this figure, the premise for the example is an existing resource that has
9 total existing qualified capacity (abbreviated as “ExCap QC” in the example
10 figures) of 100 MW and submits a partial demand bid for the substitution auction
11 (i.e., for only a portion of its qualified capacity). The submitted substitution
12 auction (abbreviated “SA” in the figures) demand bid quantity is for 70 MW. The
13 blue line represents the price-quantity segments of the resource’s substitution
14 auction demand bid. The solid-line sections of the bid curve total to 70 MW,
15 which is the amount of the participant’s submitted substitution auction demand
16 bid. The participant specifies three price-quantity segments: 30 MW at a price of
17 \$7 per kW-month; 30 MW at \$5 per kW-month; and 10 MW at \$3 per kW-month.
18 Each segment defines the maximum price the participant is willing to pay to shed
19 its CSO and then retire the segment of its capacity.

20

21

Figure III.1




The demand bid curve illustrated in Figure III.1 includes a fourth segment (differentiated with the dashed line format) for 30 MW at a price of negative \$999 per kW-month. This is not a demand bid segment provided by the participant and would never be entered into the substitution auction. However, this segment represents the portion of the resource's qualified capacity that the participant does not want to enter into this substitution auction and will be useful in illustrating the adjustment treatments under both the top-down and bottom-up approaches.

In Figure III.2 below, the mechanics of the top-down demand bid adjustment treatment are illustrated. For this example, assume that the participant de-listed 40 MW of capacity in the primary auction. This amount of de-listed capacity, 40 MW, is removed directly from the resource's substitution auction demand quantity under the top-down adjustment method. Specifically, the 40 MW of

capacity are removed from the demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity segments. The amount removed from the bid is shown with the orange-shaded rectangle in Figure III.2, where the full 30 MW segment priced at \$7 per kW-month is removed and 10 MW are removed from the second 30 MW segment priced at \$5 per kW-month. The remaining segments of the demand bid for the substitution auction total 30 MW, which is the remainder of the 70 MW submitted demand bid after the 40 MW of capacity de-listed in the primary auction are removed from the bid. As noted above, the last 30 MW segment shown in the dashed line format and priced at negative \$999 per kW-month is not an actual bid segment and is not entered in the substitution auction.

Figure III.2



1 Again referring to Figure III.2 above, observe that the top-down adjustment
2 process (i.e., reducing the demand bid quantity beginning with the highest price
3 price-quantity segments) has the effect of removing the capacity that the
4 participant was most-willing to retire in the substitution auction (as evidenced by
5 its higher demand bid prices). The remaining demand bid segments entered into
6 the substitution auction are the portions that the participant is less willing to retire
7 (as evidenced by the lower demand bid prices).

8
9 The top-down adjustment treatment is suited to accommodate a scenario where
10 the cleared de-list bid in the primary auction was a retirement bid. If the capacity
11 the participant is most willing to retire (i.e., the capacity corresponding to the
12 higher demand bid prices) was already withdrawn from the market in the primary
13 auction, then the participant will want to remove the corresponding segments of
14 the substitution auction demand bid in order to remove the bid to retire this same
15 capacity in the substitution auction. In simple terms, a participant may not want
16 to have retirement bids that are priced to represent the same segment of its
17 resource's capacity accepted in both the primary auction and substitution auction.

18


19 **Q: Can you now provide an example that demonstrates the bottom-up demand**
20 **bid adjustment treatment?**

21 A: Yes, this example builds on the example above. In Figure III.3 below, the
22 bottom-up demand bid adjustment mechanics are illustrated, again using the
23 assumption that the participant de-listed 40 MW of the resource's capacity in the

1 primary auction. The bottom-up method compares the submitted substitution
2 auction demand bid quantity (i.e., 70 MW) to the amount of CSO the resource
3 acquired in the primary auction, which is 60 MW in this case (the remainder of
4 100 MW of qualified capacity minus the 40 MW of de-listed capacity). The
5 substitution auction demand bid must be reduced by 10 MW to equal the 60 MW
6 of CSO the resource acquired in the primary auction.

7
8 Mechanically, we perform this adjustment in the same manner as the top-down
9 adjustment (i.e., by taking 40 MW out of the demand bid), but we must also take
10 account of the 30 MW of qualified capacity that the participant never intended to
11 enter into the substitution auction. This is the purpose for illustrating the last 30
12 MW segment priced at negative \$999 per kW-month (the dashed line segment)
13 for this partial demand bid scenario. Beginning from the lowest price price-
14 quantity segment, the bottom-up approach removes 40 MW from the demand bid
15 as shown by the orange-shaded rectangle in Figure III.3, where the 30 MW
16 segment at negative \$999 per kW-month and the 10 MW segment at \$3 per kW-
17 month are removed. The remaining 60 MW of the adjusted demand bid curve is
18 shown in the inverse area of the orange-shaded rectangle in Figure III.3.

19 **Figure III.3**



1

2

3 Referring again to Figure III.3 above, observe that the bottom-up adjustment

4 treatment of bid segments (i.e., reducing the demand bid quantity beginning with

5 the lowest price price-quantity segments) operates on the bid curve in a manner

6 that preserves the portion of the demand bid that corresponds with the capacity

7 the participant is most-willing to retire in the substitution auction (as evidenced by

8 the higher demand bid prices). The bottom-up treatment is intended to suit a case

9 where the capacity that was de-listed in the primary auction is the least-costly

10 (most-valuable) capacity of the resource. The capacity the participant removed

11 from the FCM in the primary auction likely corresponds to the capacity it is least-

12 likely to retire; the primary auction de-list bid would be a temporary withdrawal

13 from the market such as a Static or Dynamic De-List Bid. In this framework, the

14 capacity that the participant intends to enter into the substitution auction is the

1 resource's most-costly (least-valuable) capacity, as indicated by the higher bid
2 prices that reflect the participant's willingness to pay more to retire this capacity.

3

4 **Q: Do the enhanced demand bid adjustment options provide improved**
5 **flexibility for both full and partial resource retirement scenarios?**

6 A: Yes. Regardless of whether the participant provides a demand bid for the entire
7 amount of the resource's qualified capacity or only a portion of it, providing the
8 top-down and bottom-up options allows a participant greater flexibility to manage
9 the quantity of capacity that will be entered into the substitution auction
10 (depending on the primary auction result) and the corresponding bid prices.

11

12 **Q: When will participants make their election for which demand bid adjustment**
13 **treatment they want to apply for their resource?**

14 A: This election will be made in October, at the same deadline that demand bid
15 price-quantity pairs must be submitted. Specifically, this deadline is five business
16 days after the deadline for the submission of a Composite FCM Transaction, as
17 specified in the proposed revisions to Section III.13.2.8.3.2 of the Tariff.

18

19 Making this election relatively late in the qualification process adds to the
20 flexibility afforded with this enhancement because a participant will have more
21 complete information about its resource's qualification for the FCA (for example,
22 the IMM-determined de-list bid price for the resource).

23

1 **Q: Is there a default demand bid adjustment treatment that applies if a**
2 **participant does not make an election to apply either adjustment?**

3 A: If the participant does not make an election, the default treatment applied to its
4 resource's demand bid will be the top-down adjustment. This is the more
5 conservative of the two alternatives. Between the two treatments, the top-down
6 adjustment will produce a demand bid with either the same amount or a lesser
7 amount of capacity than would result from the bottom-up adjustment. This will
8 minimize the potential for a resource to have more capacity retired in the
9 substitution auction than the participant intended to retire.

10
11 **C. Enhancement to the Reliability Review Process for Substitution**
12 **Auction Demand Bids**

13
14 **Q: Please provide an overview of the proposed changes to the reliability review**
15 **process for substitution auction demand bids.**

16 A: Under the existing rules (Section III.13.2.5.2.5), the ISO performs a reliability
17 review of resources that may retire from the FCM to determine whether those
18 resources have to be retained to address a reliability need. The prior
19 modifications to these processes in the core CASPR rules contemplated that the
20 review of substitution auction demand bids will be performed before the
21 substitution auction is conducted, and any existing resources that have to be
22 retained for reliability will not be permitted to enter their demand bid into the
23 substitution auction. The ISO is proposing to modify the reliability review
24 process for substitution auction demand bids so that the reviews are performed
25 during the auction. This approach is consistent with the substitution auction

1 objective of maximizing social surplus among the set of eligible supply offers and
2 demand bids.

3

4 **Q: Please describe how the existing CASPR rules apply the reliability review**
5 **process to substitution auction demand bids.**

6 A: As envisioned when the core CASPR rules were developed, the reliability review
7 of substitution auction demand bids (also addressed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5)
8 occurs before the substitution auction is conducted (i.e., a pre-auction review).
9 The core CASPR rules prescribe that demand bids are ordered for the pre-auction
10 review in descending price order. Beginning with the highest-priced demand bid
11 (i.e., all else equal, the bid most-likely to be cleared in the auction), the ISO
12 would perform reliability analyses assuming the bid capacity was removed from
13 the market. If reliability criteria violations are identified, the ISO would withdraw
14 the resource from the set of demand bids that would be entered into the
15 substitution auction (meaning the resource would retain its CSO acquired in the
16 primary auction for the period). The reliability evaluation process would proceed
17 through the price-ordered bid stack. For this evaluation, any higher-price demand
18 that is evaluated and not deemed needed for reliability is treated as having retired.
19 After completing the review of all resources, the remaining demand bids (i.e.,
20 those for which no reliability criterion violations is identified) are entered into the
21 substitution auction and the substitution auction is then cleared.

22

1 This pre-auction review approach based on bid price recognizes that higher-priced
2 demand bids are more likely to clear in the auction, but it fails to account for
3 substitution auction constraints that will impact whether a demand bid will clear.
4

5 **Q: Please describe the constraints that might impact whether a demand bid will**
6 **clear in the substitution auction.**

7 A: There are various constraints (in addition to descending price order) that may
8 affect which demand bids are cleared. For one, constraints on inter-zonal
9 transfers of CSOs in the substitution auction may limit or prevent the ability for
10 supply and demand located in different capacity zones to be matched due to
11 network constraints.¹¹ Also, demand bids are non-rationable (cannot partially
12 clear), which may cause a higher-price bid for a larger amount of capacity to be
13 “skipped over” if, for example, there is not sufficient supply to clear the entire bid
14 quantity.¹²
15

16 **Q: Please describe the approach to the reliability review process that is now**
17 **being proposed to improve this process.**

18 A: The proposed approach employs an in-auction review process. All eligible
19 demand bids are entered into an initial, preliminary clearing of the substitution
20 auction to determine the set of demand bids and supply offers that maximizes

¹¹ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.D for an explanation of these network constraints.

¹² See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.A for discussion of the non-rationable treatment of demand bids and the reasons this applies in the substitution auction.

1 social surplus, subject to the various constraints that may apply in the auction as
2 part of the clearing rules. The reliability review process is then applied to the
3 demand bids that would clear absent a need for the ISO to remove a bid because it
4 is necessary to retain the resource for reliability.

5
6 **Q: In what order are resources reviewed for reliability needs under the**
7 **proposed approach?**

8 A: Resources will be reviewed based on the contribution of their cleared demand
9 bids to the social surplus achieved in the substitution auction. Specifically,
10 resources with cleared demand bids that have a larger contribution to social
11 surplus (by shedding their CSO) in the substitution auction are reviewed first. For
12 this evaluation, higher-ranked resources in the review order (based on
13 contributions to social surplus) that were evaluated and not determined to be
14 needed for reliability are treated as having retired.

15
16 **Q: When a demand bid that would otherwise clear is determined to be needed**
17 **for reliability, what then happens to the resource's bid?**

18 A: If a resource with a demand bid that would otherwise clear, in whole or in part, in
19 the substitution auction is determined to be needed for reliability, then the
20 resource's entire bid is removed from the substitution auction (the resource will
21 retain its CSO awarded in the primary auction for the commitment period).

22

1 **Q: Does the substitution auction process continue after the bid for a resource**
2 **that was determined to be needed for reliability is removed from the auction?**

3 A: Yes. When a resource's demand bid that would otherwise clear is identified as
4 being needed for reliability and is removed from the initial, preliminary clearing
5 of the substitution auction, then the substitution auction will be re-cleared using
6 the remaining demand bids (and the supply offers, which are not modified by the
7 reliability review process) to determine a new auction solution that maximizes
8 social surplus considering the remaining bids and offers. The reliability review of
9 cleared demand bids would then proceed sequentially through the remaining
10 demand bids in the same manner as described above. This process will be
11 repeated until an auction-clearing solution does not result in a demand bid
12 clearing that must be retained for reliability, and that auction solution will then be
13 the final substitution auction result.

14

15 **Q: What are the benefits of performing this reliability review in the substitution**
16 **auction rather than prior to the auction?**

17 A: Applying the reviews during the auction allows the auction clearing engine to first
18 determine the optimal set of bids and offers that maximize social surplus,
19 respecting the various constraints that apply in the substitution auction clearing.
20 The reliability review process can then determine whether the resource
21 retirements accepted in the auction will create a reliability issue.

22

1 In addition, the in-auction reliability review process can take account of the
2 reliability contributions of Sponsored Policy Resources that would acquire a CSO
3 in the substitution auction. These new resources would receive a CSO in the
4 substitution auction and can, therefore, be included in the assessment of whether
5 reliability needs remain after removing existing capacity.

6

7 **Q: Can you provide an example to demonstrate how the enhanced process could**
8 **achieve a better outcome?**

9 A: Yes. We will focus on the improvements resulting from allowing the initial,
10 preliminary substitution-auction clearing to first determine which demand bids to
11 clear. Assume that two existing resources ('A' and 'B') are the only two
12 resources that can satisfy a particular reliability need, for which one (and only
13 one) must be retained, and recall that substitution auction demand bids are non-
14 rationable (cannot clear partially). Resource B submits a higher-priced demand
15 bid than resource A, but resource B's demand bid quantity is significantly larger.
16 Assume also that the available supply offers in the auction are more than enough
17 to match up with resource A's smaller demand quantity, but there is not enough
18 supply to match resource B's larger demand quantity.

19

20 If these demand bids were pre-reviewed to determine whether either would have
21 to be retained for reliability, the analysis may determine that resource B (which
22 would be reviewed first based on its higher bid price) can be allowed to retire, but
23 in the absence of resource B that resource A will have to be retained to address

1 the reliability need. As a result, only resource B's demand bid would be entered
2 into the substitution auction. But because resource B's bid quantity is non-
3 rationable (cannot clear partially) and it exceeds the total available supply, it
4 cannot be cleared. Under the pre-auction review approach, and the assumptions
5 of this example, no CSO trade is achieved in the substitution auction.

6
7 Alternatively, if both demand bids were entered into the auction, resource B's
8 demand again would not clear (because it is larger than the available supply), but
9 resource A's demand bid would clear. Resource A therefore has a greater
10 contribution to social surplus. If the reliability review for resource A is performed
11 in the auction, as proposed in the instant filing, then the retirement of resource A
12 can be allowed because resource B will retain its CSO for the commitment period
13 (and continue to meet the reliability need). Using the in-auction review approach,
14 a CSO trade is achieved in the auction, and the overall reliability need to retain
15 one of the two resources is still met.

16

17 **IV. THE CASPR TEST PRICE**

18

19 **Q: Please provide an overview of the Tariff revisions that address the CASPR**
20 **“test price” mechanism.**

21 A: The test price mechanism is intended to address the incentive for a participant to
22 reduce its resource's primary auction de-list bid price below its competitively-
23 determined break-even price, as a means to increase the likelihood that its
24 resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction and then can shed the CSO in the

1 substitution auction to receive a severance payment in exchange for its retirement.
2 This behavior (referred to as “bid shading”) could produce an inefficient outcome
3 in the primary auction.
4

5 The ISO is proposing a “test price” mechanism to deter bid shading. The test
6 price will estimate the resource’s competitive break-even price to obtain a CSO
7 rather than retire. As we will explain, the test price will exclude the expected
8 opportunity cost of receiving a substitution auction severance payment to
9 determine the competitive break-even price for the resource.
10

11 The test price is not a form of direct mitigation, in that it does not dictate the price
12 at which a participant may offer its existing capacity in the primary auction (or in
13 the substitution auction). Rather, the test price serves as a screen for competitive
14 behavior in the primary auction to determine whether the resource’s demand bid
15 can enter the substitution auction. That determination is based on whether the
16 primary auction clearing price is higher or lower than a resource’s test price. If
17 the primary auction clearing price is below an existing resource’s test price, and it
18 acquired a CSO at this primary auction price, then the resource is excluded from
19 the substitution auction. The test price, therefore, counters the incentive for a
20 participant to shade its primary auction de-list bid for purposes of entering the
21 substitution auction.
22

1 **Q: You state that a participant with an existing capacity resource can receive**
2 **compensation for retiring all or some portion of its resource through the**
3 **substitution auction. Please explain how this is possible.**

4 A: The substitution auction will always produce a clearing price that is equal to or
5 less than the primary auction clearing price. More specifically, supply offers in
6 the substitution auction will generally be at lower prices (relative to the primary
7 auction), consistent with the fact that Sponsored Policy Resources seeking to sell
8 capacity are receiving out-of-market payments that lower the price at which they
9 are willing to acquire a CSO. Also, demand bids in the substitution auction will
10 tend to be priced below the primary auction clearing price, because an existing
11 resource would not want to buy out of a CSO at a higher price than it is paid to
12 acquire the CSO in the primary auction. To do otherwise would be the economic
13 equivalent of “selling low and buying high,” which is not a profitable endeavor.

14
15 These general properties of supply offers and demand bids will tend to produce a
16 substitution auction clearing price below the primary auction clearing price. As a
17 result, an existing resource that acquires a CSO in the primary auction at a higher
18 price and then sheds the CSO in the substitution auction at a lower price will
19 receive a positive FCM payment, on net, equal to this price difference (for each
20 MW of CSO that it shed in the substitution auction). This net positive FCM
21 payment is referred to as the “severance payment.” The severance payment is the
22 market-based compensation for relinquishing something of value (i.e., its future

1 market revenues from the ISO-administered markets) when a resource sheds its
2 CSO and retires via the substitution auction.

3

4 **Q: Can this result—i.e., that a participant can be compensated for shedding its**
5 **CSO in the substitution auction—incent bid shading in the FCM?**

6 A: Yes. As the CASPR Geissler Testimony explained, the opportunity to obtain a
7 severance payment in the substitution auction can incent “bid shading.”¹³ An
8 existing resource nearing retirement may have an incentive to reduce its primary
9 auction offer to sell capacity below its competitive break-even price (i.e., the price
10 it must receive from the FCM to cover its expected going-forward costs). A
11 participant would do this to increase the likelihood that its resource acquires a
12 CSO in the primary auction, so that it can then shed the CSO in the substitution
13 auction to receive the severance payment in exchange for its retirement. If, on the
14 other hand, the participant provides de-list bids for its existing capacity at its
15 break-even price and does not receive a CSO in the primary auction, then it does
16 not receive a severance payment for retiring.

17

18 The behavior of shading down a primary auction de-list bid to receive a severance
19 payment can produce an inefficient outcome in the primary auction.

20

¹³ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VII.B, pp. 119-123.

1 **Q: How could this behavior impact the primary auction clearing price?**

2 A: As the CASPR Geissler Testimony explained, it is possible that this behavior
3 could reduce the primary auction clearing price below its competitively-based
4 level. However, a specific set of conditions would have to apply in order for the
5 primary auction clearing price to be affected: the existing resource that engages in
6 bid shading would need to (a) have a competitive break-even price that would
7 make its de-list bid extra-marginal (priced above the clearing price) or marginal
8 (setting the clearing price) in the primary auction, and (b) have a shaded bid price
9 that would move it down in the supply stack such that it becomes the marginal bid
10 or an infra-marginal bid (priced below the clearing price). This incentive to
11 reduce the primary auction de-list bid price could arise if the expected severance
12 payment in the substitution auction is sufficiently large and the risk of failing to
13 shed the CSO in the substitution auction is sufficiently remote. Otherwise, the
14 participant faces the risk of retaining a CSO obligation at a price below its cost to
15 provide capacity, a risk that will tend to deter this behavior.¹⁴

16
17 **Q: Are there factors that can reduce the magnitude of any potential impact on**
18 **the auction clearing price?**

19 A: Yes. As the CASPR Geissler testimony explained, the use of sloped demand
20 curves in the primary auction, rather than fixed requirements as were applied in
21 earlier FCAs, tends to reduce the price impact associated with bid shading
22 because the auction may also increase the quantity of capacity procured.

¹⁴ See the CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VII.B, pp. 123-126.

1

2 Further, bid shading is a financially risky strategy. There is the possibility that the
3 participant that engages in this behavior will sell its capacity in the primary
4 auction at a price below its true break-even price and then be unable to clear its
5 demand bid in the substitution auction. In such instances, the participant would
6 then retain a CSO for the resource at a price below the price at which it would
7 break-even on the obligation.

8

9 For these reasons, the ISO did not propose a mechanism in the core CASPR filing
10 to reduce the likelihood or impact of bid shading behavior. Nevertheless, the
11 CASPR Geissler testimony noted that further analysis of the issue would be
12 prudent; specifically, to assess how a process to address bid-shading concerns
13 could be designed, the timing and information collection efforts that it would
14 require, and the appropriate consequences for engaging in bid shading for
15 purposes of gaining entry to the substitution auction.

16

17 **Q: Has the ISO performed this further analysis?**

18 A: Yes. We have determined that the existing FCM market power mitigation
19 construct applied to Retirement De-List Bids can be leveraged to develop a
20 mechanism (a) to reduce the incentive for existing resources participating in the
21 substitution auction to engage in bid shading and (b) to evaluate whether bid
22 shading was present. This new mechanism for CASPR can be implemented with
23 relative efficiency.

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Further, the appropriate consequences of failing this test are straightforward: a participant is prevented from having its resource participate in the substitution auction. The test price mechanism therefore does not prevent a participant from submitting its preferred de-list bid into the primary auction (subject to the other existing market power mitigation mechanisms). However, the consequence of losing access to the substitution auction (which is the only means to obtain the severance payment) should serve as an appropriate disincentive to engage in bid shading, as we will explain below in more detail. The administration, timing and information collection requirements for the new CASPR test price mechanism build upon the existing construct for submitting Retirement De-List Bids.

Q: Does the new test price mechanism modify the existing market power mitigation rules that are applicable to capacity resources?

A: Broadly, no, but there are related conforming changes. The test price mechanism does not make any fundamental change to the manner in which market power mitigation is carried out in the FCM. However, there are circumstances in which a resource’s test price value might impact the de-list bid price at which the participant would want to offer its existing capacity into the primary auction. We will explain these circumstances, and the associated conforming change to the market power mitigation process to address them, after first explaining the test price process.

1 **Q: Please describe the mechanics of the proposed mechanism to prevent the**
2 **potential pricing impacts of bid shading in the primary auction.**

3 A: The ISO is proposing to use a test price mechanism that evaluates whether a
4 participant acquired a CSO with its existing resource in the primary auction at a
5 price that is above or below the competitive break-even price for the resource to
6 provide capacity (rather than retire). The primary components of the mechanism
7 are contained in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A of Market Rule 1, and the consequences
8 of offering below the test price are addressed in Section III.13.2.8.3.3.

9
10 If the existing resource acquires its CSO at a primary auction clearing price that is
11 at or above its test price, then its demand bid will be entered into the substitution
12 auction (subject to the other rules for adjusting demand bids after the primary
13 auction). If instead the primary auction clearing price is below the resource's test
14 price, then the resource's demand bid will be excluded from the substitution
15 auction.

16
17 The test price mechanism helps incentivize competitive bidding behavior in the
18 primary auction by removing the potential benefit to a participant of engaging in
19 bid shading. The expected value of a substitution auction severance payment will
20 be zero (i.e., non-existent) at primary auction clearing prices below the resource's
21 test price, which nullifies the potential benefit of remaining in the auction at
22 clearing prices that are below this value.

23

1 **Q: Please explain the rationale for using a test price rather than a traditional**
2 **market power mitigation mechanism that regulates the price at which the**
3 **participant may offer its capacity in the primary auction.**

4 A: Market power refers to the ability of a capacity supplier to utilize its market
5 position—that is, the amount of capacity it controls relative to the amount
6 controlled by other participants—to profitably set the auction clearing price
7 higher or lower than its competitive level. Market power mitigation mechanisms
8 are intended to remove the influence that an attempted exercise of market power
9 may have on the market clearing price.

10
11 A participant with a portfolio of existing resources would exercise (unilateral)
12 market power in the FCA by withdrawing some of its supply at an
13 uncompetitively high price, and in so doing force the auction clearing price higher
14 to benefit its remaining portfolio that does acquire a CSO at the inflated clearing
15 price. The FCM de-list bid mitigation rules address this exercise of market power
16 by mitigating existing resource bids down to a competitively-based price.

17
18 These supplier-side market power concerns are not at issue when a participant
19 with existing capacity engages in bid shading: by offering below its cost of
20 providing capacity, the participant puts downward pressure on the auction
21 clearing price that would work to its detriment (i.e., by lowering the revenue
22 received by its remaining portfolio of resources that do acquire a CSO). The
23 concern the CASPR test price is designed to address is therefore different: it is

1 that an uneconomic resource nearing retirement (with costs to provide capacity
2 that exceed the competitive primary auction price) may bid below its true cost in
3 the primary auction, in expectation of a severance payment in the substitution
4 auction. Therefore, the function of the test price mechanism (i.e., disallowing
5 entry in the substitution auction) is aligned with its purpose of deterring bid
6 shading to gain entry to the substitution auction.

7
8 **Q: Please provide an overview of how the test price will be determined and**
9 **applied in the FCA process.**

10 A: There are five elements to the test price design. These are: (1) the timeline of
11 activities and information provided during the FCA qualification period that will
12 determine the applicable resource-specific test price; (2) the methodology to
13 calculate the test price; (3) the application of the test price in the FCA; (4) the
14 relationship of the test price to a participant's preferred de-list price for its
15 resource; and (5) conditions under which a test price will not be calculated or
16 applied for a resource (i.e., a *de minimis* quantity rule).

17
18 **Q: What timeline applies to the calculation and application of the test price for a**
19 **resource?**

20 A: As specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, the test price mechanism will utilize the
21 existing timeline for CASPR retirement elections, which is similar to the timeline
22 for developing Retirement De-List Bids. The test price mechanism only applies
23 to existing resources that elect to participate in the substitution auction. Suppliers

1 that submit a Retirement De-List Bid (a “track 1” demand bid election), or that
2 elect at that same deadline to submit a demand bid for participation in the
3 substitution auction without a retirement bid (a “track 2” election), will utilize the
4 Retirement De-List Bid calculation methodology in the Tariff to calculate a test
5 price (typically in March). The Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”) will review the
6 submitted test price and consult with the participant to establish an IMM-
7 determined test price for the resource using the cost-evaluation framework
8 applicable to the IMM’s review of Retirement De-List Bids. The IMM will notify
9 the participant of the IMM-determined test price in the retirement determination
10 notification (typically in June). The ISO will also file the test price with the
11 Commission in its confidential filing of retirement and permanent de-list bid
12 information (typically in July). The test price values—as accepted or modified by
13 the Commission in its order on the ISO’s retirements filing—will then apply in
14 the FCA.

15
16 **Q: How is the test price calculated?**

17 A: The test price will reflect the IMM’s estimate of the competitive price below
18 which a participant would retire its capacity rather than acquire a CSO, excluding
19 the impact of a potential severance payment from the substitution auction. This
20 price represents the break-even price to provide capacity from the resource rather
21 than retire in the primary auction. At prices below the test price, the participant
22 cannot expect to recover its going-forward costs to continue participating in the
23 wholesale markets, and therefore it should retire the resource rather than acquire

1 an obligation to provide capacity. A willingness to remain in the FCM below this
2 break-even price may indicate the participant's intent to utilize the substitution
3 auction mechanism to retire with a severance payment.

4
5 Under the current market rules, the break-even price to provide capacity rather
6 than retire is reflected in the Retirement De-List Bid calculation, and so, as
7 specified in Section III.13.8.2.8.3.1A, the test price mechanism leverages the
8 existing rules by providing that the test price will be calculated in the same
9 manner as a Retirement De-List Bid (*See* Market Rule 1, Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1).

10

11 **Q: Is the test price subject to the same review by the Internal Market Monitor**
12 **that is performed for Retirement De-List Bids?**

13 A: Yes. The IMM will review the participant-submitted test price using the same
14 cost-review framework that is used for Retirement De-List Bids. As with the de-
15 list bid review process, the IMM will evaluate the submitted cost information and
16 review assumptions with the participant to assess whether an adjustment to the
17 submitted test price value is necessary. Specifically, using the Retirement De-List
18 Bid formula, an adjustment to the participant-submitted test price value is
19 necessary if the submitted price is not “consistent with (1) the net present value of
20 the resource's expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section
21 III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource's Capacity
22 Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and

1 (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section
2 III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5),” as specified in Market Rule 1 Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

3

4 If the participant-submitted test price is *lower* than the IMM-determined test
5 price, then the participant’s price is replaced with the IMM-determined price,
6 which is necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the test price.

7 Specifically, by replacing the lower participant-submitted price with the IMM-
8 determined price in this case, the rules ensure that any attempt to “bid shade” a
9 de-list bid below the competitive break-even price for the resource will not be
10 rewarded with the ability to participate in the substitution auction. Nevertheless,
11 as discussed above, the test price does not directly control a participant’s conduct
12 in the primary auction. Adjusting the resource’s test price upward to reflect the
13 IMM’s higher estimate of the test price will not constrain the participant’s de-list
14 bids for the primary auction.

15

16 If the participant-submitted test price is *higher* than the IMM-determined test
17 price, then the participant’s price is also replaced with the lower IMM-determined
18 test price. This downward adjustment will permit the participant greater
19 flexibility with respect to its participation in the substitution auction, and in doing
20 so supports the CASPR objective to facilitate the coordinated exit of existing
21 resources and entry of Sponsored Policy Resources through the substitution
22 auction.

23

Q: Are there any differences in the way a test price and a Retirement De-List Bid are reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor?

A: Yes, there are three differences. First, although under both the test price review and the Retirement De-List Bid review there is a means to account for estimation uncertainty, how the uncertainty “tolerance” is applied differs. Under the existing rules governing the IMM’s review of Retirement De-List Bids, the process accounts for uncertainty in the IMM’s estimation of a resource’s costs and revenues by applying a 10% tolerance before the IMM-determined price would replace the participant-submitted price. Specifically, the IMM will replace a participant-submitted de-list bid price with the IMM-determined price only if the participant-submitted de-list bid price is more than 10 percent greater than the IMM-determined de-list bid price. In contrast, for the test price mechanism, the IMM does not apply a tolerance in determining whether to replace the participant-submitted test price with its own estimate, but rather applies an across-the-board 10% reduction in the IMM-determined test price for each resource. This adjustment is made when the test price is applied in the auction, under Section III.13.2.8.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

Second, unlike a Retirement De-List Bid, a participant cannot submit multiple test prices for a single resource for multiple price-quantity segments, but must instead submit a single test price using its cost and revenue data.

1 Third, the IMM review removes from the participant-submitted test price any
2 amount that reflects the expected value of a CASPR severance payment.

3

4 **Q: Please explain how the 10 percent adjustment applies to the test price.**

5 A: To account for uncertainty with respect to the estimation of the resource's costs
6 and revenues that comprise the test price, the final test price will be set at 90% of
7 the test price value that has been accepted by the Commission. The test price
8 value that is 90% of the Commission-accepted price is then applied in the FCA to
9 test the eligibility of the resource to enter into the substitution auction. If the
10 resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction at a clearing price below the
11 adjusted test price, then its demand bid is excluded from the substitution auction.
12 Otherwise, the demand bid can be included in the substitution auction (provided
13 the resource meets all the other conditions to have its demand bid included).

14

15 **Q: Please explain why a single test price value applies rather than a test price**
16 **consisting of multiple price-quantity pairs.**

17 A: Although an existing resource may differentiate the costs for different quantities
18 (called "price segmentation") of its resource's capacity using price-quantity
19 segments in its de-list bid or demand bid, the test price does not allow for price
20 segmentation. Instead, the test price calculation requires the participant and the
21 IMM to estimate the competitive bid for the aggregate amount of capacity
22 corresponding to the resource's substitution auction demand bid quantity. The
23 underlying reason for not allowing segments in the test price is to avoid false

1 precision that could prevent the test price from meeting its objective of producing
2 competitively-based bidding behavior in the primary auction.

3

4 **Q: Please explain what you mean by “false precision” in this context.**

5 A; If the test price used price segmentation, then a resource with segments of higher-
6 cost capacity and lower-cost capacity included in its demand bid might acquire a
7 CSO in the primary auction at a clearing price that falls in-between the two test
8 price values for the high- and low-cost segments of capacity. In this case, if the
9 test price mechanism permitted price segmentation, it might exclude from the
10 substitution auction the capacity corresponding to the higher-cost segment (i.e.,
11 the segment of the resource’s capacity that acquired a CSO at a price below its
12 competitive break-even price).

13

14 Irrespective of the intention to exclude the higher-cost segment of capacity from
15 participating in the substitution auction, the participant will very likely choose to
16 retire this higher-cost capacity if any amount of its demand bid clears in the
17 substitution auction. In this case the test price would fail to meet its objective
18 because it would allow the resource to receive the severance payment
19 compensation for retiring capacity that was not offered competitively in the
20 primary auction.

21

22

23

1 **Q: Did the ISO consider other alternatives to avoid this “false precision” issue?**

2 A: Yes, the ISO also considered allowing price segmentation and setting the test
3 price at either (1) the highest segment price or (2) the lowest segment price, but
4 neither option would produce reasonable results. The highest segment price
5 approach would overly-restrict participation in the substitution auction. For
6 example, if the resource’s demand bid includes a small portion of high-cost
7 capacity, its entire demand bid, including the larger, low-cost segment, might be
8 excluded from the substitution auction by the test price mechanism even if the
9 primary auction clearing price was higher than the competitive price for the
10 resource’s lower-cost capacity.

11
12 Similarly, the lowest segment price approach would fail to meet the purpose of
13 the test price since participants could increase the probability that their resource
14 would “pass” the test price mechanism by including low-cost capacity in the
15 demand bid even if they didn’t intend to actually retire this capacity.

16

17 **Q: How does the single test price format compare with these alternatives that**
18 **the ISO rejected?**

19 A: Considering the issues with the price segmentation alternatives discussed above,
20 we identified that the single test price approach will better meet the intended
21 objective of the test price mechanism, avoids false precision issues, simplifies the
22 administration and transparency of the test price, and minimizes incentives for a
23 participant to adjust its demand bid quantity to affect a resource’s test price.

1

2 **Q: Next, please explain the removal of the expected value of a CASPR severance**
3 **payment from the test price.**

4 A: As we have discussed, the expected value of a severance payment may prompt a
5 participant to decrease its preferred de-list bid price for a resource below its
6 competitively-based price in order to increase its chances of taking on a CSO in
7 the primary auction and then obtaining a severance payment through participation
8 in the substitution auction. And it is the purpose of the test price mechanism to
9 prevent this very outcome. Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude the participant's
10 expected value of a CASPR severance payment when calculating its resource's
11 test price. This serves the objective of establishing a competitive retirement bid
12 price for a resource assuming that bidding behavior is unaffected by CASPR.

13

14 **Q: Is it also necessary to exclude the expected value of a severance payment**
15 **from the de-list bid itself, or just from the test price?**

16 A: It is not necessary to exclude the expected value of a severance payment from the
17 resource's de-list bid. The market power mitigation rules that apply to existing
18 resources (to address seller-side market power) do not prevent a participant from
19 offering its existing capacity below a competitively-based bid price. If a
20 participant wants to reflect the opportunity cost of obtaining a severance payment,
21 the current de-list bid mitigation review process would not preclude them from
22 reducing the de-list bid price. Furthermore, the test price mechanism is not
23 intended to mandate the resource's minimum de-list bid price.

1

2 That being said, to the extent the test price represents the resource's competitive
3 de-list bid price when the severance payment is excluded, the test price
4 mechanism eliminates the participant's incentive to include this expected
5 severance payment to lower its de-list bid price. Specifically, if the resource
6 remains in the primary auction at prices below its test price and acquires a CSO, it
7 will be excluded from the substitution auction. Therefore, the IMM's
8 determination of the test price may impact the manner in which a participant
9 calculates its preferred de-list bid price, and creating flexibility for participants to
10 incorporate information about the resource's test price is appropriate.

11 Accordingly, the ISO is proposing conforming changes to the de-list bid review
12 process to permit adjustments to a de-list bid after the IMM-determined test price
13 is provided to the participant.

14

15 **Q: Please elaborate on the types of changes to a de-list bid that a participant**
16 **may want to make after learning of its resource's test price.**

17 A: A participant that did reflect its expected value of a severance payment in its de-
18 list bid may want to adjust that expected value once it learns of the test price. The
19 test price impacts the ability to participate in the substitution auction to obtain a
20 severance payment. At primary auction clearing prices below the resource's test
21 price, the expected value of the severance payment is zero for the coincident
22 auction. Because the participant must submit its Retirement De-List Bid or
23 Permanent De-List Bid in advance of when it learns of the IMM-determined test

1 price, the proposed rule changes include a mechanism to permit the participant to
2 update its Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid to account for the
3 impact of the IMM-determined test price.

4

5 Note that the same adjustment option would be appropriate for a Static De-List
6 Bid if there were uncertainty about the IMM-determined test price before the bid
7 was submitted. Therefore, the proposed rules include additional conforming
8 changes to set the deadline for the IMM to provide its approved test price before
9 the deadline for submitting these de-list bids. These qualification calendar
10 adjustments ensure that a participant is able to adjust its preferred Static De-List
11 Bid in accordance with the resource's IMM-determined test price.

12

13 **Q: Please explain the mechanism in the proposed rules to permit a participant to**
14 **reflect the expected value of a severance payment in its Retirement or**
15 **Permanent De-List Bid after learning of the IMM-determined test price.**

16 A: The proposed rules provide (in Section III.13.1.2.4) that the participant will have
17 the option to increase its Retirement De-List Bid price up to the resource's IMM-
18 determined test price (less the 10 percent estimation uncertainty adjustment). A
19 similar adjustment option will apply for a participant that submits a Permanent
20 De-List Bid and has a demand bid for the substitution auction. For either de-list
21 bid type, the participant may have considered the expected value of a severance
22 payment when setting its preferred de-list price, and may want to adjust that bid

1 upward to reflect any limits on the ability to obtain a severance payment as
2 conditioned by the IMM-determined test price.

3
4 To apply the adjustment in a manner that is consistent with the function of the de-
5 list bid mitigation rules (i.e., to prevent de-list bids above competitive-based
6 levels), it is necessary to limit the upward adjustment flexibility to account for
7 potential differences in the test price calculation and the de-list bid calculation.

8
9 The need for this limitation is most apparent for adjustments to Permanent De-
10 List Bids. A Permanent De-List Bid reflects the option to remove a resource from
11 the FCM, but not to remove the resource from other ISO-administered markets.
12 As a result, the competitive price for a Permanent De-List Bid may be different
13 from the competitive price for a Retirement De-List Bid. Therefore, it would be
14 inappropriate to allow the participant to raise its Permanent De-List Bid to the
15 IMM-determined test price value, which is calculated using the formula for a
16 Retirement De-List Bid. Accordingly, any increase to the Permanent De-List Bid
17 must be limited to an increase that is not higher than the IMM's estimate of the
18 competitive Permanent De-List Bid price.

19
20 The need to limit the allowed increase in the de-list price also applies for
21 increases to a Retirement De-List Bid, but for different reasons. A participant
22 may submit a Retirement De-List Bid for only a portion of the resource's capacity
23 and may separately submit a substitution auction demand bid for a greater amount

1 of the resource’s capacity. The calculation of the test price would apply to the
2 larger amount of capacity included in the substitution auction demand bid
3 quantity. To prevent the participant from raising its Retirement De-List Bid price
4 to a value that is not reflective of the competitive price for the portion of the
5 resource that is subject to the de-list bid, the proposed adjustment flexibility rules
6 also limit the upward adjustment to a Retirement De-List Bid to the lower of (a)
7 the competitive price for the Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the IMM-determined
8 test price for the resource.

9

10 **Q: For this limitation, what constitutes a “competitive price for the Retirement**
11 **De-List Bid” or a “competitive price for the Permanent De-List Bid”?**

12 A: The existing market power mitigation reviews applicable to de-list bids are
13 intended to prevent the exercise of supplier-side market power (i.e., bidding above
14 competitive-based levels), as discussed earlier. The existing de-list bid review
15 rules permit participants to have de-list bids priced below competitive-based
16 levels, and the IMM review will accept these low de-list bid prices without
17 adjustment (*See* Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2). In other words, the IMM’s review
18 does not contemplate *increasing* a de-list bid, even if the participant-proposed bid
19 is below a competitive price (as calculated by the IMM).

20

21 Therefore, the proposed upward adjustment mechanism contemplates a
22 competitive price that the IMM *would have* calculated if it were permitted to
23 increase a participant’s de-list bid price, and it permits the participant to adjust its

1 de-list bid up to the lower of the de-list bid price that the IMM otherwise would
2 have calculated but for the limitations on upward adjustments (or rather, the
3 absence of such an adjustment in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2) and the IMM-
4 determined test price for the resource.

5
6 **Q: Finally, please explain the *de minimis* rule that would allow an exemption**
7 **from the test price review.**

8 A: The *de minimis* rule exempts resources from the test price review when they are
9 participating in the substitution auction with a demand bid quantity of less than
10 three MW. The intent is to avoid burdensome administrative work by both
11 participants and the ISO for small amounts of capacity that are unlikely to have
12 any material impact on the primary auction results.

13
14 The election to participate in the substitution auction for existing resources occurs
15 in March, at which time the participant also must specify its chosen demand bid
16 quantity. If the demand bid quantity is less than three MW, the resource will not
17 participate in the test price review and will automatically have a test price of \$0
18 per kW-month (equivalent to no test price). Thus, resources that intend to
19 participate in the substitution auction with a *de minimis* capacity quantity will not
20 be prevented from entering the substitution auction by the test price rule.

21

1 **Q: Has the ISO performed analysis to support the use of the three MW limit on**
2 **applying this *de minimis* exemption?**

3 A: Yes. Using results of recent auctions, we reviewed the frequency of generator
4 resources (i.e., those resources that could have capacity network interconnection
5 service) with a total amount of CSO in different quantity ranges (e.g., less than 1
6 MW, 1 to 2 MW, 2 to 3 MW, and so forth) and identified that a large number of
7 resources in the 0.001 to 3 MW range participate in the FCM and, in principle,
8 would be eligible to participate in the substitution auction.

9
10 At MW quantities above this range, the distribution of CSO amounts among these
11 resources is much more disperse. This data indicates that if the *de minimis* limit
12 were instead set at two MW, the number of resources excluded from the test price
13 review would increase significantly. On the other hand, if the limit were set
14 higher at four MW, the number of resources subject to the test price would
15 increase minimally. In other words, raising the limit to be above three MW would
16 not materially decrease the potential administrative burden (for participants and
17 for the ISO) of developing test prices for small bids that may be submitted for
18 these resources.

19
20 Using the same data, we observed that generators below three MW in size
21 accounted for between 300 and 350 resources and had an aggregate amount of
22 capacity obligations of roughly 215 MW. This set of resources was also
23 compared to prior submitted de-list bids. Among these resources, very few had

1 de-list bids submitted for the prior auctions we evaluated. This means the
2 suppliers of this capacity have previously chosen to participate in the primary
3 auction by offering these resources as price-takers. The introduction of CASPR
4 would therefore not be expected to cause these resources to lower their de-list bid
5 prices, as they are already effectively offering their capacity at \$0 per kW-month.
6 Therefore, exempting them from the test price rules will not create an adverse
7 impact on the FCA clearing prices.

8

9 **Q: Why does the *de minimis* exemption apply to the substitution auction demand**
10 **bid quantity rather than the resource's total capability?**

11 A: While the ISO used historical resource-level data to identify a population of small
12 resources that could be exempted to avoid unnecessary administrative burden, the
13 potential pricing impacts of bid shading would be affected by the demand bid
14 quantity, not the resource's total capability. If the *de minimis* exemption were
15 based on resource size rather than the bid quantity, small resources would be
16 advantaged relative to larger resources.

17

18 **V. FORWARD CAPACITY MARKET SETTLEMENT**

19

20 **A. Substitution Auction Cost Allocation**

21

22 **Q: Please describe the nature of the conforming changes pertaining to the cost**
23 **allocation provisions for the substitution auction.**

24 A: The cost allocation provisions for the substitution auction are being conformed to
25 the recent updates to the cost allocation rules for the Forward Capacity Market

1 that will be implemented for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with
2 FCA 13.¹⁵

3

4 **Q: Can you briefly summarize the recent updates to the FCM cost allocation**
5 **rules?**

6 A: The updated FCM cost allocation rules replace the prior Net Regional Clearing
7 Price (“NRCP”)-based method for allocating the majority of FCM costs (i.e.,
8 payments for capacity supplied) with two new allocation methods. Under the
9 updated methodology, costs associated with CSOs awarded through the annual
10 market auctions are allocated based on the locational marginal reliability impact
11 (“MRI”) of capacity in order to be consistent with the auction-clearing principles
12 of the MRI-based demand curves. This is referred to as the “marginal value”
13 allocation method.

14

15 The second allocator applies to capacity obligation costs that are not determined
16 using the MRI-based demand curves and instead arise from special compensation
17 provisions for certain participant elections (e.g., self-supply), resource types (e.g.,
18 intermittent resources), or administratively-specified rights (e.g., Hydro-Quebec
19 Interconnection Capability Credits). These non-annual and non-auction costs

¹⁵ The cost allocation rules are contained in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1. Section III.13.7.5.1 addresses the rules that will be in effective up until the start of the thirteenth Capacity Commitment Period ending May 31, 2022. Section III.13.7.5.2, which is modified by the proposed changes addressed in this filing, addresses the updated rules that will be applied starting on June 1, 2022. *See ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee*, Filing re FCM Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (filed August 1, 2018); Letter Order Accepting Proposed Forward Capacity Market Cost Allocation Improvements, Docket No. ER18-2125-000 (issued September 26, 2018).

1 resulting from these special compensation provisions are allocated pro-rata to
2 pool-wide Capacity Load Obligations.

3

4 The second significant improvement to the cost allocation rules was to increase
5 the transparency of the cost allocation for market participants. The updated cost
6 allocation rules separate the charges by capacity auction, and also separate out the
7 charges associated with individual special compensation scenarios, such as, for
8 example, self-supply capacity obligations.

9

10 **Q: How will substitution auction settlement costs be incorporated into the**
11 **framework of the updated cost allocation design?**

12 A: The conforming changes proposed with this filing incorporate cost allocation for
13 the substitution auction into the new allocation method, and also maintain the
14 objective of providing increased transparency for the FCM cost allocation.

15

16 The allocation of costs arising directly from the auction-clearing solution for the
17 substitution auction will utilize the marginal value allocation method, consistent
18 with how the updated cost allocation rules apportion costs arising from each
19 annual auction. These changes are reflected in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.1 of Market
20 Rule 1.

21

22 In addition, there may be costs arising from the substitution auction that fall under
23 the special compensation provisions, including for self-supply capacity

1 obligations (Section III.13.7.5.1.1.5.) and intermittent resource seasonal capacity
2 variances (Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6.). Such costs arising from the substitution
3 auction will be allocated pro-rata to pool-wide Capacity Load Obligations in the
4 same manner as when these costs arise in the primary auction.

5
6 **Q: Since the substitution auction is a two-sided auction to match supply offers**
7 **and demand bids from capacity suppliers willing to exchange CSOs at the**
8 **auction clearing price, why are the total payments to cleared supply and total**
9 **charges to cleared demand not equivalent? In other words, why are there**
10 **any additional costs arising from the substitution auction to allocate?**

11 A: Generally, the substitution auction transfers both CSOs and revenues between
12 suppliers with Sponsored Policy Resources that acquire a CSO (receiving an
13 associated credit) and suppliers with retiring existing resources that shed a CSO
14 (receiving an associated charge). As such, the majority of the settlement activity
15 is expected to be comprised of these revenue transfers between capacity suppliers
16 and will not result in an additional cost allocation to third parties.

17
18 However, there are several reasons why the total credits to cleared supply and
19 total charges to cleared demand may not balance. These imbalances may be a
20 property of the auction-clearing solution (e.g., due to interface congestion), or
21 may be due to post-auction administrative adjustments, or may be the result of the
22 application of the special compensation provisions. The resulting imbalances can

1 produce either additional charges or rebates to those participants responsible for
2 Capacity Load Obligations.

3

4 **Q: Please explain the settlement imbalance costs associated with substitution**
5 **auction transactions that will be allocated using the marginal value method.**

6 A: There are four potential sources of settlement imbalance costs that could result
7 from the substitution auction-clearing solution. First, like any auction with
8 modeled network constraints, it is possible to have locational price differences
9 between the export- and import-constrained sides of a congested interface. When
10 an interface constraint binds in the auction, supply is being increased on the
11 export-constrained side of the interface and decreased on the import-constrained
12 side of the interface. When an interface constraint binds, resources that acquire a
13 CSO on the export-constrained side of the interface are paid a lower clearing price
14 and resources that shed a CSO on the import-constrained side of the interface are
15 charged a higher clearing price. These instances of congestion produce a rebate to
16 Capacity Load Obligations.

17

18 Second, the presence of proxy demand bids in the substitution auction can create
19 an imbalance in the final settled transactions. No actual resource is associated
20 with a proxy demand bid, and therefore there is no participant to charge (or credit)
21 for the cleared proxy demand bid. However, if a proxy demand bid is cleared in
22 the substitution auction, it will “transfer” a CSO to a new resource that clears.
23 This new resource will be credited for the CSO acquired at the substitution

1 auction clearing price. If the substitution auction clearing price is positive, then
2 load-servers will receive an additional charge to pay for this supply. If the
3 substitution auction price is negative, then the new resource will be charged for
4 the CSO acquired and load-servers will receive a rebate for the charge collected
5 from this resource. In either case, the credit or charge is allocated to Capacity
6 Load Obligation.

7
8 The third source of imbalances results from “side payments” for demand bids that
9 were cleared at a substitution auction clearing price that exceeds their bid price
10 (i.e., exceeds the maximum price the participant was willing to pay to shed the
11 existing resource’s CSO in the substitution auction). Under the CASPR design,
12 there are instances where no single clearing price in the substitution auction will
13 be (i) less than or equal to all accepted demand bids, and (ii) greater than or equal
14 to all accepted supply offers. To address this scenario, an additional payment is
15 necessary to ensure that no participant with a cleared supply offer or demand bid
16 is made worse off by participating in the substitution auction.¹⁶ The cost of side
17 payments will result in additional charges to Capacity Load Obligation.

18
19 The fourth source of imbalances results from CSO terminations after the
20 substitution auction. A new sponsored resource that acquires a CSO in the
21 auction may later have the obligation terminated under the existing FCM

¹⁶ See CASPR Geissler Testimony at Section VIII.C for discussion of side payments in the CASPR design.

1 termination rules. If the CSO is acquired at a positive price in the substitution
2 auction, the participant foregoes the associated payment when the CSO is
3 terminated. In this instance, the CSO termination produces a rebate for Capacity
4 Load Obligation. Conversely, and unique to the substitution auction, in the case
5 that a CSO is acquired in the substitution auction at a negative price, then the
6 participant with a terminated CSO would forego the associated *charge* for the
7 terminated CSO. However, in this unique situation the participant's charge
8 obligation for the CSO will not be removed, which avoids creating a settlement
9 imbalance for which participants with Capacity Load Obligations would
10 otherwise receive an additional charge.

11

12 **Q: How are these four types of auction-based imbalances incorporated into the**
13 **total FCA costs?**

14 A: The additional charges or rebates associated with individual substitution auction
15 CSO transactions will be added to the total charges for capacity procured in the
16 FCA process to determine the total FCA costs for the auction. This total amount
17 of FCA cost is then apportioned to Capacity Load Obligations using the marginal
18 value allocation.

19

20 **Q: Why are the primary auction MRI-based allocation rates applied to allocate**
21 **auction-based imbalances resulting from the substitution auction?**

22 A: As we have discussed above, the constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of
23 CSOs in the substitution auction are applied to prevent the substitution auction

1 from changing the marginal reliability benefit of capacity (in the system and each
2 capacity zone) that was established in the primary auction. This means that the
3 MRI values that correspond to the primary auction result are the same that apply
4 to the substitution auction result. Accordingly, the market-based costs arising
5 from the substitution auction will be apportioned to Capacity Load Obligations
6 using the same marginal value cost allocation shares as are applied for the
7 primary auction costs.

8

9 **Q: How are the incremental charge adjustments for self-supply CSOs awarded**
10 **in the substitution auction allocated to Capacity Load Obligations?**

11 A: A Sponsored Policy Resource that acquired a CSO in the substitution auction may
12 have designated (prior to the FCA) its capacity to meet a self-supply obligation.
13 A resource that designates its capacity as self-supply foregoes the capacity
14 payment for the designated MW amount, and the Capacity Load Obligation of the
15 participant who contracted for that self-supply is decreased by the same MW
16 amount. As with self-supply designations in the primary auction, electing this
17 treatment in the substitution auction creates a difference between the resource-
18 owner's foregone revenue and the load-serving participant's avoided charges,
19 which, in turn, creates a net FCM settlement imbalance. Under Section
20 III.13.7.5.1.1.5, the self-supply obligations arising from the substitution auction
21 will be treated the same as the self-supply obligations arising from the primary
22 auction. All of the imbalance costs for self-supply obligations arising from the

1 primary auction and substitution auction will be summed together and allocated
2 equally to Capacity Load Obligations.

3

4 **Q: How are the incremental charge adjustments for seasonal variation in CSOs**
5 **awarded to Intermittent Power Resources in the substitution auction**
6 **allocated to Capacity Load Obligations?**

7 A: Intermittent Power Resources may either acquire or shed a CSO in the
8 substitution auction. Obligations awarded in the substitution auction are based on
9 the intermittent resource's summer qualified capacity (consistent with the FCA
10 qualification rules), and after the auction a pro-rated winter period obligation is
11 established for the intermittent resource's winter qualified capacity. In the
12 substitution auction, the seasonal variance in CSO values for intermittent
13 resources creates a settlement imbalance, which can be positive or negative
14 depending on (a) whether the intermittent resource has acquired or shed a CSO
15 and (b) whether the substitution auction clearing price is positive or negative.
16 Under Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6., the credits or charges associated with intermittent
17 resource seasonal variances from both the primary auction and the substitution
18 auction are summed and allocated to Capacity Load Obligations.

19

20 **Q: Does the ISO plan to provide information about the portion of total FCA**
21 **costs that resulted from the substitution auction activity?**

22 A: Yes. The ISO will provide information after the FCA that participants can use to
23 forecast their expected charges associated with the substitution auction, as well as

1 detail about the share of total FCA costs included in the monthly FCM settlements
2 that resulted from the substitution auction.

3

4 **Q: Are there other types of FCA costs not described above that are applicable to**
5 **the substitution auction?**

6 A: No. The other types of FCA costs (namely the costs associated with multi-year
7 rate elections, Hydro-Quebec Interconnection Capability Credits, and specifically-
8 allocated Capacity Transfer Rights) are not applicable to the substitution auction.

9

10 **B. Settlement Treatment of a Terminated CSO Acquired in the**
11 **Substitution Auction**

12

13 **Q: You state above that a participant that acquires a CSO at a negative price**
14 **will not be relieved of its charges in the event the CSO is terminated. Can**
15 **you explain how a resource that acquires a CSO in the substitution auction**
16 **could be terminated?**

17 A: The FCM rules include provisions for terminating the CSO of a resource that has
18 not yet achieved commercial operation (*See* Market Rule 1, Section
19 III.13.3.4A).¹⁷ A CSO acquired in a substitution auction by a non-commercial
20 resource is subject to the same rules governing how and when the CSO may be
21 terminated.

22

¹⁷ The ISO has submitted Tariff revisions to modify the termination rules, which the Commission has not yet accepted. *See ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Participants Committee*, Filing Re CSO Cover Changes, Docket No. ER19-169-000 (filed October 23, 2018). The ISO's proposed revisions in the instant filing are independent of the changes in Docket No. ER19-169-000 and apply regardless of whether those rule changes are accepted.

1 **Q: Why does the ISO propose not to remove the settlement charge associated**
2 **with a CSO awarded at a negative substitution auction clearing price if the**
3 **CSO is later terminated?**

4 A: If the participant that chose to take on the CSO at a negative price was able to
5 “walk away” from their settlement obligation (i.e., to provide the necessary funds
6 to settle the cleared demand bids from existing resources that the participant’s
7 new capacity project replaced), then load-servers would be exposed to additional
8 charges to fund the settlement of these cleared demand bids. Transferring these
9 costs to Capacity Load Obligations would reduce the risk to capacity suppliers of
10 offering at a negative price. A participant could later walk away (in other words,
11 default) on its capacity obligation without incurring the cost associated with
12 acquiring the obligation (i.e., the CSO acquired at a negative price). To prevent
13 incentives for such problematic conduct, the proposed rules leave the cost of the
14 terminated CSO with the participant that voluntarily acquired the obligation in the
15 substitution auction by offering to supply capacity at a negative price.

16

17 **Q: Can you provide a simple numerical example to illustrate how Capacity**
18 **Load Obligations would receive additional charges if CSO acquired at a**
19 **negative price had their settlement obligation removed when terminated?**

20 A: Yes. In a simple example, assume there is one cleared demand bid for 10 MW
21 and one cleared supply offer for 10 MW, and the clearing price set by the supply
22 offer is negative \$2 per kW-month. In each monthly settlement, the substitution
23 auction settlement to the supply offer is a *charge* of \$-20,000 per kW-month (= 10

1 MW acquired x \$-2,000 per MW-month) and the substitution auction settlement
2 to the cleared demand bid is a *payment* of \$20,000 per kW-month (= -10 MW
3 shed x -\$2,000 per MW-month). When both transactions are included in the FCM
4 settlement, there is no residual charge or rebate to Capacity Load Obligations.

5
6 However, if the new sponsored resource's CSO were terminated *and* the
7 settlement charge were removed, then that charge would be removed from the
8 settlement, but the demand bid would still be due its payment of \$20,000 per kW-
9 month. This imbalance would have to be charged to Capacity Load Obligations if
10 the participant was able to "walk away" from the settlement obligation.

11

12 **Q: Specifically, what does it mean to terminate the CSO but leave the settlement**
13 **charge obligation in place?**

14 A: This means that the ISO will remove the resource's CSO (or reduce its CSO for a
15 partial termination) such that it no longer is required to meet the obligations of a
16 capacity resource. However, the settlement charge obligation for the quantity of
17 CSO terminated multiplied by the substitution auction clearing price at which the
18 CSO was acquired will continue to be billed to the participant. This obligation is
19 addressed in Section III.13.3.4A of Market Rule 1.

20

1 **Q: When will the participant with a terminated CSO pay these settlement**
2 **charges?**

3 A: Like all credits and charges associated with the FCA and substitution auction
4 specifically, these obligations are settled in the monthly bills for the duration of
5 the commitment period (the monthly bill occurs after each delivery month).

6

7 **Q: Is the settlement credit associated with a CSO awarded at a positive clearing**
8 **price removed if the CSO is terminated?**

9 A: Yes. The removal of the settlement payment for a CSO acquired at a positive
10 price is the same as applies to a CSO acquired in any other capacity auction (in
11 the other capacity auctions the clearing price cannot be negative). If the CSO is
12 terminated, the participant foregoes the obligation and the payment. The
13 termination results in reduced charges to Capacity Load Obligations, which is
14 appropriate since consumers do not receive the benefit of capacity supply for a
15 terminated CSO.

16

17 **VI. FINANCIAL ASSURANCE**

18

19 **Q: Please summarize the changes to the Financial Assurance rules to**
20 **incorporate activity in the substitution auction.**

21 A: Two changes to the Financial Assurance Policy are being proposed to address
22 capacity obligations acquired or shed in the substitution auction. First, the
23 proposed changes update the collateral requirements that apply to Non-
24 Commercial Capacity participating in the FCA to clarify the rate used to calculate

1 financial assurance for non-commercial resources that acquire a CSO in the
2 substitution auction (Section VII.B). Second, the proposed changes update the
3 collateral requirements that apply to transfers of CSOs to account for substitution
4 auction transfers that have the potential to produce a charge for the participant
5 that acquires or sheds a CSO in the substitution auction (Section VII.F).

6

7 The proposed changes also make a minor addition to the list of consequences of
8 suspension in Section III.3.a, to clarify that suspension of a participant removes
9 its ability to participate in substitution auctions.

10

11 **A. Financial Assurance Requirements for Non-Commercial Capacity**

12

13 **Q: Please describe the Non-Commercial Capacity collateral requirements of the**
14 **FCM Financial Assurance provisions.**

15 **A:** The Non-Commercial Capacity collateral requirements pertain to new capacity
16 projects that are qualified to participate in the FCA and have not yet achieved
17 commercial operation (which is typical for new projects). In concept, financial
18 assurance for new non-commercial projects is intended to provide a financial
19 obligation that will ensure the participant will meet its market obligation. In
20 terms of mechanics, the collateral is posted on a schedule before the FCA and is
21 reset after the auction if the new project acquires a CSO. After the new project
22 receives its qualification determination notification, it must begin satisfying its
23 financial assurance requirement by posting a deposit of \$2 per kW of qualified
24 Non-Commercial Capacity. Just before the FCA, the participant must increase

1 the amount of assurance on deposit to the FCA Starting Price for each MW of
2 qualified capacity. After the FCA is completed, a participant is required to
3 maintain collateral for each MW of Non-Commercial Capacity that acquired a
4 CSO in the FCA. This collateral requirement remains in effect until the project
5 becomes commercial, is subject to increases if the resource is late to deliver, and
6 may be forfeited by the resource (and allocated to Capacity Load Obligations) if
7 the CSO is ultimately terminated.

8

9 **Q: Are the Non-Commercial Capacity collateral requirements applicable to**
10 **resources that are participating in the substitution auction?**

11 A: Yes. A Sponsored Policy Resource must first satisfy all the qualification criteria
12 to participate in the FCA (in addition to meeting the specific eligibility criteria to
13 participate in the substitution auction). If the new sponsored resource is also a
14 non-commercial project, then it must satisfy the Non-Commercial Capacity
15 provisions of the Financial Assurance Policy.

16

17 **Q: What change is being proposed to the Non-Commercial Capacity collateral**
18 **requirements to conform these provisions for the substitution auction?**

19 A: The conforming change is to clarify that the Capacity Clearing Price from the
20 primary auction of the FCA is the rate that will apply for setting the collateral
21 requirement for a CSO obtained by non-commercial resources in the FCA. That
22 is, for each location there will be a single price term (i.e., the primary auction
23 clearing price) for setting the post-FCA collateral requirement for non-

1 commercial projects, irrespective of the “stage” in which the resource acquired its
2 CSO in the FCA.

3

4 **Q: Why will the Non-Commercial Capacity collateral requirement apply the**
5 **primary auction Capacity Clearing Price for CSOs acquired in the**
6 **substitution auction?**

7 A: Without this conforming change, the Financial Assurance Policy would require
8 the use of the substitution auction clearing price for the post-FCA rate used in
9 calculating the collateral required for a CSO acquired in the substitution auction
10 by a non-commercial resource. Applying the primary auction Capacity Clearing
11 Price to all non-commercial resources that acquire a CSO in the FCA will ensure
12 a consistent financial assurance obligation based on the marginal reliability value
13 of capacity established in the primary auction. Furthermore, as we have
14 discussed, the substitution auction clearing price could be zero or negative, which
15 would produce a counter-intuitive result of either requiring no financial assurance
16 or crediting the participant toward its other financial assurance requirements for a
17 CSO acquired in the substitution auction, respectively.

18

19 **B. Financial Assurance Requirements for CSO Transfers**

20

21 **Q: Why do collateral requirements apply when a participant chooses to transfer**
22 **a Capacity Supply Obligation?**

23 A: A participant may transfer its resource’s CSO using a transaction that will result
24 in a settlement charge to the participant. For example, a participant may acquire a
25 CSO in an FCA and shed the CSO through a reconfiguration auction. Assume the

1 participant acquires a CSO in the FCA at a clearing price of \$6 per kW-month.
2 The participant will receive \$6 per kW-month for this obligation, but if the
3 participant later bids to shed that CSO in a reconfiguration auction at a higher
4 price (say \$7 per kW-month), then the participant is subject to a net settlement
5 charge exposure of \$1 per kW-month for the reconfiguration auction transaction.

6
7 Under the Financial Assurance Policy, any transaction to transfer a CSO that
8 could potentially result in a settlement charge is subject to financial assurance
9 requirements, including reconfiguration auctions, CSO bilateral transactions, and
10 Annual Reconfiguration Transactions. Because of the possibility that a
11 participant will accrue a settlement charge through participation in a substitution
12 auction, these same financial assurance requirements are being extended to apply
13 to CSOs transferred through substitution auctions.

14

15 **Q: Under what circumstances will these additional collateral requirements**
16 **apply to transfers through a substitution auction?**

17 A: The “Transfer of CSO” financial assurance requirements will apply to a
18 participant’s supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction if the
19 participant may incur a settlement charge as a result of its offer or bid clearing in
20 the auction. Specifically, before the substitution auction is conducted, a
21 participant must provide sufficient financial assurance to cover the maximum
22 potential charges the participant may incur if its supply offer or demand bid clears
23 in the substitution auction. And then, after the auction is completed, the

1 participant must maintain financial assurance on the offers and bids that were
2 cleared in the auction to cover the settlement charges, if any, associated with its
3 CSO transactions established in the substitution auction. These requirements are
4 addressed in Section VII.F.4 of the Financial Assurance Policy.

5
6 **Q: Please describe when the Transfer of CSO requirements would apply to a**
7 **supply offer for a substitution auction.**

8 A: The circumstances where these provisions apply to a supply offer are
9 straightforward: a participant may choose to include negative-priced segments in
10 its substitution auction supply offer. The negative-priced offer indicates the
11 resource will accept a CSO and be charged to provide its capacity. The potential
12 settlement charge arises directly from the negative offer price, and therefore a
13 financial assurance requirement will be applied to this supply offer.

14
15 **Q: Please explain how the potential charge for a substitution auction supply**
16 **offer that includes negatively priced offer segments is determined.**

17 A: Prior to the substitution auction, each supply offer that includes one or more
18 negative-priced segments (supply offers may contain up to five segments) will be
19 evaluated to determine the maximum potential charge if each segment of the
20 supply offer were cleared in the auction at its offered price.

21
22 Suppose a supply offer included two segments for 10 MW each: one segment
23 offered at negative \$3 per kW-month and the second segment offered at negative

1 \$1 per kW-month. If only the first segment offered at negative \$3 per kW-month
2 clears, the potential charge is \$30,000 per month (= \$-3,000 per MW-month x 10
3 MW). If the second segment offered at negative \$1 per kW-month clears, the
4 potential charge is \$20,000 per month (= \$-1,000 per MW-month x 20 MW). If
5 the second supply offer segment clears, then the first 10 MW segment offered at a
6 lower price also will have cleared in the auction (because it was offered at a lower
7 price); this is why 20 MW are assumed to have cleared in the latter calculation at
8 a higher assumed clearing price of negative \$1 per kW-month. Of these two
9 potential charge amounts (i.e., \$30,000 and \$20,000 per month), the \$30,000
10 amount is larger and, therefore, the participant will be required to provide
11 sufficient financial assurance for the potential charge of \$30,000 per month.

12

13 **Q: Please describe when the Transfer of CSO requirements would apply to a**
14 **demand bid in the substitution auction.**

15 A: The circumstance when a substitution auction demand bid would be subject to a
16 transfer of CSO collateral requirement is more complicated and may be less likely
17 to occur. This condition would only apply to an existing capacity resource that
18 holds a multi-year capacity obligation (i.e., to receive the clearing price from the
19 FCA in which the resource originally acquired the CSO for the duration of the
20 multi-year obligation), which is commonly referred to as a multi-year “rate-lock.”

21

22 A participant would have to provide a demand bid to retire some or all of its
23 resource’s capacity in a substitution auction at a price that is higher than its rate-

1 locked price. Because the resource's rate-locked payment for its CSO was
2 established in a prior FCA (and therefore has no direct relationship to the
3 coincident primary auction clearing price), it is possible that the substitution
4 auction price at which the demand bid to shed this CSO is cleared could exceed
5 the rate-locked price.

6
7 This is a scenario unique to resources with a multi-year rate lock that shed the
8 CSO, since the substitution auction clearing price cannot exceed the primary
9 auction clearing price. Existing resources without a rate-lock obligation cannot be
10 charged a higher price to shed their CSO in the substitution auction than the
11 coincident primary auction clearing price at which they acquired the CSO.

12
13 **Q: Please explain how the potential charge for a substitution auction demand**
14 **bid for an existing resource with a multi-year rate lock is determined.**

15 A: This is determined in a similar fashion to how supply offers are analyzed to
16 evaluate the maximum potential charge exposure. The ISO will evaluate a
17 demand bid to calculate the largest potential charge if one or more segments of
18 the bid are accepted in the substitution auction at the demand bid price. The
19 evaluation will compare the potential demand bid charge (for the amount of the
20 rate-locked CSO) to the rate-locked CSO payments held by the existing resource.

21
22 Using a simplified example, assume a participant has a multi-year CSO obligation
23 with a rate-lock revenue of \$70,000 per month, and the maximum potential charge

1 for the resource's substitution auction demand bid is \$80,000 per month (i.e., the
2 potential charge exceeds the rate-lock revenue). The participant will be required
3 to provide sufficient financial assurance to cover the \$10,000 per month potential
4 net charge for its demand bid.

5
6 **Q: When must participants post their additional collateral required, if any, for**
7 **substitution auction transactions?**

8 A: If applicable, these collateral requirements for substitution auction supply offers
9 and demand bids will be added to a participant's FCM financial assurance
10 requirements beginning on the tenth business day prior to the FCA. The supply
11 offer and demand bid price information is submitted by participants in October
12 prior to the FCA. However, it is not necessary to adjust a participant's collateral
13 requirement for these transactions at this earlier date, which is many months
14 before the auction. Imposing this requirement beginning on the tenth business
15 day before the FCA aligns with the existing timing of when participants must
16 meet the additional collateral requirements for Non-Commercial Capacity.

17
18 **Q: If a participant does not post the collateral required for their substitution**
19 **auction transactions, what are the ramifications?**

20 A: If a participant does not provide the additional amount of financial assurance
21 required for their substitution auction supply offers or demand bids, or is for any
22 other reason in default and fails to cure in the appropriate period, then its
23 substitution auction offers and bids will be removed by the ISO before the FCA.

1 In other words, if a participant is unable to provide adequate financial assurance
2 to cover the potential charges it could accrue in the auction, the participant will be
3 unable to acquire or shed a CSO with offers and bids in the auction.
4

5 **Q: What is the deadline for curing a failure to meet the CSO transfer financial**
6 **assurance requirements?**

7 A: For substitution auction supply offers and demand bids, the Financial Assurance
8 Policy will allow a participant to cure a default before its offers or bids are
9 withdrawn from the auction. The applicable cure period and requirements will be
10 defined by the credit test that the participant has failed (as defined under the
11 existing Financial Assurance Policy rules applicable for each such test). In order
12 for the ISO to complete the FCA auction inputs preparation steps, it is necessary
13 to impose an additional time limit on the cure period, which is at 5:00 p.m. on the
14 second business day prior to the FCA. After this deadline, a participant would no
15 longer be able to cure the default and maintain the supply offer or demand that is
16 subject to these financial assurance requirements. This is the same, final time
17 limit that applies to Non-Commercial Capacity financial assurance requirements.
18

19 **Q: After the substitution auction is finalized, how will a participant's collateral**
20 **requirement for substitution auction offers and bids be adjusted?**

21 A: Like all other established CSO transactions that are subject to these requirements,
22 the amount of financial assurance required for an established substitution auction
23 transaction is updated after the auction. After the auction, the collateral

1 requirement (if any) is set by the as-cleared transaction quantity and clearing
2 price. For example, if a supply offer included negative-priced segments (and
3 therefore had to meet collateral requirements before the FCA), but the substitution
4 auction clearing price is zero or positive, then the collateral requirement for the
5 transaction would be removed from the participant's FCM financial assurance
6 obligation.

7
8 **Q: Are any other aspects of the CSO transfer provisions under the Financial**
9 **Assurance Policy applicable to transfers through the substitution auction?**

10 A: Yes. The existing CSO transfer provisions apply "netting rules" to determine the
11 net value of a participant's future revenues and charges for CSO transactions. In
12 simple terms, the netting rules allow charges that will accrue to the participant to
13 be offset by its credits, in order to determine the net financial assurance
14 requirement (i.e., the amount, if any, by which total CSO charges exceed total
15 CSO credits). The netting calculation is applied to calculate both the collateral
16 requirements for submitted bids and offers before the auction, and the updated
17 requirements for CSO transactions established in the auction. The specific netting
18 treatment of CSO credits and charges for a certain billing period are different
19 depending on how far in the future the billing period will occur. Section VII.F.1
20 paragraphs (a) and (b) define the netting periods.

21
22 The proposed revisions update the netting rules in Section VII.F.4 of the Financial
23 Assurance Policy for substitution auction transactions to take account of the fact

1 that the billing period for substitution auction transactions is beyond the furthest
2 period that is currently contemplated in the CSO transfer provisions. Currently,
3 this financial assurance requirement only applies to transactions for commitment
4 periods as far forward as the period associated with the last-completed FCA (*See*
5 Section VII.F.1 para (b) of the Financial Assurance Policy). However, the
6 substitution auction transaction evaluation, which is proposed with this filing,
7 must include the commitment period associated with the instant FCA in order to
8 appropriately account for potential charges participants may incur within the FCA
9 for their substitution auction supply offers and demand bids. The proposed
10 changes therefore add specificity to account for the fact that (unlike in the case of
11 the remaining transfer provisions addressed in Section VII.F.1) the collateral
12 calculation is being done for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the
13 instant Forward Capacity Action, and so charges arising from the instant FCA
14 must be taken into consideration in calculating the collateral requirement.


15
16 **VII. CONCLUSION**

1 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

2
3 **A:** Yes, this concludes our testimony.

4
5 I declare that the foregoing is true and correct.

6
7 Executed on November 28, 2018.

8
9
10
11 
12 Matthew C. Brewster

13
14 
Christopher Geissler

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2 BEFORE THE

3 FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
4
5

6 ISO New England Inc. and) Docket No. ER19-____-000
7 New England Power Pool)
8

9 PREPARED TESTIMONY OF ALAN MCBRIDE
10 ON BEHALF OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.

11 I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

12
13 Q: Please state your name, position and business address.

14 A: My name is Alan McBride. I am the Director of Transmission Strategy and
15 Services for ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”). My business address is One
16 Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.
17

18 Q: Please describe your responsibilities, work experience and educational
19 background.

20 A: I joined the ISO in June 2006 and for the following four years my primary
21 responsibility was as Project Manager of New Generation Qualification for the
22 Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”).¹ In 2010, I became the Manager, Area
23 Transmission Planning for northern New England, and continued in that position
24 until I was appointed to my current position. I am currently responsible for the

¹ Capitalized terms used but not defined in this testimony are intended to have the meaning given to such terms in the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement and the Participants Agreement. Market Rule 1 is Section III of the Tariff. The ISO New England Open Access Transmission Tariff (the “OATT”) is Section II of the Tariff.

1 oversight of the ISO's interconnection process for new Generating Facilities and
2 Elective Transmission Upgrades. Before joining the ISO, I worked at Dynegy
3 Inc. and then at Calpine Corporation. At both companies, I supported various
4 transmission-related activities associated with the development, interconnection,
5 and commercial operation of merchant generation facilities. Prior to joining
6 Dynegy, I worked at Power Technologies Incorporated (now a division of
7 Siemens Industries), where I conducted various transmission analysis studies,
8 including the system impact studies of several proposed generating facilities. I
9 have 23 years of experience in various aspects of power transmission system
10 analysis and transmission services. I hold a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering
11 from University College Dublin, in Ireland, a Master's degree in Electric Power
12 Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and an M.B.A. degree from
13 Purdue University.

14

15 **Q: What role did you play in the planning-related conforming changes and**
16 **enhancements addressed in this testimony?**

17 A: As a subject matter expert from the ISO's System Planning Department, I
18 contributed to the development and design of the planning-related items that are
19 included in the Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources
20 ("CASPR") conforming changes, which I further describe below.

21

22 **II. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF TESTIMONY**

23

1 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

2 A: The purpose of my testimony is to describe and explain the planning-related
3 changes to the Tariff that the ISO is proposing in order to integrate the CASPR
4 substitution auctions into the overall FCM design and administration.

5
6 **Q: Please provide a high-level overview of the proposed planning-related**
7 **changes for CASPR substitution auctions.**

8 A: As was detailed in the testimony of Matthew C. Brewster and Christopher
9 Geissler (the “Brewster-Geissler Testimony”) included with this filing, during the
10 development and stakeholder consideration of the core CASPR rules,² the ISO
11 identified that the development of some conforming changes and enhancements to
12 the FCM rules would be deferred until later in 2018. The ISO was aware that the
13 planning-related conforming changes would be necessary, but could not complete
14 these changes as part of the core CASPR filing. The proposed changes modify
15 three aspects of the planning-related Tariff provisions, to account for substitution
16 auction demand bids and to make ministerial updates to some of the study
17 requirements:

- 18
19 • Revisions to the transmission transfer capability studies and capacity zone
20 modeling processes that occur annually for each Forward Capacity Auction
21 (“FCA”).

² *ISO New England Inc.*, Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff Related to Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources, Docket ER18-619-000 (filed January 8, 2018); 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (referred to herein as the “core CASPR” rules or filing).

- Revisions to the rules on calculating the Installed Capacity Requirement (“ICR”) for the next FCA.
- Revisions to Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Study assumptions.

A few of these planning-related conforming changes will apply for the thirteenth FCA (“FCA 13”) for the 2022-2023 Capacity Commitment Period, which is scheduled for February 2019. However, the majority of these changes will apply for the FCA auction-administration processes beginning with the fourteenth FCA for the 2023-2024 Capacity Commitment Period, which will commence in March 2019. This is because the relevant studies and FCA parameters that are completed in advance of each FCA have already been finalized for FCA 13.

Q: How is your testimony organized?

A: Following this introductory section, Section III discusses the conforming changes pertaining to the development of the resource adequacy-based parameters for the FCA and transmission studies. The CASPR design introduced a new mechanism for resource retirements (i.e., a demand bid for the substitution auction). Retirements in the substitution auction will be included in the relevant studies consistent with how retirement bids for the primary auction are addressed. The clarification changes ensure the rules are clear that substitution auction retirements are treated in the same manner.

1 **III. CASPR-RELATED REVISIONS FOR RESOURCE ADEQUACY AND**
2 **TRANSMISSION STUDIES**

3 **Q: Please describe the nature of the conforming changes to the processes for**
4 **setting resource adequacy parameters for the FCA.**

5 A: These conforming changes pertain primarily to the capacity zone modeling
6 process that occurs annually for each FCA. The zone modeling process occurs in
7 two-steps: (1) identifying the potential zonal boundaries and the associated
8 transmission transfer capabilities; and (2) using objective criteria to test whether a
9 potential zone meets the trigger to be modeled for the Capacity Commitment
10 Period. The first step is described in Attachment K of the OATT, which
11 addresses the manner in which various transmission planning studies are to be
12 performed. The second step is described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1,
13 which addresses the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement, zonal
14 requirements and other related values for each FCA. Both steps in the zone
15 modeling process require conforming changes to address that there is a new
16 option for existing resources to retire (i.e., the substitution auction).

17
18 The proposed changes also include similar clarifications pertaining to the
19 calculations of the ICR, and other related values, which are also contained in
20 Section III.12 of Market Rule 1. I will refer to these revisions as changes to the
21 rules for the ICR-related values. The ICR calculations only take account of
22 resource retirements after they are certain to occur. There is no certainty that a
23 substitution auction demand bid will result in a retirement until after it is cleared
24 in the substitution auction. The revisions to the rules for the ICR-related values

1 clarify that, for purposes of calculating the ICR-related values, substitution
2 auction demand bids are removed from the existing capacity value only after they
3 have cleared.

4
5 Similar to the revisions to the rules for the ICR-related values, the proposed
6 CASPR conforming changes include clarifications to the rules addressing the
7 assumptions that go into the Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission
8 Studies, contained in Attachment K of the OATT. These revisions also specify
9 that these studies only consider retirements through the substitution auction once
10 the demand bid has cleared in the auction.

11
12 The proposed revisions also include assorted technical and ministerial corrections
13 in Attachment K and Section III.12.

14

15 **Q: Please provide an overview of the timeline and activities involved in**
16 **establishing the resource adequacy parameters.**

17 A: The activities related to the capacity zone modeling process and preparing the
18 resource adequacy parameters for the FCA occur over many months, beginning as
19 early as 15 months before the FCA. Pursuant to Section 14 of Attachment K of
20 the OATT, the ISO uses information about certified transmission project in-
21 service dates and the prior FCA results to begin conducting the transmission
22 transfer capability studies and identifying potential zonal boundaries. The
23 transfer capabilities and potential zones identified at this stage are then evaluated

1 further using the retirement bids and new resource proposals submitted, typically,
2 during March and April. The ISO's assessment of potential zones and
3 stakeholder review are typically concluded by April. If a new capacity zone that
4 has never before been identified for the FCM is identified, the ISO files this
5 information with the Commission.

6
7 After the potential capacity zones are finalized in the April timeframe, the ISO
8 begins the process of testing whether the potential capacity zones meet the
9 objective trigger criteria to be modeled for the Capacity Commitment Period. The
10 objective criteria test whether potential import-constrained zones may have
11 insufficient existing capacity after accounting for capacity retirements and the
12 largest generating station loss, and whether potential export-constrained resources
13 may have a surplus of capacity with existing and proposed new resources.

14
15 Once the capacity zones that will be modeled in the auction for the Capacity
16 Commitment Period are finalized, the ICR and ICR-related values are calculated
17 (e.g., Local Sourcing Requirements, Maximum Capacity Limits, and Marginal
18 Reliability Impact-based demand curve parameters). The development of
19 capacity zones and the ICR-related values (and the review of these parameters
20 with stakeholders) is generally concluded by October preceding the FCA. The
21 final capacity zones and ICR-related values are filed with the Commission by
22 November, before the FCA is held the following February.

23

1 **Q: Turning now to the capacity zone modeling rules, please provide an overview**
2 **of how these rules currently account for capacity retirements.**

3 A: Section 14 of Attachment K to the OATT addresses the annual assessment of
4 transmission transfer capability and interface boundaries that is performed early in
5 the qualification process for the next FCA. Section 14 currently indicates that the
6 ISO’s annual assessment of transfer capabilities and interface boundaries will
7 model as out-of-service all resources associated with non-price retirements (an
8 out-of-date reference to a form of retirement that is no longer permitted under the
9 FCM rules) and permanent de-list bids from the FCM.

10

11 **Q: What changes are being proposed to account for retirements through the**
12 **substitution auction?**

13 A: First, the current language is being updated to remove the reference to “Non-Price
14 Retirement Requests” and replace it with the reference to “Retirement De-List
15 Bids.” This ensures that the transfer capabilities and potential capacity zone
16 boundary determinations currently take account of potential capacity retirements
17 for the Capacity Commitment Period submitted using Retirement De-List Bids
18 and Permanent De-List Bids. In addition, the proposed revisions take account of
19 potential retirements through the substitution auction. A substitution auction
20 demand bid similarly indicates the potential for an existing resource to retire its
21 capacity, although at a different stage of the FCA (i.e., in the substitution auction,
22 rather than in the primary auction). However, the mere fact that these retirements
23 are taking place through a different phase of the FCA is not reason to treat them

1 differently than retirements that take place through the primary auction, and
2 failing to do so could potentially produce unreliable outcomes.

3

4 **Q: Are changes being proposed to the manner in which potential retirements**
5 **are accounted for in the transmission transfer capability studies?**

6 A: Yes. The current rules require that the ISO model as out-of-service *any* existing
7 capacity associated with the various types of de-list bids considered in these
8 studies, regardless of the likelihood that the capacity will actually be removed or
9 whether the removal will have an impact on transfer capability or zonal boundary
10 determinations. The ISO is proposing to model capacity as out-of-service *only if*
11 it is considered likely the capacity will actually be removed in the upcoming FCA
12 and *only if* the removal of that capacity would have an impact on transfer
13 capabilities (and therefore the zonal boundary determinations). This modification
14 is primarily to ensure that the calculated transfer capabilities and capacity zones
15 best match the expected conditions that will be relevant for the commitment
16 period. The modification also avoids modeling and analysis work that is not
17 necessary.

18

19 **Q: How will the ISO assess whether a retirement is likely, and whether its**
20 **removal would have an impact on transfer capabilities and zonal boundary**
21 **determinations?**

22 A: At the time the ISO is performing these studies, participants will not yet have
23 signaled through the formal qualification process whether they intend to

1 “unconditionally” retire a resource, or whether instead there is a clearing price at
2 which they would accept a CSO and remain in the market. Nevertheless, the
3 participant may have communicated to the ISO the certainty that they will
4 unconditionally retire, such as, for example, in the case of the expiration of a
5 necessary operating license that will not be renewed. The ISO will evaluate such
6 information in determining the likelihood of a resource retirement.

7
8 If it is determined that a resource is likely to retire, the ISO will evaluate whether
9 the resource is one that has been identified in a previous transfer assessment as
10 having an impact on the calculation of a given transfer capability. If this is the
11 case, the ISO will conduct a transfer capability assessment with the retiring
12 resource out-of-service to determine an updated transfer capability to be used in
13 the FCM studies.

14
15 **Q: How will stakeholders be aware of the ISO’s determination regarding which**
16 **potential resource retirements will be modeled as out-of-service when**
17 **establishing the interface transfer capabilities?**

18 A: The process of developing the interface transfer capabilities is public, and the
19 results are brought through the stakeholder process and filed with the Commission
20 each year in advance of the FCA. Although resource-specific information is not
21 typically public, participants have access to reports of aggregate retirement bid
22 quantities as well as resource-specific information about certain de-list bids that
23 are evaluated for reliability needs before the FCA. Stakeholders will generally be

1 aware of the resources that potentially may be modeled and the ISO will explain
2 its reasoning for modeling the subset of resources that are likely to impact transfer
3 capabilities as out-of-service for these studies.

4

5 **Q: Turning now to the revisions in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1, please**
6 **describe the capacity zone modeling trigger criteria for import-constrained**
7 **capacity zones.**

8 A: The trigger criteria to model an import-constrained capacity zone tests whether,
9 after removing the largest single generating station from the zone as well as any
10 existing capacity associated with retirement bids, the remaining existing capacity
11 in the area will exceed a calculation of the line-line second contingency
12 Transmission Security Analysis Requirement for the zone. An import-constrained
13 zone will be separately modeled if existing capacity net of all potential resource
14 retirements is not sufficient to meet this criterion. Otherwise, the area is included
15 in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

16

17 **Q: How will potential retirements in the substitution auction be incorporated**
18 **into the import-constrained capacity zone modeling trigger criteria?**

19 A: Under Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1, an existing resource that submits a
20 substitution auction demand bid will be modeled as out-of-service when testing
21 whether a potential import-constrained capacity zone meets the trigger condition
22 to be modeled for the Capacity Commitment Period.

23

1 **Q: Why is it appropriate to model potential retirements through the substitution**
2 **auction as out-of-service for the import-constrained capacity zone trigger**
3 **condition?**

4 A: The proposed changes simply conform the existing modeling criteria to account
5 for potential retirements through the substitution auction; there is no change to the
6 standards that apply for this modeling criteria. A resource retirement occurring in
7 the substitution auction has the same effect on the relative surplus in the capacity
8 zone as a retirement in the primary auction, and it is therefore appropriate to treat
9 them in the same manner for purposes of determining the impact of the potential
10 retirement on the import-constrained zone.

11

12 **Q: Does including potential substitution auction retirements in determining**
13 **which capacity zones to model help ensure competitive capacity market**
14 **prices?**

15 A: Yes. Including potential substitution auction retirements to determine the
16 appropriate capacity zone model will help ensure that competitive capacity prices
17 are maintained despite the more complex capacity market design that CASPR
18 creates.

19

20 The introduction of substitution auctions should avoid, to all extent possible,
21 affecting primary auction clearing prices in the instant auction and subsequent
22 auctions. The constraints governing inter-zonal transfers of capacity (specifically,
23 the transfer of the Capacity Supply Obligation itself) in the substitution auction

1 help to achieve this objective. The constraints on inter-zonal transfers of CSOs
2 restrict the movement of capacity into or out of constrained zones in the
3 substitution auction, so that they occur only to the extent there is no net impact on
4 system reliability (as measured by the capacity's Marginal Reliability Impact
5 value in each zone). If the movement of CSOs to different locations in the system
6 were not restricted in this way in the substitution auction, it is possible that these
7 exchanges could alter the relative reliability value of capacity in different zones
8 and thereby impact primary auction prices in future auctions. In order to apply
9 the intended limits on inter-zonal transfers of CSOs in the substitution auction, the
10 capacity zones that best-match the *potential* for resource retirements (and new
11 entry) that may occur in the auction must be modeled in the FCA. Therefore, it is
12 important to account for potential retirements through the substitution auction
13 when modeling the relevant capacity zones.

14
15 **Q: Turning now to the third set of changes—i.e., to the rules addressing the**
16 **calculation of the ICR-related values—are potential resource retirements in**
17 **the substitution auction incorporated into the ICR-related values**
18 **calculations?**

19 **A:** No. Section III.12.7.2 addresses the resource modeling assumptions that are
20 utilized in calculating the ICR and related resource adequacy values. The current
21 rules exclude from these assumptions any capacity that has been permanently de-
22 listed (from the capacity market) or retired altogether in a prior FCA,³ as well as

³ Market Rule 1, Section III.12.7.2(f).

1 capacity that has made an election to unconditionally retire in the upcoming
2 FCA.⁴ The proposed changes do not propose to change this treatment, but instead
3 simply update the assumptions by excluding capacity that has retired through the
4 substitution auction.

5
6 **Q: Turning back to Attachment K, are potential resource retirements in the**
7 **substitution auction incorporated into the Needs Assessments and Public**
8 **Policy Transmission Studies?**

9 A: No. Similar to the assumptions for the ICR-related values calculations, Needs
10 Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Studies in Attachment K to the
11 OATT only incorporate information about resource retirements that are certain to
12 occur. Therefore, these studies take account of all submitted Retirement De-List
13 Bids and Permanent De-List Bids because, under the FCM rules applicable for
14 retirements, all Retirement De-List Bids and Permanent De-List Bids will
15 continue to apply for future auctions until the bid clears and the resource is
16 retired. In contrast, the substitution auction demand bids do not have a similar
17 permanence; there is no obligation for the participant to re-submit the demand bid
18 for future FCAs, and therefore no certainty that the resource will retire. For
19 purposes of Needs Assessments and Public Policy Transmission Studies, the
20 proposed changes only exclude resources subject to a demand bid that has cleared
21 in a prior substitution auction.

22

⁴ Market Rule 1, Section III.12.7.2(g).

1 The revision to Section 4.1 of Attachment K regarding Needs Assessments adds
2 reference to the indicated treatment of substitution auction demand bids.

3

4 Additionally, in performing its review of Attachment K provisions in support of
5 the CASPR conforming changes effort, the ISO noted the sentence regarding the
6 treatment of retiring resources reflected in Section 4.1 had been inadvertently
7 omitted from Section 4A(3), which mimics Section 4.1. As part of this effort, the
8 ISO is truing-up Section 4A(3) so that it aligns with Section 4.1 by adding the
9 sentence providing the conditions under which retiring and permanently de-listed
10 resources will be modeled out of service for such studies.

11

12 **Q: Do any of the studies discussed in this testimony require conforming changes**
13 **to address how new Sponsored Policy Resources that may acquire (or have**
14 **previously acquired) a CSO in a substitution auction are reflected in these**
15 **studies?**

16 A: No, new Sponsored Policy Resources are required to meet the general FCA
17 qualification requirements applicable to new capacity projects. As such, new
18 sponsored resources are treated in the same manner as all other new capacity
19 resources for purposes of these studies. After a Sponsored Policy Resource has
20 acquired a CSO in the substitution auction, its capacity will be qualified as
21 existing for subsequent auctions and will be treated in a manner that is
22 comparable to all other existing capacity resources for purpose of the above-
23 mentioned studies going-forward.

24

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2
3 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

4 **A: Yes.**

5
6
7 I declare that the foregoing is true and correct.

8
9 Executed on November 28, 2018.

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Alan McBride

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