March 31, 2022

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

Re: Revisions to ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff of Buyer-Side Market Power Review and Mitigation Reforms, Docket No. ER22-000

Dear Secretary Bose:

Pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act,1 ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”), joined by the New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) Participants Committee (together, the “Filing Parties”),2 hereby electronically submits revisions to the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.3 The Filing Parties are proposing to eliminate New England’s current minimum offer price rule (“MOPR”) in the Forward Capacity Market, over a two-year period. This is accomplished by permitting a substantial quantity of state-sponsored policy resources to enter the market without buyer-side market power mitigation review during the next two Forward Capacity Auctions (“FCAs”) 17 and 18. Thereafter, beginning with FCA 19, the proposal eliminates the MOPR in full and replaces it with a reformed buyer-side market

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1 16 U.S.C. § 824d.
2 Under New England's Regional Transmission Organization arrangements, the rights to make this filing of revisions to the Tariff under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act belong to the ISO. NEPOOL, which pursuant to the Participants Agreement provides the sole Participant Processes for advisory voting on ISO matters, supported the revisions reflected in this filing and, accordingly, joins in this Section 205 filing.
3 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined in this filing have the meanings ascribed thereto in the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, and the Participants Agreement. Market Rule 1 is Section III of the Tariff. Appendix A to Market Rule 1 contains the Tariff provisions on Market Monitoring, Reporting and Market Power Mitigation.
power mitigation review construct. The revisions proposed in this filing are supported by the testimonies of Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada and Ryan McCarthy, which are sponsored solely by the ISO.4

In this filing, the ISO is proposing two sets of revisions to the Tariff with two separate effective dates as part of a single Section 205 filing. The first set of revisions concerns the transition mechanism for FCA 17 and FCA 18 (“Transition Mechanism”). The second set of revisions concerns the reforms to the Tariff’s buyer-side market power review and mitigation rules for FCA 19 (“BSMPR Reforms”). As addressed in Section XI of this transmittal letter, the ISO respectfully requests an effective date of May 30, 2022 for the Transition Mechanism revisions and an effective date of March 1, 2024 for the BSMPR Reforms revisions. The ISO further respectfully requests that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”) issue an order accepting both sets of Tariff revisions no later than 60 days from the date of this filing.

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE FILING PARTIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

The ISO is the private, non-profit entity that serves as the Regional Transmission Organization for New England. The ISO operates the New England bulk power system and administers New England’s organized wholesale electricity market pursuant to the Tariff and the Transmission Operating Agreement with the New England Participating Transmission Owners. In its capacity as a Regional Transmission Organization, the ISO has the responsibility to protect the short-term reliability of the New England Control Area and to operate the system according to reliability standards established by the Northeast Power Coordinating Council and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

The signatories to the New England Power Pool Agreement, which was first entered into in 1971, are referred to collectively as “NEPOOL.” Currently, there are more than 510 signatories, which are referred to either as “members” or “Participants.” They include all of the electric utilities rendering or receiving services under the Tariff, as well as independent power generators, marketers, load aggregators, brokers, consumer-owned utility systems, demand response providers (including owners of distributed generation and aggregators of such generation), developers, end users, and a merchant transmission provider. Pursuant to revised governance provisions the Commission accepted in ISO New England Inc., et al., 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 (2004), the Participants act through the NEPOOL Participants Committee. Section 6.1 of the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement and Section 8.1.3(c) of the Participants Agreement authorize the NEPOOL Participants Committee to represent NEPOOL in proceedings before the Commission. Through the Commission-approved voting structures, NEPOOL is the vehicle

4 Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada is the ISO’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. Ryan McCarthy is the Lead Risk Analyst in the ISO’s Market Development Department. Dr. Chadalavada’s testimony is referred to herein as the “Chadalavada Testimony.” Mr. McCarthy’s testimony addressing the proposed Transition Mechanism Tariff revisions is referred to herein as the “McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony.” Mr. McCarthy’s testimony addressing the proposed BSMPR Reforms Tariff revisions is referred to herein as the “McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony.”
through which stakeholders with business interests in New England are able to provide informed input and advice to the ISO.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) NEPOOL achieves an affirmative institutional position via a supermajority vote of the NEPOOL Participants Committee on proposed Tariff revisions but not on any specific rationale or argument in support of a market rule proposal. NEPOOL joins in this filing given the nearly 70 percent Vote in favor by the Participants Committee of the Tariff revisions filed herein. It is anticipated that NEPOOL members (individually and/or collectively) may file comments explaining their specific rationale on why they support the jointly filed MOPR reform proposal. Additional information concerning NEPOOL’s position and the stakeholder process that resulted in NEPOOL supporting the gradual elimination and replacement of the MOPR will be forthcoming in supplemental comments.

\(^6\) Due to the joint nature of this filing, the Filing Parties respectfully request a waiver of Section 385.203(b)(3) of the Commission’s regulations to allow more than two persons on the service list.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The proposed BSMPR Reforms and Transition Mechanism are submitted pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, which “gives a utility the right to file rates and terms for services rendered with its assets.” The Commission “plays ‘an essentially passive and reactive’ role” whereby it “can reject [a filing] only if it finds that the changes proposed by the public utility are not ‘just and reasonable.’” The Commission limits this inquiry “into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable – and [this inquiry does not] extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative rate designs.” The revisions filed herein “need not be the only reasonable methodology, or even the most accurate.” As a result, even if an intervenor or the Commission develops an alternate proposal, the Commission must accept this Section 205 filing if it is just and reasonable.

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout much of the history of the ISO’s Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”), the New England region has struggled with how to accommodate into the market new generation resources that receive substantial financial support through state governmental programs aimed at reducing carbon emissions. The touchstone market mechanism at issue in this struggle is the minimum offer price rule, or MOPR. The MOPR’s purpose is to evaluate each offer in the Forward Capacity Auction from a new capacity resource to assess whether it reflects revenues from sources outside the market, and to ignore those revenues, thus forcing the new resource to offer at a higher price. The rationale for the rule is that those so-called “out of market” revenues may lower the clearing price in the auction to the benefit of those who pay the costs for that capacity. In short: pay a small amount to “subsidize” the cost of the new resource, with the goal

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7 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
8 Id. at 10 (quoting City of Winnfield v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
9 Id. at 9.
10 Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also ISO New England Inc., 114 FERC ¶ 61,315 at P 33 and n.35 (2006) (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. FERC, 832 F.2d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 1987) and Bethany at 1136).
11 Oxy USA, Inc. v. FERC, 64 F.3d 679, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
12 Cf. Southern California Edison Co., 73 FERC ¶ 61,219 at 61,608 n.73 (1995) (“Having found the Plan to be just and reasonable, there is no need to consider in any detail the alternative plans proposed by the Joint Protesters.”) (citing Bethany at 1136).
13 These resources are referred to generally in this filing as state-sponsored resources or state-sponsored policy resources.
of receiving a capacity cost reduction that covers the cost of the subsidy and then some. This strategy is referred to as exercising buyer-side market power.

The MOPR is ultimately at the center of a confounding challenge—how to protect the market, and more particularly the investors in the generation resources that provide capacity in the markets and the consumers that pay for that capacity, from two competing inefficiencies. On the one hand is the inefficiency that can result when state-sponsored resources are permitted entry into the Forward Capacity Market without application of the MOPR. In this case, their below-cost capacity offers may reduce the clearing prices in the Forward Capacity Auction, threatening the ability of investors (and specifically, the investors in resources that do not receive state support) to recover their costs through participation in the market, leading those investors to either raise their offer prices or withdraw their capacity from the market, both actions that can ultimately cause consumers to pay increased costs for capacity.

On the other hand is the inefficiency that results when the MOPR is employed to “protect the capacity market” from the impact of state-sponsored resources. In this case, below-cost offers are mitigated and the sponsored resources are priced out of entering the market. However, the state decarbonization policies that fund the construction of these resources mean they will be built anyway, at expense to consumers. As a result, consumers pay for additional capacity as the region continues to meet its resource adequacy objectives solely with “in-market” resources in the Forward Capacity Market, ignoring the reliability contribution of the state-sponsored resources that are excluded from market participation. And while there is no evidence that this potential inefficiency has harmed consumers to date, that result is clearly looming. The ISO has referred to this problem in the past as the “inefficient overbuild” problem.14

The story of the Forward Capacity Market is, in some respects, the story of the region’s attempt at reconciling these two inefficiencies, first with a relatively straightforward exemption from the MOPR for a limited quantity of state-sponsored resources, and subsequently with a more sophisticated mechanism known as Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources, or “CASPR.” By the ISO’s own admission, both mechanisms leaned toward protecting the FCM from the inefficiencies that may ensue from the unmitigated entry of state-sponsored resources. Thus, both attempts maintained the MOPR in its original form, and were designed to permit entry of state-sponsored resources only to the extent doing so would not impact clearing prices in the Forward Capacity Auction.15 Perhaps as a result, neither mechanism has been viewed within the region as being particularly successful in accommodating state-sponsored resource entry into the market.

The region is now at a crossroads. New England’s generation mix is poised to change dramatically. The states have substantially increased their decarbonization goals, with

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14 The ISO’s previous discussions on the inefficient overbuild problem are addressed in Section VI.A, infra, as well as in the McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 21–22.

15 The original exemption for state-sponsored resources and CASPR are discussed in Section VI.A, infra.
corresponding expansion of state clean energy procurement targets and renewable portfolio standards. The ISO interconnection queue—one significant measure of new resource interest in New England—is dominated by renewable and clean-energy resources. All new resources that cleared in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction were renewable or clean.16

Application of the MOPR going forward, however, will likely exclude large amounts of state-sponsored capacity from entering the Forward Capacity Market, and CASPR has not proven to date that it will facilitate their entry. As these resources will ultimately be built regardless to achieve the region’s decarbonization goals, the inefficient overbuild problem will grow and ultimately threatens to overwhelm the capacity market—outweighing the efficiency gains that may be obtained from application of the MOPR to state-sponsored resources.

Several New England state policymakers and federal regulators have made it clear: the MOPR must go or be overhauled. As the New England States Committee on Electricity (“NESCOE”) recently put it in comments filed with the Commission: “The MOPR impedes state-led investments in clean energy from participating in the Forward Capacity Market (‘FCM’), resulting in these investments not being counted toward ISO-NE’s resource adequacy requirements. This effectively creates a double payment for consumers as has been acknowledged in various Commission proceedings.”17 Chairman Glick and Commissioner Clements have been more direct: “the [ISO-NE] MOPR appears to act as a barrier to competition, insulating incumbent generators from having to compete with certain new resources that may be able to provide capacity at lower cost. Such overbroad barriers are the antithesis of market competition, in that they divorce capacity market clearing prices from the actual net going forward costs of would-be capacity suppliers and serve only to prop up capacity prices, protect incumbent generators, and increase the costs of state policies.”18

This filing meets that demand. In a proposal that is supported by a supermajority of New England stakeholders, the MOPR will be eliminated and replaced with a more nuanced mechanism for evaluating new resource capacity market offers for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power. The nuance is achieved in two ways. First, the benchmark Offer Review Trigger Price mechanism at the heart of the MOPR (and the cause for much ire) is removed, and is replaced by a resource-specific review process that, of central importance, permits a capacity supplier the opportunity to demonstrate that it lacks an incentive to exercise buyer-side market power. Second, a number of exemptions from buyer-side market power review are proposed. Most significantly, the new mechanism exempts from buyer-side market power review all state-sponsored clean or renewable resources, employing a broad definition of such resources that is intended to remain current as state decarbonization policies continue to

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16 The states’ decarbonization policies are discussed in Section V, infra.


18 Order Accepting Informational Filing and Directing Modification, 178 FERC ¶ 61,050 (2022), Glick-Clements Concurrence at P 4 (internal quotations omitted).
The proposal also contains exemptions for offers from merchant generation and other classes of resources that are not in a strong position to exercise buyer-side market power. As noted above, the new mechanism is referred to herein as the BSMPR Reforms, and sometimes as the “buyer-side mitigation reforms.”

This proposal is likely to facilitate entry into the Forward Capacity Market of substantial amounts of capacity from state-sponsored resources over the next several decades, reversing the potential for an inefficient overbuild of the region’s capacity. Nevertheless, it also has the potential to come at a cost—one that the ISO, as the region’s only independent entity responsible for the reliability of the bulk power system, must take steps to prevent. Specifically, an immediate elimination of the MOPR threatens to cause the retirement of existing capacity resources upon which the region relies to maintain reliability. Those retirements could occur before the state-sponsored resources are commercially available and able to replace the capacity of the retiring resources, and before the region has had time to develop the tools to properly assess and account for the relative reliability contributions of the exiting and entering resources. These risks could exacerbate existing energy adequacy concerns in New England.

To prevent this result, the Filing Parties are proposing a two-year, graduated transition to the MOPR’s elimination and replacement with the BSMPR Reforms. The proposal, referred to herein as the Transition Mechanism, was developed by stakeholders during the course of the NEPOOL stakeholder process in consultation with the ISO and the New England states. It calls for the MOPR and the current CASPR mechanism to remain in place for the next two Forward Capacity Auction cycles, but exempts from the MOPR over the course of these auctions as much as 700 MW of state-sponsored resources.20

To be clear, as filed herein, the MOPR’s elimination and replacement with the BSMPR Reforms go into effect on March 1, 2024, starting with FCA 19. The Tariff revisions that

19 This is achieved using an updated definition of “Sponsored Policy Resource,” the term used to establish which resources are permitted to qualify as new supply for participation in the CASPR substitution auction. See infra, Section VII.C.2. As explained further below, the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition refers to “a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal.” For ease of reference, this transmittal letter will at times refer to such standards and goals collectively as a “decarbonization program” or “decarbonization mandate.” Similarly, the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition refers to “renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource[s].” For ease of reference, this transmittal letter will at times refer to such resources as either “renewable,” “clean,” or “non-emitting” resources.

20 As Dr. Chadalavada explains in his supporting testimony, this 700 MW represents the qualified capacity of state-sponsored resources. The total nameplate (or “installed”) capacity of new state-sponsored resources that may avail themselves of the 700 MW (qualified capacity) exemption will depend on the particular technology mix that enters, as different renewable energy resources have different qualified capacity values. Using an approximate value of 35 percent for illustration, 700 MW of qualified capacity would correspond to 2,000 MW of installed capacity. Chadalavada Testimony at 30–31.
support the graduated elimination of the MOPR through the transition mechanism apply only for the next two auction cycles—FCA 17 and FCA 18.

As the Filing Parties demonstrate in this filing, the combined proposal of the BSMPR Reforms and the Transition Mechanism are a just and reasonable means to remove the barriers to the entry of state-sponsored resources inherent in the current MOPR. Together, they achieve a reasonable balancing of investor and consumer interests, by minimizing the potential over time for an inefficient overbuild of capacity while providing the necessary time for a more orderly transition of the region’s resource mix that will protect both reliability and the interests of the investors in those resources.

Section IV of this transmittal letter provides an overview of the ISO’s current MOPR. Section V discusses the significant steps the New England states are taking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, focusing in particular on the aggressive expansion of decarbonization policies over the last four years since CASPR was implemented, and the impact these policies will have on the region’s resource mix over the coming decades. Section VI then addresses the region’s efforts at permitting state-sponsored resources entry into the Forward Capacity Market and provides the justification for the BSMPR Reforms and the Transition Mechanism, and is followed in Sections VII and VIII with a more detailed explanation of both aspects of the Filing Parties’ proposal. Additional conforming and ancillary changes are then addressed in Section IX.

IV. OVERVIEW OF NEW ENGLAND’S CURRENT BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER REVIEW AND MITIGATION RULES

For almost fifteen years, the ISO has run New England’s Forward Capacity Market, which procures capacity three years in advance of when a participating resource must provide its capacity and does so for the purpose of ensuring resource adequacy in the region. The FCM is designed to ensure that resource developers are able to recover enough money in the New England markets to make it financially worth their while to build a resource in New England when the region requires new capacity to meet its resource adequacy needs. As a market-based mechanism, the FCM relies on price signals to induce economically efficient entry, retention, and exit of resources to meet the region’s forecasted reliability requirements.\(^\text{21}\) To protect these price signals, the FCM includes mechanisms to identify and mitigate potential exercises of market power by market participants on both the supply and the demand, i.e., buyer side, of the market.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{21}\) *ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm.*, 155 FERC ¶ 61,023 at P 23 (2016) ("RTR Remand Order") ("The Commission has sought to ensure that capacity prices are at a just and reasonable level, sufficient to incent economically-efficient existing resources to stay in the capacity market and new resources to enter, so as to enable ISO-NE to meet its reliability requirements.").

\(^{22}\) *See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC*, 7 F.4th 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ("[T]he Commission’s market based approach is consistent with the Federal Power Act’s requirement of ‘just and reasonable’ rates, reasoning that, in a ‘competitive market, where neither buyer nor seller has significant market
Because demand in the FCM is administratively determined, exercises of buyer-side market power do not occur through the manipulation of the demand side of the market. Load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations, the buyers in the FCM, cannot simply withhold demand in order to drive down clearing prices. Instead, load serving entities or other entities representing the interests of load (collectively, “load-side interests”) exercise buyer-side market power on the supply side of the market. To accomplish this, a load-side interest would promote the entry of new capacity into the FCM as a way of increasing supply so that clearing prices fall below a competitive level. This is primarily accomplished by supporting a new resource with revenues from outside of competitive markets (“out-of-market revenues”) so that the new resource can offer its capacity in the FCA at a price that is not sufficient to cover the resource’s going forward costs (a “below-cost offer”). By supporting the new resource with out-of-market revenues, the load-side interest enables the resource to make a below-cost offer that has a better chance of clearing the auction, thereby allowing the resource to enter the market and reduce the auction’s clearing price.  

Two different mechanisms have been used in the FCM to address potential exercises of buyer-side market power, both of which have focused on out-of-market revenues provided to new capacity. The first mechanism, which was adopted as part of the settlement agreement that instituted the FCM, was the Alternative Price Rule (“APR”). The APR was intended to mitigate buyer-side market power by making a post-auction price adjustment, when certain conditions were met, that would raise the capacity clearing price to the lesser of either the cost of new entry (“CONE”) or the price at which the last new capacity resource withdrew from the auction minus $0.01. When the APR was in place, the conditions required for the price adjustment never triggered, and the mechanism was ultimately replaced by the mechanism in place today: the MOPR.  

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23 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 8–9. The Commission has explained, “Entities with [buyer-side market power] can artificially lower the capacity price, sometimes substantially, by subsidizing new investment that is then offered into the market at prices below its full entry costs. The result is that new resources enter the market even though the market clearing price is lower than their true cost of entry. The cost of the subsidized new resource is higher than the market price, which on first impression would seem to be financially harmful to buyers. But buyers as a whole may benefit from the subsidized resource because the lower market price may reduce the total bill for acquiring existing capacity, and this bill reduction may outweigh the net cost of the new resource.” ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., 135 FERC ¶ 61,029 at P 158 (2011) (“APR Rejection Order”), clarif. and r‘hg granted in part, denied in part, 138 FERC ¶ 61,027 (2012) (“APR Rejection Rehearing Order”).  


25 The Commission described the APR as “a market power mitigation rule intended to discourage buyers who have the incentive and ability to suppress market clearing prices below a competitive level from doing so.” APR Rejection Order at P 58. When the ISO and NEPOOL proposed revisions to the
The MOPR imposes offer floor prices on all new capacity resources, referred to in the Tariff as New Resource Offer Floor Prices.\(^{26}\) As a first step in calculating these offer floor prices, the MOPR employs technology-specific benchmark prices—known as Offer Review Trigger Prices (“ORTPs”).\(^{27}\) ORTPs are intended to reflect the competitive cost of new entry, net of the competitive market revenues a resource would be expected to receive (for example, revenues from the ISO’s energy and ancillary markets) for each technology type. An ORTP is essentially a break-even price that is calculated assuming representative capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues, operating costs, depreciation, taxes, and discount rate without consideration of out-of-market revenues. When a new resource intends to offer its capacity into the FCA at a price that either equals or exceeds the ORTP for its technology type, the ORTP becomes the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price.\(^{28}\) In this way, ORTPs are used to screen out presumptively below-cost offers from new capacity resources.

New resources may request to offer their capacity in the FCA at a price lower than the applicable ORTP. In such cases, the Project Sponsor for the new resource will submit the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity and the resource’s financial information in the form of cost workbooks to support that request.\(^{29}\) The Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”) will review the requested offer price and the resource’s workbooks to determine whether the requested offer price constitutes a below-cost offer (specifically, whether the offer reflects out-of-market revenues). The IMM accomplishes this by using the information from the workbooks to calculate the break-even contribution the resource needs from FCM revenues and does so using the same methodology used to calculate ORTPs.\(^{30}\)

As it does when calculating ORTPs, the IMM will exclude from its resource-specific break-even contribution calculation any out-of-market revenues and will adjust any values from the workbooks that do not represent market-based values. For example, the IMM will replace any cash flows that are supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or cost recovery mechanism with estimates of energy market revenues.\(^{31}\) Pursuant to the Tariff’s definition of out-of-market revenues, not all revenues from outside of the ISO’s energy and ancillary markets are considered “out-of-market” for the purpose of the IMM’s analysis. The Tariff defines “out-of-market revenues” as “any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England APR, the Commission rejected the proposal, ultimately leading to the ISO’s adoption of a MOPR. See New England Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 757 F.3d 283, 288–89 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (summarizing complex procedural history behind Commission’s order to ISO “to develop a minimum-offer price rule (‘MOPR’ or ‘offer-floor mitigation’) specific to resources’ asset class”).

\(^{26}\) The MOPR is contained in Section III.A.21 of Appendix A to Market Rule 1.

\(^{27}\) McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 10.

\(^{28}\) Id. at 10–11.

\(^{29}\) Id. at 11–12.

\(^{30}\) Id. at 12.

\(^{31}\) Id. at 12–13.
Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner.”

32 Notably, this definition excludes Class I Renewable Energy Credits (“RECs”), which are tradable throughout New England and available to all resources of the same physical type. 33 The Tariff’s “out-of-market revenues” definition also explicitly excludes “[e]xpected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the [FCM].” 34

The IMM’s new resource offer review results in what the Tariff refers to as a resource-specific capacity price estimate. If the capacity price estimate is consistent with the new resource’s requested offer price, then the requested offer price becomes the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. If the capacity price estimate is not consistent with the requested offer price, then the IMM’s capacity price estimate becomes the New Resource Offer Floor Price, with the ORTP serving as an ultimate ceiling on that offer floor price. 35

By setting New Resource Offer Floor Prices at levels that eliminate the impact of out-of-market support, the ISO’s MOPR construct focuses on the conduct that is necessary for an exercise of buyer-side market power—a below-cost offer from a new capacity resource. The MOPR does not inquire whether that conduct actually impacts clearing prices or would do so in a way that ultimately benefits a load-side interest. This contrasts with MOPR mechanisms the Commission has accepted in other regions at various points over the past fifteen years. For example, the original MOPR mechanism implemented by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) did not mitigate offers from new resources unless the presumptively below-cost offer also affected the clearing price and the capacity seller or its affiliates were net buyers of capacity. 36 Similarly, the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) had a Commission-directed self-supply exemption for certain load serving entities that met the majority of their

32 Market Rule 1, Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2(b)(i).

33 Id. See also McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 48–49.

34 Market Rule 1, Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2(b)(i).

35 In other words, if the IMM’s capacity price estimate exceeds the ORTP, then the ORTP will serve as the New Resource Offer Floor Price. 36 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 14. Section III.A.21.2(b)(vi) of Appendix A to Market Rule 1 states, “If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s offer prices shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.” For the purpose of determining the New Resource Offer Floor Price, the IMM considers the ORTP to be consistent with the capacity price estimate in circumstances where the capacity price estimate exceeds the OTRP. Namely, under no circumstances does the IMM review a new resource’s requested offer price and then mitigate the offer to a price above the ORTP.

capacity needs through self-supply, on the theory that the cost of promoting uneconomic entry would exceed any benefits these entities would achieve by reducing capacity prices.\textsuperscript{37}

Also in contrast to the PJM and NYISO MOPRs, the ISO’s MOPR has not included a range of exemptions adopted in other regions for certain segments of the market (e.g., for competitive-entrants\textsuperscript{38}), but instead has focused on the issue of how to accommodate entry of state-sponsored resources. As is discussed further below, in 2014 the ISO implemented a narrow exemption to the MOPR for state-sponsored resources—the Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption. Subsequently, in 2018, the ISO phased-out that exemption in favor of a different structure that would accommodate state-sponsored resources—the CASPR substitution auction.\textsuperscript{39}

As described further below and in the McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony, the substitution auction has not allowed a significant number of state policy resources to enter the capacity market.\textsuperscript{40} Meanwhile, most of the New England states have continued to increase their clean energy procurement targets and have established ambitious decarbonization goals.

The RTR exemption and CASPR rules are discussed in more detail in Section VI.A.

V. STATE CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES AND DECARBONIZATION GOALS

The New England states have been leaders in addressing greenhouse gas emissions both economy-wide and within the electricity sector in particular. That leadership is reflected in aggressive clean energy procurement and decarbonization legislation, with mandates that have continued to intensify. As is addressed throughout this filing, these initiatives have reached a point in recent years where the market rules designed to accommodate the participation of state-sponsored resources within the FCM—CASPR—are unlikely to sufficiently address the potential for excess capacity procurement throughout the region.

This section provides an overview of the more significant clean energy and greenhouse gas emissions reduction initiatives that the New England states have undertaken in the years


\textsuperscript{40} McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 17 fn 12.
since CASPR’s introduction. For ease of reference, these reforms and mandates are collectively referred to in this filing as “decarbonization” mandates, reforms, or policies.

As a starting point, when CASPR was proposed in 2018, the ISO anticipated that approximately 3,300 MW of state-sponsored clean and renewable resources would attempt to enter the capacity market in the coming years.\(^{41}\) This assumption was grounded in the fact that two requests for proposals were anticipated or in process at that time: solicitations for approximately 2,800 MW of resources in accordance with Massachusetts’ Act to Promote Energy Diversity; and the “Three State RFP” issued by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, which procured 460 MW of resources.\(^{42}\) In addition, at the time of the initial CASPR filing, the majority of states in New England had either statutory requirements or goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across their economies up to 80 percent by 2050, with varying starting benchmarks and interim goals or requirements.

The policy landscape in New England has changed substantially in the years following the ISO’s development of CASPR. Since that time, the New England states have undertaken even more significant clean energy and decarbonization initiatives.\(^{43}\) Clean energy procurements and procurement targets have increased in line with states’ increased decarbonization goals and policies. These procurements and procurement targets vastly exceed those referenced while designing CASPR. The remainder of this section details the major state policy developments since the ISO’s CASPR filing. It is not exhaustive, but rather highlights the advancement of state climate and energy policy in recent years.

**Connecticut**

In Connecticut, the legislature acted in 2018 to extend the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) targets beyond 2020 to 2030, expanding the Class I RECs requirements from 20 percent in 2020 to 40 percent in 2030.\(^{44}\) Connecticut also increased the state greenhouse gas

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\(^{43}\) The remainder of this section discusses programs of five of the six New England states. In recent years, New Hampshire has not been as active in this area.

emission reduction mandates to achieve a 45 percent reduction below 2001 levels by 2030.\textsuperscript{45} This was followed by a 2019 Executive Order from the Connecticut Governor requiring state agencies to develop plans to achieve a 100 percent zero-carbon electric sector by 2040.\textsuperscript{46}

Connecticut has also aggressively increased its procurement of clean and renewable generation resources. In 2017, Connecticut acted to require the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) and Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (“PURA”) to conduct a solicitation for 12 Terawatt hours of zero-carbon generation.\textsuperscript{47} The first solicitation occurred in early 2018 and led to PURA’s approval of long-term contracts for 200 MW of offshore wind and 52 MW of fuel cells.\textsuperscript{48} In July 2018, Connecticut selected bids from seven new solar projects and an additional 104 MW of offshore wind.\textsuperscript{49} According to the state, annual


\textsuperscript{49} Conn. DEEP Request for Proposals from Private Developers of Zero Carbon Energy. (July 2018), available at http://www.dpuc.state.ct.us/DEEPEnergy.nsf/e6e6d525f7cdd1168525797d0047e5bf/f18419651b249e2e852582db006dceca3/$FILE/2018.08.1_FINAL%20RFP%20-%20updated.pdf. PURA also approved contracts for the Millstone and Seabrook generating stations. See PURA Implementation of Special Session Public Act 17-3, Docket No. 18-05-04, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Interim Decision (Conn. Pub. Utils, Regul. Auth., September 18, 2019) (approving ten-year power purchase agreement between Connecticut electric distribution companies and Dominion Energy Nuclear for 50 percent of output of Millstone Nuclear Plant), available at http://www.dpuc.state.ct.us/dockcurr.nsf/8e6fc37a54110e3e852576190052b64d/2d1e0c7b8f2de91f852584790056db56/$FILE/180504%20(2nd%20Interim%20Decision-REDACTED%20PUBLIC%20VERSION)-091819.pdf; see also 3\textsuperscript{rd} Interim Decision (Conn. Pub. Utils, Regul. Auth., November 22, 2019) (conditionally approving power purchase agreements between Connecticut electric distribution companies and owners of various generation projects, including
production from the portfolio selected totaled 11.66 Terawatt hours per year.\footnote{50}

One year later, Connecticut passed into law an act authorizing the state to purchase up to 2,000 MW of offshore wind generation.\footnote{51} In December 2019, DEEP announced the selection of a single 804 MW offshore wind project, with that project receiving PURA’s approval in August 2020.\footnote{52}

Maine

Maine in 2019 updated its RPS to require competitive electricity providers to procure 80 percent of their supply portfolio from renewable sources by 2030, set a goal of 100 percent renewable portfolios by 2050,\footnote{53} and established an economy-wide greenhouse gas emission reduction target of 45 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and 80 percent by 2050.\footnote{54}


\footnote{54} An Act to Promote Clean Energy Jobs and to Establish the Maine Climate Council, 2019 Me. Laws Ch. 476, available at https://legislature.maine.gov/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=SP0550&item=3&snum=129.
In addition, pursuant to 2019 legislation directing the Maine Public Utilities Commission (“Maine PUC”) to solicit distributed generation resources, Maine has procured a combined total of 968 MW of solar and distributed generation resources.

Further, in 2021, pursuant to new legislation establishing the Northern Maine Renewable Energy Development Program, the Maine PUC issued a request for proposals to procure between 700 and 1,100 MW of renewable generation in Aroostook County, Maine and other areas administered by the Northern Maine Independent System Administrator, as well as a solicitation for construction of a new 345 kV (or larger) double-circuit transmission line, capable of delivering the procured generation into the New England Control Area.

Massachusetts

In Massachusetts, the legislature in 2018 increased the state’s RPS growth rate for the years 2020 to 2029 to 2 percent annually, set a statewide energy storage development target of 1,000 megawatt hours (“MWh”) by 2025, and created a Clean Peak Standard. In March 2021,

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59 An Act to Advance Clean Energy, 2018 Mass. Acts Ch. 227 (increasing RPS growth rate from 1 percent annually to 2 percent annually and requiring retail electric suppliers to provide increasing
the state’s RPS growth rate was further increased for the years 2025 to 2029 to 3 percent annually, to achieve a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and mandates were put in place that require municipal light plants to procure increasing quantities of clean energy and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The 2021 MA Climate Act also increased the economy-wide greenhouse gas emission reduction mandates, requiring net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and establishing interim reduction mandates of 50 percent and 75 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and 2040, respectively.

These mandates were accompanied by several large-scale offshore wind procurements. As described above, the first of these was contemplated around the time of CASPR’s development. Specifically, between 2018 and 2019, the state’s electric distribution companies (“EDCs”) entered into long-term contracts for approximately 1,600 MW of offshore wind generation, with 800 MW expected for commercial operation by 2023, and 800 MW expected for commercial operation by 2025. These procurement contracts were accompanied by annual percentage of retail sales during peak demand periods from renewable resources, energy storage, and demand resources, available at https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2018/Chapter227.


Id. Previously, Massachusetts had targeted an 80 percent reduction below 1990 GHG levels by 2050.

Supplementing the offshore wind procurements, since 2018 the state’s EDCs have solicited and executed contracts for 9,554,940 MWh per year of firm service hydroelectric generation, representing approximately 1,090 MW of capacity. Although the winning project, the New England Clean Energy Connect, was rejected by Maine voters in a November 2021 referendum, the constitutionality of that referendum has been appealed to the Maine Supreme Court. See NSTAR Elec. Co. d/b/a Eversource Energy, Docket No. 18-64, Order at 5 (Mass. Dep’t Pub. Utils., June 25, 2019), available at https://fileservice.eea.comacloud.net/FileService.Api/file/FileRoom/10881348; see also Me. Supreme Court. Docket No. BCD-21-416, available at https://www.courts.maine.gov/news/hecce/order_expediting_briefing.pdf.


increases in the state’s offshore wind procurement targets of 1,600 MW in 2018 and 2,400 MW in 2021, increasing the state’s overall offshore wind procurement authority to 5,600 MW by 2027. Of this 5,600 MW, Massachusetts, through its EDCs, has contracted to procure approximately 3,600 MW of offshore wind generation to date; winning bids for the additional 1,632 MW have been selected, but are pending execution. In addition, the 2021 MA Climate Act provided the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources with the authority to require the Commonwealth’s EDCs to solicit independent offshore wind transmission sufficient to deliver one or more of the generation projects procured by the state.

Lastly, in December 2021, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities issued an order doubling the state Solar Massachusetts Renewable Target (“SMART”) program. That order extends the state’s declining block incentive program for solar from 1,600 MW to 3,200 MW.

Rhode Island

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67 Massachusetts Clean Energy 83C Solicitation Website (declaring Vineyard Wind’s 1232 MW Commonwealth Wind proposal and Mayflower Wind’s 400 MW proposal as winning bidders of third 83C solicitation in December 2021, with contract execution expected March 2022), available at https://macleanenergy.com/83c-iii/.

In Rhode Island, the legislature updated emission targets in 2021, which now require the state to achieve a 45 percent greenhouse gas emissions reduction (below 1990 levels) by 2030, 80 percent reduction by 2040, and net-zero emissions by 2050.\textsuperscript{69}

Further, to advance the state’s goal to increase clean energy in the state by 1000 MW by 2020, Rhode Island announced in 2018 the selection of a 400 MW offshore wind facility under authority of the Affordable Clean Energy Security Act (“ACES”).\textsuperscript{70} In 2018, pursuant to long-term contracting authority enacted in 2009, National Grid solicited up to 400 MW of clean energy, and entered into a power purchase agreement with a 50 MW solar facility, which the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission approved in 2020.\textsuperscript{71}

Vermont

While Vermont has not updated its Renewable Energy Standard requirements or enacted new legislation authorizing long-term contracts for generation since 2018, in 2020, the Vermont Legislature passed the Global Warming Solutions Act, which created legally binding emission reduction targets.\textsuperscript{72} The act requires Vermont to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 26 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.

New England’s Long-Term New Resource Procurements Since January 2018

The table below summarizes the long-term procurements and power purchase agreements the New England States have engaged in since January 2018 for new clean energy and renewable resources.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State Resource Procurement Initiative</th>
<th>Contracted MW (Nameplate)</th>
<th>Remaining Procurement Capacity</th>
<th>Target Delivery Year(^{73})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2019 Offshore Wind RFP</td>
<td>804 MW Offshore Wind</td>
<td>1,200 MW</td>
<td>2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 Zero Carbon Resources RFP</td>
<td>124.6 MW Solar 100 MW Offshore Wind 2.5 MW storage (2 hour duration)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 Renewable Energy RFP*</td>
<td>200 MW Offshore Wind 52 MW Fuel Cell</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>2019 Public Law Ch. 478. Tranche I</td>
<td>482 MW Solar 39 MW Biomass 20 MW Wind 4.5 MW Hydro</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Varying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019 Public Law Ch. 478. Tranche II</td>
<td>290 MW Solar 132 MW Wind</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Varying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>83(C).iii RFP</td>
<td>1,632 MW Offshore Wind 2,400</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pending DPU Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83(C).ii RFP*</td>
<td>800 MW Offshore Wind</td>
<td></td>
<td>2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83(C).i RFP*</td>
<td>800 MW Offshore Wind</td>
<td></td>
<td>2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83(D) RFP*</td>
<td>1090 MW Firm Hydro</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Pending Litigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{73}\) Target delivery years are based on public information as of the time of this filing and may not reflect changes that may occur due to construction or regulatory delays.
As shown in the above table, the New England states have awarded bids or contracted for the procurement of up to 3,630 MW of capacity from clean energy resources since the ISO developed its CASPR proposal (under the Contracted MW column). An additional 3,600 MW of legislatively authorized procurement authority remains available, pending future solicitations (under the Remaining Procurement Capacity column). The 3,630 MW of contracted resources includes capacity associated with Connecticut’s most recent solicitation of offshore wind (804 MW) and zero carbon resources (227 MW), Maine’s renewable energy solicitations pursuant to 2019 Public Law Ch. 478 (967 MW), and Massachusetts’ most recent offshore wind solicitation (1,632 MW). The remaining capacity that is under contract (under the Contracted MW column), that is, in addition to the 3,630 MW, includes those procurements that were authorized prior to the January 2018 CASPR filing (denoted with an asterisk under the “State Resource Procurement Initiative” column), and in aggregate totals 3,392 MW. Therefore, between the contracted capacity pre- and post-January 2018 and the remaining capacity that is authorized for procurement, the region has committed to a total procurement of up to 10,622 MW in clean and renewable resources.

The states also have accelerated their RPS requirements and codified ambitious decarbonization goals, which signal even more clean energy resource development and procurement in the future. Consequently, the ISO anticipates an aggressively increasing number of state-sponsored policy resources will be built over the coming decades, a circumstance that was not apparent when the ISO designed CASPR.

## VI. RATIONALE FOR OVERHAULING THE CURRENT BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER REVIEW AND MITIGATION RULES

Despite repeated attempts to accommodate the entry of state-sponsored resources into the Forward Capacity Market, the fact remains that the long-standing buyer-side mitigation rules will prevent a significant quantity of such resources from clearing in the market. Exclusion of state-sponsored resources from the capacity market is detrimental to consumers, as it forces them to pay higher prices for electricity.

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This aggregate is greater than the approximately 3,300 MW that were accounted for in CASPR because the latter only accounted for a subset of the state procurements that were authorized at that time.
to effectively pay for capacity twice—once to meet the resource adequacy objectives of the FCM and a second time to meet the clean energy and decarbonization objectives of the states. Of course, the resources that achieve the latter objective could also serve the former objective, but for the existing buyer-side mitigation rules. The Filing Parties are therefore proposing a significant overhaul of the existing rules, one that directly facilitates the entry into the capacity market of state-sponsored resources, but also maintains a traditional buyer-side market power test for resources that do not qualify for an exemption therefrom.

Section VI traces the history of the region’s attempts at accommodating market entry of state-sponsored resources in more detail, and explains the justification for the proposed overhaul of the buyer-side mitigation rules in the face of the failure of those initiatives to date and the significant expansion of state decarbonization policies and clean energy procurements. This section also considers the likely impact of those state policies on consumers, as well as the overall efficiency of the FCM, if the current mitigation rules remain in place.

While changes to the existing mitigation rules to avoid these inefficiencies and unnecessary costs are justified, it must be recognized that unmitigated entry of significant quantities of state-sponsored resources has the potential to undermine investor confidence in the market, which ultimately could also work to the detriment of consumers. This section addresses the steps the Filing Parties are taking in this proposal, as well as steps the ISO anticipates taking over the next couple years, to prevent these outcomes. Of primary importance, the Filing Parties are proposing a two-year transition to the MOPR’s elimination, which is intended to help prevent adverse impacts to reliability that could result with the MOPR’s immediate elimination, and prevent accompanying harms to investors and consumers.

A. New England’s Repeated Attempts at Accommodating Entry of State-Sponsored Resources in the Forward Capacity Market Have Not Achieved Their Intended Result

From the inception of the Forward Capacity Market, the region has attempted to reconcile the fundamental tension between, on the one hand, protecting consumers from the cost of procuring unnecessary capacity, and, on the other hand, protecting investors from the potential price-suppressive effects of permitting market entry from resources supported by out-of-market revenues. This discourse has played out most vociferously in the efforts to accommodate entry of resources that receive support from one or more of the New England states to achieve state environmental objectives (i.e., state-sponsored resources).

1. Early Recognition of the Issue

The region first grappled with these issues in an early (and, to date, the only) overhaul of the FCM’s buyer-side market power mitigation rules following the first two Forward Capacity Auctions. In that context, the Commission ruled upon, and rejected, the ISO’s proposed two-tiered capacity pricing model that would have permitted the entry of certain out-of-market resources in a second auction round. Recognizing that the FCM, as then structured, was

75 APR Rejection Order at P 19 (finding that ISO’s proposed two-tiered pricing model “fails to appropriately balance the competing interests at issue, in particular, the objective of limiting purchases to the ICR,” and directing “ISO-NE to work with its stakeholders to develop an offer-floor mitigation
intended to procure only the Installed Capacity Requirement under a vertical demand curve, the Commission rejected the ISO’s proposal because it would “require[e] customers to purchase more than the ICR when the [alternative price rule] triggers.” On rehearing, the Commission affirmed this decision, finding that “the appropriate course of action . . . is to prevent new resources from lowering the price of capacity significantly below competitive levels while sparing load the cost of acquiring capacity above the installed capacity requirement.”

While the Commission also rejected requests to establish blanket exemptions from buy-side mitigation for self-supplied resources and state-sponsored renewable resources, it clarified that “ISO-NE, stakeholders, and state regulators may develop in the stakeholder process a categorical exemption for renewable resources that qualify to meet RPS objectives or as state-sponsored, cost-effective energy efficiency.” In doing so, the Commission laid the foundation for the region’s future efforts in this regard.

2. The RTR Exemption

The region’s first direct attempt at accommodating state-sponsored resource entry in the FCM was in 2014. Recognizing that it is economically inefficient to exclude from the capacity market resources that are being built to meet state initiatives, the ISO proposed a limited exemption from the MOPR for renewable resources built to meet state environmental policies, in conjunction with the introduction of a sloped demand curve in the FCM to replace the vertical demand curve. The Renewable Technology Resource, or RTR, exemption would permit, in

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76 APR Rejection Order at P 160 (internal citations omitted).

77 APR Rejection Rehearing Order at P 75.

78 Id. at PP 88–91. As the Commission noted in accepting the MOPR’s design, there were a “large number of stakeholders that supported some form of renewable resource exemption,” and the Commission further encouraged the ISO to “undertake the development of a stakeholder process for such an exemption.” ISO New England Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,107 at P 97 (2013), r’hg denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,055 (2015). Nevertheless, the Commission rejected arguments that the MOPR must include a renewables exemption, in part, because the FCM at the time relied on a vertical demand curve. See New England States Comm. on Elec. v. ISO New England Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,108 at P 35 (2013), r’hg denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2015).

79 APR Rejection Rehearing Order at P 91. New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 757 F.3d 283, at 295 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that the Commission “reasonably acted to balance competing interests [when it] made the judgment that encouraging renewable energies was less important than allowing such out-of-market entrants to depress capacity prices”).

80 See ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., Filing of ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Regarding Demand Curve Changes, Docket No. ER14-1639-000 (filed Apr. 1, 2014), at 12 (“Demand Curve Filing”) (“The renewables exemption included in the Demand Curve Changes is a reasonable means of accommodating legitimate state policies that favor renewable resources and that are not intended to suppress market-clearing prices, while being sufficiently limited to alleviate design concerns.”); ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., Filing of ISO New
any auction, up to 200 MW of defined state-sponsored resources developed to meet environmental targets to bypass the MOPR. Under a carry-forward rule, any unused portion of the RTR exemption could be used in subsequent auctions for up to two years, allowing the potential for 600 MW of RTR exemptions in an auction.81

In accepting the RTR exemption,82 the Commission employed a balancing test to evaluate the impact of the proposal on consumers relative to the impact on investors in the market. With respect to the former, it found that the exemption “decreases the likelihood that customers must pay for more resources than are necessary to provide for resource adequacy or that the capacity market will provide a false signal that new investment is needed when this is not the case.”83 With respect to the latter, it rejected arguments that the exemption would “suppress prices over time such that the capacity market is unable to perform its function of attracting and retaining sufficient capacity to maintain reliability in New England at a just and reasonable price.”84 On balance, it found that state support for renewables development “over time, [had] tipped the scales” in favor of “a narrowly tailored exemption to reduce the likelihood that customers will have to pay for redundant capacity.”85 It noted that “participation in the FCAs has been and continues to be robust,” and found that forecasted retirements, the

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81 Demand Curve Filing at 12–13. In support of the proposal, the ISO argued that the exemption prevented the possibility of consumers paying for capacity outside of the FCM that exceeded the demand in the auction, but also that, by calibrating the cap on the RTR exemption to forecasted load growth and employing a sloped demand curve, the RTR exemption ameliorated price suppression concerns.

82 ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., 147 FERC ¶ 61,173 at PP 81–88 (2014) (“RTR Exemption Order”), clarif. granted, r’g denied, 150 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2015), order on remand, 155 FERC ¶ 61,023 (2016), r’g denied, 158 FERC ¶ 61,138 (2017) (“RTR Remand Rehearing Order”). The Commission’s acceptance of the RTR exemption was the subject of a petition for review, which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied. See NextEra Energy Res., LLC v. FERC, 898 F.3d 14, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting argument that FERC approval of RTR exemption contravenes precedent because “[t]he Commission explained why its view on the renewables exemption evolved and why the specific circumstances of this case led it to conclude that the renewable exemption is just and reasonable”).

83 RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 26.

84 Id. at P 28.

85 Id. at P 43.
introduction of a sloped demand curve, and the ISO’s commitment to revisit the exemption depending on load growth were all reasons that justified its acceptance of the RTR exemption.86

3. CASPR

The RTR exemption was in place for only three Forward Capacity Auctions before the ISO, based on responses from some of the New England states and stakeholders, deemed it inadequate as a means of accommodating entry into the market of state-sponsored resources and chose to replace it with the alternative CASPR mechanism. As the ISO explained in the CASPR filing, with states increasing their procurement targets, approximately 3,300 MW of state-sponsored resources could potentially vie for entry into the market.87 Some of this capacity would not qualify under the RTR exemption’s qualification criteria,88 and, regardless, the caps on the exemption amounts were too low to permit entry of a significant quantity of the newly contracted state resources.89

Further, as the ISO explained, the assumptions underlying the RTR exemption’s implementation had proven incorrect:

Three years later, the ISO’s expectations have not materialized, and the RTR exemption now presents a greater risk of price suppression. Specifically, the region now has significant excess capacity; in FCA 11, FCM procured excess resources amounting to 1,760 MW over the net Installed Capacity Requirement (“NICR”). As a result, FCM cleared well below the Net Cost of New Entry (“CONE”) in FCA 11. Exacerbating this situation, Massachusetts is expected to contract for approximately 2,800 MW (nameplate value) of sponsored new supply resources to meet legislative mandates, and the region has not experienced the expected load growth. On the latter point, for FCA 12, NICR declined to 33,725 MW from 34,075 in FCA 11. There were small declines in FCAs 9 and 10 as well. Under these

86 Id. at P 28. See also NextEra Energy, 898 F.3d at 21 (“In this case, the Commission reasonably balanced the potential for limited price suppression against competing interests in concluding that the renewable exemption to the minimum offer price rule is consistent with the purpose of the forward capacity market.”).

87 CASPR Filing at 3–4.

88 See CASPR Filing, Geissler CASPR Testimony at 17 (providing, as an example of a resource that would not qualify under the RTR exemption, Massachusetts’ potential procurement of approximately 1,200 MW of large-scale imported hydropower under the 2016 Energy Diversity Act because the act was not in place as of January 2014, one requirement for qualification for the RTR exemption).

89 CASPR Filing, Geissler CASPR Testimony at 17–18; see also CASPR Filing, Geissler CASPR Testimony at 8–9 (“[T]he quantity of new resources receiving out-of-market revenue is expected to grow as states seek to meet their legislative mandates. Much of this capacity is not expected to clear in the FCA because the ISO has the MOPR, which prevents new resources from accounting for many sources of out-of-market revenue in their offer price. Without such revenue, these resources would require a very high capacity payment to be developed.”).
conditions, the market may continue to clear well below Net CONE for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus, the region once again faced the question of how best to reconcile the opposing objectives: the objective of accommodating the entry of state-sponsored resources into the capacity market, in order to avoid the “over-build” of capacity, the resulting market inefficiencies, and the attendant costs to consumers; and the objective of preventing the market impacts that result when state-sponsored resources bid into the FCM unmitigated, \textit{i.e.}, in a manner that reflects the out-of-market support they receive from the states.

CASPR was proposed as a market-based attempt to reconcile these objectives. Under the design,\textsuperscript{91} the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the primary auction is conducted with no modifications, and therefore with all resources subject to the existing buyer-side market power mitigation requirements. CASPR added a second stage, referred to as the substitution auction, in which existing resources that were awarded Capacity Supply Obligations (“CSOs”) in the primary auction can permanently transfer those CSOs (in their entirety) to state-sponsored resources that did not acquire CSOs in the primary auction due to mitigation. As compensation for agreeing to take on the transferring resource’s CSO, a state-sponsored resource receives a portion of the transferring resource’s capacity revenue; the transferring resource permanently retires and, following its first year of participation, the state-sponsored resource continues in the market as an existing resource.\textsuperscript{92}

The ISO described the anticipated benefits of CASPR as follows:

By closely coordinating the entry (of sponsored) and exit (of retiring) capacity resources, CASPR meets the two most significant objectives outlined above – maintaining competitive FCM pricing and allowing sponsored resources into the FCM. Because an existing resource that sheds its obligation in the substitution auction must permanently exit the market, the design … helps to prevent the system’s aggregate obligated capacity level from increasing above the competitive level over time – and, therefore, helps prevent[] the primary auction’s clearing price from decreasing below the competitive level. Furthermore, by allowing sponsored resources to take on obligations via the substitution auction and become existing resources when they displace older resources that elect to retire, CASPR

\textsuperscript{90} CASPR Filing at 11.

\textsuperscript{91} The CASPR market rules are contained in Market Rule 1, Sections I.2.2 (defining sponsored policy resource), III.13.2.8 \textit{et seq.} (describing substitution auction process), III.13.2.5.2.5 (describing review for local reliability need), III.13.7.1.1(d) (detailing monthly payments and charges related to the substitution auction), III.13.1.8(g) (permitting the release of certain submitted supply and demand elections in the substitution auction by capacity zone), and III.13.8.1(c)(xi) (permitting the release of information relating to total qualified supply and demand quantities in substitution auction).

\textsuperscript{92} See CASPR Filing at 6 for a more detailed explanation of the substitution auction process.
accommodates such resources into the FCM at a pace that should not adversely impact capacity prices.\textsuperscript{93}

In accepting CASPR, the Commission found that the design “reasonably mitigates the impacts of Sponsored Policy Resources entering the FCM through the substitution auction,” and therefore will allow the FCM to “continue to attract and maintain resource investment when the system requires it, and to do so at a reasonable cost.”\textsuperscript{94} It further highlighted that coordinating entry of sponsored resources and exit of existing resources through the substitution auction “attempts to avoid the sudden and dramatic shifts in the supply curve from year to year that can undermine confidence that potential investors have in the FCM as a means to recoup the costs of their investments in new capacity over the long term,”\textsuperscript{95} and found that, with these design choices, “CASPR will allow the FCM to continue to meet its objective of providing resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates.”\textsuperscript{96} Upon rehearing, the Commission highlighted the ISO’s commitment to work with stakeholders to replace or refine CASPR if necessary, including by determining how the impact of new state laws and policies might be accommodated, and how CASPR functioned over time.\textsuperscript{97}

4.  CASPR Has Not, to Date, Facilitated Sponsored Resource Entry

CASPR has not, to date, facilitated the introduction into the market of large quantities of state-sponsored resources. In the four auctions that have taken place since CASPR’s implementation, only 54 MW of state-sponsored resources have been awarded a CSO through a CASPR substitution auction, despite more than 900 MW of state-sponsored resources having submitted supply offers to participate in the four substitution auctions.\textsuperscript{98} In its analysis of the

\textsuperscript{93}Id. at 6–7.

\textsuperscript{94}ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 at P 25 (2018) (“CASPR Initial Order”), r’hg denied, 173 FERC ¶ 61,161 (2020) (“CASPR Initial Rehearing Order”), r’hg denied, 174 FERC ¶ 62,041 (denying by operation of law but providing for further consideration), r’hg denied, 174 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2021) (rejected rehearing as procedurally barred); see also CASPR Initial Rehearing Order at P 48 (“CASPR thus both recognizes the New England states' preference for supporting renewable resources and also provides a mechanism to incorporate them into the FCM as older, traditional resources retire, maintaining just and reasonable capacity market prices while attracting future investment sufficient to maintain resource adequacy in the ISO-NE footprint.”).

\textsuperscript{95}CASPR Initial Order at P 25.

\textsuperscript{96}Id. at P 25.

\textsuperscript{97}CASPR Initial Rehearing Order at P 71 (“While we continue to find that our acceptance of CASPR is based on substantial record evidence, including expert testimony and economic theory, we note that our acceptance is not the end of the matter; ISO-NE has pledged to revisit and revise CASPR, depending on how CASPR functions over time.”); see also CASPR Initial Order at PP 30, 88, 100.

first three CASPR auction cycles (for FCAs 13, 14 and 15), the ISO’s Internal Market Monitor pointed to the lack of demand bids (i.e., bids from existing resources looking to retire through the substitution auction after taking on a CSO in the primary auction) as the cause for the lack of activity in the substitution auction.\textsuperscript{99} Only 54 MW of demand entered the substitution auction for FCA 13, and no demand entered the substitution auction for either FCA 14 or 15 (so that no substitution auction was held). While participation of demand in FCA 16 was more robust, the auction nevertheless did not see any capacity obligations trading hands from existing to new state-sponsored resources.\textsuperscript{100}

The IMM concluded that “it is clear that CASPR does not provide a certain and steady rate of sponsored resource entry in the same way as the Renewable Technology Resource exemption did previously.”\textsuperscript{101}

B. With the Continued Expansion of State Decarbonization Policies, the ISO’s Long-Standing Buyer-Side Mitigation Rules Are No Longer Sustainable

As the Commission has recognized, protecting the FCM from the price impacts of below-cost offers serves both investors and consumers over the long-term through more stable market pricing.\textsuperscript{102} The erosion of capacity prices through the unmitigated entry of resources submitting below-cost offers, including offers from state-sponsored resources, may in turn erode the confidence of investors in the ability of the markets to permit recovery of their costs. Erosion of investor confidence can lead to inefficiency, with the market failing to send the correct signal for market entry and exit, and ultimately imposing excessive costs on consumers.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{99} IMM Spring 2021 QMR at 10.

\textsuperscript{100} ISO New England Inc., Filing of ISO New England Inc. Regarding Forward Capacity Auction Results, Testimony of Robert G. Ethier on behalf of ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER22-1417-000, at 19 (filed March 21, 2022) (although ISO-NE data indicates approximately 738 MW of demand entered the substitution auction in FCA 16, no substitution auction supply offers were able to clear against any substitution auction demand bids because “in all instances of pairings that would not have impacted the marginal reliability values cleared in FCA 16, the highest-priced demand bid segment was priced below the lowest-priced supply offer segment”).

\textsuperscript{101} IMM Spring 2021 QMR at 15.

\textsuperscript{102} NextEra Energy, 898 F.3d at 21 (finding that the Commission “reasonably balanced the potential for limited price suppression against competing interests” when it determined that, despite the fact that the price suppression will be “counter to the Generators’ interest . . . the renewables exemption ‘is consistent with the purpose of the’ Forward Capacity Market, ‘namely, ensuring that price signals are sufficient to incent existing resources to stay in the capacity market, and new resources to enter, so that ISO [New England] meets its reliability requirements at least cost,’”’) (citing RTR Remand Order at 35); see also RTR Remand Rehearing Order at 11 (finding that the Commission must balance the need to develop and retain sufficient capacity with the need to protect customers from overpaying for that capacity).

\textsuperscript{103} CASPR Initial Order at P 24 (“Absent market mechanisms to limit the impact on FCM prices, which serve as both a revenue stream and a price signal for investors, those state actions can erode the investor confidence on which the FCM relies to meet its objective. Erosion of investor confidence can prevent the FCM from attracting investment in new and existing non-state-supported resources when
But as the region, and the Commission, are well aware, this is not the whole of the story. A market that precludes entry of capacity that nonetheless contributes to the resource adequacy objectives of the region can lead to substantial inefficiencies, as the market will fail to send accurate price signals about the need for new capacity and the need to maintain existing capacity. This, in turn, forces consumers to pay the cost for unneeded capacity as the region continues to meet its resource adequacy needs solely with “in-market” resources, ignoring entirely the reliability contribution of resources that are excluded from market participation. This inefficiency, and the resulting costs to consumers, can threaten to overwhelm any benefit that is obtained from the de facto preclusion of higher-cost state-sponsored resources from the market. The ISO has referred to this in the past as the “inefficient overbuild” problem.

This is precisely the position New England finds itself in today. With the majority of New England states aggressively increasing their clean energy mandates, the region now faces the potential that significant quantities of new generation being built pursuant to state decarbonization policies will be precluded from entry into the Forward Capacity Market if the current buyer-side mitigation rules remain in place.

As is addressed in Section V above, since CASPR was implemented in 2018, the New England states have awarded bids for, or entered into long-term contracts with, an additional 3,630 MW of clean and renewable resources to meet state decarbonization mandates, and have called for procurement of an additional 3,600 MW of such resources by 2030. This is a three-fold increase from the 3,300 MW (approximate) procurements of state-sponsored resources that the ISO contemplated when CASPR was proposed, and does not account for the state-support that is being provided to large-scale battery storage resources through state RPS standards and other programs.

investment is needed, or can lead to excessive costs for consumers as capacity sellers include significant risk premiums in their offers. It is, therefore, imperative that such a market construct include rules that appropriately manage the impact of out-of-market state support, to ensure that the market’s underlying principles are met and that the resulting rates are just and reasonable.”).

104 See CASPR Initial Order at P 21 (“A capacity market should . . . provide price signals that guide the orderly entry and exit of capacity resources.”); RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 26 (finding that an exemption for renewable resources “decreases the likelihood that customers must pay for more resources than are necessary to provide for resource adequacy or that the capacity market will provide a false signal that new investment is needed when this is not the case”) and P 46 (“[T]he price that generators receive in the FCM with the [RTR Exemption] is the appropriate price because it elicits sufficient entry into the FCM to maintain reliability at least cost, as well as providing a balance between supplier and customer interests.”).

105 CASPR Initial Rehearing Order at P 98 (describing the substitution auction as better accommodating Sponsored Policy Resources within the FCM, and therefore mitigating over-procurement and double payment for capacity); see also NextEra Energy, 898 F.3d at 20 (citing RTR Remand Rehearing Order at PP 9, 48).

106 See CASPR Filing, Geissler CASPR Testimony at 8-18 (describing the inefficient overbuild problem and the ISO’s pre-CASPR attempt to address it with the RTR exemption).
Furthermore, these procurements are likely to intensify. Since CASPR’s implementation, four of the six New England states have increased both their RPS targets and/or have implemented even more aggressive economy-wide decarbonization mandates. These actions will intensify the need for additional renewable and clean resources, to meet these mandates and as electric demand increases to meet decarbonization goals in other sectors of the economy.¹⁰⁷

This fundamental transformation in New England’s generation mix is reflected in the most current interconnection queue data, which indicates that the vast majority of resources looking to enter the market are renewables.¹⁰⁸ Thus, as the following table indicates, whereas in 2017 49 percent of new resource proposals were for natural-gas or oil fired resources, today the new resource proposal queue is dominated almost exclusively by wind (60 percent), solar (15 percent) and battery storage (21 percent) resources, with natural gas comprising just three percent of the new resources in the queue.

¹⁰⁷ See e.g., Energy Pathways to Deep Decarbonization, A Technical Report of the Massachusetts 2050 Decarbonization Roadmap Study, prepared by Evolved Energy Research for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, December 2020 (“MA Pathways Study”) (concluding, as one of its four main findings, that “[e]lectricity is the least-cost means of supplying zero-carbon energy, and in many cases, electrification also increases energy efficiency. The greater the efficiency benefits, and the more flexible the end-uses in terms of their time of use, the more competitive electrification is relative to using decarbonized fuels”), available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/energy-pathways-for-deep-decarbonization-report/download.

¹⁰⁸ Interconnection requests and reviews for new generating facilities, elective transmission upgrades, and modifications to existing generating facilities, are governed by the ISO New England Open Access Transmission Tariff, or OATT, which is Section II of the Tariff.
Under the current buyer-side mitigation construct, it is possible, indeed likely, that a majority of the capacity in the current interconnection queue will be excluded from entry into the market. This is particularly so for offshore wind resources, which comprise a significant percentage of proposed new resources and a vast majority of the state procurements. With current capacity prices reflecting moderate-to-substantial levels of surplus in the market, and with an estimated net cost of new entry for an offshore wind facility in New England above the starting price in the Forward Capacity Auction, such projects are unlikely to clear in the auction unless their capacity offers are permitted to reflect the substantial out-of-market support received from state procurements. The ISO’s existing minimum offer price rules prevent that result, by excluding revenues from state contracts when establishing the minimum offer price, or “offer floor,” that determines the price a resource must receive in the auction in order to clear and cover its net cost of entry.

Simply put, this situation is no longer sustainable. If the current buyer-side mitigation construct remains in place, the evidence is clear that consumers will be forced to pay for a substantial quantity of capacity twice—once “in market” to achieve the region’s resource adequacy objectives, and a second time “out of market” for additional resources developed to meet state decarbonization policies. Given that the latter set of resources are capable of

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110 ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., FCA 16 Offer Review Trigger Price Filing, Docket No. ER21-1637-000, at 5 (filed Apr. 7 2021) (“After performing a thorough, ‘bottom-up’ engineering based cost analysis of the competitive cost of entry for large-scale offshore wind development in New England, the ISO determined that the competitive cost is still above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.”) (“FCA 16 ORTP Filing”); see also 175 FERC ¶ 61,195 at 76 (acceptingISO’s proposed ORTP value for offshore wind) (“FCA 16 ORTP Order”); modified by 176 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2021) (“FCA 16 ORTP Rehearing Order”).

111 FCA 16 ORTP Filing at 16–18; see also FCA 16 ORTP Order at PP 2–5.

112 See McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 21–22, 44–45; CASPR Filing, Geissler CASPR Testimony at 8–18. These concerns have been echoed throughout the region, as is evidenced in the comments of many state officials. See Transcript May 25, 2021 Technical Conference Regarding Modernizing Electricity Market Design: Energy and Ancillary Services in the Evolving Electricity Sector, Docket No. AD21-10-000, Tr. 237:18–238:5 (“You know whenever we are doing the RFPs for these resources needed to meet our clean energy goals, that unpredictability and the uncertainty around the possibility of those resources clearing the capacity market I think contributes to them properly pricing all of their revenue needs into our power purchase agreements. And so that puts our ratepayers at significant risk of duplicative payments, especially when you think about the scale of these investments. We have already contracted about 20 percent of our load for offshore wind projects which we’re excited to see move forward. So there are significant costs of getting this wrong, or not having these issues addressed in
serving both objectives, it is the definition of market inefficiency to sustain a market construct that administratively precludes them from doing so.

Accordingly, given the substantial increase in state clean energy procurements in recent years, the likelihood that these procurements will continue to increase over time, and the failure to date of any of the proposed market-based mechanisms to successfully facilitate the entry of such resources into the capacity market under the current buyer-side market power mitigation construct, the ISO is proposing to substantially overhaul its buyer-side market power mitigation rules. The ISO’s proposal is addressed in detail in Sections VII, VIII and IX below, as well as in the supporting testimony of Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada and Ryan McCarthy. In the remainder of this section, we address several core aspects of the ISO’s proposal, and reconcile these core aspects with applicable Commission and court precedent.

C. The Filing Parties are Proposing a Solution that will Permit State-Sponsored Resources Unmitigated Entry into the FCM in a Measured Fashion, Employing a Transition Mechanism to Protect Reliability, Investors, and Consumers

A primary component of the ISO’s new buyer-side mitigation construct is the exemption of state-sponsored resources from buyer-side market power review. Specifically, the proposal exempts a resource from buyer-side market power review if the resource meets an updated and expanded definition of a Sponsored Policy Resource, the term currently employed under the CASPR rules to determine which resources may participate as supply in the substitution auction. The revised definition is intended to ensure that the term continues to remain current as state decarbonization policies change over time, ensuring that state-sponsored resources are not inadvertently excluded from the exemption as policies change.

The ISO submits that the proposed treatment of state-sponsored resources is a just and reasonable balancing of consumer and investor interests.

113 The Sponsored Policy Resource exemption is addressed in Section VII.C.2 below, as well as in the McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 42–54.

114 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 48–53.
1. **Exempting State Sponsored Resources Mitigates the Current Inefficiency and Costs to Consumers of the Current MOPR**

As discussed above, the proposal addresses the inefficiency and attendant costs to consumers that would result from the current exclusion of state-sponsored resources from the market under the existing mitigation construct. While the ISO recognizes the potential for below-cost entry to undermine investor confidence in the market,\(^{115}\) that potential must be balanced against the harm to the market and consumers that results when consumers are forced to pay the costs for additional capacity that is ultimately not needed to meet the region’s resource adequacy objectives.\(^{116}\) Given the substantial increase in states’ procurements of clean energy and renewable resources, and given the likelihood that these procurements will increase, the attendant harm to consumers, as well as to the market, from the exclusion of such resources from the market may overwhelm the harm that might result from the impact of these changes on investor confidence.

In short, the circumstances have changed significantly since the Commission last addressed the treatment of state-sponsored resources in the context of the ISO’s CASPR proposal. CASPR has not, to date, achieved its intended results,\(^{117}\) the states have substantially increased their procurements of clean and renewable resources,\(^{118}\) and the region’s resource mix is, as a result, set to change dramatically over the coming years.\(^{119}\) Collectively, these factors justify a reconsideration of the balance the market has struck between investor and consumer interests, to more directly permit entry into the market of state-sponsored resources.\(^{120}\)

\(^{115}\) See CASPR Initial Order at P 24 (discussing potential for state support for resources to “erode the investor confidence on which the FCM relies to meet its objective”).

\(^{116}\) *NextEra Energy*, 898 F.3d 14, at 21 (“[S]etting a just and reasonable rate necessarily involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 43 (finding that the Commission “may reasonably consider the impact external circumstances, such as state renewable resource development policies, have on the justness and reasonableness of FERC-regulated rates,” together with the need to enable the FCM to procure sufficient resources to maintain reliability, and determining that “[t]he Commission, in balancing generators’ and customers’ interests, reasonably recognized how these developments, over time, have tipped the scales....”); RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 26 (finding that an exemption for renewable resources “decreases the likelihood that customers must pay for more resources than are necessary to provide for resource adequacy or that the capacity market will provide a false signal that new investment is needed when this is not the case”).

\(^{117}\) See supra, discussion of CASPR at VI.A.3.

\(^{118}\) See supra, discussion of state procurements at Section V.

\(^{119}\) See supra, discussion of the ISO’s interconnection queue at VI.B.

\(^{120}\) As the discussion above in Section VI.A suggests, the ISO’s proposal to exempt state-sponsored resources from buyer-side mitigation review is a continuation of the course the region has been on since almost the inception of the FCM to accommodate entry of state-sponsored resources. Nevertheless, to the extent the acceptance of this change would be deemed to reflect a substantial change in Commission policy, the failure of the region’s prior efforts, the states’ increase in decarbonization
It is further important to note that the proposed exemption is in accord with aspects of the current buyer-side mitigation rules that are retained in the replacement mitigation mechanism. The current buyer-side mitigation rules already contemplate that, in evaluating a new resource’s offer for possible buyer-side mitigation, the ISO will not count as “out-of-market” certain revenues received from governmental programs that are “not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market.”

By excluding these revenues from the definition of what constitutes an “out-of-market” revenue, those revenues can be counted toward a resource’s total net revenues, thus lowering the amount of compensation it must receive in the FCM, and therefore lowering its offer floor price used in the buyer-side mitigation review.

While the existing out-of-market revenue exclusion applies specifically to “economic development incentives,” the same rationale supports an exclusion for revenues from state decarbonization policies. These state policies are, expressly by their terms, intended for the purpose of achieving state decarbonization mandates, and thus are not “expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market.” Excluding them from buyer-side mitigation review is consistent with the current, long-standing, Commission-approved buyer-side mitigation provisions.

efforts, and the drastic changes in the region’s resource mix, collectively justify this policy shift. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (finding that, to justify a change in policy when faced with record evidence demonstrating the need for such change, an agency must only show that the new policy “is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates”).

Market Rule 1, Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2(b)(i) excludes from the definition of “out-of-market revenues” that must be removed from a resource’s net revenues when establishing a resource’s offer floor price “revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market.”

An Act Concerning Connecticut’s Energy Future, Pub. Act 18-50 (2018) (directing PURA to “initiate a proceeding to establish a procurement plan for each electric distribution company . . . [that] is consistent with and contributes to the requirements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”); An Act To Require Prompt and Effective Use of the Renewable Energy Resources of Northern Maine, 2021 Me. Laws Ch. 380 (directing Commission to issue a request for proposals for renewable generation projects in Northern Maine “to advance the renewable energy and climate policies and goals” of Maine); An Act Creating a Next-Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy, 2021 Mass. Acts Ch. 8 (raising the offshore wind solicitation and long-term contracting target to 4,000 MW while also establishing a statewide greenhouse gas emission goal of net zero by 2050); 2021 Act on Climate, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-6.2-9 (2021) (accelerating Rhode Island’s emission reduction targets from 45 percent below 1990 levels by 2035, and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050); Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020, 2020 Pub. Act 153 (replacing previous Vermont non-binding emission reduction goals with binding reduction targets).

APR Rejection Rehearing Order at P 80 (noting the Commission’s approval of changes that require the ISO’s Internal Market Monitor to account for (and thus not exclude as out-of-market) economic development incentives that are broadly offered by state or local governments and “are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the FCM,” and encouraging the ISO and stakeholders to consider
2. The Proposal Entails Steps to Mitigate the Impact of this Exemption on Reliability, on Investors in Existing Resources and Ultimately on Consumers

The ISO is cognizant of the possibility that the entry of substantial quantities of state-sponsored resources may contribute to the erosion of investor confidence in the market, a result that could, in turn, undermine the efficiency of the market, lead to higher costs for consumers, and could create reliability-related challenges as well. Concern over investor confidence in the FCM has been a primary consideration in several market-design efforts over time. There are, however, steps that can be taken to protect the overall competitiveness of the market, and avoid attendant reliability concerns, and the ISO is taking these steps with this proposal.

a. The Proposed Transition Mechanism

The proposed buyer-side market power review reforms contemplate, and include the necessary rules for, a graduated elimination and replacement of the MOPR. The proposed Transition Mechanism maintains the existing MOPR for the next two auction cycles—FCAs 17 and 18—and achieves a stepped transition to the full implementation of the new buyer-side market power review rules (and attendant MOPR elimination) in FCA 19. The transition is achieved by exempting 700 MW of state-sponsored resources from the MOPR over the course of the next two Forward Capacity Auctions.

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whether similar such provisions might be appropriate for self-supply so as not to “automatically deem suspect long-standing and well-recognized business models.”).

124 See New England Power Generators Association, Inc. v. ISO New England Inc., Brief of ISO New England Inc. on Issues Set for Paper Hearing, Docket Nos. EL14-7-002, EL15-23-002, EL20-54-000 (filed August 24, 2020 (evaluating the potential for the removal of the FCM price-lock mechanism to erode investor confidence in the market, and arguing that, while it is not possible to determine with certainty what impact its removal will have on investors going forward, there was no evidence to suggestion at that time that the result would be adverse). See also ISO New England Inc., 146 FERC ¶ 61,038 at P 26 (2014) (accepting changes to the FCM’s then-existing administrative pricing rules in the face of substantial supply and demand shifts for FCA 8, and finding that “the Commission must strike a balance between, on one hand, setting a price that will retain enough existing resources to maintain reliability and, on the other hand, protecting consumers from overpaying for that capacity and minimizing price volatility that could undermine both investor and consumer confidence in the market.”); RTR Exemption Order at PP 56, 57 (accepting an extension of the price-lock mechanism in the FCM for new resources, finding that the extension is “an appropriate way to provide investor assurance” and “a reasonable means to address the New England region’s current capacity shortage and investor perceptions regarding risk”), reh’g denied 150 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2015).

125 The details of the Transition Mechanism are addressed in Section VIII below, and in the McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony. For FCA 17, the buyer-side mitigation exemption for state-sponsored resources is set at 300 MW. For FCA 18, the buyer-side mitigation exemption for state-sponsored resources is increased to 400 MW, plus any unused portion of the exemption from FCA 17. Therefore, the total exemption amount is 700 MW for the two auction cycles. As explained supra at fn 20, this 700 MW represents the qualified capacity of state-sponsored resources. The total nameplate (or “installed”) capacity of new state-sponsored resources that may avail themselves of the 700 MW
The primary driver for the ISO’s decision to propose a stepped elimination of the MOPR and the implementation of the new buyer-side market power mitigation rules is its concerns with the potential adverse reliability impacts of the MOPR’s immediate elimination. However, the transition mechanism is also a helpful means of minimizing the impacts of the MOPR’s elimination on investors and consumers.

i. The ISO’s Reasons for Supporting a Transition Mechanism

The ISO is filing a graduated elimination and replacement of the MOPR for two central reasons, which are addressed in detail in the supporting testimony of Dr. Chadalavada. These reasons include the adverse impacts to reliability from “inefficient retirements” and from likely delays in the development of state-sponsored resources, and the need to provide the region time to undertake market reforms to facilitate the reliable transition to the new resource mix.

Adverse Impacts to Reliability from “Inefficient Retirements”

Allowing significant quantities of state-sponsored resources to enter the market unmitigated is, in the short-term, likely to impact the clearing price in a manner that could lead to the premature retirement of resources that have important reliability benefits for the region. These benefits will be of even greater importance as the region transitions to a resource mix that is dominated by intermittent resources that currently have only limited or no storage capabilities. This is referred to as the problem of “inefficient retirements.”

Dr. Chadalavada discusses several potential adverse consequences of inefficient retirements. As other regions of the country have experienced, the influx of highly weather-dependent renewable resources, combined with the inefficient retirements of higher-cost resources that are not dependent on the weather for their input energy sources, could leave the region without the ability to balance supply and demand during certain periods of the day, such as early evening hours when the lack of sun and wind reduce the availability of photovoltaic (“PV”) solar and wind resources. Further, inefficient retirements of resources that are able to

(qualified capacity) exemption will depend on the particular technology mix that enters, as different renewable energy resources have different qualified capacity values. Using an approximate value of 35 percent for illustration, 700 MW of qualified capacity would correspond to 2,000 MW of installed capacity.

127 Id. at 11–21. As Dr. Chadalavada explains, the transitioning resource mix in California was identified in a root cause analysis as one of the factors that led to capacity shortfalls and rotating outages in California during the August 2021 heat wave. He further explains: “[m]any of the same conditions that led to California’s August 2020 outages have the potential to arise in New England. . . . As in California, the increase of renewable resources will create similar late-day net peak load conditions. To be clear, these changes are happening and are expected to continue regardless of the MOPR’s elimination. At the same time, the entry of significant volumes of ‘below cost’ state-sponsored resources into the market from the MOPR’s immediate elimination is likely to hasten the retirement of higher-cost resources that are not dependent on the weather for their input energy sources and which would otherwise be available to serve load during net peak periods.” Chadalavada Testimony at 21.
operate in extended cold conditions could also exacerbate the challenges the region faces in maintaining reliability during winter severe weather events when solar generation output can be limited and wind resources can be susceptible to icing and high wind shutdowns.\textsuperscript{128}

Fundamentally, these concerns reflect the fact that the reliability attributes of the capacity that might exit the system, and upon which the region heavily relies and will continue to rely under a changing resource mix, are not necessarily available from the new resources that will enter the system with the MOPR’s elimination. This point is further illustrated by the following example from Dr. Chadalavada’s testimony.

[T]oday, a new solar resource’s summer qualified capacity as a percent of nameplate capacity is typically 50 percent that of a thermal resource, reflecting the former’s lower average output during reliability hours. Therefore, 800 MWs of nameplate PV solar projects would have a summer qualified capacity of 400 MW in the FCA, and a nameplate 400 MW (for this example) of thermal projects would have a summer qualified capacity of 400 MW.

However, as the system transitions to reflect high periods of demand in the evenings (after the sun sets) on hot summer days, as seen in other regions of the country, \textit{and} during cold winter hours when it is dark in New England and winter demand peaks, the actual contributions to reliability of the PV solar resource may be a fraction of the 400 MW for which it would be paid.\textsuperscript{129}

As Dr. Chadalavada concludes, the 400 MW of qualified solar capacity does not provide the same reliability benefits to the system as the 400 MW of thermal resources in the FCA, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that many of the existing thermal resources provide additional benefits to the system given their dispatchable and controllable nature.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Need for Time to Complete Necessary Market Reforms}

Additionally, the ISO’s current FCA capacity accreditation rules have not yet been modernized to account for the inefficiencies and potential reliability concerns that might arise with this displacement as the pending resource mix changes begin to alter the system’s reliability risks. Dr. Chadalavada concludes that, “[f]undamentally, under the current FCM rules, the

\textsuperscript{128} Id. at 23–24. As Dr. Chadalavada explains, concerns about the ISO’s ability to reliably meet the region’s energy demands in winter are not theoretical, as just this past January the region experienced a multi-day period involving outages of several large units, including a nuclear unit, the temporary outage of the largest source of liquefied natural gas for the region, an outage of one half of a major interconnection with Quebec, and the potential loss of imports from New York. \textit{See} Chadalavada Testimony at 24-26. He concludes, “if these outages were bunched together sooner, including the loss of the nuclear unit (or) had unfolded closer to the peak hour (or) the duration of the outages that impacted the availability of the Saint John LNG terminal and ties with our neighbors was much longer, the reliability consequences would have been significantly more severe.” Chadalavada Testimony at 26.

\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 13–14.

\textsuperscript{130} Id.
qualified capacity values of all capacity resources may not reflect resources’ actual contributions to the system’s reliability as the system transitions to one with substantially more highly variable, weather-dependent resources.”

Adverse Impacts to Reliability from Delays in the Development of Replacement State-Sponsored Resources

Retirement of resources (inefficient or not) with the MOPR’s elimination also raises a second concern, unrelated to any potential inefficiency of those retirements. Specifically, should the MOPR’s elimination spur retirement of existing resources, those retirements, which will take place by a date certain, could occur before new state-sponsored resources that are scheduled to replace them reach commercial operation. As Dr. Chadalavada addresses, state-sponsored resources are not immune to the development delays that have plagued many energy infrastructure projects in New England, and there are reasons to believe that large-scale projects such as offshore wind are and will continue to experience delays. If the elimination of the MOPR prompts the near-term retirement of existing resources upon which the region relies to maintain reliability, and state-sponsored resources whose capacity the market has procured to replace those retiring resources are delayed, the result could be a significant reliability gap.

Dr. Chadalavada illustrates this concern with an example, which shows how the potential reliability risk from new resource development delays should be manageable with the proposed two-year transition, but may not be in the absence of the transition. As he explains, should the MOPR’s immediate elimination prompt entry into the FCM for FCA 17 of the roughly 4,700 MW (or 1,269 MW in qualified capacity) of offshore wind projects that have been awarded long-term contracts and are in various stages of development, prompting retirement of a similar quantity (in qualified capacity) of existing resources in the same timeframe, and should those new projects face delays of even a single year beyond the date at which the existing resources will retire, the existing forecasted capacity surplus from FCA 16 of 1,165 MW could result in a capacity deficit, or negative planning margin, of roughly 104 MW. This, Dr. Chadalavada concludes, would pose a “serious resource adequacy concern to the region for that commitment period.”

131 Id. at 14.
132 Id. at 27–30.
133 Id. at 27.
134 Id. at 32–38.
135 This 4,700 MW reflects the offshore wind projects that are under state contract, as reflected in the “Contracted MW” column in the summary table provided in Section V, supra.
136 Chadalavada Testimony at 31–38.
137 Id. at 37. As Dr. Chadalavada explains, while the current FCM rules permit the ISO to delay a resource retirement when the retirement would create a reliability problem, those mechanisms are available only to address certain defined local transmission security issues. See Tariff, Market Rule 1, Section III.13.2.5.2.5(a); ISO New England Planning Procedure No. 10, Planning Procedure to Support the Forward Capacity Market, at Sections 6.0 and 7.0, available at https://www.iso-ne.com/static-
For all of these reasons, the ISO anticipates that a more graduated transition to the BSMPR Reforms would minimize the reliability risks to the region. The transition proposal sets a steady pace for new, sponsored technologies to displace existing resources over two auction cycles, and gives the new resources time to become commercial. More certainty around the quantity of sponsored resources entering the market should attenuate the potential for inefficient retirements and the resource adequacy gap that could result from potential delays in the development of replacement resources.\(^\text{138}\)

By capping the entry of unmitigated state-sponsored resources over a two-year transition to the implementation of the replacement buyer-side mitigation rules, the Transition Mechanism achieves several objectives that counter the concerns over inefficient retirements. First, the Transition Mechanism provides investors in competitive (i.e., unsubsidized) resources with certainty as to the amount of new state-sponsored resource capacity that may offer and clear in the FCA 17 and FCA 18 primary auctions without price mitigation. The limit is intended to create predictability about the potential for clearing price impacts that may occur as a result of the introduction of below-cost offers in those auctions. This predictability will render it less likely that these resources will retire before the ISO is able to complete important market design enhancements that will provide for a more efficient transition of the region’s resource mix.\(^\text{139}\)

Second, the transition affords time to complete development of those market designs. The two-year transition period provides the region time to work to complete two market design enhancements, the first to overhaul the method the ISO employs to establish capacity resource accreditation values, and the second to implement day-ahead ancillary services.\(^\text{140}\) These design changes, and their relation to the transition mechanism, are discussed in more detail below.

Third, the two-year transition affords more time for large-scale state-sponsored resources to complete construction before retirements occur. This will help reduce the risk that delays in construction will leave the region incapable of meeting its resource adequacy needs in the face of resource retirements.\(^\text{141}\)

ii. The Time Needed for the Region to Work to Complete Important Market Design Enhancements

The two-year transition period affords the ISO, as well as the region’s stakeholders, time to focus efforts on developing and filing with the Commission two market enhancements that

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\(^\text{138}\) Chadalavada Testimony at 6–7, 11–12.

\(^\text{139}\) Id. at 30–31, 32.

\(^\text{140}\) Id. at 42–45.

\(^\text{141}\) Id. at 32–38.
will help ensure the markets properly value the attributes of the resources that are needed to reliably operate a power system with high concentrations of renewable resources.

First, the ISO has begun working with stakeholders to develop a proposal for revising the methodology employed to establish the capacity values of resources participating in the Forward Capacity Market, referred to as the resource capacity accreditation project. Working with the region, the ISO plans to overhaul the manner in which resources participating in the FCM receive capacity values, away from the current approach that produces values based on the ability of the resource to serve gross peak load, to a methodology that accredits resource capacity values based on their marginal reliability contribution to reducing expected unserved load (whenever it may occur).142

Completing the capacity accreditation project by the time the BSMPR Reforms are fully implemented in FCA 19 will allow the ISO to more accurately track and account for the relative reliability benefits of state sponsored resources that are entering the market and the loss of such benefits from resources that are exiting.143 Given the influx of sponsored resources that is anticipated when the BSMPR Reforms are implemented, and the reasonable concerns over the potential for existing resources to exit the market at that time, attempting to coordinate the BSMPR Reforms’ implementation with the planned completion of the capacity accreditation project will help to ensure that the market continues to meet its resource adequacy objective.144

The ISO has held two technical sessions with New England stakeholders to discuss concepts and hear ideas and concerns regarding resource capacity accreditation. The ISO plans to begin the formal stakeholder process to develop a proposal in June 2022. As Dr. Chadalavada explains, the ISO plans to refine its design efforts as it begins the stakeholder discussions, and anticipates continuing those efforts in parallel, allowing it to incorporate feedback from stakeholders into its design.145

Currently, stakeholder discussions are scheduled to continue through 2022 and be completed in June 2023, with a filing to the Commission to follow shortly thereafter.146 This

142 Id. at 43–45. As Dr. Chadalavada explains, “It is anticipated that the revised approach will account for intermittency, limitations on fuel supplies, and other factors traditionally ignored in resource adequacy assessment and capacity qualification processes (and largely ignored in the ISO’s current process).”

143 Id. at 43–44.

144 Id.

145 Id. at 44.

146 See ISO New England’s 2022 Annual Work Plan, October 8, 2021 (“2022 AWP”), at slide 5, available at https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2021/10/2022_awp_final_10_08_21.pdf. Note that while the 2022 AWP indicates that the ISO intends to complete the resource capacity accreditation project in two phases, the ISO subsequently clarified that the interdependencies between the various aspects of the design effort require a single phase development effort, and committed to a design for implementation in FCA 19. See NEPOOL Participants Committee, February 3, 2022 Meeting.
The schedule is anticipated to permit the ISO to incorporate the new resource capacity accreditation methodology for FCA 19 (to be held in February 2025), a process that begins in February 2024.\footnote{Chadalavada Testimony at 44. While an overhaul of the capacity accreditation process is of critical importance as the region transitions to a resource mix that is heavily concentrated with intermittent resources, to date the market has not been under-procuring capacity under the existing capacity accreditation rules, and is achieving its primary reliability objective. The concern with capacity accreditation arises primarily with the shift to higher concentrations of intermittent or “just in time” resources, which the BSMPR Reforms are very likely to facilitate. \textit{See id.} at 44-45.}

In addition to the resource capacity accreditation reforms, the ISO plans to re-propose the day-ahead ancillary services that the Commission rejected when filed as a response to the Commission’s order instructing the ISO to address regional energy security concerns.\footnote{ISO New England Inc., 173 FERC ¶ 61,106 (2020).} The ISO remains convinced that employing at least some portion of those ancillary services will help ensure the markets properly compensate resources for several resource attributes that the ISO currently relies upon (albeit, currently without compensation through the markets). These ancillary services will be of even greater importance once the system is more heavily dependent upon intermittent renewable resources.\footnote{See Chadalavada Testimony at 26–27.} The ISO will begin discussions of its day-ahead ancillary services design in 2022, and currently plans to complete the project and file these market enhancements in mid-to-late 2023.\footnote{2022 AWP at slide 6; Chadalavada Testimony at 45.}

It is important to underscore that the proposed package of Tariff revisions in this filing is not contingent upon completion of either of these market reforms or filings. If the Commission accepts this filing, the MOPR will be eliminated and the BSMPR Reforms will be implemented for FCA 19. While the ISO is aggressively pursuing the development of both the day-ahead ancillary services and the resource capacity accreditation reforms, and has developed work plans that provide for their implementation for FCA 19, ultimately those projects—in particular the capacity accreditation reforms—are in their design phases and will require significant engagement with stakeholders, the New England states, and ultimately the Commission, before they are implemented. As Dr. Chadalavada concludes, “It is simply not possible to guarantee to the region that those market design enhancements will be completed for FCA 19, despite our very strong desire to complete both projects for implementation simultaneously with the BSMPR Reforms in FCA 19.”\footnote{Chadalavada Testimony at 46.}

iii. The Basis for the 700 MW Cap on State-Sponsored Resource Entry During the Two-Year Transition

Critically, the Transition Mechanism permits entry of a significant quantity of state-sponsored resources over the course of its two-year term. For FCA 17, 300 MW of state-sponsored resources are exempted from the buyer-side mitigation rules, and an additional 400 MW are exempted in FCA 18.152

The 700 MW value was proposed by the proponents of the Transition Mechanism during the stakeholder process as a reasonable amount of capacity to exempt from the MOPR for the two-year period leading up to its elimination.153 The ISO understands that representatives of many of the generating companies that rely on wholesale markets and deploy private capital affected by the entry of these resources, have generally agreed with the proposed quantity of resources in the renewed renewables exemption, and that the states contracting for these renewable resources are not opposed to this exemption value.154

As Dr. Chadalavada explains, the stakeholder-derived 700 MW value is reasonable, given (1) the recent precedent of the RTR Exemption, which permitted up to 600 MW of entry over a three-year period, (2) the agreement and support by a broad section of stakeholders, and (3) that sponsored resources such as solar, onshore wind, battery storage, and hybrid technologies, have lower market entry costs that increase significantly the likelihood of those resources clearing and receiving a Capacity Supply Obligation despite application of the MOPR.155

iv. The Proposed Transition is Consistent with Prior Transition Mechanisms for Major Market Design Enhancements

The ISO has proposed, and the Commission has accepted, transition mechanisms for other significant market design enhancements. Of particular note is the transition demand curves proposed for the implementation of marginal reliability impact or “MRI” demand curves in the Forward Capacity Market in 2016.156 The MRI demand curves enhancements introduced both system-wide and zonal demand curves that reflect the marginal reliability impact of adding an increment of capacity at a location (i.e., in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone or a constrained

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152 See infra, Section VIII.A, and McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 8–13, for further details of this aspect of the Transition Mechanism and its relation to the continuation of CASPR for the period of the transition.

153 NEPOOL Participants Committee, February 3, 2022 Meeting, Agenda Item 5: Memorandum to Participants Committee Regarding ISO-NE’s Proposal to Remove the Minimum Offer Price Rule from the Forward Capacity Market, Attachment C1, D1, and D2 (describing a two year transition period and base RTR exemptions of 300 MW for FCA 17 and 400 MW for FCA 18), available at https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/02/npc-2022-02-03-composite4.pdf.

154 Chadalavada Testimony at 40–41.

155 Id. at 41–42.

As part of the MRI demand curves filing, the ISO, with broad stakeholder support, proposed a transition curve, which was a hybrid of the then existing linear demand curve design and the new MRI-based design. In explaining the need for the transition curve, the ISO argued that it would help address investor and developer concerns that might otherwise arise due to potentially significant changes in short-term clearing prices if the MRI demand curves were implemented without the transition.

In the absence of a transition, an immediate and abrupt switch from the existing linear demand curve to the new MRI-based system demand curve would shift the system demand curve significantly to the left for a wide range of prices, which may suddenly and unexpectedly lower anticipated short-term clearing prices and increase the perceived investment risk associated with developing new capacity in New England. The ISO also has concluded that a transition mechanism should help maintain developer/investor confidence in the market and may lower the risk of higher bid prices that could result from a perception of an unstable, riskier market.

The Commission accepted the transition curve, finding it “a balanced approach for implementing the proposed MRI-based demand curves as early as reasonable.” It further explained that while implementing the MRI-based demand curves immediately could “result in additional short-term consumer savings,” nevertheless employing a transition “promotes long-term cost-effectiveness for the market, while promoting investor confidence.” It further noted the wide-spread stakeholder support the transition curve garnered.

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157 MRI Demand Curves Filing at 2, 5–7.
158 Id. at 15.
159 Id. at 15–16.
161 MRI Demand Curves Order at P 62.
162 Id. at P 62. Prior to its proposal of a transition for the MRI demand curves, the ISO proposed a longer, six-year phase-in of the Capacity Performance Payment Rate, a critical feature of the pay-for-performance capacity market redesign proposed in 2014. ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm. Filings of Performance Incentives Market Rule Changes, Docket No. ER14-1050-000 (filed January 17, 2014), ISO-NE transmittal letter at 24. In support of the phase-in, the ISO argued that it would “smooth the introduction” of the pay-for-performance design, allowing participants to gain experience under the new design and afford the ISO the ability to evaluate performance under the new design and to make any adjustments that may be needed. Id. In accepting the phase-in, the Commission found it to be one of several aspects of the ISO’s proposal that “appropriately help balance or limit capacity suppliers’ risk exposure,” 147 FERC ¶ 61,172 at P 69 (2014), and further agreed with the ISO that the phase-in would allow suppliers to gain experience with the new market at “reduced risk exposure” and permit the ISO to evaluate and assess whether adjustments to the payment rate may be necessary. 147 FERC ¶ 61,172 at P 73 (2014).
As with the transition curve, the proposed Transition Mechanism is an important component of the Filings Parties’ proposal, necessary to ensure a proper balancing of consumer and investor interests. Similar to the transition curve, the Transition Mechanism provides investors in competitive resources with certainty as to the amount of new state-sponsored resource capacity that may clear the next two FCAs without offer price mitigation, thus minimizing the potential for inefficient retirements and the deleterious impacts of such retirements. It also affords the region time to implement important market enhancements that will allow the market to properly value the reliability attributes of all resources on the system, which is critical as the region transitions to a renewables-dominant resource mix. The Transition Mechanism also limits the impacts to consumers by permitting entry of a substantial quantity of state-sponsored resources and avoiding the potential for costly resource adequacy and reliability issues. Finally, as with the transition curve, the Transition Mechanism received wide-spread stakeholder support. For these reasons, the ISO strongly supports the adoption of the Transition Mechanism as a component of the proposed buyer-side market power mitigation reforms.

b. Future Adjustment to Net CONE to Address Cost of Capital Impacts and Investor Confidence Going Forward

Even with the Transition Mechanism, it is possible that the elimination of the MOPR may increase the financial risk for participants in the FCM, which may serve to undermine investor confidence in the market. The ISO can take steps, going forward, to address these concerns. While these steps are not included as part of the current proposal, the ISO anticipates that they may be a necessary consequence of the MOPR’s elimination and replacement with the new buyer-side market power mitigation rules in FCA 19, and intends to work with stakeholders and the states to address these steps prior to the elimination of the MOPR in FCA 19.

The ISO’s External Market Monitor (“EMM”) has observed that one material consequence of eliminating the MOPR is that future capacity market revenues may become more

163 In this regard, while it is often assumed that entry of state-sponsored resources into the FCM will lower capacity clearing prices, it should be recognized that under certain conditions, it could have the opposite impact, a point the ISO raised with stakeholders when discussing its support for a transition mechanism: “While it is widely expected that the elimination of the MOPR will reduce capacity clearing prices and total capacity market costs to consumers, it is not the only possible outcome. Depending on the size and geographic pattern of sponsored policy resources that could enter with a more abrupt MOPR elimination, and the size and location of resulting retirements and/or delists, it could potentially increase the clearing price in certain or all capacity zones – with attendant increased costs to consumers. That is because the steepness of the demand curve in (certain) capacity zones may make clearing prices sensitive to potential retirements that may follow the MOPR’s elimination. In contrast, the MOPR transition will temper the potential displacement of existing resources and limit the likelihood of abruptly increasing capacity costs in such a zone by providing a less-volatile, more measured adjustment of capacity cost to consumers over time, as the clean-energy transition proceeds.” See ISO Transition Support Memo at 3-4.

164 See infra, Section X, for a discussion of the stakeholder process and support for the filed proposal.
volatile, resulting in increased financial risk for merchant resource owners and developers.\textsuperscript{165} The EMM noted, and the ISO agrees, that this increased level of financial risk may erode investor confidence, an impact that would be most directly signaled by an increase in the cost of capital.

More specifically, if investors in non-state sponsored resources are increasingly uncertain whether or not, over the long-term, they will be able to recover their costs through the market, they will demand a higher rate of return on their investments. Unless the parameters governing the FCM are adjusted to reflect that higher cost of capital, investors may be unwilling to maintain sufficient resources, or to bring forth sufficient replacement resources, for the region to continue to meet its resource adequacy objectives. In effect, with a loss in merchant investors’ confidence and higher future costs of capital, the system could conceivably swing from the current elevated risk of overbuild (under the current MOPR) to an elevated risk of resource insufficiency (with its elimination), unless the region makes further adjustments to the capacity market’s assumptions regarding the cost of capital.

The EMM recommended that one way to account for the increased uncertainty is to adjust the Net CONE value to reflect an increase in that cost of capital.\textsuperscript{166} The Net CONE value is used in establishing the FCA demand curves (as well as several other parameters in the FCM). The demand curves are designed to ensure that, on average over time, the market pays the estimated net cost of new entry at the amount of installed capacity necessary to meet the 1-day-in-10 reliability target for the region.\textsuperscript{167} Thus, reflecting in the Net CONE value any increase in the cost of capital that is engendered by the unmitigated entry of state-sponsored resources is the most direct way to ensure merchant investors in non-sponsored resources—which are wholly dependent on the ISO-administered markets for the return on their investments—of the opportunity to recover those costs.\textsuperscript{168}


\textsuperscript{167} MRI Demand Curves Filing at 7–8.

\textsuperscript{168} In discussions with stakeholders on its analysis, the EMM estimated that, were the BSMPR Reforms implemented for FCA 17, the after-tax weighted cost of equity would increase to 10.51 percent, primarily as a result of an increase in the level of equity necessary for merchant generation investment (due to revenue volatility). Potomac Economics, External Market Monitor, Evaluation of Changes in the Minimum Offer Price Rules on Financial Risk in New England, at 48 (November 2021), available at https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/a00_nov_9_10_mc_meeting_materials_2nd_set.zip. This increase in the cost of
While the instant filing does not propose a change to Net CONE based on the EMM’s work as discussed above, the ISO intends to continue to work with the EMM, states, and stakeholders during the transition period to monitor the impact of the MOPR’s elimination. Unless further analysis by the EMM suggests that a cost of capital adjustment for FCA 19 is unnecessary, the ISO plans to propose such an adjustment—updated for the relevant period—to stakeholders for implementation with the full elimination of the MOPR for FCA 19.

VII. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE REPLACEMENT BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER REVIEW AND MITIGATION RULES

A. Overview of the Replacement Buyer-Side Mitigation Proposal

The BSMPR Reforms proposal retains certain core features of the ISO’s existing buyer-side mitigation rules, while eliminating the overall MOPR structure and its use of offer floor prices for all new capacity resources. Importantly, the reforms eliminate technology-specific ORTPs, which require significant ISO and stakeholder resources, engender litigation, and are considered to be a primary reason for the exclusion from the market of substantial quantities of state-sponsored resources. The reforms do not set offer floor prices for each and every new capacity resource offering its capacity in the FCA. Instead, the proposal excludes certain new resources from any such offer mitigation because those resources lack either the ability or the incentive to exercise market power (or both), or because exclusion of those resources will address the inefficient overbuild concerns related to the accelerated state procurement of sponsored resources.

Capital would translate to a possible Net CONE increase of 16 percent above the value approved in the FCA 16 ORTP Order, and an estimated future Net CONE of $8.66/kW-month.

169 The calculation of these technology-specific ORTPs (which is re-done every three years) is highly resource intensive, both for the ISO and for stakeholder and state representatives engaged in reviewing the ISO’s calculations, and historically has engendered increasingly significant amounts of litigation. See FCA 16 ORTP Filing at 55–56 (recounting intensive stakeholder process that resulted in contested “jump ball” proceeding of opposing ORTP values and ORTP calculation methodologies). ORTPs are also considered to be the primary reason for the exclusion from the market of substantial quantities of state-sponsored resources, as historically several categories of ORTPs have been well above the clearing prices in the auction. See FCA 16 ORTP Order at PP 76–84 (accepting ISO’s offshore wind capital cost estimate), Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at P 1 (“The majority's adoption of ISO's proposal will, by definition, shunt every offshore wind resource into an administrative pricing construct that is particularly ill-suited to an emerging technology.”), modified by FCA 16 ORTP Rehearing Order; see also Comments and Protest of Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, the New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate, the Maine Office of the Public Advocate, and the Connecticut Office of the Consumer Counsel, FCA 16 ORTP Filing, Docket No. ER21-1637-000, at 8 (filed Apr. 28, 2021) (describing the ISO offshore wind ORTP as “effectively guarantee[ing]” that no offshore wind resource will be able to clear in FCA 16).

170 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 16–17, 21–22. The BSMPR Reform revisions remove references to ORTPs throughout Market Rule 1 and mostly replace Section III.A.21 of Appendix A to Market Rule 1 with a new structure. Proposed Section III.A.21.1 establishes the exclusions from
Specifically, the BSMPR Reforms will exclude the following new capacity resources from any buyer-side review and offer mitigation: (1) resources with a capacity less than or equal to 5 MW (“de minimis resources”); (2) passive demand-response resources, which are currently identified in the Tariff as On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources; (3) new resources that are not receiving or expecting to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets from a load serving entity (“LSE”), state, or subdivision of a state—referred to as “competitive entrants”; and (4) federally or state-sponsored resources receiving or expecting to receive revenues from outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets that are doing so as part of some federal or New England state renewable, clean, decarbonization, net-zero carbon or alternative energy program—which will be captured in an updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition in the Tariff.171 As described further in Section VII.C below, the exclusion from review for competitive entrants or Sponsored Policy Resources is contingent on the Project Sponsor’s certification in a signed affidavit that the new resource meets either the competitive-entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource conditions.

Offers from new capacity resources that are not excluded from buyer-side review and mitigation must undergo a review to determine whether they reflect out-of-market revenues, which will be similar to the IMM’s current buyer-side review.172 In this regard, the proposal retains a core feature of the current mitigation rules, in that, for any new resource that is subject to review, submittal of a “below-cost offer” that reflects out-of-market revenues is sufficient to subject the offer to mitigation. Unlike the existing buyer-side mitigation mechanism, the proposal exempts from mitigation suppliers that are able to demonstrate that, in fact, they lack the incentive to exercise buyer-side market power. This “incentive rebuttal” opportunity—along with the de minimis resource, passive demand-response resource, and competitive-entrant exclusions—grounds the new review and mitigation structure in the long-standing principle that mitigation should generally target only those that have the ability and incentive to exercise market power.173 The details of this incentive rebuttal process are discussed in Section VII.D below.

buyer-side review and mitigation; proposed Section III.A.21.2 establishes the rules for the IMM’s buyer-side review and mitigation; proposed Section III.A.21.3 contains the methodology for calculating New Resource Offer Floor Prices to be used as part of the buyer-side review and mitigation, and it retains the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculation methodology that exists today with certain adjustments described herein.


172 See Section VII.D below for additional details regarding this review.

173 See, e.g., Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,297 at P 35 (2003) (“Both the ability and incentive to raise prices by restricting access are necessary for a vertical market power problem to exist.”); NiSource Inc., 92 FERC ¶ 61,068 at 61,239 (2000) (“Because the merged company must have both the ability and incentive to adversely affect electricity prices or output, and the merged company will lack the former, no further findings are necessary.”). See also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,137 at P 31 (2017) (mandating an exemption from NYISO’s buyer-side mitigation rules for certain new demand response resources on the grounds that such resources “have
The ISO’s proposed buyer-side review structure effectively creates three separate tranches of new capacity resources. The first tranche, which includes de minimis resources and passive demand-response resources, are the resources that receive no buyer-side review and are not subject to mitigation.\(^{174}\) The second tranche, which includes competitive entrants and Sponsored Policy Resources, are the resources that receive no buyer-side review and are not mitigated, contingent on the ISO’s acceptance of a certification (referred to in a new Tariff definition as “Load-Side Relationship Certification”\(^ {175}\)) that identifies the resource as either a competitive entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource. Finally, the third tranche, which includes new capacity resources that do not qualify for an exclusion, are resources that are subject to the IMM’s resource-specific buyer-side review and potential offer mitigation.

The ISO’s proposed BSMPR Reforms strike a reasonable balance between under-mitigation and over-mitigation of new capacity resource offers in the FCM. First, consistent with Commission precedent, the proposal recognizes and justifies a range of circumstances where buyer-side market power review is either unnecessary to protect against uncompetitive bidding in the market,\(^ {176}\) or where the benefits of mitigation to the market and its investors are likely to be significantly outweighed by the harms to both the market and consumers who ultimately pay its costs.\(^ {177}\) As discussed above, those circumstances are encapsulated in a number of exclusions from buyer-side review and mitigation. For the remaining resources that are subject to review, the ISO’s proposal retains a resource-specific review process that appropriately focuses its analysis on the offer behavior of the sponsor of the resource, including,

\(^{174}\) As explained further in Section VII.B.1 below, there may be circumstances where a de minimis resource’s offer is subject to buyer-side review but not to mitigation.

\(^{175}\) See Section I.2.2 of BSMPR Revisions.

\(^{176}\) See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 143 FERC ¶ 61,090 at P 26 (2013) (finding that proposed exemptions from PJM’s MOPR “appropriately identify entry that is consistent with competitive behavior,” and, therefore, “appropriately balance the need for mitigation of buyer-side market power against the risk of over-mitigation,” so long as PJM retains its unit-specific review process for resources not eligible for the exemptions).

\(^{177}\) Supra at VI.B and VI.C. RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 43. See NextEra Energy, 898 F.3d at 21; RTR Remand Rehearing Order at PP 26, 43.
importantly, on whether that sponsor has an incentive to exercise buyer-side market power in the market.\(^{178}\)

The following, which is organized by the tranches of resources identified above, describes the rationales for and details of each buyer-side review exclusion and the resource-specific review process for resources that cannot claim any exclusion.

**B. First Tranche of New Capacity Resources—No Review or Mitigation**

The first tranche of new capacity resources under the proposed buyer-side review structure includes *de minimis* resources (those with a capacity less than or equal to 5 MW) and passive demand-response resources. The determination of which new resources qualify as either *de minimis* resources or passive demand-response resources will be made from the traditional materials submitted as part of the new resource qualification packages (referred to in the Tariff as the New Capacity Qualification Package or New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package). Project Sponsors do not need to take make any special election or provide any certification for these exclusions to apply. These resources’ offers will not be subject to any buyer-side review, and their offers will not be mitigated.

1. **De Minimis Resource Exclusion**

   The ISO proposes to exclude new *de minimis* resources, those with an FCA Qualified Capacity equal to or less than 5 MW, from any buyer-side review and mitigation.\(^{179}\) The practical effect of this exclusion is to exempt from review and mitigation somewhere in the neighborhood of 80 percent of new capacity resources (by count).\(^{180}\) As detailed in Mr.

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\(^{178}\) See NYISO Self-Supply Rehearing Order at P 31 (finding that “focus on incentive and ability appropriately balances the need to mitigate the exercise of buyer-side market power to ensure just and reasonable ICAP market prices with the risk of over-mitigating new entrants”).

\(^{179}\) Section III.A.21.1.1 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this exclusion: “A New Capacity Resource will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the project’s expected auction capacity (in MW) at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction does not exceed 5 MW.”

\(^{180}\) There is the potential that a new capacity resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity equal to or less than 5 MW will be subject to IMM review. This would occur in the circumstance where a new capacity resource requests to offer more than 5 MW of capacity in the FCA in its qualification package, but the ISO ultimately determines the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity is actually equal to or less than 5 MW. In this circumstance, even if the resource had been subject to the IMM’s review, the resource will not be subject to any offer mitigation. McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 32–34. Section III.A.21.1.1 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions addresses this circumstance: “If a New Capacity Resource’s expected auction capacity exceeds 5 MW at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but the final FCA Qualified Capacity for the New Capacity Resource does not exceed 5 MW, an offer from the New Capacity Resource will not be mitigated pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, notwithstanding any buyer-side market power review that may have been conducted at the time of the qualification process.” This circumstance is addressed again in proposed Section III.A.21.2.3:
McCarthy’s testimony, for FCA 13 through FCA 16, approximately 81 percent of new capacity resources seeking to participate in the FCA had an FCA Qualified Capacity equal to or less than 5 MW.\textsuperscript{181} These \textit{de minimis} resources, however, accounted for only 8.7 percent of the total MW qualified to participate in those FCAs.\textsuperscript{182}

The ISO proposes to exclude these resources from buyer-side review because there is little likelihood that an offer from a \textit{de minimis} resource will have any meaningful impact on FCA clearing prices.\textsuperscript{183} As explained further in Mr. McCarthy’s testimony, the ISO conducted an analysis of how a hypothetical resource five times the \textit{de minimis} threshold—25 MW—would have impacted clearing prices under similar supply and demand conditions that exist today.\textsuperscript{184} A hypothetical 25 MW of new capacity offered into the Rest-of-Pool zone as a price-taker had only a negligible impact on clearing prices.\textsuperscript{185} Knowing that a resource with five times the capacity of a \textit{de minimis} resource would not have a material impact on FCA clearing prices, the ISO chose a conservative limit of 5 MW.\textsuperscript{186} Namely, offers from new \textit{de minimis} resources under current market conditions do not have the ability to impact clearing prices in any material way, and therefore, do not reflect an exercise of buyer-side market power.\textsuperscript{187}

This conservative \textit{de minimis} threshold has the benefit of addressing concerns that an entity controlling or providing out-of-market revenues to a group of small resources below the threshold might use the collective offers from that group to impact market clearing prices. To have a material impact on clearing prices under current market conditions, a load-side interest would have to control or support a group of small resources that will all submit below-cost offers in the FCA in an aggregate capacity that exceeds 25 MW, which may be impractical or costly.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{quote}
“As described in Section III.A.21.1.1, the mitigation described in this Section III.A.21.2.3 will not apply to a New Capacity Resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity that does not exceed the capacity threshold set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1, notwithstanding the results of any buyer-side market power review.”
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{181} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 24.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Id.} at 25.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Id.} at 27–28.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Id.} (explaining use of FCA 15 supply conditions and FCA 16 demand conditions, which were conditions known to ISO at time of analysis).
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Id.} at 27–28.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Id.} at 29–32.
\textsuperscript{187} RTR Remand Rehearing Order at P 10 (2017) (Describing how “intermittent renewable resources with low capacity factors and high development costs have \textit{limited or no incentive and ability to} exercise buyer market power to artificially suppress capacity market prices.”) (emphasis added); \textit{see also} \textit{N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n}, 154 FERC \textsuperscript{\textsection} 61,088 at P 31.
\textsuperscript{188} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 29–32. The ISO also considered the potential for a Project Sponsor to attempt to disaggregate a project that exceeds the threshold into a collection of \textit{de minimis} resources. Any such disaggregation scheme seems unlikely given the checks on artificial disaggregation in the ISO’s resource qualification process, the financial impracticality of such a scheme.
If supply and demand conditions change in such a way that excluding *de minimis* resources from buyer-side review may result in meaningful impacts to clearing prices—either because supply and demand conditions change, or because the ISO and IMM observe that aggregations of such resources threaten competitive market outcomes—the ISO can revisit the *de minimis* threshold and propose to change the threshold as needed.\(^{189}\)

*De minimis* resources constitute the overwhelming majority of new capacity resources seeking to participate in the FCA, but only a small fraction of the total MW qualified to participate in the FCA. The ISO has adopted, and the Commission has accepted, similar size-based exclusions from market power review and mitigation where resource size made the ability to exercise market power unlikely and where the exclusion was administratively efficient.\(^{190}\) The *de minimis* threshold will allow the ISO and the IMM to focus their efforts on reviewing offers that pose real buyer-side market power risks.\(^{191}\)

2. **Passive Demand-Response Exclusion**

The ISO proposes to exclude new passive demand-response resources, which are On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, from any buyer-side review and mitigation.\(^{192}\) The rationale for excluding these resources from any review and mitigation is that

(especially where small resources like photovoltaic solar and batteries may have the potential to qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion), and the ISO’s ability to propose elimination of the *de minimis* exclusion if it appears subject to abuse. *Id.* at 30–32.

\(^{189}\) *Id.* at 28–32. As explained in the McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony, the IMM, as part of its core duties, observes the supply and demand dynamics in the FCM and is empowered to propose to the ISO an appropriate adjustment to the 5 MW threshold, if necessary. *Id.* at 28. Even without an IMM recommendation, the ISO, of course, also may propose adjustments in response to observed supply and demand dynamics and market participant behavior.

\(^{190}\) *See* Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1 (excluding from IMM review Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids where total of such bids from a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates is equal to or less than 20 MW); *ISO New England Inc.*, 155 FERC ¶ 61,029 at P 1 (2016) (accepting filing subject to condition), *clarif. and r’hg denied*, 161 FERC ¶ 61,115 (2017), *order on remand and clarif.*, 166 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2019); *ISO New England Inc.*, Filing of ISO New England Inc. Regarding Forward Capacity Market Retirement Reforms, Prepared Testimony of Jeffrey D. McDonald on Behalf of ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER16-551-000, at 9–10 (filed Dec. 17, 2016) (explaining 20 MW threshold is “intended to relieve the administrative burden on market participants of submitting cost, revenue, and risk information and working with [IMM] through the review process in instances where the retirement is less likely to have an impact on the clearing price” and is “administratively derived and was chosen because it reflects a quantity of capacity that is not likely to have a material impact on the market price”).

\(^{191}\) McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 27.

\(^{192}\) Section III.A.21.1.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures this exclusion: “New Demand Capacity Resources that consist solely of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review.”
a load-side interest would find it nearly impossible to impact market clearing prices through their offers in the FCA. This lack of ability to impact prices is related to the way the capacity of these resources is treated in the construction of the load data used to determine the FCA’s demand curve.\footnote{193}{McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 34–35.}

Passive demand-response resources offer capacity in the FCA as suppliers, but because they are load reductions, they impact measurements of load. Historical load data, which is used to determine the demand curve, is adjusted prior to each FCA to add back in the load reductions from these passive demand-response resources—a process referred to as “reconstitution.” Reconstitution aligns the load forecast, and thus the demand assumptions underpinning the FCA’s demand curve, with passive demand-response participation as supply in the FCA.\footnote{194}{Id. at 34.}

The effect of reconstitution of passive demand-response MWs is a rightward shift in the demand curve proportionate to the rightward shift in the supply curve from including such resources in the supply stack. As a result, offers from such resources have little impact on FCA clearing prices. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a load-side interest sponsoring such resources to exercise buyer-side market power through them.\footnote{195}{Id. at 35.} Because a load-side interest would lack the ability to exercise buyer-side market power through these resources, the ISO is excluding such resources from buyer-side review and mitigation.\footnote{196}{As a practical matter, the exclusion is not any meaningful deviation from how such resources are treated under the current MOPR mechanism. A significant portion of passive demand-response resources are energy efficiency resources that are currently assigned an ORTP of $0.00/kW-month and can enter the auction as price-takers. McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 35.}

\section*{C. Second Tranche Offer Review Treatment—No Review or Mitigation, Contingent on Certification}

The ISO proposes to exclude new competitive entrants (i.e., those resources without any out-of-market support from a load-side interest) and new Sponsored Policy Resources from buyer-side review and mitigation, contingent, however, on the Project Sponsor’s demonstration through a certification that the resource qualifies as either a competitive entrant or a Sponsored Policy Resource.\footnote{197}{Section III.A.21.1.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures the certification requirement and the second-tranche exclusions: “New Capacity Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the Project Sponsor submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification, as described in this Section III.A.21.1.3, demonstrating one of the following qualifying circumstances: . . . .”}

The certification, referred to in the proposal as a Load-Side Relationship
Certification, must include a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes sufficient factual detail to make such a demonstration.\textsuperscript{198}

Project Sponsors must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the new resource’s qualification package.\textsuperscript{199} The ISO will review the Load-Side Relationship Certification during the qualification process and determine if the certification demonstrates either competitive-entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource status. If the ISO accepts the Load-Side Relationship Certification, the resource may proceed to the FCA, if otherwise qualified to do so, without any buyer-side review or mitigation. If the ISO rejects the Load-Side Relationship Certification, the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor, and the resource will be treated as though it is in the third tranche of new capacity resources.\textsuperscript{200} Namely, upon notification, the Project Sponsor will be required to provide (1) the lowest offer price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the FCA and (2) the resource’s cost workbooks.\textsuperscript{201} The IMM will then proceed with the resource-specific buyer-side review reserved for the third tranche of new capacity resources (which is explained more fully below in Section VII.D).\textsuperscript{202}

1. **Competitive-Entrant Exclusion**

To qualify for the competitive-entrant exclusion, the Project Sponsor must certify in the Load-Side Relationship Certification that the Project Sponsor and any of the Project Sponsor’s

\textsuperscript{198} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 37–38. Section III.A.21.1.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions sets forth the sworn affidavit requirement: “To demonstrate such circumstances, the Project Sponsor must include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances.”

\textsuperscript{199} The requirement to provide the certification as part of the qualification package is set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.9, and also captured in the new defined term in Section I.2.2.

\textsuperscript{200} Section III.A.21.1.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions sets forth this treatment: “The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification with the New Capacity Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2, or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource’s offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.”

\textsuperscript{201} The requirement to provide this information if the ISO rejects the Load-Side Relationship Certification is captured in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions (“A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.”) and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

\textsuperscript{202} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 37–38.
affiliated entities or partners (1) are not LSEs and (2) are not receiving or expecting to receive any revenues (except revenues in an ISO-administered market) from an LSE, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the new resource.  Specifically, the new capacity resource cannot receive out-of-market support from an LSE or state or local public entity.

The ISO proposes the competitive-entrant exclusion because competitive entrants do not have the requisite incentive to exercise buyer-side market power. Simply, there is no load-side interest promoting the entry of the resource, or otherwise associated with the resource, that would benefit from lowering capacity clearing prices. To the extent the new resource is receiving revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a private commercial entity that is not a load-side interest, it is not economically logical to presume that such an entity has an incentive to lower market clearing prices or is in the position to exercise buyer-side market power. To the contrary, a private commercial entity providing funding to a resource may very likely be doing so as an investor seeking a return on its investment, and likely has an incentive to want higher clearing prices.

The Commission has previously determined in other regions that “buyer-side mitigation rules should not be applied to competitive unsubsidized merchant resources because these resources do not have the incentive to exercise buyer-side market power.” As the Commission explained when directing NYISO to exclude such resources from mitigation:

[S]ubjecting such resources to an offer floor serves no competitive objective or market efficiency, regardless of whether they are judged uneconomic according to NYISO’s existing buyer-side mitigation exemption test, because customers do not

Section III.A.21.1.3(a) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures the requirements: “[T]he Project Sponsor and its Affiliates or partners, if any, are not load serving entities and are neither receiving nor expecting to receive any revenues from a load-serving entity, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource (excepting any revenues earned through an ISO-administered market)[.]”

McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 39–40. Out-of-market support solely from the federal government, which is not currently mitigated out of new capacity resource offers under the MOPR mechanism, will not disqualify a resource from qualifying for the competitive-entrant exemption. Id. at 40. The Commission has suggested that buyer-side mitigation should not apply to resources only receiving out-of-market support from the federal government. See Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 at P 10 (2019) (suggesting that buyer-side mitigation removing the impact of federal support would “disregard or nullify the effects of federal legislation”), clarif. and r’hg granted in part and denied in part, 171 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2020).

McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 39.

Id. at 39.

bear the risk or costs of uneconomic entry of such resources. The competitive market process alone is sufficient to discipline competitive unsubsidized merchant entry. . . . Because a purely merchant generator places its own capital at risk when it invests in a new resource, any such resource will have a strong incentive to bid its true costs into the auction, and it will clear the market only when it is cost effective. 208

Overall, the Commission has indicated that it is “unreasonable” not to exclude competitive entrants from buyer-side mitigation and that a mitigation scheme that subjects competitive entrants to mitigation fails to achieve the correct balance between over-mitigation and under-mitigation. 209 Further, the Commission has approved competitive-entrant exemptions that rely on market participant certifications as the basis for granting the exemption. 210 Consequently, the ISO’s proposal to adopt a certification-based, competitive-entrant exclusion for its new buyer-side review and mitigation rules ensures the ISO is striking the right balance between over-mitigation and under-mitigation in a way that is consistent Commission precedent.

2. Sponsored Policy Resource Exclusion

To qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion, the Project Sponsor must certify in the Load-Side Relationship Certification that the new resource meets all three elements of the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition. The three elements, as set forth in the proposed Tariff language for the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition, are: (1) “receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism”; (2) “qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute,

208 Id. at P 46 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 40.

209 Consol. Edison, 150 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 4 (“Our action today also is consistent with our desire to balance two objectives: preventing the exercise of market power to depress capacity prices, and providing flexibility to project developers to implement certain business decisions without inappropriate regulatory restrictions. Here, the Commission is directing modifications to NYISO’s buyer-side mitigation rules to allow for private investors, relying solely on market revenues, to enter the capacity market unmitigated upon certifying that they are a purely merchant investment, with no out of market subsidy. Without these modifications, private investors would be unnecessarily mitigated and possibly deterred from entering the market altogether. Such an outcome is unreasonable. . . . [T]he modifications we are directing today strike the balance that the Commission is seeking with respect to buyer-side mitigation rules.”).

210 See Calpine, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 at P 15 (allowing certification-based exemption for competitive entrants other than new gas-fired resources); Consol. Edison, 150 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 79.
regulation, or executive or administrative order”; and (3) “as a result of [such standard or goal] the resource receives the revenue source.”

In order to provide sufficient details such that the ISO can determine whether a resource meets the elements of the Sponsored Policy Resource definition, the BSMPR Reforms require that the Project Sponsor include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification “factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances.” The ISO anticipates that such detail will include, at minimum, the identity of the specific federal or New England state statute, regulation, or order that sets out the decarbonization standard or goal deeming the resource renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative. The Load-Side Relationship Certification should also explain how the revenue source received by the resource is a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism and is related to the identified standard or goal. The Project Sponsor should also include sufficient detail that will allow the ISO to resolve any ambiguities that may exist regarding the resource’s status under the identified federal or state standard or goal, as well as any ambiguities that may exist regarding the nature of the federal or state standard or goal. If a Project Sponsor provides insufficient detail for the ISO to determine whether the resource qualifies as a Sponsored Policy Resource, or if the Project Sponsor simply fails to submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the resource will be subject to the IMM’s resource-specific buyer-side review.

As explained above in Sections III and VI, the ISO’s rationale for creating a Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion is its concern about the growing overbuild problem. The exclusion responds to the need to balance the economic inefficiencies of the overbuild problem with the market inefficiencies of allowing new resources to submit offers in the FCA that reflect the influence of out-of-market revenues. Since the ISO designed the CASPR substitution auction, the New England states have accelerated their plans to procure non-emitting resources and their

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211 The updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition is proposed as part of Section I.2.2 of the Transition Mechanism revisions. As explained further in Section VIII.A below, the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition created as part of the proposed BSMPR Reforms has been adopted as part of the Transition Mechanism as well.

212 BSMPR Reforms, Section III.A.21.1.3.

213 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 54. Generally, resources that generate RECs pursuant to existing New England state RPS programs and resources that have power purchase agreements with LSEs that were mandated by existing state clean-energy procurement programs will qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion. See id. at 47, 49, 53. However, the ISO will not make any resource-specific determinations about which resources qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion without first reviewing a Load-Side Relationship Certification submitted for the resource. Id. at 53–54.

214 BSMPR Reforms, Section III.A.21.1.3 (“If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource’s offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.”).
economy-wide decarbonization efforts.\textsuperscript{215} With the substitution auction failing to accommodate the state-sponsored resources seeking to enter the FCM today, and with the acceleration of the states’ efforts, the ISO believes that a Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion is a reasonable way to address the economic inefficiencies of overbuild within the ISO’s buyer-side review and mitigation structure.\textsuperscript{216}

Moreover, as addressed above, excluding state-supported resources from buyer-side mitigation is not without precedent in the history of the FCM. The current Tariff excludes state and local economic development incentives from its definition of “out-of-market revenues,” meaning that such incentives are not excluded when the ISO calculates ORTPs and the IMM calculates a resource-specific capacity price estimate for a new capacity resource. Section III.A.21.2(b)(1) of the current Tariff states, “Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues . . . .” The Tariff recognizes that economic development incentives are generally not state support aimed at participation in the FCM. Economic development incentives appear to compensate other benefits from developing the resource, such as job creation and financial investment in the local community.\textsuperscript{217} Similarly, state support for Sponsored Policy Resources is usually about resource benefits that are not within the purview of ISO’s wholesale energy markets; namely, the renewable and non-emitting attributes of these resources.\textsuperscript{218}

To better accommodate the range of state-sponsored resources in existence today and anticipated in the future, the ISO proposes to update the Sponsored Policy Resource definition, which sets forth the exclusion’s qualification requirements, with the following changes:

- replacement of the phrase “out-of-market revenue source” with “revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets,” which primarily will ensure that resources generating Class I RECs are treated as part of the exclusion;\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{215} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 43–44.

\textsuperscript{216} See id. at 43–45.

\textsuperscript{217} Id. at 45–46.


\textsuperscript{219} As explained in the McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony, Class I RECs are not “out-of-market revenues” as the Tariff defines that term, and revenues earned from selling Class I RECs are not
expansion of the list of terms describing state-sponsored clean energy resources and decarbonization programs to better reflect evolving nomenclature;\textsuperscript{220}

expansion of the phrase “enacted either by statute or regulation” to include “enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order,” simply to ensure that any federal or state decarbonization standards or goals with the force of law are not inadvertently excluded from the definition;\textsuperscript{221}

replacement of “from which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source” with “as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source,” to recognize circumstances where a state program may provide a revenue source for a clean energy resource in a somewhat indirect or implicit manner;\textsuperscript{222}

finally, and perhaps most importantly, elimination of the date restriction on decarbonization programs recognized under the definition, which will allow new resources qualifying under recently enacted and future decarbonization programs to utilize the exclusion.\textsuperscript{223}

In sum, the ISO has designed a Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion that should encompass all federal and state-sponsored resources receiving support from federal and New England state decarbonization programs that have the force of law, both now and in the future. Crucially, the terms of the exclusion are limited to resources that, pursuant to federal or state law, are receiving or will receive government-directed funds.\textsuperscript{224} Namely, the exclusion is limited to those resources that are most likely to be built independent of any FCM revenues and that will thereby contribute to the inefficient overbuild risk that underpins the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion mitigated by the MOPR. For simplicity and the purpose of ensuring all revenues associated with federal and state decarbonization programs are treated alike under the new buyer-side review structure, both the competitive-entrant exclusion and the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion avoid the use of the term “out-of-market.” McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 48–49.

\textsuperscript{220} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 49–50 (clarifying that Sponsored Policy Resource definition, although updated, still requires resources to qualify as renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative as so determined by the relevant federal or state program, not some other measure).

\textsuperscript{221} Id. at 50.

\textsuperscript{222} Mr. McCarthy’s testimony provides the example of Massachusetts’ recently enacted S.B. 9, which creates an RPS for municipally-owned electric distribution systems (“municipal systems”) within the state and implicitly recognizes that municipal systems may fund compliance with the RPS requirements using the rates they charge their retail customers. McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 51–52.

\textsuperscript{223} Id. at 52.

\textsuperscript{224} Id. at 46, 51–52.
exclusion. The Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion is narrowly crafted to extend only as far as necessary to address the inefficient overbuild issue and to respect the New England states’ policy choices about generation facilities that are aimed at protecting the health and welfare of their residents.

D. Third Tranche of New Capacity Resources—Resource-Specific Buyer-Side Review

For new capacity resources that do not meet the requirements of any of the exclusions described above (referred to here as “third-tranche resources”), the IMM will conduct a resource-specific buyer-side review similar to the resource-specific review the IMM currently conducts when a resource seeks to offer its capacity in the FCA at a price below the ORTP. Similar to a resource asking for a price below the ORTP today, a third-tranche resource must submit as part of its qualification package (1) the lowest price at which it requests to offer capacity in the FCA and (2) supporting cost workbooks, with sufficient documentation and information for the IMM to conduct its review. The cost workbook information is the same information a resource subject to the IMM’s resource-specific review must submit today.

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225 Id. at 46, 51–52. As explained by Mr. McCarthy, the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion, while grounded in the “will be built anyway” rationale, is a conservative approach and does not extend to just any resource a New England state will build independent of the receipt of FCM revenues. The ISO is not aware of other New England state energy programs that are directed at protecting the health and welfare of their residents and that present risks of inefficient overbuild similar to the states’ decarbonization programs. Id. at 52–53.

226 Section III.A.21.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions describes third-tranche treatment: “With the exception of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in Section III.A.21.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall review requested lowest offer prices from New Capacity Resources, as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power following the process in this Section III.A.21.2.”

227 These requirements are captured in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions (“For a New Generating Capacity Resource that does not satisfy the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Capacity Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.”) and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

228 The contents of the cost workbooks are described in current Section III.A.21.2(b)(iv) of Appendix A to Market Rule 1. Those descriptions have been relocated with some slight rewording to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions (“Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Generating Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior
The IMM will use this information to perform a conduct test to determine whether the new resource’s requested lowest offer price represents a below-cost offer.\textsuperscript{229} The conduct test requires the IMM to determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price using the same methodology it uses for determining New Resource Offer Floor Prices today.\textsuperscript{230} If the IMM-determined New Resource Offer Floor Price does not exceed the resource’s requested lowest offer price, the new resource’s requested lowest offer price passes the conduct test. If the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price, then the requested lowest offer price fails the conduct test.\textsuperscript{231}

Failing the conduct test does not necessarily result in offer mitigation. The Project Sponsor still has the opportunity to rebut the presumption that an LSE supporting the resource with out-of-market revenues has the incentive to exercise buyer-side market power through the resource’s offer. A Project Sponsor of a third-tranche resource that is receiving out-of-market support from an LSE (as opposed to a state or political subdivision of a state) is entitled to submit documentation and information as part of the qualification package in order to rebut the presumption.\textsuperscript{232} Specifically, the documentation and information must demonstrate that the LSE to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation.” and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

\textsuperscript{229} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 55–56.

\textsuperscript{230} Section III.A.21.2.1 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures the parameters of the conduct test: “The Internal Market Monitor will perform a conduct test by reviewing the information described in Sections III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) and determining a New Resource Offer Floor Price, as described in Section III.A.21.3, for the New Capacity Resource.” Section III.A.21.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions sets forth the process for determining capacity price estimates and New Resource Offer Floor Prices that, today, is set forth in current Market Rule 1, Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2, but it makes certain necessary revisions. First, proposed Section III.A.21.3 eliminates references to offer floor prices for resources not requesting to submit offers below the relevant ORTP, and eliminates a subsection regarding ORTPs for new capacity resources composed of different technology types. Second, proposed Section III.A.21.3(a) includes provisions setting forth the methodology for calculating capacity price estimates, with some minor clarifying revisions, that exist today in current Appendix A Section III.A.21.1.2 and had been incorporated by reference into current Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2(b) by the phrase “capital budgeting model used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price.” Third, proposed Section III.A.21.3 eliminates descriptions of cost workbooks that have been relocated to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) (generating resources), III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) (imports) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) (demand resources). Finally, as described further below in Section IX.B, proposed Section III.A.21.3 includes other changes related to New Import Capacity Resources and a revision to the default New Resource Offer Floor Price for resources that fail to provide sufficient cost workbooks.

\textsuperscript{231} Section III.A.21.2.1 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures the pass-fail provision: “A requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price.”

\textsuperscript{232} Section III.A.21.2.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions captures this: “If the Project Sponsor does not submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification (or the ISO rejects the Project Sponsor’s Load-
would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in clearing prices that may result from entry of the resource into the FCM. Effectively, it is the Project Sponsor’s burden to show that any financial gain to an associated LSE does not result in a “net benefit.”

For the IMM to be able to perform the incentive rebuttal “net benefits” analysis, the ISO expects a Project Sponsor to submit as part of its documentation and information a full disclosure of any relationships or arrangements with an LSE regarding the new resource, information about the LSE’s net-load position, the cost to the LSE for providing out-of-market support for the resource, and any assumptions the Project Sponsor made regarding the potential clearing price impacts that would result from the entry of the new resource at its requested lowest offer price. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide sufficient documentation and information, or fails to provide any documentation and information at all, the IMM will not deem the presumption rebutted.

The ISO proposed the incentive rebuttal opportunity in recognition that, when an LSE’s out-of-market support for a new resource is going to cost more than the LSE could hope to gain by way of reduced clearing prices, neither the Project Sponsor nor the LSE supporting the resource (if it is a different entity than the Project Sponsor) has an incentive to use the resource to exercise buyer-side market power. This recognition is consistent with the Commission’s acceptance of self-supply exemptions in other regions where the self-supply exemption was

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233 Section III.A.21.2.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions sets forth the required showing: “to demonstrate that, notwithstanding such a relationship with a load serving entity with regard to the New Capacity Resource, such load serving entity would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market.”

234 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 57.

235 Id. at 57–58. Section III.A.21.2.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions states, “As part of the documentation and information the Project Sponsor submits pursuant to this Section III.A.21.2.2, the Project Sponsor must include in its documentation and information a disclosure of any and all direct or indirect relationships or arrangements with a load serving entity regarding the New Capacity Resource and any other information necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to make the determination described in this Section III.A.21.2.2.”

236 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 58.

237 Id. at 56.
limited based on whether the LSE could profitably lower its capacity payments by promoting entry of the resource. 238

In effect, the incentive rebuttal process also considers whether the Project Sponsor or LSE has the ability to exercise buyer-side market power through the resource’s offer. As part of its analysis of whether the LSE could profitably benefit its load position by promoting entry of the resource, the IMM will have to consider whether the resource’s capacity offered in the FCA at the resource’s requested lowest offer price can lower clearing prices at all. If the offer from the resource could not actually lower clearing prices, there would be no benefit to the LSE’s load position and thus no material, net financial benefit.

As noted above, third-tranche resources receiving out-of-market revenues from a state or local government cannot take advantage of the incentive rebuttal process. 239 The rationale for this limitation is that state and local governments are not entities for which net financial benefits can be determined by the IMM. 240 Because of this limitation, third-tranche resources receiving out-of-market revenues from a state or local government are subject only to the conduct test. The incentive rebuttal process is available to publicly owned and municipal electric distribution systems, however, because they are LSEs for which the IMM should be able to perform a net-benefits test. 241

238 NYISO Self-Supply Exemption Order at P 61 (accepting narrowly defined self-supply exemption for load serving entities because exemption applied to circumstances where “uneconomic entry would reduce the cost of procuring this portion [of capacity from the ICAP] by less than the cost of financing the uneconomic entry in the first place”); PJM Interconnection, 143 FERC ¶ 61,090 at PP 107–08, 112 (accepting, subject to conditions, self-supply exemption with net-short and net-long thresholds, where such thresholds “evaluat[ed] whether a self-supply resource would benefit economically from uneconomic entry given the effect of that entry on the market”).

239 Section III.A.21.2.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions, in addition to setting forth the incentive rebuttal opportunity where “the Project Sponsor is or is affiliated with a load serving entity or because the Project Sponsor receives or expected to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a load-serving entity,” states: “For the avoidance of doubt, a Project Sponsor may not utilize the provisions of this Section III.A.21.2.2 if it receives or expects to receive any revenues from a state, or from a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity, that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource.”

240 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 59. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC ¶ 61,022 at P 87 (2011) (accepting the elimination of the net-short requirement in PJM’s MOPR on grounds that it could be gamed by structuring the support for the supplier’s resource to come from an entity that does not itself serve load), order on reh’g, 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011), aff’d sub nom. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014).

241 See McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 59. Section III.A.21.2.2 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions only prevents “a state, or a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity” from using the incentive rebuttal process, and Section III.A.21.1.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions specifies: “For the purpose of this Section III.A.21, a load serving entity is any entity that has or is the type of entity that could acquire a Capacity Load Obligation in the Forward Capacity Market.”
In sum, the resource-specific buyer-side review for third-tranche resources incorporates (1) a conduct test and (2) a process by which a Project Sponsor can demonstrate to the ISO that neither it, nor a separate LSE associated with the project, has the ability and incentive to exercise buyer-sider market power by offering the resource’s capacity at the desired price in the FCA. If the resource’s requested lowest offer price fails the conduct test and the Project Sponsor fails to rebut the presumed incentive, only then will the ISO mitigate the resource’s offer. In that circumstance, the ISO will mitigate the resource’s offer to the IMM-determined New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test.242 If the resource’s requested lowest offer price passes the conduct test, or the offer price fails the conduct test but the Project Sponsor effectively rebuts the presumed incentive, then the resource can proceed to the auction with its requested lowest price or a higher price.243

VIII. DETAILD DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITION MECHANISM RULES

As explained above, the ISO is proposing to gradually eliminate the MOPR. The Transition Mechanism will allow a capped, incremental amount of unmitigated offers from new state-sponsored capacity resources in FCA 17 and FCA 18.244 The proposal utilizes the now-retired RTR exemption (described above) with updated resource qualification requirements and revised MW caps on RTR capacity. The proposal also retains the CASPR substitution auction for FCAs 17 and 18 but removes the test price rules that apply to that auction.

A. Transition Mechanism’s RTR Exemption

The proposed Transition Mechanism will use an updated RTR exemption as a way of introducing a controlled amount of unmitigated capacity offers from new state-sponsored resources in FCAs 17 and 18.245 The Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption will operate in a manner that is nearly identical to the only-recently-retired RTR exemption, which will have the

242 Section III.A.21.2.3 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions reflects this: “If a requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test and the Internal Market Monitor does not determine the lack of a material net financial benefit to a load serving entity, as described in Section III.A.21.2.2, the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test shall be used in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.”

243 Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iv) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions reflects the removal of offer floor prices, except where the IMM determines a New Resource Offer Floor Price: “The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a New Capacity Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, such New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price.” A parallel revision is made in Section III.13.2.3.2(c), which addresses how supply offers from new Self-Supplied FCA Resources are included in the aggregate supply curves.

244 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 2–3.

245 Id. at 3–4.
benefit of being more administratively efficient and creating less uncertainty for market participants than if the transition implemented an entirely novel market rule.\textsuperscript{246}

The mechanics of how a market participant takes advantage of the RTR exemption, which are still set forth in the Tariff today, will remain the same. As with the former RTR exemption, the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption will allow a new capacity resource to elect RTR treatment no later than two days after the ISO provides the qualification determination notification to the Project Sponsor, by which point the Project Sponsor will know whether the IMM has mitigated any requested offer price it may have submitted for the resource.\textsuperscript{247} For the resource’s capacity that qualifies as an RTR, such capacity is not subject to a New Resource Offer Floor Price, and thereby not subject to any MOPR mitigation.\textsuperscript{248} However, there are two distinct changes the Transition Mechanism makes to the RTR exemption.

First, the most significant difference between the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption and the former exemption is the cap on state-sponsored capacity that may proceed to each FCA without offer mitigation. The former RTR exemption had a 200 MW cap on capacity that could clear the FCA’s primary auction using the RTR exemption (“RTR capacity”) in any given FCA; however, the RTR rules included a “carry-forward provision” that allowed the unused portion of the 200 MW to be carried forward into subsequent FCAs for up to two years.\textsuperscript{249} The Transition Mechanism establishes a 300 MW cap on RTR capacity for FCA 17 and a 400 MW cap on RTR capacity for FCA 18—a total of 700 MW—also with a carry-forward provision for “unused” RTR MW from FCA 17.\textsuperscript{250} The total 700 MW cap for the two upcoming FCAs represents a rational increase over the former RTR cap (which was, effectively, 600 MW over three auctions), has the agreement and support of a broad section of stakeholders, and should not deter the development of renewable resources.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{246} Id. at 3–6 (explaining former RTR exemption was in use as recently as FCA 15).
\textsuperscript{247} Market Rule 1, Section III.13.1.2.9.
\textsuperscript{248} Market Rule 1, Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iv).
\textsuperscript{249} McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 5. As explained above, with this two-year carry-forward provision, the highest amount of potential RTR capacity for any given FCA was 600 MW. Id.
\textsuperscript{250} Id. at 8–9. Section III.13.1.2.10 of the Transition Mechanism revisions sets forth the caps and carry-forward provision: “(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 is 300 MW, (c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 . . . .”
\textsuperscript{251} Chadalavada Testimony at 40–42; McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 10–11. As explained in Mr. McCarthy’s testimony, the stakeholders that designed the Transition Mechanism and proposed it as an amendment to the ISO’s proposal to eliminate the MOPR derived the MW caps from the state-sponsored resource capacity offered in the FCA 13, FCA 14, and FCA 15 substitution auctions, which was 273 MW, 292 MW, and 229 MW, respectively. McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony
The Transition Mechanism makes a further adjustment to the FCA 18 cap, however. For FCA 18, the cap on RTR capacity will be reduced by the MW amount of capacity that cleared in the FCA 17 substitution auction.\(^{252}\) The reason for reducing the FCA 18 cap by the amount of FCA 17 MW that cleared in the substitution auction has to do with how FCA 17 substitution auction capacity will be treated in the FCA 18 primary auction. Namely, any state-sponsored resource capacity that clears in the FCA 17 substitution auction will be treated as existing capacity in the FCA 18 primary auction. Existing capacity is not subject to any offer mitigation by the MOPR. As a consequence, the state-sponsored resources that come in through the FCA 17 substitution auction will be able to offer their capacity in the FCA 18 primary auction without any MOPR mitigation.\(^{253}\)

For example, assume that 300 MW of RTR capacity clear in the FCA 17 primary auction, taking up the entirety of the FCA 17 cap. Also assume that 100 MW of state-sponsored resources clear in the FCA 17 substitution auction. Going into the FCA 18 primary auction, there are now a total of 400 MW of state-sponsored resources, new as of FCA 17, that will be able to proceed to the auction without any offer floor price.\(^ {254}\) Without any reduction in the FCA 18 cap, there would be the potential for a total of 800 MW of such capacity—400 MW that had cleared in FCA 17 and 400 MW of potential RTR capacity in FCA 18—to proceed to the FCA 18 primary auction without any offer floor price. With the reduction, however, the FCA 18 cap is lowered from 400 MW to 300 MW. The potential MW of state-sponsored resources, new as of FCA 17, that could proceed to the FCA 18 primary auction without MOPR mitigation is thereby limited to 700 MW—400 MW that had cleared in FCA 17 and only 300 MW of potential RTR capacity in FCA 18.\(^{255}\) In this way, the reduction will keep the total amount of additional state-sponsored resource capacity permitted to enter the market through the primary auction with offers unmitigated by the MOPR capped at 700 MW during the transition period.\(^{256}\)

While the Transition Mechanism reduces the FCA 18 cap by what cleared in the FCA 17 substitution auction, the Transition Mechanism does not cap substitution auction participation during the transition period. The clearance of unmitigated offers from state-sponsored resources

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\(^{252}\) Section III.13.1.2.10(c) of the Transition Mechanism revisions captures this: “and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the substitution auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026.”

\(^{253}\) McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 12–13.

\(^{254}\) Id.

\(^{255}\) Id. at 13.

\(^{256}\) Id. at 12–13.
in the substitution auction should not adversely impact primary auction clearing prices.\footnote{Id. at 11.} Thus, a cap on substitution auction participation is not necessary to further the Transition Mechanism’s goal of providing predictability as to the impact unmitigated offers from state-sponsored resources may have on primary auction clearing prices.\footnote{Id. There is the theoretical concern that 300 MW of RTR capacity could clear in the FCA 17 primary auction and that more than 400 MW of capacity could clear in the FCA 17 substitution auction, resulting in an amount of state-sponsored resource capacity in excess of 700 MW that could then participate in the FCA 18 primary auction as existing resource capacity without an offer floor price. (For example, 300 MW of RTR capacity in FCA 17 added to 401 MW of capacity clearing in the FCA 17 substitution auction would result in 701 MW of state-sponsored capacity, new as of FCA 17, that could proceed as existing capacity in FCA 18.) Such a circumstance is unlikely, given the region’s experience with the substitution auction; across four FCAs, only 54 MW have cleared in the substitution auction.\footnote{Section III.13.1.1.1.7 of the Transition Mechanism revisions captures the resource qualification requirements: “To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource . . . must satisfy the following requirements: (a) qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource; (b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and; (c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.”}

The second difference from the original RTR exemption is the change to the resource qualification requirements. Rather than rely on the RTR’s prior resource qualification requirements, the Transition Mechanism uses the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition described above in Section VII.C.2 to set the requirements.\footnote{McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 8. By comparison, the former RTR exemption only encompassed resources qualifying as renewable or alternative under state programs in effect on January 1, 2014 (Tariff Section III.13.1.1.1.7(b)) and the current Sponsored Policy Resource definition encompasses only those qualifying as renewable, clean, or alternative under state programs in effect on January 1, 2018 (Tariff Section I.2.2).} The decision to use the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition for the requirements resulted from stakeholder discussions. Because the updated definition expands the terms that describe qualifying resources and state decarbonization programs, and has no date limitation, the updated definition will accommodate state programs that were recently implemented and that may be implemented in time for use by resources participating in FCAs 17 and 18.\footnote{The elimination of the test price provisions is shown in the strikethrough changes in Sections III.13.1.2.4, III.13.2.8.3.1A, III.13.2.8.3.3, and III.13.8.1 of the Transition Mechanism revisions.}

**B. Removal of Substitution Auction Test Price Rules**

The proposed Transition Mechanism also eliminates the test price rules that apply to the CASPR substitution auction.\footnote{The elimination of the test price provisions is shown in the strikethrough changes in Sections III.13.1.2.4, III.13.2.8.3.1A, III.13.2.8.3.3, and III.13.8.1 of the Transition Mechanism revisions.} As described in more detail below, the test price excludes from the substitution auction those demand bidders whose primary auction bids are lower than an
applicable competitive ("test") price. The ISO implemented the test price rules in response to stakeholder concerns that existing resources nearing retirement may have an incentive to make uncompetitively low de-list bids in the primary auction to improve their chances of obtaining a CSO that could then be shed in the substitution auction. Selling capacity in the primary auction below a competitive price is referred to as "bid shading." 

The incentive to engage in "bid shading" stems from the fact that, as explained further in Mr. McCarthy’s testimony, the substitution auction presents a resource with an opportunity to obtain a one-time “severance” payment for permanently retiring. This opportunity is not available if the resource retires through the primary auction by way of a retirement de-list bid. To participate in the substitution auction, therefore, an existing resource must first obtain a CSO from the primary auction that it can hope to shed to a state-sponsored resource in the substitution auction. The need for a CSO award from the primary auction creates an incentive for the resource seeking to retire to submit a low de-list bid in the primary auction, even if that low de-list bid is inconsistent with the resource’s costs to retain a CSO.

To reduce any incentive for bid shading, and thereby prevent any potential impacts of bid shading on primary auction clearing prices, the test price mechanism evaluates whether an existing resource seeking to participate in the substitution auction retained its CSO in the primary auction at a competitive price for the resource—i.e., a test price. If the primary auction clearing price at which the existing resource retained its CSO is below 90 percent of the test price, then the resource cannot bid into the substitution auction.

The ISO did not propose the test price mechanism as part of its original CASPR filing, and the test price rules were not in place until the second substitution auction, which was held as part of FCA 14. As the ISO stated when it proposed CASPR and again when it later proposed the test price rules, bid shading does not pose a significant risk to price formation in the primary auction because of the low likelihood that resources will engage in such behavior. The financial risks for a resource engaged in bid shading are high. Namely, the resource runs the significant risk of retaining a CSO at a low capacity clearing price, receiving compensation that is less than its cost to provide capacity, and then failing to clear the substitution auction and shed

262 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 14.
263 Id. at 14–17. See also CASPR Filing at 7; ISO New England Inc. & NEPOOL Participants Comm., Joint filing of Conforming Changes to ISO Tariff for CASPR, Docket No. ER19-444-000, at 20–21 (filed Nov. 30, 2018) (“CASPR Conforming Changes Filing”).
264 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 15–16.
265 Id. at 16–17.
266 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 17–19. The process of deriving the test price is described more fully in Mr. McCarthy’s testimony. Id.
267 Id. at 19.
268 Id. at 18; CASPR Conforming Changes Filing at 21; CASPR Filing at 9.
its CSO. The ISO explained that the risk of retaining a CSO at a price that does not cover costs already deters bid shading, and the Commission has agreed that these financial risks temper concerns about bid shading behavior.

The rationale behind the Transition Mechanism’s removal of the test price is that doing so may be a way to facilitate more participation by existing resources in the substitution auction. As discussed above, few MW have cleared in the substitution auction. In reviewing substitution auction performance for FCAs 13, 14, and 15, the IMM determined that the low amount of capacity clearing in the auction was the result of low demand-side participation from existing resources. Removal of the test price has the potential to facilitate more demand-bids in the substitution auction because it removes one of the barriers to the submittal of such bids.

The potential for the elimination of the test price to truly facilitate the clearance of more MW in the substitution auction may be limited, however, if only because other barriers exist to demand-bid participation. The IMM stated in its evaluation of the substitution auctions for FCAs 13, 14, and 15 that low clearing prices had hampered demand-bid participation by making it more difficult for resources nearing retirement to either obtain a CSO in the primary auction or obtain a CSO at a clearing price that exceeds the 90-percent-adjusted test price. In its study, the IMM identified only one resource out of a number of resources that could not participate on account of the test price, and even in that circumstance, the resource’s demand bid was too low to clear in the substitution auction anyway. FCA 16 saw an increase in existing resource participation in the substitution auction, but still no demand bids cleared because they were too low to clear against supply offers.

Given these other barriers, it is not clear that removal of the test price mechanism will accomplish much in the way of increasing the clearance of capacity in the substitution auction. Nevertheless, the ISO does not believe removal of the test price mechanism will cause any harm to the FCM. The ISO maintains that the financial risks of engaging in bid shading are an important deterrent for such behavior and that such risks counterbalance any concerns about how bid shading may impact primary auction prices.

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269 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 18.
270 CASPR Initial Order at P 85; see also McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 18.
271 McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony at 20.
272 Id. (citing IMM Spring 2021 QMR).
273 Id. at 20–21.
274 Id. at 21–22.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 22.
277 Id. at 22–23.
IX. ADDITIONAL TARIFF REVISIONS INCLUDED IN THE BSMPR REFORMS AND TRANSITION MECHANISM REVISIONS

The ISO proposes additional Tariff revisions that accompany the core revisions that implement the new buyer-side market power review structure and the Transition Mechanism. These additional Tariff revisions include various revisions accommodating the BSMPR Reforms and the redrafting of Tariff provisions concerning the treatment of New Import Capacity Resource offers.278

A. Tariff Revisions Accommodating the BSMPR Reforms

The ISO is proposing five sets of Tariff revisions to accommodate the BSMPR Reforms: (1) elimination of the CASPR substitution auction; (2) adjustments to the Qualification Determination Notification (“QDN”) requirements; (3) adjustments to the pre-auction information filing requirements; (4) rearrangement and clarification of the CONE and Net CONE calculation methodology provisions; and (5) a change to the FCA’s treatment of new capacity resources that fail to provide sufficient cost workbook information when required for the IMM’s buyer-side review. All of these proposed revisions will go into effect with the BSMPR Reforms for FCA 19.

First, the ISO proposes to sunset the substitution auction for FCA 19 by adding the following to Section III.13.2.8 of the Tariff: “The final substitution auction shall take place for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the June 1, 2027 to May 31, 2028 Capacity Commitment Period, and no substitution auction shall be conducted thereafter.” However, additional language is proposed to clarify that Tariff provisions outside of Section III.13 that account for activity in the substitution auction remain in effect for the purpose of calculating the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process.279 The ISO is also eliminating current Section III.13.8.1(c)(xi), which addresses certain pre-auction information filing requirements regarding eligibility to participate in the substitution auction.280

Second, the ISO proposes adjustments to the QDN requirements to reflect the elimination of ORTPs and better reflect the nature of the IMM’s buyer-side review and mitigation under the proposed MOPR replacement. Regarding the QDN requirements, the ISO will disclose to the

278 An additional proposed Tariff revision not otherwise addressed in this filing letter is the elimination of special de-list bid and substitution auction-related provisions that applied for FCA 16, which is shown as a strikethrough in Section III.13 of the Transition Mechanism revisions.

279 Section III.13.2.8 of the BSMPR Reforms revisions sets out the clarification: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and Attachment K to the OATT addressing the manner in which Capacity Supply Obligations acquired or shed through the substitution auction are accounted for in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process shall continue to have full force and effect.”

280 See Section III.13.8.1(c) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions.
Project Sponsor whether the resource qualified for any exclusions from buyer-side review and mitigation, and the basis for such determinations.\textsuperscript{281} The ISO will also disclose the IMM’s determinations regarding any mitigation of a new capacity resource’s requested lowest offer price (if the resource was subject to review).\textsuperscript{282} Notwithstanding any incentive rebuttal analysis the IMM conducts, the ISO will not disclose as part of the QDN any information that would reveal the potential impact the requested lowest offer price may have on market clearing prices. Disclosure of such information could reveal confidential and highly sensitive market information that could give the Project Sponsor a competitive advantage and, thus, undermine the competitiveness of the auction.\textsuperscript{283}

Third, the ISO proposes similar adjustments to the pre-auction information filing requirements. In the public version of the filing, the ISO will provide de-identified information about resources that provided a Load-Side Relationship Certification and which resources qualified for the competitive-entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource exclusions.\textsuperscript{284} This requirement is proposed in response to stakeholder feedback as a way to provide market participants with guidance about the types of resources that qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion.\textsuperscript{285} As part of the confidential portion of the filing, the ISO will file with the Commission information about which specific resources were excluded from buyer-side review, along with any Load-Side Relationship Certifications submitted by Project Sponsors.\textsuperscript{286}

\textsuperscript{281} The BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this requirement in Section III.13.1.1.2.8(f) (“if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO’s determination as to whether the New Generating Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination”) and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6(b) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

\textsuperscript{282} The BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this requirement in Section III.13.1.1.2.8(g) (“if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding whether the New Generating Capacity Resource’s requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3”) and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6(c) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

\textsuperscript{283} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 62–63. The BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this restriction in Section III.13.1.1.2.8(g) (“The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.”) and parallel Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6(c) (addressing the same for New Demand Capacity Resources).

\textsuperscript{284} Section III.13.8.1(c)(v) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this requirement: “for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.3 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to review for the exercise of buyer-side market power[].”

\textsuperscript{285} McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 63.

\textsuperscript{286} Section III.13.8.1(c)(vii) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions capture this requirement: “which new resources were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the
confidential portion of the filing will also provide the buyer-side review and mitigation determinations made by the IMM and the basis for those determinations. The information filing Tariff revisions also clarify that the ISO will not disclose—either fifteen days after the FCA or to an impacted Project Sponsor—any IMM determinations related to a resource’s impact on clearing prices. The revisions further clarify the ISO’s current practice that it does not publish confidential bid and offer information after the auction, and adds that the ISO also will not publish Load-Side Relationship Certifications submitted to the Commission. Maintaining the confidentiality of bid and offer information and Load-Side Relationship Certifications is necessary to protect market participants’ competitively sensitive information, and ultimately, the competitiveness of the FCA itself.

Fourth, the ISO proposes to rearrange and clarify the Tariff provisions concerning CONE and Net CONE recalculation and yearly adjustments. The current Tariff language in Section III.13.2.4 that addresses how the ISO adjusts CONE and Net CONE values before each FCA (as opposed to full recalculation that occurs no less than every three years) incorporates by reference the methodology used to perform the analogous annual updates to the ORTP values, which is in current Tariff Section III.A.21.1.2(e). Because the ISO is eliminating ORTP provisions from the Tariff, the ISO is relocating the relevant annual update language to a Section III.13.2.4.
The revisions to Section III.13.2.4 are not intended to be substantive changes to how the ISO currently updates CONE and Net CONE values, either annually or every three years.

Fifth and finally, the ISO proposes to change the default New Resource Offer Floor Price for resources that provide insufficient cost workbook information for the IMM to conduct a resource-specific buyer-side review. Current Appendix A provision Section III.A.21.2(b)(iv) requires the IMM to mitigate a resource’s offer to the ORTP applicable to the resource in circumstances where the IMM is conducting a resource-specific review, but the Project Sponsor has failed to provide sufficient information for the IMM to do so. With the elimination of ORTPs, the ISO must set a replacement default New Resource Offer Floor Price for when similar circumstances occur for third-tranche resources subject to the IMM’s buyer-side review. The ISO proposes to use the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for this purpose. The ISO recognizes that, under current and most future market conditions, this amendment will effectively keep new resources that fail to provide sufficient information from clearing in the auction. Nevertheless, the ISO is retaining the consultation provision allowing the IMM to consult with Project Sponsors in order to obtain more information and is confident that the consultation process will ensure that few, if any, third-tranche resource offers are mitigated to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price due to insufficient information.

B. Redrafting of the Tariff Provisions Addressing the Treatment of New Import Capacity Resource Offers

The ISO further proposes revisions to Tariff provisions addressing the treatment of New Import Capacity Resource offers, both to accommodate the buyer-side review and mitigation reforms and to simplify how the Tariff refers to different types of New Import Capacity Resources in this context. These proposed revisions do not substantively change the treatment of New Import Capacity Resource offers, but rather provide clarity around the existing treatment.

Only specific types of New Import Capacity Resources are subject to buyer-side review and mitigation. Under the current Tariff rules, a New Import Capacity Resource that “is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in


293 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 66.

294 Section III.A.21.3(b)(iv) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions states, “If the supporting documentation and information is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete the analysis, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.”

295 McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony at 66.

296 Id. at 66.
transmission that increases New England’s import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission upgrade” is subject to buyer-side review and mitigation. All other New Import Capacity Resources are treated as existing resources for the purpose of how their offers in the FCA are reviewed and mitigated, and they effectively are exempt from any buyer-side market power review and mitigation. Instead, these other New Import Capacity Resources, like existing resources, are subject to the pivotal supplier test, as the terms of that test are set forth in Section III.A.23 of Appendix A to Market Rule 1.

Current Appendix A, Section III.A.21.2, which sets forth the rules for New Resource Offer Floor Prices for the purpose of buyer-side review and mitigation, also sets forth offer price rules that are intended to address seller-side market power concerns for “existing” New Import Capacity Resources. Consequently, because the ISO proposes to eliminate ORTPs and revise Section III.A.21.2 as part of its BSMPR Reforms, Tariff revisions are required to retain the rules that address seller-side market power concerns for the “existing” New Import Capacity Resources.

To accomplish this, the ISO proposes new Section III.A.21.4 of Appendix A. Proposed Section III.A.21.4 distinguishes between the “existing” New Import Capacity Resources, which are “subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23,” and New Import Capacity Resources potentially subject to buyer-side review and mitigation. The proposed section also sets forth

297 See Sections III.A.21.1 and III.A.21.2(a) of the current Appendix A, which subject such New Import Capacity Resources to ORTPs but assigns all other New Import Capacity Resources a New Resource Offer Floor Price of $0.00/kW-month.

298 Section III.A.23.1 addresses the test as it relates to Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources and states, “Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.”

299 As the Commission stated in its orders that engendered today’s MOPR, “[I]t is reasonable to treat most imports like existing internal resources for mitigation purposes, and thus, reasonable not to require an offer floor for most imports.” APR Rejection Rehearing Order at P 92. “[H]owever, . . . imports where a specific new external resource is identified as the sole support for the import, and where a significant investment (such as the construction of a new transmission line to import power from an adjacent control area) is made to provide capacity to New England . . . [,] would be devoted to the New England market over the long term, and should therefore be treated like new internal resources for mitigation purposes, and subject to an offer floor . . . .” Id.

300 Section III.A.21.4(a) of the BSMPR Reforms explains that “[a]ll New Import Capacity Resources (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and . . . associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or . . . associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23. Section III.A.21.4(c) then specifies that “[f]or any New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23”—i.e., those backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission and those associated with an Elective Transmission upgrade—“the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price
the rules governing the treatment of offer prices from New Import Capacity Resources subject to the pivotal supplier test, which are substantively the same rules that exist under the current Tariff.

Additionally, the ISO proposes corresponding changes to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A of the FCM rules, which concerns the offer information a New Import Capacity Resource must submit as part of the qualification package. The proposed revisions to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A will incorporate the “subject to the pivotal supplier test” shorthand to distinguish between the two types of New Import Capacity Resources. For those imports not subject to the pivotal supplier test, and thereby subject to potential buyer-side review and mitigation, the revisions impose the same requirements imposed on other new capacity resources to submit a lowest offer price and cost workbooks. For imports subject to the pivotal supplier test, the revisions retain their existing offer information requirements. The ISO also proposes to update the QDN requirements provisions for New Import Capacity Resources to use the “subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23” shorthand.

In sum, the ISO’s proposed Tariff revisions regarding New Import Capacity Resources are intended to ensure that the new buyer-side review and mitigation structure proposed in this filing also applies to New Import Capacity Resources that, today, are subject to the ORTPs and MOPR mitigation. For the New Import Capacity Resources that are not subject to any buyer-side review and mitigation—i.e., those “existing” New Import Capacity Resources subject to the pivotal supplier test—the proposed Tariff revisions are intended to retain the treatment of those resources that exists today; such changes are non-substantive, clarifying changes resulting from the significant overhaul of Section III.A.21 of the Tariff.

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301 The BSMPR Reforms revisions split Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A of the current Tariff into two subsections, with subsection (a) addressing New Import Capacity Resources subject to potential buyer-side review and mitigation and subsection (b) addressing New Import Capacity Resources subject to the pivotal supplier test.

302 Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(a) of the BSMPR Reforms revisions incorporates by reference the same requirements imposed on all new generating resources: “A New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 is subject to the same offer information submission requirements for a New Generating Capacity Resource that are described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3.”

303 Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) of the BSMPR Reforms.

304 Section III.13.1.3.5.7 of the BSMPR Reforms.

305 In addition to the New Import Capacity Resource tariff revisions described above, the BSMPR Reforms revise Section III.13.1.3.5.6, which concerns the IMM’s review of New Import Capacity Resources.
X. STAKEHOLDER PROCESS

The Tariff rules to implement the BSMPR Reforms and Transition Mechanism were considered through the complete NEPOOL Participant Process. Beginning in June 2021, the ISO convened more than a dozen meetings with the NEPOOL Markets Committee in which Participants, NESCOE, ISO-NE, the IMM, and the EMM explored the impacts of eliminating the MOPR and reforming the buyer-side market power review rules. Over the course of eight months, stakeholders offered input and offered alternative ideas on the ISO’s initial proposal, which would have eliminated the MOPR in advance of FCA 17.

At its January 11, 2022 meeting, the Markets Committee considered the ISO’s proposal to eliminate the MOPR (and associated Tariff revisions) in advance of FCA 17 and a Participants-sponsored amendment that advocated to eliminate the MOPR prior to FCA 19 through a transition (the “Transition Proposal”). The Markets Committee voted to recommend a motion that the NEPOOL Participants Committee support the ISO’s proposal, with a 74.04 percent Vote in favor. The Markets Committee did not support the Transition Proposal, with a 23.79 percent Vote in favor. After the Markets Committee vote, the ISO issued a memorandum on January 26, 2022 in which the ISO expressed its strong preference for the Transition Proposal and the reasons for its preference and noted its intent to adopt and file the Transition Proposal if supported by stakeholders.

At its February 3, 2022 meeting, the Participants Committee considered and ultimately approved the package of MOPR reforms filed herein (including the Transition Proposal, with almost 70 percent in favor. 306

XI. REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE AND COMMISSION ORDER

The ISO respectfully requests that the Commission accept the Transition Mechanism Tariff revisions as filed herein, without suspension or hearing, to be effective on May 30, 2022, which is 60 days from the date of this filing. The ISO respectfully requests that the Commission accept the BSMPR Reforms Tariff Revisions as filed herein, without suspension or hearing, to be effective on March 1, 2024. The ISO respectfully requests that the Commission issue an order on this filing on or before May 30, 2022.

306 With a Participants Committee Vote of 69.56 percent in favor, NEPOOL established its affirmative position in support of the Tariff revisions filed herein. See Feb. 3, 2022 Participants Committee Meeting Minutes at 15, Attachment 2, available at: https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/02/npc-20220303-initial.pdf. NEPOOL has indicated that it will file supplemental comments in this proceeding to provide the Commission with additional information concerning the stakeholder discussions and debate on this subject that took place through the region’s Participant Processes.
An order on or before May 30, 2022 accepting the proposed Tariff revisions will permit the ISO to conduct the FCA 17 qualification process without delay.

XII. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Section 35.13 of the Commission’s regulations generally requires public utilities to file certain cost and other information related to an examination of traditional cost-of-service rates. However, the ISO is not a traditional investor-owned utility. Therefore, to the extent necessary, the Filing Parties request waiver of Section 35.13 of the Commission’s regulations. Notwithstanding their request for waiver, the Filing Parties submit the additional information enumerated below in substantial compliance with the relevant provisions of Section 35.13.

35.13(b)(1) – Materials included herewith are as follows:

- This transmittal letter;
- Marked sections of the Tariff, reflecting the Transition Mechanism revisions to be effective on May 30, 2022;
- Clean sections of the Tariff, reflecting the Transition Mechanism revisions to be effective on May 30, 2022;
- Marked sections of the Tariff, reflecting the BSMPR Reforms revisions to be effective on March 1, 2024;
- Clean sections of the Tariff, reflecting the BSMPR Mechanism revisions to be effective on March 1, 2024;
- The Testimony of Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada addressing the ISO’s justification for supporting the Transition Mechanism (the “Chadalavada Testimony”);
- The Testimony of Ryan McCarthy in support of the Transition Mechanism (the “McCarthy Transition Mechanism Testimony”)
- The Testimony of Ryan McCarthy in support of the BSMPR Reforms (the “McCarthy BSMPR Reforms Testimony”);
- Tabulation of votes of the NEPOOL Participants Committee on the BSMPR Reforms and Transition Mechanism; and
- List of governors, utility regulatory agencies in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, and others to which a copy of this filing has been e-mailed.

35.13(b)(2) – As noted in Section XI above, the Filing Parties request that the Transition Mechanism revisions become effective on May 30, 2022 and that the BSMPR Reforms revisions become effective on March 1, 2024.

35.13(b)(3) – Pursuant to Section 17.11(e) of the Participants Agreement, Governance Participants are being served electronically rather than by paper copy. The names and addresses of the Governance Participants are posted on the ISO’s website at https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/participant-asset-listings/directory?id=1&type=committee. A copy of this transmittal letter and the accompanying materials have also been sent electronically to the governors and electric utility regulatory agencies for the six New England states that comprise the New England Control Area, to the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, and to the Executive Director of the New England States Committee on Electricity. In accordance with Commission rules and practice, there is no need for the Governance Participants or the other entities described above to be included on the Commission’s official service list in the captioned proceeding unless such entities become intervenors in this proceeding.

35.13(b)(4) – A description of the materials submitted pursuant to this filing is contained in Section XII of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(5) – The reasons for this filing are discussed in Sections III through IX of this transmittal letter.

35.13(b)(6) – The ISO’s approval of the revisions proposed herein is evidenced by this filing. These revisions reflect the results of the Participant Processes required by the Participants Agreement and the support of the Participants Committee.

35.13(b)(7) – The Filing Parties have no knowledge of any relevant expenses or costs of service that have been alleged or judged in any administrative or judicial proceeding to be illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary costs that are demonstrably the product of discriminatory employment practices.

35.13(b)(8) – A form of notice and electronic media are no longer required for filings in light of the Commission’s Combined Notice of Filings notice methodology.

35.13(c)(1) – The Tariff changes herein do not modify a traditional “rate,” and the statement required under this Commission regulation is not applicable to the instant filing.

35.13(c)(2) – The ISO does not provide services under other rate schedules that are similar to the wholesale, resale, and transmission services it provides under the Tariff.

35.13(c)(3) – No specifically assignable facilities have been or will be installed or modified in connection with the revisions filed herein.
XIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Filing Parties respectfully request that the Commission accept the BSMPR Reforms and the Transition Mechanism as described herein without condition or change.

Respectfully submitted,

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March 31, 2022
Marked Tariff – Effective May 30, 2022
I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions

I.2.1 Rules of Construction:
In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;

(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;

(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;

(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;

(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;

(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;

(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;

(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;

(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;

(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day);

(k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

I.2.2. Definitions:

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.
**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.
Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR) is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

Ancillary Services are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

Applicants, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

Application is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

Asset is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

Asset Registration Process is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.

Asset Related Demand is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service
from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or
greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an
aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for
each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the
daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time
unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related
Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of
“available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating
Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating
Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or
an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement
De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset.
These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill
its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally
responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with
Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market
Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction
Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.
**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy Event occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

Bilateral Contract (BC) is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

Bilateral Contract Block-Hours are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

Binary Storage DARD is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Binary Storage Facility is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Blackstart Capability Test is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

Blackstart Capital Payment is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

Blackstart Equipment is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

Blackstart O&M Payment is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service** (CNR Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Bilateral** is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment Rate** is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Score** is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.
CLAIM10 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

CLAIM30 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

Claimed Capability Audit is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset or the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Entry Deadline has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Clustering has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

CNR Capability is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Coincident Peak Contribution is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

Commercial Capacity is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

Commission is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different.
from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Continuous Storage Generator Asset** is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
4. provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation** means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.
**Coordinated Transaction Scheduling** means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.10.7.A.

**Correction Limit** means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of Energy Produced (CEP)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of New Entry (CONE)** is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

**Counterparty** means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

**Covered Entity** is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Credit Coverage** is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

**Credit Qualifying** means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

**Credit Threshold** consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailment** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.
Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Generation Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Loss Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Prices means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

DDP Dispatchable Resource is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource’s Dispatch Instructions.

Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.
**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Bid Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Demand Capacity Resource** means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.
**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or
Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset’s Offer Data.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host ParticipantAssigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a
Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)** is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

**Dispatchable Resource** is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that
the facility’s Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.
**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.
**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the
distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.
**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative $150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.
Establish Claimed Capability Audit is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

Excepted Transaction is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Capacity Qualification Package is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Capacity Resource is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Capacity Retirement Package is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Demand Capacity Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Generating Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Existing Import Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

Expedited Study Request is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.
Export-Adjusted LSR is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

Export Bid is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

Exports are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

External Market Monitor means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

External Node is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

External Resource means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

External Transaction is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

External Transaction Cap is $2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.
**External Transaction Floor** is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.
**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

Firm Point-To-Point Service is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.


Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

Force Majeure - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Capacity Market (FCM) is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant’s Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.
Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Delivery Period is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Fuel Index is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Heat Rate is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.
**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is $9,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.
**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.
**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.
**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.
**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Hub** is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.
**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.
**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoried Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoried energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported
by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.
ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Information Policy is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Manuals are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.


ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs) are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

ISO New England Planning Procedures are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


ITC Agreement is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC Rate Schedule is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.
ITC System is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC System Planning Procedures is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC) is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

Late Payment Account is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Late Payment Account Limit is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Late Payment Charge is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Lead Market Participant, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

Limited Energy Resource means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

Load Asset means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

Load Management means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not
limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.
Local Network Service (LNS) is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP) is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

Local Resource Adequacy Requirement is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

Local Second Contingency Protection Resources are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

Local Service is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

Local Service Schedule is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR) is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Local System Planning (LSP) is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
Localized Costs are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

Location is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.

Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Long-Term is a term of one year or more.

Long-Term Transmission Outage is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

Longer-Term Transmission Study is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT. The 2050 Transmission Study shall be the first Longer-Term Transmission Study.

Loss Component is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or
Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

LSE means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Marginal Reliability Impact** is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk
power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

Market Participant is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

Market Rule 1 is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

Market Violation is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

Material Adverse Change is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.
Material Adverse Impact is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

Maximum Capacity Limit is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

Maximum Consumption Limit is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

Maximum Daily Consumption Limit is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

Maximum Facility Load is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

Maximum Interruptible Capacity is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

Maximum Load is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.
**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.
Measurement and Verification Reference Reports are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

Measurement and Verification Summary Report is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA) is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF) are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider) is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service) is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.
**Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

**Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO)** is an owner of MTF.

**Meter Data Error** means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit** means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Metered Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Minimum Consumption Limit** is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

**Minimum Down Time** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.
**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.
**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.
Needs Assessment is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

NEMA, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

NEMA Contract is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE) is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.


NEPOOL Agreement is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

NEPOOL GIS is the generation information system.

NEPOOL GIS Administrator is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

NEPOOL GIS API Fees are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

NEPOOL Participant is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.
NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

NESCOE is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Net CONE is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

Net Regional Clearing Price is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

Net Supply is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

Net Supply Capability is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

Network Capability Interconnection Standard has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Customer is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

Network Import Capability (NI Capability) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Resource is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is
restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
New **Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.
**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.2.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.

**Non-Commercial Capacity** is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

**Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period** is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount) is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

Non-Dispatchable Resource is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

Non-Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Non-Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

Non-Market Participant is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.
**Non-Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

**Non-Qualifying** means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

**Notice of RBA** is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Notification Time** is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.


**NPCC** is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

**Obligation Month** means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

**Offer Data** means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

**Offer Review Trigger Prices** are the prices specified in Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of New Capacity Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction.
Offered CLAIM10 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

Offered CLAIM30 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

On-Peak Demand Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Operating Authority is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

Operating Data means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

Operating Day means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

Operating Reserve means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

Operations Date is February 1, 2005.
OTF Service is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

Other Transmission Facility (OTF) are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA) is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

Other Transmission Owner (OTO) is an owner of OTF.

Ownership Share is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

Participant Expenses are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participant Required Balance is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Participant Vote is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participants Agreement is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

Participants Committee is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.
**Passive DR Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Passive DR Auditing Period** is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Peak Energy Rent (PER)** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**PER Proxy Unit** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability.
Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point of Interconnection** shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.
**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.
**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a
rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rapid Response Pricing Asset** is: (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant’s Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost** is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

**Rationing Minimum Limit** is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Capability Audit** is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.
**Reactive Resource** is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete
Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer’s Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.
**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.
**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.
Replacement Reserve is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP) is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA) is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Required Balance is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

Reseller is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

Reserve Adequacy Analysis is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs) are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

Reserve Quantity For Settlement is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

Reserve Zone is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

Reserved Capacity is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

Resource means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, or a Demand Response Resource.
**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
RTEP02 Upgrade(s) means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

RTO is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP) is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

Scheduling Service, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

Seasonal Claimed Capability is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

Seasonal DR Audit is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer
facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.
**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

**SMD Effective Date** is March 1, 2003.

**Solar High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.
**Solar Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solutions Study** is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource (SCR)** is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives an out-of-market revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, or clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted (either by federal or New England state statute, or regulation, or executive or administrative order) in the New England state from and as a result of which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source and that is in effect on January 1, 2018.

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.
**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**State-identified Requirement** refers to a legal requirement, mandate or policy of a New England state or local government that forms the basis for a Longer-Term Transmission Study request submitted to the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to
remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Supply Offer** is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and
information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.

**Supply Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

**Synchronous Condenser** is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System Operating Limit (SOL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.
**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.
Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

Third-Party Sale is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR) is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate) is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

Through or Out Service (TOUT Service) means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

Tie-Line Asset is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.
**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.
Transmission Credit Limit is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Credit Test Percentage is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Customer is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

Transmission Default Amount is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

Transmission Default Period is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account Limit is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Charge is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff) is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.
Transmission Obligations are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA) is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

Transmission Owner means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

Transmission Provider is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

Transmission Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

Transmission Upgrade(s) means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.
**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Updated Measurement and Verification Plan is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

VAR CC Rate is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

VAR Payment is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

VAR Service is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Virtual Cap is $2,000/MWh.

Virtual Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR) is a measurement of reactive power.

Volumetric Measure (VM) is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.
**Wind High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Wind Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Year** means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

**Zonal Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Capacity Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.
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III.14.5 Regulation Market Resource Selection.

III.14.6 Regulation Market Dispatch.

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III.14.8 Regulation Market Settlement and Compensation.

III.13. **Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.

For the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the 2026-2027 Capacity Commitment Period), any dates, date ranges and/or deadlines for activities related to the Forward Capacity Auction established in or pursuant to any provision of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets, and Services Tariff and all other ISO New England Operating Documents shall not apply. For the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall publish each date, date range, and/or deadline for Forward Capacity Auction activities as soon as practicable. The ISO may adjust any published date, date range and/or deadline for Forward Capacity Auction activities if needed and shall publish a revised date, date range and/or deadline as soon as practicable. The ISO shall establish and, as applicable, adjust, such published dates, date ranges and/or deadlines to provide reasonable advance notice of each date, date range, and/or deadline.

**Special Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Substitution Auction Demand Bid Modification and Withdrawal Provisions for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025).** For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the Internal Market Monitor will modify any submitted Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices (whether or not associated with a Retirement De-List Bid) submitted for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction to reflect the impact of updated CONE, Net CONE and Capacity Performance Payment Rate values accepted by the Commission in Docket No. ER21-787.

The Internal Market Monitor will provide Lead Market Participants with updated Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids and substitution auction test prices in the retirement determination
notifications that it issues on June 3, 2021. Within 5 Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notifications, a Lead Market Participant may withdraw its Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or substitution auction demand bid, and the attendant substitution auction test price, by written notification to the Internal Market Monitor. The election to withdraw a Retirement De-List Bid will also withdraw the associated substitution auction demand bid.

Special Dynamic De-List Threshold and Certain Information Publications for the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025). For the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), on or before June 3, 2021, the ISO will recalculate and re-post the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A to reflect the impact of updated CONE and Net CONE values accepted by the Commission for use in the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction in Docket No. ER21-787.

In addition, the ISO will, on or before June 11, 2021, repost information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(e) and will repost information about the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have elected to participate in the substitution auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.8(g).
III.13.1. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1. New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

**III.13.1.1.1. Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

**III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.
(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity
Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.1.4. **De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.5. **Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6. **Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]
(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.
To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state—or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;

(b)(a) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state’s mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state’s renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state where its Point of Interconnection is located; Sponsored Policy Resource;
(c)(b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018-2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d)(c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.


For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

**III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.**

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor’s contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the
proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1.  Site Control.
For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.2.  Critical Path Schedule.
In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a)  **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.
(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the
major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.2.3. **Offer Information.**

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is
expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.
In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail
to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.
III.13.1.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating
Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be
accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection
impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in
the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section
III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering
capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.
The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package
consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is
complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is
accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may
consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:
(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this
Section III.13.1.1.2;

(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for
treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the
resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided
reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power
Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource
that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be
based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and
verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. **New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4. **New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**
Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. **Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**
In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.


No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;
(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor’s determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price
election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.**

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c) (b), (c), (d) and (e) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018-2026 is 3200 MW.  
(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019-2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the substitution auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period. For clarification, the calculation in (ii) above shall only account for Capacity Supply Obligations acquired in the primary Forward Capacity Auction, and shall not include any additional Capacity Supply Obligations for such a resource acquired through the substitution auction.

(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.

(e)(c) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.
III.13.1.2.  Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1.  Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource’s status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2  Rationing Minimum Limit.
No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.  Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.  Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1.  Summer Qualified Capacity.
The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource
shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

### III.13.1.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.
III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the
Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that ExistingGenerating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.
(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;

(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
   (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent
summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward
Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.
III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is $4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO’s website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

$$Margin = \$1/kW\text{-month} \times \left[ \frac{(75\% \times \text{Net CONE}_{\text{upcoming FCA}}) - DDBT_{\text{preliminary}}}{(75\% \times \text{Net CONE}_{\text{upcoming FCA}})} \right]$$
(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its
capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate
the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.
During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity
Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:
(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.


Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.
The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will
establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor-accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification.
described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. **Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due
consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal
Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The
Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid
shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the
de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal
Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted
by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-
list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static
De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the
resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity
Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid,
both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational
filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the
Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the
resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance
Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the
Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids
identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market
Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or
an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted
Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to
the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless
the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the
Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s)
submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-
accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-
accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

\[
Net \text{ Going Forward Costs} = (GFC - IMR) \times Infl\text{Index} \\
(CQS_{\text{Summer, kw}}) \times (12 \text{ months})
\]

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not
be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

\[ CQ_{Summer} \text{ kW} = \text{capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.} \]

\[ \text{IMR} = \text{expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00.} \]

\[ \text{InfIndex} = \text{inflation index. InfIndex} = (1 + i)^4 \]

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4- Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or
The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market
Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.
If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C  Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3.  Expected Capacity Performance Payments.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4.  Risk Premium.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This
documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.
To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).
III.13.1.2.3.2.4. **Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.**

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. **Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted
average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\text{Cost Of Capital} = \frac{\text{Remaining Life}}{(1 - (1 + \text{Cost Of Capital})^{\text{Remaining Life}})}
\]

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity, Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:

(i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;
(ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).
(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

### III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

### III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones
pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade's Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

### III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New

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Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

**III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

**III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also
submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: CMEEC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: MMWEC</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: Pascoag</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: VELCO</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 225</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE (extension)</td>
<td>Up to 6</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(beginning 11/01/2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Phase I/II ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 110</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service. Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.
III.13.1.3.4. **Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. **Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.**

The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. **Documentation of Import.**

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed
import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each
New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity
will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any
investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an
Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import
Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services
Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its
association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm
that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor
submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment
configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section
III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period
associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project
Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity
Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in
the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity
Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor
must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and
III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the
time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has
achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and
Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule
(Section III.13.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of
how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity
Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

**III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.
III.13.1.3.5.3.1. **Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. **Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. **Initial Interconnection Analysis.**
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.
The offer information described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.
For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the
Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.
New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.
To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility’s Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.
A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand
Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.

**III.13.1.4.1.1. Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.**
For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.
A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2. **New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.**

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. **Source of Funding.**
The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.
For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.
(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility’s Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility’s Maximum Facility Load.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer
clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. **Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.3. **Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources),
then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.


The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.


The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource’s summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to
Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.1 A Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.1.4.2.1 Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.
(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO’s assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. **Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.**

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. **Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.**
To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. **Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The
monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent
with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. **Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. **Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. **ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address
questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

**III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.**

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward
Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Winter Resource</th>
<th>Location of Summer Resource</th>
<th>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
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<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.
No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction
qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. **Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.1.7. **Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration.
auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are
those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

### III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.
If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.

Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

### III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

### III.13.1.9.2.3. Forfeit of Financial Assurance.
Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

### III.13.1.9.2.4. Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.
A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be
subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in
Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources &lt; 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW</th>
<th>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources &lt; 2 MW</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
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<td>$25,000</td>
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III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO
all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.
Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;
(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.
Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.
III.13.2. **Annual Forward Capacity Auction.**

III.13.2.1. **Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.**

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

III.13.2.2. **Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.**

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. **System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.**

The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

(i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);

(ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at $7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

(iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.
During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

(1) at prices above $7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;

(2) at prices below $7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between $7.03/kW-month and $0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
   (a) At the price of $0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
   (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,437 MW; and
      2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,090 MW; and
      2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 34,865 MW; and
      2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of $7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.
In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

### III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.
III.13.2.3. **Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

   (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor
would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} 
q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\
q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\
q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\
\vdots & \vdots \\
q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m.
\end{cases}$$
where, in the first round, \( q_0 \) is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, \( q_0 \) is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.
(b)  **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i)  Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii)  For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a)
to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rational and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.
Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity
Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a
Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

**III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**
The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

1. the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
(2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);

(3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;

(4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

(1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
(2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone:

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.
(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
2. in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
3. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
   or;
   2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
   or;
   2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.
If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing
Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. **Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant
Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. **Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.**

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is \( \max \{1.6 \times \text{Net CONE, CONE} \} \). References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by $0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.
III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the
uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity
Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.
The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the
same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as
soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.
If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A  Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity
Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and
other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).
In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability. If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common
Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO: A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state
utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.
(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is
subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.
III.13.2.7.1. **Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. **Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

III.13.2.7.3. **[Reserved.]**

III.13.2.7.3A. **Treatment of Imports.**
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and
Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.
Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.
III.13.2.7.7. **Tie-Breaking Rules.**

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

III.13.2.8. **Capacity Substitution Auctions.**

III.13.2.8.1. **Administration of Substitution Auctions.**

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

III.13.2.8.1.1. **Substitution Auction Clearing and Awards.**

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

(i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
(ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.

(iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

(iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.
In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction’s objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource’s cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.
The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.
For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

(i) if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

(ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone’s Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.
The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

**III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.**

**III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.**

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource’s total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology
Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.
If the offer quantity does not equal the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

**III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction**

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) Any portion of a resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource’s substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

**III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.**

**III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.**

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource’s Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).
A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.

(a) Participant-Submitted Test Price. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

The test price for the capacity associated with a resource’s demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is $0.00/kW-month.

(b) IMM-Determined Test Price. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be
included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The Internal Market Monitor’s determination regarding a Market Participant-submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant-submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor’s filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).

III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).
III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource’s test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource’s demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

   (i) The portion of a resource’s capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

   (ii) Any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rational demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or
Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality


(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, and substitution auction test price, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by
the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the
Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local
Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum
Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) [reserved];

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate
in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from a
new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8,
including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s
determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and
whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is
consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than
capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids,
Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made
according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market
Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and
Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market
Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the
resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and
reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall
identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and
shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and
which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-
determined price for the bid;
(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which
resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.
Clean Tariff – Effective May 30, 2022
I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions

I.2.1. Rules of Construction:
In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;
(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day);

(k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

I.2.2. Definitions:
In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.
**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.
**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR)** is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annual Reconfiguration Transaction** is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**Asset** is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.

**Asset Related Demand** is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service
from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or
greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an
aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for
each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the
daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time
unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related
Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of
“available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating
Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating
Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or
an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement
De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset.
These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill
its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally
responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with
Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market
Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction
Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.
**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.
**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Binary Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Binary Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service** (CNR Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Bilateral** is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment Rate** is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Score** is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.
CLAIM10 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

CLAIM30 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

Claimed Capability Audit is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset or the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Entry Deadline has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Clustering has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

CNR Capability is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Coincident Peak Contribution is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

Commercial Capacity is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

Commission is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different
from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Continuous Storage Generator Asset** is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
4. provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation** means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.
Coordinated Transaction Scheduling means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

Correction Limit means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of Energy Produced (CEP) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

Cost of New Entry (CONE) is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

Counterparty means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

Covered Entity is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Credit Coverage is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

Credit Qualifying means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

Credit Threshold consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailment** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.
Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Generation Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Loss Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Prices means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

DDP Dispatchable Resource is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource’s Dispatch Instructions.

Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.
**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Bid Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Demand Capacity Resource** means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.
**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or
Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset’s Offer Data.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a
Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)** is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

**Dispatchable Resource** is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that
the facility’s Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.
**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.
**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the
distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.

**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.
**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative $150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.
**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.
**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transaction Cap** is $2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.
External Transaction Floor is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

External Transmission Project is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

Facilities Study is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

Facility and Equipment Testing means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

Failure to Perform During a System Restoration is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

Fast Start Demand Response Resource is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.
**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.

**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Financial Transmission Right (FTR) is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

Firm Point-To-Point Service is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.


Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

Force Majeure - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Capacity Market (FCM) is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant’s Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.**

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.
**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.

**Forward Reserve Obligation Charge** is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Offer Cap** is $9,000/megawatt-month.

**Forward Reserve Payment Rate** is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Procurement Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts** refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Resource** is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

**Forward Reserve Threshold Price** is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Auction** is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.
**FTR Auction Revenue** is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**FTR Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.
**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.
**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.

**Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs** is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

**Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF)** are existing U.S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

**Host Participant or Host Utility** is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.
**Hourly Charges** are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Hourly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Hourly Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Hub** is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.
**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.

**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.
**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

** Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoryed Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoryed energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported
by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

Investment Grade Rating, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.

Invoice is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Invoice Date is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

ISO means ISO New England Inc.

ISO Charges, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

ISO Control Center is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


ISO New England Billing Policy is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Filed Documents means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.
ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Information Policy is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

ISO New England Manuals are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.


ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs) are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

ISO New England Planning Procedures are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


ITC Agreement is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

ITC Rate Schedule is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.
**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached, under the ISO New England Billing Policy and penalties collected under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids or Demand Reduction Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

**Load Management** means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not
limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.
Local Network Service (LNS) is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.

Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP) is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

Local Resource Adequacy Requirement is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

Local Second Contingency Protection Resources are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

Local Service is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

Local Service Schedule is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR) is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Local System Planning (LSP) is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
Localized Costs are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

Location is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.

Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Long-Term is a term of one year or more.

Long-Term Transmission Outage is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

Longer-Term Transmission Study is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT. The 2050 Transmission Study shall be the first Longer-Term Transmission Study.

Loss Component is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or
Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.

**Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

LSE means load serving entity.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Manual Response Rate** is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

**Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Marginal Reliability Impact** is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

**Market Credit Limit** is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade** is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk
power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.

**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.
**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Maximum Daily Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.
**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.
**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider)** is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service)** is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.
Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA) is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO) is an owner of MTF.

Meter Data Error means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

Metered Quantity For Settlement is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

Minimum Consumption Limit is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

Minimum Down Time is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

Minimum Generation Emergency means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

Minimum Generation Emergency Credits are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.
**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.

**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly PER** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.1.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.
**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.
Needs Assessment is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

NEMA, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

NEMA Contract is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE) is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.


NEPOOL Agreement is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

NEPOOL GIS is the generation information system.

NEPOOL GIS Administrator is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

NEPOOL GIS API Fees are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

NEPOOL Participant is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.
NERC is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

NESCOE is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.

Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Net CONE is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

Net Regional Clearing Price is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

Net Supply is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

Net Supply Capability is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

Network Capability Interconnection Standard has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Customer is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

Network Import Capability (NI Capability) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Resource is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is
restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.
New Generating Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

New Import Capacity Resource is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

New Resource Offer Floor Price is defined in Section III.A.21.2.

NMPTC means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

NMPTC Credit Threshold is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


Node is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

No-Load Fee is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

Nominated Consumption Limit is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.

Non-Commercial Capacity is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount) is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

Non-Dispatchable Resource is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

Non-Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Non-Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.

Non-Market Participant is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.
Non-Municipal Market Participant is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF) are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

Non-Qualifying means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

Notice of RBA is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Notification Time is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

Northeastern Planning Protocol is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL: www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc.

NPCC is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

Obligation Month means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

Offer Data means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.

Offer Review Trigger Prices are the prices specified in Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of New Capacity Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction.
Offered CLAIM10 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

Offered CLAIM30 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

On-Peak Demand Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Operating Authority is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

Operating Data means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

Operating Day means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

Operating Reserve means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

Operations Date is February 1, 2005.
OTF Service is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

Other Transmission Facility (OTF) are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA) is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

Other Transmission Owner (OTO) is an owner of OTF.

Ownership Share is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

Participant Expenses are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participant Required Balance is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Participant Vote is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

Participants Agreement is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

Participants Committee is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.
**Passive DR Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Passive DR Auditing Period** is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Peak Energy Rent (PER)** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**PER Proxy Unit** is described in Section III.13.7.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability.
Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point of Interconnection** shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.
**Pool-Planned Unit** is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.
**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlemets) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a
rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rapid Response Pricing Asset** is: (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant’s Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost** is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

**Rationing Minimum Limit** is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Capability Audit** is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.
**Reactive Resource** is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete
Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer’s Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.
**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.
Reliability Markets are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

Reliability Region means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

Reliability Transmission Upgrade means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

Remittance Advice is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

Remittance Advice Date is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

Renewable Technology Resource is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.7.

Re-Offer Period is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.
**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs)** are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, or a Demand Response Resource.
**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.

**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer
facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.
**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

**SMD Effective Date** is March 1, 2003.

**Solar High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.
Solar Plant Future Availability is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

Solutions Study is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource (SCR) is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

Sponsored Policy Resource is a New Capacity Resource that: receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order and as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.

Stage One Proposal is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Stage Two Solution is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.
**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**State-identified Requirement** refers to a legal requirement, mandate or policy of a New England state or local government that forms the basis for a Longer-Term Transmission Study request submitted to the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.
**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Supply Offer** is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.
Supply Offer Block-Hours are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

Synchronous Condenser is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

System Condition is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

System Impact Study is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

System Operator shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

System Operating Limit (SOL) has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

TADO is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market
Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement** is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.
**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve** (TMOR) is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Rate** (TOUT Rate) is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Service** (TOUT Service) means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Transmission Customer is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

Transmission Default Amount is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

Transmission Default Period is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Account Limit is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission Late Payment Charge is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff) is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.

Transmission Obligations are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA) is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

Transmission Owner means a PTO, MTO or OTO.
**Transmission Provider** is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

**Transmission Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Security Analysis Requirement** shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

**Transmission Service Agreement (TSA)** is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

**Transmission Upgrade(s)** means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Wind High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Wind Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.
Winter ARA Qualified Capacity is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

Winter Capability Period means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

Year means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

Zonal Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

Zonal Capacity Obligation is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

Zonal Reserve Requirement is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.
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III.13. **Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.

For the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction (associated with the 2026-2027 Capacity Commitment Period), any dates, date ranges and/or deadlines for activities related to the Forward Capacity Auction established in or pursuant to any provision of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets, and Services Tariff and all other ISO New England Operating Documents shall not apply. For the seventeenth Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall publish each date, date range, and/or deadline for Forward Capacity Auction activities as soon as practicable. The ISO may adjust any published date, date range and/or deadline for Forward Capacity Auction activities if needed and shall publish a revised date, date range and/or deadline as soon as practicable. The ISO shall establish and, as applicable, adjust, such published dates, date ranges and/or deadlines to provide reasonable advance notice of each date, date range, and/or deadline.
III.13.1.  **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.  New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

**III.13.1.1.1.  Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

**III.13.1.1.1.1.  Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.
Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity
Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 as applied to the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.

(a) [Reserved.]
(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.
To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource;

(b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of
Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor’s contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project.
described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.
For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam...
generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.2.2.2(e) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full
demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive
Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if
necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

III.13.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2, III.13.1.3, III.13.1.4, or III.13.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to
participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.
(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.

The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3. New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.
III.13.1.2.5.4. **New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. **Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.

III.13.1.1.2.8. **Qualification Determination Notification for New Generating Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:
(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor’s determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.
### III.13.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2028.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

### III.13.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c), the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 is 300 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction associated
with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the substitution auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026. For clarification, the calculation in (ii) above shall only account for Capacity Supply Obligations acquired in the primary Forward Capacity Auction, and shall not include any additional Capacity Supply Obligations for such a resource acquired through the substitution auction.

III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource’s status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2 Rationing Minimum Limit.
No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1. Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.2.2.1.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity.**
The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. **Winter Qualified Capacity.**
The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of
that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating
Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability
ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.1.1, by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;

(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:

(i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
(ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section
III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no
election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated
requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to
have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent
summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead
Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in
Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing
that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent
with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the
relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s
summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward
Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path
schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the
requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead
Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified
Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer
Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in
October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of
incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market
Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New
Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in
writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest.
Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List
Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.
Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is $4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO’s website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the
Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

\[
Margin = \frac{75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA} - DDBT_{preliminary}}{75\% \times Net\ CONE_{upcoming\ FCA}}
\]

(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may:

(a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is
greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. **Export Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity.
Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-
List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in
Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward
Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and
the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the
multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing
Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification
Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate
the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each
Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be
exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside
of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export
De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or
below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating
Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a
Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or
below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets
beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid
in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply
Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement
De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be
detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing
Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs)
associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity
offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review
by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional
documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1.  Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for
which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.


Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.
III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor–accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section
III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including
data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or
an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. **Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

\[
\text{Net Going Forward Costs} = \frac{(GFC - IMR) \times InfIndex}{(CQ_{Summer}, \text{kw}) \times (12 \text{ months})}
\]

Where:

\(GFC\) = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a
resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

CQ_{\text{Summer}} kW = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.

IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index. infIndex = (1 + i)^t

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or
Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be
**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present
value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation
must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.
To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.2.3.2.3. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. **Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.**

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. **Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{1 - (1 + \text{Cost Of Capital})^{\text{Remaining Life}}}$$

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.
No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of
Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity
Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.
III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY — NE: CMEEC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY — NE: MMWEC</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY — NE: Pascoag</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY— NE: VELCO</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate — NE</td>
<td>Up to 225</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate — NE (extension)</td>
<td>Up to 6</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(beginning 11/01/2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Phase I/II — NE</td>
<td>Up to 110</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service. Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource. Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.
The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

**III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.**

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).
To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.
III.13.1.3.5.3. **Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. **Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be
delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. **Capacity Commitment Period Election.**

The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. **Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. **Cost Information.**

The offer information described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. **Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**
In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

### III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

### III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3(b).

### III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW.
An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility’s Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.
A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest
Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be
ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.
The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.
(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of
target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing
the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing
plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use
customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource
Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility’s Net Supply Capability will be less
than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility’s Maximum Facility Load.

III.13.1.4.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand
Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at
a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package
a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail
Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand
reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package
a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand
reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand
reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity
Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii)
the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks
prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project
Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in
the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full
demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment
Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.2.6. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.  Capacity Commitment Period Election.

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8.  Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.

(a)  All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.
(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.3. **Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.4. **Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.
The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.
No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity
Resource’s summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.A Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for
which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO’s assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.
If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.
An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.
To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.
Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification
performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.
At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the
schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting
shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak
Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity
Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.
At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak
Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward
Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the
Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include
updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However,
the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity
Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type
from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally,
the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent
with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality
of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction
qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity
Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification
Documents.
Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no
less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for
which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the
submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be
received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.
For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with
greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain
records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s
utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.
The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.
Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of
capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

| Location of Summer Resource |
(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

### III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

### III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing...
Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.

III.13.1.6.1. **Self-Supplied FCA Resource Eligibility.**

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. **Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity
Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.


In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.
(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).


Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting
Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.
III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.9.2.3. **Forfeit of Financial Assurance.**

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.13.1.9.2.4. **Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.**

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.3. **Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration
auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

| New Generating Capacity Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission | New Generating Capacity Resources < 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW | Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources | New Generating Capacity Resources < 2 MW |
III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in
accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. **Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. **Crediting Of Reimbursements.**

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.10. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification Schedule.**
Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.**

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1.  System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.
The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

(i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);

(ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at $7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;

(iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.
During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

(1) at prices above $7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;

(2) at prices below $7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between $7.03/kW-month and $0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
   (a) At the price of $0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
   (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,437 MW; and
      2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,090 MW; and
      2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 34,865 MW; and
      2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month

(3) a price of $7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.
In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

### III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.

The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.
III.13.2.3. **Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

   (i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor
would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that
round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices,
each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round
Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed
in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the
decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most
three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve
indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section
III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity
Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an
investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity
Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity
Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the
resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first
round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater
capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for
a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any
price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$,
respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity
Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities
submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply
curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} 
q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\
q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\
q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\
\ldots & \ldots \\
q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m.
\end{cases}$$
where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.
Bids from Existing Capacity Resources

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a)
to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.
Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity...
Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a
Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. **Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

1. the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);

(3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;

(4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

(1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;
(2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.
(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
2. in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
3. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

or;

2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,

or;

2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.
If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing...
Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. **Determination of Final Capacity Zones.**

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant
Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.
The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by $0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.
III.13.2.5. **Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

### III.13.2.5.1. **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

### III.13.2.5.2. **Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

#### III.13.2.5.2.1. **Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the
uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity
Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.
The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the
same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission
time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an
order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the
minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of
subsitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the
resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated
with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the
violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected
pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall
not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less
capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for
a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid,
Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward
Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list
bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not
clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity
associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability
reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons
at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction
price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has
determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market
Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the
qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if
the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a
case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the
later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price
reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in
which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward
Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as
soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.
If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity
Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and
other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).
(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common
Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) **Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO:** A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state
utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:** In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation:** Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

**III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.
(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is
subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.
III.13.2.7.1. **Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. **Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

III.13.2.7.3. **Reserved.**

III.13.2.7.3A. **Treatment of Imports.**
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and
Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. **Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**
Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. **Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**
Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. **Minimum Capacity Award.**
Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.
III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.
Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.


III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.
Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

(i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.

Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.
In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction’s objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationalable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource’s cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. Substitution Auction Pricing.

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.
For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

(i) if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

(ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone’s Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.
The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

**III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.**

**III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.**

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource’s total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology
Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.
If the offer quantity does not equal the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) Any portion of a resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource’s substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource’s Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).
A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.
Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.
If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

(i) The portion of a resource’s capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

(ii) Any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality


(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently delist or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

   (i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

   (ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) [reserved];

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;
(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction
(this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity
Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the
substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described
in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections
III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days
after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within
75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations
contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and
challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in
accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of
the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s
determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following
that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs
otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall
be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the
results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing
Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports
pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total
amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price
above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each
Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and
future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which
resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future
auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.
Marked Tariff – Effective March 1, 2024
I.2  Rules of Construction; Definitions

I.2.1.  Rules of Construction:
In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;
(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day); 

(k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of _ejusdem generis_ shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

I.2.2. Definitions:

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.
**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.
**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR)** is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annual Reconfiguration Transaction** is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**Asset** is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Distributed Energy Resource participating as part of Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.
**Asset Related Demand** is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

**Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

**Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs** are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

**Assigned Meter Reader** reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

**Auction Revenue Right (ARR)** is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation)** is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

**Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder)** is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.
**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.
**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Binary Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Binary Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
**Block** is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

**Block-Hours** are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

**Budget and Finance Subcommittee** is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

**Business Day** is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

**Cancelled Start NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Capability Demonstration Year** is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

**Capacity Acquiring Resource** is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Balancing Ratio** is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant** is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Resource (CNR)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service (CNR Interconnection Service)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

**Capacity Performance Bilateral** is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment** is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Payment Rate** is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Performance Score** is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Rationing Rule** addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Scarcity Condition** is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.
CLAIM10 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

CLAIM30 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

Claimed Capability Audit is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset, the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource, or the demand reduction capability and energy injection capability of a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Entry Deadline has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Clustering has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

CNR Capability is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Coincident Peak Contribution is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

Commercial Capacity is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.
**Commission** is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that
results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
Continuous Storage DARD is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Continuous Storage Generator Asset is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Continuous Storage Facility is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Control Agreement is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

Control Area is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

(1) match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
(2) maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
(3) maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
(4) provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

Coordinated External Transaction is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy
into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.

**Coordinated Transaction Scheduling** means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

**Correction Limit** means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of Energy Produced (CEP)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of New Entry (CONE)** is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

**Counterparty** means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

**Covered Entity** is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Credit Coverage** is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

**Credit Qualifying** means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

**Credit Threshold** consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

Current Ratio is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

Curtailment is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

Customer is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

Data Reconciliation Process means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

Day-Ahead is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.
**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**DDP Dispatchable Resource** is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource’s Dispatch Instructions.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.
Decrement Bid means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

Default Amount is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

Default Period is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Delivering Party is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

Demand Bid means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

Demand Bid Block-Hours are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

Demand Bid Cap is $2,000/MWh.

Demand Capacity Resource means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

Demand Designated Entity is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

Demand Reduction Offer is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.
**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (DRDERA)** is a type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is described in additional detail in Section III.6.5.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.
Designated FCM Participant is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Designated FTR Participant is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Desired Dispatch Point (DDP) means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset’s Offer Data.

Direct Assignment Facilities are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

Directly Metered Assets are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

Disbursement Agreement is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.
**Dispatch Instruction** means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

**Dispatch Zone** means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

**Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)** is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

**Dispatchable Resource** is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

**Dispute Representatives** are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputed Amount** is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Disputing Party**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.
**Distributed Energy Capacity Resource (DECR)** means an Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource or a New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource.

**Distributed Energy Resource (DER)** is any resource located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter that is capable of providing energy injection, energy withdrawal, regulation, or demand reduction.

**Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (DERA)** is an aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources that is registered under Section III.6.7 and is described in additional detail in Section III.6.

**Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator (DER Aggregator)** is a Market Participant that aggregates one or more Distributed Energy Resources for participation in a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation and serves as the Lead Market Participant for a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that the facility’s Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity
Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must
maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.
**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a
positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative $150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.
**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource** is a type of Distributed Energy Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4A.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.

**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transaction Cap** is $2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transaction Floor** is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and
scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.
**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


**Financial Transmission Right (FTR)** is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

**Firm Point-To-Point Service** is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.

**Firm Transmission Service** is Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, service for Excepted Transactions, firm MTF Service, firm OTF Service, and firm Local Service.

**Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator** is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.
**Force Majeure** - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant’s Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.
Forward Reserve Obligation Charge is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Offer Cap is $9,000/megawatt-month.

Forward Reserve Payment Rate is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Procurement Period is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Resource is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

Forward Reserve Threshold Price is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

FTR Auction is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

FTR Auction Revenue is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

FTR Credit Test Percentage is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

FTR Financial Assurance Requirements are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability
As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.
Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF) are existing U.S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

Host Participant or Host Utility is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Hub is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a
reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.
**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under
which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

**Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoried Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoried energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.
**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.
**ISO New England Manuals** are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

**ISO New England Operating Documents** are the Tariff and the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs)** are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

**ISO New England Planning Procedures** are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


**ITC Agreement** is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC Rate Schedule** is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached,

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids, Demand Reduction Offers or Baseline Deviation Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

**Load Management** means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load-Side Relationship Certification** is a certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3 that a Project Sponsor submits as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package to demonstrate that the New Capacity Resource should not be subject to buyer-side market power review.
**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.
**Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP)** is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

**Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

**Local Resource Adequacy Requirement** is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

**Local Second Contingency Protection Resources** are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

**Local Service** is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

**Local Service Schedule** is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

**Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR)** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Local System Planning (LSP)** is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Localized Costs** are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

**Location** is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.
**Locational Marginal Price (LMP)** is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

**Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Long-Term** is a term of one year or more.

**Long-Term Transmission Outage** is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Longer-Term Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 ofAttachment K of the OATT. The 2050 Transmission Study shall be the first Longer-Term Transmission Study.

**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.
Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

LSE means load serving entity.

Lump Sum Blackstart Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Manual Response Rate is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

Marginal Reliability Impact is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

Market Credit Limit is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Market Credit Test Percentage is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.
**Market Participant** is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


**Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA)** is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

**Market Rule 1** is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

**Market Violation** is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

**Material Adverse Change** is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

**Material Adverse Impact** is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission,
Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Maximum Daily Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.
**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.
**Measurement and Verification Summary Report** is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

**MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA)** is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider)** is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service)** is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

**Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA)** is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

**Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO)** is an owner of MTF.

**Meter Data Error** means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.
**Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit** means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Metered Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Minimum Consumption Limit** is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

**Minimum Down Time** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.
**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Needs Assessment** is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**NEMA**, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

**NEMA Contract** is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.
**NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE)** is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

**NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.

**NEPOOL** is the New England Power Pool, and the entities that collectively participated in the New England Power Pool.

**NEPOOL Agreement** is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

**NEPOOL GIS** is the generation information system.

**NEPOOL GIS Administrator** is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL GIS API Fees** are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL Participant** is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.

**NERC** is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

**NESCOE** is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.
Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Net CONE is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

Net Regional Clearing Price is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

Net Supply is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

Net Supply Capability is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

Network Capability Interconnection Standard has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Customer is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

Network Import Capability (NI Capability) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Resource is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating
resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.
New Demand Capacity Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4A.1 of Market Rule 1.

New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Qualification Package is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4A.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form is described in Section III.13.1.4A.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

New England Control Area is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

New England Markets are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuant to rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

New England System Restoration Plan is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and
ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.32.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.
Non-Commercial Capacity is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount) is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

Non-Dispatchable Resource is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

Non-Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Non-Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.
Non-Market Participant is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

Non-Municipal Market Participant is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF) are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

Non-Qualifying means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

Notice of RBA is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Notification Time is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

Northeastern Planning Protocol is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL: www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc.

NPCC is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

Obligation Month means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

Offer Data means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.
**Offer Review Trigger Prices** are the prices specified in Section III.A.21.1 of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of New Capacity Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**Offered CLAIM10** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**Offered CLAIM30** is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

**On-Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS)** is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.


**Operating Authority** is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

**Operating Data** means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**Operating Day** means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.
**Operating Reserve** means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Operations Date** is February 1, 2005.

**OTF Service** is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

**Other Transmission Facility (OTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

**Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA)** is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

**Other Transmission Owner (OTO)** is an owner of OTF.

**Ownership Share** is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

**Participant Expenses** are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participant Required Balance** is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Participant Vote** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.
Participants Agreement is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

Participants Committee is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.

Participating Transmission Owner (PTO) is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

Passive DR Audit is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

Passive DR Auditing Period is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

Payment is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

Payment Default Shortfall Fund is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Permanent De-list Bid is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

Phase I Transfer Credit is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

Phase I/II HVDC-TF is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference
between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability. Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.

**Phase One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Phase II Transfer Credit** is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Planning Advisory Committee** is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Planning and Reliability Criteria** is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Planning Authority** is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

**Point(s) of Delivery (POD)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

**Point of Interconnection** shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.

**Point(s) of Receipt (POR)** is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

**Point-To-Point Service** is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.
Pool-Planned Unit is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

Pool PTF Rate is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

Pool RNS Rate is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

Pool-Scheduled Resources are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

Pool Supported PTF is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

Pool Transmission Facility (PTF) means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.


Posture means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

Posturing Credits are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.
**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.

**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a
rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.
**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Queue Position** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Rapid Response Pricing Asset** is (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant’s Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

**Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost** is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

**Rated** means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

**Rating Agencies** are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

**Rationing Minimum Limit** is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

**RBA Decision** is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

**Reactive Capability Audit** is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.
**Reactive Resource** is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.
Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Loss Revenue is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time NCP Load Obligation is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

Real-Time Offer Change is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Prices means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

Real-Time Reserve Charge is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete
Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer’s Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service (RNS)** is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan (RSP)** is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service (RTS)** is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.
**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.
**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.

**Reliability Region** means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

**Reliability Transmission Upgrade** means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

**Remittance Advice** is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

**Remittance Advice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

**Renewable Technology Resource** is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.7.

**Re-Offer Period** is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.
**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPFs)** are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.
**Resource** means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, a Demand Response Resource, a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

**Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA)** is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

**Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone** is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

**Rest of System** is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Retail Delivery Point** is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

**Retirement De-List Bid** is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

**Returning Market Participant** is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

**Revenue Requirement** is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

**Reviewable Action** is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.
**Reviewable Determination** is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RSP Project List** is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.
**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.

**Service Agreement** is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

**Service Commencement Date** is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

**Services** means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

**Settlement Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (SODERA)** is a type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation and is described in additional detail in Section III.6.6.

**Settlement Only Resources** are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

**Shortfall Funding Arrangement**, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

**Short-Term** is a period of less than one year.

**Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs** are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.
SMD Effective Date is March 1, 2003.

Solar High Limit is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

Solar Plant Future Availability is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

Solutions Study is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource (SCR) is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

Special Constraint Resource Service is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

Sponsored Policy Resource is a New Capacity Resource that: receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order and as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.
**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**State-identified Requirement** refers to a legal requirement, mandate or policy of a New England state or local government that forms the basis for a Longer-Term Transmission Study request submitted to the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.
**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Station** is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located within a common property boundary.

**Station Going Forward Common Costs** are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Summer Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

**Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.
Supply Offer is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.

Supply Offer Block-Hours are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

Synchronous Condenser is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

System Condition is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

System Impact Study is an assessment pursuant to Part I.B, I.C, I.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

System Operator shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.
**System Operating Limit (SOL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.
**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement** is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)** is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate)** is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Service (TOUT Service)** means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.
**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.
**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

**Transmission Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

**Transmission Default Period** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff)** is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.
Transmission Obligations are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA) is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

Transmission Owner means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

Transmission Provider is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

Transmission Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

Transmission Upgrade(s) means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1,
2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.

**UDS** is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.
**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Wind High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Wind Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Winter ARA Qualified Capacity** is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Winter Capability Period** means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

**Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours** are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Year** means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

**Zonal Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Capacity Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Zonal Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.
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III.14.7  Performance Monitoring.
III.14.8  Regulation Market Settlement and Compensation.

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.


To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.


A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1.1. Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.
(b) [Reserved.]

c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity
Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.3 as applied to the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.1.4. **De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.5. **Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6. **Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a) [Reserved.]
(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource;

(b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of
Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project.
described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.
For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam
generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full
demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) For a All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price does not satisfy the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1.1 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Capacity Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21) sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)).

For a New Generating Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.
(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.
In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New
Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the
summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

### III.13.1.2.2.7. Load-Side Interests.

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

### III.13.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the
New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able
to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.
The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:

(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;

(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.
III.13.1.2.5.  Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.5.1.  New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.2.5.2.  [Reserved]

III.13.1.2.5.3.  New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.2.5.4.  New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.
Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating
Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.
In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.

No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct
those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO’s determination as to whether the New Generating Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination; and

(\textit{fg}) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding whether the New Generating Capacity Resource’s requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a), is consistent with the long-run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

\textbf{III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.}

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2028.
A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c), the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 is 300 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the substitution auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026. For clarification, the calculation in (ii) above shall only account for Capacity Supply Obligations acquired in the primary Forward
Capacity Auction, and shall not include any additional Capacity Supply Obligations for such a resource acquired through the substitution auction.

III.13.1.2.  Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1.  Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource’s status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2  Rationing Minimum Limit.
No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2  Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.  Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1  Summer Qualified Capacity.
The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in
October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.
The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter
Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. **Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

III.13.1.2.2.2.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2.2. **Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the
Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date
shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2 plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;

(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
   (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.
(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.
A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may...
be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is $4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO’s website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:
(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.2.3.1.3. **Export Bids.**
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the
multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.
During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.3.1.6, the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.


Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include
detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs. The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less
than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor– accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids
and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including
published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the
Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Net Going Forward Costs} &= \frac{(GFC – IMR) \times \text{InflIndex}}{(CQ_{\text{Summer}}, \text{kw}) \times (12 \text{ months})}
\end{align*}
\]

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses,
and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

\[ \text{CQ}_{\text{summer}} \text{kW} = \text{capacity seeking to de-list in kW}. \] In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.

\[ \text{IMR} = \text{expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars}. \] In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00.

\[ \text{InfIndex} = \text{inflation index}. \] \[ \text{infIndex} = (1 + i)^t \]

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with
overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity
Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures.** in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk.
The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3. Expected Capacity Performance Payments.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4. Risk Premium.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. **Opportunity Costs.**

To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines
that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.

A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor
shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\frac{\text{Cost Of Capital}}{(1 - (1 + \text{CostOfCapital})^{-\text{RemainingLife}})}
\]

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

**III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.**

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

**III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.**

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would
only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.
The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection
Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. **Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.**
Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. **Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A **Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**
Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: CMEEC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: MMWEC</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: Pascoag</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: VELCO</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 225</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)</td>
<td>Up to 6</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Phase I/II ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 110</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to
manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service. Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource. Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources. The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:
III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.

(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity
Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. **Import Backed by Existing External Resources.**
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.13.1.3.5.3. **Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project
Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is
located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Offer Information.
(a) A New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 is subject to the same offer information submission requirements for a New Generating Capacity Resource that are described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3.

(b) A New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold must submit the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and documentation and information supporting such lowest price, which should include the documentation and information listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk.
adjustments. The offer information described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.42 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix Section III.A.19 of Market Rule 1 to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) and that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.
III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility’s Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.

A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at
the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2. New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

### III.13.1.4.1.1.2.2. Measurement and Verification Plan.
For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must
provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification
Plan that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section
III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.
(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity
Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not
limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of
target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing
the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing
plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use
customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource
Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility’s Net Supply Capability will be less
than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility’s Maximum Facility Load.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand
Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at
a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package
a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail
Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.
The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand
reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package
a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand
reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand
reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity
Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii)
the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks
prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.
III.13.1.4.1.2.8. Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For all New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price does not satisfy any of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1 or III.A.21.1.2 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21) sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-sider market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Demand Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.9 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.1.4.1.1.3. **Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.**

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.1.4. **Consistency of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.**

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.5. **Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.**
The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource’s summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and
winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide the ISO’s determination as to whether the New Demand Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination.

(c) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the notification will provide the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding whether the New Demand Capacity Resource’s requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.8(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

(bd) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.
Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.
III.13.1.4.2.A Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO’s assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.
(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.
An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.
To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the
ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

### III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from eligible pre-
existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. **Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.**
At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. **Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.**
At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.
 III.13.1.4.3.1.3. **Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. **Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.**

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. **ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.**

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the
Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.
Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.
(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced prorata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Winter Resource</th>
<th>Location of Summer Resource</th>
<th>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.
No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate
resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating
Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the
resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail
the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an
Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must
make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is
required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving
entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity
regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing
Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA
Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If
designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the
resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the
exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load
serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity
seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual
reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore,
is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All
designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are
binding.

Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain
its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import
Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction
qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource
type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate
resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified
in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The
total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

### III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.


In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.
III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.1. **Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2. **Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. **Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.**
If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]


Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.


A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing resources...
External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the
ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

**III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.**

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources &lt; 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW</th>
<th>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources &lt; 2 MW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

III.13.1.9.3.2.1. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and
critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.
Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and
(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.
Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.
III.13.2. **Annual Forward Capacity Auction.**

III.13.2.1. **Timing of Annual Forward Capacity Auctions.**
Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

III.13.2.2. **Amount of Capacity Cleared in Each Forward Capacity Auction.**
The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. **System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.**
The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

(i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);

(ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at $7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;
(iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

(1) at prices above $7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;

(2) at prices below $7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between $7.03/kW-month and $0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
   (a) At the price of $0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
   (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,437 MW; and
      2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,090 MW; and
      2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 34,865 MW; and
      2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month
(3) a price of $7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.
The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.13.2.3. **Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, New Demand Capacity Resources, and New Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.**

(i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity
Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:
where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), the amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a New Capacity Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, such a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \vdots & \vdots \vdotswithin{\text{...}} \\ q_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$
prices (as they may be established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.42) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section...
If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal
pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the
Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that
is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted
bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then
the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to
Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for
an Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1
and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the
Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section
III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a new Self-Supplied FCA Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, the new resource’s self-supplied quantity shall be entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Distributed Energy Capacity
Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the
New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO
concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

III.13.2.3.3. **Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

1. the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
2. the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
3. for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   i. the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
   ii. the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
4. for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   i. that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
   ii. the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity.
at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;

2. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-
constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

(1) the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;

(2) in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;

(3) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

(1) the sum of:

(i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
or;
2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

   (i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what
price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.
(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.

III.13.2.4.1 Calculation of Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, CONE, and Net CONE.

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $12.400/kW-month.
Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $7.468/kW-month.

CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

**III.13.2.4.2 Interim Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.**

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e) (except that the bonus tax depreciation adjustment described in Section III.A.21.1.2(e)(5) shall not apply).

For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.1, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.13.2.4. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.

1. Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).

2. For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.13.2.4.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

3. The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak
electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.13.2.4.2 will be published on the ISO’s web site.

(5) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.13.2.4.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.

III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.


A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.
Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or
portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. **Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. **Dynamic De-List Bids.**
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.
III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has
determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for
reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.
(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.
(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.
(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its
Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.
III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO: A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) Allocation: Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3. Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1)
submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid,
consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.


Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow.
requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.3A. Treatment of Imports.
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New
England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.
III.13.2.7.5. **Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. **Minimum Capacity Award.**

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.2.7.7. **Tie-Breaking Rules.**

Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

The final substitution auction shall take place for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the June 1, 2027 to May 31, 2028 Capacity Commitment Period, and no substitution auctions shall be conducted thereafter. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and Attachment K to the OATT addressing the manner in which Capacity Supply Obligations acquired or shed through the substitution auction are accounted for in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process shall continue to have full force and effect.

III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.

Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.


The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

(i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.

(ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.

(iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

(iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity


Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.
In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction’s objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationalable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource’s cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. **Substitution Auction Pricing.**

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

(i) if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations
(total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

(ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone’s Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.
If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-cleared process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-cleared process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-cleared process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.
If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.
To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource’s total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.
A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) Any portion of a resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource’s substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.
(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

III.13.2.8.3. **Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.**

III.13.2.8.3.1. **Demand Bids.**

Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource’s Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.2.8.3.2. **Demand Bid Prices.**  
Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

III.13.2.8.3.3. **Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.**
If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.
(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after
June 1, 2023, a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected
pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:
(i) The portion of a resource’s capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the
primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning
with the highest priced price-quantity pair.
(ii) Any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in
the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning
with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any
price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity
Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the
Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the
substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or
Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that
was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing
process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality


(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii), and (ix) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii), and (ix) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price and offer price information and submitted Load-Side Relationship Certifications, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.3 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) which new resources were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.3; the condition met by each such resource; and, for new resources that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the Load-Side Relationship Certification submitted by the resource;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any New Resource Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to a new resource, and the basis for any such determinations submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues; for the avoidance of doubt, any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to the potential impact of a New Capacity Resource’s offer on Capacity Clearing Prices, including
any such information filed by the ISO in response to a pleading filed with the Commission, shall be filed confidentially and shall not be released to any entity, including to the Project Sponsor whose offer is the subject of dispute:

(ix) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

(x) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

(xi) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of
the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s
determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following
that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs
otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall
be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.
(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the
results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing
Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports
pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total
amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price
above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each
Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and
future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which
resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future
auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25
of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to
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(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also
include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may
include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the
Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1;
and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within
45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection
with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.
(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.
SECTION III

MARKET RULE 1

APPENDIX A

MARKET MONITORING,
REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION
# APPENDIX A

MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

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The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this Appendix A.

III.A.1.2. Structure and Oversight.
The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this Appendix A shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this Appendix A. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor’s functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO’s contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor’s scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

III.A.1.3. Data Access and Information Sharing.
The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this Appendix A.
This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO’s electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.1.4. Interpretation.
In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this Appendix A, the provisions of Appendix A shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either Appendix A or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

III.A.1.5. Definitions.
Capitalized terms not defined in this Appendix A are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

(a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its
identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

(b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.

(c) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

(a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England
Markets, including the adequacy of this Appendix A, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.

(d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this Appendix A.

(f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.

(g) Review the ISO’s filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor’s assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this Appendix A, as appropriate.

(h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

III.A.2.3. **Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.**

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:
(a) Maintain Appendix A and consider whether Appendix A requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.

(b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this Appendix A.

(c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this Appendix A.

(d) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this Appendix A.

(e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s functions.

(g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the
Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

(i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this Appendix A.

(j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this Appendix A are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

(i) *Economic withholding*, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.

(ii) *Uneconomic production from a Resource*, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.

(iii) *Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids*, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this Appendix A.

(iv) *Anti-competitive Demand Bids*, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A.

(v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend Appendix A as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of
(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

(i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
(ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
(iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
(iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
(v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this Appendix A, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
(vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this Appendix A. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

(l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.

(m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission.
If and when established, participate in a committee of regional market monitors to review issues associated with interregional transactions, including any barriers to efficient trade and competition.

III.A.2.4. Overview of the Internal Market Monitor’s Mitigation Functions.

III.A.2.4.1. Purpose.
The mitigation measures set forth in this Appendix A for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule I (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this Appendix A. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied ex ante. Nothing in this Appendix A, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO’s authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.A.2.4.2. Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.
(a) Imposing Mitigation. To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below.

III.A.2.4.3. Applicability.
Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.

III.A.2.4.4. Mitigation Not Provided for Under This Appendix A.
The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified
below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this Appendix A, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act ("§205") with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

III.A.2.4.5. Duration of Mitigation.
Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this Appendix A.

III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.
Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective. Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

III.A.3.1. Consultation Prior to Offer.
If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4(d) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this Appendix A, the Market Participant may contact
the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant’s submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources.
In evaluating bids or offers under this Appendix A for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:

(a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.

(b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.

If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five Business Days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.
For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource’s higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource’s Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

III.A.3.3. Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.
The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant’s Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO’s or Internal Market Monitor’s systems.

(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource’s Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant’s expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

(i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

(ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

(iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer plus $2.50/MMbtu.
Within five Business Days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm’s length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

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<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>6</td>
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III.A.4.1. Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.
This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

(a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
(b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
(c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
(d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

III.A.4.2. Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.

III.A.4.2.1. Initial Thresholds.
Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

(a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource’s capacity;
(b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant’s total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or
(c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO’s Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.
The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource’s available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.
A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.
Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.
Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.

III.A.5. Mitigation.

III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.
Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.
Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

(a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
(b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
(c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset’s Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource. The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior.

III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.
There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

(a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation” apply, and;
(b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation” apply.

III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.
The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.
The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

III.A.5.2.2. **Constrained Area Test.**

A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

(a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;

(b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource’s Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than $25/MWh.

III.A.5.3. **Calculation of Impact Test in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.**

The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource’s Node and the LMP at the Hub.

III.A.5.4. **Calculation of Impact Tests in the Real-Time Energy Market.**

The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource’s Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:
(a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
(b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.

III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below $25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.
III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower.

III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.


III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource’s Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.5.3.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.3.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.
If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.4. **General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.**

III.A.5.5.4.1. **Applicability.**
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.4.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

III.A.5.5.4.3. **Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**
If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.5. **Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.**

III.A.5.5.5.1. **Applicability.**
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.5.2. **Conduct Test.**
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

III.A.5.5.5.3. **Consequence of Failing Test.**
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.6. **Reliability Commitment Mitigation.**
III.A.5.5.6.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are (a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

i. local first contingency;
ii. local second contingency;
iii. VAR or voltage;
iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

III.A.5.5.6.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.6.3. Consequence of Failing Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.

III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.
III.A.5.5.7.3.  Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.

If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.8.  Low Load Cost.

Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

(a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
(b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
(c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.

III.A.5.6.  Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:
(a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
   i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
   ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.

(b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.7. Duration of Commitment Mitigation.
Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

III.A.5.8. Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.
Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

III.A.5.9. Correction of Mitigation.
If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.
The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

III.A.5.10. **Delay of Day-Ahead Energy Market Due to Mitigation Process.**
The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

III.A.6. **Physical and Financial Parameter Offer Thresholds.**
Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

III.A.6.1. **Time-Based Offer Parameters.**
Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

III.A.6.2. **Financial Offer Parameters.**
The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource’s Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.
III.A.6.3. **Other Offer Parameters.**
Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater, for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per day) compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject to the provisions of this section.

III.A.7. **Calculation of Resource Reference Levels for Physical Parameters and Financial Parameters of Resources.**
Market Participants are responsible for providing the Internal Market Monitor with all the information and data necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to calculate up-to-date Reference Levels for each of a Market Participant’s Resources.

III.A.7.1. **Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Physical Parameters.**
The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the basis of one or more of the following:

(a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and fuel types.
(b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing environmental regulatory body.
(c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.

III.A.7.2. **Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Financial Parameters of Offers.**
The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, Interruption Costs and offer blocks will be calculated separately and assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.
III.A.7.2.1. **Order of Reference Level Calculation.**
The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of an offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

(a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
(b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
(c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

III.A.7.2.2. **Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.**
In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

(a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
(b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
(c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
(d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
   (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
   (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.
(e) When in any hour the incremental energy parameter of an offer, including adjusted offers pursuant to Section III.2.4, is greater than $1,000/MWh.

For the purposes of this subsection:
i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.

ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO’s or the Internal Market Monitor’s systems, telemetered values will be used.

iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.

iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.

(e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

(f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:

(i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,

(ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,

(iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,

(iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and

(v) whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,

then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource’s Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller’s Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource’s Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant though the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3.

The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

(a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 “Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources”.

(b) Costs must be documented.

(c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible. All cost estimates, including opportunity cost estimates, must be quantified and analytically supported.

(d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.

(e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:

   i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected
natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and

ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.
The Internal Market Monitor’s determination of a Resource’s marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource’s incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy/Reduction:
\[\text{incremental heat rate} \times \text{fuel costs} + \text{emissions rate} \times \text{emissions allowance price} + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs}.\]

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

(a) emissions limits;
(b) water storage limits;
(c) other operating permits that limit production of energy; and
(d) reducing electricity consumption.

No-Load:
\[\text{no-load fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs} + \text{no-load emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price} + \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.\]

Start-Up/Interruption:
\[\text{start-up fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs} + \text{start-up emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price} + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs}.\]

III.A.8. [Reserved.]
III.A.9. **Regulation.**
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.10. **Demand Bids.**
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Energy Market as outlined below:

(a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.

(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as: \( \frac{\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}}}{\text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}} - 1 \). The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

(c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant’s bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization
to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.

III.A.11.1. Purpose.
The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.A.11.2. Implementation.

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:

\[(\text{LMP real time} / \text{LMP day ahead}) - 1\]

The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs
in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.

(ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.

(iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at
another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.


In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor’s review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor’s determination following such review.

(a) [Reserved].
(b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.
(c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
(d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
(e) Section III.13.1.3.5.6 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
(f) Section III.13.1.7 - Internal Market Monitor review of summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values.

Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

Appendix G of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The
Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner’s scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.13.4.  Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.
The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this Appendix A. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

III.A.14.  Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.
Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in Appendix I to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.


If as a result of an offer being capped under Section III.1.9, a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was capped, the Market Participant may, within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit an additional cost recovery request to the Internal Market Monitor.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the cap.
III.A.15.1.1. **Timing and Contents of Request.**

Within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, a Market Participant requesting additional cost recovery under this Section III.A.15.1 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor a request in writing detailing: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data, documentation and calculations for those costs; and (ii) an explanation of why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the capped costs.

III.A.15.1.2. **Review by Internal Market Monitor.**

To evaluate a Market Participant’s request, the Internal Market Monitor shall use the data, calculations and explanations provided by the Market Participant to verify the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, using the same standards and methodologies the Internal Market Monitor uses to evaluate requests to update Reference Levels under Section III.A.3 of Appendix A. To the extent the Market Participant’s request warrants additional cost recovery, the Internal Market Monitor shall reflect that adjustment in the Resource’s Reference Levels for the period covered by the request. The ISO shall then re-apply the cost verification and capping formulas in Section III.1.9 using the updated Reference Levels to re-calculate the adjustments to the Market Participant’s offers required thereunder, and then shall calculate additional cost recovery using the adjusted offer values.

Within 20 days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written response to the Market Participant’s request, detailing (i) the extent to which it agrees with the request with supporting explanation, and (ii) a calculation of the additional cost recovery. Changes to credits and charges resulting from an additional cost recovery request shall be included in the Data Reconciliation Process.

III.A.15.1.3. **Cost Allocation.**

The ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of any additional cost recovery granted under this Section III.A.15.1 in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

III.A.15.2. **Section 205 Filing Right.**
If either
(a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this Appendix A for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or
(b) in the absence of mitigation, as a result of a request under Section III.A.15.1 being denied in whole or in part,
a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was mitigated or the Section III.A.15.1 request was denied, the Market Participant may submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(a), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(b), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued that reflects the denied request for additional cost recovery under Section III.A.15.1.

A request under this Section III.A.15.2 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having a Section III.A.15.1 request denied, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time addressed in the Section III.A.15.1 request.

III.A.15.2.1. Contents of Filing.
Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating the Resource, as reflected in the original offer and to the extent not recovered under Section III.A.15.1, exceeded the costs as reflected in the capped offer; (iii) the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

III.A.15.2.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.
Within twenty days of the receipt of the applicable Invoice, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section III.A.15.2 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the
information and explanation detailed in Section III.A.15.2.1 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that resulted in the Section III.A.15.2 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section III A.15.2.

III.A.15.2.3. Cost Allocation.
In the event that the Commission accepts a Market Participant’s filing for cost recovery under this section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.


III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.
A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) review of any Internal Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in Appendix D to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to review are:

- Imposition of a mitigation remedy.
- Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.)

III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.
On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor’s mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor’s application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In
considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor’s action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

III.A.17. Reporting.

III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.
Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Appendix A, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant’s cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:

(a) the opportunity costs associated with Demand Reduction Offers;
(b) the accuracy of Demand Response Baselines;
(c) the method used to achieve a demand reduction, and;
(d) the accuracy of metered demand reported to the ISO.

III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market’s performance in the most recent period.
III.A.17.2.2. **Quarterly Report.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this Appendix A and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.3. **Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.**

The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO’s website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.4. **Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the
operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO’s priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.
The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of Appendix A. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:

(i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

(ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of Appendix A and the administration of Appendix A by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of Appendix A.
(v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.

III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:

(a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;

(b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;

(c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain
market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,

(d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten Business Days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than
compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, as amended from time to time and available on the ISO’s website. Consistent with the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, at a minimum each such monitoring unit and its employees: (a) must have no material affiliation with any Market Participant or Affiliate, (b) must have no material financial interest in any Market Participant or Affiliate with potential exceptions for mutual funds and non-directed investments, (c) must not engage in any market transactions other than the performance of their duties hereunder, (d) may not accept anything of value from a Market Participant in excess of a de minimis amount, and (e) must advise a supervisor in the event they seek employment with a Market Participant, and must disqualify themselves from participating in any matter that would have an effect on the financial interest of the Market Participant.

III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.
The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the
ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

III.A.18.2.2. Prohibition on Compensation for Services.
No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

III.A.18.2.3. Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.
In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of Appendix A, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.19. Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.
(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for
any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

(B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information

1. The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);
2. The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;
3. The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;
4. The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;
5. The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
6. If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;
7. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(B) All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral should be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.

1. A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
2. The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
3. The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
4. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.


The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from certain New Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21. The provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and
III.A.21.2 are not applicable to offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

III.A.21.1. **Applicability of Buyer-Side Market Power Review.**

The Internal Market Monitor will not conduct a buyer-side market power review of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in this Section III.A.21.1.

III.A.21.1.1. **Resources with Capacity Not Exceeding 5 MW.**

A New Capacity Resource will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the project’s expected auction capacity (in MW) at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction does not exceed 5 MW.

If a New Capacity Resource’s expected auction capacity exceeds 5 MW at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but the final FCA Qualified Capacity for the New Capacity Resource does not exceed 5 MW, an offer from the New Capacity Resource will not be mitigated pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, notwithstanding any buyer-side market power review that may have been conducted at the time of the qualification process.

III.A.21.1.2. **Passive Demand Response Resources.**

New Demand Capacity Resources that consist solely of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review.

III.A.21.1.3. **Resources Supported by a Qualifying Load-Side Relationship Certification.**

New Capacity Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the Project Sponsor submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification, as described in this Section III.A.21.1.3, demonstrating one of the following qualifying circumstances:

(a) the Project Sponsor and its Affiliates or partners, if any, are not load serving entities and are neither receiving nor expecting to receive any revenues from a load serving entity, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource (excepting any revenues earned through an ISO-administered market); or

(b) the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource.
For the purpose of this Section III.A.21, a load serving entity is any entity that has or is the type of entity that could acquire a Capacity Load Obligation in the Forward Capacity Market.

To demonstrate such circumstances, the Project Sponsor must include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances. The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification with the New Capacity Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2, or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource’s offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.


With the exception of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in Section III.A.21.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall review requested lowest offer prices from New Capacity Resources, as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power following the process described in this Section III.A.21.2.


The Internal Market Monitor will perform a conduct test by reviewing the information described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) and determining a New Resource Offer Floor Price, as described in Section III.A.21.3, for the New Capacity Resource. A requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price.

III.A.21.2.2. Demonstration of Lack of Incentive to Exercise Buyer-Side Market Power.

If the Project Sponsor does not submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification (or the ISO rejects the Project Sponsor’s Load-Side Relationship Certification) because the Project Sponsor is or is affiliated with a load serving entity or because the Project Sponsor receives or expects to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a load serving entity, the Project Sponsor is entitled to submit documentation and information as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification package to demonstrate that, notwithstanding such a relationship with a load serving entity with regard to the New Capacity Resource, such load serving entity would be unlikely
to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market. If, after consideration of such documentation and information, the Internal Market Monitor determines that a load serving entity as described in this Section III.A.21.2.2 would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market, then the Internal Market Monitor will not subject the requested lowest offer price to the mitigation described in Section III.A.21.2.3. For the avoidance of doubt, a Project Sponsor may not utilize the provisions of this Section III.A.21.2.2 if it receives or expects to receive any revenues from a state, or from a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity, that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource.

As part of the documentation and information the Project Sponsor submits pursuant to this Section III.A.21.2.2, the Project Sponsor must include in its documentation and information a disclosure of any and all direct or indirect relationships or arrangements with a load serving entity regarding the New Capacity Resource and any other information necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to make the determination described in this Section III.A.21.2.2.

III.A.21.2.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test and Failing to Rebut Presumed Incentive.
If a requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test and the Internal Market Monitor does not determine the lack of a material, net financial benefit to a load serving entity, as described in Section III.A.21.2.2, the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test shall be used in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

As described in Section III.A.21.1.1, the mitigation described in this Section III.A.21.2.3 will not apply to a New Capacity Resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity that does not exceed the capacity threshold set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1, notwithstanding the results of any buyer-side market power review.

For each new technology type, the Internal Market Monitor shall establish an Offer Review Trigger Price. Offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are equal to or above the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price will not be subject to further review by the Internal Market Monitor. A request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must be submitted in advance of the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3,
III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.2.8 and shall be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor as described in this Section III.A.21.

### III.A.21.1.1. **Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Forward Capacity Auction.**

For resources other than New Import Capacity Resources, the Offer Review Trigger Prices for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology Type</th>
<th>Offer Review Trigger Price ($/kW-month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generating Capacity Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Cycle Combustion Turbine</td>
<td>$5.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Cycle Gas Turbine</td>
<td>$9.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Shore Wind</td>
<td>$0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Storage Device – Lithium Ion Battery</td>
<td>$2.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photovoltaic Solar</td>
<td>$1.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand Capacity Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load Management (Commercial / Industrial)</td>
<td>$0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously Installed Distributed Generation</td>
<td>$0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Distributed Generation</td>
<td>Based on generation technology type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Peak Solar</td>
<td>$5.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>$0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other technology types</td>
<td>Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where a new resource is composed of assets having different technology types, the resource’s Offer Review Trigger Price will be calculated in accordance with the weighted average formula in Section III.A.21.2(c).
For purposes of determining the Offer Review Trigger Price of a Demand Capacity Resource composed in whole or in part of Distributed Generation, the Distributed Generation is considered new, rather than previously installed, if (1) the Project Sponsor for the New Demand Capacity Resource has participated materially in the development, installation or funding of the Distributed Generation during the five years prior to commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource is being qualified for participation, and (2) the Distributed Generation has not been assigned to a Demand Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation in a prior Capacity Commitment Period.

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, the Offer Review Trigger Prices in the table above shall apply, based on the technology type of the External Resource; provided that, if a New Import Capacity Resource is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, it shall have an Offer Review Trigger Price of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.

For any other New Import Capacity Resource, the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price plus $0.01/kW-month.


(a) The Offer Review Trigger Price for each of the technology types listed above shall be recalculated using updated data for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Where any Offer Review Trigger Price is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new Offer Review Trigger Price shall be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Offer Review Trigger Price is to apply.

(b) For New Generating Capacity Resources, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is as follows. Capital costs, expected non-capacity revenues and operating costs, assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes and discount rate are input into a capital budgeting model which is used to calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The Offer Review Trigger Price is set equal to the year-one capacity price output from the model. The model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent
with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two unrelated parties).

c) For New Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above shall be the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, with the following exceptions. First, the model takes account of all costs incurred by the utility and end-use customer to deploy the efficiency measure. Second, rather than energy revenues, the model recognizes end-use customer savings associated with the efficiency programs. Third, the model assumes that all costs are expensed as incurred. Fourth, the benefits realized by end-use customers are assumed to have no tax implications for the utility. Fifth, the model discounts cash flows over the Measure Life of the energy efficiency measure.

d) For New Demand Capacity Resources other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency, the methodology used to recalculate the Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to subsection (a) above is the same as that used for New Generating Capacity Resources, except that the model discounts cash flows over the contract life. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than those comprised of Energy Efficiency) that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include new equipment costs and annual operating costs such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions. For Demand Capacity Resources (other than Demand Capacity Resources comprised of Energy Efficiency) primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, incremental costs include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs.

(e) For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to subsection (a) above, the Offer Review Trigger Prices will be adjusted as follows:

1) For the simple cycle combustion turbine and combined cycle gas turbine technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114). For all other Generating Capacity Resource technology types, each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the levelized cost of energy for that technology as published by Bloomberg.
(2) For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the Offer Review Trigger Prices reflected in the table in Section III.A.21.1.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model for the FCA reflected in the table in Section A.21.1.1 will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

(3) The energy and ancillary services offset values for gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

The energy and ancillary services offset values for non-gas technology types in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

(4) Renewable energy credit values in the capital budgeting model shall be updated based on the first MA Class 1 REC prices published in February for the five vintages closest to the first year of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the relevant FCA as published by SNL Financial.

(5) The bonus tax depreciation adjustment included in the financial model for the Offer Review Trigger Prices (which is 40 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 20 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and zero for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 and thereafter.

(6) The investment tax credit adjustment included in the capital budgeting model for the Offer Review Trigger Price for the photovoltaic solar Generating Capacity Resource technology type (which is 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025), shall be 26 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, 22 percent for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027, and 10 percent thereafter.
(7) The capital budgeting model and the Offer Review Trigger Prices adjusted pursuant to this subsection (e) will be published on the ISO's web site.

(8) If any of the values required for the calculations described in this subsection (e) are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.


For every new resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction any New Capacity Resource for which the Internal Market Monitor is required to calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price, the Internal Market Monitor shall determine a New Resource Offer Floor Price or offer prices, as described in this Section III.A.21.2 use the calculation methodology described in this Section III.A.21.3.

(a) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does not submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be calculated as follows:

For a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be $0.00/kW-month.

For a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and New Demand Capacity Resource, the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price.

A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price determined pursuant to this Section III.A.21.3 that is higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For a Lead Market Participant with a New Capacity Resource that does submit a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3, III.13.1.3.5 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, the resource’s New Resource
Offer Floor Price and offer prices in the case of a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be calculated as follows:

For a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be equal to the lower of (i) the requested offer price submitted to the ISO as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5; or (ii) the price revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

(a) When calculating a New Resource Offer Floor Price for any other New Capacity Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource capital and operating costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into a capital budgeting model used to develop the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The default model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two unrelated parties). The model horizon shall be longer or shorter than 20 years for a resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price calculation, if sufficiently documented in the offer information submitted pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.2.3 or III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Adjustments to the model and calculation methodology will be made for certain types of New Demand Capacity Resources as described below in this subsection (a):

(i) For New Demand Capacity Resources, the Internal Market Monitor will model discounted cash flows over the contract life.

(ii) For New Demand Capacity Resources that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include new equipment costs and annual operating costs, such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions, as incremental costs.
(iii) For New Demand Capacity Resources primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs as incremental costs.

(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the requested lowest offer price to the capacity price estimate calculated pursuant to subsection (a), and the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price and offer prices shall be determined as follows:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred to acquire and/or develop the Demand Capacity Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the associated Demand Response Resource, and expected costs avoided by the
associated end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the associated Asset(s).

(iii) For a New Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.

(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource’s qualification package (as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.2.8(a)) to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this subsection (b) Section III.A.21.3. Such documentation should include all relevant financial estimates and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data. For a New Import Capacity Resource, such documentation should also include the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. For a new capacity resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all relevant financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation. If the supporting documentation and information required by this subsection (b) is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Offer Review Trigger Price Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer price is
are consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price, subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer prices are not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s offer prices New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource’s qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c), subject to the provisions of subsection (vii) concerning New Import Capacity Resources.

(vii) For New Import Capacity Resources that have been found to be associated with a pivotal supplier as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7 to values that are below the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate established pursuant to subsection (v) or (vi), then the resource’s offer prices shall be equal to the revised offer prices.

(c) For a new capacity resource composed of assets having different technology types the Offer Review Trigger Price shall be the weighted average of the Offer Review Trigger Prices of the asset technology types of the assets that comprise the resource, based on the expected capacity contribution from each asset technology type. Sufficient documentation must be included in the resource’s qualification package to permit the Internal Market Monitor to determine the weighted average Offer Review Trigger Price.

III.A.21.4. Offer Prices for New Import Capacity Resources.

(a) All New Import Capacity Resources (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

(b) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 that does not seek to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the resource’s offer price shall be $0.00/kW-month, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v).
(c) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-determined offer price for the resource using the methodology for calculating New Resource Offer Floor Prices set forth in Section III.A.21.3. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price using the methodology set forth in Section III.A.21.3, if such a calculation is required for the resource under Section III.A.21.2 above.

(d) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource’s offer prices shall be reduced to equal the lower of (1) the prices determined by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to subsection (c); or (2) the offer prices as revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource’s offer prices shall be reduced to the prices revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

III.A.22. [Reserved.]

III.A.23. Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.A.23.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.
The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.
For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

(a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;
(b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
   (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;
(c) For each modeled nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
   (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone;
(d) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone, excluding the total FCA Qualified Capacity from Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not included in any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the
total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the
interface, excluding the contribution from any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone
as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
(2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the
contribution from any associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined
pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
(e) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser
of:
(1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and;
(2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the
interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the
following:
(1) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and
Existing Demand Capacity Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity
Zone; and
(2) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone,
the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2)
the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the
interface.

III.A.23.2. Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.
FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated
as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

(a) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone
or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section
III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity
Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.
(b) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity
Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section
III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal
supplier.
(c) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

III.A.23.3. Pivotal Supplier Test Notification of Results.

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.A.23.4. Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.

For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.
III.A.24. **Retirement Portfolio Test for Existing Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.**

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than

ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then

iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.

Where,

iv. the Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

v. The Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
vi. The Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price, not to exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, is based on the parameters of the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

For purposes of the test performed in this Section III.A.24, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant includes the capacity of Existing Capacity Resources that is controlled by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates under this Section III.A.24, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a Lead Market Participant shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.
Clean Tariff – Effective March 1, 2024
I.2 Rules of Construction; Definitions

I.2.1 Rules of Construction:
In this Tariff, unless otherwise provided herein:

(a) words denoting the singular include the plural and vice versa;
(b) words denoting a gender include all genders;
(c) references to a particular part, clause, section, paragraph, article, exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment shall be a reference to a part, clause, section, paragraph, or article of, or an exhibit, schedule, appendix or other attachment to, this Tariff;
(d) the exhibits, schedules and appendices attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference and shall be construed with an as an integral part of this Tariff to the same extent as if they were set forth verbatim herein;
(e) a reference to any statute, regulation, proclamation, ordinance or law includes all statutes, regulations, proclamations, amendments, ordinances or laws varying, consolidating or replacing the same from time to time, and a reference to a statute includes all regulations, policies, protocols, codes, proclamations and ordinances issued or otherwise applicable under that statute unless, in any such case, otherwise expressly provided in any such statute or in this Tariff;
(f) a reference to a particular section, paragraph or other part of a particular statute shall be deemed to be a reference to any other section, paragraph or other part substituted therefor from time to time;
(g) a definition of or reference to any document, instrument or agreement includes any amendment or supplement to, or restatement, replacement, modification or novation of, any such document, instrument or agreement unless otherwise specified in such definition or in the context in which such reference is used;
(h) a reference to any person (as hereinafter defined) includes such person’s successors and permitted assigns in that designated capacity;
(i) any reference to “days” shall mean calendar days unless “Business Days” (as hereinafter defined) are expressly specified;
(j) if the date as of which any right, option or election is exercisable, or the date upon which any amount is due and payable, is stated to be on a date or day that is not a Business Day, such right, option or election may be exercised, and such amount shall be deemed due and payable, on the next succeeding Business Day with the same effect as if the same was exercised or made on such date or day (without, in the case of any such payment, the payment or accrual of any interest or
other late payment or charge, provided such payment is made on such next succeeding Business Day);

(k) words such as “hereunder,” “hereto,” “hereof” and “herein” and other words of similar import shall, unless the context requires otherwise, refer to this Tariff as a whole and not to any particular article, section, subsection, paragraph or clause hereof; and a reference to “include” or “including” means including without limiting the generality of any description preceding such term, and for purposes hereof the rule of *ejusdem generis* shall not be applicable to limit a general statement, followed by or referable to an enumeration of specific matters, to matters similar to those specifically mentioned.

**I.2.2. Definitions:**

In this Tariff, the terms listed in this section shall be defined as described below:

**Active Demand Capacity Resource** is one or more Demand Response Resources located within the same Dispatch Zone, that is registered with the ISO, assigned a unique resource identification number by the ISO, and participates in the Forward Capacity Market to fulfill a Market Participant’s Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Capacity Provided** is the measure of capacity provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition, as described in Section III.13.7.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Actual Load** is the consumption at the Retail Delivery Point for the hour.

**Additional Resource Blackstart O&M Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Additional Resource Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Administrative Costs** are those costs incurred in connection with the review of Applications for transmission service and the carrying out of System Impact Studies and Facilities Studies.
**Administrative Export De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted in a Forward Capacity Auction by certain Existing Generating Capacity Resources subject to a multi-year contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.4 of Market Rule 1.

**ADR Neutrals** are one or more firms or individuals identified by the ISO with the advice and consent of the Participants Committee that are prepared to act as neutrals in ADR proceedings under Appendix D to Market Rule 1.

**Advance** is defined in Section IV.A.3.2 of the Tariff.


**Affiliate** is any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control by another person or entity. For purposes of this definition, "control" means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the management or policies of an entity. A voting interest of ten percent or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of control.

**AGC** is automatic generation control.

**AGC SetPoint** is the desired output signal for a Resource providing Regulation that is produced by the AGC system as frequently as every four seconds.

**AGC SetPoint Deadband** is a deadband expressed in megawatts that is applied to changing values of the AGC SetPoint for generating units.

**Allocated Assessment** is a Covered Entity’s right to seek and obtain payment and recovery of its share in any shortfall payments under Section 3.3 or Section 3.4 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)** is the procedure set forth in Appendix D to Market Rule 1.
**Alternative Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR)** is one or more facilities capable of providing Regulation that have been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. An Alternative Technology Regulation Resource is eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Ancillary Services** are those services that are necessary to support the transmission of electric capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the New England Transmission System in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Announced Schedule 1 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 2 EA Amount, Announced Schedule 3 EA Amount** are defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Annual Transmission Revenue Requirements** are the annual revenue requirements of a PTO’s PTF or of all PTOs’ PTF for purposes of the OATT shall be the amount determined in accordance with Attachment F to the OATT.

**Annual Reconfiguration Transaction** is a bilateral transaction that may be used in accordance with Section III.13.5.4 of Market Rule 1 to specify a price when a Capacity Supply Obligation is transferred using supply offers and demand bids in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.

**Applicants**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, are entities applying for Market Participant status or for transmission service from the ISO.

**Application** is a written request by an Eligible Customer for transmission service pursuant to the provisions of the OATT.

**Asset** is a Generator Asset, a Demand Response Asset, a component of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, a Distributed Energy Resource participating as part of Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, a Load Asset (including an Asset Related Demand), an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, or a Tie-Line Asset.

**Asset Registration Process** is the ISO business process for registering an Asset.
Asset Related Demand is a Load Asset that has been discretely modeled within the ISO’s dispatch and settlement systems, settles at a Node, has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process, and is made up of either: (1) one or more individual end-use metered customers receiving service from the same point or points of electrical supply with an aggregate average hourly load of 1 MW or greater during the 12 months preceding its registration or (2) one or more storage facilities with an aggregate consumption capability of at least 1 MW.

Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Asset Related Demand bid. Blocks of the bid in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the daily quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for an entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours.

Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs are the net costs of an asset that is part of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, calculated for the asset in the same manner as the net costs of Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1 (for an asset with a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid) or Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 (for an asset with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid).

Assigned Meter Reader reports to the ISO the hourly and monthly MWh associated with the Asset. These MWh are used for settlement. The Assigned Meter Reader may designate an agent to help fulfill its Assigned Meter Reader responsibilities; however, the Assigned Meter Reader remains functionally responsible to the ISO.

Auction Revenue Right (ARR) is a right to receive FTR Auction Revenues in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

Auction Revenue Right Allocation (ARR Allocation) is defined in Section 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

Auction Revenue Right Holder (ARR Holder) is an entity which is the record holder of an Auction Revenue Right (excluding an Incremental ARR) in the register maintained by the ISO.
**Authorized Commission** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Authorized Person** is defined in Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

**Automatic Response Rate** is the response rate, in MW/Minute, at which a Market Participant is willing to have a Regulation Resource change its output or consumption while providing Regulation between the Regulation High Limit and Regulation Low Limit.

**Average Hourly Load Reduction** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. The On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy reduction and Average Hourly Load Reduction shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Average Hourly Output** is either: (i) the sum of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in the month; or (ii) the sum of the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s electrical energy output during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month divided by the number of Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in the month. Electrical energy output and Average Hourly Output shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Backstop Transmission Solution** is a solution proposed: (i) to address a reliability or market efficiency need identified by the ISO in a Needs Assessment reported by the ISO pursuant to Section 4.1(i) of Attachment K to the ISO OATT, (ii) by the PTO or PTOs with an obligation under Schedule 3.09(a) of the TOA to address the identified need; and (iii) in circumstances in which the competitive solution process specified in Section 4.3 of Attachment K to the ISO OATT will be utilized.

**Bankruptcy Code** is the United States Bankruptcy Code.
**Bankruptcy Event** occurs when a Covered Entity files a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy or commences a proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code or any other applicable law concerning insolvency, reorganization or bankruptcy by or against such Covered Entity as debtor.

**Bilateral Contract (BC)** is any of the following types of contracts: Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy, and External Transactions.

**Bilateral Contract Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the seller and purchaser of an Internal Bilateral for Load, Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy and External Transactions; provided, however, that only those contracts which apply to the Real-Time Energy Market will accrue Block-Hours.

**Binary Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Binary Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Binary Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Blackstart Capability Test** is the test, required by ISO New England Operating Documents, of a resource’s capability to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1, or as referred to in Section 5.2, of Schedule 16 to the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s Blackstart Equipment capital costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Blackstart Equipment** is any equipment that is solely necessary to enable the Designated Blackstart Resource to provide Blackstart Service and is not required to provide other products or services under the Tariff.

**Blackstart O&M Payment** is the annual Blackstart O&M compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.
**Blackstart Owner** is the Market Participant who is authorized on behalf of the Generator Owner(s) to offer or operate the resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource and is authorized to commit the resource to provide Blackstart Service.

**Blackstart Service** is the Ancillary Service described in Section II.47 of the Tariff and Schedule 16 of the OATT.

**Blackstart Service Commitment** is the commitment by a Blackstart Owner for its resource to provide Blackstart Service and the acceptance of that commitment by the ISO, in the manner detailed in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP 11), and which includes a commitment to provide Blackstart Service established under Operating Procedure 11 – Designated Blackstart Resource Administration (OP11).

**Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria** are the minimum criteria that a Blackstart Owner and its resource must meet in order to establish and maintain a resource as a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Standard Rate Payment** is the formulaic rate of monthly compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner for the provision of Blackstart Service from a Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Blackstart Station** is comprised of (i) a single Designated Blackstart Resource or (ii) two or more Designated Blackstart Resources that share Blackstart Equipment.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment** is the Commission-approved compensation, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT, paid to a Blackstart Owner on a monthly basis for the provision of Blackstart Service by Designated Blackstart Resources located at a specific Blackstart Station.

**Blackstart Station-specific Rate Capital Payment** is a component of the Blackstart Station-specific Rate Payment that reflects a Blackstart Station’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (excluding the capital costs associated with compliance with NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).
Block is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Bilateral Contracts, a Bilateral Contract administered by the ISO for an hour; (2) with respect to Supply Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Supply Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (3) with respect to Demand Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Demand Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (4) with respect to Increment Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Increment Offers for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (5) with respect to Decrement Bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Decrement Bids for Energy may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); (6) with respect to Asset Related Demand bids administered by the ISO, a quantity with a related price for Energy (Asset Related Demand bids may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for each hour); and (7) with respect to Demand Reduction Offers administered by the ISO, a quantity of reduced demand with a related price (Demand Reduction Offers may contain multiple sets of quantity and price pairs for the day).

Block-Hours are the number of Blocks administered for a particular hour.

Budget and Finance Subcommittee is a subcommittee of the Participants Committee, the responsibilities of which are specified in Section 8.4 of the Participants Agreement.

Business Day is any day other than a Saturday or Sunday or ISO holidays as posted by the ISO on its website.

Cancelled Start NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Capability Demonstration Year is the one year period from September 1 through August 31.

Capacity Acquiring Resource is a resource that is seeking to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

Capacity Balancing Ratio is a ratio used in calculating the Capacity Performance Payment in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.3 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Base Payment** is the portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market as described in Section III.13.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard** has the meaning specified in Schedule 22, Schedule 23, and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Clearing Price** is the clearing price for a Capacity Zone for a Capacity Commitment Period resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction conducted for that Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Commitment Period** is the one-year period from June 1 through May 31 for which obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Capacity Cost (CC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Capacity Export Through Import Constrained Zone Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation** is the quantity of capacity for which a Market Participant is financially responsible as described in Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant** is a load serving entity or any other Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Network Import Capability (CNI Capability)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service (CNI Interconnection Service)** is as defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant is an entity that has a Capacity Load Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation through a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Network Resource (CNR) is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service (CNR Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Capacity Performance Bilateral is a transaction for transferring Capacity Performance Score, as described in Section III.13.5.3 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Performance Payment is the performance-dependent portion of revenue received in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Performance Payment Rate is a rate used in calculating Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.5 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Performance Score is a figure used in determining Capacity Performance Payments, as described in Section III.13.7.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Rationing Rule addresses whether offers and bids in a Forward Capacity Auction may be rationed, as described in Section III.13.2.6 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Scarcity Condition is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Capacity Scarcity Condition is a period during which performance is measured in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 of Market Rule 1.
**Capacity Supply Obligation** is an obligation to provide capacity from a resource, or a portion thereof, to satisfy a portion of the Installed Capacity Requirement that is acquired through a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with Section III.13.2, a reconfiguration auction in accordance with Section III.13.4, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in accordance with Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral** is a bilateral contract through which a Market Participant may transfer all or a part of its Capacity Supply Obligation to another entity, as described in Section III.13.5.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Transfer Rights (CTRs)** are calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.4.

**Capacity Transferring Resource** is a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation and is seeking to shed such obligation, or a portion thereof, through: (1) a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as described in Section III.13.5.1, or; (2) an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, as described in Section III.13.4.

**Capacity Zone** is a geographic sub-region of the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.12.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Capacity Zone Demand Curves** are the demand curves used in the Forward Capacity Market for a Capacity Zone as specified in Sections III.13.2.2.2 and III.13.2.2.3.

**Capital Funding Charge (CFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**CARL Data** is Control Area reliability data submitted to the ISO to permit an assessment of the ability of an external Control Area to provide energy to the New England Control Area in support of capacity offered to the New England Control Area by that external Control Area.

**Category B Designated Blackstart Resource** has the same meaning as Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Charge** is a sum of money due from a Covered Entity to the ISO, either in its individual capacity or as billing and collection agent for NEPOOL pursuant to the Participants Agreement.
CLAIM10 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

CLAIM30 is the value, expressed in megawatts, calculated pursuant to Section III.9.5.3 of the Tariff.

Claimed Capability Audit is performed to determine the real power output capability of a Generator Asset, the demand reduction capability of a Demand Response Resource, or the demand reduction capability and energy injection capability of a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade (CETU) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Enabling Transmission Upgrade Regional Planning Study (CRPS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Entry Deadline has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Cluster Interconnection System Impact Study (CSIS) has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Clustering has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

CNR Capability is defined in Section I of Schedule 22 and Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 of the OATT.

Coincident Peak Contribution is a Market Participant’s share of the New England Control Area coincident peak demand for the prior calendar year as determined prior to the start of each Capacity Commitment Period, which reflects the sum of the prior year’s annual coincident peak contributions of the customers served by the Market Participant at each Load Asset. Daily Coincident Peak Contribution values shall be submitted by the Assigned Meter Reader or Host Participant by the meter reading deadline to the ISO.

Commercial Capacity is capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation.
**Commission** is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**Commitment Period** is (i) for a Day-Ahead Energy Market commitment, a period of one or more contiguous hours for which a Resource is cleared in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, and (ii) for a Real-Time Energy Market commitment, the period of time for which the ISO indicates the Resource is being committed when it issues the Dispatch Instruction. If the ISO does not indicate the period of time for which the Resource is being committed in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Commitment Period is the Minimum Run Time for an offline Resource and one hour for an online Resource.

**Common Costs** are those costs associated with a Station that are avoided only by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids, or the Retirement De-List Bids of all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

**Completed Application** is an Application that satisfies all of the information and other requirements of the OATT, including any required deposit.

**Compliance Effective Date** is the date upon which the changes in the predecessor NEPOOL Open Access Transmission Tariff which have been reflected herein to comply with the Commission’s Order of April 20, 1998 became effective.

**Composite FCM Transaction** is a transaction for separate resources seeking to participate as a single composite resource in a Forward Capacity Auction in which multiple Designated FCM Participants provide capacity, as described in Section III.13.1.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Conditional Qualified New Resource** is defined in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Confidential Information** is defined in Section 2.1 of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Confidentiality Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Congestion** is a condition of the New England Transmission System in which transmission limitations prevent unconstrained regional economic dispatch of the power system. Congestion is the condition that
results in the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at one Location being different from the Congestion Component of the Locational Marginal Price at another Location during any given hour of the dispatch day in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Congestion Component** is the component of the nodal price that reflects the marginal cost of congestion at a given Node or External Node relative to the reference point. When used in connection with Zonal Price and Hub Price, the term Congestion Component refers to the Congestion Components of the nodal prices that comprise the Zonal Price and Hub Price weighted and averaged in the same way that nodal prices are weighted to determine Zonal Price and averaged to determine the Hub Price.

**Congestion Cost** is the cost of congestion as measured by the difference between the Congestion Components of the Locational Marginal Prices at different Locations and/or Reliability Regions on the New England Transmission System.

**Congestion Paying LSE** is, for the purpose of the allocation of FTR Auction Revenues to ARR Holders as provided for in Appendix C of Market Rule 1, a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer that is responsible for paying for Congestion Costs as a Transmission Customer paying for Regional Network Service under the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, unless such Transmission Customer has transferred its obligation to supply load in accordance with ISO New England System Rules, in which case the Congestion Paying LSE shall be the Market Participant supplying the transferred load obligation. The term Congestion Paying LSE shall be deemed to include, but not be limited to, the seller of internal bilateral transactions that transfer Real-Time Load Obligations under the ISO New England System Rules.

**Congestion Revenue Fund** is the amount available for payment of target allocations to FTR Holders from the collection of Congestion Cost.

**Congestion Shortfall** means congestion payments exceed congestion charges during the billing process in any billing period.

**Continuous Storage ATRR** is an ATRR that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Continuous Storage DARD** is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Generator Asset** is a Generator Asset that participates in the New England Markets as part of a Continuous Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Continuous Storage Facility** is a type of Electric Storage Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Control Agreement** is the document posted on the ISO website that is required if a Market Participant’s cash collateral is to be invested in BlackRock funds.

**Control Area** is an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to:

1. match, at all times, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s) and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s);
2. maintain scheduled interchange with other Control Areas, within the limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within reasonable limits in accordance with Good Utility Practice and the criteria of the applicable regional reliability council or the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; and
4. provide sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**Controllable Behind-the-Meter Generation** means generation whose output can be controlled located at the same facility as a DARD or a Demand Response Asset, excluding: (1) generators whose output is separately metered and reported and (2) generators that cannot operate electrically synchronized to, and that are operated only when the facility loses its supply of power from, the New England Transmission System, or when undergoing related testing.

**Coordinated External Transaction** is an External Transaction at an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented. A transaction to wheel energy
into, out of or through the New England Control Area is not a Coordinated External Transaction.

**Coordinated Transaction Scheduling** means the enhanced scheduling procedures set forth in Section III.1.10.7.A.

**Correction Limit** means the date that is one hundred and one (101) calendar days from the last Operating Day of the month to which the data applied. As described in Section III.3.6.1 of Market Rule 1, this will be the period during which meter data corrections must be submitted unless they qualify for submission as a Requested Billing Adjustment under Section III.3.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Cost of Energy Consumed (CEC)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of Energy Produced (CEP)** is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Cost of New Entry (CONE)** is the estimated cost of new entry ($/kW-month) for a capacity resource that is determined by the ISO for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

**Counterparty** means the status in which the ISO acts as the contracting party, in its name and own right and not as an agent, to an agreement or transaction with a Customer (including assignments involving Customers) involving sale to the ISO, and/or purchase from the ISO, of Regional Transmission Service and market and other products and services, and other transactions and assignments involving Customers, all as described in the Tariff.

**Covered Entity** is defined in the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Credit Coverage** is third-party credit protection obtained by the ISO in the form of credit insurance coverage.

**Credit Qualifying** means a Rated Market Participant that has an Investment Grade Rating and an Unrated Market Participant that satisfies the Credit Threshold.

**Credit Threshold** consists of the conditions for Unrated Market Participants outlined in Section II.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII)** is defined in Section 3.0(j) of the ISO New England Information Policy, which is Attachment D to the Tariff.

**Current Ratio** is, on any date, all of a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s current assets divided by all of its current liabilities, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Curtailment** is a reduction in the dispatch of a transaction that was scheduled, using transmission service, in response to a transfer capability shortage as a result of system reliability conditions.

**Customer** is a Market Participant, a Transmission Customer or another customer of the ISO.

**Data Reconciliation Process** means the process by which meter reconciliation and data corrections that are discovered by Governance Participants after the Invoice has been issued for a particular month or that are discovered prior to the issuance of the Invoice for the relevant month but not included in that Invoice or in the other Invoices for that month and are reconciled by the ISO on an hourly basis based on data submitted to the ISO by the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader or Assigned Meter Reader.

**Day-Ahead** is the calendar day immediately preceding the Operating Day.

**Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market** means the schedule of commitments for the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, payment for losses developed by the ISO as a result of the offers and specifications submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.
**Day-Ahead Energy Market Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(f) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Energy Market NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Export and Decrement Bid NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead External Transaction Import and Increment Offer NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(k) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(j) of Market Rule 1.

**Day-Ahead Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**DDP Dispatchable Resource** is any Dispatchable Resource that the ISO dispatches using Desired Dispatch Points in the Resource’s Dispatch Instructions.

**Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s total debt (including all current borrowings) divided by its total shareholders’ equity plus total debt, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.
**Decrement Bid** means a bid to purchase energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical load. An accepted Decrement Bid results in scheduled load at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due (other than in the case of a payment dispute for any amount due for transmission service under the OATT).

**Default Period** is defined in Section 3.3.h(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Delivering Party** is the entity supplying capacity and/or energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of Receipt under the OATT.

**Demand Bid** means a request to purchase an amount of energy, at a specified Location, or an amount of energy at a specified price, that is associated with a physical load. A cleared Demand Bid in the Day-Ahead Energy Market results in scheduled load at the specified Location. Demand Bids submitted for use in the Real-Time Energy Market are specific to Dispatchable Asset Related Demands only.

**Demand Bid Block-Hours** are the Block-Hours assigned to the submitting Customer for each Demand Bid.

**Demand Bid Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Demand Capacity Resource** means an Existing Demand Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource. There are three Demand Capacity Resource types: Active Demand Capacity Resources, On-Peak Demand Resources, and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Demand Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for Demand Response Resources in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.

**Demand Reduction Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Demand Reduction Offer. Blocks of the Demand Reduction Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours.

**Demand Reduction Threshold Price** is a minimum offer price calculated pursuant to Section III.1.10.1A(f).

**Demand Resource On-Peak Hours** are hours ending 1400 through 1700, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of June, July, and August and hours ending 1800 through 1900, Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays during the months of December and January.

**Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours** are those hours in which the actual, real-time hourly load, as measured using real-time telemetry (adjusted for transmission and distribution losses, and excluding load associated with Exports and Storage DARDs) for Monday through Friday on non-Demand Response Holidays, during the months of June, July, August, December, and January, as determined by the ISO, is equal to or greater than 90% of the most recent 50/50 system peak load forecast, as determined by the ISO, for the applicable summer or winter season.

**Demand Response Asset** is an asset comprising the demand reduction capability of an individual end-use customer at a Retail Delivery Point or the aggregated demand reduction capability of multiple end-use customers from multiple delivery points (as described in Section III.8.1.1(f)) that has been registered in accordance with III.8.1.1.

**Demand Response Available** is the capability of the Demand Response Resource, in whole or in part, at any given time, to reduce demand in response to a Dispatch Instruction.

**Demand Response Baseline** is the expected baseline demand of an individual end-use metered customer or group of end-use metered customers as determined pursuant to Section III.8.2.
**Demand Response Holiday** is New Year’s Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. If the holiday falls on a Saturday, the holiday will be observed on the preceding Friday; if the holiday falls on a Sunday, the holiday will be observed on the following Monday.

**Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (DRDERA)** is a type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation that is described in additional detail in Section III.6.5.

**Demand Response Resource** is an individual Demand Response Asset or aggregation of Demand Response Assets within a DRR Aggregation Zone that has been registered in accordance with Section III.8.1.2.

**Demand Response Resource Notification Time** is the period of time between the receipt of a startup Dispatch Instruction and the time the Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand.

**Demand Response Resource Ramp Rate** is the average rate, expressed in MW per minute, at which the Demand Response Resource can reduce demand.

**Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time** is the period of time between the time a Demand Response Resource starts reducing demand at the conclusion of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time and the time the resource can reach its Minimum Reduction and be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**Designated Agent** is any entity that performs actions or functions required under the OATT on behalf of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, an Eligible Customer, or a Transmission Customer.

**Designated Blackstart Resource** is a resource that meets the eligibility requirements specified in Schedule 16 of the OATT, which includes any resource referred to previously as a Category B Designated Blackstart Resource.

**Designated Entity** is the entity designated by a Market Participant to receive Dispatch Instructions for a Generator Asset and/or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the provisions set forth in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14.
**Designated FCM Participant** is any Lead Market Participant, including any Provisional Member that is a Lead Market Participant, transacting in any Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for capacity that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Designated FTR Participant** is a Market Participant, including FTR-Only Customers, transacting in the FTR Auction that is otherwise required to provide additional financial assurance under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Desired Dispatch Point (DDP)** means the control signal, expressed in megawatts, transmitted to direct the output, consumption, or demand reduction level of each Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, or Demand Response Resource dispatched by the ISO in accordance with the asset’s Offer Data.

**Direct Assignment Facilities** are facilities or portions of facilities that are constructed for the sole use/benefit of a particular Transmission Customer requesting service under the OATT or a Generator Owner requesting an interconnection. Direct Assignment Facilities shall be specified in a separate agreement among the ISO, Interconnection Customer and Transmission Customer, as applicable, and the Transmission Owner whose transmission system is to be modified to include and/or interconnect with the Direct Assignment Facilities, shall be subject to applicable Commission requirements, and shall be paid for by the Customer in accordance with the applicable agreement and the Tariff.

**Directly Metered Assets** are specifically measured by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP-18. Directly Metered Assets include all Tie-Line Assets, all Generator Assets, as well as some Load Assets. Load Assets for which the Host Participant is not the Assigned Meter Reader are considered Directly Metered Assets. In addition, the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader determines which additional Load Assets are considered Directly Metered Assets and which ones are considered Profiled Load Assets based upon the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader reporting systems and process by which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Disbursement Agreement** is the Rate Design and Funds Disbursement Agreement among the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.
Dispatch Instruction means directions given by the ISO to Market Participants, which may include instructions to start up, shut down, raise or lower generation, curtail or restore loads from Demand Response Resources, change External Transactions, or change the status or consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand in accordance with the Supply Offer, Demand Bid, or Demand Reduction Offer parameters. Such instructions may also require a change to the operation of a Pool Transmission Facility. Such instructions are given through either electronic or verbal means.

Dispatch Zone means a subset of Nodes located within a Load Zone established by the ISO for each Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.12.4A.

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD) is an Asset Related Demand that is capable of having its energy consumption modified in Real-Time in response to Dispatch Instructions. A DARD must be capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions, must be able to increase or decrease energy consumption between its Minimum Consumption Limit and Maximum Consumption Limit in accordance with Dispatch Instructions, and must meet the technical requirements specified in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and Manuals.

Dispatchable Resource is any Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, Demand Response Resource, or, with respect to the Regulation Market only, Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, that, during the course of normal operation, is capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions in accordance with the parameters contained in the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Bid, Demand Reduction Offer or Regulation Service Offer. A Resource that is normally classified as a Dispatchable Resource remains a Dispatchable Resource when it is temporarily not capable of receiving and responding to electronic Dispatch Instructions.

Dispute Representatives are defined in 6.5.c of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Disputed Amount is a Covered Entity’s disputed amount due on any fully paid monthly Invoice and/or any amount believed to be due or owed on a Remittance Advice, as defined in Section 6 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Disputing Party, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is any Covered Entity seeking to recover a Disputed Amount.
**Distributed Energy Capacity Resource (DECR)** means an Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource or a New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource.

**Distributed Energy Resource (DER)** is any resource located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof or behind a customer meter that is capable of providing energy injection, energy withdrawal, regulation, or demand reduction.

**Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (DERA)** is an aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources that is registered under Section III.6.7 and is described in additional detail in Section III.6.

**Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator (DER Aggregator)** is a Market Participant that aggregates one or more Distributed Energy Resources for participation in a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation and serves as the Lead Market Participant for a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.

**Distributed Generation** means generation directly connected to end-use customer load and located behind the end-use customer’s Retail Delivery Point that reduces the amount of energy that would otherwise have been produced on the electricity network in the New England Control Area, provided that the facility’s Net Supply Capability is (i) less than 5 MW or (ii) less than or equal to the Maximum Facility Load, whichever is greater.

**DRR Aggregation Zone** is a Dispatch Zone entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System or, where a Dispatch Zone is not entirely within a single Reserve Zone or Rest of System, each portion of the Dispatch Zone demarcated by the Reserve Zone boundary.

**Do Not Exceed (DNE) Dispatchable Generator** is any Generator Asset that is dispatched using Do Not Exceed Dispatch Points in its Dispatch Instructions and meets the criteria specified in Section III.1.11.3(e). Do Not Exceed Dispatchable Generators are Dispatchable Resources.

**Do Not Exceed Dispatch Point** is a Dispatch Instruction indicating a maximum output level that a DNE Dispatchable Generator must not exceed.

**Dynamic De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity
Auction below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold** is the price specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A of Market Rule 1 associated with the submission of Dynamic De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction.

**EA Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Charge (EAC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Amortization Working Capital Charge (EAWCC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Amount (EPSF Amount)** is defined in Section IV.B.2.4 of the Tariff.

**Early Payment Shortfall Funding Charge (EPSFC)** is defined in Section IV.B.2 of the Tariff.

**EAWW Amount** is defined in Section IV.B.2.3 of the Tariff.

**EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio** is, on any date, a Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in the most recent fiscal quarter divided by that Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s expense for interest in that fiscal quarter, in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer to the ISO.

**Economic Dispatch Point** is the output, reduction, or consumption level to which a Resource would have been dispatched, based on the Resource’s Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid and the Real-Time Price, and taking account of any operating limits, had the ISO not dispatched the Resource to another Desired Dispatch Point.

**Economic Maximum Limit or Economic Max** is the maximum available output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that a Market Participant offers to supply in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This represents the highest MW output a Market Participant has offered for a Generator Asset for economic dispatch. A Market Participant must
maintain an up-to-date Economic Maximum Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Economic Maximum Limit) for all hours in which a Generator Asset has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Economic Minimum Limit or Economic Min** is (a) for a Generator Asset with an incremental heat rate, the maximum of: (i) the lowest sustainable output level as specified by physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits; and (ii) the lowest sustainable output level at which a one MW increment increase in the output level would not decrease the incremental cost, calculated based on the incremental heat rate, of providing an additional MW of output, and (b) for a Generator Asset without an incremental heat rate, the lowest sustainable output level that is consistent with the physical design characteristics of the Generator Asset and with meeting all environmental regulations and licensing limits, and (c) for a Generator Asset undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the Generator Asset requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, and (d) for Non-Dispatchable Resources the output level at which a Market Participant anticipates its Non-Dispatchable Resource will be available to operate based on fuel limitations, physical design characteristics, environmental regulations or licensing limits.

**Economic Study** is defined in Section 4.1(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Effective Offer** is the Supply Offer, Demand Reduction Offer, or Demand Bid that is used for NCPC calculation purposes as specified in Section III.F.1(a).

**EFT** is electronic funds transfer.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer** is defined in Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)** is defined in 18 C.F.R. § 39.1.

**Electric Storage Facility** is a storage facility that participates in the New England Markets as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.
**Eligible Customer** is: (i) Any entity that is engaged, or proposes to engage, in the wholesale or retail electric power business is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. (ii) Any electric utility (including any power marketer), Federal power marketing agency, or any other entity generating electric energy for sale or for resale is an Eligible Customer under the OATT. Electric energy sold or produced by such entity may be electric energy produced in the United States, Canada or Mexico. However, with respect to transmission service that the Commission is prohibited from ordering by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power Act, such entity is eligible only if the service is provided pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that entity is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer). (iii) Any end user taking or eligible to take unbundled transmission service or Local Delivery Service pursuant to a state requirement that the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) offer the transmission service or Local Delivery Service, or pursuant to a voluntary offer of such service by the Transmission Owner with which that end user is directly interconnected, or the distribution company having the service territory in which that entity is located (if that entity is a retail customer) is an Eligible Customer under the OATT.

**Eligible FTR Bidder** is an entity that has satisfied applicable financial assurance criteria, and shall not include the auctioneer, its Affiliates, and their officers, directors, employees, consultants and other representatives.

**Emergency** is an abnormal system condition on the bulk power systems of New England or neighboring Control Areas requiring manual or automatic action to maintain system frequency, or to prevent the involuntary loss of load, equipment damage, or tripping of system elements that could adversely affect the reliability of an electric system or the safety of persons or property; or a fuel shortage requiring departure from normal operating procedures in order to minimize the use of such scarce fuel; or a condition that requires implementation of Emergency procedures as defined in the ISO New England Manuals.

**Emergency Condition** means an Emergency has been declared by the ISO in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Administrative Procedures.
**Emergency Energy** is energy transferred from one control area operator to another in an Emergency.

**Emergency Minimum Limit or Emergency Min** means the minimum output, in MWs, that a Generator Asset can deliver for a limited period of time without exceeding specified limits of equipment stability and operating permits.

**EMS** is energy management system.

**End-of-Round Price** is the lowest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**End User Participant** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Energy** is power produced in the form of electricity, measured in kilowatthours or megawatthours.

**Energy Administration Service (EAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Energy Component** means the Locational Marginal Price at the reference point.

**Energy Efficiency** is installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy needed, while delivering a comparable or improved level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, the installation of more energy efficient lighting, motors, refrigeration, HVAC equipment and control systems, envelope measures, operations and maintenance procedures, and industrial process equipment.

**Energy Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 4 of the OATT.


**Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours** are the sum of the hours for which the Customer has a positive or negative Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange or for which the Customer has a
positive or negative Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation as determined by the ISO settlement process for the Energy Market.

**Energy Offer Floor** is negative $150/MWh.

**Energy Transaction Units (Energy TUs)** are the sum for the month for a Customer of Bilateral Contract Block-Hours, Demand Bid Block-Hours, Asset Related Demand Bid Block-Hours, Supply Offer Block-Hours, Demand Reduction Offer Block-Hours, and Energy Non-Zero Spot Market Settlement Hours.

**Equipment Damage Reimbursement** is the compensation paid to the owner of a Designated Blackstart Resource as specified in Section 5.5 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Equivalent Demand Forced Outage Rate (EFORd)** means the portion of time a unit is in demand, but is unavailable due to forced outages.

**Estimated Capacity Load Obligation** is, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, a Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation from the latest available month, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations for the applicable month.

**Establish Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.2.

**Excepted Transaction** is a transaction specified in Section II.40 of the Tariff for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Resource** is any resource that does not meet any of the eligibility criteria to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.
**Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Capacity Retirement Package** is information submitted for certain existing resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource** is a type of Distributed Energy Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4A.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Existing Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Expedited Study Request** is defined in Section II.34.7 of the OATT.

**Export-Adjusted LSR** is as defined in Section III.12.4(b)(ii).

**Export Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by certain resources in the Forward Capacity Auction to export capacity to an external Control Area, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Exports** are Real-Time External Transactions, which are limited to sales from the New England Control Area, for exporting energy out of the New England Control Area.

**External Elective Transmission Upgrade (External ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**External Market Monitor** means the person or entity appointed by the ISO Board of Directors pursuant to Section III.A.1.2 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1 to carry out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**External Node** is a proxy bus or buses used for establishing a Locational Marginal Price for energy received by Market Participants from, or delivered by Market Participants to, a neighboring Control Area or for establishing Locational Marginal Prices associated with energy delivered through the New England Control Area by Non-Market Participants for use in calculating Non-Market Participant Congestion Costs and loss costs.

**External Resource** means a generation resource located outside the metered boundaries of the New England Control Area.

**External Transaction** is the import of external energy into the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or the export of internal energy out of the New England Control Area by a Market Participant in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and/or Real-Time Energy Market, or the wheeling of external energy through the New England Control Area by a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**External Transaction Cap** is $2,000/MWh for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transaction Floor** is the Energy Offer Floor for External Transactions other than Coordinated External Transactions and negative $1,000/MWh for Coordinated External Transactions.

**External Transmission Project** is a transmission project comprising facilities located wholly outside the New England Control Area and regarding which an agreement has been reached whereby New England ratepayers will support all or a portion of the cost of the facilities.

**Facilities Study** is an engineering study conducted pursuant to the OATT by the ISO (or, in the case of Local Service or interconnections to Local Area Facilities as defined in the TOA, by one or more affected PTOs) or some other entity designated by the ISO in consultation with any affected Transmission Owner(s), to determine the required modifications to the PTF and Non-PTF, including the cost and
scheduled completion date for such modifications, that will be required to provide a requested transmission service or interconnection on the PTF and Non-PTF.

**Facility and Equipment Testing** means operation of a Resource to evaluate the functionality of the facility or equipment utilized in the operation of the facility.

**Failure to Maintain Blackstart Capability** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to meet the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria or Blackstart Service obligations, but does not include a Failure to Perform During a System Restoration event.

**Failure to Perform During a System Restoration** is a failure of a Blackstart Owner or Designated Blackstart Resource to follow ISO or Local Control Center dispatch instructions or perform in accordance with the dispatch instructions or the Blackstart Service Minimum Criteria and Blackstart Service obligations, described within the ISO New England Operating Documents, during a restoration of the New England Transmission System.

**Fast Start Demand Response Resource** is a Demand Response Resource that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Time Between Reductions does not exceed one hour; (iii) Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Demand Response Resource Notification Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) has personnel available to respond to Dispatch Instructions or has automatic remote response capability; and (v) is capable of receiving and acknowledging a Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**Fast Start Generator** means a Generator Asset that the ISO can dispatch to an on-line or off-line state through electronic dispatch and that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes; (iv) available for dispatch (when it is either in an on-line or off-line state) and manned or has automatic remote dispatch capability; and (v) capable of receiving and acknowledging a start-up or shut-down Dispatch Instruction electronically.

**FCA Cleared Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**FCA Qualified Capacity** is the Qualified Capacity that is used in a Forward Capacity Auction.
**FCM Capacity Charge Requirements** are calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Charge Rate** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Commercial Operation** is defined in Section III.13.3.8 of Market Rule 1.

**FCM Deposit** is calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**FCM Financial Assurance Requirements** are described in Section VII of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Final Forward Reserve Obligation** is calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Financial Assurance Default** results from a Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s failure to comply with the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


**Financial Transmission Right (FTR)** is a financial instrument that evidences the rights and obligations specified in Sections III.5.2.2 and III.7 of the Tariff.

**Firm Point-To-Point Service** is service which is arranged for and administered between specified Points of Receipt and Delivery in accordance with Part II.C of the OATT.

**Firm Transmission Service** is Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, service for Excepted Transactions, firm MTF Service, firm OTF Service, and firm Local Service.

**Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator** is any DNE Dispatchable Generator that meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Run Time does not exceed one hour; (ii) Minimum Down Time does not exceed one hour; and (iii) cold Notification Time plus cold Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.
**Force Majeure** - An event of Force Majeure means any act of God, labor disturbance, act of the public enemy or terrorists, war, invasion, insurrection, riot, fire, storm or flood, ice, explosion, breakage or accident to machinery or equipment, any curtailment, order, regulation or restriction imposed by governmental military or lawfully established civilian authorities, or any other cause beyond the control of the ISO, a Transmission Owner, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Customer, including without limitation, in the case of the ISO, any action or inaction by a Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or a Transmission Owner, in the case of a Transmission Owner, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any other Transmission Owner, in the case of a Schedule 20A Service Provider, any action or inaction by the ISO, any Customer, a Transmission Owner, or any other Schedule 20A Service Provider, and, in the case of a Transmission Customer, any action or inaction by the ISO, a Schedule 20A Service Provider, or any Transmission Owner.

**Forward Capacity Auction (FCA)** is the annual Forward Capacity Market auction process described in Section III.13.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.2.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Capacity Market (FCM)** is the forward market for procuring capacity in the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.13 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Energy Inventory Election** is the total MWh value for which a Market Participant elects to be compensated at the forward rate in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward LNG Inventory Election** is the portion of a Market Participant’s Forward Energy Inventory Election attributed to liquefied natural gas in the inventoried energy program as described in Section III.K.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve** means TMNSR and TMOR purchased by the ISO on a forward basis on behalf of Market Participants as provided for in Section III.9 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Assigned Megawatts** is the amount of Forward Reserve, in megawatts, that a Market Participant assigns to eligible Forward Reserve Resources to meet its Forward Reserve Obligation as defined in Section III.9.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Auction** is the periodic auction conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.9 of Market Rule 1 to procure Forward Reserve.

**Forward Reserve Auction Offers** are offers to provide Forward Reserve to meet system and Reserve Zone requirements as submitted by a Market Participant in accordance with Section III.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Forward Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Forward Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.9 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Clearing Price** is the clearing price for TMNSR or TMOR, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone resulting from the Forward Reserve Auction as defined in Section III.9.4 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Credit** is the credit received by a Market Participant that is associated with that Market Participant’s Final Forward Reserve Obligation as calculated in accordance with Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.5 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Delivery Period** is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.2(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to activate Forward Reserve when requested to do so by the ISO and is defined in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.
**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Activate Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve**, as specified in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1, occurs when a Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Delivered Megawatts for a Reserve Zone in an hour is less than that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Obligation for that Reserve Zone in that hour. Under these circumstances the Market Participant pays a penalty based upon the Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate and that Market Participant’s Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Megawatts** are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.7.1(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty** is the penalty associated with a Market Participant’s failure to reserve Forward Reserve and is defined in Section III.9.7.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Failure-to-Reserve Penalty Rate** is specified in Section III.9.7.1(b)(ii) of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Fuel Index** is the index or set of indices used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Forward Reserve Heat Rate** is the heat rate as defined in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1 that is used to calculate the Forward Reserve Threshold Price.

**Forward Reserve Market** is a market for forward procurement of two reserve products, Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

**Forward Reserve MWs** are those megawatts assigned to specific eligible Forward Reserve Resources which convert a Forward Reserve Obligation into a Resource-specific obligation.

**Forward Reserve Obligation** is a Market Participant’s amount, in megawatts, of Forward Reserve that cleared in the Forward Reserve Auction and adjusted, as applicable, to account for bilateral transactions that transfer Forward Reserve Obligations.
Forward Reserve Obligation Charge is defined in Section III.10.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Offer Cap is $9,000/megawatt-month.

Forward Reserve Payment Rate is defined in Section III.9.8 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Procurement Period is defined in Section III.9.1 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Qualifying Megawatts refer to all or a portion of a Forward Reserve Resource’s capability offered into the Real-Time Energy Market at energy offer prices above the applicable Forward Reserve Threshold Price that are calculated in accordance with Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

Forward Reserve Resource is a Resource that meets the eligibility requirements defined in Section III.9.5.2 of Market Rule 1 that has been assigned Forward Reserve Obligation by a Market Participant.

Forward Reserve Threshold Price is the minimum price at which assigned Forward Reserve Megawatts are required to be offered into the Real-Time Energy Market as calculated in Section III.9.6.2 of Market Rule 1.

FTR Auction is the periodic auction of FTRs conducted by the ISO in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1.

FTR Auction Revenue is the revenue collected from the sale of FTRs in FTR Auctions. FTR Auction Revenue is payable to FTR Holders who submit their FTRs for sale in the FTR Auction in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and to ARR Holders and Incremental ARR Holders in accordance with Appendix C of Market Rule 1.

FTR Credit Test Percentage is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(b) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

FTR Financial Assurance Requirements are described in Section VI of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.
**FTR Holder** is an entity that acquires an FTR through the FTR Auction to Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and registers with the ISO as the holder of the FTR in accordance with Section III.7 of Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals.

**FTR-Only Customer** is a Market Participant that transacts in the FTR Auction and that does not participate in other markets or programs of the New England Markets. References in this Tariff to a “Non-Market Participant FTR Customers” and similar phrases shall be deemed references to an FTR-Only Customer.

**FTR Settlement Risk Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required by a Designated FTR Participant for each bid submission into an FTR Auction and for each bid awarded to the individual participant in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.A of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**GADS Data** means data submitted to the NERC for collection into the NERC’s Generating Availability Data System (GADS).

**Gap Request for Proposals (Gap RFP)** is defined in Section III.11 of Market Rule 1.

**Gas Day** means a period of 24 consecutive hours beginning at 0900 hrs Central Time.

**Generating Capacity Resource** means a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

**Generator Asset** is a device (or a collection of devices) that is capable of injecting real power onto the grid that has been registered as a Generator Asset in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.

**Generator Imbalance Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 10 of the OATT.

**Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade** is an addition to or modification of the New England Transmission System (pursuant to Section II.47.1, Schedule 22 or Schedule 23 of the OATT) to effect the interconnection of a new generating unit or an existing generating unit whose energy capability or capacity capability is being materially changed and increased whether or not the interconnection is being effected to meet the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard or the Network Capability
Interconnection Standard. As to Category A Projects (as defined in Schedule 11 of the OATT), a Generator Interconnection Related Upgrade also includes an upgrade beyond that required to satisfy the Network Capability Interconnection Standard (or its predecessor) for which the Generator Owner has committed to pay prior to October 29, 1998.

**Generator Owner** is the owner, in whole or part, of a generating unit whether located within or outside the New England Control Area.

**Good Utility Practice** means any of the practices, methods and acts engaged in or approved by a significant portion of the electric utility industry during the relevant time period, or any of the practices, methods and acts which, in the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of the facts known at the time the decision was made, could have been expected to accomplish the desired result at a reasonable cost consistent with good business practices, reliability, safety and expedition. Good Utility Practice is not intended to be limited to the optimum practice, method, or act to the exclusion of all others, but rather includes all acceptable practices, methods, or acts generally accepted in the region, including those practices required by Federal Power Act Section 215(a)(4).

**Governance Only Member** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Governance Participant** is defined in the Participants Agreement.

**Governing Documents**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and ISO Participants Agreement.

**Governing Rating** is the lowest corporate rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant, or, if the Market Participant has no corporate rating, then the lowest rating from any Rating Agency for that Market Participant’s senior unsecured debt.

**Grandfathered Agreements (GAs)** is a transaction specified in Section II.45 for the applicable period specified in that Section.

**Grandfathered Intertie Agreement (GIA)** is defined pursuant to the TOA.
Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs is the Total Other Production Plant index shown in the Cost Trends of Electric Utility Construction for the North Atlantic Region as published in the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs.

Highgate Transmission Facilities (HTF) are existing U. S.-based transmission facilities covered under the Agreement for Joint Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Highgate Transmission Interconnection dated as of August 1, 1984 including (1) the whole of a 200 megawatt high-voltage, back-to-back, direct-current converter facility located in Highgate, Vermont and (2) a 345 kilovolt transmission line within Highgate and Franklin, Vermont (which connects the converter facility at the U.S.-Canadian border to a Hydro-Quebec 120 kilovolt line in Bedford, Quebec). The HTF include any upgrades associated with increasing the capacity or changing the physical characteristics of these facilities as defined in the above stated agreement dated August 1, 1984 until the Operations Date, as defined in the TOA. The current HTF rating is a nominal 225 MW. The HTF are not defined as PTF. Coincident with the Operations Date and except as stipulated in Schedules, 9, 12, and Attachment F to the OATT, HTF shall be treated in the same manner as PTF for purposes of the OATT and all references to PTF in the OATT shall be deemed to apply to HTF as well. The treatment of the HTF is not intended to establish any binding precedent or presumption with regard to the treatment for other transmission facilities within the New England Transmission System (including HVDC, MTF, or Control Area Interties) for purposes of the OATT.

Host Participant or Host Utility is a Market Participant or a Governance Participant transmission or distribution provider that reconciles the loads within the metering domain with OP-18 compliant metering.

Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(i) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Hourly Shortfall NCPC Credit is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Hub is a specific set of pre-defined Nodes for which a Locational Marginal Price will be calculated for the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market and which can be used to establish a
reference price for energy purchases and the transfer of Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligations and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligations and for the designation of FTRs.

**Hub Price** is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.8 of Market Rule 1.

**HQ Interconnection Capability Credit (HQICC)** is a monthly value reflective of the annual installed capacity benefits of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, as determined by the ISO, using a standard methodology on file with the Commission, in conjunction with the setting of the Installed Capacity Requirement. An appropriate share of the HQICC shall be assigned to an IRH if the Phase I/II HVDC-TF support costs are paid by that IRH and such costs are not included in the calculation of the Regional Network Service rate. The share of HQICC allocated to such an eligible IRH for a month is the sum in kilowatts of (1)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase I Transfer Capability times (b) the Phase I Transfer Credit, plus (2)(a) the IRH’s percentage share, if any, of the Phase II Transfer Capability, times (b) the Phase II Transfer Credit. The ISO shall establish appropriate HQICCs to apply for an IRH which has such a percentage share.

**Import Capacity Resource** means an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource offered to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from an external Control Area.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(o) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Energy Revenue Charges or Credits** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(p) of Market Rule 1.

**Inadvertent Interchange** means the difference between net actual energy flow and net scheduled energy flow into or out of the New England Control Area.

**Increment Offer** means an offer to sell energy at a specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market which is not associated with a physical supply. An accepted Increment Offer results in scheduled supply at the specified Location in the Day-Ahead Energy Market.

**Incremental ARR** is an ARR provided in recognition of a participant-funded transmission system upgrade pursuant to Appendix C of this Market Rule.
**Incremental ARR Holder** is an entity which is the record holder of an Incremental Auction Revenue Right in the register maintained by the ISO.

**Incremental Cost of Reliability Service** is described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Independent Transmission Company (ITC)** is a transmission entity that assumes certain responsibilities in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Transmission Operating Agreement and Attachment M to the OATT, subject to the acceptance or approval of the Commission and a finding of the Commission that the transmission entity satisfies applicable independence requirements.

**Information Request** is a request from a potential Disputing Party submitted in writing to the ISO for access to Confidential Information.

**Initial Market Participant Financial Assurance Requirement** is calculated for new Market Participants and Returning Market Participants, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, according to Section IV of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Installed Capacity Requirement** means the level of capacity required to meet the reliability requirements defined for the New England Control Area, as described in Section III.12 of Market Rule 1.

**Interchange Transactions** are transactions deemed to be effected under Market Rule 1.

**Interconnecting Transmission Owner** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Agreement** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Agreement”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Agreement”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Agreement” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of the ISO OATT or an interconnection agreement approved by the Commission prior to the adoption of the Interconnection Procedures.

**Interconnection Customer** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.
**Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Procedure** is the “Large Generator Interconnection Procedures”, the “Small Generator Interconnection Procedures”, or the “Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Procedures” pursuant to Schedules 22, 23, and 25 of the ISO OATT.

**Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.

**Interconnection Request** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, or Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interconnection Rights Holder(s) (IRH)** has the meaning given to it in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23 and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Interest** is interest calculated in the manner specified in Section II.8.3.

**Interface Bid** is a unified real-time bid to simultaneously purchase and sell energy on each side of an external interface for which the enhanced scheduling procedures in Section III.1.10.7.A are implemented.

**Intermittent Power Resource** is a wind, solar, run of river hydro or other renewable resource that does not have control over its net power output.

**Internal Bilateral for Load** is an internal bilateral transaction under which the buyer receives a reduction in Real-Time Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Real-Time Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs. An Internal Bilateral for Load transaction is only applicable in the Real-Time Energy Market.

**Internal Bilateral for Market for Energy** is an internal bilateral transaction for Energy which applies in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market or just the Real-Time Energy Market under
which the buyer receives a reduction in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation and the seller receives a corresponding increase in Day-Ahead Adjusted Load Obligation and Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation in the amount of the sale, in MWs.

**Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade (Internal ETU)** is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Internal Market Monitor** means the department of the ISO responsible for carrying out the market monitoring and mitigation functions specified in Appendix A and elsewhere in Market Rule 1.

**Interregional Planning Stakeholder Advisory Committee (IPSAC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeast Planning Protocol.

**Interregional Transmission Project** is a transmission project located within the New England Control Area and one or more of the neighboring transmission planning regions.

** Interruption Cost** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid to a Market Participant each time the Market Participant’s Demand Response Resource is scheduled or dispatched in the New England Markets to reduce demand.

**Inventoried Energy Day** is an Operating Day that occurs in the months of December, January, or February during the winters of 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 (inventoried energy program) and for which the average of the high temperature and the low temperature on that Operating Day, as measured and reported by the National Weather Service at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, is less than or equal to 17 degrees Fahrenheit, as described in Section III.K.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Investment Grade Rating**, for a Market (other than an FTR-Only Customer) or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer, is either (a) a corporate investment grade rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or (b) if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have a corporate rating from one of the Rating Agencies, then an investment grade rating for the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s senior unsecured debt from one or more of the Rating Agencies.
**Invoice** is a statement issued by the ISO for the net Charge owed by a Covered Entity pursuant to the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Invoice Date** is the day on which the ISO issues an Invoice.

**ISO** means ISO New England Inc.

**ISO Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Billing Policy, are both Non-Hourly Charges and Hourly Charges.

**ISO Control Center** is the primary control center established by the ISO for the exercise of its Operating Authority and the performance of functions as an RTO.

**ISO-Initiated Claimed Capability Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.4.


**ISO New England Billing Policy** is Exhibit ID to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Filed Documents** means the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, including but not limited to Market Rule 1, the Participants Agreement, the Transmission Operating Agreement or other documents that affect the rates, terms and conditions of service.

**ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy** is Exhibit IA to Section I of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

**ISO New England Information Policy** is the policy establishing guidelines regarding the information received, created and distributed by Market Participants and the ISO in connection with the settlement, operation and planning of the System, as the same may be amended from time to time in accordance with the provisions of this Tariff. The ISO New England Information Policy is Attachment D to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.
**ISO New England Manuals** are the manuals implementing Market Rule 1, as amended from time to time in accordance with the Participants Agreement. Any elements of the ISO New England Manuals that substantially affect rates, terms, and/or conditions of service shall be filed with the Commission under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

**ISO New England Operating Documents** are the Tariff and the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

**ISO New England Operating Procedures (OPs)** are the ISO New England Planning Procedures and the operating guides, manuals, procedures and protocols developed and utilized by the ISO for operating the ISO bulk power system and the New England Markets.

**ISO New England Planning Procedures** are the procedures developed and utilized by the ISO for planning the ISO bulk power system.


**ITC Agreement** is defined in Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC Rate Schedule** is defined in Section 3.1 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System** is defined in Section 2.2 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**ITC System Planning Procedures** is defined in Section 15.4 of Attachment M to the OATT.

**Joint ISO/RTO Planning Committee (JIPC)** is the committee described as such in the Northeastern Planning Protocol.

**Late Payment Account** is a segregated interest-bearing account into which the ISO deposits Late Payment Charges due from ISO Charges and interest owed from participants for late payments that are collected and not distributed to the Covered Entities, until the Late Payment Account Limit is reached,

**Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Lead Market Participant**, for purposes other than the Forward Capacity Market, is the entity authorized to submit Supply Offers, Demand Bids, Demand Reduction Offers or Baseline Deviation Offers for a Resource and to whom certain Energy TUs are assessed under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff. For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, the Lead Market Participant is the entity designated to participate in that market on behalf of an Existing Capacity Resource or a New Capacity Resource.

**Limited Energy Resource** means a Generator Asset that, due to design considerations, environmental restriction on operations, cyclical requirements, such as the need to recharge or refill or manage water flow, or fuel limitations, are unable to operate continuously at full output on a daily basis.

**Load Asset** means a physical load that has been registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process. A Load Asset can be an Asset Related Demand, including a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

**Load Management** means measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that curtail electrical usage or shift electrical usage while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include, but are not limited to, energy management systems, load control end-use cycling, load curtailment strategies, and energy storage that curtails or shifts electrical usage by means other than generating electricity.

**Load Shedding** is the systematic reduction of system demand by temporarily decreasing load.

**Load-Side Relationship Certification** is a certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3 that a Project Sponsor submits as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package to demonstrate that the New Capacity Resource should not be subject to buyer-side market power review.
**Load Zone** is a Reliability Region, except as otherwise provided for in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Local Area Facilities** are defined in the TOA.

**Local Benefit Upgrade(s) (LBU)** is an upgrade, modification or addition to the transmission system that is: (i) rated below 115kV or (ii) rated 115kV or above and does not meet all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT.

**Local Control Centers** are those control centers in existence as of the effective date of the OATT (including the CONVEX, REMVEC, Maine and New Hampshire control centers) or established by the PTOs in accordance with the TOA that are separate from the ISO Control Center and perform certain functions in accordance with the OATT and the TOA.

**Local Delivery Service** is the service of delivering electric energy to end users. This service is subject to state jurisdiction regardless of whether such service is provided over local distribution or transmission facilities. An entity that is an Eligible Customer under the OATT is not excused from any requirements of state law, or any order or regulation issued pursuant to state law, to arrange for Local Delivery Service with the Participating Transmission Owner and/or distribution company providing such service and to pay all applicable charges associated with such service, including charges for stranded costs and benefits.

**Local Network** is defined as the transmission facilities constituting a local network as identified in Attachment E, as such Attachment may be modified from time to time in accordance with the Transmission Operating Agreement.

**Local Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Local Network Service under Schedule 21 to the OATT.

**Local Network RNS Rate** is the rate applicable to Regional Network Service to effect a delivery to load in a particular Local Network, as determined in accordance with Schedule 9 to the OATT.

**Local Network Service (LNS)** is the network service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules to permit the Transmission Customer to efficiently and economically utilize its resources to serve its load.
Local Point-To-Point Service (LPTP) is Point-to-Point Service provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT and the Local Service Schedules to permit deliveries to or from an interconnection point on the PTF.

Local Public Policy Transmission Upgrade is any addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System with a voltage level below 115kV that is required in connection with the construction of a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade approved for inclusion in the Regional System Plan pursuant to Attachment K to the ISO OATT or included in a Local System Plan in accordance with Appendix 1 to Attachment K.

Local Resource Adequacy Requirement is calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.1.

Local Second Contingency Protection Resources are those Resources identified by the ISO on a daily basis as necessary for the provision of Operating Reserve requirements and adherence to NERC, NPCC and ISO reliability criteria over and above those Resources required to meet first contingency reliability criteria within a Reliability Region.

Local Service is transmission service provided under Schedule 21 and the Local Service Schedules thereto.

Local Service Schedule is a PTO-specific schedule to the OATT setting forth the rates, charges, terms and conditions applicable to Local Service.

Local Sourcing Requirement (LSR) is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

Local System Planning (LSP) is the process defined in Appendix 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

Localized Costs are costs that the ISO, with advisory input from the Reliability Committee, determines in accordance with Schedule 12C of the OATT shall not be included in the Pool-Supported PTF costs recoverable under this OATT, or in costs allocated to Regional Network Load according to Section 6 of Schedule 12. If there are any Localized Costs, the ISO shall identify them in the Regional System Plan.

Location is a Node, External Node, Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone, or Hub.
**Locational Marginal Price (LMP)** is defined in Section III.2 of Market Rule 1. The Locational Marginal Price for a Node is the nodal price at that Node; the Locational Marginal Price for an External Node is the nodal price at that External Node; the Locational Marginal Price for a Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region is the Zonal Price for that Load Zone, DRR Aggregation Zone or Reliability Region, respectively; and the Locational Marginal Price for a Hub is the Hub Price for that Hub.

**Long Lead Time Facility (Long Lead Facility)** has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22 and Schedule 25 of the OATT.

**Long-Term** is a term of one year or more.

**Long-Term Transmission Outage** is a long-term transmission outage scheduled in accordance with ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 3.

**Longer-Term Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT. The 2050 Transmission Study shall be the first Longer-Term Transmission Study.

**Loss Component** is the component of the nodal LMP at a given Node or External Node on the PTF that reflects the cost of losses at that Node or External Node relative to the reference point. The Loss Component of the nodal LMP at a given Node on the non-PTF system reflects the relative cost of losses at that Node adjusted as required to account for losses on the non-PTF system already accounted for through tariffs associated with the non-PTF. When used in connection with Hub Price or Zonal Price, the term Loss Component refers to the Loss Components of the nodal LMPs that comprise the Hub Price or Zonal Price, which Loss Components are averaged or weighted in the same way that nodal LMPs are averaged to determine Hub Price or weighted to determine Zonal Price.

**Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE)** is the probability of disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to a resource deficiency.
Lost Opportunity Cost (LOC) is one of four forms of compensation that may be paid to resources providing VAR Service under Schedule 2 of the OATT.

LSE means load serving entity.

Lump Sum Blackstart Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Lump Sum Blackstart Capital Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.4 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Manual Response Rate is the rate, in MW/Minute, at which the output of a Generator Asset, or the consumption of a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, is capable of changing.

Marginal Loss Revenue Load Obligation is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

Marginal Reliability Impact is the change, with respect to an increment of capacity supply, in expected unserved energy due to resource deficiency, as measured in hours per year.

Market Credit Limit is a credit limit for a Market Participant’s Financial Assurance Obligations (except FTR Financial Assurance Requirements) established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Market Credit Test Percentage is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(a) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade is defined as those additions and upgrades that are not related to the interconnection of a generator, and, in the ISO’s determination, are designed to reduce bulk power system costs to load system-wide, where the net present value of the reduction in bulk power system costs to load system-wide exceeds the net present value of the cost of the transmission addition or upgrade. For purposes of this definition, the term “bulk power system costs to load system-wide” includes, but is not limited to, the costs of energy, capacity, reserves, losses and impacts on bilateral prices for electricity.
Market Participant is a participant in the New England Markets (including a FTR-Only Customer) that has executed a Market Participant Service Agreement, or on whose behalf an unexecuted Market Participant Service Agreement has been filed with the Commission.


Market Participant Service Agreement (MPSA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Market Participant, in the form specified in Attachment A or Attachment A-1 to the Tariff, as applicable.

Market Rule 1 is ISO Market Rule 1 and appendices set forth in Section III of this ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

Market Violation is a tariff violation, violation of a Commission-approved order, rule or regulation, market manipulation, or inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

Material Adverse Change is any change in financial status including, but not limited to a downgrade to below an Investment Grade Rating by any Rating Agency, being placed on credit watch with negative implication by any Rating Agency if the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer does not have an Investment Grade Rating, a bankruptcy filing or other insolvency, a report of a significant quarterly loss or decline of earnings, the resignation of key officer(s), the sanctioning of the Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer or any of its Principles imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; the filing of a material lawsuit that could materially adversely impact current or future financial results; a significant change in the Market Participant’s or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer’s credit default spreads; or a significant change in market capitalization.

Material Adverse Impact is defined, for purposes of review of ITC-proposed plans, as a proposed facility or project will be deemed to cause a “material adverse impact” on facilities outside of the ITC System if: (i) the proposed facility or project causes non-ITC facilities to exceed their capabilities or exceed their thermal, voltage or stability limits, consistent with all applicable reliability criteria, or (ii) the proposed facility or project would not satisfy the standards set forth in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission,
Markets and Services Tariff. This standard is intended to assure the continued service of all non-ITC firm load customers and the ability of the non-ITC systems to meet outstanding transmission service obligations.

**Maximum Capacity Limit** is a value calculated as described in Section III.12.2.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Maximum Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data. A Market Participant must maintain an up-to-date Maximum Consumption Limit (and where applicable, must provide the ISO with any telemetry required by ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 18 to allow the ISO to maintain an updated Maximum Consumption Limit) for all hours in which a DARD has been offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

**Maximum Daily Consumption Limit** is the maximum amount of megawatt-hours that a Storage DARD expects to be able to consume in the next Operating Day.

**Maximum Facility Load** is the highest demand of an end-use customer facility since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), where the demand evaluated is established by adding metered demand measured at the Retail Delivery Point and the output of all generators located behind the Retail Delivery Point in the same time intervals.

**Maximum Interruptible Capacity** is an estimate of the maximum demand reduction and Net Supply that a Demand Response Asset can deliver, as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Load** is the highest demand since the start of the prior calendar year (or, if unavailable, an estimate thereof), as measured at the Retail Delivery Point.

**Maximum Number of Daily Starts** is the maximum number of times that a Binary Storage DARD or a Generator Asset can be started or that a Demand Response Resource can be interrupted in the next Operating Day under normal operating conditions.

**Maximum Reduction** is the maximum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.
**Measure Life** is the estimated time an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource measure will remain in place, or the estimated time period over which the facility, structure, equipment or system in which a measure is installed continues to exist, whichever is shorter. Suppliers of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources comprised of an aggregation of measures with varied Measures Lives shall determine and document the Measure Life either: (i) for each type of measure with a different Measure Life and adjust the aggregate performance based on the individual measure life calculation in the portfolio; or (ii) as the average Measure Life for the aggregated measures as long as the demand reduction capability of the resource is greater than or equal to the amount that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, and the demand reduction capability for an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is not over-stated in a subsequent Capacity Commitment Period. Measure Life shall be determined consistent with the resource’s Measurement and Verification Plan, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Documents** mean the measurement and verification documents described in Section 13.1.4.3.1 of Market Rule 1 that are submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, which include Measurement and Verification Plans, Updated Measurement and Verification Plans, Measurement and Verification Summary Reports, and Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

**Measurement and Verification Plan** means the measurement and verification plan submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource as part of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the requirements of Section III.13.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**Measurement and Verification Reference Reports** are optional reports submitted by On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports update the prospective demand reduction capability of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource project based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.
Measurement and Verification Summary Report is the monthly report submitted by an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource with the monthly settlement report for the Forward Capacity Market, which documents the total demand reduction capability for all On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources in operation as of the end of the previous month.

MEPCO Grandfathered Transmission Service Agreement (MGTSA) is a MEPCO long-term firm point-to-point transmission service agreement with a POR or POD at the New Brunswick border and a start date prior to June 1, 2007 where the holder has elected, by written notice delivered to MEPCO within five (5) days following the filing of the settlement agreement in Docket Nos. ER07-1289 and EL08-56 or by September 1, 2008 (whichever is later), MGTSA treatment as further described in Section II.45.1.

Merchant Transmission Facilities (MTF) are the transmission facilities owned by MTOs, defined and classified as MTF pursuant to Schedule 18 of the OATT, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in a MTOA or Attachment K to the OATT, rated 69 kV or above and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Provider (MTF Provider) is an entity as defined in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Facilities Service (MTF Service) is transmission service over MTF as provided for in Schedule 18 of the OATT.

Merchant Transmission Operating Agreement (MTOA) is an agreement between the ISO and an MTO with respect to its MTF.

Merchant Transmission Owner (MTO) is an owner of MTF.

Meter Data Error means an error in meter data, including an error in Coincident Peak Contribution values, on an Invoice issued by the ISO after the completion of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.8 of Market Rule 1.
**Meter Data Error RBA Submission Limit** means the date thirty 30 calendar days after the issuance of the Invoice containing the results of the Data Reconciliation Process as described in the ISO New England Manuals and in Section III.3.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Metered Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.3.2.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Minimum Consumption Limit** is (a) the lowest consumption level, in MW, available for economic dispatch from a DARD and is based on the physical characteristics as submitted as part of the DARD’s Offer Data, and (b) for a DARD undergoing Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing, the level to which the DARD requests and is approved to operate or is directed to operate for purposes of completing the Facility and Equipment Testing or auditing.

**Minimum Down Time** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Generator Asset or Storage DARD has been released for shutdown at or below its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit before the Generator Asset or Storage DARD can be brought online and be released for dispatch at its Economic Minimum Limit or Minimum Consumption Limit.

**Minimum Generation Emergency** means an Emergency declared by the ISO in which the ISO anticipates requesting one or more Generator Assets to operate at or below Economic Minimum Limit in order to manage, alleviate, or end the Emergency.

**Minimum Generation Emergency Credits** are those Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits calculated pursuant to Appendix F of Market Rule 1 for resources within a reliability region that are dispatched during a period for which a Minimum Generation Emergency has been declared.

**Minimum Reduction** is the minimum available demand reduction, in MW, of a Demand Response Resource that a Market Participant offers to deliver in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market, as reflected in the Demand Response Resource’s Demand Reduction Offer.

**Minimum Reduction Time** is the minimum number of hours of demand reduction at or above the Minimum Reduction for which the ISO must dispatch a Demand Response Resource to reduce demand.
**Minimum Run Time** is the number of hours that a Generator Asset must remain online after it has been scheduled to reach its Economic Minimum Limit before it can be released for shutdown from its Economic Minimum Limit or the number of hours that must elapse after a Storage DARD has been scheduled to consume at its Minimum Consumption Limit before it can be released for shutdown.

**Minimum Time Between Reductions** is the number of hours that must elapse after a Demand Response Resource has received a Dispatch Instruction to stop reducing demand before the Demand Response Resource can achieve its Minimum Reduction after receiving a Dispatch Instruction to start reducing demand.

**Minimum Total Reserve Requirement**, which does not include Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Monthly Blackstart Service Charge** is the charge made to Transmission Customers pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Monthly Capacity Payment** is the Forward Capacity Market payment described in Section III.13.7.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Monthly Peak** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Monthly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Generation Obligation** is the sum, for all hours in a month, at all Locations, of a Customer’s Real-Time Generation Obligation, in MWhs.

**Monthly Real-Time Load Obligation** is the absolute value of a Customer’s hourly Real-Time Load Obligation summed for all hours in a month, in MWhs.

**Monthly Regional Network Load** is defined in Section II.21.2 of the OATT.
**Monthly Statement** is the first weekly Statement issued on a Monday after the tenth of a calendar month that includes both the Hourly Charges for the relevant billing period and Non-Hourly Charges for the immediately preceding calendar month.

**MRI Transition Period** is the period specified in Section III.13.2.2.1.

**MUI** is the market user interface.

**Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**MW** is megawatt.

**MWh** is megawatt-hour.

**Native Load Customers** are the wholesale and retail power customers of a Transmission Owner on whose behalf the Transmission Owner, by statute, franchise, regulatory requirement, or contract, has undertaken an obligation to construct and operate its system to meet the reliable electric needs of such customers.

**NCPC Charge** means the charges to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**NCPC Credit** means the credits to Market Participants calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Needs Assessment** is defined in Section 4.1 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**NEMA**, for purposes of Section III of the Tariff, is the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region.

**NEMA Contract** is a contract described in Appendix C of Market Rule 1 and listed in Exhibit 1 of Appendix C of Market Rule 1.
**NEMA Load Serving Entity (NEMA LSE)** is a Transmission Customer or Congestion Paying LSE Entity that serves load within NEMA.

**NEMA or Northeast Massachusetts Upgrade**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is an addition to or modification of the PTF into or within the Northeast Massachusetts Reliability Region that was not, as of December 31, 1999, the subject of a System Impact Study or application filed pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; that is not related to generation interconnections; and that will be completed and placed in service by June 30, 2004. Such upgrades include, but are not limited to, new transmission facilities and related equipment and/or modifications to existing transmission facilities and related equipment. The list of NEMA Upgrades is contained in Schedule 12A of the OATT.

**NEPOOL** is the New England Power Pool, and the entities that collectively participated in the New England Power Pool.

**NEPOOL Agreement** is the agreement among the participants in NEPOOL.

**NEPOOL GIS** is the generation information system.

**NEPOOL GIS Administrator** is the entity or entities that develop, administer, operate and maintain the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL GIS API Fees** are the one-time on-boarding fees and annual maintenance fees charged to NEPOOL by the NEPOOL GIS Administrator for each NEPOOL Participant or Market Participant that accesses the NEPOOL GIS through an application programming interface pursuant to Rule 3.9(b) of the operating rules of the NEPOOL GIS.

**NEPOOL Participant** is a party to the NEPOOL Agreement.

**NERC** is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or its successor organization.

**NESCOE** is the New England States Committee on Electricity, recognized by the Commission as the regional state committee for the New England Control Area.
Net Commitment Period Compensation (NCPC) is the compensation methodology for Resources that is described in Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

Net CONE is an estimate of the Cost of New Entry, net of non-capacity market revenues, for a reference technology resource type and is intended to equal the amount of capacity revenue the reference technology resource would require to be economically viable given reasonable expectations of the energy and ancillary services revenues under long-term equilibrium conditions.

Net Regional Clearing Price is described in Section III.13.7.5 of Market Rule 1.

Net Supply is energy injected into the transmission or distribution system at a Retail Delivery Point.

Net Supply Capability is the maximum Net Supply a facility is physically and contractually able to inject into the transmission or distribution system at its Retail Delivery Point.

Network Capability Interconnection Standard has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Customer is a Transmission Customer receiving RNS or LNS.

Network Import Capability (NI Capability) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Import Interconnection Service (NI Interconnection Service) is defined in Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Network Resource is defined as follows: (1) With respect to Market Participants, (a) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which has been placed in service prior to the Compliance Effective Date (including a unit that has lost its capacity value when its capacity value is restored and a deactivated unit which may be reactivated without satisfying the requirements of Section II.46 of the OATT in accordance with the provisions thereof) until retired; (b) any generating resource located in the New England Control Area which is placed in service after the Compliance Effective Date until retired, provided that (i) the Generator Owner has complied with the requirements of Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT, and (ii) the output of the unit shall be limited in accordance with Sections II.46 and II.47 and Schedules 22 and 23, if required; and (c) any generating
resource or combination of resources (including bilateral purchases) located outside the New England Control Area for so long as any Market Participant has an Ownership Share in the resource or resources which is being delivered to it in the New England Control Area to serve Regional Network Load located in the New England Control Area or other designated Regional Network Loads contemplated by Section II.18.3 of the OATT taking Regional Network Service. (2) With respect to Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, any generating resource owned, purchased or leased by the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer which it designates to serve Regional Network Load.

**New Brunswick Security Energy** is defined in Section III.3.2.6A of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Offer** is an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction to provide capacity from a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Qualification Deadline** is a deadline, specified in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1, for submission of certain qualification materials for the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Qualification Package** is information submitted by certain new resources prior to participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Resource** is a resource (i) that never previously received any payment as a capacity resource including any capacity payment pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 and that has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) that is otherwise eligible to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Capacity Resource.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window** is the period of time during which a Project Sponsor may submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form, as described in Section III.13.1.10 of Market Rule 1.
**New Demand Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.4A.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Qualification Package** is the information that a Project Sponsor must submit, in accordance with Section III.13.1.4A.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1, for each resource that it seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.

**New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form** is described in Section III.13.1.4A.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New England Control Area** is the Control Area for New England, which includes PTF, Non-PTF, MTF and OTF. The New England Control Area covers Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and part of Maine (i.e., excluding the portions of Northern Maine and the northern portion of Eastern Maine which are in the Maritimes Control Area).

**New England Markets** are markets or programs for the purchase of energy, capacity, ancillary services, demand response services or other related products or services (including Financial Transmission Rights) that are delivered through or useful to the operation of the New England Transmission System and that are administered by the ISO pursuanto rules, rates, or agreements on file from time to time with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

**New England System Restoration Plan** is the plan that is developed by ISO, in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards, NPCC regional criteria and standards, ISO New England Operating Documents and
ISO operating agreements, to facilitate the restoration of the New England Transmission System following a partial or complete shutdown of the New England Transmission System.

**New England Transmission System** is the system of transmission facilities, including PTF, Non-PTF, OTF and MTF, within the New England Control Area under the ISO’s operational jurisdiction.

**New Generating Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

**New Import Capacity Resource** is a type of resource participating in the Forward Capacity Market, as defined in Section III.13.1.3.4 of Market Rule 1.

**New Resource Offer Floor Price** is defined in Section III.A.21.3.

**NMPTC** means Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer.

**NMPTC Credit Threshold** is described in Section V.A.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**NMPTC Financial Assurance Requirement** is an amount of additional financial assurance for Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers described in Section V.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Node** is a point on the New England Transmission System at which LMPs are calculated.

**No-Load Fee** is the amount, in dollars per hour, for a Generator Asset that must be paid to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset for being scheduled in the New England Markets, in addition to the Start-Up Fee and price offered to supply energy, for each hour that the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets.

**Nominated Consumption Limit** is the consumption level specified by the Market Participant for a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand as adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.7.5.1.3.
Non-Commercial Capacity is the capacity of a New Capacity Resource or an Existing Capacity Resource, or portion thereof, that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

Non-Commercial Capacity Cure Period is the time period described in Section VII.D of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Commercial Capacity Financial Assurance Amount (Non-Commercial Capacity FA Amount) is the financial assurance amount held on Non-Commercial Capacity cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as calculated in accordance with Section VII.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-Designated Blackstart Resource Study Cost Payments are the study costs reimbursed under Section 5.3 of Schedule 16 of the OATT.

Non-Dispatchable Resource is any Resource that does not meet the requirements to be a Dispatchable Resource.

Non-Hourly Charges are defined in Section 1.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Non-Hourly Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(ii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, which is Exhibit 1A of Section I of the Tariff.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer is a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that: (i) is not currently a PTO; (ii) has a transmission project listed in the RSP Project List; and (iii) has executed a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement. “Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer” also includes a PTO that proposes the development of a transmission facility not located within or connected to its existing electric system; however, because such a PTO is a party to the TOA, it is not required to enter into a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement.

Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer Operating Agreement (or NTDOA) is an agreement between the ISO and a Non-Incumbent Transmission Developer in the form specified in Attachment O to the OATT that sets forth their respective rights and responsibilities to each other with regard to proposals for and construction of certain transmission facilities.
Non-Market Participant is any entity that is not a Market Participant.

Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer is any entity which is not a Market Participant but is a Transmission Customer.

Non-Municipal Market Participant is defined in Section II of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Non-PTF Transmission Facilities (Non-PTF) are the transmission facilities owned by the PTOs that do not constitute PTF, OTF or MTF.

Non-Qualifying means a Market Participant that is not a Credit Qualifying Market Participant.

Notice of RBA is defined in Section 6.3.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

Notification Time is the time required for a Generator Asset to synchronize to the system from the time a startup Dispatch Instruction is received from the ISO.

Northeastern Planning Protocol is the Amended and Restated Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol on file with the Commission and posted on the ISO website at the following URL: www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/07/northeastern_protocol_dmeast.doc.

NPCC is the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

Obligation Month means a time period of one calendar month for which capacity payments are issued and the costs associated with capacity payments are allocated.

Offer Data means the scheduling, operations planning, dispatch, new Resource, and other data, including Generator Asset, Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, and Demand Response Resource operating limits based on physical characteristics, and information necessary to schedule and dispatch Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands, and Demand Response Resources for the provision or consumption of energy, the provision of other services, and the maintenance of the reliability and security of the transmission system in the New England Control Area, and specified for submission to the New England Markets for such purposes by the ISO.
Offered CLAIM10 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM10 of the resource that represents the amount of TMNSR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

Offered CLAIM30 is a Supply Offer value or a Demand Reduction Offer value between 0 and the CLAIM30 of the resource that represents the amount of TMOR available either from an off-line Fast Start Generator or from a Fast Start Demand Response Resource that has not been dispatched.

On-Peak Demand Resource is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and means installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) is the ISO information system and standards of conduct responding to requirements of 18 C.F.R. §37 of the Commission’s regulations and all additional requirements implemented by subsequent Commission orders dealing with OASIS.

Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) is Section II of the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Operating Authority is defined pursuant to a MTOA, an OTOA, the TOA or the OATT, as applicable.

Operating Data means GADS Data, data equivalent to GADS Data, CARL Data, metered load data, or actual system failure occurrences data, all as described in the ISO New England Operating Procedures.

Operating Day means the calendar day period beginning at midnight for which transactions on the New England Markets are scheduled.

Operating Reserve means Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR), Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR) and Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR).

Operations Date is February 1, 2005.
**OTF Service** is transmission service over OTF as provided for in Schedule 20.

**Other Transmission Facility (OTF)** are the transmission facilities owned by Transmission Owners, defined and classified as OTF pursuant to Schedule 20, over which the ISO shall exercise Operating Authority in accordance with the terms set forth in the OTOA, rated 69 kV or above, and required to allow energy from significant power sources to move freely on the New England Transmission System. OTF classification shall be limited to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF.

**Other Transmission Operating Agreements (OTOA)** is the agreement(s) between the ISO, an OTO and/or the associated service provider(s) with respect to an OTF, which includes the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement. With respect to the Phase I/II HVDC-TF, the HVDC Transmission Operating Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the operation of the facility and the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transmission Service Administration Agreement covers the rights and responsibilities for the administration of transmission service.

**Other Transmission Owner (OTO)** is an owner of OTF.

**Ownership Share** is a right or obligation, for purposes of settlement, to a percentage share of all credits or charges associated with a Generator Asset or a Load Asset, where such facility is interconnected to the New England Transmission System.

**Participant Expenses** are defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participant Required Balance** is defined in Section 5.3 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Participant Vote** is defined in Section 1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Participants Agreement** is the agreement among the ISO, the New England Power Pool and Individual Participants, as amended from time to time, on file with the Commission.

**Participants Committee** is the principal committee referred to in the Participants Agreement.
**Participating Transmission Owner (PTO)** is a transmission owner that is a party to the TOA.

**Passive DR Audit** is the audit performed pursuant to Section III.13.6.1.5.4.

**Passive DR Auditing Period** is the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June 1 to August 31) or winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December 1 to January 31) applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

**Payment** is a sum of money due to a Covered Entity from the ISO.

**Payment Default Shortfall Fund** is defined in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Permanent De-list Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to permanently remove itself from the capacity market, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Phase I Transfer Credit** is 40% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability** is the transfer capacity of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The “Phase I Transfer Capability” is the transfer capacity under normal operating conditions, as determined in accordance with Good Utility Practice, of the Phase I terminal facilities as determined initially as of the time immediately prior to Phase II of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF first being placed in service, and as adjusted thereafter only to take into account changes in the transfer capacity which are independent of any effect of Phase II on the operation of Phase I. The “Phase II Transfer Capability” is the difference between the Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability and the Phase I Transfer Capability. Determinations of, and any adjustment in, Phase I/II HVDC-TF Transfer Capability shall be made by the ISO, and the basis for any such adjustment shall be explained in writing and posted on the ISO website.
Phase One Proposal is a first round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade, as applicable, by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Phase II Transfer Credit is 60% of the HQICC, or such other fraction of the HQICC as the ISO may establish.

Phase Two Solution is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

Planning Advisory Committee is the committee described in Attachment K of the OATT.

Planning and Reliability Criteria is defined in Section 3.3 of Attachment K to the OATT.

Planning Authority is an entity defined as such by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

Point(s) of Delivery (POD) is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available to the Receiving Party under the OATT.

Point of Interconnection shall have the same meaning as that used for purposes of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of the OATT.

Point(s) of Receipt (POR) is point(s) of interconnection where capacity and/or energy transmitted by a Transmission Customer will be made available by the Delivering Party under the OATT.

Point-To-Point Service is the transmission of capacity and/or energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Local Point-To-Point Service or OTF Service or MTF Service; and the transmission of capacity and/or energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT pursuant to Through or Out Service.

Pool-Planned Unit is one of the following units: New Haven Harbor Unit 1 (Coke Works), Mystic Unit 7, Canal Unit 2, Potter Unit 2, Wyman Unit 4, Stony Brook Units 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A and 2B, Millstone
Unit 3, Seabrook Unit 1 and Waters River Unit 2 (to the extent of 7 megawatts of its Summer capability and 12 megawatts of its Winter capability).

**Pool PTF Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with Schedule 8 to the OATT.

**Pool RNS Rate** is the transmission rate determined in accordance with paragraph (2) of Schedule 9 of Section II of the Tariff.

**Pool-Scheduled Resources** are described in Section III.1.10.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Pool Supported PTF** is defined as: (i) PTF first placed in service prior to January 1, 2000; (ii) Generator Interconnection Related Upgrades with respect to Category A and B projects (as defined in Schedule 11), but only to the extent not paid for by the interconnecting Generator Owner; and (iii) other PTF upgrades, but only to the extent the costs therefore are determined to be Pool Supported PTF in accordance with Schedule 12.

**Pool Transmission Facility (PTF)** means the transmission facilities owned by PTOs which meet the criteria specified in Section II.49 of the OATT.

**Posting Entity** is any Market Participant or Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer providing financial security under the provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Posture** means an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource produced by the ISO’s technical software for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR support.

**Posturing Credits** are the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credits for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability and the Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability.

**Power Purchaser** is the entity that is purchasing the capacity and/or energy to be transmitted under the OATT.
**Principal** is (i) the sole proprietor of a sole proprietorship; (ii) a general partner of a partnership; (iii) a president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer or chief financial officer (or equivalent position) of an organization; (iv) a manager, managing member or a member vested with the management authority for a limited liability company or limited liability partnership; (v) any person or entity that has the power to exercise a controlling influence over an organization’s activities that are subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, any exchange monitored by the National Futures Association, or any state entity responsible for regulating activity in energy markets; or (vi) any person or entity that: (a) is the direct owner of 10% or more of any class of an organization’s equity securities; or (b) has directly contributed 10% or more of an organization’s capital.

**Profiled Load Assets** include all Load Assets that are not directly metered by OP-18 compliant metering as currently described in Section IV (Metering and Recording for Settlements) of OP18, and some Load Assets that are measured by OP-18 compliant metering (as currently described in Section IV of OP-18) to which the Host Participant Assigned Meter Reader allocates non-PTF losses.

**Project Sponsor** is an entity seeking to have a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource participate in the Forward Capacity Market, as described in Section III.13.

**Proxy De-List Bid** is a type of bid used in the Forward Capacity Market.

**Provisional Member** is defined in Section I.68A of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**PTO Administrative Committee** is the committee referred to in Section 11.04 of the TOA.

**Public Policy Requirement** is a requirement reflected in a statute enacted by, or a regulation promulgated by, the federal government or a state or local (e.g., municipal or county) government.

**Public Policy Transmission Study** is a study conducted by the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 4A.3 of Attachment K of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce a rough estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.
**Public Policy Local Transmission Study** is a study conducted by a PTO pursuant to the process set out in Section 1.6 of Attachment K Appendix 1 of the OATT, and consists of two phases: (i) an initial phase to produce an estimate of the costs and benefits of concepts that could meet transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and (ii) a follow-on phase designed to produce more detailed analysis and engineering work on transmission concepts identified in the first phase.

**Public Policy Transmission Upgrade** is an addition and/or upgrade to the New England Transmission System that meets the voltage and non-voltage criteria for Public Policy Transmission Upgrade PTF classification specified in the OATT, and has been included in the Regional System Plan and RSP Project List as a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade pursuant to the procedures described in Section 4A of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Publicly Owned Entity** is defined in Section I of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.

**Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit** is described in Section III.13.1.9.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Qualified Capacity** is the amount of capacity a resource may provide in the summer or winter in a Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in the Forward Capacity Market qualification processes.

**Qualified Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource(s)** is any non-generator source of dynamic reactive power that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Reactive Resource(s)** is any Qualified Generator Reactive Resource and/or Qualified Non-Generator Reactive Resource that meets the criteria specified in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is defined in Sections 4B.2 and 4B.3 of Attachment K of the OATT.
Queue Position has the meaning specified in Section I of Schedule 22, Attachment 1 to Schedule 23, and Section I of Schedule 25 of the OATT.

Rapid Response Pricing Asset is: (i) a Fast Start Generator; (ii) a Flexible DNE Dispatchable Generator; or (iii) a Binary Storage DARD with Offer Data specifying a Minimum Run Time and a Minimum Down Time not exceeding one hour each. A Rapid Response Pricing Asset shall also include a Fast Start Demand Response Resource for which the Market Participant’s Offer Data meets the following criteria: (i) Minimum Reduction Time does not exceed one hour; and (ii) Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time does not exceed 30 minutes.

Rapid Response Pricing Opportunity Cost is the NCPC Credit described in Section III.F.2.3.10.

Rated means a Market Participant that receives a credit rating from one or more of the Rating Agencies, or, if such Market Participant is not rated by one of the Rating Agencies, then a Market Participant that has outstanding unsecured debt rated by one or more of the Rating Agencies.

Rating Agencies are Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.

Rationing Minimum Limit is the MW quantity for a New Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Generating Capacity Resource below which an offer or bid may not be rationed in the Forward Capacity Auction, but shall not apply to supply offers or demand bids in a substitution auction as specified in Section III.13.2.8.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.

RBA Decision is a written decision provided by the ISO to a Disputing Party and to the Chair of the NEPOOL Budget and Finance Subcommittee accepting or denying a Requested Billing Adjustment within twenty Business Days of the date the ISO distributes a Notice of RBA, unless some later date is agreed upon by the Disputing Party and the ISO.

Reactive Capability Audit is an audit that measures the ability of a Reactive Resource to provide or absorb reactive power to or from the transmission system at a specified real power output or consumption.

Reactive Resource is a device that dynamically adjusts reactive power output automatically in Real-Time over a continuous range, taking into account control system response bandwidth, within a specified voltage bandwidth in response to grid voltage changes. These resources operate to maintain a set-point
voltage and include, but are not limited to, Generator Assets, Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that are part of an Electric Storage Facility, and dynamic transmission devices.

**Reactive Supply and Voltage Control Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Real-Time** is a period in the current Operating Day for which the ISO dispatches Resources for energy and Regulation, designates Resources for Regulation and Operating Reserve and, if necessary, commits additional Resources.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Adjusted Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(i) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Demand Reduction Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(e) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Inventory** is a component of the spot payment that a Market Participant may receive through the inventoried energy program, as described in Section III.K.3.2.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market** means the purchase or sale of energy, purchase of demand reductions, payment of Congestion Costs, and payment for losses for quantity deviations from the Day-Ahead Energy Market in the Operating Day and designation of and payment for provision of Operating Reserve in Real-Time.
**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Congestion Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Energy Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market Deviation Loss Charge/Credit** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(g) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Energy Market NCPC Credits** are the Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credit and the Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credit.

**Real-Time External Transaction NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Generation Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time High Operating Limit** is the maximum output, in MW, of a Generator Asset that could be achieved, consistent with Good Utility Practice, in response to an ISO request for Energy (including pursuant to Section III.13.6.4 of Market Rule 1), for each hour of the Operating Day, as reflected in the Generator Asset’s Offer Data. This value is based on real-time operating conditions and the physical operating characteristics and operating permits of the facility and must be submitted for all Generator Assets (other than Settlement Only Resources).

**Real-Time Load Obligation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Load Obligation Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(b) of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange Deviation** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(d) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue** is defined in Section III.3.2.1(l) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Loss Revenue Charges or Credits** are defined in Section III.3.2.1(m) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time NCP Load Obligation** is the maximum hourly value, during a month, of a Market Participant’s Real-Time Load Obligation summed over all Locations, excluding exports, in kilowatts.

**Real-Time Offer Change** is a modification to a Supply Offer pursuant to Section III.1.10.9(b).

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Generators (Other Than Limited Energy Resources) Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Posturing NCPC Credit for Limited Energy Resources Postured for Reliability** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Prices** means the Locational Marginal Prices resulting from the ISO’s dispatch of the New England Markets in the Operating Day.

**Real-Time Reserve Charge** is a Market Participant’s share of applicable system and Reserve Zone Real-Time Operating Reserve costs attributable to meeting the Real-Time Operating Reserve requirement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price** is the Real-Time TMSR, TMNSR or TMOR clearing price, as applicable, for the system and each Reserve Zone that is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7A of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Credit** is a Market Participant’s compensation associated with that Market Participant’s Resources’ Reserve Quantity For Settlement as calculated in accordance with Section III.10 of Market Rule 1.
**Real-Time Reserve Designation** is the amount, in MW, of Operating Reserve designated to a Resource in Real-Time by the ISO as described in Section III.1.7.19 of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Reserve Opportunity Cost** is defined in Section III.2.7A(b) of Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time Synchronous Condensing NCPC Credit** is an NCPC Credit calculated pursuant to Appendix F to Market Rule 1.

**Real-Time System Adjusted Net Interchange** means, for each hour, the sum of Real-Time Locational Adjusted Net Interchange for a Market Participant over all Locations, in kilowatts.

**Receiving Party** is the entity receiving the capacity and/or energy transmitted to Point(s) of Delivery under the OATT.

**Reference Level** is defined in Section III.A.5.7 of Appendix A of Market Rule 1.

**Regional Benefit Upgrade(s) (RBU)** means a Transmission Upgrade that: (i) is rated 115kV or above; (ii) meets all of the non-voltage criteria for PTF classification specified in the OATT; and (iii) is included in the Regional System Plan as either a Reliability Transmission Upgrade or a Market Efficiency Transmission Upgrade identified as needed pursuant to Attachment K of the OATT. The category of RBU shall not include any Transmission Upgrade that has been categorized under any of the other categories specified in Schedule 12 of the OATT (e.g., an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not also be categorized as an RBU). Any upgrades to transmission facilities rated below 115kV that were PTF prior to January 1, 2004 shall remain classified as PTF and be categorized as an RBU if, and for so long as, such upgrades meet the criteria for PTF specified in the OATT.

**Regional Network Load** is the load that a Network Customer designates for Regional Network Service under Part II.B of the OATT. The Network Customer’s Regional Network Load shall include all load designated by the Network Customer (including losses). A Network Customer may elect to designate less than its total load as Regional Network Load but may not designate only part of the load at a discrete Point of Delivery. Where a Transmission Customer has elected not to designate a particular load at discrete Points of Delivery as Regional Network Load, the Transmission Customer is responsible for making separate arrangements under Part II.C of the OATT for any Point-To-Point Service that may be
necessary for such non-designated load. A Network Customer’s Monthly Regional Network Load shall be calculated in accordance with Section II.21.2 of the OATT.

**Regional Network Service** (RNS) is the transmission service over the PTF described in Part II.B of the OATT, including such service which is used with respect to Network Resources or Regional Network Load that is not physically interconnected with the PTF.

**Regional Planning Dispute Resolution Process** is described in Section 12 of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Regional System Plan** (RSP) is the plan developed under the process specified in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Regional Transmission Service** (RTS) is Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided over the PTF in accordance with Section II.B, Section II.C, Schedule 8 and Schedule 9 of the OATT.

**Regulation** is the capability of a specific Resource with appropriate telecommunications, control and response capability to respond to an AGC SetPoint.

**Regulation and Frequency Response Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 3 of the OATT. The capability of performing Regulation and Frequency Response Service is referred to as automatic generation control (AGC).

**Regulation Capacity** is the lesser of five times the Automatic Response Rate and one-half of the difference between the Regulation High Limit and the Regulation Low Limit of a Resource capable of providing Regulation.

**Regulation Capacity Requirement** is the amount of Regulation Capacity required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Capacity Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Capacity.
**Regulation High Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the upper bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Low Limit** is an offer parameter that establishes the lower bound for AGC SetPoints and is used in the determination of a Resource’s Regulation Capacity.

**Regulation Market** is the market described in Section III.14 of Market Rule 1.

**Regulation Resources** are those Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Generator Assets, and Dispatchable Asset Related Demands that satisfy the requirements of Section III.14.2. Regulation Resources are eligible to participate in the Regulation Market.

**Regulation Service** is the change in output or consumption made in response to changing AGC SetPoints.

**Regulation Service Requirement** is the estimated amount of Regulation Service required to maintain system control and reliability in the New England Control Area as calculated and posted on the ISO website.

**Regulation Service Offer** is an offer by a Market Participant to provide Regulation Service.

**Related Person** is defined pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Participants Agreement.

**Related Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.4.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Reliability Administration Service (RAS)** is the service provided by the ISO, as described in Schedule 3 of Section IV.A of the Tariff, in order to administer the Reliability Markets and provide other reliability-related and informational functions.

**Reliability Committee** is the committee whose responsibilities are specified in Section 8.2.3 of the Participants Agreement.

**Reliability Markets** are, collectively, the ISO’s administration of Regulation, the Forward Capacity Market, and Operating Reserve.
Reliability Region means any one of the regions identified on the ISO’s website. Reliability Regions are intended to reflect the operating characteristics of, and the major transmission constraints on, the New England Transmission System.

Reliability Transmission Upgrade means those additions and upgrades not required by the interconnection of a generator that are nonetheless necessary to ensure the continued reliability of the New England Transmission System, taking into account load growth and known resource changes, and include those upgrades necessary to provide acceptable stability response, short circuit capability and system voltage levels, and those facilities required to provide adequate thermal capability and local voltage levels that cannot otherwise be achieved with reasonable assumptions for certain amounts of generation being unavailable (due to maintenance or forced outages) for purposes of long-term planning studies. Good Utility Practice, applicable reliability principles, guidelines, criteria, rules, procedures and standards of ERO and NPCC and any of their successors, applicable publicly available local reliability criteria, and the ISO System Rules, as they may be amended from time to time, will be used to define the system facilities required to maintain reliability in evaluating proposed Reliability Transmission Upgrades. A Reliability Transmission Upgrade may provide market efficiency benefits as well as reliability benefits to the New England Transmission System.

Remittance Advice is an issuance from the ISO for the net Payment owed to a Covered Entity where a Covered Entity’s total Payments exceed its total Charges in a billing period.

Remittance Advice Date is the day on which the ISO issues a Remittance Advice.

Renewable Technology Resource is a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource that satisfies the requirements specified in Section III.13.1.1.1.7.

Re-Offer Period is the period that normally occurs between the posting of the of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results and 2:00 p.m. on the day before the Operating Day during which a Market Participant may submit revised Supply Offers, revised External Transactions, or revised Demand Bids associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands or, revised Demand Reduction Offers associated with Demand Response Resources.
**Replacement Reserve** is described in Part III, Section VII of ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Request for Alternative Proposals (RFAP)** is the request described in Attachment K of the OATT.

**Requested Billing Adjustment (RBA)** is defined in Section 6.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Required Balance** is an amount as defined in Section 5.3 of the Billing Policy.

**Reseller** is a MGTSA holder that sells, assigns or transfers its rights under its MGTSA, as described in Section II.45.1(a) of the OATT.

**Reserve Adequacy Analysis** is the analysis performed by the ISO to determine if adequate Resources are committed to meet forecasted load, Operating Reserve, and security constraint requirements for the current and next Operating Day.

**Reserve Constraint Penalty Factors (RCPF)** are rates, in $/MWh, that are used within the Real-Time dispatch and pricing algorithm to reflect the value of Operating Reserve shortages and are defined in Section III.2.7A(c) of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Quantity For Settlement** is defined in Section III.10.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserve Zone** is defined in Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

**Reserved Capacity** is the maximum amount of capacity and energy that is committed to the Transmission Customer for transmission over the New England Transmission System between the Point(s) of Receipt and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part II.C or Schedule 18, 20 or 21 of the OATT, as applicable. Reserved Capacity shall be expressed in terms of whole kilowatts on a sixty-minute interval (commencing on the clock hour) basis, or, in the case of Reserved Capacity for Local Point-to-Point Service, in terms of whole megawatts on a sixty-minute interval basis.

**Resource** means a Generator Asset, a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand, an External Resource, an External Transaction, a Demand Response Resource, a Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation, or a Demand Response Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation.
Restated New England Power Pool Agreement (RNA) is the Second Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, which restated for a second time by an amendment dated as of August 16, 2004 the New England Power Pool Agreement dated September 1, 1971, as the same may be amended and restated from time to time, governing the relationship among the NEPOOL members.

Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is a single Capacity Zone made up of the adjacent Load Zones that are neither export-constrained nor import-constrained.

Rest of System is an area established under Section III.2.7(d) of Market Rule 1.

Retail Delivery Point is the point on the transmission or distribution system at which the load of an end-use facility, which is metered and assigned a unique account number by the Host Participant, is measured to determine the amount of energy delivered to the facility from the transmission and distribution system. If an end-use facility is connected to the transmission or distribution system at more than one location, the Retail Delivery Point shall consist of the metered load at each connection point, summed to measure the net energy delivered to the facility in each interval.

Retirement De-List Bid is a bid to retire an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource from all New England Markets, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

Returning Market Participant is a Market Participant, other than an FTR-Only Customer or a Governance Only Member, whose previous membership as a Market Participant was involuntarily terminated due to a Financial Assurance Default or a payment default and, since returning, has been a Market Participant for less than six consecutive months.

Revenue Requirement is defined in Section IV.A.2.1 of the Tariff.

Reviewable Action is defined in Section III.D.1.1 of Appendix D of Market Rule 1.

Reviewable Determination is defined in Section 12.4(a) of Attachment K to the OATT.

RSP Project List is defined in Section 1 of Attachment K to the OATT.
**RTEP02 Upgrade(s)** means a Transmission Upgrade that was included in the annual NEPOOL Transmission Plan (also known as the “Regional Transmission Expansion Plan” or “RTEP”) for the year 2002, as approved by ISO New England Inc.’s Board of Directors, or the functional equivalent of such Transmission Upgrade, as determined by ISO New England Inc. The RTEP02 Upgrades are listed in Schedule 12B of the OATT.

**RTO** is a regional transmission organization or comparable independent transmission organization that complies with Order No. 2000 and the Commission’s corresponding regulation.

**Same Reserve Zone Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iii) of Market Rule 1.

**Schedule, Schedules, Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5** are references to the individual or collective schedules to Section IV.A. of the Tariff.

**Schedule 20A Service Provider (SSP)** is defined in Schedule 20A to Section II of this Tariff.

**Scheduling Service**, for purposes of Section IV.A and Section IV.B of the Tariff, is the service described in Schedule 1 to Section IV.A of the Tariff.

**Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service**, for purposes of Section II of the Tariff, is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 1 of the OATT.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability** is the summer or winter claimed capability of a Generator Asset or Generating Capacity Resource, and represents the maximum dependable load carrying ability of the asset or resource, excluding capacity required for station use.

**Seasonal Claimed Capability Audit** is the Generator Asset audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.

**Seasonal DR Audit** is the Demand Response Resource audit performed pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1.

**Seasonal Peak Demand Resource** is a type of Demand Capacity Resource and shall mean installed measures (e.g., products, equipment, systems, services, practices and/or strategies) on end-use customer
facilities that reduce the total amount of electrical energy consumed during Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, while delivering a comparable or acceptable level of end-use service. Such measures include Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and Distributed Generation.

**Section III.1.4 Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Section III.1.4 Conforming Transactions** are defined in Section III.1.4.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Security Agreement** is Attachment 1 to the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor** is the Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor that proposed the Phase Two or Stage Two Solution that has been identified by the ISO as the preferred Phase Two or Stage Two Solution.

**Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement** is the agreement between the ISO and a Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor. The Selected Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor Agreement is provided in Attachment P to the OATT.

**Self-Schedule** is the action of a Market Participant in committing its Generator Asset or DARD, in accordance with applicable ISO New England Manuals, to provide service in an hour, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset or DARD would have been committed by the ISO to provide the service. For a Generator Asset, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a Generator Asset to provide Energy in an hour at its Economic Minimum Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the Generator Asset would have been committed by the ISO to provide the Energy. For a DARD, Self-Schedule is the action of a Market Participant in committing a DARD to consume Energy in an hour at its Minimum Consumption Limit, whether or not in the absence of that action the DARD would have been committed by the ISO to consume Energy. For an External Transaction, a Self-Schedule is a request by a Market Participant for the ISO to select the External Transaction regardless of the LMP. Demand Response Resources are not permitted to Self-Schedule.

**Self-Supplied FCA Resource** is described in Section III.13.1.6 of Market Rule 1.

**Senior Officer** means an officer of the subject entity with the title of vice president (or similar office) or higher, or another officer designated in writing to the ISO by that officer.
Service Agreement is a Transmission Service Agreement or an MPSA.

Service Commencement Date is the date service is to begin pursuant to the terms of an executed Service Agreement, or the date service begins in accordance with the sections of the OATT addressing the filing of unexecuted Service Agreements.

Services means, collectively, the Scheduling Service, EAS and RAS; individually, a Service.

Settlement Financial Assurance is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant awarded a bid in an FTR Auction. This amount is calculated pursuant to Section VI.C of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Settlement Only Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation (SODERA) is a type of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation and is described in additional detail in Section III.6.6.

Settlement Only Resources are generators of less than 5 MW of maximum net output when operating at any temperature at or above zero degrees Fahrenheit, that meet the metering, interconnection and other requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 14 and that have elected Settlement Only Resource treatment as described in the ISO New England Manual for Registration and Performance Auditing.

Shortfall Funding Arrangement, as specified in Section 5.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy, is a separate financing arrangement that can be used to make up any non-congestion related differences between amounts received on Invoices and amounts due for ISO Charges in any bill issued.

Short-Term is a period of less than one year.

Significantly Reduced Congestion Costs are defined in Section III.G.2.2 of Appendix G to Market Rule 1.

SMD Effective Date is March 1, 2003.
**Solar High Limit** is the estimated power output (MW) of a solar Generator Asset given the Real-Time solar and weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solar Plant Future Availability** is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a solar Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

**Solutions Study** is described in Section 4.2(b) of Attachment K to the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource (SCR)** is a Resource that provides Special Constraint Resource Service under Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Special Constraint Resource Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 19 of the OATT.

**Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Sponsored Policy Resource** is a New Capacity Resource that: receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, and; qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order and as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.

**Stage One Proposal** is a first round submission, as defined in Sections 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.
**Stage Two Solution** is a second round submission, as defined in Section 4A.5 of Attachment K of the OATT, of a proposal for a Public Policy Transmission Upgrade by a Qualified Transmission Project Sponsor.

**Standard Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation level, as calculated pursuant to Section 5.1 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, for a Designated Blackstart Resource’s capital Blackstart Equipment costs associated with the provision of Blackstart Service (except for capital costs associated with adhering to NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards as part of Blackstart Service).

**Start-of-Round Price** is the highest price associated with a round of a Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.1 of Market Rule 1.

**Start-Up Fee** is the amount, in dollars, that must be paid for a Generator Asset to Market Participants with an Ownership Share in the Generator Asset each time the Generator Asset is scheduled in the New England Markets to start-up.

**Start-Up Time** is the time it takes the Generator Asset, after synchronizing to the system, to reach its Economic Minimum Limit and, for dispatchable Generator Assets, be ready for further dispatch by the ISO.

**State Estimator** means the computer model of power flows specified in Section III.2.3 of Market Rule 1.

**State-identified Requirement** refers to a legal requirement, mandate or policy of a New England state or local government that forms the basis for a Longer-Term Transmission Study request submitted to the ISO pursuant to the process set out in Section 16 of Attachment K of the OATT.

**Statements**, for the purpose of the ISO New England Billing Policy, refer to both Invoices and Remittance Advices.

**Static De-List Bid** is a bid that may be submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction to
remove itself from the capacity market for a one year period, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 of
Market Rule 1.

Station is one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources consisting of one or more assets located
within a common property boundary.

Station Going Forward Common Costs are the net costs associated with a Station that are avoided only
by the clearing of the Static De-List Bids, the Permanent De-List Bids or the Retirement De-List Bids of
all the Existing Generating Capacity Resources comprising the Station.

Station-level Blackstart O&M Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section 5.1.2 of
Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Station-level Specified-Term Blackstart Capital Payment is defined and calculated as specified in
Section 5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Station-level Standard Blackstart Capital Payment is defined and calculated as specified in Section
5.1.2 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

Storage DARD is a DARD that participates in the New England Markets as part of an Electric Storage
Facility, as described in Section III.1.10.6 of Market Rule 1.

Summer ARA Qualified Capacity is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1 of Market Rule 1.

Summer Capability Period means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating
and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Summer Capability
Period is the period of June 1 through September 30.

Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.1(c) of Market Rule 1.

Supply Offer is a proposal to furnish energy at a Node or Regulation from a Resource that meets the
applicable requirements set forth in the ISO New England Manuals submitted to the ISO by a Market
Participant with authority to submit a Supply Offer for the Resource. The Supply Offer will be submitted
pursuant to Market Rule 1 and applicable ISO New England Manuals, and include a price and
information with respect to the quantity proposed to be furnished, technical parameters for the Resource, timing and other matters. A Supply Offer is a subset of the information required in a Market Participant’s Offer Data.

**Supply Offer Block-Hours** are Block-Hours assigned to the Lead Market Participant for each Supply Offer. Blocks of the Supply Offer in effect for each hour will be totaled to determine the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours for a given day. In the case that a Resource has a Real-Time unit status of “unavailable” for the entire day, that day will not contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours. However, if the Resource has at least one hour of the day with a unit status of “available,” the entire day will contribute to the quantity of Supply Offer Block-Hours.

**Synchronous Condenser** is a generator that is synchronized to the grid but supplying no energy for the purpose of providing Operating Reserve or VAR or voltage support.

**System Condition** is a specified condition on the New England Transmission System or on a neighboring system, such as a constrained transmission element or flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of Long-Term Firm MTF or OTF Service on the MTF or the OTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Section II.44 of the Tariff or Curtailment of Local Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service on the non-PTF using the curtailment priority pursuant to Schedule 21 of the Tariff. Such conditions must be identified in the Transmission Customer’s Service Agreement.

**System Impact Study** is an assessment pursuant to Part II.B, II.C, II.G, Schedule 21, Schedule 22, Schedule 23, or Schedule 25 of the OATT of (i) the adequacy of the PTF or Non-PTF to accommodate a request for the interconnection of a new or materially changed generating unit or a new or materially changed interconnection to another Control Area or new Regional Network Service or new Local Service or an Elective Transmission Upgrade, and (ii) whether any additional costs may be required to be incurred in order to provide the interconnection or transmission service.

**System Operator** shall mean ISO New England Inc. or a successor organization.

**System Operating Limit (SOL)** has the meaning specified in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards.
**System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve** is the demand curve used in the Forward Capacity Market as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

**TADO** is the total amount due and owing (not including any amounts due under Section 14.1 of the RNA) at such time to the ISO, NEPOOL, the PTOs, the Market Participants and the Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers, by all PTOs, Market Participants and Non-Market Participant Transmission Customers.

**Tangible Net Worth** is the value, determined in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States, of all of that entity’s assets less the following: (i) assets the ISO reasonably believes to be restricted or potentially unavailable to settle a claim in the event of a default (e.g., regulatory assets, restricted assets, and Affiliate assets), net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (ii) derivative assets, net of any matching liabilities, to the extent that the result of that netting is a positive value; (iii) the amount at which the liabilities of the entity would be shown on a balance sheet in accordance with international accounting standards or generally accepted accounting principles in the United States; (iv) preferred stock; (v) non-controlling interest; and (vi) all of that entity’s intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchises, intellectual property, goodwill and any other assets not having a physical existence), in each case as shown on the most recent financial statements provided by such entity to the ISO.

**Technical Committee** is defined in Section 8.2 of the Participants Agreement.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 6 of the OATT.

**Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement** is the combined amount of TMSR and TMNSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)** is a form of ten-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.
**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Requirement** is the amount of TMSR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 5 of the OATT.

**Third-Party Sale** is any sale for resale in interstate commerce to a Power Purchaser that is not designated as part of Regional Network Load or Local Network Load under the Regional Network Service or Local Network Service, as applicable.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)** is a form of thirty-minute reserve capability, determined pursuant to Section III.1.7.19.2.

**Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve Service** is the form of Ancillary Service described in Schedule 7 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Rate (TOUT Rate)** is the rate per hour for Through or Out Service, as defined in Section II.25.2 of the OATT.

**Through or Out Service (TOUT Service)** means Point-To-Point Service over the PTF provided by the ISO with respect to a transaction that goes through the New England Control Area, as, for example, a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New Brunswick and subsequently out of the New England Control Area to New York, or a single transaction where energy or capacity is transmitted into the New England Control Area from New York through one point on the PTF and subsequently flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area to New York, or with respect to a transaction which originates at a point on the PTF and flows over the PTF prior to passing out of the New England Control Area, as, for example, from Boston to New York.

**Tie-Line Asset** is a physical transmission tie-line, or an inter-state or intra-state border arrangement created according to the ISO New England Manuals and registered in accordance with the Asset Registration Process.
**Total Available Amount** is the sum of the available amount of the Shortfall Funding Arrangement and the balance in the Payment Default Shortfall Fund.

**Total Blackstart Capital Payment** is the annual compensation calculated under either Section 5.1 or Section 5.2 of Schedule 16 of the OATT, as applicable.

**Total Blackstart Service Payments** is monthly compensation to Blackstart Owners or Market Participants, as applicable, and as calculated pursuant to Section 5.6 of Schedule 16 to the OATT.

**Total Reserve Requirement**, which includes Replacement Reserve, is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required system-wide as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.

**Total System Capacity** is the aggregate capacity supply curve for the New England Control Area as determined in accordance with Section III.13.2.3.3 of Market Rule 1.

**Transaction Unit (TU)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers.

**Transition Period**: The six-year period commencing on March 1, 1997.

**Transmission Charges**, for the purposes of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and the ISO New England Billing Policy, are all charges and payments under Schedules 1, 8 and 9 of the OATT.

**Transmission Congestion Credit** means the allocated share of total Transmission Congestion Revenue credited to each holder of Financial Transmission Rights, calculated and allocated as specified in Section III.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Congestion Revenue** is defined in Section III.5.2.5(a) of Market Rule 1.

**Transmission Constraint Penalty Factors** are described in Section III.1.7.5 of Market Rule 1.
**Transmission Credit Limit** is a credit limit, not to be used to meet FTR Requirements, established for each Market Participant in accordance with Section II.D and each Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer in accordance with Section V.B.2 of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Credit Test Percentage** is calculated in accordance with Section III.B.1(c) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Transmission Customer** is any Eligible Customer that (i) executes, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, an MPSA or TSA, or (ii) requests in writing, on its own behalf or through its Designated Agent, that the ISO, the Transmission Owner, or the Schedule 20A Service Provider, as applicable, file with the Commission, a proposed unexecuted MPSA or TSA containing terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the ISO (in consultation with the applicable PTO, OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider) in order that the Eligible Customer may receive transmission service under Section II of this Tariff. A Transmission Customer under Section II of this Tariff includes a Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant taking Regional Network Service, Through or Out Service, MTF Service, OTF Service, Ancillary Services, or Local Service.

**Transmission Default Amount** is all or any part of any amount of Transmission Charges due to be paid by any Covered Entity that the ISO, in its reasonable opinion, believes will not or has not been paid when due.

**Transmission Default Period** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Account Limit** is defined in Section 4.2 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission Late Payment Charge** is defined in Section 4.1 of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff)** is the ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, as amended from time to time.
Transmission Obligations are determined in accordance with Section III.A(vi) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Operating Agreement (TOA) is the Transmission Operating Agreement between and among the ISO and the PTOs, as amended and restated from time to time.

Transmission Owner means a PTO, MTO or OTO.

Transmission Provider is the ISO for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service as provided under Section II.B and II.C of the OATT; Cross-Sound Cable, LLC for Merchant Transmission Service as provided under Schedule 18 of the OATT; the Schedule 20A Service Providers for Phase I/II HVDC-TF Service as provided under Schedule 20A of the OATT; and the Participating Transmission Owners for Local Service as provided under Schedule 21 of the OATT.

Transmission Requirements are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iii) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

Transmission Security Analysis Requirement shall be determined pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.2.

Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) is the initial agreement and any amendments or supplements thereto: (A) in the form specified in either Attachment A or B to the OATT, entered into by the Transmission Customer and the ISO for Regional Network Service or Through or Out Service; (B) entered into by the Transmission Customer with the ISO and PTO in the form specified in Attachment A to Schedule 21 of the OATT; (C) entered into by the Transmission Customer with an OTO or Schedule 20A Service Provider in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 20 of the OATT; or (D) entered into by the Transmission Customer with a MTO in the appropriate form specified under Schedule 18 of the OATT. A Transmission Service Agreement shall be required for Local Service, MTF Service and OTF Service, and shall be required for Regional Network Service and Through or Out Service if the Transmission Customer has not executed a MPSA.

Transmission Upgrade(s) means an upgrade, modification or addition to the PTF that becomes subject to the terms and conditions of the OATT governing rates and service on the PTF on or after January 1, 2004. This categorization and cost allocation of Transmission Upgrades shall be as provided for in Schedule 12 of the OATT.
UDS is unit dispatch system software.

**Unconstrained Export Transaction** is defined in Section III.1.10.7(f)(iv) of Market Rule 1.

**Uncovered Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Uncovered Transmission Default Amounts** are defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unrated** means a Market Participant that is not a Rated Market Participant.

**Unsecured Covered Entity** is, collectively, an Unsecured Municipal Market Participant and an Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity.

**Unsecured Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Market Participant** is defined in Section 3.3(h) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.4.f of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Covered Entity** is a Covered Entity that is not a Municipal Market Participant or a Non-Market Participant Transmission Customer and has a Market Credit Limit or Transmission Credit Limit of greater than $0 under the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.

**Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount** is defined in Section 3.3(i) of the ISO New England Billing Policy.
**Unsecured Transmission Default Amounts** are, collectively, the Unsecured Municipal Transmission Default Amount and the Unsecured Non-Municipal Transmission Default Amount.

**Unsettled FTR Financial Assurance** is an amount of financial assurance required from a Designated FTR Participant as calculated pursuant to Section VI.B of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Updated Measurement and Verification Plan** is an optional Measurement and Verification Plan that may be submitted as part of a subsequent qualification process for a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Response project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 of Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**VAR CC Rate** is the CC rate paid to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Payment** is the payment made to Qualified Reactive Resources for VAR Service capability under Section IV.A of Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**VAR Service** is the provision of reactive power voltage support to the New England Transmission System by a Qualified Reactive Resource or by other generators that are dispatched by the ISO to provide dynamic reactive power as described in Schedule 2 of the OATT.

**Virtual Cap** is $2,000/MWh.

**Virtual Requirements** are determined in accordance with Section III.A(iv) of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**Volt Ampere Reactive (VAR)** is a measurement of reactive power.

**Volumetric Measure (VM)** is a type of billing determinant under Schedule 2 of Section IV.A of the Tariff used to assess charges to Customers under Section IV.A of the Tariff.
Wind High Limit is the estimated power output (MW) of a wind Generator Asset given the Real-Time weather conditions, taking into account equipment outages, and absent any self-imposed reductions in power output or any reduction in power output as a result of a Dispatch Instruction, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

Wind Plant Future Availability is the forecasted Real-Time High Operating Limit of a wind Generator Asset, calculated in the manner described in the ISO Operating Documents.

Winter ARA Qualified Capacity is described in Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2 of Market Rule 1.

Winter Capability Period means one of two time periods defined by the ISO for the purposes of rating and auditing resources pursuant to Section III.9. The time period associated with the Winter Capability Period is the period October 1 through May 31.

Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours are defined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(c) of Market Rule 1.

Year means a period of 365 or 366 days, whichever is appropriate, commencing on, or on the anniversary of March 1, 1997. Year One is the Year commencing on March 1, 1997, and Years Two and higher follow it in sequence.

Zonal Price is calculated in accordance with Section III.2.7 of Market Rule 1.

Zonal Capacity Obligation is calculated in accordance with Section III.13.7.5.2 of Market Rule 1.

Zonal Reserve Requirement is the combined amount of TMSR, TMNSR, and TMOR required for a Reserve Zone as described in Section III.2.7A and ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 8.
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III.13.1. **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1. **New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

III.13.1.1.1. **Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.1.1.1. **Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**

(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.
(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(e)).

III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity
Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.1.3. Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.3.A. Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.3 as applied to the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.1.4.  **De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.5.  **Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.**

For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6.  **Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.**

(a)  [Reserved.]
(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3 (Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.
To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource;

(b) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2026 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(c) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.

For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of
Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor's contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type; a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.
(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.

For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of
III.13.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.

In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant CapacityCommitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) **Major Permits.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource
associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.

(a) For a New Generating Capacity Resource that does not satisfy the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1.1 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Capacity Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Generating Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation.

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.7 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February 2021 for the June 1, 2024 through May 31, 2025 Capacity Commitment Period, and no election shall be permitted thereafter.

For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor
must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.2(c)) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.2.7. Load-Side Interests.

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Capacity Qualification Package.
III.13.1.1.2.3. **Initial Interconnection Analysis.**

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating
Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be
accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).

III.13.1.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.
The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:
(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;

(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and
verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.2.  [Reserved]

III.13.1.1.2.5.3.  **New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4.  **New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**
Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6.  [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7.  **Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**
In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.


No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.5;
(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource; (ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource;

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO’s determination as to whether the New Generating Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination; and

(g) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding whether the New Generating Capacity Resource’s requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2028.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.
Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

### III.13.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.

(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b) and (c), the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026 is 300 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2027 is (i) 400 MW, (ii) plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026, and (iii) minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the substitution auction, as described in Section III.13.2.8, for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2026. For clarification, the calculation in (ii) above shall only account for Capacity Supply Obligations acquired in the primary Forward Capacity Auction, and shall not include any additional Capacity Supply Obligations for such a resource acquired through the substitution auction.

### III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

### III.13.1.2.1 Definition of Existing Generating Capacity Resource.
Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1. **Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource’s status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2 **Rationing Minimum Limit.**

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2. **Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

III.13.1.2.2.1. **Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.**

III.13.1.2.2.1.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity.**

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median
of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.
The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.
The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:
III.13.1.2.2.2.1. **Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2. **Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.**

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).
(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median
of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.1.2 plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;

(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
   (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]
A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward Capacity Auction. For an Existing Generating Capacity Resource subject to this election, the critical path schedule monitoring provisions of Section III.13.3 shall apply.

### III.13.1.2.2.5.
**Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.**

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

#### III.13.1.2.2.5.1.
**[Reserved.]**

#### III.13.1.2.2.5.2.
**Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.**
Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

**III.13.1.2.3. Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

**III.13.1.2.3.1. Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than
the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.3.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

**III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

For the fifteenth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2024), the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is $4.30/kW-month. For each Forward Capacity Auction thereafter, the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as described below in this Section.
III.13.1.2.3.1.A, and shall be published to the ISO’s website no later than 5 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. This publication shall include the preliminary value calculated pursuant to subsection (a) below, whether the preliminary value was constrained by either of the limitations described in subsection (b) below, the margin value as calculated pursuant to subsection (c) below, and the final value as calculated pursuant to subsection (d) below.

(a) Subject to the limitations described in subsection (b) below, a preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be calculated as the average of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction (provided, however, that if there is a second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(d), the resulting Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone clearing price from that run shall be used instead); and (ii) the price at which the total amount of capacity clearing in the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction intersects the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. For this purpose, the estimated System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be constructed, in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.2.1, using the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact values from the immediately preceding Forward Capacity Auction, the most recent estimate of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction, and the Net CONE and Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction. The preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall not be lower than 75 percent of the clearing price applicable pursuant to (a)(i) of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A, except as needed to ensure that it is not higher than 75 percent of the Net CONE value for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) A margin value shall be calculated using the following formula:

\[
\text{Margin} = \frac{1\$/kW-month \times \left(\frac{(75\% \times \text{Net CONE}_{\text{upcoming FCA}}) - \text{DDBT}_{\text{preliminary}}}{75\% \times \text{Net CONE}_{\text{upcoming FCA}}\right)}
\]

(d) The final value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction shall be equal to the preliminary value of the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold calculated pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.A(a) and III.13.1.2.3.1.A(b) plus the margin value calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.A(c).
III.13.1.2.3.1.1. Static De-List Bids.

A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3. Export Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid
Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.
III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:
(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.

(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).
(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6. **Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations having Common Costs.**

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. **Submission of Cost Data.**

In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. **Reserved.]**

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. **Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.**

The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:
Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.

Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor– accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted
documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal
Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market
Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A. Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.**

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

\[
Net \text{ Going Forward Costs} = (GFC - IMR) \times \text{InfIndex} \times (CQ_{\text{Summer}, \text{kW}} \times (12 \text{ months})
\]

Where:

- \(GFC\) = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

- \(CQ_{\text{Summer}, \text{kW}}\) = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.
IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index. InfIndex = \((1 + i)^t\)

Where: “i” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s
remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate
supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s
discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C  Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the maximum evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is non-negative. However, effective April 9, 2020, beginning with the sixteenth Forward Capacity Auction, the economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3.  Expected Capacity Performance Payments.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4.  Risk Premium.
The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate
officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5. Opportunity Costs.
To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4. Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.
A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall
verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

### III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\frac{Cost\ Of\ Capital}{(1 - (1 + Cost\ Of\ Capital)^{-Remaining\ Life})}
\]

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.

Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity.

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.

(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the
resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

III.13.1.2.5. Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. Import Capacity.
The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. An Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.
III.13.1.3.1. **Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.**

Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. **Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A **Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.
The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: CMEEC</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: MMWEC</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: Pascoag</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPA: NY ─ NE: VELCO</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8/31/2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 225</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Highgate ─ NE (extension) (beginning 11/01/2016)</td>
<td>Up to 6</td>
<td>October 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJO: Phase I/II ─ NE</td>
<td>Up to 110</td>
<td>10/31/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

**III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.**

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and
Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.
The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.
(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New
England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource technology type.

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule
(Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

### III.13.1.3.5.3. Imports Backed by an External Control Area.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor
submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.
The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall
receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. **Initial Interconnection Analysis.**
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. **Offer Information.**
(a) A New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 is subject to the same offer information submission requirements for a New Generating Capacity Resource that are described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3.

(b) A New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold must submit the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and documentation and information supporting such lowest price, which should include the documentation and information listed in Section III.13.1.2.2.3(a) and the expected costs of purchasing power outside the New England Control Area (including transaction costs and supported by forward power price index values or a power price forecast for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period), expected transmission costs outside the New England Control Area, and expected transmission costs associated with importing to the New England Control Area, and may also include reasonable opportunity costs and risk adjustments. The offer information may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.4 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6. **Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.**
In addition to the review described in Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Section III.A.19 of Market Rule 1.

III.13.1.3.5.7. Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.5.A(b) may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8. Rationing Election.

New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may consist of Load Management measures, Distributed Generation measures, or a combination
thereof, or may consist solely of Energy Efficiency measures. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility’s Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. **Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.**
A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1. **Qualification Process for New Demand Capacity Resources.**
For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of
the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. A New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form for a resource composed of Energy Efficiency measures must represent a resource with a new and unique resource identification number. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource
projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.

For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.
The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.
(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.
(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility’s Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility’s Maximum Facility Load.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.

Project Sponsors shall be required to specify whether they are making the election set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 for each Forward Capacity Auction up to and including the auction held in February
For each Forward Capacity Auction occurring up to and including the February 2021 auction, in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. **Offer Information from New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource that does not satisfy any of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1 or III.A.21.1.2 based on the information submitted at the time of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, and for which the Project Sponsor does not provide a Load-Side Relationship Certification described in Section III.A.21.1.3, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and sufficient documentation and information for a buyer-sider market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2. Such documentation and information includes all financial estimates, projected revenues, and cost projections for the project, including the project’s pro-forma financing support data and anticipated out-of-market revenues (as defined in Section III.A.21.3(b)(i)). For a New Demand Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to
the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, such documentation should also include all financial data of actual incurred capital costs, actual operating costs, and actual revenues since the date of commercial operation.

A Project Sponsor that submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.2.9 must be prepared to provide both (1) the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and (2) the documentation and information described in this subsection (a), in the event that the ISO determines that the Load-Side Relationship Certification does not meet the requirements of Section III.A.21.1.3.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.2.9. Load-Side Interests.

If the Project Sponsor seeks to demonstrate one of the qualifying circumstances described in Section III.A.21.1.3 with regard to its New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must provide the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package.

III.13.1.4.1.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.

For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources),
then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.


The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.


The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;
(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity Resource’s summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide the ISO’s determination as to whether the New Demand Capacity Resource satisfies any of the conditions described in Section III.A.21.1 and the basis for such determination.

(c) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2, the notification will provide the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding whether the New Demand Capacity Resource’s requested lowest offer price, submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), must be mitigated, as described in Section III.A.21.2.3. The ISO shall not disclose to the Project Sponsor any information regarding the potential impact of any offer from the Project Sponsor on Capacity Clearing Prices.
(d) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its summer or winter demand reduction value an Energy Efficiency measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the applicable season of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.A Qualified Capacity for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer (or winter, as applicable) Qualified Capacity shall equal the lesser of: (i) the sum of the summer (or winter, as applicable) demand reduction values of the installed Energy Efficiency measures as of the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (excluding any capacity that will retire or permanently de-list, or whose Measure Life will expire, prior to start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses) and any summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction and has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation (provided that such capacity is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3, is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the applicable season of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, and for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy) and (ii) the amount of summer (or winter, as applicable) capacity that cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource.
(b) For Existing Demand Capacity Resources other than those composed of Energy Efficiency measures, the summer and winter Qualified Capacity shall equal the summer and winter demand reduction value, respectively, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

### III.13.1.4.2.1. Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity; the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO’s assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or
actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification.

### III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.

An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

### III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

#### III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s demand reduction value for each
month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

### III.13.1.4.3.1.1.

#### Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.

At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak
Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.
At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.
Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.
For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility,
the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.
The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.
Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple
resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources
together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month,
that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining
with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance
with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of
separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of
the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section
III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity
Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward
Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer
composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward
Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand
Capacity Resource.

(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer
Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the
summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater
than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even
where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power
Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than
the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-
rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the
following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Summer Resource</th>
<th>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

### III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.

No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.

### III.13.1.6. Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Winter Resource</th>
<th>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Findings

- **Location of Winter Resource**
- **Import-Constrained Capacity Zone**: Eligible
- **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone**: Ineligible
- **Export-Constrained Capacity Zone**: Ineligible
- **Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone**: Ineligible
- **Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)**: Eligible
- **Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)**: Eligible
resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.


Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. The total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.

III.13.1.8. Publication of Offer and Bid Information.

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).


Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New
Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.


Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.

If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]
III.13.1.9.2.3. **Forfeit of Financial Assurance.**

Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.

III.13.1.9.2.4. **Financial Assurance for New Import Capacity Resources.**

A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.3. **Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below (“Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit”). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost.
Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

| New Generating Capacity Resources ≥ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined | New Generating Capacity Resources < 20 MW and ≥ 2 MW | Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources | New Generating Capacity Resources < 2 MW |
### Settlement of Costs.

**III.13.1.9.3.2.** **Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources Participating In A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.**

Upon the latter of: (i) the first day of the Capacity Commitment Period for which a resource offers into the Forward Capacity Market or (ii) the date on which the entire resource is accepted by the ISO for FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s) associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the excess shall be refunded to the Project Sponsor.
Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.2. Settlement Of Costs Associated With Resources That Withdraw From A Forward Capacity Auction Or Reconfiguration Auction.

Upon the withdrawal or failure to meet the requirements of the qualification process set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. A Project Sponsor that withdraws or is deemed to have withdrawn its request for qualification shall pay to the ISO all costs prudently incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.

Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.


Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:
(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and

(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.
The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

(i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);

(ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at $7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;
During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

(1) at prices above $7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;

(2) at prices below $7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between $7.03/kW-month and $0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:

(a) At the price of $0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.

(b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
   1. 35,437 MW; and
   2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;

(c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
   1. 35,090 MW; and
   2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;

(d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
   1. 34,865 MW; and
   2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month.
(3) a price of $7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.2. **Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.2.3. **Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

III.13.2.2.4. **Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.**
The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.13.2.3.  Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2.  Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.
The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a)  Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, New Demand Capacity Resources, and New Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

(i)  The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity
Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, New Demand Capacity Resource, or New Distributed Energy Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the $m$ prices ($1 \leq m \leq 5$) submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:
where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a New Capacity Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, such New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.4) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.4), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as established or modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.4) that are less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment
Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s
transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above; capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted
bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources. Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3. If the Internal Market Monitor has determined that a new Self-Supplied FCA Resource must use a New Resource Offer Floor Price pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, the new resource’s self-supplied quantity shall be entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at prices at or above the New Resource Offer Floor Price.

(d) Dynamic De-List Bids. In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in
Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the
associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

**III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**
The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:

1. the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
2. the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);
3. for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   i. the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
   ii. the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;
4. for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   i. that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
   ii. the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:
(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;

2. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) **Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.**

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price.

(c) **Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
2. in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
3. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.
   or;
   2. the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.
The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

(1) the sum of:
   (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,
   or;
   (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) **Treatment of Import Capacity.** Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.
(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.
III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.

III.13.2.4.1 Calculation of Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, CONE, and Net CONE.

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $12.400/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 is $7.468/kW-month.
CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated no less often than once every three years. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

**III.13.2.4.2 Interim Year Adjustments to CONE and Net CONE.**

For years in which no full recalculation is performed pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.1, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction with the following updates to the capital budgeting model used to calculate the CONE and Net CONE values set forth above in this Section III.13.2.4.

1. Each line item associated with capital costs that is included in the capital budgeting model will be updated to reflect changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for Machinery and Equipment: General Purpose Machinery and Equipment (WPU114).

2. For each line item in (1) above, the ISO shall calculate a multiplier that is equal to the average of values published during the most recent 12 month period available at the time of making the adjustment divided by the average of the most recent 12 month period available at the time of establishing the CONE and Net CONE values set forth in Section III.13.2.4.1. The value of each line item associated with capital costs in the capital budgeting model will be adjusted by the relevant multiplier.

3. The energy and ancillary services offset values in the capital budgeting model shall be adjusted by inputting to the capital budgeting model the Henry Hub natural gas futures prices, the Algonquin Citygates Basis natural gas futures prices and the Massachusetts Hub Day-Ahead Peak electricity prices, as published by ICE for the first five trading days in February, for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period to which the updated value will apply.

4. The CONE and Net CONE values adjusted pursuant to this Section III.13.2.4.2 will be published on the ISO’s web site.

5. If any of the values required for the calculations described in this Section III.13.2.4.2 are unavailable, then comparable values, prices or sources shall be used.
III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.


A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2. Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, and Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resources.

III.13.2.5.2.1. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward
Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-
clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.3.1.2.2.2.4 or Section III.3.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.3.1.2.5.2.2. **Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.**
Except as provided in Section III.3.1.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.3.1.2.6.

III.3.1.2.5.2.3. **Dynamic De-List Bids.**
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.3.1.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.3.1.2.5.2.4. **Administrative Export De-List Bids.**
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.3.1.2.5.2.5. **Reliability Review.**
The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same
price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.

(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as
soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).

(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.
If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.

(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity
Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and
other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).

### III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).
(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common
Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.

III.13.2.5.2.5.2. Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Distributed Energy Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a) Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO: A
resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b) **Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**: In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c) **Allocation**: Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3. **Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.**

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof,
for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.
(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.

Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each
import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

III.13.2.7.1. **Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. **Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.**
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.2.7.3A. **Treatment of Imports.**
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and
(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

**III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

**III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.**

Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

**III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.**

Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity
Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.2 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.
Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.

(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.

The final substitution auction shall take place for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the June 1, 2027 to May 31, 2028 Capacity Commitment Period, and no substitution auctions shall be conducted thereafter. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section III.12 of Market Rule 1 and Attachment K to the OATT addressing the manner in which Capacity Supply Obligations acquired or shed through the substitution auction are accounted for in the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and related values and in carrying out the regional system planning process shall continue to have full force and effect.

III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.
Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.


The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

(i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.

(ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.

(iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

(iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to
export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids within the zone, and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations shed from demand bids associated with Proxy De-List Bids within the zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction’s objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.

For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource’s cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.
The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2. **Substitution Auction Pricing.**

The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

(i) if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

(ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone’s Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section
III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid
associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.

The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.
To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:
(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource’s total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.
Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.
A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction
Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) Any portion of a resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource’s substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.
Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource’s Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.
Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.**

Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.
For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

(i) The portion of a resource’s capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

(ii) Any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.
III.13.8.  Reporting and Price Finality


(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently delist or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), (viii), and (ix) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), (viii), and (ix) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction, with the exception of bid price and offer price information and submitted Load-Side Relationship Certifications, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) for each resource that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the following information: the resource technology type; which qualifying circumstance in Section III.A.21.1.3 was asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification; the relevant state policy asserted in the Load-Side Relationship Certification, if any; whether the ISO accepted or rejected the Load-Side Relationship Certification; and, consequently, whether the resource was subject to a review for the exercise of buyer-side market power;

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) which new resources were not reviewed for an exercise of buyer-side market power because of one of the conditions described in Sections III.A.21.1.1, III.A.21.1.2, or III.A.21.1.3; the condition met by each such resource; and, for new resources that submitted a Load-Side Relationship Certification, the Load-Side Relationship Certification submitted by the resource;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations made as part of any buyer-side market power review conducted pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and any New Resource Offer Floor Price determinations made pursuant to Section III.A.21.3 with regard to a new resource, and the basis for any such determinations; for the avoidance of doubt, any information employed by the Internal Market Monitor in making these determinations related to the potential impact of a New Capacity Resource’s offer on Capacity Clearing Prices, including any such information filed by the ISO in response to a pleading filed with the Commission, shall be filed confidentially and shall not be released to any entity, including to the Project Sponsor whose offer is the subject of dispute;
(ix) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;

(x) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW); and

(xi) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing, the Commission does issue an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.
As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.
SECTION III

MARKET RULE 1

APPENDIX A

MARKET MONITORING,
REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION
APPENDIX A
MARKET MONITORING, REPORTING AND MARKET POWER MITIGATION

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EXHIBIT 4 [Reserved]

EXHIBIT 5 [Reserved]
III.A.1. Introduction and Purpose; Structure and Oversight: Independence.

The mission of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall be (1) to protect both consumers and Market Participants by the identification and reporting of market design flaws and market power abuses; (2) to evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements to remove or prevent market design flaws and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO; (3) to review and report on the performance of the New England Markets; (4) to identify and notify the Commission of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation; and (5) to carry out the mitigation functions set forth in this Appendix A.

III.A.1.2. Structure and Oversight.
The market monitoring and mitigation functions contained in this Appendix A shall be performed by the Internal Market Monitor, which shall report to the ISO Board of Directors and, for administrative purposes only, to the ISO Chief Executive Officer, and by an External Market Monitor selected by and reporting to the ISO Board of Directors. Members of the ISO Board of Directors who also perform management functions for the ISO shall be excluded from oversight and governance of the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. The ISO shall enter into a contract with the External Market Monitor addressing the roles and responsibilities of the External Market Monitor as detailed in this Appendix A. The ISO shall file its contract with the External Market Monitor with the Commission. In order to facilitate the performance of the External Market Monitor’s functions, the External Market Monitor shall have, and the ISO’s contract with the External Market Monitor shall provide for, access by the External Market Monitor to ISO data and personnel, including ISO management responsible for market monitoring, operations and billing and settlement functions. Any proposed termination of the contract with the External Market Monitor or modification of, or other limitation on, the External Market Monitor’s scope of work shall be subject to prior Commission approval.

III.A.1.3. Data Access and Information Sharing.
The ISO shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with access to all market data, resources and personnel sufficient to enable the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor to perform the market monitoring and mitigation functions provided for in this Appendix A.
This access shall include access to any confidential market information that the ISO receives from another independent system operator or regional transmission organization subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction, or its market monitor, as part of an investigation to determine (a) if a Market Violation is occurring or has occurred, (b) if market power is being or has been exercised, or (c) if a market design flaw exists. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall have full access to the ISO’s electronically generated information and databases and shall have exclusive control over any data created by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may share any data created by it with the ISO, which shall maintain the confidentiality of such data in accordance with the terms of the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.1.4. Interpretation.
In the event that any provision of any ISO New England Filed Document is inconsistent with the provisions of this Appendix A, the provisions of Appendix A shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Sections III.A.1.2, III.A.2.2 (a)-(c), (e)-(h), Section III.A.2.3 (a)-(g), (i), (n) and Section III.A.17.3 are also part of the Participants Agreement and cannot be modified in either Appendix A or the Participants Agreement without a corresponding modification at the same time to the same language in the other document.

III.A.1.5. Definitions.
Capitalized terms not defined in this Appendix A are defined in the definitions section of Section I of the Tariff.

III.A.2. Functions of the Market Monitor.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will perform the following core functions:

(a) Evaluate existing and proposed market rules, tariff provisions and market design elements, and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities, with the understanding that the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not to effectuate any proposed market designs (except as specifically provided in Section III.A.2.4.4, Section III.A.9 and Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A). In the event the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its
identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time. Nothing in this Section III.A.2.1 (a) shall prohibit or restrict the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor from implementing Commission accepted rule and tariff provisions regarding market monitoring or mitigation functions that, according to the terms of the applicable rule or tariff language, are to be performed by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor.

(b) Review and report on the performance of the New England Markets to the ISO, the Commission, Market Participants, the public utility commissioners of the six New England states, and to other interested entities.

(c) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies.

III.A.2.2. Functions of the External Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the External Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:

(a) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that the ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the External Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(b) Perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England
Markets, including the adequacy of this Appendix A, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(c) Conduct evaluations and prepare reports on its own initiative or at the request of others.

(d) Monitor and review the quality and appropriateness of the mitigation conducted by the Internal Market Monitor. In the event that the External Market Monitor discovers problems with the quality or appropriateness of such mitigation, the External Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and/or III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the External Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(e) Prepare recommendations to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants on how to improve the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including improvements to this Appendix A.

(f) Recommend actions to the ISO Board of Directors and the Market Participants to increase liquidity and efficient trade between regions and improve the efficiency of the New England Markets.

(g) Review the ISO’s filings with the Commission from the standpoint of the effects of any such filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets. The External Market Monitor will have the opportunity to comment on any filings under development by the ISO and may file comments with the Commission when the filings are made by the ISO. The subject of any such comments will be the External Market Monitor’s assessment of the effects of any proposed filing on the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets, or the effectiveness of this Appendix A, as appropriate.

(h) Provide information to be directly included in the monthly market updates that are provided at the meetings of the Market Participants.

III.A.2.3. Functions of the Internal Market Monitor.

To accomplish the functions specified in Section III.A.2.1 of this Appendix A, the Internal Market Monitor shall perform the following functions:
(a) Maintain Appendix A and consider whether Appendix A requires amendment. Any amendments deemed to be necessary by the Internal Market Monitor shall be undertaken after consultation with Market Participants in accordance with Section 11 of the Participants Agreement.

(b) Perform the day-to-day, real-time review of market behavior in accordance with the provisions of this Appendix A.

(c) Consult with the External Market Monitor, as needed, with respect to implementing and applying the provisions of this Appendix A.

(d) Identify and notify the Commission’s Office of Enforcement staff of instances in which a Market Participant’s behavior, or that of the ISO, may require investigation, including suspected Tariff violations, suspected violations of Commission-approved rules and regulations, suspected market manipulation, and inappropriate dispatch that creates substantial concerns regarding unnecessary market inefficiencies, in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section III.A.19 of this Appendix A.

(e) Review the competitiveness of the New England Markets, the impact that the market rules and/or changes to the market rules will have on the New England Markets and the impact that ISO’s actions have had on the New England Markets. In the event that the Internal Market Monitor uncovers problems with the New England Markets, the Internal Market Monitor shall promptly inform the Commission, the Commission’s Office of Energy Market Regulation staff, the ISO Board of Directors, the public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, and the Market Participants of its findings in accordance with the procedures outlined in Sections III.A.19 and III.A.20 of this Appendix A, provided that in the case of Market Participants and the public utility commissions, information in such findings shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Internal Market Monitor believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, it shall limit distribution of its identifications to the ISO and to the Commission, with an explanation of why broader dissemination should be avoided at that time.

(f) Provide support and information to the ISO Board of Directors and the External Market Monitor consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s functions.

(g) Prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, as well as less extensive quarterly reports, in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A.

(h) Make one or more of the Internal Market Monitor staff members available for regular conference calls, which may be attended, telephonically or in person, by Commission and state commission staff, by representatives of the ISO, and by Market Participants. The information to be provided in the
Internal Market Monitor conference calls is generally to consist of a review of market data and analyses of the type regularly gathered and prepared by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of its business, subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. This function may be performed through making a staff member of the Internal Market Monitor available for the monthly meetings of the Market Participants and inviting Commission staff and the staff of state public utility commissions to those monthly meetings.

(i) Be primarily responsible for interaction with external Control Areas, the Commission, other regulators and Market Participants with respect to the matters addressed in this Appendix A.

(j) Monitor for conduct whether by a single Market Participant or by multiple Market Participants acting in concert, including actions involving more than one Resource, that may cause a material effect on prices or other payments in the New England Markets if exercised from a position of market power, and impose appropriate mitigation measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of mitigation measures as set forth in this Appendix A are met. The categories of conduct for which the Internal Market Monitor shall perform monitoring for potential mitigation are:

(i) *Economic withholding*, that is, submitting a Supply Offer for a Resource that is unjustifiably high and violates the economic withholding criteria set forth in Section III.A.5 so that (i) the Resource is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the bid or offer will set an unjustifiably high market clearing price.

(ii) *Uneconomic production from a Resource*, that is, increasing the output of a Resource to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic, absent an order of the ISO, in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.

(iii) *Anti-competitive Increment Offers and Decrement Bids*, which are bidding practices relating to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids that cause Day-Ahead LMPs not to achieve the degree of convergence with Real-Time LMPs that would be expected in a workably competitive market, more fully addressed in Section III.A.11 of this Appendix A.

(iv) *Anti-competitive Demand Bids*, which are addressed in Section III.A.10 of this Appendix A.

(v) Other categories of conduct that have material effects on prices or NCPC payments in the New England Markets. The Internal Market Monitor, in consultation with the External Market Monitor, shall; (i) seek to amend Appendix A as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of
the New England Markets; and (ii) seek such other authorization to mitigate the effects of such conduct from the Commission as may be appropriate.

(k) Perform such additional monitoring as the Internal Market Monitor deems necessary, including without limitation, monitoring for:

(i) Anti-competitive gaming of Resources;
(ii) Conduct and market outcomes that are inconsistent with competitive markets;
(iii) Flaws in market design or software or in the implementation of rules by the ISO that create inefficient incentives or market outcomes;
(iv) Actions in one market that affect price in another market;
(v) Other aspects of market implementation that prevent competitive market results, the extent to which market rules, including this Appendix A, interfere with efficient market operation, both short-run and long-run; and
(vi) Rules or conduct that creates barriers to entry into a market.

The Internal Market Monitor will include significant results of such monitoring in its reports under Section III.A.17 of this Appendix A. Monitoring under this Section III.A.2.3(k) cannot serve as a basis for mitigation under III.A.11 of this Appendix A. If the Internal Market Monitor concludes as a result of its monitoring that additional specific monitoring thresholds or mitigation remedies are necessary, it may proceed under Section III.A.20.

(l) Propose to the ISO and Market Participants appropriate mitigation measures or market rule changes for conduct that departs significantly from the conduct that would be expected under competitive market conditions but does not rise to the thresholds specified in Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, or III.A.11. In considering whether to recommend such changes, the Internal Market Monitor shall evaluate whether the conduct has a significant effect on market prices or NCPC payments as specified below. The Internal Market Monitor will not recommend changes if it determines, from information provided by Market Participants (or parties that would be subject to mitigation) or from other information available to the Internal Market Monitor, that the conduct and associated price or NCPC payments under investigation are attributable to legitimate competitive market forces or incentives.

(m) Evaluate physical withholding of Supply Offers in accordance with Section III.A.4 below for referral to the Commission.
III.A.2.4. Overview of the Internal Market Monitor’s Mitigation Functions.

III.A.2.4.1. Purpose.
The mitigation measures set forth in this Appendix A for mitigation of market power are intended to provide the means for the Internal Market Monitor to mitigate the market effects of any actions or transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or electricity products. Actions or transactions undertaken by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in Market Rule I (such as virtual supply or load bidding) or taken at the direction of the ISO are not in violation of this Appendix A. These mitigation measures are intended to minimize interference with open and competitive markets, and thus to permit to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the mitigation measures authorize the mitigation of only specific conduct that exceeds well-defined thresholds specified below. When implemented, mitigation measures affecting the LMP or clearing prices in other markets will be applied ex ante. Nothing in this Appendix A, including the application of a mitigation measure, shall be deemed to be a limitation of the ISO’s authority to evaluate Market Participant behavior for potential referral under Section III.A.19.

III.A.2.4.2. Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation.
(a) Imposing Mitigation. To achieve the foregoing purpose and objectives, mitigation measures are imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5, III.A.10, and III.A.11 below.

III.A.2.4.3. Applicability.
Mitigation measures may be applied to Supply Offers, Increment Offers, Demand Bids, and Decrement Bids, as well as to the scheduling or operation of a generation unit or transmission facility.

III.A.2.4.4. Mitigation Not Provided for Under This Appendix A.
The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the New England Markets for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but does not trigger the thresholds specified.
below for the imposition of mitigation measures by the Internal Market Monitor. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, and in particular conduct exceeding the thresholds specified in this Appendix A, it may make a filing under §205 of the Federal Power Act (“§205”) with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

III.A.2.4.5. Duration of Mitigation.

Any mitigation measure imposed on a specific Market Participant, as specified below, shall expire not later than six months after the occurrence of the conduct giving rise to the measure, or at such earlier time as may be specified by the Internal Market Monitor or as otherwise provided in this Appendix A.

III.A.3. Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources; Fuel Price Adjustments.

Upon request of a Market Participant or at the initiative of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with a Market Participant with respect to the information and analysis used to determine Reference Levels under Section III.A.7 for that Market Participant. In order for the Internal Market Monitor to revise Reference Levels or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for an Operating Day for which the offer is submitted, all cost data and other information, other than automated index-based cost data received by the Internal Market Monitor from third party vendors, cost data and information calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, and cost data and information provided under the provisions of Section III.A.3.1 or Section III.A.3.2, must be submitted by a Market Participant, and all consultations must be completed, no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day prior to the Operating Day for which the Reference Level will be effective. Adjustments to fuel prices after this time must be submitted in accordance with the fuel price adjustment provisions in Section III.A.3.4.

III.A.3.1. Consultation Prior to Offer.

If an event occurs within the 24 hour period prior to the Operating Day that a Market Participant, including a Market Participant that is not permitted to submit a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4(d) believes will cause the operating cost of a Resource to exceed the level that would violate one of the conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5 of this Appendix A, the Market Participant may contact
the Internal Market Monitor to provide an explanation of the increased costs. In order for the information to be considered for the purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Day-Ahead Energy Market. In order for the information to be considered for purposes of the first commitment analysis performed following the close of the Re-Offer Period, the Market Participant must contact the Internal Market Monitor at least 30 minutes prior to the close of the Re-Offer Period. Cost information submitted thereafter shall be considered in subsequent commitment and dispatch analyses if received between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and at least one hour prior to the close of the next hourly Supply Offer submittal period. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there is an increased cost, the Internal Market Monitor will either update the Reference Level or treat an offer as not violating applicable conduct tests specified in Section III.A.5.5 for the Operating Day for which the offer is submitted. Any request and all supporting cost data and other verifiable supporting information must be submitted to the Internal Market Monitor prior to the Market participant’s submission of the offer.

If a Market Participant believes that the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) should be modified, it may contact the Internal Market Monitor to request a change to the fuel price and provide an explanation of the basis for the change. Any request to change the fuel price determined under Section III.A.7.5(e) must be received between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on any day.

III.A.3.2. Dual Fuel Resources.
In evaluating bids or offers under this Appendix A for dual fuel Resources, the Internal Market Monitor shall utilize the fuel type specified in the Supply Offer for the calculation of Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7 below. If a Market Participant specifies a fuel type in the Supply Offer that, at the time the Supply Offer is submitted, is the higher cost fuel available to the Resource, then if the ratio of the higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel, as calculated in accordance with the formula specified below, is greater than 1.75, the Market Participant must within five Business Days:

(a) provide the Internal Market Monitor with written verification as to the cause for the use of the higher cost fuel.
(b) provide the Internal Market Monitor with evidence that the higher cost fuel was used.

If the Market Participant fails to provide supporting information demonstrating the use of the higher-cost fuel within five Business Days of the Operating Day, then the Reference Level based on the lower cost fuel will be used in place of the Supply Offer for settlement purposes.
For purposes of this Section III.A.3.2, the ratio of the Resource’s higher cost fuel to the lower cost fuel is calculated as, for the two primary fuels utilized in the dispatch of the Resource, the maximum fuel index price for the Operating Day divided by the minimum fuel index price for the Operating Day, using the two fuel indices that are utilized in the calculation of the Resource’s Reference Levels for the Day-Ahead Energy Market for that Operating Day.

III.A.3.3. Market Participant Access to its Reference Levels.
The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the Market Participant the Reference Levels applicable to that Market Participant’s Supply Offers through the MUI. Updated Reference Levels will be made available whenever calculated. The Market Participant shall not modify such Reference Levels in the ISO’s or Internal Market Monitor’s systems.

(a) A Market Participant may submit a fuel price, to be used in calculating the Reference Levels for a Resource’s Supply Offer, whenever the Market Participant’s expected price to procure fuel for the Resource will be greater than that used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Supply Offer. A fuel price may be submitted for Supply Offers entered in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the Re-Offer Period, or for a Real-Time Offer Change. A fuel price is subject to the following conditions:

(i) In order for the submitted fuel price to be utilized in calculating the Reference Levels for a Supply Offer, the fuel price must be submitted prior to the applicable Supply Offer deadline,

(ii) The submitted fuel price must reflect the price at which the Market Participant expects to be able to procure fuel to supply energy under the terms of its Supply Offer, exclusive of resource-specific transportation costs. Modifications to Reference Levels based on changes to transportation costs must be addressed through the consultation process specified in Section III.A.3.1.

(iii) The submitted fuel price may be no lower than the lesser of (1) 110% of the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer or (2) the fuel price used by the Internal Market Monitor in calculating the Reference Levels for the Resource’s Supply Offer plus $2.50/MMbtu.
(b) Within five Business Days following submittal of a fuel price, a Market Participant must provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation or analysis to support the submitted fuel price, which may include but is not limited to (i) an invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized or (ii) a quote from a named supplier or (iii) a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, demonstrating that the submitted fuel price reflects the cost at which the Market Participant expected to purchase fuel for the operating period covered by the Supply Offer, as of the time that the Supply Offer was submitted, under an arm’s length fuel purchase transaction. Any amount to be added to the quote from a named supplier, or to a price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, must be submitted and approved using the provision for consultations prior to the determination of Reference Levels in Section III.A.3. The submitted fuel price must be consistent with the fuel price reflected on the submitted invoice or purchase confirmation for the fuel utilized, the quote from a named supplier or the price from a publicly available trading platform or price reporting agency, plus any approved adder, or the other documentation or analysis provided to support the submitted fuel price.

(c) If, within a 12 month period, the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met for a Resource and, for the time period for which the fuel price adjustment that does not meet the requirements in sub-section (b) was submitted, (i) the Market Participant was determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test described in Section III.A.5.2.1 or (ii) the Resource was determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test described in Section III.A.5.2.2 or (iii) the Resource satisfied any of the conditions described in Section III.A.5.5.6.1, then a fuel price adjustment pursuant to Section III.A.3.4 shall not be permitted for that Resource for up to six months. The following table specifies the number of months for which a Market Participant will be precluded from using the fuel price adjustment, based on the number of times the requirements in sub-section (b) are not met within the 12 month period. The 12 month period excludes any previous days for which the Market Participant was precluded from using the fuel price adjustment. The period of time for which a Market Participant is precluded from using the fuel price adjustment begins two weeks after the most-recent incident occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Months Precluded (starting from most-recent incident)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

III.A.4.1. Identification of Conduct Inconsistent with Competition.
This section defines thresholds used to identify possible instances of physical withholding. This section does not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s ability to refer potential instances of physical withholding to the Commission.

Generally, physical withholding involves not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by a Resource capable of serving the New England Markets when it is economic to do so. Physical withholding may include, but is not limited to:

(a) falsely declaring that a Resource has been forced out of service or otherwise become unavailable,
(b) refusing to make a Supply Offer, or schedules for a Resource when it would be in the economic interest absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so,
(c) operating a Resource in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the ISO Dispatch Rate, or
(d) operating a transmission facility in a manner that is not economic, is not justified on the basis of legitimate safety or reliability concerns, and contributes to a binding transmission constraint.

III.A.4.2. Thresholds for Identifying Physical Withholding.

III.A.4.2.1. Initial Thresholds.
Except as specified in subsection III.A.4.2.4 below, the following initial thresholds will be employed by the Internal Market Monitor to identify physical withholding of a Resource:

(a) Withholding that exceeds the lower of 10% or 100 MW of a Resource’s capacity;
(b) Withholding that exceeds in the aggregate the lower of 5% or 200 MW of a Market Participant’s total capacity for Market Participants with more than one Resource; or
(c) Operating a Resource in Real-Time at an output level that is less than 90% of the ISO’s Dispatch Rate for the Resource.

III.A.4.2.2. Adjustment to Generating Capacity.
The amounts of generating capacity considered withheld for purposes of applying the foregoing thresholds shall include unjustified deratings, that is, falsely declaring a Resource derated, and the portions of a Resource’s available output that are not offered. The amounts deemed withheld shall not include generating output that is subject to a forced outage or capacity that is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.3. Withholding of Transmission.
A transmission facility shall be deemed physically withheld if it is not operated in accordance with ISO instructions and such failure to conform to ISO instructions causes transmission congestion. A transmission facility shall not be deemed withheld if it is subject to a forced outage or is out of service for maintenance in accordance with an ISO maintenance schedule, subject to verification by the Internal Market Monitor as may be appropriate that an outage was forced.

III.A.4.2.4. Resources in Congestion Areas.
Minimum quantity thresholds shall not be applicable to the identification of physical withholding by a Resource in an area the ISO has determined is congested.

III.A.4.3. Hourly Market Impacts.
Before evaluating possible instances of physical withholding for imposition of sanctions, the Internal Market Monitor shall investigate the reasons for the change in accordance with Section III.A.3. If the physical withholding in question is not explained to the satisfaction of the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor will determine whether the conduct in question causes a price impact in the New England Markets in excess of any of the thresholds specified in Section III.A.5, as appropriate.

III.A.5. Mitigation.

III.A.5.1. Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.
Only Supply Offers associated with Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Day-Ahead Energy Market. All Supply Offers will be evaluated for economic withholding in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.1.1. Resources with Partial Capacity Supply Obligations.
Supply Offers associated with Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for less than their full capacity shall be evaluated for economic withholding and mitigation as follows:

(a) all Supply Offer parameters shall be reviewed for economic withholding;
(b) the energy price Supply Offer parameter shall be reviewed for economic withholding up to and including the higher of: (i) the block containing the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit, or; (ii) the highest block that includes any portion of the Capacity Supply Obligation;
(c) if a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consists of multiple assets, the offer blocks associated with the Resource that shall be evaluated for mitigation shall be determined by using each asset’s Seasonal Claimed Capability value in proportion to the total of the Seasonal Claimed Capabilities for all of the assets that make up the Resource. The Lead Market Participant of a Resource with a partial Capacity Supply Obligation consisting of multiple assets may also propose to the Internal Market Monitor the offer blocks that shall be evaluated for mitigation based on an alternative allocation on a monthly basis. The proposal must be made at least five Business Days prior to the start of the month. A proposal shall be rejected by the Internal Market Monitor if the designation would be inconsistent with competitive behavior.

III.A.5.2. Structural Tests.
There are two structural tests that determine which mitigation thresholds are applied to a Supply Offer:

(a) if a supplier is determined to be pivotal according to the pivotal supplier test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation” apply, and;
(b) if a Resource is determined to be in a constrained area according to the constrained area test, then the thresholds in Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” and Section III.A.5.5.4 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation” apply.

III.A.5.2.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.
The pivotal supplier test examines whether a Market Participant has aggregate energy Supply Offers (up to and including Economic Max) that exceed the supply margin in the Real-Time Energy Market. A Market Participant whose aggregate energy associated with Supply Offers exceeds the supply margin is a pivotal supplier.
The supply margin for an interval is the total energy Supply Offers from available Resources (up to and including Economic Max), less total system load (as adjusted for net interchange with other Control Areas, including Operating Reserve). Resources are considered available for an interval if they can provide energy within the interval. The applicable interval for the current operating plan in the Real-Time Energy Market is any of the hours in the plan. The applicable interval for UDS is the interval for which UDS issues instructions.

The pivotal supplier test shall be run prior to each determination of a new operating plan for the Operating Day, and prior to each execution of the UDS.

III.A.5.2.2. Constrained Area Test.
A Resource is considered to be within a constrained area if:

(a) for purposes of the Real-Time Energy Market, the Resource is located on the import-constrained side of a binding constraint and there is a sensitivity to the binding constraint such that the UDS used to relieve transmission constraints would commit or dispatch the Resource in order to relieve that binding transmission constraint, or;

(b) for purposes of the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the LMP at the Resource’s Node exceeds the LMP at the Hub by more than $25/MWh.

The price impact for the purposes of Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is equal to the difference between the LMP at the Resource’s Node and the LMP at the Hub.

The energy price impact test applied in the Real-Time Energy Market shall compare two LMPs at the Resource’s Node. The first LMP will be calculated based on the Supply Offers submitted for all Resources. If a Supply Offer has been mitigated in a prior interval, the calculation of the first LMP shall be based on the mitigated value. The second LMP shall be calculated substituting Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the applicable conduct test. The difference between the two LMPs is the price impact of the conduct violation.

A Supply Offer shall be determined to have no price impact if the offer block that violates the conduct test is:
(a) less than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and less than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, or;
(b) greater than the LMP calculated using the submitted Supply Offers, and greater than the LMP calculated using Reference Levels for Supply Offers that have failed the conduct test, and the Resource has not been dispatched into the offer block that exceeds the LMP.

III.A.5.5. Mitigation by Type.

III.A.5.5.1. General Threshold Energy Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.1.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.1.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 300% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower. Offer block prices below $25/MWh are not subject to the conduct test.

III.A.5.5.1.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer that fails the conduct test for general threshold energy mitigation shall be evaluated against the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation. A Supply Offer fails the impact test for general threshold energy mitigation if there is an increase in the LMP greater than 200% or $100/MWh, whichever is lower as determined by the real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.1.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the general threshold conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer block prices and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.2. Constrained Area Energy Mitigation.
III.A.5.5.2.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market associated with a Resource determined to be within a constrained area.

III.A.5.5.2.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for constrained area energy mitigation if any offer block price exceeds the Reference Level by an amount greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower.

III.A.5.5.2.3. Impact Test.
A Supply Offer fails the impact test for constrained area energy mitigation if there is an increase greater than 50% or $25/MWh, whichever is lower, in the LMP as determined by the day-ahead or real-time impact test.

III.A.5.5.2.4. Consequence of Failing Both Conduct and Impact Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area conduct and impact tests, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.


III.A.5.5.3.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers associated with a Resource, when the Resource is manually dispatched above the Economic Minimum Limit value specified in the Resource’s Supply Offer and the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.5.3.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer fails the conduct test for manual dispatch energy mitigation if any offer block price divided by the Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.3.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test.
If a Supply Offer for a Resource fails the manual dispatch energy conduct test, then the financial parameters of the Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels, including all energy offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee.

III.A.5.5.4. General Threshold Commitment Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.4.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to all Supply Offers in the Real-Time Energy Market submitted by a Lead Market Participant that is determined to be a pivotal supplier in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.4.2. Conduct Test.
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for general threshold commitment mitigation if the low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 3.00.

III.A.5.5.4.3. Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.
If a Resource fails the general threshold commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.5. Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.5.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Resource determined to be within a constrained area in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.A.5.5.5.2. Conduct Test.
A Resource shall fail the conduct test for constrained area commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.25.

III.A.5.5.5.3. Consequence of Failing Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the constrained area commitment conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.6. Reliability Commitment Mitigation.
III.A.5.5.6.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to Supply Offers for Resources that are (a) committed to provide, or Resources that are required to remain online to provide, one or more of the following:

i. local first contingency;
ii. local second contingency;
iii. VAR or voltage;
iv. distribution (Special Constraint Resource Service);
v. dual fuel resource auditing;

(b) otherwise manually committed by the ISO for reasons other than meeting anticipated load plus reserve requirements.

III.A.5.5.6.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for local reliability commitment mitigation if the Low Load Cost at Offer divided by the Low Load Cost at Reference Level is greater than 1.10.

III.A.5.5.6.3. Consequence of Failing Test.
If a Supply Offer fails the local reliability commitment conduct test, it shall be evaluated for commitment based on an offer with all financial parameters set to their Reference Levels. This includes all offer blocks and all types of Start-Up Fees and the No-Load Fee. If a Resource is committed, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer are set to their Reference Level.

III.A.5.5.7. Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.

III.A.5.5.7.1. Applicability.
Mitigation pursuant to this section shall be applied to any Supply Offer submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market if the resource is committed.

III.A.5.5.7.2. Conduct Test.
A Supply Offer shall fail the conduct test for Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee mitigation if its Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee divided by the Reference Level for that fee is greater than 3.
III.A.5.5.3. **Consequence of Failing Conduct Test.**

If a Supply Offer fails the conduct test, then all financial parameters of its Supply Offer shall be set to their Reference Levels.

III.A.5.5.8. **Low Load Cost.**

Low Load Cost, which is the cost of operating the Resource at its Economic Minimum Limit, is calculated as the sum of:

(a) If the Resource is starting from an offline state, the Start-Up Fee;
(b) The sum of the No Load Fees for the Commitment Period; and
(c) The sum of the hourly values resulting from the multiplication of the price of energy at the Resource’s Economic Minimum Limit times its Economic Minimum Limit, for each hour of the Commitment Period.

All Supply Offer parameter values used in calculating the Low Load Cost are the values in place at the time the commitment decision is made.

Low Load Cost at Offer equals the Low Load Cost calculated with financial parameters of the Supply Offer as submitted by the Lead Market Participant.

Low Load Cost at Reference Level equals the Low Load Cost calculated with the financial parameters of the Supply Offer set to Reference Levels.

For Low Load Cost at Offer, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Supply Offer at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block. For Low Load Cost at Reference Level, the price of energy is the energy price parameter of the Resource’s Reference Level at the Economic Minimum Limit offer block.

III.A.5.6. **Duration of Energy Threshold Mitigation.**

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.1 “General Threshold Energy Mitigation” or III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation” is in effect for the following duration:
(a) in the Real-Time Energy Market, mitigation starts when the impact test violation occurs and remains in effect until there is one complete hour in which:
   i. for general threshold mitigation, the Market Participant whose Supply Offer is subject to mitigation is not a pivotal supplier; or,
   ii. for constrained area energy mitigation, the Resource is not located within a constrained area.

(b) in the Day-Ahead Energy Market (applicable only for Section III.A.5.5.2 “Constrained Area Energy Mitigation”), mitigation is in effect in each hour in which the impact test is violated.

Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Section III.A.5.5.3 “Manual Dispatch Energy Mitigation” is in effect for at least one hour until the earlier of either (a) the hour when manual dispatch is no longer in effect and the Resource returns to its Economic Minimum Limit, or (b) the hour when the energy price parameter of its Supply Offer at the Desired Dispatch Point is no longer greater than the Real-Time Price at the Resource’s Node.

III.A.5.7. Duration of Commitment Mitigation.
Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.4 “General Threshold Commitment Mitigation”, III.A.5.5.5 “Constrained Area Commitment Mitigation”, or III.A.5.5.6 “Reliability Commitment Mitigation” is in effect for the duration of the Commitment Period.

III.A.5.8. Duration of Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation.
Any mitigation imposed pursuant to Sections III.A.5.5.7 “Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Mitigation” is in effect for any hour in which the Supply Offer fails the conduct test in Section III.A.5.5.7.2.

III.A.5.9. Correction of Mitigation.
If the Internal Market Monitor determines that there are one or more errors in the mitigation applied in an Operating Day due to data entry, system or software errors by the ISO or the Internal Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the market monitoring contacts specified by the Lead Market Participant within five Business Days of the applicable Operating Day. The ISO shall correct the error as part of the Data Reconciliation Process by applying the correct values to the relevant Supply Offer in the settlement process.
The permissibility of correction of errors in mitigation, and the timeframes and procedures for permitted corrections, are addressed solely in this section and not in those sections of Market Rule 1 relating to settlement and billing processes.

The posting of the Day-Ahead Energy Market results may be delayed if necessary for the completion of mitigation procedures.

Physical parameters of a Supply Offer are limited to thresholds specified in this section. Physical parameters are limited by the software accepting offers, except those that can be re-declared in real time during the Operating Day. Parameters that exceed the thresholds specified here but are not limited through the software accepting offers are subject to Internal Market Monitor review after the Operating Day and possible referral to the Commission under Section III.A.19 of this Appendix.

III.A.6.1. Time-Based Offer Parameters.
Supply Offer parameters that are expressed in time (i.e., Minimum Run Time, Minimum Down Time, Start-Up Time, and Notification Time) shall have a threshold of two hours for an individual parameter or six hours for the combination of the time-based offer parameters compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels. Offers may not exceed these thresholds in a manner that reduce the flexibility of the Resource. To determine if the six hour threshold is exceeded, all time-based offer parameters will be summed for each start-up state (hot, intermediate and cold). If the sum of the time-based offer parameters for a start-up state exceeds six hours above the sum of the Reference Levels for those offer parameters, then the six hour threshold is exceeded.

The Start-Up Fee and the No-Load Fee values of a Resource’s Supply Offer may be no greater than three times the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee Reference Level values for the Resource. In the event a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4, the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee for the associated Supply Offer shall be limited in a Real-Time Offer Change. The limit shall be the percent increase in the new fuel price, relative to the fuel price otherwise used by the Internal Market Monitor, multiplied by the Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee from the Re-Offer Period. Absent a fuel price adjustment, a Start-Up Fee or No-Load Fee may be changed in a Real-Time Offer Change to no more than the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee values submitted for the Re-Offer Period.
III.A.6.3. **Other Offer Parameters.**

Non-financial or non-time-based offer parameters shall have a threshold of a 100% increase, or greater, for parameters that are minimum values, or a 50% decrease, or greater, for parameters that are maximum values (including, but not limited to, ramp rates, Economic Maximum Limits and maximum starts per day) compared to the Resource’s Reference Levels.

Offer parameters that are limited by performance caps or audit values imposed by the ISO are not subject to the provisions of this section.

III.A.7. **Calculation of Resource Reference Levels for Physical Parameters and Financial Parameters of Resources.**

Market Participants are responsible for providing the Internal Market Monitor with all the information and data necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to calculate up-to-date Reference Levels for each of a Market Participant’s Resources.

III.A.7.1. **Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Physical Parameters.**

The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each element of a bid or offer that is expressed in units other than dollars (such as time-based or quantity level bid or offer parameters) on the basis of one or more of the following:

(a) Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) operating recommendations and performance data for all Resource types in the New England Control Area, grouped by unit classes, physical parameters and fuel types.

(b) Applicable environmental operating permit information currently on file with the issuing environmental regulatory body.

(c) Verifiable Resource physical operating characteristic data, including but not limited to facility and/or Resource operating guides and procedures, historical operating data and any verifiable documentation related to the Resource, which will be reviewed in consultation with the Market Participant.

III.A.7.2. **Methods for Determining Reference Levels for Financial Parameters of Offers.**

The Reference Levels for Start-Up Fees, No-Load Fees, Interruption Costs and offer blocks will be calculated separately and assuming no costs from one component are included in another component.
III.A.7.2.1. Order of Reference Level Calculation.
The Internal Market Monitor will calculate a Reference Level for each offer block of an offer according to the following hierarchy, under which the first method that can be calculated is used:

(a) accepted offer-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.3;
(b) LMP-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.4; and,
(c) cost-based Reference Levels pursuant to Section III.A.7.5.

III.A.7.2.2. Circumstances in Which Cost-Based Reference Levels Supersede the Hierarchy of Reference Level Calculation.
In the following circumstances, cost-based Reference Levels shall be used notwithstanding the hierarchy specified in Section III.A.7.2.1.

(a) When in any hour the cost-based Reference Level is higher than either the accepted offer-based or LMP-based Reference Level.
(b) When the Supply Offer parameter is a Start-Up Fee or the No-Load Fee.
(c) For any Operating Day for which the Lead Market Participant requests the cost-based Reference Level.
(d) For any Operating Day for which, during the previous 90 days:
   (i) the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market, and;
   (ii) the ratio of the sum of the operating hours for days for which the Resource has been flagged during the previous 90 days in which the number of hours operated out of economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and the Real-Time Energy Market exceed the number of hours operated in economic merit order in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, to the total number of operating hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market during the previous 90 days is greater than or equal to 50 percent.
(e) When in any hour the incremental energy parameter of an offer, including adjusted offers pursuant to Section III.2.4, is greater than $1,000/MWh.

For the purposes of this subsection:
i. A flagged day is any day in which the Resource has been flagged for VAR, SCR, or as a Local Second Contingency Protection Resource for any hour in either the Day-Ahead Energy Market or the Real-Time Energy Market.

ii. Operating hours are the hours in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for which a Resource has cleared output (MW) greater than zero and hours in the Real-Time Energy Market for which a Resource has metered output (MW) greater than zero. For days for which Real-time Energy Market metered values are not yet available in the ISO’s or the Internal Market Monitor’s systems, telemetered values will be used.

iii. Self-scheduled hours will be excluded from all of the calculations described in this subsection, including the determination of operating hours.

iv. The determination as to whether a Resource operated in economic merit order during an hour will be based on the energy offer block within which the Resource is operating.

(e) The Market Participant submits a fuel price pursuant to Section III.A.3.4. When the Market Participant submits a fuel price for any hour of a Supply Offer in the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Re-Offer Period, then the cost-based Reference Level is used for the entire Operating Day. If a fuel price is submitted for a Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period for the next Operating Day or for the current Operating Day, then the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer is used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

(f) When the Market Participant submits a change to any of the following parameters of the Supply Offer after the close of the Re-Offer Period:

(i) hot, intermediate, or cold Start-Up Fee, or a corresponding fuel blend,
(ii) No-Load Fee or its corresponding fuel blends,
(iii) whether to include the Start-Up Fee and No-Load Fee in the Supply Offer,
(iv) the quantity or price value of any Block in the Supply Offer or its corresponding fuel blends, and
(v) whether to use the offer slope for the Supply Offer,

then, the cost-based Reference Level for the Supply Offer will be used from the time of the submittal to the end of the Operating Day.

III.A.7.3. Accepted Offer-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the accepted offer-based Reference Level as the lower of the mean or the median of a generating Resource’s Supply Offers that have been accepted and are part of the seller’s Day-Ahead Generation Obligation or Real-Time Generation Obligation in competitive periods over the previous 90 days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices utilizing fuel indices generally applicable for the location and type of Resource. For purposes of this section, a competitive period is an Operating Day in which the Resource is scheduled in economic merit order.

III.A.7.4. LMP-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the LMP-based Reference Level as the mean of the LMP at the Resource’s Node during the lowest-priced 25% of the hours that the Resource was dispatched over the previous 90 days for similar hours (on-peak or off-peak), adjusted for changes in fuel prices.

III.A.7.5. Cost-Based Reference Level.
The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate cost-based Reference Levels taking into account information on costs provided by the Market Participant though the consultation process prescribed in Section III.A.3.

The following criteria shall be applied to estimates of cost:

(a) The provision of cost estimates by a Market Participant shall conform with the timing and requirements of Section III.A.3 “Consultation Prior to Determination of Reference Levels for Physical and Financial Parameters of Resources”.
(b) Costs must be documented.
(c) All cost estimates shall be based on estimates of current market prices or replacement costs and not inventory costs wherever possible. All cost estimates, including opportunity cost estimates, must be quantified and analytically supported.
(d) When market prices or replacement costs are unavailable, cost estimates shall identify whether the reported costs are the result of a product or service provided by an Affiliate of the Market Participant.
(e) The Internal Market Monitor will evaluate cost information provided by the Market Participant in comparison to other information available to the Internal Market Monitor. Reference Levels associated with Resources for which a fuel price has been submitted under Section III.A.3.4 shall be calculated using the lower of the submitted fuel price or a price, calculated by the Internal Market Monitor, that takes account of the following factors and conditions:
   i. Fuel market conditions, including the current spread between bids and asks for current fuel delivery, fuel trading volumes, near-term price quotes for fuel, expected
natural gas heating demand, and Market Participant-reported quotes for trading and fuel costs; and

ii. Fuel delivery conditions, including current and forecasted fuel delivery constraints and current line pack levels for natural gas pipelines.

III.A.7.5.1. Estimation of Incremental Operating Cost.
The Internal Market Monitor’s determination of a Resource’s marginal costs shall include an assessment of the Resource’s incremental operating costs in accordance with the following formulas,

Incremental Energy/Reduction:
\[(\text{incremental heat rate} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{emissions rate} \times \text{emissions allowance price}) + \text{variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{opportunity costs.}\]

Opportunity costs may include, but are not limited to, economic costs associated with complying with:

(a) emissions limits;
(b) water storage limits;
(c) other operating permits that limit production of energy; and
(d) reducing electricity consumption.

No-Load:
\[(\text{no-load fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{no-load emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{no-load variable operating and maintenance costs} + \text{other no-load costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs.}\]

Start-Up/Interruption:
\[(\text{start-up fuel use} \times \text{fuel costs}) + (\text{start-up emissions} \times \text{emission allowance price}) + \text{start-up variable and maintenance costs} + \text{other start-up costs that are not fuel, emissions or variable and maintenance costs.}\]

III.A.8. [Reserved.]
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Regulation market for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power. If the Internal Market Monitor identifies any such conduct, it may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.10. Demand Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor will monitor the Energy Market as outlined below:

(a) LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in any location that would not be expected in a workably competitive market.

(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market LMPs, measured as: \((\frac{\text{LMP}_{\text{real time}}}{\text{LMP}_{\text{day ahead}}}) - 1\). The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

(c) The Internal Market Monitor shall estimate and monitor the average percentage of each Market Participant’s bid to serve load scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, using a methodology intended to identify a sustained pattern of under-bidding as accurately as deemed practicable. The average percentage will be computed over a specified time period determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that: (i) The average hourly deviation is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), (ii) one or more Market Participants on behalf of one or more LSEs have been purchasing a substantial portion of their loads with purchases in the Real-Time Energy Market, (iii) this practice has contributed to an unwarranted divergence of LMPs between the two markets, and (iv) this practice has created operational problems, the Internal Market Monitor may make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act with the Commission requesting authorization.
to apply appropriate mitigation measures or to revise Market Rule 1 to address such conduct (or both). The thresholds identified above shall not limit the Internal Market Monitor’s authority to make such a filing. The Internal Market Monitor may make such a filing at any time it deems necessary, and may request expedited treatment from the Commission. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct that the Internal Market Monitor believes warrants mitigation or revisions to Market Rule 1 (or both), shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both), and shall set forth the Internal Market Monitor’s justification for imposing that mitigation measure or revision to Market Rule 1 (or both).

III.A.11. Mitigation of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids.

III.A.11.1. Purpose.
The provisions of this section specify the market monitoring and mitigation measures applicable to Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. An Increment Offer is one to supply energy and a Decrement Bid is one to purchase energy, in either such case not being backed by physical load or generation and submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market in accordance with the procedures and requirements specified in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.A.11.2. Implementation.

Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs in each Load Zone or Node, as applicable, shall be monitored to determine whether there is a persistent hourly deviation in the LMPs that would not be expected in a workably competitive market. The Internal Market Monitor shall compute the average hourly deviation between Day-Ahead LMPs and Real-Time LMPs, measured as:

\[(\frac{\text{LMP real time}}{\text{LMP day ahead}}) - 1.\]

The average hourly deviation shall be computed over a rolling four-week period or such other period determined by the Internal Market Monitor to be appropriate to achieve the purpose of this mitigation measure.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines that (i) the average hourly deviation computed over a rolling four week period is greater than ten percent (10%) or less than negative ten percent (-10%), and (ii) the bid and offer practices of one or more Market Participants has contributed to a divergence between LMPs
in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market, then the following mitigation measure may be imposed:

The Internal Market Monitor may limit the hourly quantities of Increment Offers for supply or Decrement Bids for load that may be offered in a Location by a Market Participant, subject to the following provisions:

(i) The Internal Market Monitor shall, when practicable, request explanations of the relevant bid and offer practices from any Market Participant submitting such bids.

(ii) Prior to imposing a mitigation measure, the Internal Market Monitor shall notify the affected Market Participant of the limitation.

(iii) The Internal Market Monitor, with the assistance of the ISO, will restrict the Market Participant for a period of six months from submitting any virtual transactions at the same Node(s), and/or electrically similar Nodes to, the Nodes where it had submitted the virtual transactions that contributed to the unwarranted divergence between the LMPs in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market.

The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor and assess the impact of Increment Offers and Decrement Bids on the competitive structure and performance, and the economic efficiency of the New England Markets. Such monitoring and assessment shall include the effects, if any, on such bids and offers of any mitigation measures specified in this Market Rule 1.

If a holder of an FTR between specified delivery and receipt Locations (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the ISO for an applicable hour in the Day-Ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt Locations of the FTR; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer or Decrement Bid is that the difference in LMP in the Day-Ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt Locations is greater than the difference in LMP between such delivery and receipt Locations in the Real-Time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit associated with such FTR in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount originally paid for the FTR in the FTR Auction. A Location shall be considered at or near the FTR delivery or receipt Location if seventy-five % or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that Location and which is withdrawn or injected at
another Location is reflected in the constrained path between the subject FTR delivery and receipt Locations that were acquired in the FTR Auction.


In accordance with the following provisions of Section III.13 of Market Rule 1, the Internal Market Monitor is responsible for reviewing certain bids and offers made in the Forward Capacity Market. Section III.13 of Market Rule 1 specifies the nature and detail of the Internal Market Monitor’s review and the consequences that will result from the Internal Market Monitor’s determination following such review.

(a) [Reserved].
(b) Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3 - Internal Market Monitor review of Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs.
(c) Section III.13.1.2.3.2 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
(d) Section III.13.1.3.3A(d) - Review by Internal Market Monitor of offers from Existing Import Capacity Resources.
(e) Section III.13.1.3.5.6 - Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.
(f) Section III.13.1.7 - Internal Market Monitor review of summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values.

Section III.13.4 of Market Rule 1 addresses reconfiguration auctions in the Forward Capacity Market. As addressed in Section III.13.4.2 of Market Rule 1, a supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor.

Appendix G of Market Rule 1 addresses the scheduling of outages for transmission facilities. The Internal Market Monitor shall monitor the outage scheduling activities of the Transmission Owners. The
Internal Market Monitor shall have the right to request that each Transmission Owner provide information to the Internal Market Monitor concerning the Transmission Owner’s scheduling of transmission facility outages, including the repositioning or cancellation of any interim approved or approved outage, and the Transmission Owner shall provide such information to the Internal Market Monitor in accordance with the ISO New England Information Policy.

III.A.13.4. Monitoring of Forward Reserve Resources.
The Internal Market Monitor will receive information that will identify Forward Reserve Resources, the Forward Reserve Threshold Price, and the assigned Forward Reserve Obligation. Prior to mitigation of Supply Offers or Demand Bids associated with a Forward Reserve Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall consult with the Market Participant in accordance with Section III.A.3 of this Appendix A. The Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant shall consider the impact on meeting any Forward Reserve Obligations in those consultations. If mitigation is imposed, any mitigated offers shall be used in the calculation of qualifying megawatts under Section III.9.6.4 of Market Rule 1.

III.A.14. Treatment of Supply Offers for Resources Subject to a Cost-of-Service Agreement.
Article 5 of the form of Cost-of-Service Agreement in Appendix I to Market Rule 1 addresses the monitoring of resources subject to a cost-of-service agreement by the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Article 5 of the Form of Cost-of-Service Agreement, after consultation with the Lead Market Participant, Supply Offers that exceed Stipulated Variable Cost as determined in the agreement are subject to adjustment by the Internal Market Monitor to Stipulated Variable Cost.


If as a result of an offer being capped under Section III.1.9, a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was capped, the Market Participant may, within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, submit an additional cost recovery request to the Internal Market Monitor.

A request under this Section III.A.15 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred for the duration of the period of time for which the Resource was operated at the cap.
Within 20 days of the receipt of the first Invoice containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day, a Market Participant requesting additional cost recovery under this Section III.A.15.1 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor a request in writing detailing: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data, documentation and calculations for those costs; and (ii) an explanation of why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the capped costs.

III.A.15.1.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor.
To evaluate a Market Participant’s request, the Internal Market Monitor shall use the data, calculations and explanations provided by the Market Participant to verify the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, using the same standards and methodologies the Internal Market Monitor uses to evaluate requests to update Reference Levels under Section III.A.3 of Appendix A. To the extent the Market Participant’s request warrants additional cost recovery, the Internal Market Monitor shall reflect that adjustment in the Resource’s Reference Levels for the period covered by the request. The ISO shall then re-apply the cost verification and capping formulas in Section III.1.9 using the updated Reference Levels to re-calculate the adjustments to the Market Participant’s offers required thereunder, and then shall calculate additional cost recovery using the adjusted offer values.

Within 20 days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written response to the Market Participant’s request, detailing (i) the extent to which it agrees with the request with supporting explanation, and (ii) a calculation of the additional cost recovery. Changes to credits and charges resulting from an additional cost recovery request shall be included in the Data Reconciliation Process.

III.A.15.1.3. Cost Allocation.
The ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of any additional cost recovery granted under this Section III.A.15.1 in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.

III.A.15.2. Section 205 Filing Right.
If either

(a) as a result of mitigation applied to a Resource under this Appendix A for all or part of one or more Operating Days, or
(b) in the absence of mitigation, as a result of a request under Section III.A.15.1 being denied in whole or in part,

a Market Participant believes that it will not recover the fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs of the Resource, as reflected in the offer, for the hours of the Operating Day during which the offer was mitigated or the Section III.A.15.1 request was denied, the Market Participant may submit a filing to the Commission seeking recovery of those costs pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(a), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued containing credits or charges for the applicable Operating Day. For filings to address cost recovery under Section III.A.15.2(b), the filing must be made within sixty days of receipt of the first Invoice issued that reflects the denied request for additional cost recovery under Section III.A.15.1.

A request under this Section III.A.15.2 may seek recovery of additional costs incurred during the following periods: (a) if as a result of mitigation, costs incurred for the duration of the mitigation event, and (b) if as a result of having a Section III.A.15.1 request denied, costs incurred for the duration of the period of time addressed in the Section III.A.15.1 request.

III.A.15.2.1. Contents of Filing.

Any Section 205 filing made pursuant to this section shall include: (i) the actual fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs for the Resource for the applicable Operating Days, with supporting data and calculations for those costs; (ii) an explanation of (a) why the actual costs of operating the Resource exceeded the Reference Level costs or, (b) in the absence of mitigation, why the actual costs of operating the Resource, as reflected in the original offer and to the extent not recovered under Section III.A.15.1, exceeded the costs as reflected in the capped offer; (iii) the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation provided pursuant to Section III.A.15.3; and (iv) all requested regulatory costs in connection with the filing.

III.A.15.2.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor Prior to Filing.

Within twenty days of the receipt of the applicable Invoice, a Market Participant that intends to make a Section 205 filing pursuant to this Section III.A.15.2 shall submit to the Internal Market Monitor the
information and explanation detailed in Section III.A.15.2.1 (i) and (ii) that is to be included in the Section 205 filing. Within twenty days of the receipt of a completed submittal, the Internal Market Monitor shall provide a written explanation of the events that resulted in the Section III.A.15.2 request for additional cost recovery. The Market Participant shall include the Internal Market Monitor’s written explanation in the Section 205 filing made pursuant to this Section III A.15.2.

III.A.15.2.3. Cost Allocation.
In the event that the Commission accepts a Market Participant’s filing for cost recovery under this section, the ISO shall allocate charges to Market Participants for payment of those costs in accordance with the cost allocation provisions of Market Rule 1 that otherwise would apply to payments for the services provided based on the Resource’s actual dispatch for the Operating Days in question.


III.A.16.1. Actions Subject to Review.
A Market Participant may obtain prompt Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) review of any Internal Market Monitor mitigation imposed on a Resource as to which that Market Participant has bidding or operational authority. A Market Participant must seek review pursuant to the procedure set forth in Appendix D to this Market Rule 1, but in all cases within the time limits applicable to billing adjustment requests. These deadlines are currently specified in the ISO New England Manuals. Actions subject to review are:

- Imposition of a mitigation remedy.
- Continuation of a mitigation remedy as to which a Market Participant has submitted material evidence of changed facts or circumstances. (Thus, after a Market Participant has unsuccessfully challenged imposition of a mitigation remedy, it may challenge the continuation of that mitigation in a subsequent ADR review on a showing of material evidence of changed facts or circumstances.)

III.A.16.2. Standard of Review.
On the basis of the written record and the presentations of the Internal Market Monitor and the Market Participant, the ADR Neutral shall review the facts and circumstances upon which the Internal Market Monitor based its decision and the remedy imposed by the Internal Market Monitor. The ADR Neutral shall remove the Internal Market Monitor’s mitigation only if it concludes that the Internal Market Monitor’s application of the Internal Market Monitor mitigation policy was clearly erroneous. In
considering the reasonableness of the Internal Market Monitor’s action, the ADR Neutral shall consider whether adequate opportunity was given to the Market Participant to present information, any voluntary remedies proposed by the Market Participant, and the need of the Internal Market Monitor to act quickly to preserve competitive markets.

III.A.17. Reporting.

III.A.17.1. Data Collection and Retention.
Market Participants shall provide the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor with any and all information within their custody or control that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems necessary to perform its obligations under this Appendix A, subject to applicable confidentiality limitations contained in the ISO New England Information Policy. This would include a Market Participant’s cost information if the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor deems it necessary, including start up, no-load and all other actual marginal costs, when needed for monitoring or mitigation of that Market Participant. Additional data requirements may be specified in the ISO New England Manuals. If for any reason the requested explanation or data is unavailable, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will use the best information available in carrying out their responsibilities. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor may use any and all information they receive in the course of carrying out their market monitor and mitigation functions to the extent necessary to fully perform those functions.

Market Participants must provide data and any other information requested by the Internal Market Monitor that the Internal Market Monitor requests to determine:

(a) the opportunity costs associated with Demand Reduction Offers;
(b) the accuracy of Demand Response Baselines;
(c) the method used to achieve a demand reduction, and;
(d) the accuracy of metered demand reported to the ISO.

III.A.17.2. Periodic Reporting by the ISO and Internal Market Monitor.

The ISO will prepare a monthly report, which will be available to the public both in printed form and electronically, containing an overview of the market’s performance in the most recent period.
III.A.17.2.2. **Quarterly Report.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare a quarterly report consisting of market data regularly collected by the Internal Market Monitor in the course of carrying out its functions under this Appendix A and analysis of such market data. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. The format and content of the quarterly reports will be updated periodically through consensus of the Internal Market Monitor, the Commission, the ISO, the public utility commissions of the six New England States and Market Participants. The entire quarterly report will be subject to confidentiality protection consistent with the ISO New England Information Policy and the recipients will ensure the confidentiality of the information in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. The Internal Market Monitor will make available to the public a redacted version of such quarterly reports. The Internal Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The Internal Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared pursuant to the terms of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.3. **Reporting on General Performance of the Forward Capacity Market.**

The performance of the Forward Capacity Market, including reconfiguration auctions, shall be subject to the review of the Internal Market Monitor. No later than 180 days after the completion of the second Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall file with the Commission and post to the ISO’s website a full report analyzing the operations and effectiveness of the Forward Capacity Market. Thereafter, the Internal Market Monitor shall report on the functioning of the Forward Capacity Market in its annual markets report in accordance with the provisions of Section III.A.17.2.4 of this Appendix A.

III.A.17.2.4. **Annual Review and Report by the Internal Market Monitor.**

The Internal Market Monitor will prepare an annual state of the market report on market trends and the performance of the New England Markets and will present an annual review of the
operations of the New England Markets. The annual report and review will include an evaluation of the procedures for the determination of energy, reserve and regulation clearing prices, NCPC costs and the performance of the Forward Capacity Market and FTR Auctions. The review will include a public forum to discuss the performance of the New England Markets, the state of competition, and the ISO’s priorities for the coming year. In addition, the Internal Market Monitor will arrange a non-public meeting open to appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets, subject to the confidentiality protections of the ISO New England Information Policy, to the greatest extent permitted by law.

III.A.17.3. Periodic Reporting by the External Market Monitor.

The External Market Monitor will perform independent evaluations and prepare annual and ad hoc reports on the overall competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets or particular aspects of the New England Markets, including the adequacy of Appendix A. The External Market Monitor shall have the sole discretion to determine whether and when to prepare ad hoc reports and may prepare such reports on its own initiative or pursuant to requests by the ISO, state public utility commissions or one or more Market Participants. Final versions of such reports shall be disseminated contemporaneously to the Commission, the ISO Board of Directors, the Market Participants, and state public utility commissions for each of the six New England states, provided that in the case of the Market Participants and public utility commissions, such information shall be redacted as necessary to comply with the ISO New England Information Policy. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include:

(i) Review and assessment of the practices, market rules, procedures, protocols and other activities of the ISO insofar as such activities, and the manner in which the ISO implements such activities, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of New England Markets.

(ii) Review and assessment of the practices, procedures, protocols and other activities of any independent transmission company, transmission provider or similar entity insofar as its activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iii) Review and assessment of the activities of Market Participants insofar as these activities affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the New England Markets.

(iv) Review and assessment of the effectiveness of Appendix A and the administration of Appendix A by the Internal Market Monitor for consistency and compliance with the terms of Appendix A.
(v) Review and assessment of the relationship of the New England Markets with any independent transmission company and with adjacent markets.

The External Market Monitor, subject to confidentiality restrictions, may decide whether and to what extent to share drafts of any report or portions thereof with the Commission, the ISO, one or more state public utility commission(s) in New England or Market Participants for input and verification before the report is finalized. The External Market Monitor shall keep the Market Participants informed of the progress of any report being prepared.

III.A.17.4. Other Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor Communications With Government Agencies.

III.A.17.4.1. Routine Communications.

The periodic reviews are in addition to any routine communications the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may have with appropriate state or federal government agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general, and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets.

III.A.17.4.2. Additional Communications.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor are not a regulatory or enforcement agency. However, they will monitor market trends, including changes in Resource ownership as well as market performance. In addition to the information on market performance and mitigation provided in the monthly, quarterly and annual reports the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor shall:

(a) Inform the jurisdictional state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as the Markets Committee, if the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor determines that a market problem appears to be developing that will not be adequately remediable by existing market rules or mitigation measures;

(b) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor receives information from any entity regarding an alleged violation of law, refer the entity to the appropriate state or federal agencies;

(c) If the External Market Monitor or Internal Market Monitor reasonably concludes, in the normal course of carrying out its monitoring and mitigation responsibilities, that certain
market conduct constitutes a violation of law, report these matters to the appropriate state and federal agencies; and,

(d) Provide the names of any companies subjected to mitigation under these procedures as well as a description of the behaviors subjected to mitigation and any mitigation remedies or sanctions applied.

III.A.17.4.3. Confidentiality.

Information identifying particular participants required or permitted to be disclosed to jurisdictional bodies under this section shall be provided in a confidential report filed under Section 388.112 of the Commission regulations and corresponding provisions of other jurisdictional agencies. The Internal Market Monitor will include the confidential report with the quarterly submission it provides to the Commission pursuant to Section III.A.17.2.2.

III.A.17.5. Other Information Available from Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor on Request by Regulators.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor will normally make their records available as described in this paragraph to authorized state or federal agencies, including the Commission and state regulatory bodies, attorneys general and others with jurisdiction over the competitive operation of electric power markets (“authorized government agencies”). With respect to state regulatory bodies and state attorneys general (“authorized state agencies”), the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall entertain information requests for information regarding general market trends and the performance of the New England Markets, but shall not entertain requests that are designed to aid enforcement actions of a state agency. The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall promptly make available all requested data and information that they are permitted to disclose to authorized government agencies under the ISO New England Information Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event an information request is unduly burdensome in terms of the demands it places on the time and/or resources of the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor shall work with the authorized government agency to modify the scope of the request or the time within which a response is required, and shall respond to the modified request.

The Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor also will comply with compulsory process, after first notifying the owner(s) of the items and information called for by the subpoena or civil investigative demand and giving them at least ten Business Days to seek to modify or quash the compulsory process. If an authorized government agency makes a request in writing, other than
 compulsory process, for information or data whose disclosure to authorized government agencies is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy, the Internal Market Monitor and External Market Monitor shall notify each party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information and shall process the request under the applicable provisions of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from the Commission for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.2 of the ISO New England Information Policy. Requests from authorized state agencies for information or data whose disclosure is not permitted by the ISO New England Information Policy shall be processed under Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy. In the event confidential information is ultimately released to an authorized state agency in accordance with Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy, any party with an interest in the confidentiality of the information shall be permitted to contest the factual content of the information, or to provide context to such information, through a written statement provided to the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor and the authorized state agency that has received the information.

III.A.18. Ethical Conduct Standards.

The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO shall execute and shall comply with the terms of the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, as amended from time to time and available on the ISO’s website. Consistent with the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, at a minimum each such monitoring unit and its employees: (a) must have no material affiliation with any Market Participant or Affiliate, (b) must have no material financial interest in any Market Participant or Affiliate with potential exceptions for mutual funds and non-directed investments, (c) must not engage in any market transactions other than the performance of their duties hereunder, (d) may not accept anything of value from a Market Participant in excess of a de minimis amount, and (e) must advise a supervisor in the event they seek employment with a Market Participant, and must disqualify themselves from participating in any matter that would have an effect on the financial interest of the Market Participant.

III.A.18.2. Additional Ethical Conduct Standards.
The employees of the ISO that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO and the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the
ISO shall also comply with the following additional ethical conduct standards. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth below and one or more standards contained in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.18.2.1. **Prohibition on Employment with a Market Participant.**

No such employee shall serve as an officer, director, employee or partner of a Market Participant.

III.A.18.2.2. **Prohibition on Compensation for Services.**

No such employee shall be compensated, other than by the ISO or, in the case of employees of the External Market Monitor, by the External Market Monitor, for any expert witness testimony or other commercial services, either to the ISO or to any other party, in connection with any legal or regulatory proceeding or commercial transaction relating to the ISO or the New England Markets.

III.A.18.2.3. **Additional Standards Applicable to External Market Monitor.**

In addition to the standards referenced in the remainder of this Section 18 of Appendix A, the employees of the External Market Monitor that perform market monitoring and mitigation services for the ISO are subject to conduct standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement entered into between the External Market Monitor and the ISO, as amended from time-to-time. In the event of a conflict between one or more standards set forth in the External Market Monitor Services Agreement and one or more standards set forth above or in the ISO New England Inc. Code of Conduct, the more stringent standard(s) shall control.

III.A.19. **Protocols on Referral to the Commission of Suspected Violations.**

(A) The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a non-public referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe that a Market Violation has occurred. While the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor need not be able to prove that a Market Violation has occurred, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to provide sufficient credible information to warrant further investigation by the Commission. Once the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has obtained sufficient credible information to warrant referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to immediately refer the matter to the Commission and desist from independent action related to the alleged Market Violation. This does not preclude the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor from continuing to monitor for
any repeated instances of the activity by the same or other entities, which would constitute new Market Violations. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to respond to requests from the Commission for any additional information in connection with the alleged Market Violation it has referred.

(B) All referrals to the Commission of alleged Market Violations are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

(C) The referral is to be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Enforcement, with a copy also directed to both the Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation and the General Counsel.

(D) The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information

1. The name(s) of and, if possible, the contact information for, the entity(ies) that allegedly took the action(s) that constituted the alleged Market Violation(s);
2. The date(s) or time period during which the alleged Market Violation(s) occurred and whether the alleged wrongful conduct is ongoing;
3. The specific rule or regulation, and/or tariff provision, that was allegedly violated, or the nature of any inappropriate dispatch that may have occurred;
4. The specific act(s) or conduct that allegedly constituted the Market Violation;
5. The consequences to the market resulting from the acts or conduct, including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
6. If the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes that the act(s) or conduct constituted a violation of the anti-manipulation rule of Part 1c of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, 18 C.F.R. Part 1c, a description of the alleged manipulative effect on market prices, market conditions, or market rules;
7. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

(E) Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any information that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor learns of that may be related to the referral, but the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is not to undertake any investigative steps regarding the referral except at the express direction of the Commission or Commission staff.

The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to make a referral to the Commission in all instances where the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor has reason to believe market design flaws exist that it believes could effectively be remedied by rule or tariff changes. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor must limit distribution of its identifications and recommendations to the ISO and to the Commission in the event it believes broader dissemination could lead to exploitation, with an explanation of why further dissemination should be avoided at that time.

All referrals to the Commission relating to perceived market design flaws and recommended tariff changes are to be in writing, whether transmitted electronically, by fax, mail, or courier. The Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor may alert the Commission orally in advance of the written referral.

The referral should be addressed to the Commission’s Director of the Office of Energy Market Regulation, with copies directed to both the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the General Counsel.

The referral is to include, but need not be limited to, the following information.

1. A detailed narrative describing the perceived market design flaw(s);
2. The consequences of the perceived market design flaw(s), including, if known, an estimate of economic impact on the market;
3. The rule or tariff change(s) that the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes could remedy the perceived market design flaw;
4. Any other information the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor believes is relevant and may be helpful to the Commission.

Following a referral to the Commission, the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor is to continue to notify and inform the Commission of any additional information regarding the perceived market design flaw, its effects on the market, any additional or modified observations concerning the rule or tariff changes that could remedy the perceived design flaw, any recommendations made by the Internal Market Monitor or External Market Monitor to the regional transmission organization or independent system operator, stakeholders, market participants or state commissions regarding the perceived design flaw, and any actions taken by the regional transmission organization or independent system operator regarding the perceived design flaw.


The Internal Market Monitor shall review offers from certain New Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in this Section III.A.21. The provisions of Sections III.A.21.1 and
III.A.21.2 are not applicable to offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

III.A.21.1. **Applicability of Buyer-Side Market Power Review.**
The Internal Market Monitor will not conduct a buyer-side market power review of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in this Section III.A.21.1.

III.A.21.1.1. **Resources with Capacity Not Exceeding 5 MW.**
A New Capacity Resource will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the project’s expected auction capacity (in MW) at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction does not exceed 5 MW.

If a New Capacity Resource’s expected auction capacity exceeds 5 MW at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, but the final FCA Qualified Capacity for the New Capacity Resource does not exceed 5 MW, an offer from the New Capacity Resource will not be mitigated pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.3, notwithstanding any buyer-side market power review that may have been conducted at the time of the qualification process.

III.A.21.1.2. **Passive Demand Response Resources.**
New Demand Capacity Resources that consist solely of On-Peak Demand Resources or Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review.

III.A.21.1.3. **Resources Supported by a Qualifying Load-Side Relationship Certification.**
New Capacity Resources will not be subject to the Internal Market Monitor’s buyer-side market power review if the Project Sponsor submits a Load-Side Relationship Certification, as described in this Section III.A.21.1.3, demonstrating one of the following qualifying circumstances:

(a) the Project Sponsor and its Affiliates or partners, if any, are not load serving entities and are neither receiving nor expecting to receive any revenues from a load serving entity, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource (excepting any revenues earned through an ISO-administered market); or

(b) the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource.
For the purpose of this Section III.A.21, a load serving entity is any entity that has or is the type of entity that could acquire a Capacity Load Obligation in the Forward Capacity Market.

To demonstrate such circumstances, the Project Sponsor must include as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes factual detail sufficient to explain the qualifying circumstances. The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification with the New Capacity Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2, or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. If the ISO is unable to determine from the Load-Side Relationship Certification that one of the qualifying circumstances exists, the New Capacity Resource’s offer shall be subject to buyer-side market power review pursuant to Section III.A.21.2.


With the exception of New Capacity Resources that meet the criteria described in Section III.A.21.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall review requested lowest offer prices from New Capacity Resources, as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a), for the potential exercise of buyer-side market power following the process described in this Section III.A.21.2.


The Internal Market Monitor will perform a conduct test by reviewing the information described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8(a) and determining a New Resource Offer Floor Price, as described in Section III.A.21.3, for the New Capacity Resource. A requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the New Resource Offer Floor Price exceeds the requested lowest offer price.

#### III.A.21.2.2. Demonstration of Lack of Incentive to Exercise Buyer-Side Market Power.

If the Project Sponsor does not submit a Load-Side Relationship Certification (or the ISO rejects the Project Sponsor’s Load-Side Relationship Certification) because the Project Sponsor is or is affiliated with a load serving entity or because the Project Sponsor receives or expects to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered markets from a load serving entity, the Project Sponsor is entitled to submit documentation and information as part of the New Capacity Qualification Package or the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification package to demonstrate that, notwithstanding such a relationship with a load serving entity with regard to the New Capacity Resource, such load serving entity would be unlikely
to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market. If, after consideration of such documentation and information, the Internal Market Monitor determines that a load serving entity as described in this Section III.A.21.2.2 would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in Forward Capacity Auction clearing prices resulting from entry of the New Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Market, then the Internal Market Monitor will not subject the requested lowest offer price to the mitigation described in Section III.A.21.2.3. For the avoidance of doubt, a Project Sponsor may not utilize the provisions of this Section III.A.21.2.2 if it receives or expects to receive any revenues from a state, or from a political subdivision of a state that is not also a load serving entity, that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the New Capacity Resource.

As part of the documentation and information the Project Sponsor submits pursuant to this Section III.A.21.2.2, the Project Sponsor must include in its documentation and information a disclosure of any and all direct or indirect relationships or arrangements with a load serving entity regarding the New Capacity Resource and any other information necessary for the Internal Market Monitor to make the determination described in this Section III.A.21.2.2.

III.A.21.2.3. Consequence of Failing the Conduct Test and Failing to Rebut Presumed Incentive.

If a requested lowest offer price from a New Capacity Resource fails the conduct test and the Internal Market Monitor does not determine the lack of a material, net financial benefit to a load serving entity, as described in Section III.A.21.2.2, the New Resource Offer Floor Price calculated as part of the conduct test shall be used in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2.

As described in Section III.A.21.1.1, the mitigation described in this Section III.A.21.2.3 will not apply to a New Capacity Resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity that does not exceed the capacity threshold set forth in Section III.A.21.1.1, notwithstanding the results of any buyer-side market power review.


For any New Capacity Resource for which the Internal Market Monitor is required to calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price, the Internal Market Monitor shall use the calculation methodology described in this Section III.A.21.3.
A resource having a New Resource Offer Floor Price determined pursuant to this Section III.A.21.3 that is higher than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) When calculating a New Resource Offer Floor Price for any New Capacity Resource, the Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant resource capital and operating costs and non-capacity revenue data, as well as assumptions regarding depreciation, taxes, and discount rate into a capital budgeting model and shall calculate the break-even contribution required from the Forward Capacity Market to yield a discounted cash flow with a net present value of zero for the project. The default model looks at 20 years of real-dollar cash flows discounted at a rate (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) consistent with that expected of a project whose output is under contract (i.e., a contract negotiated at arm’s length between two unrelated parties). The model horizon shall be longer or shorter than 20 years for a resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price calculation, if sufficiently documented in the offer information submitted pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.1.2.3 or III.13.1.4.1.2.8. Adjustments to the model and calculation methodology will be made for certain types of New Demand Capacity Resources as described below in this subsection (a):

(i) For New Demand Capacity Resources, the Internal Market Monitor will model discounted cash flows over the contract life.

(ii) For New Demand Capacity Resources that are composed primarily of large commercial or industrial customers that use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include new equipment costs and annual operating costs, such as customer incentives and sales representative commissions, as incremental costs.

(iii) For New Demand Capacity Resources primarily composed of residential or small commercial customers that do not use pre-existing equipment or strategies, the Internal Market Monitor will include equipment costs, customer incentives, marketing, sales, and recruitment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and software and network infrastructure costs as incremental costs.

(b) The Internal Market Monitor shall compare the requested lowest offer price to the capacity price estimate calculated pursuant to subsection (a), and the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be determined as follows:
(i) The Internal Market Monitor will exclude any out-of-market revenue sources from the cash flows used to evaluate the requested offer price. Out-of-market revenues are any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner. Expected revenues associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose. In submitting its requested offer price, the Project Sponsor shall indicate whether and which project cash flows are supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism. If the project is supported by a regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism, then that rate will be replaced with the Internal Market Monitor estimate of energy revenues. Where possible, the Internal Market Monitor will use like-unit historical production, revenue, and fuel cost data. Where such information is not available (e.g., there is no resource of that type in service), the Internal Market Monitor will use a forecast provided by a credible third party source. The Internal Market Monitor will review capital costs, discount rates, depreciation and tax treatment to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions. Any assumptions that are clearly inconsistent with prevailing market conditions will be adjusted.

(ii) For a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s costs shall include all expenses, including incentive payments, equipment costs, marketing and selling and administrative and general costs incurred to acquire and/or develop the Demand Capacity Resource. Revenues shall include all non-capacity payments expected from the ISO-administered markets made for services delivered from the associated Demand Response Resource, and expected costs avoided by the associated end-use customer as a direct result of the installation or implementation of the associated Asset(s).

(iii) For a New Capacity Resource that has achieved commercial operation prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction in which it seeks to participate, the relevant capital costs to be entered into the capital budgeting model will be the undepreciated original capital costs adjusted for inflation. For any such resource, the prevailing market conditions will be those that were in place at the time of the decision to construct the resource.
(iv) Sufficient documentation and information must be included in the resource’s qualification package (as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.3(a) and III.13.1.4.1.2.8(a)) to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the determinations described in this Section III.A.21.3. If the supporting documentation and information is deficient, the Internal Market Monitor, at its sole discretion, may consult with the Project Sponsor to gather further information as necessary to complete its analysis. If after consultation, the Project Sponsor does not provide sufficient documentation and information for the Internal Market Monitor to complete its analysis, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

(v) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer price is consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be equal to the requested offer price.

(vi) If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the requested offer price is not consistent with the Internal Market Monitor’s capacity price estimate, then the New Resource Offer Floor Price shall be set to a level that is consistent with the capacity price estimate, as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. Any such determination will be explained in the resource’s qualification determination notification and will be filed with the Commission as part of the filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c).

III.A.21.4. Offer Prices for New Import Capacity Resources.

(a) All New Import Capacity Resources (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23.

(b) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 that does not seek to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the resource’s offer price shall be $0.00/kW-month, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v).

(c) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and seeks to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal
Market Monitor-determined offer price for the resource using the methodology for calculating New Resource Offer Floor Prices set forth in Section III.A.21.3. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is not subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23, the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate a New Resource Offer Floor Price using the methodology set forth in Section III.A.21.3, if such a calculation is required for the resource under Section III.A.21.2 above.

(d) For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test in Section III.A.23 and is found to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource’s offer prices shall be reduced to equal the lower of (1) the prices determined by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to subsection (c); or (2) the offer prices as revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7. For any New Import Capacity Resource that is subject to the pivotal supplier test and is found not to be associated with a pivotal supplier, if the supplier elects to revise the requested offer prices pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7, the resource’s offer prices shall be reduced to the prices revised pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.7.

III.A.22. [Reserved.]

III.A.23. Pivotal Supplier Test for Existing Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources in the Forward Capacity Market.

III.A.23.1. Pivotal Supplier Test.
The pivotal supplier test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction at the system level and for each import-constrained Capacity Zone.

An Existing Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource is associated with a pivotal supplier if, after removing all the supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is less than the requirement. Only those New Import Capacity Resources that are not (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, are subject to the pivotal supplier test.

For the system level determination, the relevant requirement is the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the relevant requirement is the Local Sourcing Requirement for that import-constrained Capacity Zone.
At the system level, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the following:

(a) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;
(b) For each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone, the greater of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the import-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
   (2) the Local Sourcing Requirement of the import-constrained Capacity Zone;
(c) For each modeled nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone plus, for each external interface connected to the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, and;
   (2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone;
(d) For each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (1) the total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within the export-constrained Capacity Zone, excluding the total FCA Qualified Capacity from Existing Generating Capacity Resources and Existing Demand Capacity Resources within a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, plus, for each external interface connected to the export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not included in any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of: (i) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (ii) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the interface, excluding the contribution from any nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;
(2) the Maximum Capacity Limit of the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the
contribution from any associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone as determined
pursuant to Section III.A.23.1(c), and;

(e) For each modeled external interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser
of:

(1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and;
(2) the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the
interface.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the ability to meet the relevant requirement is the sum of the
following:

(1) The total FCA Qualified Capacity from all Existing Generating Capacity Resources and
Existing Demand Capacity Resources located within the import-constrained Capacity
Zone; and

(2) For each modeled external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone,
the lesser of: (1) the capacity transfer limit of the interface (net of tie benefits), and; (2)
the total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity from Import Capacity Resources over the
interface.

III.A.23.2. Conditions Under Which Capacity is Treated as Non-Pivotal.
FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier that is determined to be pivotal under Section III.A.23.1 is treated
as non-pivotal under the following four conditions:

(a) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in an export-constrained Capacity Zone
or nested export-constrained Capacity Zone does not change the quantity calculated in Section
III.A.23.1(c) for that export-constrained Capacity Zone or nested export-constrained Capacity
Zone, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(b) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity
Resources at an external interface does not change the quantity calculated in Section
III.A.23.1(d) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal
supplier.

(c) If the removal of a supplier’s FCA Qualified Capacity in the form of Import Capacity
Resources at an external interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone does not
change the quantity calculated in Section III.A.23.1(f) for that interface, then that capacity is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

(d) If a supplier whose only FCA Qualified Capacity is a single capacity resource with a bid that (i) is not subject to rationing under Section III.13.1.2.3.1 or III.13.2.6, and (ii) contains only one price-quantity pair for the entire FCA Qualified Capacity amount, then the capacity of that resource is treated as capacity of a non-pivotal supplier.

III.A.23.3.  **Pivotal Supplier Test Notification of Results.**

Results of the pivotal supplier test will be made available to suppliers no later than seven days prior to the start of the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.A.23.4.  **Qualified Capacity for Purposes of Pivotal Supplier Test.**

For purposes of the tests performed in Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier includes the capacity of Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Demand Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources (other than (i) a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that is controlled by the supplier or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the ability to meet the relevant requirement under Section III.A.23.1, the FCA Qualified Capacity from New Import Capacity Resources does not include (i) any New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability; and (ii) any New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a supplier or its Affiliates under Section III.A.23.4, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a supplier shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.23.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.

The retirement portfolio test is performed prior to the commencement of the Forward Capacity Auction for each Lead Market Participant submitting a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The test will be performed as follows:

If

i. The annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, is greater than

ii. the annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity, including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, then

iii. the Lead Market Participant will be found to have a portfolio benefit pursuant to the retirement portfolio test.

Where,

iv. the Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price not including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

v. The Lead Market Participant’s annual capacity revenue from the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is calculated as the product of (a) the Lead Market Participant’s total FCA Qualified Capacity including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid and (b) the Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price including the FCA Qualified Capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.

vi. The Internal Market Monitor-estimated capacity clearing price, not to exceed the Forward
Capacity Auction Starting Price, is based on the parameters of the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and Capacity Zone Demand Curves as specified in Section III.13.2.2.

For purposes of the test performed in this Section III.A.24, the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant includes the capacity of Existing Capacity Resources that is controlled by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates.

For purposes of determining the FCA Qualified Capacity of a Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates under this Section III.A.24, “control” or “controlled” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the authority to direct the decision-making regarding how capacity is offered into the Forward Capacity Market, and includes control by contract with unaffiliated third parties. In complying with Section I.3.5 of the ISO Tariff, a Lead Market Participant shall inform the ISO of all capacity that it and its Affiliates control under this Section III.A.4 and all capacity the control of which it has contracted to a third party.
I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Q: Please state your name, position, and business address.

A: My name is Vamsi Chadalavada. I am the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”). My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.1

Q: Dr. Chadalavada, please describe your professional experience and qualifications.

A: I have served as the Chief Operating Officer since July 13, 2008. I have managerial responsibility for the ISO’s System and Market Operations, Market Development, Project Management, Information and Cyber Security Services, 

1 Capitalized terms used in this testimony but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, and the Participants Agreement.
NEPOOL Relations, and System Planning departments. In this role, I have the ultimate managerial responsibility for the design, development, and implementation of the ISO's approach to addressing the region's resource adequacy needs and its approach to ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system.

Prior to my current position, I served as the Senior Vice President for Market and System Solutions. I served in that capacity beginning on December 1, 2003. Before joining the ISO, I held a number of positions at Siemens Power Transmission and Distribution, most recently Vice President and General Manager of Siemens’ Energy Management and Information Systems (EMIS).

I received my BS in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from SVU Engineering College, India in 1989; my MS degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa in 1991; and my PhD degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa in 1994. My PhD dissertation on “Contingency Filters for Dynamic Security Assessment” received a Research Excellence award from Iowa State University. I have published articles and papers in Power Engineering journals.
II. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY

Q: What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A: The purpose of my testimony is to explain the reasons that the ISO supports a graduated transition to the elimination of the existing Minimum Offer Price Rule ("MOPR") in the Forward Capacity Market ("FCM"), and its replacement with new buyer-side market power review rules that are proposed in the instant filing (the "BSMPR Reforms"). That graduated transition, which is referred to in the filing as the Transition Mechanism, permits, over the course of the next two Forward Capacity Auctions ("FCA") 17 and 18, measured entry of state-sponsored resources into the capacity market that would otherwise be prevented due to the MOPR. The proposed Transition Mechanism will thereafter terminate, and pursuant to the instant filing the MOPR will be eliminated and will be replaced by the BSMPR Reforms for FCA 19.

Q: Please provide an overview of the Transition Mechanism.

A: The Transition Mechanism maintains the current MOPR in the FCM for the next two auctions, FCAs 17 and 18, but permits entry of a total of 700 MW of state-sponsored resources in these two auctions through the reinstatement of the Renewable Technology Resource (or "RTR") exemption to the MOPR. This RTR mechanism was employed in the FCM prior to the implementation of the Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources ("CASPR") substitution auction mechanism.
As proposed in the instant filing, in FCA 17 up to 300 MW of state-sponsored resources will be permitted an exemption from the MOPR, and in FCA 18, an additional 400 MW of state-sponsored resources, plus any unused portion from FCA 17, will be permitted such an exemption. Additional details regarding the mechanism are explained in the companion testimony of Ryan McCarthy, Lead Analyst for the ISO, on the Transition Mechanism, but the 700 MW RTR exemption is the primary feature of the transition. In FCA 19, the Transition Mechanism is retired in full, and the MOPR is eliminated and replaced with the BSMPR Reforms.

Q: Please summarize why the ISO favors a graduated transition to the replacement of the existing buyer-side mitigation rules with the proposed BSMPR Reforms.

A: It is first important to recognize that the ISO is focused on supporting the clean energy transition. This is reflected in the ISO’s vision statement—*To harness the power of competition and advanced technologies to reliably plan and operate the grid as the region transitions to clean energy.* The ISO favors a graduated transition because it furthers the clean energy transition while posing a lower risk to the region than an immediate elimination of the MOPR.

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Replacement of the existing MOPR with the BSMPR Reforms enables new state-sponsored resources to enter the FCM unmitigated. The replacement of the MOPR is appropriate, as discussed in the transmittal letter, given the pace of state procurements and the emerging impact of the MOPR on consumers. However, the replacement of the MOPR also poses risks. The graduated transition is an opportunity to minimize those risks. Such caution is warranted, in particular, in light of the region’s energy adequacy concerns and the region’s experience with delays in building new energy infrastructure.

Given states’ decarbonization policies, the ISO anticipates that a substantial amount of state-sponsored resources will qualify for participation in the FCM once the BSMPR Reforms are implemented. Since these resources receive compensation outside the FCM, eliminating the MOPR will allow many of these resources to offer into the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are at or close to zero, thereby impacting clearing prices in the auction. The ISO is concerned that these impacts have the potential to spur retirements of existing capacity resources sooner than would be efficient, thereby increasing risk to the reliability of the region in the short-term and, potentially, undermining investor confidence in the region’s markets over the long-term.

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3 The significant growth in these policies is summarized in Section V of the transmittal letter for this filing.
A two-year transition will afford the region time to complete and implement critical market design enhancements before those retirements occur. These market design enhancements will, among other things, allow the region to better account for the reliability contributions of all resources on the system, including in particular the relative contributions of resources exiting and entering the system.

Moreover, those retirements will necessitate the replacement of the retiring MW. Delays in the development of new resources to replace retiring generators create their own reliability concerns. We have seen an unmistakable trend in New England toward opposition to the development of new energy infrastructure, whether they are large renewable resources, combined-cycle resources, or transmission projects. Significant delays—which the region should reasonably anticipate—in the completion of the states’ large, sponsored clean-energy generation projects could pose serious challenges to reliability as the MOPR’s elimination spurs existing resource retirements.

As the only independent entity responsible for the reliability of the bulk power system, it is incumbent for us to give careful review to market changes that could have an adverse impact on the system. After listening carefully to stakeholder feedback, observing continuing delays and terminations in the construction of new resources, and qualitatively assessing the impact to the system, the ISO
believes that a two-year transition will provide the region time to implement key
market reforms, and increase confidence in the development of the state-
sponsored resources that will replace resources that will likely retire with the
MOPR’s elimination. Energy infrastructure development delays appear inevitable
in New England; addressing the adverse consequences of those delays with a two-
year transition to the MOPR elimination is a measured and reasonable step.

III. POTENTIAL ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIABILITY IF THE
MOPR IS ELIMINATED WITHOUT A TRANSITION MECHANISM

Q: Can you quantify the amount of state-sponsored resource capacity that
would enter the FCM over the course of the next two Forward Capacity
Auctions in 2023 (FCA 17) and 2024 (FCA 18) if those resources were
permitted to participate unmitigated?

A: It is difficult to know with certainty what quantity of new state-sponsored
resources would receive Capacity Supply Obligations over the course of the next
two years were they permitted to do so without mitigation. There are, however, a
few factors that can help provide guidance on this question, and which we have
considered in evaluating how best to transition to the BSMPR Reforms.

First, the entry costs for a range of clean energy and renewable resources are
decreasing with advancements in technologies, which has enabled several
technologies to clear in recent Forward Capacity Auctions without, or with
limited, state sponsorship. This is reflected in the ISO’s most recent recalculation
of Offer Review Trigger Prices in 2020-2021, which demonstrated extremely low
entry costs for onshore wind resources, photovoltaic (“PV”) solar resources and
battery storage resources.\textsuperscript{4} It is thus not surprising that, in the latest Forward
Capacity Auction held in February 2022, despite the application of the MOPR,
100 percent of the new resources that received Capacity Supply Obligations were
PV solar and battery storage resources.\textsuperscript{5} We believe these resources will continue
to compete in future auctions without any, or with limited, state sponsorship,
which largely mitigates the impact of the existing buyer-side mitigation rules for
these technology types.

Second, while this result is promising, the same cannot be said for the largest
classes (in terms of MW) of clean energy and renewable resources that the New
England states are sponsoring—large-scale offshore wind resources, large-scale
transmission projects to support the procurement of clean energy imports, and
potentially, larger battery storage projects. As the table below demonstrates, wind
projects—primarily offshore wind—now comprise 60 percent of resources that
are seeking interconnection service, and battery storage comprises an additional

\textsuperscript{4} ISO New England Inc., 175 FERC ¶ 61,195 (2021) (accepting an ORTP of $2.601/kW-month for battery storage, $1.381/kW-month for PV solar, and $0.00/kW-month for onshore wind). For FCA 17, these values have decreased even further, with battery storage having an ORTP of $0.789/kW-month, and both onshore wind and PV solar having an ORTP of $0.00/kW-month.

22 percent. This is a striking jump from 2017, when natural gas and oil-fired resources comprised 50 percent of the queue.⁶

While there is some indication that the costs of construction for offshore wind facilities will likely decrease over the next decade,⁷ the ISO’s evidence, as

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⁶ In contrast, natural gas or dual fuel facilities have waned from more than 60 percent of the interconnection queue in 2015 to approximately 3 percent in 2022.

reflected in its filing of Offer Review Trigger Prices in 2021, is that those costs are still much too high for offshore wind resources to clear in the capacity market without significant state support. In addition, while battery storage projects have significantly lower entry costs than offshore wind projects, some stand-alone large-scale projects are too expensive to clear in the auction without state support. Similarly, the significant up-front costs for transmission infrastructure render projects to import clean energy into New England from other regions cost-prohibitive without substantial state support, making such projects unlikely to clear in the FCM under the MOPR.

These factors are currently reflected in the substantial quantities of state-directed procurements of offshore wind and “clean transmission” projects. Between Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, up to 8,000 MW of offshore wind procurements have either already occurred or are anticipated by 2030. In addition, Massachusetts has executed contracts for approximately 1,090 MW of capacity in the form of firm service hydroelectric generation from Hydro-Quebec. We provide an overview of these procurements in Section V of the transmittal letter for this filing.

Q: Why is the ISO concerned about the unmitigated entry of these resources for FCAs 17 and 18?

A: The ISO believes that maintaining a reliable bulk power system is critical to ensuring a successful transition to the clean energy future. To that end, the ISO is concerned that the immediate entry of large quantities of state-sponsored resources could pose an unacceptable risk to the existing resources upon which the region currently relies, prompting the retirement of these resources before the point at which we are in a position to fully ascertain and account for the relative reliability benefits of the retiring resources and the new resources replacing them.

These retirements could have significant adverse consequences for reliability, particularly during times when the interstate natural gas pipelines are constrained or during large contingencies. We refer to these adverse reliability consequences generally as a potential for “inefficient retirements,” a concept that I will explain further below. We are further concerned that inefficient retirements could exacerbate the energy adequacy challenges the New England region chronically faces during the winter months.

The ISO is equally concerned that these retirements could occur before new state-sponsored resources that are scheduled to replace them reach commercial operation. As I address in more detail below, state-sponsored resources are not immune to the development delays that have plagued many energy infrastructure projects in New England, and indeed there are reasons to believe that the observed delays of large-scale projects will continue. If the elimination of the MOPR
prompts near-term retirements of existing resources upon which the region relies
to maintain reliability, and state-sponsored resources whose capacity the market
has procured to replace those retiring resources are delayed, the result could pose
a significant reliability challenge.

In contrast, the ISO anticipates that a more graduated transition to the BSMPR
Reforms would minimize the reliability risks to the region. The transition
proposal sets a steady pace for new, sponsored technologies to displace existing
resources over the next two auction cycles, and gives the new large-scale, state-
sponsored resources time to achieve commercial operation. More certainty
around the quantity of sponsored resources entering the market should attenuate
the potential for inefficient retirements and the ensuing reliability risk.

Q: Can you elaborate on your concern with the potential for inefficient
retirements?

A: Prior to launching the stakeholder process and throughout the stakeholder process
to address reforms to the existing buyer-side market power mitigation rules, the
ISO discussed its concerns about the risk of inefficient retirements with the
elimination of the MOPR. At its core, the risk is that, without the current MOPR
construct in place, entry from state-sponsored resources with low-priced offers
could prompt the premature retirement of resources whose flexibility,
dependability and/or sustainability may be far more valuable in the future, with
high renewables penetration, than the wholesale markets currently remunerate.
Eliminating the MOPR would increase low-cost supply offers in the FCA, which would tend to lower clearing prices. This would in turn lower revenues for existing resources and ultimately increase the likelihood of their retirement.

These retirements are made more likely, and potentially more harmful, because the current market construct utilizes imprecise measures of technologies’ actual contributions to resource adequacy in the FCA qualification process. While this has not been a concern to date given the relatively low penetration of intermittent resources, the entry of large quantities of state sponsored resources could substantially magnify the problem with the market’s current method of resource capacity accreditation.

In practice, inefficient retirements could take several forms, and the ISO seeks to minimize the cumulative consequences of such inefficiencies. To take a simple example, today, a new solar resource’s summer qualified capacity as a percent of nameplate capacity is typically 50 percent that of a thermal resource, reflecting the former’s lower average output during reliability hours. Therefore, 800 MWs of nameplate PV solar projects would have a summer qualified capacity of 400 MW in the FCA, and a nameplate 400 MW (for this example) of thermal projects would have a summer qualified capacity of 400 MW.

However, as the system transitions to reflect high periods of demand in the evenings (after the sun sets) on hot summer days, as seen in other regions of the
country, and during cold winter hours when it is dark in New England and winter demand peaks, the actual contributions to reliability of the PV solar resource may be a fraction of the 400 MW for which it would be paid.

Therefore, the 400 MW of qualified solar capacity (on 800 MW of nameplate solar resources) does not provide the same reliability benefits to the system as the 400 MW of thermal resources in the FCA. Exacerbating the problem, many of the existing thermal resources provide additional benefits to the system given their dispatchable and controllable nature.

**Q:** How does the transition help reliability if solar resources may clear without the MOPR?

**A:** As I have explained above, the entry costs for solar and battery storage resources have decreased significantly over the last few years, and continue to do so. These resources are likely to be competitive in the auction regardless of the application of the MOPR, and thus a transition mechanism that maintains the MOPR is not likely to impact the entry of many PV solar resources.

But for precisely this reason, it is critical that we be careful to take a measured approach to the MOPR’s elimination. In particular, it is important not to trigger further inefficient retirements (that is, further than the 400 MW in the illustrative example above), which could occur if a large volume of higher-cost resources were to clear in the upcoming auction without the MOPR.
This issue is a prominent regional concern because the ISO’s current FCA capacity accreditation rules have not yet been modernized to account for this inefficient displacement as resource mix changes begin to alter the system’s reliability risks. Fundamentally, under the current FCM rules, the qualified capacity values of all capacity resources may not reflect resources’ actual contributions to the system’s reliability as the system transitions to one with substantially more highly variable, weather-dependent resources.

Q: **Is the ISO seeking to prevent retirements of existing units?**

A: No. Since 2013, roughly 7,000 MW of generation have retired or announced plans to retire. The ISO-administered markets are intended to facilitate the entry and exit of resources. So long as retirement and entry of resources are based upon expectations of competitive market outcomes, and so long as resources are properly remunerated for both the energy they provide (in the energy markets) and their reliability contributions to the system, resources’ exit decisions would be the result of properly-functioning market signals.

The ISO’s concern is with inefficient retirements, wherein resources choose to retire prematurely because the price signals they face do not presently reflect, in the case of the capacity market in particular, resources’ contributions to the system’s overall reliability.
Q: Has the ISO studied the longer-term need to maintain existing resources—i.e., in terms of their flexibility, dependability and/or sustainability—with the introduction of large quantities of intermittent, renewable resources onto the system?

A: The on-going long-term transmission planning study effort that was initiated by the New England states is informative on the question of the continued need for existing resources.\(^9\) The ISO performed the study in response to the New England States Committee on Electricity’s (“NESCOE”) “New England States’ Vision for a Clean, Affordable, and Reliable 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Regional Electric Grid.”\(^10\) In accordance with NESCOE’s request, the ISO studied transmission needs necessary to serve load through 2050 while satisfying applicable reliability criteria, and transmission upgrades required to satisfy those needs. Also in accordance with NESCOE’s request, load and resource assumptions for the study were based on an “all options” pathway used as part of Massachusetts’ Energy Pathways to Deep Decarbonization initiative.\(^11\)


\(^10\) The NESCOE vision statement is available at https://nescoe.com/resource-center/vision-stmt-oct2020/.

employed assumptions that were compatible with the objective of achieving deep
decarbonization, and included shifting from summer peaking to winter peaking,
a doubling of peak power consumption by 2050 due to electrification of heating
and transportation sectors, and utilization of over 56,000 MW of nameplate PV
and over 34,000 MW of nameplate wind in 2050.

The results of the study indicate that, under all 12 scenarios (referred to as
“snapshots”) studied, the dispatch of fossil-fueled generation would be necessary
to achieve a load-generation balance. It is important to underscore that, as with
any such study, results could differ under different load and resource assumptions.
Nevertheless, these results indicate the importance of ensuring that significant
market design enhancements such as the elimination of the MOPR are
thoughtfully implemented, so as to avoid the inefficient loss of resources that may
well be necessary to reliably operate the system well into the future, as part of the
transforming resource mix.

Q: Is it possible to quantify the risk of inefficient retirements, in terms of the
likely capacity that would retire and specific adverse reliability events that
would ensue with those retirements?

12 MA Pathways Study at 29.
13 ISO 2050 Transmission Study at slide 50.
14 Id.
A: It is very difficult to quantify these risks and their consequences. Ultimately, a
decision to retire is a function of the specific financial position of the resource and
the organization that owns it—i.e., the financial data of the resource and its
owner. The decision is complex, reflecting individual perceptions of future
revenue and risks, corporate financial positions, and possible externalities (for
example, a requirement to perform environmental remediation on a site following
retirement). The ISO does not have access to that information, and therefore it is
not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the likely timing or pace of
individual resources’ retirement decisions.

Quantifying with accuracy the likely impact of any particular resource retirement
decision at this stage is also complicated by the fact that, as I explained above, the
ISO does not currently have in place the necessary tools to comprehensively
perform this analysis. The ISO is in the midst of developing a new methodology
to assess the reliability contributions of different resources, given the region’s
rapidly evolving resource mix. That methodology is not yet developed to where it
can better model the risks to reliability (specifically, the system’s expected loss-of-load MWh) associated with a particular resource retirement and its replacement
with a different, likely renewable, resource technology.

Q: While you indicate you cannot quantify the risks or likelihood of inefficient
resource retirements presently, are there examples of the kind of reliability
concerns that can result when a rapid change in the resource mix prompts inefficient retirements?

A: Yes, we are seeing the adverse consequences of significant changes in resource mix in other regions with rapid shutdowns of existing resources displaced by state-sponsored resources. For example, in September 2019, the California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) forecasted the potential for capacity shortfalls during summer evening peak load conditions beginning in 2020, attributing those shortfalls to, among other things, decreased capacity resulting from “net retirement of 4,000 MW of once-through cooling steam generation.”

In August of 2020, a heat wave throughout the western United States led to capacity shortfalls and rotating outages in California.

A root cause analysis of the August 2020 outages identified several contributing factors, including: (1) the extreme nature of the August heat wave, which led to demand exceeding resource adequacy targets; (2) a transition to a resource mix that was unable to adequately balance supply and demand during the early

15 California Independent System Operator, Briefing on Post 2020 Grid Operational Outlook, slide 4 (September 2019) (identifying a shift in peak demand to early evening when solar production is significantly reduced as a basis for reliance on natural gas resources, but also noting that capacity is decreasing due to “Net retirement of 4,000 MW of once-through cooling stream generation”), available at http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Briefing-Post-2020-GridOperationalOutlook-Presentation-Sep2019.pdf.

16 At the time, California’s resource adequacy requirements were based on a one-in-two peak weather demand, plus a 15 percent planning reserve margin.
evening hours of net peak load;¹⁷ and (3) day-ahead energy market practices that exacerbated supply challenges.¹⁸ Although the combined generation and import portfolio produced adequate supply to meet load during the hour of gross peak demand, there was insufficient supply during the net peak demand period, which occurred one-to-two hours after gross peak demand.¹⁹

In reviewing the net peak demand shortfall, the root cause analysis cited shortcomings of the static Net Qualifying Capacity values assigned to certain resources, which it indicated may under-value performance during gross peak load but over-value performance during net peak load conditions occurring later in the evening.²⁰ A key recommendation of the root cause analysis was to account for the time-dependent capabilities of intermittent resources as part of CAISO’s resource adequacy planning process.

**Q:** How do the events in California in August of 2020 inform the ISO’s thinking with respect to the proposed overhaul of its market power mitigation rules in the capacity market?

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¹⁷ Net peak load represents the total energy demand, but subtracts from the gross peak load wind and solar resource capability, to show the variance between demand and the amount of resources available later in the afternoon when renewable resources are no longer generating.


¹⁹ *Id.* at 43.

²⁰ *Id.* at 44.
A: Many of the same conditions that led to California’s August 2020 outages have the potential to arise in New England. The proposed overhaul of the market power mitigation rules, while well-justified, will likely usher into the market large volumes of state-sponsored renewable resources. As in California, the increase of renewable resources will create similar late-day net peak load conditions. To be clear, these changes are happening and are expected to continue regardless of the MOPR’s elimination. At the same time, the entry of significant volumes of “below cost” state-sponsored resources into the market from the MOPR’s immediate elimination is likely to hasten the retirement of higher-cost resources that are not dependent on the weather for their input energy sources and which would otherwise be available to serve load during net peak periods.

Capacity accreditation is currently determined using qualified capacity values based upon historical performance figures, and those figures fail to reflect the reliability value of capacity resources under varying operating conditions. It is critical that we employ a measured transition to the implementation of the BSMPR Reforms to permit the region the time to reform its capacity accreditation rules so that they produce values that more accurately account for the resource adequacy contributions of different resources, and thereby avoid similar reliability risks.21

Q: Could inefficient retirements pose other threats in New England?

A: Yes, as I noted above, inefficient retirements could exacerbate the challenge we face in New England of maintaining reliability in extended cold-weather conditions.

The ISO’s concerns about serving load in New England during extreme winter weather events are well-documented. Over the past two decades, market forces in New England have spurred an evolution from a generating fleet where large stockpiles of fuel were stored on-site and readily available for dispatch (e.g., coal and oil-fired resources), to a fleet where a near-majority of generation relies on just-in-time fuels, such as pipeline-constrained natural gas.

This evolution has generally resulted in decreased annual wholesale electricity costs to consumers, but has also increased the risk that generators may not be able to perform when needed during extreme winter weather events and related contingencies, referred to as “tail risk” events. This potential non-performance

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could result in shortfalls (i.e., insufficient energy available to meet electricity
demand and maintain reserves), negatively affecting system reliability.

At the same time, while a steady growth in renewable resources will usher in
substantial emissions reductions benefits, the emerging resource fleet is energy
constrained when the weather is uncooperative. Solar generation output is limited
in the winter due to snow, clouds, and shortened daylight hours; wind resources
experience their highest production during winter, but their output is also
susceptible to adverse winter conditions (such as the icing of wind turbines or
high wind shutdowns); gas-only resources are susceptible to unavailability of
natural gas during the coldest days. Relatedly, state policies favoring
electrification of the transportation and heating sectors may also lead to an
increase in winter peak demand, potentially exacerbating these winter reliability
issues.\textsuperscript{24}

While New England has been able to manage through the operational challenges
presented during past extreme weather events, climate change presents the
potential for more frequent and extreme weather conditions, including extended
cold weather spells, that will further challenge the system’s reliability. The
increased likelihood of more frequent and extreme weather events, when paired
with the retirement of the Mystic station in 2024 with on-site fuel necessitates a

\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 2.
measured approach to major market changes to try and protect against rapid and inefficient retirements.

Q: **How could inefficient retirement of existing resources exacerbate these winter reliability issues?**

A: If a rapid entry of state-sponsored resources displaces existing generation that is able to operate in extended cold conditions, and at the same time, weather is uncooperative and renewable resources’ output is limited, then the region’s winter reliability risks will be compounded. In essence, inefficient retirements, even if they occur in a manner such that nominal resource adequacy goals are achieved, can still exacerbate energy security reliability risks.

Q: **Has the region experienced winter operational issues within the recent past?**

A: Yes, these concerns are not theoretical. Within the 12-day period from January 10 to January 22 of 2022, the New England region experienced outages of several large units, including a nuclear unit, the temporary outage of the largest source of liquefied natural gas for the region, an outage of one half of the Hydro-Quebec Phase 2 HVDC Interconnection that regularly supplies up to 1,400 MW of energy to New England during the winter months, and the potential loss of imports from New York.

On January 10, three units, totaling ~1,100 MW, either tripped or had to reduce generation heading into January 11. The ISO entered January 11 expecting to
have surplus capacity of approximately 1,278 MW during the peak hour of the
day (HE 18). By 2:00 p.m., that expected surplus had turned into an
approximately 1,200 MW deficit, as (a) NYISO informed ISO-NE that imports
during the peak would likely be reduced due to constraints on the New York
system,25 (b) one half of the Hydro-Quebec Phase 2 HVDC Interconnection
Tripped, and (c) the region experienced the additional loss of approximately 1,100
MW of capacity resources due to unanticipated outages.

Mid-afternoon on January 12, the ISO was informed by the New Brunswick
System Operator of the loss of the electric line feeding power to the Saint John
Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal (often referred to as the “Canaport” terminal),
placing additional demand on the New England natural gas pipelines and raising
concerns that the loss of the Saint John facility would cause pressure issues on the
Maritimes and Northeast (“M&N”) pipeline (which feeds New England partially
from the Saint John LNG terminal).

The ISO relied on other resources that could start in time to make up the energy
shortfall over the evening peak. Such a stack of resources that are available intra-
day to start and ramp up to provide energy and reserves is critical to reliability.

25 Increasingly, the New England region faces potential reductions of imports from New
York due to the shutdown of the nuclear generating facility at the Indian Point Energy Center in
Buchanan, New York and (as a result) increased gas consumption for electric generation in New
York, causing gas constraints in New England to bind more frequently than in past years.
Thankfully, these events did not cause any reliability issues. However, if these
current events were bunched together sooner, including the loss of the nuclear unit (or)
had unfolded closer to the peak hour (or) the duration of the outages that impacted
the availability of the Saint John LNG terminal and ties with our neighbors was
much longer, the reliability consequences would have been significantly more
severe.

This real-life set of events serves to illustrate the importance of maintaining on
the system other resources that can quickly replace the loss of energy when such
contingencies occur. If the stack of existing resources is lessened via inefficient
retirements, the region will face even more significant constraints on its ability to
call upon needed resources to provide energy to address such contingencies. The
most recent Forward Capacity Auction cleared with less surplus than the past two
auctions.

These events also illustrate another point that is an important factor for
consideration in addressing the benefits of a transition mechanism. The current
markets do not properly value the attributes of resources that are capable of
responding quickly to replace the loss of energy when contingencies occur. More
specifically, the markets do not adequately incent resources to maintain these
capabilities, which the ISO has proposed to address through the development of
various day-ahead ancillary services. While the Commission rejected the ISO’s
initial proposal for such day-ahead ancillary services when filed to address the
region’s energy security concerns, the Commission acknowledged that the ISO may want to propose them independently of such concerns. As I address below, permitting the region time to complete work on these day-ahead ancillary services before the complete elimination of the MOPR will help ensure resources capable of providing such services account for those market revenues as they consider the potential value of continued operation and the alternative of retirement.

Q: Apart from inefficient retirements, does the immediate elimination of the MOPR raise any other concerns?

A: Yes. It is important to recognize the potential reliability risks arising due to delays in the development of new resources. The challenges of building new infrastructure in the region are real, and it is now well-recognized that major new state-sponsored resources can encounter significant delays in their commercial development. When existing resources are displaced in the FCM by new sponsored resources, the existing resource retirements will occur by a date certain—but development delays in major new resources replacing them can create “gaps” in the region’s resource adequacy. While the gaps due to development delays can be difficult to predict in advance, they are a growing concern and the increasing risk of commercial-operation delays could adversely impact reliability as the system becomes tighter with further retirements.

Delays in construction apply to all forms of new infrastructure—that is, all types of generation as well as transmission infrastructure. This makes it imperative to maintain existing infrastructure for as long as it is efficient, and until the uncertainties regarding the commercial operation date of new infrastructure are resolved. A measured approach is even more critical now, when delays are further exacerbated by several supply chain constraints due to previously unforeseen global events.

Q: Has New England recently observed such development delays for state sponsored resources?

A: Yes. Energy infrastructure development, generally, within New England is extremely challenging. We have seen this recently with the termination from the FCM of two major planned natural-gas fired plants that were, ultimately, unable to proceed to construction. Prominently, on-going legal challenges in Maine have impeded and significantly delayed the development of the New England Clean Energy Connect (“NECEC”) transmission line that would bring up to 1,090 MW of hydro-electric power into New England. The NECEC project is funded in part by a long-term contract with Massachusetts utilities to meet Massachusetts’ clean
energy procurement requirements. Construction on the project has halted as its sponsors attempt to address regulatory and legal hurdles.

Large offshore wind development in New England faces similar hurdles. While the New England states, collectively, have authorized the procurement of up to 8,000 MW of offshore wind by 2030, it is reported that there currently are no wind turbine installation vessels available to support construction of those projects, and only one such vessel in development.

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28 See Portland Press Herald, Three months after referendum, NECEC battles for survival amid legal challenges, February 6, 2022, available at https://www.pressherald.com/2022/02/06/three-months-after-referendum-necec-battles-for-survival-amid-legal-challenges/. It is also important to note that the NECEC project is Massachusetts’ second attempt at procurement of clean energy imports. The project originally selected for the Massachusetts procurement—the Northern Pass Project—was cancelled after extensive litigation and development delays. See Eversource Energy, Current Report (Form 8k) (July 25, 2019) (notifying investors that the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s Northern Pass decision resulted in Eversource’s construction of the project no longer being probable, and that project costs would be recorded as an impairment on Eversource’s books), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72741/000007274119000031/form8-knpt.htm.

Overcoming these kinds of logistical hurdles will take time, and at this stage it is difficult to see how the projects that are currently slated for development will become operational in the near-term.

IV. HOW THE PROPOSED TRANSITION MECHANISM ADDRESSES THESE CONCERNS

Q: How does the proposed transition mechanism address the concerns of inefficient retirements and delayed commercial resources?

A: The proposed transition during FCAs 17 and 18 to the implementation of the BSMPR Reforms in FCA 19 offers a measured way to reduce the potential reliability risk from inefficient retirements and the potential for new state-sponsored resource development delays, by reducing the pace of existing resource displacement for two years.

As explained presently, the proposed transition over the next two years will enable up to 700 MW (as measured by FCM qualified capacity) of new state-sponsored resources into the capacity market that would otherwise be prevented due to the MOPR. This will provide the market with predictability regarding the volume of higher-cost sponsored resources’ entry in each of these two years, and the region will have the opportunity to work through the development of the resource capacity accreditation reforms and day-ahead ancillary services that will help ensure the markets properly value the reliability attributes of resources. The total nameplate (or “installed”) capacity of new sponsored policy resources that
may avail themselves of the proposed 700 MW (qualified capacity) exemption from the MOPR will depend on the particular technology mix that enters, as different renewable energy resources have different qualified capacity values. It is ultimately the ISO’s judgment that a measured transition that allows for the entry of up to approximately 700 MW (qualified capacity) of state-sponsored resources will be less disruptive than an immediate elimination of the MOPR.

Q: How does the transition proposal achieve this result?

A: The proposal is for a stepped transition to the implementation of the BSMPR Reforms. This is achieved by exempting a specified amount of state-sponsored resources from the existing buyer-side mitigation rules in each of the next two Forward Capacity Auctions, before the replacement buyer-side mitigation rules take effect (and the existing MOPR mechanism is eliminated) in full for FCA 19 forward.

For FCA 17, the buyer-side mitigation exemption for state-sponsored resources is set at 300 MW (by qualified capacity). For FCA 18, the buyer-side mitigation

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30 For example, the ISO has previously estimated various Intermittent Power Resource technologies’ annualized qualified capacity values (under current rules), as a share of their nominal (installed) capacity, that range from 19 percent (for PV solar) to 46 percent (for offshore wind). Using an approximate value of 35 percent solely for present purposes of illustration, 700 MW of qualified capacity would correspond to 2,000 MW of installed capacity (i.e., 700 MW = 35 percent \times 2,000 MW). Annualized qualified capacity values are derived from the ISO’s most recent filing of ORTP values for use starting with FCA 16. See ISO New England Inc., Joint Filing of ISO-New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Regarding Offer Review Trigger Price Proposals, Docket No. ER21-1637-000 (filed April 7, 2021).
exemption for state-sponsored resources is increased to 400 MW (qualified capacity), plus any unused portion of the exemption from FCA 17. Therefore, the total exemption amount is 700 MW (qualified capacity) for the two auction cycles. The details of the proposal are addressed in the companion testimony of Ryan McCarthy, Lead Analyst in the ISO’s Market Development Department.

By capping the entry of unmitigated state-sponsored resources for two years, the transition mechanism provides investors in competitive (i.e., unsubsidized) resources with certainty as to the amount of new state-sponsored resource capacity that may be offered in the FCA 17 and FCA 18 primary auctions without price mitigation. The limit is intended to create predictability about the potential for clearing price impacts that may occur as a result of the entry of state-sponsored resources (which are expected to offer capacity at low prices) in those auctions. This certainty will render it less likely that substantial amounts of existing resources will retire before the ISO is able to complete important market design enhancements that will provide for a more efficient transition of the region’s resource mix, thus reducing the potential for inefficient retirements, and before the state-sponsored resources that will replace them have the opportunity to complete construction.

Q: Can you elaborate on how the proposed transition mechanism helps address the potential reliability risks from project development delays?
The transition helps address these risks by providing additional commercial development time before existing resources must cease operation, thereby reducing the resource adequacy “gap” in time between when existing resources must exit and delayed new resources enter. The logic is best explained with the assistance of a simple example. In this example, I will first consider a sequence of entry and exit outcomes with the proposed two-year transition in place, and then consider how those outcomes may differ without the transition mechanism. The point of my example is that with the proposed two-year transition, the potential reliability risk from new resource development delays should be manageable—but without the proposed transition, it may not be.

Specifically, assume that in the first year of the proposed MOPR transition, 300 MW (by qualified capacity) of large-scale state-sponsored resources clear in FCA 17, and displace 300 MW (by qualified capacity) of existing resources that will retire. Note that, as I explained above, 300 MW is the maximum amount of sponsored resources that are able to use the new RTR mechanism in FCA 17, under the proposed transition. Suppose further than in the corresponding Capacity Commitment Period (which begins June 1, 2026), the development and construction of the new, replacement 300 MW of state-sponsored resources is delayed such that they begin commercial operation one or more years later (e.g., in mid-2027 or later). Since the displaced 300 MW of existing resources will have retired by June 2026, there is at least a one-year coverage “gap” between the timing of the existing resource retirements and the initial commercial operation of
the sponsored policy resources to replace them (in mid-2027 or later). This 300 MW coverage gap will increase the system’s resource adequacy risk in the 2026-2027 Capacity Commitment Period, but that risk should be manageable given the system’s modest (approximately 1,165 MW) projected capacity surplus in the just-conducted FCA 16, for commitment year 2025-2026.\footnote{The projected surplus is the difference between the 32,810 MW of capacity that received Capacity Supply Obligations in FCA 16, and the 31,645 MW net Installed Capacity Requirement to meet reliability requirements for New England’s power system for the FCA 16 Capacity Commitment Period. See ISO New England Inc., New England’s Forward Capacity Auction Closes with Adequate Power System Resources for 2025-2026, March 9, 2022, available at https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2022/03/20220309_pr_fca16_initial_results.pdf.}

Now, let us consider transition year two. Assume similarly that in the second year of the proposed MOPR transition, the full FCA 18 RTR value of 400 MW of state-sponsored resources clear with additional, large-scale new projects that further displace (an additional) 400 MW of existing resources that will retire. And suppose again that the new sponsored resources’ development and construction is delayed and they begin commercial operation a year later than the corresponding Capacity Commitment Period (which, for FCA 18, begins June 1, 2027). This creates an additional coverage “gap” of 400 MW for the 2027-2028 Capacity Commitment Period. If some or all of the 300 MW coverage cap from the prior commitment year (2026-2027) continues into 2027-2028, thus posing a total coverage gap of up to 700 MW in commitment year 2027-2028, the system’s resource adequacy risk will certainly increase (that is, relative to if there were no
such infrastructure development delays). In my view, however, that resulting
resource adequacy risk will be manageable in the absence of any other major
unforeseen disruptions to capacity supply (given the aforementioned projected
surplus of 1,165 MW for commitment year 2025-2026).

Let me now compare that scenario under the proposed transition mechanism to a
scenario with no transition, i.e., one in which—contrary to the instant filing—the
MOPR was eliminated for FCA 17 with no transition. Earlier in my testimony, I
noted that between Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, up to 8,000
MW of offshore wind procurements have either already occurred or are
anticipated by 2030. Of that total, approximately 4,700 MW (by installed
capacity) have already been awarded long-term contracts and are in varying
stages of development.32 In what follows, I will assume that these projects will
ultimately receive a qualified capacity value (summer rating) of 27 percent of
their installed MW, or a qualified capacity of 1,269 MW. Using this percentage is
consistent with the manner in which the ISO treated the offshore wind technology
for the 2020-2021 recalculation of Offer Review Trigger Prices, updated for the
last Forward Capacity Auction that was held in February of 2022.33

32 This value is aggregated from the data that is included in the transmittal letter at
Section V.

33 See ISO New England Inc., Joint Filing Regarding Offer Review Trigger Prices,
Docket No. ER21-1637-000 (filed April 7, 2021), Attachment I-1e, Testimony of Danielle S.
Powers of Concentric Energy Advisors on behalf of ISO New England Inc., at 31-32 (explaining
that qualified capacity values for intermittent resources are calculated pursuant to the ISO-NE
In the absence of a transition, assume that all 1,269 MW (qualified capacity) of these large-scale sponsored policy resources enter and clear in FCA 17, displacing a similar amount—that is, 1,269 MW—of existing resources. As highlighted in prior answers, those 1,269 MW of existing resource retirements would, in this situation, be obligated to retire and would permanently shutter by June 1, 2026 for certain. But now, without the MOPR transition, the development-delay coverage gap becomes a serious risk. Specifically, as in the earlier portion of this example, assume that these new sponsored resources’ development and construction is delayed by even one year, such that they begin commercial operation in mid-2027. That creates a coverage gap of 1,269 MW for the 2026-2027 Capacity Commitment Year—a value exceeding the projected capacity surplus of 1,165 MW for 2025-2026—and, all else being equal, that would leave the region with a negative planning margin: 1,165 MW – 1,269 MW = –104 MW in 2026-2027. This poses a serious resource adequacy concern to the region for that commitment period.

Tariff based on median output during summer and winter reliability hours, and indicating a summer qualified capacity value of 212.63 MW on an 800 MW nominal offshore wind project, which equates to a rating of 26.58 percent of nominal capacity for offshore wind based on 2019 data). Summer qualified capacity values are used to qualify intermittent resources for participation in the FCA. While this example uses 27 percent as the summer qualified capacity for offshore wind, projects may have a higher summer qualified capacity in the range of 30-35 percent.
Note that, while the current FCM rules permit the ISO to delay a resource retirement when the retirement would create a reliability problem, those mechanisms are available under the ISO’s Tariff only to address certain defined local transmission security issues. In the absence of a transmission security issue, the Tariff expressly excludes delaying the requested retirement where the purpose of the delay would be to ensure the region can procure sufficient capacity to meet the region’s resource adequacy needs.

Note further that, while I have posed this as a concern that results from the coverage “gap” with resource retirements, existing resources have at their disposal a broader range of mechanisms under the market rules through which they could remove, or “de-list,” their capacity, each of which poses reliability concerns under these circumstances. Thus, rather than fully retire their resource, a capacity supplier could de-list the capacity for a single year, which removes it from the capacity market for the year but affords it the option to return the next year (or to subsequently seek permanent retirement). Alternatively, the supplier could permanently de-list its capacity, leaving it free to continue to provide energy and ancillary services, but with no obligation to do so. In short, the resource adequacy gap may present itself via retirements, or single year de-lists,


35 Tariff, Market Rule 1, Section III.13.2.5.2.5(a).
or permanent de-lists. De-listed resources may choose to participate in the energy market, but have no obligation to do so, and the ISO will not be able to confirm if any of them actually chooses to do so until real-time. In short, regardless of the mechanism by which existing resources are displaced from the FCM by (subsequently delayed) new sponsored resources, in the absence of the transition proposal the ensuing resource adequacy coverage gap translates to a significant reliability risk of insufficient operational resources for commitment period 2026-2027.

In summary, the proposed two-year transition mechanism provides a valuable means to address the indisputable delays observed to date in the development of large-scale new resources in the region, including large new supply resources being actively sponsored by the New England states. Without the transition mechanism, the risks to regional reliability during this period become appreciably larger, for the reasons just explained.

Q: Doesn’t the two-year delay just push that same heightened reliability risk from FCA 17 back to FCA 19, at which time—under the instant filing—the MOPR will be fully eliminated regardless?

A: No, it does not just delay the same reliability risk; the MOPR transition reduces it overall. The reason is simple: The two-year transition provides an additional two years for the 4,700 MW of already-contracted, in development, large-scale new resources to “close the gap”—that is, to be at or much closer to their commercial
operation date before the existing capacity they displace in the FCM will cease operation serving the region.

For example, with the two-year transition delay, the 1,269 MW of large-scale sponsored resources assumed in the last scenario would not all be able to clear in FCA 17. Rather, as that example illustrated, only 300 MW may clear in FCA 17, another 400 MW may clear in FCA 18, and the remaining 569 MW consequentially clear in FCA 19. That means with the two-year transition delay, the final 569 MW of sponsored resources currently in development would not displace the corresponding 569 MW of existing capacity resources until the FCA 19 commitment period, which begins June 1, 2028. By delaying the shutdown of 569 MW of existing, operating capacity by an additional two years, the developers of the 569 MW of new state-sponsored resources have an additional two years of development and construction time to bring their projects to fruition and commercial operation.

The central point here is this: Assuming these 1,269 MW of large-scale sponsored resources in development can achieve commercial operation with (at most) two years of delay, with the proposed two-year transition there would be no “coverage gap” during the 2028-2029 capacity commitment period at all. And if most, but not all, can achieve commercial operation with at most two years of delay, the coverage gap in 2028-2029 would again be a fraction of the 1,269 MW illustrated in my example with no transition.
Of course, this extended example is a hypothetical one that serves to convey the resource adequacy risks we foresee in a simple and accessible way. But the example rests on plausible assumptions, and serves to explain a serious concern. The central conclusion is that with the transition mechanism, the region faces a maximal coverage “gap” due to large-scale sponsored resource development delays that I believe could reach 300 MW in 2026-2027 and (up to) 700 MW in 2027-2028, which should be manageable; and in FCA 19, the remaining large-scale resources under development that may then clear will have had two additional years to “catch up” before the existing resources they will displace must shut down. In this way, the two-year transition does not just push the reliability risk back to FCA 19, it reduces the risk overall—relative to the potential negative planning margin the region could conceivably experience in 2026-2027 in the absence of the transition mechanism.

Q: What is the basis for the 700 MW value of the RTR exemption under the two year transition mechanism?

A: The 700 MW value under the transition was proposed by stakeholders as a reasonable amount of capacity to exempt from the MOPR for the two-year period leading up to the elimination of the MOPR. The ISO understands that representatives of many of the generating companies that rely on wholesale markets and deploy private capital affected by the entry of these resources, have generally agreed with the proposed quantity of resources in the renewed
renewables exemption, and that the states contracting for these renewable
resources are not opposed to this exemption value.

From an ISO perspective, the 300 MW and 400 MW allocations in each of the
next two auctions are in line with the values of the previous renewables
exemption (referred to as the “RTR exemption”). The RTR exemption was
initially an element of the FCM demand curve design, and subsequently was a
component in the transition to CASPR. The value of the RTR exemption was 200
MW for each auction, which could be aggregated for up to three auction cycles,
thus creating a cap of 600 MW. The 700 MW exemption proposed for the
transition mechanism is an increase over the RTR exemption amount, with higher
exemption amounts in each auction, and a higher aggregated amount; however,
unlike the RTR exemption, it is only for a two-year period.

The ISO believes the stakeholder-derived 700 MW value is reasonable, given the
precedent of a similar RTR exemption amount, the agreement and support by a
broad section of stakeholders, and that sponsored resources such as solar, onshore
wind, battery storage, and hybrid technologies have low costs that increase
significantly the likelihood of those resources clearing in the auction and
receiving a Capacity Supply Obligation despite application of the buyer-side
mitigation rules.36 While the 700 MW (by qualified capacity) exemption may be

36 See supra, at 7-8 and fn 4 for a discussion of the entry costs of such resources.
used by the large-scale renewable resources, it corresponds to a much larger
nameplate rating for renewable resources, and the large scale renewable resources
in development are unlikely to be deterred by the two-year transition as they have
long-term contracts that dictate the terms of their development.

Finally, as explained in my numerical example in preceding answers, enabling up
to 700 MW of state-sponsored policy resources to displace existing capacity in
FCAs 17 and 18 (in total) should not pose an unmanageable increase in resource
adequacy risk in the corresponding Capacity Commitment Periods—even if the
state-sponsored policy resources’ commercial operation dates are delayed and, as
a result, the system experiences my aforementioned (up to) 700 MW coverage
“gap” during the two-year transition period.

Q: You note that the ISO anticipates making certain market design
enhancements to help address the impact of the BSMPR Reforms. Please
explain the ISO’s plans with respect to these design enhancements and their
potential impacts with respect to the BSMPR Reforms.

The two-year transition period affords the ISO, as well as the region’s
stakeholders, time to focus efforts on developing and filing with the Commission
two market enhancements that the ISO believes will help ensure the markets
properly value the attributes of the resources that are needed to reliably operate a
power system with high concentrations of renewable resources.
First, the ISO is working with stakeholders to develop a proposal for revising the methodology employed to establish the capacity values of resources participating in the Forward Capacity Market, referred to as the resource capacity accreditation project. Working with the region, the ISO is planning to overhaul the manner in which resources participating in the FCM receive qualified capacity values, away from the current approach that calculates values based on the historical ability of the resource to serve gross peak load, limited largely only by the capacity network service capability for the resource, to a methodology that accredits resource capacity values based on their marginal reliability contribution to reducing expected unserved load (whenever it may occur). It is anticipated that the revised approach will account for intermittency, limitations on fuel supplies, and other factors traditionally ignored in resource adequacy assessment and capacity qualification processes (and largely ignored in the ISO’s current process).

The resource capacity accreditation reforms project is anticipated to change the capacity amounts that many of the technologies participating in the FCM can sell at auction, to better reflect the reliability benefits that different resources are able to provide to the region. Completing the capacity accreditation project by the time the BSMPR Reforms are fully implemented in FCA 19 will allow the ISO to more accurately track and account for the relative reliability benefits of state-sponsored resources that are entering the market and the loss of such benefits from resources that are exiting. Given the influx of sponsored resources that is anticipated when the BSMPR Reforms are implemented, and the reasonable
concerns over the potential for existing resources to exit the market at that time, coordinating the BSMPR Reforms’ implementation with the planned completion of the capacity accreditation project will help to ensure that the market continues to meet its resource adequacy objective.

The ISO has held two technical sessions with New England stakeholders to discuss concepts and hear ideas and concerns regarding resource capacity accreditation. The ISO plans to begin the formal stakeholder process to develop a proposal beginning in June of 2022. The ISO plans to refine its design efforts as it begins the stakeholder discussions, and anticipates continuing those efforts in parallel, allowing it to incorporate feedback from stakeholders into its design. Currently, stakeholder discussions are scheduled to continue through 2022 and be completed in June of 2023, with a filing to the Commission to follow shortly thereafter. This schedule is anticipated to permit the ISO to incorporate the new resource capacity accreditation methodology for FCA 19 (to be held in February of 2025), a process that begins in February of 2024.

I want to underscore that, while an overhaul of the capacity accreditation process is of critical importance as the region transitions to a resource mix that is heavily concentrated with intermittent resources, to date the market has not been under-procuring capacity under the existing capacity accreditation rules, and is achieving its primary reliability objective. Again, the concern with capacity accreditation arises primarily with the shift to higher concentrations of
intermittent or “just in time” resources, which the BSMPR Reforms are very likely to facilitate.

In addition, the ISO plans to re-propose the day-ahead ancillary services that the Commission rejected when filed as a response to the Commission’s order instructing the ISO to address regional energy security concerns. While the Commission rejected the ISO’s proposal as a means to address energy security, the ISO remains convinced that at least some portion of those ancillary services are critical market enhancements that will ensure the markets properly compensate resources for several resource attributes that the ISO currently relies upon (albeit, currently without compensation through the markets). These ancillary services will be of even greater importance once the system is more heavily dependent upon intermittent renewable resources.

The ISO will begin discussions of its day-ahead ancillary services design in 2022, and currently plans to complete the project and file these market enhancements in mid-to-late 2023.

Q: Under the proposal, is the MOPR elimination contingent upon the ISO’s filing and implementation of day-ahead ancillary services and the revised resource capacity accreditation mechanism?

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A: No. The proposed package of tariff revisions in this filing includes, first and foremost, the elimination of the MOPR and its replacement with the BSMPR Reforms with an effective date of FCA 19. That effective date is not contingent upon completion of any other market reforms or filings. If the Commission accepts this filing, the MOPR will be eliminated and the BSMPR Reforms will be implemented for FCA 19.

While we are aggressively pursuing the development of both the day-ahead ancillary services and the resource capacity accreditation reforms, and have developed work plans that provide for their implementation for FCA 19, ultimately those projects—in particular the capacity accreditation reforms—are in their design phases and will require significant engagement with stakeholders, the New England states, and ultimately the Commission, before they are implemented. It is simply not possible to guarantee to the region that those market design enhancements will be completed for FCA 19, despite our very strong desire to complete both projects for implementation simultaneously with the BSMPR Reforms in FCA 19.

Q: Will the proposed Transition Mechanism pose a barrier to the development of large state-sponsored resources?

A: No. Large-scale state-sponsored resources, including offshore wind developments and transmission upgrades to facilitate capacity-backed imports of renewable resources, receive financial support through long-term contracts under
state-directed procurements, and their development will proceed (pursuant to such contracts) regardless of capacity revenues. Smaller-scale state-sponsored resources, in particular PV solar and smaller battery storage installments, have reached a point where their costs, even without state support, allow them to compete with other resources to supply capacity in the market.\(^{38}\)

As the Commission has recognized, as a result of the financial support they receive from outside the ISO-administered markets, state-sponsored resources are more likely than other resources to achieve commercial operation—which is the primary driver for the region’s desire to eliminate the MOPR.\(^{39}\) This is not to say that state-sponsored resources do not encounter barriers to achieving commercial operation, and I have discussed some of those important barriers earlier in this testimony. But the continued application of the MOPR for an additional two-year period is not one of those barriers; state-sponsored resources continue to be pursued and procured at a rapid pace in New England to meet the states’ environmental policy goals, and I expect their development to continue apace regardless of the MOPR.

\(^{38}\) See supra, at 7-8, for a more detailed discussion of these points.

\(^{39}\) See New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 178 FERC ¶ 61,101 at P 22 (2022) (finding that state-sponsored resources in New York “are now more likely to be constructed than their non-Public Policy Resource counterparts due to favorable laws and policies governing siting, operation, and financing”).
Q: Nevertheless, will maintaining the existing MOPR for an additional two years create additional inefficiencies, in terms of the states procuring resources in a manner that fails to account for the potential revenues those resources might otherwise be able to receive were they to clear in the FCM?

A: While this result is theoretically possible, I do not believe it is likely. State-sponsored resources that are expected to be operational in the 2026-2028 timeframe (which cover the Capacity Commitment Periods for FCA 17 and 18) have already entered or are entering into long-term state contracts and will be developed regardless of capacity revenues. For resources seeking state support for development later in the 2020s and early 2030s, the full elimination of the MOPR in FCA 19 can be taken into account when they submit bids for state procurements. In this way, I do not believe the Transition Mechanism aggravates the (already existing) inefficiencies that are associated with the MOPR.

Q: Does this conclude your testimony?

A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 30, 2022.

Vamsi Chadalavada,  
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer  
ISO New England Inc.
I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Q: Please state your name, position, and business address.

A: My name is Ryan McCarthy. I am a Lead Analyst in the Market Development department at the ISO. My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Q: Mr. McCarthy, please describe your professional experience and qualifications.

A: I have been a Lead Analyst in the Market Development department at the ISO since August 2013. In this role, I am responsible for identifying and developing market improvements for New England’s competitive wholesale electricity market, which the ISO administers. I am also responsible for presenting these market design improvements to external stakeholders. Prior to joining the ISO, I held various power-marketing positions in the energy market industry, including over four years as a power trader at NRG Energy and two years as a Vice
President at Citibank Global Commodities. I also worked for five years as an equity options trader on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange for Timber Hill, LLC. I hold a B.A. in Economics from Lycoming College.

II. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY

Q: What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
A: The purpose of this testimony is to explain the ISO’s proposed adjustments to the Tariff’s existing Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”) and Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources (“CASPR”) substitution auctions for the seventeenth and eighteenth Forward Capacity Auctions (“FCA”).1 The proposed adjustments are intended to provide a gradual transition to the ISO’s implementation of its new buyer-side market power review structure for FCA 19.2 The new structure replaces in full the existing MOPR. The proposed adjustments described in this testimony will be referred to collectively as the “Transition Mechanism.”

Q: Please provide a high-level overview of the proposed Transition Mechanism that will go into effect for FCA 17 and FCA 18.
A: For FCAs 17 and 18, the ISO proposes to retain its current MOPR mechanism and

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1 Capitalized terms used in this testimony but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, and the Participants Agreement.

2 The ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review structure, which will replace the current MOPR mechanism, is described in detail in my separate testimony explaining such reforms, which is also included as part of this filing.
the CASPR substitution auction, but with changes that will facilitate the entry of new state-sponsored policy resources into the Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”) in an incremental fashion. The ISO proposes the following changes:

- reinstatement of the former Renewable Technology Resource (“RTR”) exemption to the MOPR, with (1) updated resource qualification requirements and (2) revised megawatt (“MW”) caps; and,
- elimination of the test price provisions of the substitution auction.

Q: Please explain how you will address each of these aspects of the proposed Transition Mechanism.

A: Section III of this testimony discusses the reinstatement of the RTR exemption with updated resource qualifications and revised MW caps on new capacity eligible to participate under the RTR exemption. Section IV of this testimony discusses elimination of the test price provisions of the substitution auction.

III. REINSTATEMENT OF THE RTR EXEMPTION

Q: What is the rationale for using a modified RTR exemption as the Transition Mechanism?

A: The Transition Mechanism is designed as a glide-path toward elimination of the MOPR. The Transition Mechanism accomplishes this by introducing a controlled amount of unmitigated capacity offers from new state-sponsored policy resources in the FCA. Importantly, the modified RTR exemption will operate in a way that is nearly identical to the operation of the former RTR exemption. As the former
RTR exemption was retired only after FCA 15, market participants and ISO staff are familiar with how the modified RTR exemption proposed in this filing will function and be implemented. Reinstituting a familiar market rule to serve as a transition mechanism will be more administratively efficient and create less uncertainty than the implementation of an entirely novel market rule.

Q: Please describe the ISO’s former RTR exemption to the MOPR.

A: In 2014, the ISO proposed, and the Commission accepted, an exemption from the MOPR for certain generating resources that further the New England states’ renewable and alternative energy portfolio standards and renewable energy goals. This exemption, known as the RTR exemption, took effect for FCA 9.

To use the exemption, a Project Sponsor with a new capacity resource that qualified as an RTR had to submit an RTR election form to the ISO no later than two business days after the ISO provided the qualification determination notification for the resource. This allowed the Project Sponsor to know whether the Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”) would mitigate the requested offer price for the resource before electing the RTR exemption. If the ISO accepted the Project Sponsor’s RTR election, then the new resource could proceed to the FCA, if

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3 The ISO proposed the RTR exemption along with its proposal to establish a sloped demand curve in the FCM, which the Commission also accepted.

4 As explained further in my separate testimony on the buyer-side market power review and mitigation reforms, a Project Sponsor submits a requested offer price to the ISO when the Project Sponsor would like to offer the capacity of its new capacity resource into the FCA at a price below the applicable Offer Review Trigger Price for the resource’s technology type.
otherwise qualified to do so, without mitigation of its offer price.

The exemption was only available for up to 200 MW of capacity in each FCA, except that any unused amount of the 200 MW cap in one FCA could be carried forward for up to two years (the “carry-forward provision”). For example, if only 100 MW of capacity cleared the auction using the RTR exemption (“RTR capacity”) in the first FCA, then the remaining unused 100 MW would carry forward to the next auction, and the next FCA would have a 300 MW cap on RTR capacity. Because of the two-year limitation on carry-forward MW, the highest amount of RTR capacity for any given FCA could be 600 MW.

The ISO implemented the exemption as a way to better accommodate state policies that favor renewable resources, with limitations that would minimize concerns about the potential price impacts of allowing resources with out-of-market revenues to submit unmitigated offers in the FCA.

Q: When did the ISO retire the RTR exemption?

A: The RTR exemption was last available for use in FCA 15, after the implementation of the substitution auction. In 2018, the ISO proposed, and the Commission accepted, the implementation of the CASPR substitution auction starting with FCA 13. The ISO proposed the substitution auction as a replacement for the RTR exemption but, in doing so, included a multi-year phase-out of the RTR exemption. The RTR phase-out allowed the use of the RTR exemption for
up to 514 MW of capacity across FCAs 12, 13, 14, and 15.\textsuperscript{5}

Q: How does the proposed Transition Mechanism reinstate the RTR exemption?
A: The proposed Transition Mechanism reinstates the RTR exemption with narrow changes; it updates the resource qualification requirements for the exemption and revises the RTR MW caps.

Q: For background, what were the previous resource qualification requirements for the RTR exemption?
A: For a resource to qualify as an RTR under the now-retired RTR exemption, Section III.13.1.1.1.7 of the Tariff required a resource to (1) “receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge or other regulated cost recovery mechanism”; and (2) “qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state’s mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state’s renewable energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1, 2014” and do so “in the New England state in which it is geographically located” or adjacent federal waters.

\textsuperscript{5} Due to the carry-forward provision of the RTR exemption, the RTR MW cap for FCA 12 was 514 MW. This was the amount of “unused” RTR MW remaining when the ISO proposed the implementation of the substitution auction.
Q: How does the Transition Mechanism propose to update the RTR’s resource qualification requirements?

A: In order to qualify for the RTR exemption in FCAs 17 and 18 under the Transition Mechanism, resources must meet the elements of an updated version of the Tariff’s Sponsored Policy Resource definition.

The three elements of the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition are the following: (1) “receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism”; (2) “qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order”; and (3) “as a result of [such standard or goal] the resource receives the revenue source.”

The updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition is part of the ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review structure that will replace the MOPR starting with FCA 19. The updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition will ensure that resources sponsored by the New England states to further their decarbonization goals can qualify for the RTR exemption for the next two FCA cycles, before the MOPR is replaced with the new buyer-side market power review structure in FCA
The decision to use the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition for the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption resulted from stakeholder discussions. Because the updated definition expands the terms that describe qualifying resources and state decarbonization programs, and eliminates the January 1, 2018 date limitation on qualifying state programs, the updated definition will accommodate state programs that were recently implemented and that may be implemented in time for use by resources participating in FCAs 17 and 18.

The specific changes made to the current Sponsored Policy Resource definition and the rationales for each change are explained in detail in my accompanying testimony concerning the ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review and mitigation reforms.

Q: Please describe the revisions to the RTR MW cap on RTR-eligible capacity.

A: Compared to the former RTR exemption’s 200 MW cap, the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption increases the MW cap on the amount of capacity that can participate as RTR capacity in any given FCA. The absolute total amount of capacity that can participate as RTR capacity across FCAs 17 and 18 is 700 MW. How that 700 MW is divided between FCA 17 and FCA 18 requires some explanation.
For FCA 17, the amount of RTR capacity that can participate in the auction is capped at 300 MW. For FCA 18, the cap on RTR capacity that can participate in the auction is determined by the following:

- a baseline cap of 400 MW;
- plus the difference between 300 MW and the amount of RTR capacity that cleared in FCA 17;
- minus the amount of capacity that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation ("CSO") through the substitution auction in FCA 17.

Effectively, the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption sets a cap on RTR capacity at 400 MW for FCA 18 but also carries forward any “unused” RTR capacity from FCA 17. After application of this carry-forward provision, the Transition Mechanism then reduces the FCA 18 cap by the MW of new capacity resources that obtained a CSO in the FCA 17 substitution auction.

**Q:** Why does the Transition Mechanism retain any RTR MW cap at all?

**A:** The intent of the RTR cap in the Transition Mechanism is to provide investors in non-state-sponsored resources with certainty as to the maximum amount of new state-sponsored resource capacity that may be offered in the FCA 17 and FCA 18 primary auctions without price mitigation. As indicated by the accompanying Testimony of Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada, a transition with this type of limit is intended to create predictability about the potential clearing price impact that may occur as a result of the introduction of unmitigated new resource offers in those
auctions and helps to address reliability concerns that could emerge without it.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{Q:} Please describe the rationale for setting the Transition Mechanism’s RTR exemption cap at 300 MW for FCA 17 and 400 MW for FCA 18, or a total of 700 MW across both auctions.

\textbf{A:} The stakeholders that designed the Transition Mechanism as an amendment to the ISO’s MOPR removal proposal derived the RTR exemption caps from the MW of Sponsored Policy Resource capacity that were offered into recent substitution auctions. The MW of Sponsored Policy Resource capacity offered into the substitution auction was approximately 273 MW in FCA 13, 292 MW in FCA 14, and 229 MW in FCA 15.\textsuperscript{7} The 300 MW and 400 MW caps for FCAs 17 and 18, respectively, are intended to reflect similar levels of participation by Sponsored Policy Resources in recent substitution auctions, with an upward adjustment. The upward adjustment is intended to recognize potential increases in Sponsored Policy Resource participation over the next two FCAs. As discussed in the separate testimony of Dr. Chadalavada, the ISO believes that the Transition Mechanism’s cap is reasonable because it is a rational increase over the former RTR cap, has the agreement and support of a broad section of stakeholders, and

\textsuperscript{6} Testimony of Dr. Vamsi Chadalavada on Behalf of ISO New England Inc. Regarding the Need for a Transition to the MOPR’s Elimination (“Chadalavada Testimony”), at 10–15, 31–40.

\textsuperscript{7} The MW of Sponsored Policy Resource capacity offered into the FCA 16 substitution auction was approximately 118 MW. The Transition Mechanism was designed prior to the FCA 16 primary and substitution auctions and was not a factor in deriving the RTR MW caps.
should not deter the development of renewable resources.\textsuperscript{8}

Q: Does the Transition Mechanism limit the number of Sponsored Policy Resource MW that can participate in the FCA 17 and FCA 18 substitution auctions?

A: No. The Transition Mechanism does not limit the amount of Sponsored Policy Resource MW that can participate in either substitution auction.

Q: Why not?

A: As the ISO explained when it proposed CASPR, clearance of unmitigated offers from Sponsored Policy Resources in the substitution auction should not adversely impact the FCA’s primary auction clearing prices.\textsuperscript{9} Limiting the amount of Sponsored Policy Resource MW that can participate in either FCA 17 or FCA 18’s substitution auction is not necessary to further the Transition Mechanism’s goal of providing predictability as to the impact unmitigated offers from new Sponsored Policy Resources may have on primary auction clearing prices. Such a limitation is therefore not required to address the inefficient retirement concerns described in Dr. Chadalavada’s testimony.

\textsuperscript{8} Chadalavada Testimony at 40–42.

Q: Please explain the rationale for reducing the FCA 18 cap by the amount of new capacity that cleared in the FCA 17 substitution auction.

A: The purpose of the RTR cap is to provide some predictability about the new state-sponsored resource capacity that may participate in FCAs 17 and 18 with unmitigated offers. Reducing the FCA 18 RTR cap by the MW that clear in the FCA 17 substitution auction furthers this goal by accounting for the capacity of resources that cleared as new, unmitigated capacity in the FCA 17 substitution auction and will therefore participate as additional supply in the FCA 18 primary auction. This keeps the total amount of unmitigated state-sponsored capacity permitted to enter the primary auction during the transition period consistent with the cap total.

By way of background, new capacity that obtains a CSO in the substitution auction in one FCA is treated as existing capacity in the subsequent FCA. Consequently, a resource that obtains a CSO through the substitution auction is able to proceed to future primary auctions without any mitigation of its offers by the MOPR. Any new state-sponsored resource that obtains a CSO in FCA 17’s substitution auction will be treated as existing and able to make an offer unmitigated by the MOPR in FCA 18’s primary auction and would thereby increase the total MW of state-sponsored resource capacity participating across FCAs 17 and 18 unaffected by the MOPR.

For example, assume that 300 MW of RTR capacity participate in the FCA 17
primary auction, and 100 MW of Sponsored Policy Resource capacity clear in the
FCA 17 substitution auction. The 300 MW of RTR capacity and 100 MW of
capacity that cleared in the substitution auction will become existing capacity
resources in FCA 18, and will therefore be able to participate in the FCA 18
primary auction without application of the MOPR. As a result, 400 MW of new
state-sponsored capacity that obtained a CSO in FCA 17 would proceed as
existing resources in FCA 18. Without any reduction to the FCA 18 400 MW cap
to account for the 100 MW that cleared in the FCA 17 substitution auction, there
is the potential for a total additional 800 MW of state-sponsored capacity to
submit offers without application of the MOPR in the FCA 17 and FCA 18
primary auctions. Reducing the FCA 18 MW cap by the 100 MW that cleared in
the FCA 17 substitution auction will ensure that, at most, 700 MW of additional
state-sponsored capacity are able to participate in the FCA 17 and FCA 18
primary auctions without any mitigation by the MOPR.

In sum, this reduction provision ensures that any state-sponsored resources newly
clearing in FCA 17 with an unmitigated offer is properly accounted for in FCA
18, in order to better achieve the target maximum total amount (i.e., 700 MW) of
unmitigated state-sponsored resource MW in the two upcoming primary auctions.

IV. ELIMINATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION AUCTION TEST PRICE

Q: What are the test price provisions of the substitution auction?
A: The test price provisions of the substitution auction are a mechanism by which the
ISO determines which existing resources can participate on the demand side of
the substitution auction.

Q: Why was the test price mechanism added to the substitution auction?
A: When the ISO proposed CASPR, stakeholders expressed concerns that existing
resources nearing retirement may have an incentive to make uncompetitively low
offers in the primary auction to improve their chances of obtaining a CSO, which
could then be traded in the substitution auction. This conjectured behavior has
been referred to as “bid shading.” Responding to these concerns, the ISO worked
with stakeholders to determine whether it could devise an administrative
mitigation process, applicable only to existing resources that seek to participate as
demand in the substitution action, to remove any such incentive. The test price
mechanism was a result of this process and is intended to reduce any potential
incentive for bid shading. The test price mechanism was not part of the original
CASPR design and was implemented for the second substitution auction in FCA
14.

Q: Why would an existing resource make an uncompetitive offer in order to
participate in the substitution auction?

10 See CASPR Filing at 9.
   England Power Pool Regarding Conforming Changes to ISO Tariff for CASPR, Docket No. ER19-444-000
   (“CASPR Conforming Changes Filing”), at 21 (filed Nov. 30, 2018); CASPR Filing, at 9.
Let us answer by first considering an existing resource’s incentives under the market rules when there was only the primary auction—that is, before the creation of the substitution auction. Both then and today, an existing resource considering retirement can submit a retirement de-list bid at the resource’s “break-even price.” The term “break-even price,” in this context, means the capacity clearing price at which an existing resource would be indifferent between retaining its CSO for another year, versus retiring from the market. Presuming the retirement de-list bid is approved by the IMM, the resource would retire if the resource is not awarded a CSO (which is generally the case when the de-list bid price is greater than the clearing price). If the resource is awarded a CSO in the primary auction, the resource would not retire (which is generally the case when the de-list bid price is less than the clearing price).

In this pre-substitution auction environment, an existing resource considering retirement in the primary auction had no incentive to lower its retirement de-list bid price below its break-even price. Doing so could result in the resource being awarded a CSO and incurring an obligation at an economic loss (i.e., at a capacity clearing price less than its break-even price).

Now let’s consider the situation with the addition of the substitution auction following each primary auction. The substitution auction provides an existing resource that may be willing to retire the opportunity to do so not only in the primary auction, but also in the second, substitution auction. In particular, if the
resource retains its CSO in the primary auction, it has the opportunity to transfer
its newly-retained CSO to a new Sponsored Policy Resource that did not acquire a
CSO in the primary auction. This transfer is accomplished by the resource
participating in the substitution auction as demand; its demand bid in the
substitution auction (which may differ from its de-list bid price in the primary
auction) reflects the resource’s willingness to “buy back” the capacity that it sold
(i.e., CSO acquired) in the primary auction. Hence, it is a necessary condition that
an existing resource have a CSO after the primary auction in order to participate
in the substitution auction, where it can transfer that CSO to a new Sponsored
Policy Resource.

However, with the substitution auction, a resource may have an incentive to
reduce its de-list price below its break-even cost in order to increase the
likelihood that it sells capacity (i.e., acquires a CSO) in the primary auction, in
order to then buy out of that obligation at a lower price in the substitution auction.
Substitution auction clearing prices generally should be lower than primary
auction clearing prices. Accordingly, existing resources that clear as demand in
the substitution auction (i.e., buy out of their obligation) generally should be able
to shed their CSOs at a lower price than they received in the primary auction.
Assuming these assumptions hold true, upon settlement, the existing resource
would receive a payment equal to the product of its CSO quantity and the
difference between the primary auction clearing price and lower substitution
auction clearing price. Effectively, this affords the existing resource a one-time
“severance” payment by retiring through the substitution auction instead of the primary auction.\textsuperscript{12}

The opportunity for a one-time severance payment through the substitution auction creates a potential incentive for an existing resource nearing retirement to reduce its primary auction de-list bid below its true break-even price. That potential submission of a de-list bid below a resource’s break-even price in the primary auction is the bid-shading concept noted earlier. By bid shading, it is theoretically possible for the potential retiring resource to increase the likelihood that it will retain its CSO in the primary auction, which in turn would make it possible to shed the CSO in the substitution auction and earn the severance payment.

Q: \textbf{How was this potential incentive addressed in the market rules?}

A: To reduce the incentive to engage in this bid-shading behavior, and thus minimize any potential impact on the primary auction clearing price, an additional administrative mitigation mechanism was subsequently added to CASPR, a year after CASPR was introduced and first used. The administrative mitigation mechanism, known as a “test price,” evaluates whether an existing resource that seeks to participate in the substitution auction retained its CSO in the primary auction.

\textsuperscript{12} The assumption that substitution auction clearing prices should be lower than primary auction clearing prices has held true so far. Only approximately 54 MW of capacity have cleared in a substitution auction since the ISO implemented CASPR. All 54 MW cleared in FCA 13 with a substitution auction clearing price of $0.00/kW-month, which was lower than the primary auction clearing price of $3.80/kW-month.
auction at a capacity clearing price that is below the IMM’s estimate of the 
resource’s break-even price. If the resource does retain its CSO at a primary 
auction clearing price below the IMM’s estimate of the resource’s break-even 
price, then the resource is prohibited from participating in the substitution auction. 
That prohibition is intended to obviate the incentive for bid-shading conduct in 
the primary auction.

Q: Why didn’t the ISO propose the test price mechanism, or something similar, 
as part of its original CASPR design?

A: The ISO did not believe that bid shading posed a significant risk to price 
formation in the primary auction under CASPR because of the low likelihood of 
such behavior. Most notably, the financial risks associated with bid shading for 
the resource deploying this strategy are high. An existing resource engaging in 
bid shading runs the significant risk of obtaining a CSO at a low capacity clearing 
price, receiving compensation that is less than its cost to provide capacity, and 
then failing to clear the substitution auction and shed its CSO. This risk of 
retaining a CSO at a price that does not cover the cost to provide capacity serves 
as a deterrent for bid shading, even without the test price mechanism.

13 CASPR Filing at 9.

14 Id.

Q: How does the test price mechanism currently operate?

A: The test price mechanism is simply this: if the resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction at a clearing price below the test price, the resource is excluded from participating in the substitution auction. The test price is determined as follows. Market participants that want the option of participating in the substitution auction must submit a test price, calculated using the Retirement De-List Bid calculation methodology in the Tariff, that reflects the resource’s break-even price to provide capacity rather than retire in the primary auction. The IMM reviews the participant-submitted test price, calculates its own test price, and will replace the participant-submitted test price with the IMM-determined test price if the two test prices are inconsistent. The test price that results from this process is then submitted to the Commission as part of the ISO’s retirement and permanent de-list bid information filing. The test price value, as accepted or modified by the Commission in its order on the ISO’s retirement filing, will then be reduced to 90 percent of its value. The 90-percent-adjusted test price is then compared to the clearing price at which the resource acquired a CSO in the primary auction. If the resource acquires a CSO in the primary auction at a clearing price below the adjusted test price, then the resource’s demand bid is excluded from the substitution auction.

Q: What will be the effect of the proposed Transition Mechanism’s elimination of the test price mechanism?
A: The elimination of the test price mechanism means that an existing resource’s ability to participate in the substitution auction will not be dependent on its test price relative to the primary auction clearing price. In practice, existing resources will no longer have to submit test prices in order to participate in the substitution auction. The IMM also will no longer calculate test prices for resources.

Q: What is the rationale for eliminating the test price mechanism as part of the Transition Mechanism?

A: The stakeholders that designed the Transition Mechanism proposed the elimination of the test price as a way to facilitate more demand-side participation in the substitution auction. As described earlier, few MW have cleared in the substitution auction since its inception in FCA 13. As the IMM noted in its Spring 2021 Quarterly Markets Report, the low quantity of capacity that has cleared through the substitution auction is a result of low demand in the substitution auction from existing resources.¹⁶

Q: Will the removal of the test price mechanism facilitate more demand-side participation in the substitution auction?

A: There is the potential that removal of the test price mechanism may facilitate more demand-side participation in the substitution auction. The removal of the

test price mechanism removes an existing substitution auction qualification requirement, a requirement that some may have deemed too onerous to undertake, which may in turn lead to additional demand-side participation in the substitution auction.

Q: Is there evidence that the test price mechanism alters substitution auction outcomes?

A: Examination of auction results since FCA 13, including analyses performed by the IMM, provide no direct evidence that the test price mechanism has altered or would have altered substitution auction outcomes. According to the IMM’s Spring 2021 Quarterly Markets Report, FCA clearing prices have been low, making it more difficult for resources nearing retirement to either (1) obtain a CSO in the primary auction or (2) obtain a CSO at a clearing price that exceeds the resource’s adjusted test price. With regard to the latter, in FCAs 13, 14, and 15, only one resource that obtained a CSO in the primary auction was precluded from participating in the substitution auction because of its test price. However, for that one resource, even if the test price mechanism had not barred that resource’s participation, the resource’s demand bid price in the substitution auction would have been lower.

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17 The test price mechanism was not in place for FCA 13’s substitution auction.
19 FCA 14 included the only substitution auction where one existing resource was precluded from participating in the substitution auction on account of the test price. Id. at 11–12.
auction was too low to clear against any supply. That is, the application of the test price mechanism did not alter substitution auction outcomes.

In FCA 16, relative to prior years, more existing resources that submitted substitution auction demand bids were able to obtain a CSO and proceed to the substitution auction. Nevertheless, the FCA 16 substitution auction did not facilitate the transfer of any CSOs to new resources, as existing resources’ substitution auction demand bids were lower than new resources’ substitution auction supply offers. In effect, the existing resources demanded too high a “severance” payment relative to the compensation new Sponsored Policy Resources were willing to accept for taking on a CSO in the substitution auction.

Q: Is the ISO concerned any potential benefit from removal of the test price mechanism is outweighed by the potential for bid shading?
A: As explained above, the ISO previously concluded that the potential financial risks incurred by a resource owner associated with bid shading serve as an

20 Id. at 11.

21 With its review of the FCA 13, FCA 14, and FCA 15 substitution auctions, the IMM concluded, “In particular, ‘test price’ mitigation . . . does not appear to have been a primary factor in low participation from existing resources in the substitution auction. Our opinion is that the primary driver of low participation and clearing in the SA is low primary auction prices that reflect a system that currently has a moderate surplus of capacity.” Id. at 1.

22 See ISO New England Inc., Forward Capacity Auction Results Filing, Testimony of Robert G. Ethier on Behalf of ISO New England Inc., Docket No. ER22-1417-000, at 19 (filed Mar. 21, 2022) (“A substitution auction was administered. However, no substitution auction supply offers were able to clear against any substitution auction demand bids. . . . [I]n all instances of pairings that would not have impacted the marginal reliability values cleared in FCA 16, the highest-priced demand bid segment was priced below the lowest-priced supply offer segment.”).
important deterrent to such behavior, even in the absence of the test price mechanism. Considering this prior conclusion again under current market conditions, the ISO continues to conclude that the financial risks to a resource owner counterbalance any bid-shading concerns.

Q: Does this conclude your testimony?
A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 31, 2022.

[Signature]

Ryan McCarthy, Lead Analyst, ISO New England, Market Development
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
ISO New England Inc. and NEPOOL Participants Committee
Docket No. ER22-____-000

TESTIMONY OF RYAN MCCARTHY
ON BEHALF OF ISO NEW ENGLAND INC.
REGARDING BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER REVIEW REFORMS

I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Q: Please state your name, position, and business address.

A: My name is Ryan McCarthy. I am a Lead Analyst in the Market Development department at ISO New England Inc. (the “ISO”). My business address is One Sullivan Road, Holyoke, Massachusetts 01040.

Q: Please describe your professional experience and qualifications.

A: I have been a Lead Analyst in the Market Development department at the ISO since August 2013. In this role, I am responsible for identifying and developing market improvements for New England’s competitive wholesale electricity market, which the ISO administers. I am also responsible for presenting these market design improvements to external stakeholders. Prior to joining the ISO, I held various power-marketing positions in the energy market industry, including over four years as a power trader at NRG Energy and two years as a Vice President at Citibank Global Commodities. I also worked for five years as an
equity options trader on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange for Timber Hill, LLC. I hold a B.A. in Economics from Lycoming College.

II. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY

Q: What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
A: The purpose of my testimony is to explain the ISO’s proposal to implement a buyer-side market power review structure that will replace the Tariff’s current Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”), starting with the nineteenth Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”).

Q: Please provide a high-level overview of the proposed buyer-side market power review structure that will go into effect for FCA 19.
A: To eliminate the MOPR, the ISO will no longer require all Project Sponsors of New Capacity Resources to either submit an offer priced at or above an ISO-determined Offer Review Trigger Price (“ORTP”) for the resource’s technology type or, in order to submit an offer below the ORTP, demonstrate to the ISO’s Internal Market Monitor (“IMM”) that such offer is competitive in light of the resource’s costs. In place of this design, the ISO proposes to eliminate ORTPs and to limit the IMM’s review of offers from new resources to only those offers that

1 Capitalized terms used in this testimony but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the ISO New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the “Tariff”), the Second Restated NEPOOL Agreement, and the Participants Agreement.
are most likely to reflect an exercise of buyer-side market power in the Forward Capacity Market (“FCM”).

Like the MOPR, the ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review structure applies only to new resources, or new segments of existing resources. Unlike the MOPR, the proposed structure divides those resources into three tranches. The first tranche consists of new resources that, because of their size or specific technology type, will not have their offers subject to any review by the IMM or mitigation related to buyer-side market power. This first tranche consists of (1) new resources, regardless of technology type, with less than or equal to 5 megawatts (“MW”) of capacity and (2) new passive demand-response resources defined in the Tariff as On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

The second tranche of new resources also will not have their offers subject to any review by the IMM or mitigation, so long as they meet certain conditions concerning their relationship to load-side interests. New resources in this second tranche include the following: (1) competitive entrants—new resources that are not receiving or expecting to receive revenues, outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets, from a load-serving entity (“LSE”), state, or subdivision of a state; and (2) federally or state-sponsored policy resources—new resources that may be receiving or expecting to receive revenues from outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets but are doing so as part of some federal or New...
England state renewable, clean, decarbonization, net-zero carbon or alternative energy program.\(^2\) These resources are, with some important modifications, consistent with the Sponsored Policy Resources currently eligible to participate in the Competitive Auctions with Sponsored Policy Resources ("CASPR") substitution auction. Unlike resources in the first tranche, Project Sponsors with new resources that meet the load-side conditions of this second tranche must certify in a signed affidavit to the ISO that the new resource meets such conditions.

The third tranche includes new resources that do not qualify for treatment under the first or second tranches of the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. Generally, these are generating and active demand-response resources larger than 5 MW that are receiving some type of out-of-market support\(^3\) from an LSE, state, or local government that is unrelated to a decarbonization program. The new resources in this final tranche will be subject to review by the IMM in order to determine if the lowest price the resource requests to offer in the auction reflects an attempt to exercise buyer-side market power.\(^4\) The IMM’s review will

\(^2\) For ease of reference, this testimony often refers to state renewable, alternative, and clean energy standards, procurement mandates, and goals; and decarbonization and net-zero carbon goals, collectively as “decarbonization programs.”

\(^3\) This testimony uses the term “out-of-market support” to refer generally to revenues provided to a resource outside of ISO’s administered wholesale markets. The phrases “out-of-market revenue” and “out-of-market revenues” have a specific, more narrow definition in current Section III.A.21.2(b)(iv) of the Tariff, as explained further below in Section III of this testimony.

\(^4\) Technically, it is the Project Sponsor for the resource that will offer a New Capacity Resource’s capacity in the FCA. For ease of discussion, this testimony often refers to a resource making an offer or offering its capacity in the FCA.
consist of a conduct test, which assesses whether the resource’s requested minimum offer price constitutes a below-cost offer. The proposed conduct test will use the same methodology the IMM currently employs when determining a resource-specific New Resource Offer Floor Price.

Additionally, the Project Sponsor will have the opportunity to demonstrate to the IMM that, notwithstanding the outcome of the conduct test, any LSE that may be backing the new resource does not have a financial incentive to use the resource as a way to exercise buyer-side market power. The ISO refers to this as an “incentive rebuttal” opportunity. Resources in the third tranche that both fail the conduct test (that is, make a below-cost offer) and do not demonstrate an associated LSE’s lack of financial incentive will be restricted from offering their capacity in the FCA at a price below an IMM-determined, resource-specific New Resource Offer Floor Price.

Q: Please explain how you will address each of these aspects of the ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review structure in your testimony.

A: I will first describe the necessary background and context for the ISO’s proposed buyer-side market power review structure. Then I will address the treatment of the three different tranches of new capacity resources under the proposed structure, each in turn. Finally, I will address certain other Tariff changes that are intended to accommodate this proposed structure.
Section III discusses the current MOPR. This discussion includes the theory of buyer-side market power, the use of ORTPs, the process by which new resources are subject to IMM review of requested offer prices below the ORTPs, and the methodology by which the IMM determines New Resource Offer Floor Prices.

Section IV discusses the proposed buyer-side market power review structure as it compares to the current MOPR. This discussion clarifies which aspects of the current buyer-side market power review process are being eliminated, which will remain, and which aspects of the proposed structure are entirely new. The discussion also explains the mechanics of the conduct test that will be employed as part of the proposed buyer-side market power review structure.

Section V discusses the treatment of the first tranche of new resources under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. This discussion includes an explanation of the ISO’s decision to exclude resources with a qualified capacity less than or equal to 5 MW from any buyer-side market power review, as well as the supporting analysis that the ISO conducted. The discussion also includes an explanation of why On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources will be excluded from such buyer-side market power reviews.

Section VI discusses the treatment of the second tranche of new resources under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. This discussion includes an explanation of the ISO’s rationale for excluding new resources that represent
competitive entrants (*i.e.*, those without out-of-market support) or that qualify as
Sponsored Policy Resources from any buyer-side market power review. This
discussion also includes a description of the process by which a Project Sponsor
must certify during the qualification process that its new resource meets either of
those two conditions, in order to be excluded from a buyer-side market power
review.

Section VII discusses the treatment of the third tranche of new resources—that is,
all other new resources—under the proposed buyer-side market power review
structure. This discussion includes a description of such resources’ specific
qualification package submission requirements and the mechanics of the buyer-
side market power review that will be conducted for such resources. This
discussion also includes an explanation of the rationale for the conduct test that
the IMM will apply and for the incentive rebuttal process. Lastly, this discussion
explains the mechanics of this incentive rebuttal aspect of the proposed buyer-side
market power review.

Finally, Section VIII discusses other Tariff changes that are being made to
accommodate the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. This
discussion includes a description of how the ISO intends to sunset the CASPR
substitution auction after FCA 18. This discussion also includes a description of
changes the ISO proposes to make to the following provisions of the Tariff: (1)
the qualification determination notification and the pre-auction information filing
provisions; (2) the CONE and Net CONE calculation provisions; and (3) the automatic mitigated offer price assigned for new resources that fail to provide sufficient information for the IMM to conduct its buyer-side market power review, if such a review is required.

III. THE CURRENT MOPR MECHANISM

Q: Please describe the concept of buyer-side market power.

A: Buyer-side market power, in a general sense, is the ability of an entity (or group of entities working in concert) on the demand side of a market to reduce market prices for a good or service below a competitive, efficient price. In a market like the FCM, where demand is administratively determined, buyer-side market power concerns an attempt by an entity with an interest on the demand side of the market to lower market clearing prices by intervening on the supply side of the market. For the FCM, those with an interest in reducing clearing prices are entities that serve, or otherwise represent the interests of, the load that will benefit from and that pays for the capacity procured by the FCM. In the FCM, entities with a load-side interest that have an incentive to lower the cost to load through lower clearing prices are the entities that may exercise buyer-side market power.

Q: How can an entity with a load-side interest attempt to lower clearing prices?

A: An entity with a load-side interest can attempt to lower clearing prices in the FCM by promoting the entry of additional supply. This may take different forms. An entity with a load-side interest might control a new capacity resource’s offer
behavior in such a way that it can ensure the resource will submit a low-priced offer to increase the chance the resource will clear in the FCA, even if the offered price is below the resource’s costs. As an example, it could arise in the context of an LSE that develops generation, or contracts with a generation resource, to serve its load. As another example, an entity with a load-side interest might support the development of a new generating resource, and do so in a manner that provides the new generating resource’s owner with an opportunity to offer the resource’s capacity in the FCA below-cost (that is, below the resource’s true development cost).

Q: **Does an entity with a load-side interest exercise buyer-side market power every time it controls the offers of or supports a resource that supplies capacity in the FCM?**

A: No. First, the offer for a new capacity resource must be a below-cost offer—meaning that the price of the offer is below the price required to cover the resource’s going forward costs without the assistance of support or other revenues supplied outside of competitive markets (*i.e.*, out-of-market support). Second, the offer must have the ability, if it were to clear the market, to lower market clearing prices, thereby distorting the market to the buyer’s benefit. That is, the offer must be a near-marginal or infra-marginal offer. Third, the load-side interest must have an incentive to provide out-of-market support for the new capacity resource, meaning that the benefit the load-side interest receives in terms of reduced capacity charges must be at least as great as the cost it incurs to provide such support.
support. Collectively, these three factors are sometimes referred to as the “ability and incentive” required for buyer-side market power.

Q: Please describe the ISO’s current buyer-side market power review and mitigation mechanism.

A: The ISO’s current buyer-side market power review and mitigation mechanism is the MOPR, which sets offer floor prices for all new capacity resources in the FCA’s primary auction. A central component of the MOPR is the specification of minimum FCA offer prices for various generic resource technology types, referred to in the Tariff as ORTPs. Generally, the MOPR is designed to screen out below-cost offers in order to prevent market distortions, including those distortions consistent with the exercise of buyer-side market power. The ISO’s MOPR presumes that a new resource capacity offer price greater than or equal to the ORTP for its technology type is competitive, not below-cost, and, therefore, not part of an exercise of buyer-side market power.

The ORTP is intended to reflect the competitive cost of new entry (net of competitive market revenues a resource would be expected to receive, e.g., for energy and ancillary services) for each specified technology. The ISO calculates technology-specific ORTPs using representative cost and revenue inputs in a discounted cash flow, capital budgeting analysis. This analysis determines the break-even contribution required from the FCM to cover a representative resource’s cost of entry, net of expected revenues from energy and ancillary services.
service markets. When a new resource intends to make an offer in the FCA that
equals or exceeds the ORTP for its technology type, the IMM does not review an
offer from the new resource for potential mitigation. The ORTP becomes the
resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, and the resource, if otherwise
qualified to participate, may offer its capacity in the FCA at a price equal to or
above the applicable ORTP.

Q: What happens if a new resource requests to offer at a price below the
applicable ORTP?
A: When a resource requests to make an offer in the FCA that is lower than the
ORTP for its technology type, the IMM will review the resource’s financials to
determine whether the requested offer price is a below-cost offer (specifically,
whether the offer reflects “out-of-market revenues” as that term is defined in the
current Tariff’s MOPR provisions). The IMM will remove any such out-of-
market revenues, or where appropriate will replace those revenues with an
estimate of market-based revenues, to calculate what the Tariff refers to as a
“capacity price estimate,” that is specific to that resource. The capacity price
estimate is, effectively, the break-even price the resource would need from the
capacity market to cover its costs, net of (non-capacity) expected market
revenues. If that resource-specific capacity price estimate is consistent with the
resource’s requested offer price, then the requested offer price becomes the offer
price floor for the new capacity resource’s participation in the FCA. If that
resource-specific capacity price estimate is (a) not consistent with the resource’s
requested offer price and (b) below the applicable ORTP, then the IMM’s
capacity price estimate becomes the offer price floor for the new capacity
resource’s participation in the FCA.

Q: Please describe the process the IMM employs to calculate a resource-specific
capacity price estimate.

A: When a Project Sponsor wishes to submit an offer price that is below the
technology-specific ORTP for its resource, it must submit financial data in the
form of a cost workbook, which details the resource’s costs and revenue streams,
including any out-of-market revenues that the resource is or anticipates receiving.
From the resource’s workbooks, the IMM uses a financial model (referred to in
the current Tariff and below as a “capital budgeting model”) to calculate the
capacity price estimate.

The IMM uses the same capital budgeting model employed to determine ORTPs
when it calculates a resource-specific capacity price estimate, but does so with
reference to resource-specific inputs. With resource-specific inputs from the
resource’s cost workbook, the IMM will determine whether the inputs used by the
Project Sponsor in calculating its requested offer price reflect market-based
parameters. To the extent necessary, the IMM will adjust certain cost, discount
rate, depreciation, and tax assumptions made in the resource’s workbook when
those assumptions are not consistent with prevailing market conditions. The IMM
will also adjust the resource’s revenue assumptions to either exclude any out-of-
market revenues that the resource is receiving or expects to receive, or to replace
out-of-market revenues with its own estimate of market-based revenues.

Q: What are out-of-market revenues for the purpose of the IMM’s
determination of the capacity price estimate?

A: Generally, out-of-market revenues are revenues that are available to a resource
from non-market sources or otherwise not consistent with wholesale market
revenues. In the Tariff, “out-of-market revenues” are defined as “any revenues
that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are
restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or
(b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New
England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner.” The definition of “out-
of-market revenues” in the Tariff expressly excludes “[e]xpected revenues
associated with economic development incentives that are offered broadly by state
or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the
Forward Capacity Market.” As noted above, out-of-market revenues are excluded
from the revenue assumptions the IMM uses to calculate a resource’s capacity
price estimate. In addition, if a resource’s revenues are “supported by a regulated
rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism,” the IMM will replace
such revenues with its own estimate of energy market revenues in the capital
budgeting model.
Q: How is the IMM’s resource-specific capacity price estimate used to review the requested offer price for a resource?

A: If a Project Sponsor requests to make an offer for its resource at a price that is below the applicable ORTP, and that offer price is consistent with the IMM-determined capacity price estimate, then the Project Sponsor’s requested offer price becomes the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, which serves as the price floor for its capacity offer in the FCA. If the requested offer price is not consistent with the IMM-determined capacity price estimate, then the IMM-determined capacity price estimate, if such estimate is below the ORTP, becomes the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. In circumstances where the IMM determines a capacity price estimate that exceeds the OTRP applicable to the resource, the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price is set to the ORTP.⁵

To summarize, the MOPR mechanism creates a floor price for each new resource that seeks to enter the FCM that is equal to either (1) the ORTP for the resource’s technology type, (2) a requested offer price lower than the ORTP, if the IMM determines that such requested offer price is not a below-cost offer, or (3) the lower of the IMM-determined capacity price estimate or the applicable ORTP, if the Project Sponsor submits a requested offer price lower than the ORTP that is inconsistent with the IMM-determined capacity price estimate.

⁵ Namely, in no event will the IMM mitigate a new resource’s offer to a price above the ORTP.
The following flow chart demonstrates at a high level the MOPR’s treatment of offers from new resources:

Figure 1: Existing MOPR Offer Review

Q: How does the MOPR mechanism mitigate the impact of buyer-side market power?
A: The MOPR mechanism’s use of new resource offer floor prices prevents the conduct required for an exercise of buyer-side market power. As I discussed earlier, the exercise of buyer-side market power requires an offer that is below-cost. The MOPR’s structure tests for and prevents below-cost offers, first through the ORTP and then, if necessary, the IMM’s resource-specific review. If the Project Sponsor submits an offer that is at or above the ORTP (and, by the ORTP’s design, therefore presumptively not below-cost)—or demonstrates that its requested minimum offer price is not below-cost—then there is no conduct requiring remedy. If the Project Sponsor’s requested minimum offer price is determined to be below-cost, then the MOPR creates an offer price floor that precludes a below-cost offer from the resource in the FCA, thereby preventing the conduct required for an exercise of buyer-side market power.

IV. THE PROPOSED NEW BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER REVIEW STRUCTURE AS COMPARED TO THE MOPR

Q: How would you compare the current MOPR mechanism to the buyer-side market power review structure proposed by the ISO in this filing?

A: As a tool for mitigating an exercise of buyer-side market power, the MOPR is broad. The MOPR mitigates all below-cost offers, even where such offers may not impact clearing prices or otherwise reflect an attempt to lower market clearing prices. The buyer-side market power review structure the ISO proposes in this filing is narrower and seeks to review and mitigate only offers that are most likely to reflect an attempt by an entity with a load-side interest to exercise buyer-side
market power. This is accomplished by excluding certain new capacity offers from review in circumstances where it is unlikely that a below-cost offer from the resource will impact clearing prices or that an incentive to reduce clearing prices exists. As explained further below, the proposed buyer-side market power review structure also excludes certain state-sponsored resources from review and mitigation as a means of addressing the economic inefficiency of excess capacity procurement (“inefficient overbuild”).

Q: As a matter of process, how does the proposed narrower buyer-side market power review structure treat offers from new resources differently from the existing MOPR?

A: Under the existing MOPR, all offers have a minimum offer price. Under the narrower structure, new resources that have a capacity less than or equal to 5 MW or that are new passive demand-response resources, which I refer to as the first tranche of new resources, have no restrictions on their offer prices in the FCA. The second tranche, new resources that demonstrate to the ISO that they meet certain conditions regarding their relationship to load-side interests, likewise have no restrictions on their offers in the FCA. New resources that do not fall within the first two tranches fall into the third tranche of new resources, which will be subject to IMM review and potential offer mitigation in the capacity market.

For the third tranche of resources, the IMM’s review is, in most ways, similar to the IMM’s current review. Specifically, a new resource in this third tranche must
submit to the ISO a desired minimum offer price and all supporting information, including resource-specific cost workbooks. From the resource’s workbooks, the IMM calculates a capacity price estimate using the same capital budgeting model and types of inputs it currently uses for evaluating potential below-cost offers. The IMM will make the same adjustments to inputs that it makes today, including adjustments that either exclude or replace out-of-market revenues. The key difference in this third tranche is the elimination of a generically-assigned minimum offer price by resource type—that is, the elimination of the ORTP.

For third tranche resources, the IMM uses the capacity price estimate to perform what the proposed buyer-side market power review structure calls a “conduct test.” If the resource’s requested lowest offer price is consistent with the IMM-determined capacity price estimate, the requested lowest offer price passes the conduct test and becomes the price floor for any capacity the new resource may offer in the FCA. This is similar to how a resource’s requested offer price that is consistent with the IMM’s capacity price estimate serves as an offer price floor under the current MOPR mechanism. Under the new structure, as with the MOPR, the requested lowest offer price may be used in the auction if the IMM determines that it is not a below-cost offer.

Q: Under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure, what happens if a third tranche resource’s requested lowest offer price is not consistent with the IMM’s capacity price estimate?
A: Under the new structure, if the requested lowest offer price is lower than the IMM-determined capacity price estimate, such a requested offer price fails the conduct test. Unlike the current MOPR mechanism, however, such an offer price is not automatically mitigated to the IMM-determined capacity price estimate. As will be explained in greater detail in Section VII below, the resource’s Project Sponsor has an opportunity to demonstrate that any LSE that is sponsoring the resource with out-of-market support is unlikely to achieve a net financial benefit from a resulting reduction in FCA clearing prices if the supported new resource clears—in other words, that the LSE does not have the financial incentive to exercise market power by supporting the resource.

The purpose of this demonstration is to show that the sponsoring LSE has no financial incentive to exercise buyer-side market power through the resource’s offer. If the Project Sponsor successfully demonstrates such a lack of financial incentive, the resource can still proceed to the auction with an offer that equals or exceeds its requested lowest offer price (even if that requested lowest offer price is below the IMM’s resource-specific capacity price estimate). However, if the offer price fails the conduct test and the Project Sponsor fails to demonstrate the lack of incentive, then—similar to the current MOPR mechanism—the IMM-determined capacity price estimate serves as the price floor for any capacity the resource may offer into the FCA.
The following flow chart demonstrates the proposed buyer-side market power mitigation structure’s treatment of offers from new resources and how the proposed conduct test and incentive rebuttal process fit into the overall structure:

**Figure 2: Proposed Buyer-side Market Power Review Structure**

The details of the proposed review structure’s treatment of each tranche is described further below.
Q: Is the ISO proposing this narrower buyer-side market power review structure because it believes the MOPR is an inappropriate mechanism for mitigating buyer-side market power?

A: No, that is not the rationale for the new buyer-side market power review structure. The ISO recognizes that there are a number of ways to conceptualize buyer-side market power and to address buyer-side market power in the FCM. The ISO believes that the MOPR mechanism is an effective method by which to review for and mitigate attempts to exercise buyer-side market power. As the ISO has noted before, the MOPR mechanism, which focuses almost exclusively on conduct, has the benefit of mitigating price impacts that are consistent with buyer-side market power without requiring the ISO to adjudicate whether a load-side entity is purposefully seeking to impact capacity market prices.\(^6\)

As the ISO has also recognized, however, the MOPR mechanism may prevent certain state-sponsored resources from selling their capacity in the FCA and being counted toward meeting the region’s resource adequacy goals.\(^7\) When state-sponsored resources are built nonetheless, New England may procure more capacity than needed, resulting in the inefficient use of society’s resources with

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\(^{7}\) *Id.* at 9.
unnecessarily high costs to consumers.\textsuperscript{8} To address this potential for inefficient overbuild, the ISO’s proposed narrower buyer-side market power review structure incorporates factors beyond conduct for determining which resources are subject to buyer-side market power review and mitigation.

V. \textbf{THE FIRST TRANCHE: SMALL RESOURCES AND PASSIVE DEMAND-RESPONSE RESOURCES}

A. RESOURCE TYPES AND OFFER REVIEW TREATMENT

Q: You explained that the proposed buyer-side market power review structure divides new resources into three tranches. Please describe the first tranche.

A: The first tranche of resources includes two types of new resources: (1) resources that have an FCA Qualified Capacity value less than or equal to 5 MW; and (2) passive demand-response resources, defined in the Tariff as On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.

Q: How are these two types of resources treated under the buyer-side market power review structure proposed by the ISO in this filing?

A: Offers from new resources that have a capacity less than or equal to 5 MW, which I will refer to as \textit{de minimis} resources, are, for the most part, not subject to any type of buyer-side market power review and will not be mitigated. Offers from new resources that meet the definition of either On-Peak Demand Resource or

\textsuperscript{8} Id.
Seasonal Peak Demand Resource are not subject to any type of buyer-side market power review and will not be mitigated.

B. **DE MINIMIS RESOURCES**

Q: Please describe the number and types of new capacity resources that are likely to qualify as *de minimis* resources under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure.

A: Based on an analysis of recent FCAs, it is likely that a substantial number of new resources seeking qualification to participate in the FCA will qualify as *de minimis* resources. Historically, the types of resources comprising resources below the 5 MW threshold have been predominantly photovoltaic solar, onshore wind, small battery storage, active demand-response resources, and small incremental capacity additions to existing resources.

Q: How did the ISO identify the types of resources that will likely qualify as *de minimis* resources?

A: The ISO examined the new resources that completed the qualification process for FCA 13, FCA 14, FCA 15, and FCA 16. These auctions were examined because these recent auctions best identify the resource mix that is likely to seek to participate in the FCA in the immediate future.⁹

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⁹ The total new capacity resource submissions from FCAs 13 through 16 that the ISO examined excluded On-Peak Demand Resources, Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and New Import Capacity Resources.
Q: What did the ISO’s examination of new resources that completed the qualification process for FCAs 13 through 16 demonstrate about the resource mix?

A: For FCAs 13 through 16, approximately 81 percent of the new capacity resources (by count) seeking to participate in the FCA had an FCA Qualified Capacity of 5 MW or less. Approximately 60 percent of new capacity resources at or below 5 MW had an FCA Qualified Capacity between 0 and 1 MW. Figures 3 and 4 below show the number and percentage, respectively, of new resources by size measured in MW of FCA Qualified Capacity.

Figure 3: Number of New Resources by Size

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<td>FCA 13</td>
<td>102</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>FCA 14</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>FCA 15</td>
<td>129</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCA 16</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum: FCA 13-16</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
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Number of Projects
Q: Do the de minimis resources account for a large share of all qualified new resource capacity, based on the data from FCAs 13 through 16?

A: No. Although resources with an FCA Qualified Capacity less than or equal to 5 MW accounted for 81 percent of the new projects seeking to participate in the FCA, they represented a small share—only 8.7 percent—of the total MW qualified to participate in the FCA in the period studied. Figures 5 and 6 below show the distribution of the total MW of FCA Qualified Capacity above and below 25 MW, with MW of FCA Qualified Capacity grouped in 5 MW increments when below 25 MW.
Figure 5: Distribution of Total MW of FCA Qualified Capacity in MW

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<td>145</td>
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<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCA 15</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA 16</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum: FCA 13-16</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>173</td>
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</table>

Figure 6: Distribution of Total MW of FCA Qualified Capacity as Percentage

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FCA 13</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA 14</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA 15</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCA 16</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum: FCA 13-16</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q: What is the ISO’s rationale for excluding offers from *de minimis* resources from any buyer-side market power review or mitigation?

A: Given current FCM conditions, there is little likelihood that an offer from a *de minimis* resource will have any meaningful impact on FCA clearing prices. Furthermore, excluding *de minimis* resources—which constitute the vast majority of new capacity resources in number—from any buyer-side market power review is administratively efficient. Their exclusion allows the IMM to focus its review for the exercise of buyer-side market power on fewer, larger new resources that may have an impact on clearing prices.

Q: How did you determine that these *de minimis* resources are not likely to have any meaningful impact on FCM clearing prices?

A: The ISO conducted an analysis of how a hypothetical resource five times the *de minimis* threshold—25 MW of capacity—would have impacted clearing prices under similar supply and demand conditions that exist today. The ISO’s analysis used supply conditions as they existed in FCA 15 with demand conditions from FCA 16, which at the time of analysis provided the most up-to-date data on supply and demand conditions in the FCM. Under these supply and demand conditions, the ISO analyzed the impact of a hypothetical 25 MW of new capacity offered into the Rest-of-Pool zone as a price-taker.
The results of the analysis showed a negligible impact on clearing prices. Thus, even a resource five times as large as the 5 MW *de minimis* threshold would have been unlikely to materially impact clearing prices. If the region maintains similar supply and demand conditions presented in FCAs 15 and 16, the ISO believes that a resource with a capacity of less than or equal to 5 MW is unlikely to impact clearing prices now or in the foreseeable future.

**Q:** What will happen if current supply and demand conditions change?

**A:** Under the Tariff, two of the core functions of the IMM are (1) to evaluate existing market rules, tariff provisions, and market design elements and recommend proposed rule and tariff changes to the ISO when appropriate and (2) to review and report on the performance of ISO’s markets. The IMM, as part of its core duties, observes and understands the supply and demand dynamics of the FCM. If supply and demand conditions change in a way such that excluding new resources below 5 MW of capacity from buyer-side market power review may meaningfully impact clearing prices, the IMM can propose an appropriate adjustment to the 5 MW *de minimis* threshold.

The ISO, including the IMM, may revisit the *de minimis* threshold if other market conditions change as well. Evolution in resource technologies and resource aggregations may affect market conditions in ways that implicate the *de minimis* threshold. To the extent circumstances evolve, the ISO will propose adjustments to the *de minimis* threshold as needed.
Q: Did you consider market participants that may have a portfolio of *de minimis* resources and the cumulative impact offers from such resources may have on FCA clearing prices?

A: Yes. As I described, a 25 MW resource that offers its capacity in the FCA at a price of zero is unlikely to have a material impact on FCA clearing prices under current market conditions. Knowing that an offer of up to 25 MW at a price of zero would not materially impact prices, the ISO chose a more conservative *de minimis* limit of 5 MW to account for the potential that certain small resources may be part of a portfolio of resources controlled or supported by the same entity.

To have any material impact on clearing prices under current market conditions, an entity with a load-side interest would have to control or support a group of small resources that all submit below-cost offers into the auction in an aggregate capacity amount that exceeds 25 MW. If the ISO, including the IMM, observes that aggregations of large numbers of below 5 MW resources may pose a threat to competitive market outcomes (*i.e.*, a means for a single controlling entity to exercise buyer-side market power), it will explain the evidence leading to that conclusion and propose revisions to stakeholders that would address such circumstances.
Q: Does the ISO have any concerns that a Project Sponsor may attempt to avoid any buyer-side market power review by disaggregating parts of a larger project into a portfolio of de minimis resources?

A: At the present time, the ISO is not concerned about a Project Sponsor disaggregating a project to avoid buyer-side market power review for a number of reasons: the ISO does not need to accept a Project Sponsor’s artificial disaggregation of a project into a number of small resources; Project Sponsors have little incentive to take this strategy; and the ISO may always propose to revise or eliminate the de minimis threshold on the unlikely chance it becomes subject to abuse.

First, during the new resource qualification process, the ISO reviews the details of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer into the auction, including the resource’s location, size, metering configuration, and point of interconnection. If a Project Sponsor submits a number of small resources at the same location or behind the same point of interconnection that appear to be part of the same physical asset or project, the ISO will be able to recognize that the Project Sponsor, absent some other legitimate reason, may have chosen to submit each resource for separate entry into the auction in order to take advantage of the de minimis threshold. If the ISO determines that the purported set of small resources is, in reality, a single resource above the de minimis threshold, the ISO will treat the project as a single resource that exceeds the threshold.
Second, this type of disaggregation scheme is costly or impractical, given existing resource technology. Thermal generator projects, which consist primarily of at least one turbine and have the ability to sell capacity well in excess of 5 MW, could not convincingly be submitted as a collection of smaller, *de minimis* resources. To split a larger, thermal-based project into multiple smaller units would require additional equipment (e.g., multiple turbines) that would make the cost of disaggregation inefficient to bring to market. Projects more realistically susceptible to disaggregation consist mainly of some combination of onshore wind, photovoltaic solar, battery storage, and active demand response. Onshore wind, photovoltaic solar, and some battery storage will likely qualify as Sponsored Policy Resources excluded from any buyer-side market power review, as will be discussed further in Section VI below. Thus, there seems little incentive for a Project Sponsor to try to artificially disaggregate, say, a photovoltaic solar and battery storage project in order to stay below the *de minimis* threshold when the project, if submitted as one resource, may qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource.¹⁰

¹⁰ Even without the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion, many of these small resources are low-cost resources (relative to recent capacity clearing prices). Under the current MOPR, in FCA 17 energy storage has an ORTP of $0.789/kW-month, which is considerably lower than historical FCA clearing prices. Onshore wind and photovoltaic solar have an ORTP of $0.00/kW-month, which is effectively an exemption from any offer price mitigation. A Project Sponsor would have little incentive to spend money on unnecessary metering equipment to artificially disaggregate projects composed of such resources, rather than simply submit offers in the FCA for these low-cost resources that reflect the resource’s true costs.
Finally, as mentioned above, the ISO always may revisit the *de minimis* threshold when circumstances require. If the ISO sees a sufficient number of instances where Project Sponsors appear to be submitting projects that are artificially disaggregated for the purpose of evading the IMM’s buyer-side market power review, the ISO may propose a change to the *de minimis* threshold or propose to eliminate it.

**Q:** Above, why do you state that *de minimis* resources “for the most part” are not subject to any type of buyer-side market power review?

**A:** There may be circumstances under which a resource with an FCA Qualified Capacity less than or equal to 5 MW may have undergone the IMM’s buyer-side market power review. During the new resource show-of-interest and qualification process, a Project Sponsor must indicate the amount of capacity it requests to offer into the auction for its resource. The ISO analyzes the resource to determine how much capacity the resource is capable of offering into the market, defined in the Tariff as FCA Qualified Capacity. In some cases, the FCA Qualified Capacity determined by the ISO is less than the requested capacity amount.

Thus, it is possible that a new resource that requests to provide capacity greater than 5 MW may, after the qualification process, become a *de minimis* resource if its FCA Qualified Capacity is ultimately less than or equal to 5 MW. However, the timing of the determination of the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity does not allow the Project Sponsor to ignore the requirements associated with submitting
the new resource as a second or third tranche resource during the qualification process. The new resource may have proceeded through the qualification process as a third tranche resource and been subject to the IMM’s buyer-side market power review. Notwithstanding that third tranche treatment, if the new resource becomes a *de minimis* resource at a later date during the pre-auction process, any prior buyer-side market power review will be deemed immaterial, and the new resource’s offer will not be mitigated in the auction.

The following simple example illustrates the issue. Assume a resource indicates in its show-of-interest and qualification package that it seeks to offer 6 MW of capacity in the FCA, and that the new resource is not a passive demand-response resource and not a resource that meets the load-side conditions of a second tranche resource (*i.e.*, as described further below, not a competitive entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource). Because the resource does not identify itself as a resource that seeks to provide less than or equal to 5 MW of capacity in the FCA, the new resource will be treated as a third tranche resource. In such a case, the resource will have to submit a requested lowest offer price, as well as its workbooks, to enable the IMM to conduct the buyer-side market power review. During the qualification process, however, imagine that the ISO determines that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be limited to 4 MW. In this circumstance, even though the resource is a first tranche, *de minimis* resource, it has been subject to the IMM’s buyer-side market power review as though it were a third tranche resource. This hypothetical resource would be allowed, however,
to offer its capacity into the auction at any price because it ultimately qualified as a de minimis resource.

C. PASSIVE DEMAND-RESPONSE RESOURCES

Q: What is the ISO’s rationale for excluding offers from passive demand-response resources from any buyer-side market power review or mitigation?

A: The ISO’s rationale for excluding offers from passive demand-response resources—Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources, which include energy efficiency resources—is related to the way the capacity of such resources is treated in the construction of the historical loads used to derive the FCM’s demand curve.

Passive demand-response resources are able to offer their capacity as supply in the FCA. The capacity of these resources also serves to reduce measurements of load. As a result, historical load data are adjusted, prior to each FCA, to properly account for the load reductions from passive demand-response resources. In the absence of such adjustments, those resources would be double-counted in the FCM, both as load reductions and as capacity supply resources. Accordingly, in developing the gross load forecast, the ISO “reconstitutes” (i.e., adds back) the demand savings achieved by passive demand-response resources. “Reconstitution” is purely an accounting mechanism intended to align demand assumptions represented by the load forecast with passive demand-response resources’ participation as supply-side resources in the FCM.
Q: What implication does “reconstitution” of Seasonal Peak Demand Resource and On-Peak Demand Resource capacity have for buyer-side market power mitigation?

A: The effect of reconstitution of Seasonal Peak Demand Resource and On-Peak Demand Resource MWs is a rightward shift in the demand curve proportionate to the rightward shift in the supply curve that results from including such resources in the supply stack. Because reconstitution yields proportionate impacts on both sides of the market, the inclusion of Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources in the FCA has little impact on FCA clearing prices. Accordingly, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an entity sponsoring such resources to exercise buyer-side market power through them, and offers from such resources will be excluded from any buyer-side market power review.

As a practical matter, the exclusion of Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources from any buyer-side market power review is not a change from the treatment of such resources under the current MOPR mechanism. A significant portion of passive demand-response resources are energy efficiency resources that, for FCA 16 and certain prior auctions, were assigned an ORTP of $0.00/kW-month, effectively exempting them from any buyer-side market power review and mitigation. These resources can proceed into the auction as price-takers under the market rules that exist today.
VI. THE SECOND TRANCHE: COMPETITIVE ENTRANTS AND SPONSORED POLICY RESOURCES

A. RESOURCE TYPES AND OFFER REVIEW TREATMENT

Q: Please describe the second tranche of new resources under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure.

A: The second tranche of resources includes two types of new resources: (1) resources that are not receiving or expecting to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets from an LSE, state, or subdivision of a state (“competitive entrants”); and (2) resources that may be receiving or expecting to receive revenues outside of ISO-administered wholesale markets from such entities but are doing so as part of some federal or New England state renewable, clean, decarbonization, net-zero carbon or alternative energy program (“Sponsored Policy Resources”).

Q: How are these two types of resources treated under the buyer-side market power review structure proposed by the ISO in this filing?

A: Offers from new competitive entrants and new Sponsored Policy Resources will not be subject to any type of buyer-side market power review and will not be mitigated, so long as the Project Sponsors for such new resources submit a certification to the ISO that details how the resource meets the conditions required to qualify as either a competitive entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource.
Q: Please describe the certification requirement that applies to second tranche resources.

A: The certification requirement, referred to as the Load-Side Relationship Certification in the proposed Tariff language, requires the Project Sponsor to demonstrate to the ISO that it meets the Tariff’s requirements of a competitive entrant or the definition of Sponsored Policy Resource. The Load-Side Relationship Certification must include a sworn affidavit from an officer or principal for the Project Sponsor that includes sufficient factual detail making this demonstration. The Project Sponsor must submit the Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the new resource qualification package, which is referred to in the Tariff as the New Capacity Qualification Package (for generation resources) and the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package (for demand-response resources).

The ISO will review Load-Side Relationship Certifications during the new resource qualification process. If the ISO determines that the certification demonstrates the resource’s status as either a competitive entrant or a Sponsored Policy Resource, the resource, if otherwise qualified to do so, may proceed to the auction without an IMM review of its offer. If the ISO determines that the certification does not sufficiently demonstrate either competitive-entrant or Sponsored Policy Resource status, the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor, and the resource will be effectively treated as a third tranche resource (described more fully in Section VII below). Specifically, upon notification from the ISO, the
Project Sponsor will be required to provide (1) the lowest offer price at which the resource requests to offer capacity into the auction and (2) the resource’s workbooks. The ISO will then inform the IMM of its determination, so that the IMM may conduct its buyer-side market power review of the resource’s requested lowest offer price and mitigate such offer price, if necessary. Failure to provide any Load-Side Relationship Certification as part of the new resource qualification package also results in IMM buyer-side market power review and potential mitigation.

B. COMPETITIVE ENTRANTS

Q: Please describe the circumstances a new resource must demonstrate to qualify as a competitive entrant for the purpose of second tranche treatment.

A: The Project Sponsor must demonstrate in its Load-Side Relationship Certification that the Project Sponsor and any of the Project Sponsor's affiliated entities or partners (1) are not LSEs and (2) are not receiving or expecting to receive any revenues (except revenues from an ISO-administered market) from an LSE, state, or political subdivision of a state that relate to the development, operation, control, or output of the new resource.

During the stakeholder process, certain stakeholders were concerned about having sufficient time between notification and any obligation to submit workbooks for the IMM's review. The ISO is developing an internal system process to ensure that notifications concerning the Load-Side Relationship Certification are provided in a manner that will allow Project Sponsors sufficient time to provide workbooks for their resources in circumstances where the ISO rejects the Load-Side Relationship Certification.
Q: Please explain the ISO’s rationale for excluding the offers from new resources that demonstrate their status as competitive entrants from any buyer-side market power review.

A: Competitive entrants lack of any out-of-market support that is consistent with an exercise of buyer-side market power. Private commercial entities that are not market participants in the FCM may have any number of reasons for supporting a new resource, including as an investment opportunity, for example. A private commercial entity acting as an investor seeking a return has an incentive to want higher auction clearing prices, rather than lower prices. It is not economically logical to presume that competitive resources, which are unsupported by load-side interests, have an incentive to lower market clearing prices or are in the position to exercise buyer-side market power. Moreover, private commercial entities that provide financial support to a resource put their own capital at risk when supporting such resources. The marketplace will discipline private entities that invest in or otherwise support new resources that may ultimately be uneconomic.

Consequently, because the ISO is narrowing the scope of its buyer-side market power review to focus on situations where attempts to exercise buyer-side market power warrant redress—which requires a nexus with a load-side interest—the ISO will exclude competitive entrants from buyer-side market power review.

Q: What does the ISO mean when it refers to a “state or political subdivision of a state” in its competitive-entrant conditions language?
A: For the purpose of the competitive-entrant conditions, the ISO intends “state or political subdivision of a state” to mean, broadly, any state, state agency, state regulatory body, state instrumentality, municipality, county, or other local government. The term is intended to capture revenues from public funding that occurs at the state or local level.

Q: Why does the language of the competitive-entrant exclusion not include any reference to federal out-of-market support?

A: Under the current MOPR mechanism, the ISO does not mitigate resource offer prices that take into account federal support. It similarly will not do so under the proposed buyer-side market power mechanism. The federal government does not represent an entity with a load-side interest specific to the New England Control Area. Federal support also may be given to a new resource for characteristics not within the purview of ISO’s wholesale energy markets, including environmental or economic stimulus attributes. The ISO will continue to exclude federal support from mitigation so that its market rules are consistent with other federal initiatives.

Q: Please provide an example of a new resource that may receive different treatment on account of the competitive-entrant exclusion when compared to application of the existing MOPR mechanism.

A: One hypothetical example would be a new resource that does not have a contract with an LSE or receive any other out-of-market support from an LSE or
government; the new resource does receive, however, uncharacteristically favorable financing terms from a private commercial entity when compared to other resources of its technology type. Under the current MOPR, if the new resource’s favorable financing significantly lowered its costs such that the resource could and would want to make an offer lower than the applicable ORTP, then the new resource would need to submit its minimum offer price to the IMM for review. If the IMM determined that the favorable financing terms were not consistent with prevailing market conditions, the IMM would adjust the cost assumptions from the resource’s workbooks to reflect financing terms more consistent with the resource’s peers. The result would be a mitigated offer price if the IMM-determined capacity price estimate (after eliminating the benefit of the favorable financing terms) were higher than the resource’s requested minimum offer price.

With the competitive-entrant exclusion, the ISO would not mitigate the offer from this hypothetical resource because of its favorable financing terms, and the new resource would be permitted to make an offer that reflects such financing terms. As noted previously, in such circumstances the investor putting forth the uncharacteristically favorable financing terms is putting investors’ capital at risk, and we expect the marketplace will discipline private investors in new resources from doing so in ways that would be uneconomic.
C. SPONSORED POLICY RESOURCES

Q: Please describe the circumstances a new resource must demonstrate to qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion for the purpose of second tranche treatment.

A: In order to qualify for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion, the resource must meet the Tariff’s definition of a Sponsored Policy Resource. The ISO is proposing adjustments to the current Sponsored Policy Resource definition, which was implemented several years ago for purposes of qualification for the CASPR substitution auction. These adjustments, which I address in detail below, will better accommodate the range of new resources receiving state support as part of the New England states’ decarbonization efforts.

Under the updated definition, a resource must meet all three of the following elements to qualify as a Sponsored Policy Resource: (1) “receives a revenue source, other than revenues from ISO-administered markets, that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism”; (2) “qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative energy resource under a renewable energy portfolio standard, clean energy standard, decarbonization or net-zero carbon standard, alternative energy portfolio standard, renewable energy goal, clean energy goal, or decarbonization or net-zero carbon goal enacted by federal or New England state statute, regulation, or executive or administrative order”; and (3) “as a result of [such standard or goal] the resource receives the revenue source.”
As discussed in my separate testimony regarding the Transition Mechanism, which also supports this filing, the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition will take effect for FCA 17 and FCA 18 as part of the proposed transition period before elimination of the MOPR. The updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition will then remain in place for FCA 19 and going forward as part of the new buyer-side market power review structure.

Q: Please explain the ISO’s rationale for excluding the offers from new Sponsored Policy Resources from any buyer-side market power review.

A: The ISO is excluding Sponsored Policy Resources from buyer-side market power review in order to reduce the potential for an inefficient overbuild of the New England power system over time, which could result in unnecessarily high costs to consumers, as I noted previously. The economic justification for the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion is that resources built pursuant to state decarbonization policies are receiving the necessary financial support to fund their construction and development; in essence, they will be constructed independent of their participation in the FCM and FCM revenues, thus resulting in the inefficient overbuild problem described above. The problem may increase significantly in coming years, absent the reforms proposed in the instant filing, as the New England states increase their clean energy procurements and aggressively pursue their decarbonization policy goals.
Q: Please summarize the information supporting the ISO’s observation that the New England states are increasing their clean energy procurements in a way that may increase the inefficient overbuild problem.

A: As described in the filing letter that this testimony accompanies, the New England states have awarded bids or contracted for the procurement of up to 3,630 MW of capacity of clean energy resources since the ISO developed its CASPR proposal, and have an additional 3,600 MW of legislatively authorized procurements pending future solicitations. The states also have increased their RPS requirements and codified ambitious decarbonization goals, which signal even more clean energy resource development and procurement in the future. Consequently, the ISO anticipates an increasing number of state-sponsored resources will be built over the coming decades, a circumstance that was not fully apparent when the ISO designed CASPR.

Q: As you have noted, the ISO has identified the inefficient overbuild concern in past proceedings, including the CASPR proceeding. Why is inefficient overbuild now a rationale for wholly excluding Sponsored Policy Resources from buyer-sider market power review?

A: As noted above, since the time the ISO developed CASPR, the New England states have significantly increased their clean energy procurement and decarbonization efforts. Looking at the number and types of resources the states intend to procure, the growth of the overbuild problem is easily outpacing the
total MW of Sponsored Policy Resource capacity that the substitution auction has been able to clear since its inception.

Across the four FCAs for which the substitution auction has been in place, only 54 MW of Sponsored Policy Resources have been able to acquire a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. Put simply, the substitution auction has done little to address the overbuild problem that currently exists. It is clear that the substitution auction is not proving to be an effective means, as a practical matter, to handle the overbuild problem that will result as an increasing number of forthcoming, higher-cost state clean energy resources are unable to clear in the FCA under the current MOPR. Consequently, the ISO is reforming its buyer-side market power review structure to eliminate the MOPR, terminate CASPR’s substitution auction, and implement a design that excludes new Sponsored Policy Resources from offer mitigation.

**Q:** Is there any precedent in the ISO’s Tariff for excluding new state-supported resources from offer mitigation?

**A:** Yes. The Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion is not wholly dissimilar from the current MOPR mechanism’s recognition that economic development incentives offered by state and local governments do not need to be mitigated out of new resource offers. The existing Tariff excludes state and local economic development incentives from its definition of “out-of-market revenues,” explaining that “economic development incentives that are offered broadly by
state or local government and that are not expressly intended to reduce prices in the Forward Capacity Market are not considered out-of-market revenues for this purpose.” Economic development incentives appear to compensate other benefits a resource may provide that are not within the purview of ISO’s wholesale energy markets, such as job creation and investment in the surrounding community.

Similarly, the revenues provided to Sponsored Policy Resources appear to compensate resource attributes not within the purview of ISO’s wholesale energy markets, but which the state supporting the resource deems beneficial. In this case, the New England states are supporting such resources for their renewable and non-emitting attributes in order to advance the states’ environmental policy objectives and protect the health and welfare of their residents.

Q: Turning to the design of the exclusion, why does the proposed Sponsored Policy Resource definition require a revenue source that is supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism?

A: By this requirement, the exclusion from buyer-side market power review for Sponsored Policy Resources is limited to those resources that receive out-of-market support effectively guaranteed by government-directed funds. Namely, it limits the exclusion to resources that are most likely to be built independent of any FCM revenues, and that thereby contribute to the inefficient overbuild problem that underpins the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion.
Q. Please provide some examples of what qualifies as a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism.

A: As a first example, some New England states have implemented requirements for their electric distribution companies to enter long-term power purchase agreements ("PPAs") with offshore wind resources, and the costs of such PPAs are recoverable through the electric distribution companies’ regulated retail rates. The state, in this way, has directed funds to offshore wind resources through the electric distribution companies’ regulated rates.

As a second example, all New England states have at least one renewable portfolio standard ("RPS") that enables a renewable resource (however so defined by the state) to generate Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs") that can be sold either to the LSEs, which must comply with the RPS, or to other entities that seek to purchase RECs. As the New England states’ RPS programs have created the demand for RECs, the ISO considers revenues from the sale of RECs to be a government-regulated cost recovery mechanism for REC-eligible renewable resources. This is another example of funds being directed by a government to the resource, this time through a state-created cost recovery mechanism.

A number of such state PPA programs are detailed in Section V of the filing letter.
Q: What changes is the ISO proposing to make to the Sponsored Policy Resource definition?

A: This ISO is proposing five changes to the Sponsored Policy Resource definition such that the definition accommodates the range of new resources sponsored by New England states in the furtherance of their decarbonization goals, both at present and as those goals evolve in the future:

- replacement of “out-of-market” with “other than revenues from ISO-administered markets”;
- expanding the terms used to describe the resources receiving out-of-market support as part of the federal and state programs, as well as the terms used to describe such programs;
- updating the definition to include federal decarbonization programs and programs enacted by executive or administrative order;
- amending the description of how a qualifying resource’s revenue source relates to a decarbonization program; and
- removing the (now out-of-date) existing date limitation on which decarbonization programs are recognized by the definition.

I describe each of these five elements in greater detail next.

Q: Why does the ISO propose to replace “out-of-market” with “other than revenues from ISO-administered markets”? 
A: The term “out-of-market,” as presently used in the Tariff, and briefly described above, has a specific definition in Appendix A that refers to “any revenues that are: (a) not tradable throughout the New England Control Area or that are restricted to resources within a particular state or other geographic sub-region; or (b) not available to all resources of the same physical type within the New England Control Area, regardless of the resource owner.”

For example, Class I RECs are a type of REC that are tradable throughout the New England Control Area and are thereby excluded from the Tariff’s definition of “out-of-market revenues.” Under today’s MOPR, new resource offers are not mitigated in a way that excludes their projected Class I REC revenues.

In constructing the second tranche exclusions, the ISO determined that it would treat all revenues associated with federal and state decarbonization programs alike. Therefore, the ISO proposes to amend the Sponsored Policy Resource definition such that Class I RECs are included in the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion. Continuing to use the phrase “out-of-market” would have prevented such inclusion. The phrase “other than revenues from ISO-administered markets” provides a more generic description of out-of-market support that will now include Class I REC revenues.

Q: Why is the ISO expanding the terms used to describe the types of resources and programs encompassed by the Sponsored Policy Resource definition?
A: The ISO is updating the resource types listed in the Sponsored Policy Resource definition to include “zero carbon” resources, and it is updating federal and state programs listed in the definition to include “decarbonization” and “net-zero carbon” standards and goals. The purpose of this change is to ensure the definition captures the terms the New England states have started to use to describe their sponsored resources and associated programs. Importantly, the Sponsored Policy Resource definition retains its requirement that the sponsored resource qualifies as renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative under the terms of the federal or state program. A Project Sponsor must demonstrate that the federal or state program considers the new resource to be renewable, clean, zero carbon, or alternative in its Load-Side Relationship Certification.

Q: Why is the ISO updating the definition to include federal programs and programs enacted by executive or administrative order?

A: Similar to the removal of the term “out-of-market,” the explicit inclusion of “federal” programs is to ensure that all resources with support pursuant to decarbonization programs receive the same treatment under the buyer-side market power review structure. The inclusion of “executive or administrative order” is to ensure that qualifying programs with the force of law are not inadvertently excluded by referring only to statute or regulation, which are the two terms listed in the current Sponsored Policy Resource definition.
Q: Why is the ISO amending the description of how a qualifying resource’s revenue source relates to a federal or state program?

A: The ISO is replacing the Sponsored Policy Resource definition’s reference to a program “from which the resource receives the out-of-market revenue source” with “as a result of which the resource receives the revenue source.” The removal of “out-of-market” is for the same reasons explained above. The change from “from which” to “as a result of which” is made in recognition that some state programs may provide a revenue source for the qualifying resource in a somewhat indirect manner.

For example, Massachusetts recently enacted a statute, known as S.B. 9, that imposes on its municipally-owned electric distribution companies (“municipal systems”) an RPS requirement. The statute sets a minimum RPS requirement for these municipal systems that (1) escalates over time, (2) defines the renewable or clean resources through which the municipal systems may meet their RPS requirements, and (3) sets forth alternative compliance payments for municipal systems that fail to meet their requirements. The statute does not explicitly indicate the revenue source by which the municipal systems will fund their RPS compliance, but it is implicit that the municipal systems may fund their compliance through the rates they charge to their retail customers—a government-regulated rate. Thus, should a Massachusetts municipal system provide revenues to a new resource for the purpose of meeting its S.B. 9 RPS requirements, and the
new resource qualifies as a renewable or clean resource under this new statute, then the ISO would consider such revenues to be “as result of” the statute’s RPS.

Q: Finally, why is the ISO removing the date limitation on which programs are recognized by the Sponsored Policy Resource definition?

A: The current Sponsored Policy Resource definition is restricted to resources that qualify under a program “enacted (either by statute or regulation) . . . and that is in effect on January 1, 2018.” The ISO is eliminating this date restriction in the interest of accommodating the evolution of New England state decarbonization programs. In recent years, the New England states have continued to enact additional programs, and the ISO anticipates further enactments in the future. In recognition that the New England states have expanded, and are likely to continue to expand, their support for renewable resources for the purpose of meeting their decarbonization goals, a time limitation would undermine the beneficial goal of the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion—avoiding the inefficient overbuild that will likely increase as future programs are enacted and additional Sponsored Policy Resources are developed in New England.

Q: Why has the ISO chosen to restrict the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion to new resources receiving state support as part of a renewable, clean, decarbonization, net-zero, or alternative energy program, and not to resources that a state may wish to support for reliability or other purposes?
A: The ISO is taking a conservative approach by limiting the Sponsored Policy Resource exclusion to only those state-supported resources that the ISO can verify are receiving state support in furtherance of a state’s environmental goals. These are the resources that are contributing to the inefficient overbuild problem, which is the fundamental driver for the ISO’s overhaul of its buyer-side market power mitigation rules. The ISO is not aware of any other state programs that provide financial support to resources in the furtherance of state goals similarly independent of the FCM or other ISO-administered markets. Consequently, the ISO is limiting the exclusion to the circumstances before it—new resources related to renewable, clean, decarbonization, net-zero, and alternative energy programs.

Q: Overall, what types of resources meet the updated Sponsored Policy Resource definition and qualify for second tranche treatment?

A: Generally, resources that generate RECs pursuant to existing New England state RPS programs qualify as Sponsored Policy Resources for second tranche treatment. As examples, such resources in the New England markets presently include (but are not limited to) photovoltaic solar, onshore wind, offshore wind, and certain hydroelectric resources. Qualification is not limited to resources that generate RECs, however, and these are only generic examples. The ISO will not make any resource-specific determination about whether a resource qualifies as a Sponsored Policy Resource without first reviewing the Load-Side Relationship.
Certification submitted for the resource as part of the new resource qualification package.

**Q:** What does the ISO expect a Project Sponsor to include in the Load-Side Relationship Certification for a determination that the Project Sponsor’s new resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource?

**A:** The ISO requires the Project Sponsor to include sufficient detail in the affidavit submitted as part of the Load-Side Relationship Certification that will allow the ISO to determine that the new resource meets all three elements of the Sponsored Policy Resource definition, which are described above. This detail should include an identification of the specific federal or New England state statute, regulation, or order that sets out the decarbonization standard or goal pursuant to which the resource qualifies as a renewable, clean, zero-carbon, or alternative energy resource. The detail also should include an explanation of how the revenue source is both supported by a government-regulated rate, charge, or other regulated cost recovery mechanism and is related to the identified program. This is not an exhaustive list of the detail that a Project Sponsor must include in its affidavit, as the ISO expects that the affidavit will include the information necessary to resolve any ambiguities that may exist regarding (1) the status of the new resource under the federal or state program or (2) the nature of the federal or state standard or goal identified in the affidavit.
Q: Please describe the third tranche of new resources under the proposed buyer-side market power review structure.

A: The third tranche of resources includes any new resources that do not qualify for treatment under the first or second tranches of the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. Generally, these are generation and active demand response resources larger than 5 MW of capacity that receive some type of out-of-market support from an LSE, state, or local government that is unrelated to a state decarbonization program. As explained above in the description of the competitive-entrant exclusion, new resources that receive funding from wholly private commercial entities (excluding LSEs) do not fall into this category.

Q: How are third tranche resources treated under the buyer-side market power review structure proposed by the ISO in this filing?

A: Third tranche resources will have their offers reviewed by the IMM to determine whether the offers represent an attempt to exercise buyer-side market power and should be mitigated. A third tranche resource must submit as part of its new resource qualification package the lowest price at which it requests to offer capacity in the FCA, and supporting cost workbooks. The IMM will use this information to perform a conduct test to determine whether the new resource’s requested lowest offer price represents a below-cost offer. The mechanics of the conduct test, which are the same mechanics used for determining New Resource
Offer Floor Prices under the current MOPR mechanism, are described in detail above in Section IV.

If the resource’s requested lowest offer price passes the conduct test, the offer price is not mitigated, and the resource may proceed to the auction (subject to all other non-mitigation related qualification requirements) with an offer at or above that requested lowest offer price. If the resource’s requested lowest offer price fails the conduct test, the IMM will consider any information the Project Sponsor submitted to rebut the presumption that an LSE supporting the resource has the incentive to exercise buyer-side market power through the resource’s offer. To do so, the information must show that the associated LSE would be unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from any reduction in capacity clearing prices that would result from clearing the resource in the FCA. This incentive rebuttal component recognizes that, when an LSE’s out-of-market support for a resource will not yield a financial benefit for the LSE via reduced capacity market charges, then such support does not reflect an attempt to exercise buyer-side market power in the capacity market. Thus, the buyer-side market power review applied to third tranche resources includes both a conduct test and an incentive rebuttal component.

**Q:** Please describe the mechanics of how a Project Sponsor may seek to demonstrate the lack of an incentive to exercise buyer-side market power on the part of an associated LSE.
A: New resources in the third tranche that receive or expect to receive out-of-market support from an LSE may submit documentation and information along with their new resource qualification packages to make a demonstration that the associated LSE lacks the incentive to exercise buyer-side market power through the resource’s offer. Specifically, the documentation and information must demonstrate that any benefit to the associated LSE’s load position from lowered capacity clearing prices, resulting from the new resource’s entry into the market, is unlikely to materially exceed the cost of the LSE’s out-of-market support for the resource. Effectively, the Project Sponsor must show that any financial gain associated with the LSE’s load position fails a net-benefits test. If the Project Sponsor demonstrates the lack of any such material, net financial benefit for the associated LSE, the new resource’s requested lowest offer price will not be mitigated, even if such offer price failed the conduct test.

Q: What type of documentation and information should a Project Sponsor submit in order to take advantage of the incentive rebuttal component of the IMM’s review?

A: The type of documentation and information the ISO expects Project Sponsors to submit for the purpose of the incentive rebuttal component of the IMM’s review includes the following: full disclosure of any relationships or arrangements with

13 In this context, failure of a net-benefits test means that the costs of supporting the resource exceed any associated financial benefits within the LSE’s load portfolio.
an LSE regarding the new resource; information concerning any associated LSE’s net-load position; the cost to the LSE for providing the out-of-market support; and any assumptions the Project Sponsor may have made regarding the potential clearing price impacts that would result from the entry of the new resource at its requested lowest offer price.

The incentive rebuttal component of the IMM’s review puts the burden on the Project Sponsor to provide the documentation and information necessary for the IMM to determine whether an associated LSE is unlikely to realize a material, net financial benefit from the entry of the resource in the FCM. If the Project Sponsor does not provide any documentation or information, or fails to provide sufficient documentation and information for the IMM’s analysis of the incentive rebuttal, the IMM will not deem the presumption rebutted.

**Q:** **What is the result if the Project Sponsor fails to rebut the presumption of incentive?**

**A:** If the resource’s requested lowest offer price fails the conduct test, and the IMM does not determine that the presumed incentive has been rebutted, the IMM will mitigate the requested lowest offer price to the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, which is equal to the capacity price estimate determined by the IMM for the resource. The resource will then be restricted from offering its capacity into the auction at a price less than the New Resource Offer Floor Price.
Q: Please explain why the incentive rebuttal component of the buyer-side market power review applies only where the out-of-market support is from an LSE, and not a state or political subdivision of a state.

A: The incentive rebuttal component is not available for third tranche resources that receive out-of-market support from a state or local government. However, the incentive rebuttal component is available to publicly owned and municipal systems, which, although they represent local governments, are LSEs. The reason for excluding third tranche resources that receive support from state or local governments from the incentive rebuttal opportunity is due to the fact that state and local governments are not entities for which the IMM can determine net financial benefits.

Note that this restriction does not preclude a resource from having state or local governmental support accounted for in its offer. The proposed buyer-side market power review structure continues to exclude economic development incentives provided by state and local governments not expressly intended to reduce auction clearing prices from the definition of “out-of-market revenues.” The result is that economic development incentives will not be excluded from the IMM’s determination of capacity price estimates used for the conduct test. Thus, the proposed buyer-side market power review mechanism already recognizes, separate from the incentive rebuttal component, circumstances under which states and local governments are broadly providing out-of-market support for reasons that appear to be independent of any impact to clearing prices.
Q: Please provide an example of a type of third tranche resource the ISO expects will be subject to the IMM’s buyer-side market power review.

A: One hypothetical third tranche resource would be a new gas-fired combined-cycle generating resource that has a long-term PPA with a large New England LSE, and that LSE has substantial annual capacity market charges. In as much as the entry of a new, large resource of this type will, in general, impact capacity clearing prices in New England’s market, it becomes important for the market rules to identify whether the LSE’s out-of-market support through the PPA reflects any incentive to exercise buyer-side market power.

In this situation, the Project Sponsor would be required to submit its requested lowest offer price and cost workbooks for the IMM’s review. The Project Sponsor, however, would also have the option of providing documentation and information to demonstrate that the LSE would not likely achieve any material, net financial benefit from its out-of-market support of the resource.

The IMM would determine a capacity price estimate and New Resource Offer Floor Price, perform the conduct test, and perform the incentive rebuttal analysis using the information submitted by the Project Sponsor. If the requested lowest offer price were to pass the conduct test, the offer price would not be mitigated. If the requested lowest offer price were to fail the conduct test, but the Project Sponsor successfully demonstrated that the LSE would be unlikely to realize a
material, net financial benefit from its support of the resource, the offer price would not be mitigated. On the other hand, if the requested lowest offer price were to fail the conduct test, and the Project Sponsor were unsuccessful in its incentive rebuttal, the offer price would be mitigated.

VIII. OTHER TARIFF CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATE THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE

Q: Please describe the other tariff changes that the ISO is making to accommodate its proposed buyer-side market power review structure.

A: The ISO proposes four types of tariff changes to accommodate the proposed buyer-side market power review structure. The first proposed change is tariff language that will sunset the CASPR substitution auction. The second proposed change is tariff language that adjusts the requirements for qualification determination notifications (“QDN”) and the pre-auction information filing. The third proposed change is tariff language that rearranges, but does not change, the tariff provisions for the CONE and Net CONE calculation methodologies. The fourth proposed change is tariff language that adjusts the FCA’s treatment of new resources that fail to provide sufficient cost workbook information when so required for the IMM’s buyer-side market power review.

Q: Please describe the tariff changes the ISO is proposing that will sunset the CASPR substitution auction.
A: As part of the ISO’s elimination of the current MOPR, it will also sunset the CASPR substitution auction. The ISO is inserting tariff language at the beginning of Section III.13.2.8 of the Tariff that provides for the final substitution auction to take place as part of FCA 18. The ISO is not removing all references to the substitution auction throughout the Tariff, however, because a number of Tariff provisions related to the calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement and other related values refer to the substitution auction and its results. The ISO’s proposed tariff language at the beginning of Section III.13.2.8 specifies that, notwithstanding the termination of the substitution auction after FCA 18, references to the substitution auction in other parts of the Tariff for planning and settlement purposes remain operative.

Q: Please describe the tariff changes the ISO is proposing that adjust the requirements for the qualification notification determinations and pre-auction information filing.

A: The ISO is amending Tariff Sections III.13.1.1.2.8 and III.13.1.4.1.1.6 regarding new resource QDNs to eliminate references to ORTPs and to better reflect the nature of the IMM’s buyer-side market power review. The QDN provisions still require the ISO to share with the Project Sponsor any mitigation determinations the IMM makes as part of its review, if the IMM conducts one. The revised QDN provisions specify, however, that the ISO will not disclose to the Project Sponsor any IMM determinations regarding the impact an offer from the new resource may have on auction clearing prices, to the extent any such determinations may
have been made as part of an incentive rebuttal analysis. This ensures that the
Project Sponsor does not obtain access to confidential and highly sensitive market
information the IMM may have evaluated using internal ISO data on capacity
market conditions for the upcoming auction. The release of such highly sensitive
market information could conceivably provide the Project Sponsor a competitive
advantage and, thus, undermine the competitiveness of the auction.

Also in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8 and III.13.1.4.1.1.6, the QDN provisions will now
require that the ISO disclose any determinations it made regarding whether the
new resource was excluded from any buyer-side market power review on account
of having a capacity less than or equal to 5 MW, being a passive demand-
response resource, or qualifying as either a competitive entrant or Sponsored
Policy Resource.

The ISO is also amending the language of Section III.13.8.1(c) regarding pre-
auction information filing requirements. The ISO will submit as part of its public
pre-auction filing information about the type of resources that submitted Load-
Side Relationship Certifications, the basis for such certifications, and whether the
ISO accepted such certifications. In response to stakeholder feedback, the ISO
proposes to provide this information, which does not identify any specific
resources, publicly. Such information will provide guidance to market participants
as to the types of resources and state or federal policies that have been determined
to satisfy the Sponsored Policy Resource definition.
Amended Section III.13.8.1(c) will also require the ISO will include in its confidential pre-auction filing to the Commission information about which specific resources’ offers were not reviewed for buyer-side market power, the basis for any exclusion from review, and the Load-Side Relationship Certifications submitted by each resource to the ISO. The ISO will also submit any determinations the IMM made as part of any buyer-side market power review, including mitigation determinations, and the basis for any such determinations.

The ISO is making additional adjustments to Section III.13.8.1(c) to clarify which information submitted will remain confidential, even after the 15-day period that follows the FCA. The ISO has adjusted the Tariff language to clarify its current practice, which is to keep confidential any bid and offer price information from new and existing resources, including any information that may indirectly reveal bid or offer information. The ISO will also keep confidential any Load-Side Relationship Certifications submitted to the ISO. Finally, the ISO will keep confidential any information regarding any IMM determinations regarding the potential impact of a new resource’s offer on auction clearing prices. The ISO’s clarifications on what information must remain confidential are necessary to protect market participants’ competitively sensitive information, and ultimately the competitiveness of the auction itself.
Q: Please describe the tariff changes the ISO is proposing that rearrange the tariff language related to the CONE and Net CONE calculation methodologies.

A: Under the current Tariff, CONE and Net CONE are recalculated in full no less frequently than every three years. In years when a complete recalculation is not performed, the Tariff requires that various adjustments to CONE and Net CONE be made. The ISO’s current Tariff language in Section III.13.2.4 describing the yearly adjustments to CONE and Net CONE simply incorporates by reference the methodology used to perform the analogous annual updates to the ORTP values, which is in Section III.A.21.1.2(e) of Appendix A. Because the ISO is eliminating the ORTP provisions of the Tariff in conjunction with its removal of the MOPR, the ISO is relocating the relevant annual update language from the ORTP provisions into the current Tariff provisions describing the yearly adjustments to CONE and Net CONE. The ISO is also making some clarifying changes to the organization of the CONE and Net CONE provisions by creating two new sections, Sections III.13.2.4.1 (containing full recalculation parameters) and III.13.2.4.2 (containing interim yearly adjustment parameters).

Q: Please describe the tariff changes the ISO is proposing that adjust the treatment of new resources that fail to provide sufficient workbooks.

A: Finally, the ISO is amending the Tariff provision in current Section III.A.21.2(b)(iv) that addresses the circumstance where a new resource fails to submit sufficient workbook information to allow the IMM to determine a capacity
price estimate. Under the current MOPR mechanism, if the IMM has insufficient information to determine a capacity price estimate for a resource that requests to submit an offer below the applicable ORTP, then the New Resource Offer Floor Price is set to the ORTP, thereby mitigating the new resource’s requested offer price to the ORTP. However, the elimination of ORTPs from the Tariff requires a new default New Resource Offer Floor Price for when a Project Sponsor of a third tranche resource fails to submit sufficient documentation for the IMM’s buyer-side market power review.

The ISO is amending this provision of the Tariff such that the default New Resource Offer Floor Price for third tranche resources that fail to submit sufficient workbook information will be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The amended provision is located in new Section III.A.21.3(b)(iv). The ISO recognizes that, under current and most future market conditions, this amendment will effectively keep new resources that fail to provide sufficient information and workbooks out of the auction. The ISO is retaining, though, the Tariff provisions that allow the IMM to consult with a Project Sponsor to gather more information if the IMM finds that the workbook information submitted as part of the new resource qualification package is deficient. The ISO is confident that this consultation process will ensure that few, if any, third tranche resources will have their offers automatically mitigated to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.
Q: Does this conclude your testimony?

A: Yes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 31, 2022.

Ryan McCarthy, Lead Analyst, ISO New England, Market Development
### FEBRUARY 3, 2022 PARTICIPANTS COMMITTEE MEETING

**VOTES TAKEN ON MOPR PROPOSAL**

#### TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>NEPOOL-Approved MOPR Reform Proposal</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td><strong>% IN FAVOR</strong></td>
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#### GENERATION SECTOR

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<tr>
<td>Able Grid Infrastructure Holdings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deepwater Wind Block Island</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominion Energy Generation Mktg</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FirstLight Power Management, LLC</td>
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<td>Energy Management Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Millennium Power Partners,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Record Hill Wind LLC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside Power, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSP Companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marco DM Holdings, LLC</td>
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<td>Nautilus Power, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>NextEra Energy Resources, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walden Renewables Development</td>
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<td>Eversource Energy</td>
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<td>National Grid</td>
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<td>VELCO</td>
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<td>Versant Power</td>
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<td><strong>ABSTENTIONS (A)</strong></td>
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#### ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES SECTOR

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<td>Central Rivers Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Covanta Energy Marketing, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENGIE Energy Marketing NA, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great River Hydro, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jericho Power LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Novatus Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheelabrator/Macquarie</td>
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<td><strong>Load Response Sub-Sector</strong></td>
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<td>Enel X North America, Inc.</td>
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<td>Maple Energy</td>
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<td>Vermont Energy Investment Corp</td>
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<td>Voltus, Inc.</td>
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<td>BP Energy Company</td>
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<td>Brookfield Renew. Trading &amp; Mktg</td>
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<td>C.N. Brown Electricity, LLC</td>
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<td>Calpine Energy Services, LP</td>
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<td>Consolidated Edison Energy Inc.</td>
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<td>Constellation Energy Generation</td>
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<td>Cross-Sound Cable Company</td>
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<td>DTE Energy Trading, Inc.</td>
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<td>Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC</td>
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<td>Emera Energy Services Companies</td>
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<td>Galt Power, Inc.</td>
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<td>H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.</td>
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<td>LIPA</td>
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<td>Maine Power, LLC</td>
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<td>Marble River, LLC</td>
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<td>Mercuria Energy America, Inc.</td>
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<td>NRG Power Marketing, LLC</td>
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<td>Shell Energy North America (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stonepeak Kestrel Energy Mktg</td>
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<td>Talen Energy Marketing, LLC</td>
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<td>Tenaska Power Services Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vitol Inc.</td>
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| IN FAVOR (F) | 24 |
| OPPOSED (O)  | 1  |
| TOTAL VOTES  | 25 |
| ABSTENTIONS (A) | 5 |

### END USER SECTOR

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<td>Associated Industries of Mass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bath Iron Works Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conn. Office of Consumer Counsel</td>
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<td>Conservation Law Foundation</td>
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<td>Durgin and Crowell Lumber Co.</td>
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<td>Elektrisola, Inc.</td>
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<td>Environmental Defense Fund</td>
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<td>Garland Manufacturing Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hammond Lumber Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harvard Dedicated Energy Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Liner Foods (USA) Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial Energy Consumer Group</td>
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<td>Maine Public Advocate Office</td>
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<td>Maine Skiing, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass. Attorney General's Office</td>
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<td>Mintz, Samuel</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>Moore Company</td>
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<td>Natural Resources Defense Council</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>New Hampshire OCA</td>
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<td>Nylon Corporation of America</td>
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<td>PowerOptions, Inc.</td>
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<td>St. Anselm College</td>
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<td>The Energy Consortium</td>
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<td>Union of Concerned Scientists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z-TECH, LLC</td>
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| IN FAVOR (F) | 14 |
| OPPOSED (O)  | 10 |
| TOTAL VOTES  | 24 |
| ABSTENTIONS (A) | 2 |
### PUBLICLY OWNED ENTITY SECTOR

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<td>Belmont Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Block Island Utility District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boylston Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Braintree Electric Light Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chester Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicopee Municipal Lighting Plant</td>
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<td>Concord Municipal Light Plant</td>
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<td>Conn. Mun. Electric Energy Coop.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danvers Electric Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgetown Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groton Electric Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Groveland Electric Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Holden Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Holyoke Gas &amp; Electric Dept.</td>
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<td>North Attleborough</td>
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<td>Pascoag Utility District</td>
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<td>Paxton Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Peabody Municipal Light Plant</td>
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<td>Princeton Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Reading Municipal Light Dept.</td>
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### PUBLICLY OWNED ENTITY SECTOR (cont.)

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<td>Sterling Municipal Electric Light Dept.</td>
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<td>Stowe (VT) Electric Dept.</td>
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<td>Wellesley Municipal Light Plant</td>
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| In Favor (F) | 25 |
| Opposed (O) | 22 |
| Total Votes | 47 |
| Abstentions (A) | 4 |

### PROVISIONAL MEMBERS

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<tr>
<th>Participant Name</th>
<th>NEPOOL-Approved MOPR Reform Proposal</th>
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<td>Anbaric Development Partners, LLC</td>
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<td>Interconnect Energy Storage LLC</td>
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<td>Jupiter Power LLC</td>
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<td>KCE CT 1 &amp; 2</td>
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| In Favor (F) | 0 |
| Opposed (O) | 2 |
| Total Votes | 2 |
| Abstentions (A) | 2 |
Connecticut
The Honorable Ned Lamont
Office of the Governor
State Capitol
210 Capitol Ave.
Hartford, CT 06106
bob.clark@ct.gov
Connecticut Attorney General’s Office
165 Capitol Avenue
Hartford, CT 06106
john.wright@ct.gov
Lauren.bidra@ct.gov
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