III.13. **Forward Capacity Market.**

The ISO shall administer a forward market for capacity (“Forward Capacity Market”) in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13. For each one-year period from June 1 through May 31, starting with the period June 1, 2010 to May 31, 2011, for which Capacity Supply Obligations are assumed and payments are made in the Forward Capacity Market (“Capacity Commitment Period”), the ISO shall conduct a Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2 to procure the amount of capacity needed in the New England Control Area and in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section III.12. To be eligible to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation for a Capacity Commitment Period through the Forward Capacity Auction, a resource must be accepted in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.
III.13.1.  **Forward Capacity Auction Qualification.**

Each resource, or portion thereof, must qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.2), a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4). Each resource must be at least 100 kW in size to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, except for resources registered with the ISO prior to the earliest date that any portion of this Section III.13 becomes effective. An offer may be composed of separate resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.5. Pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1, the ISO shall determine a summer Qualified Capacity and a winter Qualified Capacity for each resource, and an FCA Qualified Capacity for each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource.

All Project Sponsors must be Market Participants no later than 30 days prior to the deadline for submitting the FCM Deposit. The Lead Market Participant for a resource participating in a Forward Capacity Auction may not change in the 15 Business Days prior to, or during, that Forward Capacity Auction.

### III.13.1.1.  **New Generating Capacity Resources.**

To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a resource or proposed resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.

### III.13.1.1.1.  **Definition of New Generating Capacity Resource.**

A resource or a portion of a resource that is not a New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource (as defined in Section III.13.1.3), or a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (as discussed in Section III.13.1.4) shall be considered a New Generating Capacity Resource for participation in a Forward Capacity Auction if either: (i) the resource has never previously been counted as a capacity resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.1; or (ii) the resource, or a portion thereof, meets one of the criteria in Section III.13.1.1.2.

### III.13.1.1.1.1. **Resources Never Previously Counted as Capacity.**
(a) A resource, or a portion thereof, will be considered to have never been counted as a capacity resource if it has not cleared in any previous Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) Where a New Capacity Generating Resource was accepted for participation in the qualification process for a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer Qualified Capacity and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO in accordance with Section III.13.3, the portion of the resource that did not clear in the previous Forward Capacity Auction shall be a New Generating Capacity Resource in the subsequent Forward Capacity Auction. Such a New Generating Capacity Resource must satisfy all of the qualification process requirements applicable to a New Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except that the Project Sponsor is not required to resubmit documentation demonstrating site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) or to resubmit a critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) or to provide a new Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit (Section III.13.1.1.2.1(c)).

III.13.1.1.2. Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
A resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource, including a deactivated or retired capacity resource, may elect to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The incremental expenditure required to reactivate a resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) may be included in the calculation of the dollar per kilowatt thresholds in this Section III.13.1.1.2. A resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2 shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e). A Market Participant that elects to have a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, must notify the ISO when the existing resource ceases to operate and the New Generating Capacity Resource commences operation. If a Market Participant with a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource elects, pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(ii), to have the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of a New Generating Capacity Resource and the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource must take an outage in order for the New Generating Capacity Resource to commence Commercial Operation (as defined in...
Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff), then the Market Participant must notify the ISO that the outage is for the purpose of the New Generating Capacity Resource commencing Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). A resource shall be accepted for participation as a new resource if it complies with one of the following three subsections:

(a) Where investment in the resource will result, by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output by an amount exceeding the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction, the whole resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource; or

(b) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purposes of re-powering will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after re-powering, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction; or

(c) Where investment in the resource subsequent to January 1, 2007 and prior to the conclusion of the first Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation for which treatment as a new resource may be applied, for the purpose of compliance with environmental regulations or permits will be equal to or greater than $100 per kilowatt of the whole resource’s summer Qualified Capacity after the investment, the owner of the resource may elect that the whole resource participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource. The $100 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.1.1.3. **Incremental Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, where investment in the resource:

(a) will result, by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, in an increase in output less than or equal to the greater of: (i) 20 percent of the summer Qualified Capacity of the resource at the time of the qualification process for the Forward Capacity Auction; or (ii) 40 MW; and

(b) will be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. These investment costs may include the costs associated with reactivating a resource that was previously deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and in which investment in the resource was undertaken prior to reactivation.

(c) A Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant making an election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.3 must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 for the incremental amount.

III.13.1.1.3.A. **Treatment of New Incremental Capacity and Existing Generating Capacity at the Same Generating Resource.**

For incremental summer capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or incremental winter capacity that meets the investment thresholds in Section III.13.1.1.3 as applied to the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity, if the incremental summer or winter capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental summer or winter capacity with excess existing winter or summer Qualified Capacity at that same resource, as appropriate, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.
III.13.1.1.4. De-rated Capacity of Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.
For purposes of the Forward Capacity Market, de-rated capacity of a resource shall be measured by the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity prior to the de-rating of the resource and the most recent summer demonstration of Seasonal Claimed Capability of a resource, as of the fifth Business Day of October. The owner of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource that has been de-rated by at least 2 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) but by no more than the lesser of 20 percent of its summer Qualified Capacity (as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource) or 40 MW for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction may elect to have the incremental amount of capacity above the capacity level established while de-rated treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource if it demonstrates that it will be reestablished prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and that the investment in the resource for such purposes shall be equal to or greater than $200 per kilowatt of the amount of the increase in summer Qualified Capacity resulting from the investment. The Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.1 and a New Capacity Qualification Package pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2 for the incremental amount of capacity for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The $200 threshold (in base year 2008 dollars) shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs reflecting data for the period ending January 1 of the year preceding the start of the qualification process for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction. The owner of a resource seeking to have the incremental amount of capacity counted as a New Generating Capacity Resource as provided in this Section, must demonstrate based on historical data that the resource previously operated at a level at least 2 percent above the de-rated amount.

III.13.1.1.5. Treatment of Resources that are Partially New and Partially Existing.
For purposes of this Section III.13.1, where only a portion of a single resource is treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, either as a result of partial clearing in a previous Forward Capacity Auction or pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.3 or Section III.13.1.1.4, then except as otherwise indicated in this Section III.13.1, that portion of the resource shall be treated as a New Generating Capacity Resource, and the remainder of the resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.6. Treatment of Deactivated and Retired Units.

(a) [Reserved.]
(b) A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, that submits to
the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to operation shall, subject to ISO
review and acceptance of that reactivation plan, be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource
unless that resource satisfies the criteria under Section III.13.1.1.2 as a New Generating Capacity
Resource. Such reactivation plans must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the
Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. A resource that previously has been deactivated or retired
pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions),
as applicable, that submits to the ISO a reactivation plan demonstrating that the resource shall return to
operation and having a material modification as described in Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets
and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions), as applicable, shall be subject to Section III.13.1.1.2.3
(Initial Interconnection Analysis).

III.13.1.1.7 Renewable Technology Resources.
To participate in the Forward Capacity Market as a Renewable Technology Resource, a Generating
Capacity Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource (including every Asset that is part of the On-Peak
Demand Resource) must satisfy the following requirements:

(a) receive an out-of-market revenue source supported by a state- or federally-regulated rate, charge
or other regulated cost recovery mechanism;

(b) qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource under any New England state’s
mandated (either by statute or regulation) renewable or alternative energy portfolio standards as
in effect on January 1, 2014, or, in states without a standard, qualify under that state’s renewable
energy goals as a renewable resource (either by statute or regulation) as in effect on January 1,
2014. The resource must qualify as a renewable or alternative energy generating resource in the
New England state in which it is geographically located. A resource physically located in United
States federal waters directly adjacent to New England state maritime boundaries and directly
interconnecting to the New England system is considered to be geographically located in the state
where its Point of Interconnection is located;
(c) participate in a Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2018 as a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1, and;

(d) has been designated for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.9.

An Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid may not be submitted for Generating Capacity Resources that assumed a Capacity Supply Obligation by participating in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Renewable Technology Resource.


For a resource to qualify as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. Each of these submissions is described in more detail in this Section III.13.1.1.2. The Project Sponsor must also have, or in the case of an Import Capacity Resource seeking to qualify with an Elective Transmission Upgrade be associated with, a valid Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff prior to submitting a New Capacity Show of Interest Form during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. Both the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and the New Capacity Qualification Package are required regardless of the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. Neither the New Capacity Show of Interest Form nor the New Capacity Qualification Package constitutes an Interconnection Request. A Project Sponsor may withdraw from the qualification process at any time prior to three Business Days before the submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1 by providing written notification of such withdrawal to the ISO. Any withdrawal, whether pursuant to this provision or as determined by the ISO (for example as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.1 or Section III.13.1.9.3), shall be irrevocable. The Project Sponsor of a withdrawn application is subject to reconciliation of its Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit described in Section III.13.1.9.3. None of the provisions of this Section III.13.1, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, supersedes, replaces, or satisfies any of the requirements of Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the
Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, except as specifically provided thereunder. Determinations by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2, including the initial interconnection analysis and the analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, are for purposes of qualification for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction only, and do not constitute a right or approval to interconnect, and do not guarantee the ability to interconnect.

**III.13.1.1.2.1. New Capacity Show of Interest Form.**

Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1, for each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Capacity Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.1.2.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. After submission of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form, Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23, or Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) may not be made to the information contained therein or the New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall be considered withdrawn. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

(a) A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall include the following information, to the extent the information is not already provided under an active Interconnection Request under Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, and other such information necessary to evaluate a project: the project name; the Project Sponsor’s contact information; the Project Sponsor’s ISO customer status; the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff); the project address or location, and if relevant, asset identification number; the status of the project under the interconnection procedures described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff; whether the resource has ever previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010; the capacity (in MW) of the New Generating Capacity Resource; a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21 or some other type); a simple location plan and a one-line diagram of the plant and station facilities, including any known transmission facilities; the location of the
proposed interconnection; and other specific project data as set forth in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. A completed New Capacity Show of Interest Form shall also specify the Queue Position associated with the project pursuant to Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. In the case of a resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource that is supported by an Internal Elective Transmission Upgrade, all Queue Positions associated with the project must be submitted in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form. Submittal of the Interconnection Request may take place prior to the qualification process described here, but no later than the date on which the New Capacity Show of Interest Form is submitted to the ISO; however, the Interconnection Customer Interconnection Request must still be active and consistent with the project described in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form as well as the New Capacity Qualification Package to be submitted as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.

(b) The Project Sponsor must submit with the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, documentation demonstrating that the Project Sponsor has already achieved control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.

(c) In the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must indicate if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource that previously had a Capacity Supply Obligation or previously received payment as a capacity resource pursuant to the market rules in effect prior to June 1, 2010 as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.3, or if the New Generating Capacity Resource is incremental capacity associated with a resource previously listed as a capacity resource that has been de-rated for three or more years at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.4.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) With the New Capacity Show of Interest Form, the Project Sponsor must submit the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, as described in Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.2.2. New Capacity Qualification Package.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Capacity Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, described in Section III.13.1.10. Except as otherwise provided in this Section III.13.1, the New Capacity Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.1.2.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project. No change that may result in a reduction in capacity may be made to a project described in a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or New Capacity Qualification Package between the date that is 150 days before the start of the Forward Capacity Auction and the deadline for qualification determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.

III.13.1.1.2.2.1. Site Control.
For all Forward Capacity Auctions and reconfiguration auctions, the Project Sponsor must achieve, prior to the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, control of the project site for the duration of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, which shall be as defined in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 or Section 4.1 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.2. Critical Path Schedule.
In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a critical path schedule for the project with sufficient detail to allow the ISO to evaluate the feasibility of the project being built and the feasibility that the project will meet the requirement that the project achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. The critical path schedule shall include, at a minimum, the dates on which the following milestones have or are expected to occur:

(a) Major Permits. In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must list all major permits required for the project, and for each major permit, the Project Sponsor must list the agency requiring the permit, the date on which application for the permit is expected to be made, and the expected date of approval. Major permits shall include, but are not limited to: (i) all federal and state permits; and (ii) local, regional, and town permits. The permitting and installation process associated with any major ancillary infrastructure (such as new gas pipelines, new water supply systems, or large storage tanks) should be included in this portion of the New Capacity Qualification Package.
(b) **Project Financing Closing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor shall provide (i) the estimated dollar amount of required project financing; (ii) the expected sources of that financing; and (iii) the expected closing date(s) for the project financing.

(c) **Major Equipment Orders.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide a list of all of the major components necessary for the project, and the date or dates on which all major components necessary for the project have been or are expected to be ordered. Although the specific technology will determine the list of major components to be included, the list shall include, to the extent applicable: (i) electric generators which may include equipment such as fuel cells or solar photovoltaic equipment; (ii) turbines; (iii) step-up transformers; (iv) relay panels; (v) distributed control systems; and (vi) any other single piece of equipment or system such as a cooling water system, steam generation, steam handling system, water treatment system, fuel handling system or emissions control system that is not included as a sub-component of other equipment listed in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2(c) and that accounts for more than five percent of the total project cost. For an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, major components shall also include, to the extent applicable, transmission facilities and associated substation equipment.

(d) **Substantial Site Construction.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the approximate date on which the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site is expected to exceed 20 percent of construction financing costs.

(e) **Major Equipment Delivery.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the dates on which the major equipment described in subsection (d) above has been or is scheduled to be delivered to the project site.

(f) **Major Equipment Testing.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date or dates on which each piece of major equipment described in subsection (c) above is scheduled to undergo testing, including major systems testing, as appropriate for the specific technology to establish its suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major equipment, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the design capacity of the resource and in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The test(s) shall include those conducted at the point at which the operation of the
major equipment will be determined to be in compliance with the requirements of the engineering or purchase specifications.

(g) **Commissioning.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date on which the project is expected to have demonstrated the level of performance specified in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and in the New Capacity Qualification Package.

(h) **Commercial Operation.** In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must provide the date by which the project is expected to achieve Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and/or the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value. This date must be no later than the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

**III.13.1.1.2.2.3. Offer Information.**

(a) All New Generating Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Capacity Qualification Package if an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

(c) By submitting a New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor certifies that an offer from the New Generating Capacity Resource will not include any anticipated revenues the resource is
expected to receive for its capacity cost as a Qualified Generator Reactive Resource pursuant to Schedule 2 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.1.2.2.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
In the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. For incremental capacity qualified pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3.A, this election shall apply to both the incremental amount of capacity and the existing Qualified Capacity matched to the incremental capacity at the same generating resource. If no such election is made in the New Capacity Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Capacity Offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Capacity Offer clears. If a New Capacity Offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4.

III.13.1.1.2.2.5. Additional Requirements for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.
In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2:

(a) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (re-powering), Section III.13.1.1.1.3 (incremental capacity), or Section III.13.1.1.1.4 (de-rated capacity), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.1.2(b), III.13.1.1.1.3(b), and III.13.1.1.1.4) will be met.

(b) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2(c) (environmental compliance), the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package: (i) a detailed description of the specific
regulations that it is seeking to comply with and the permits that it must obtain; and (ii) documentation of the costs associated with the project in sufficient detail to allow the ISO to determine that the relevant cost threshold (described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6) will be met.

(c) For each resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.4, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package detailed information showing how and when the resource will shed its Capacity Supply Obligation to accommodate necessary work on the facility, if necessary. The Project Sponsor must also include the shedding of its Capacity Supply Obligation as an additional milestone in the critical path schedule described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.1.2.2.6. Additional Requirements for New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

In addition to the information described elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.1.2.2, for each Intermittent Power Resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must include in the New Capacity Qualification Package:

(a) a claimed summer Qualified Capacity and a claimed winter Qualified Capacity based on the data described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6(b);

(b) measured and recorded site-specific summer and winter data relevant to the expected performance of the Intermittent Power Resource (including wind speed data for wind resources, water flow data for run-of-river hydropower resources, and irradiance data for solar resources) that, with the other information provided in the New Capacity Qualification Package, will enable the ISO to confirm the summer and winter Qualified Capacity that the Project Sponsor claims for the Intermittent Power Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.3. Initial Interconnection Analysis.

(a) For each New Generating Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an initial interconnection analysis, including an analysis of overlapping interconnection impacts, based on the information provided in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and shall determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. The initial interconnection
analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures, and will include, but will not be limited to, a power flow analysis and a short circuit analysis. No initial interconnection analysis is required where the total requested Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, III.13.1.1.4, or III.13.1.1.6 can be realized without a Material Modification (as defined in Section 4.4 of Schedule 22, Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 and Section 4.4 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The ISO will perform the initial interconnection analysis in the form of a group study that will (i) include all the projects that have submitted a New Capacity Show of Interest Form to participate in the same Capacity Commitment Period (as described in Section 4.1 of Schedule 22 and Section 1.5 of Schedule 23 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) and (ii) exclude any existing capacity that will be retired as of the start of the same Capacity Commitment Period. Participation in an initial interconnection analysis is a requirement for obtaining Capacity Network Resource Interconnection Service or Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service in a manner that meets the Capacity Capability Interconnection Standard in accordance with the provisions in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

(b) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide the entire amount of capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s Qualified Capacity values may be adjusted accordingly, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.5.

(c) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the interconnection facilities and upgrades identified in the qualification process that are necessary to enable the New Generating Capacity Resource to provide capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be implemented before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period and the New Generating Capacity Resource can not provide any capacity without those facilities and upgrades, the resource shall not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In this case, the ISO will provide an explanation of its determination in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8.
(d) If as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that the New Generating Capacity Resource can provide all or some of the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period, and if the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1, then in the qualification determination notification, discussed in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, the ISO, after consultation with the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer as appropriate, shall include a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

(e) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO concludes, after consultation with the Project Sponsor and the applicable Transmission Owner(s) or Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer, as appropriate, that the capacity indicated in the New Capacity Show of Interest Form can not be interconnected by the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period, the Forward Capacity Market qualification process for that resource shall be terminated and the ISO will notify the Project Sponsor of such termination.

(f) Where, as a result of the initial interconnection analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, New Generating Capacity Resources that are otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot provide the full amount of capacity that they each would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Generating Capacity Resources and New Generating Capacity Resources seeking to qualify for the Forward Capacity Auction), those New Generating Capacity Resources will be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction on the basis of their Queue Position, as described in Schedules 22, 23 and 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, with priority given to resources that entered the queue earlier. Resources with lower priority in the queue may be accepted partially. Starting with the fourth auction, a New Generating Capacity Resource that meets the requirements of this Section III.13.1, but that would not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of overlapping interconnection impacts with another resource having a higher priority in the queue may be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f), provided that the resource having a higher priority in the queue is not a resource offering capacity into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(e).
III.13.1.2.4. Evaluation of New Capacity Qualification Package.
The ISO shall review a New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package consistent with the dates set forth in Section III.13.1.10, and shall determine whether the package is complete and whether, based on the information provided, the New Generating Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to considering, the following:
(a) whether the New Capacity Qualification Package contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.1.2;
(b) whether the critical path schedule includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;
(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule are reasonable and likely to be met;
(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Generating Capacity Resource are satisfied; and
(e) whether, in the case of an Intermittent Power Resource, sufficient data for confirming the resource’s claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity is provided, and whether the data provided reasonably supports the claimed summer and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.2.5. Qualified Capacity for New Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.5.1. New Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource that has cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification, and possibly as modified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3(b). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.2.5.2. [Reserved]
III.13.1.1.2.5.3. **New Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.**

The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity claimed by the Project Sponsor pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.6, as confirmed by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.4(e). The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be equal to the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

III.13.1.1.2.5.4. **New Generating Capacity Resources Partially Clearing in a Previous Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where, as discussed in Section III.13.1.1.1.1(c), a New Generating Capacity Resource was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, but cleared less than its summer or winter Qualified Capacity in that previous Forward Capacity Auction and is having its critical path schedule monitored by the ISO as described in Section III.13.3, its summer and winter Qualified Capacity as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the instant Forward Capacity Auction shall be the summer and winter Qualified Capacity from the previous Forward Capacity Auction minus the amount of capacity clearing from the New Generating Capacity Resource in the previous Forward Capacity Auction. The FCA Qualified Capacity for such a resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources. The amount of capacity clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction from a New Generating Capacity Resource shall be treated as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.1.2.7. **Opportunity to Consult with Project Sponsor.**

In its review of a New Capacity Show of Interest Form or a New Capacity Qualification Package, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the qualification materials if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time...
periods established for the qualification process. In addition, the ISO or the Project Sponsor may confer to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns prior to the ISO’s final determination and notification of qualification.


No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors or Market Participants, as applicable, for each New Generating Capacity Resource indicating:

(a) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the initial interconnection analysis made pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource was not accepted in the initial interconnection analysis;

(b) whether the New Generating Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the New Capacity Qualification Package evaluation made pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4, and if not accepted, an explanation of the reasons the New Generating Capacity Resource’s New Capacity Qualification Package was not accepted;

(c) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, a list of the facilities that may be required to complete the interconnection for purposes of providing capacity and time required to construct those facilities by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period, as discussed in Section III.13.1.2.3(d);

(d) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the New Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5;

(e) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, but subject to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3(f) (where not all New Generating Capacity Resources can be interconnected due to their combined effects on the New England Transmission System), a description of how the New Generating Capacity Resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction, including, for the fourth and future auctions: (i) whether the resource shall participate as a Conditional Qualified New Resource;
(ii) for the notification to a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the associated resource with higher queue priority; and (iii) for the notification to a resource with higher queue priority than a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the Queue Position of the Conditional Qualified New Resource; and

(f) if accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction and requesting to submit offers at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, the Internal Market Monitor’s determination regarding whether the requested offer price is consistent with the long run average costs of that New Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.1.2.9 Renewable Technology Resource Election.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant may not elect Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA associated with a Capacity Commitment Period beginning on or after June 1, 2025.

A Project Sponsor or Market Participant electing Renewable Technology Resource treatment for the FCA Qualified Capacity of a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall submit a Renewable Technology Resource election form no later than two Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.8 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Only the portion of the FCA Qualified Capacity of the resource that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 is eligible for treatment as a Renewable Technology Resource.

Renewable Technology Resource elections may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the Renewable Technology Resource election form.

The submission of a Renewable Technology Resource election that satisfies the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.7 will invalidate a prior multi-year Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price election for the same resource made pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 or Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 for a Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.1.2.10 Determination of Renewable Technology Resource Qualified Capacity.
(a) If the total FCA Qualified Capacity of Renewable Technology Resources exceeds the cap specified in subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) the qualified capacity value of each resource shall be prorated by the ratio of the cap divided by the total FCA Qualified Capacity. The ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as applicable, of the Qualified Capacity value of its resource no more than five Business Days after the deadline for submitting Renewable Technology Resource elections.

(b) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2018 is 200 MW.

(c) The cap for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019 is 400 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020 or June 1, 2021 is 600 MW minus the amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2 in the prior two Capacity Commitment Periods.

(e) The cap for each Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022 or June 1, 2023 or June 1, 2024 is 514 MW minus the cumulative amount of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired by Renewable Technology Resources that are New Capacity Resources in the first or second run of the primary auction-clearing process pursuant to Section III.13.2 for each Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2021.

III.13.1.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as defined in Section III.13.1.2.1, may participate in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.

Any resource that does not satisfy the criteria for participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.1), as an Existing Import Capacity Resource or New Import Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.3), or as a New Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (Section III.13.1.4) shall be an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.1.1. Attributes of Existing Generating Capacity Resources.
For purposes of Forward Capacity Auction qualification, a Market Participant may not change any Existing Generating Capacity Resource attribute (including but not limited to the resource’s status as an Intermittent Power Resource) in the period beginning 20 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and ending with the conclusion of the Forward Capacity Auction. Outside of this period, any such change must be accompanied by documentation justifying the change.

III.13.1.2.1.2  Rationing Minimum Limit.

No later than 120 days before the Forward Capacity Auction Market Participants may specify a Rationing Minimum Limit for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.  Qualified Capacity for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.  Existing Generating Capacity Resources Other Than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.1.2.2.1.1.  Summer Qualified Capacity.

The summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the summer Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the summer Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, with only positive summer ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer
Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

### III.13.1.2.2.1.2. Winter Qualified Capacity.

The winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, the winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent four years, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource has fewer than five winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, or in the case of the first Forward Capacity Auction, fewer than four winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, then the winter Qualified Capacity for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be equal to the median of all of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s previous winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings, as of the fifth Business Day in June of each year, with only positive winter ratings included in the median calculation. If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

### III.13.1.2.2.2. Existing Generating Capacity Resources that are Intermittent Power Resources.

The summer and winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource shall be calculated as follows:

#### III.13.1.2.2.2.1. Summer Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five summer periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full summer periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median
of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous summer periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.1(a).

(c) The Summer Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1400 through 1800 each day of the summer period (June through September) and all summer period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.

(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.2.2. Winter Qualified Capacity for an Intermittent Power Resource.

(a) With regard to any Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, for each of the previous five winter periods, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in the Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours. If there are less than five full winter periods since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall determine the median of the Intermittent Power Resource’s net output in each of the previous winter periods, or portion thereof, since the Intermittent Power Resource achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) The Intermittent Power Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be the average of the median numbers determined in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.2(a).

(c) The Winter Intermittent Reliability Hours shall be hours ending 1800 and 1900 each day of the winter period (October through May) and all winter period hours in which there was a system-wide Capacity Scarcity Condition and if the Intermittent Power Resource was in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, all Capacity Scarcity Conditions in that Capacity Zone.
(d) If for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource there are no previous positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings because the Existing Generating Capacity Resource had not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified Capacity shall be equal to the amount of capacity clearing from the resource as a New Generating Capacity Resource in previous Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.1.2.2.3. Qualified Capacity Adjustment for Partially New and Partially Existing Resources.

(a) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the summer Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the summer Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is associated with a New Generating Capacity Resource that was accepted for participation in a previous Forward Capacity Auction qualification process and that cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then in each subsequent Forward Capacity Auction until the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation the winter Qualified Capacity of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive winter Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day of June of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2] plus [the amount of the New Generating Capacity Resource’s capacity clearing in previous Forward Capacity Auctions]. After the New Generating Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s winter Qualified
Capacity shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.1.2, except that no data from the time period prior to the New Generating Capacity Resource’s FCM Commercial Operation date shall be used to determine the winter Qualified Capacity associated with the Existing Generating Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.2.2.4. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity Prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.

Where the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability, as of the fifth Business Day in October, of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource or an Intermittent Power Resource) is below its summer Qualified Capacity, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1, by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of 20 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or 40 MW;
(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 10 percent of that summer Qualified Capacity or two MW, or;
   (ii) 10 MW;

then the Lead Market Participant must elect one of the two treatments described in this Section III.13.1.2.2.4 by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If the Lead Market Participant makes no election, or elects treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4(c) and fails to meet the associated requirements, then the treatment described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4(a) shall apply.

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect, for the purposes of the Forward Capacity Auction only, to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity set to the most recent summer Seasonal Claimed Capability as of the fifth Business Day in October, provided that the Lead Market Participant has furnished evidence regarding the cause of the de-rating.

(b) [Reserved.]

(c) A Lead Market Participant may elect: (i) to submit a critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, modified as appropriate, describing the measures that will be taken and showing that the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with the summer Qualified Capacity as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 by the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity remain as calculated pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1 for the Forward

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### III.13.1.2.2.5. Adjustment for Certain Significant Increases in Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource (other than a Settlement Only Resource) meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a) but not the requirements of Section III.13.1.1.1.3(b), the Lead Market Participant may elect to have the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s summer Qualified Capacity be the sum of [the median of that Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s positive summer Seasonal Claimed Capability ratings from the most recent five years, as of the fifth Business Day in October of each year, calculated in a manner consistent with Section III.13.1.2.2.1.1] plus [the amount of incremental capacity as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.3(a)]; provided, however, that the Lead Market Participant must abide by all other provisions of this Section III.13 applicable to a resource that is a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.3. Such an election must be made in writing and must be received by the ISO no later than the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window. If the incremental amount of capacity seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction meets the requirements of this Section, but the incremental amount of capacity does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period, then the ISO shall match the incremental amount of capacity with excess Qualified Capacity at that same resource, not to exceed the Qualified Capacity of the existing portion of the resource, in order to cover the entire Capacity Commitment Period. This provision shall not apply to Intermittent Power Resources.

### III.13.1.2.2.5.1. [Reserved.]

### III.13.1.2.2.5.2. Requirements for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource Having a Higher Summer Qualified Capacity than Winter Qualified Capacity.

Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Demand Capacity Resource, or Existing Import Capacity Resource (other than an Intermittent Power Resource) has a summer Qualified Capacity that exceeds its winter Qualified Capacity, both as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.2, then that resource must either: (i) offer its summer Qualified Capacity as part of an offer composed of separate resources, as discussed in Section III.13.1.5; or (ii) have its FCA Qualified Capacity administratively set by the ISO to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.
III.13.1.2.3. **Qualification Process for Existing Generating Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO will notify the resource’s Lead Market Participant of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity and the Load Zone in which the Existing Generating Capacity Resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO has made a mathematical error in calculating the summer Qualified Capacity or winter Qualified Capacity for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as described in Section III.13.1.2.2, then the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(c) The ISO shall notify the Lead Market Participant of the outcome of any such challenge no later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource does not submit a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, an Administrative Export De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, or a Retirement De-List Bid in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process, then the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

III.13.1.2.3.1. **Existing Capacity Retirement Package and Existing Capacity Qualification Package.**

A resource that previously has been deactivated pursuant to Section I.3.9 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (or its predecessor provisions) and seeks to reactivate and participate in the Forward Capacity Market as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource must submit a reactivation plan no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, as described in Section III.13.1.1.1.6(b). All Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids and Administrative Export De-List Bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, except as provided for in Section III.13.1.2.4.1. All Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids submitted in the qualification process may not be modified or withdrawn after the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, except as provided for in
Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may not submit a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for an amount of capacity greater than its summer Qualified Capacity, unless the submittal is for the entire resource. Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. For a single resource, a Lead Market Participant may combine a Static De-List Bid, an Export Bid, and an Administrative Export De-List Bid; neither a Permanent De-List Bid nor a Retirement De-List Bid may be combined with any other type of de-list or export bid.

Static De-List Bids and Export Bids may elect to be rationed (as described in Section III.13.2.6, however, an Export Bid is always subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds). Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid and Export Bid for a single resource, each of those bids must have the same rationing election. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

III.13.1.2.3.1.A Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.
The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold for a Forward Capacity Auction is $4.30/kW-month. The Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. When the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is recalculated, the Internal Market Monitor will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders.

III.13.1.2.3.1.1 Static De-List Bids.
A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource, or a portion thereof, seeking to specify a price below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation for that resource, or a portion thereof, at prices at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold during a single Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Static De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

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A Static De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Each Static De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. All Static De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Static De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. With the submission of a Static De-List Bid, the Lead Market Participant must notify the ISO if the Existing Capacity Resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period (except for necessary audits or tests).

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Static De-List Bid may: (a) lower the price of any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or; (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a Static De-List Bid.

III.13.1.2.3.1.2.  [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.3.  Export Bids.
An Existing Generating Capacity Resource within the New England Control Area, other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource, seeking to export all or part of its capacity during a Capacity Commitment Period may submit an Export Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Export Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. All Export Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5. Export Bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and must include the additional information described in that Section. Each Export Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity.
offered as the price decreases. Each price-quantity pair must be less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Export Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported. Export Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b).

III.13.1.2.3.1.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.

An Existing Generating Capacity Resource other than an Intermittent Power Resource or a Renewable Technology Resource subject to a multiyear contract to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period that either: (i) cleared as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period within the duration of the contract; or (ii) entered into a contract prior to April 30, 2007 to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the Capacity Commitment Period, may submit an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process. An Administrative Export De-List Bid may not result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit except where the resource submits de-list and export bids totaling the resource’s full summer Qualified Capacity. Unless reviewed as an Export Bid in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, an Administrative Export De-List Bid is subject to a reliability review prior to clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it participates, pursuant to Section III.13.1.7. Both the reliability review and the review by the Internal Market Monitor shall be conducted once and shall remain valid for the multiyear contract period. Each Administrative Export De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, must be associated with a specific Existing Generating Capacity Resource, and must indicate the quantity of capacity subject to the bid. The Existing Capacity Qualification Package for each Administrative Export De-List Bid must also specify the interface over which the capacity will be exported, and must include documentation demonstrating a contractual obligation to sell capacity outside of the New England Control Area during the whole Capacity Commitment Period. Administrative Export De-List Bids shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.4.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(a) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would not accept a Capacity Supply Obligation permanently for all or part of a Generating
Capacity Resource beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Permanent De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(b) A Lead Market Participant with an Existing Capacity Resource seeking to specify a price at or below which it would retire all or part of a Generating Capacity Resource from all New England Markets beginning at the start of a particular Capacity Commitment Period may submit a Retirement De-List Bid in the associated Forward Capacity Auction qualification process.

(c) No Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may result in a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation being less than its Rationing Minimum Limit unless the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is for the entire resource. Each Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid must be detailed in an Existing Capacity Retirement Package submitted to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, and must be in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific Existing Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids are subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and must include the additional documentation described in that section. Once submitted, no Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may be withdrawn, except as provided in Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1. Reliability Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids During the Qualification Process.

During the qualification process, the ISO will review the following de-list bids to determine if the resource is needed for reliability: (1) Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bids and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bids that are at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price; and (2) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which the Lead Market Participant has opted to have the resource reviewed for reliability as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). The reliability review will be conducted according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, except as follows:

(a) Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that cannot be priced (for example, due to the expiration of an operating license) will be reviewed first.
(b) System needs associated with Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for resources found needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 will be reviewed with the Reliability Committee during the month of August following the issuance of retirement determination notifications pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a). The Lead Market Participant shall be notified as soon as practicable following the ISO’s consultation with the Reliability Committee that the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons.

(c) If the capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is needed for reliability reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the de-list bid shall be rejected and the resource shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and compensated according to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, unless the resource declines to be retained for reliability, as provided in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(d) No later than the fifth Business Day in the month of September following the review of system needs with the Reliability Committee per (b) above, a Lead Market Participant may notify the ISO that it declines to provide the associated capacity for reliability. Such an election will be binding. A resource for which a Lead Market Participant has made such an election will not be eligible for compensation pursuant to Sections III.13.2.5.2.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5.2.

(e) Where a resource is determined not to be needed for reliability or where a Lead Market Participant notifies the ISO that it declines to provide capacity for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), the capacity associated with the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid will be treated as follows:

(i) For a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be retired as permitted by applicable law coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a).

(ii) For a Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for which a Lead Market Participant has not elected to retire the resource pursuant to Section...
III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the portion of the resource subject to the de-list bid will be permanently de-listed coincident with the commencement of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the de-list bid was submitted, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b).

(iii) For a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for which a Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the de-list bid will continue to receive conditional treatment as described in Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), and Section III.13.2.5.2.1.

Where Existing Generating Capacity Resources at a Station having Common Costs elect to submit Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids, the provisions of this Section III.13.1.2.3.1.6 shall apply.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.1. Submission of Cost Data.
In addition to the information required elsewhere in this Section III.13.1.2.3, Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, or Retirement De-List Bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs and seeking to delist must include detailed cost data to allow the ISO to determine the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for each asset associated with the Station and the Station Going Forward Common Costs.

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.1.6.3. Internal Market Monitor Review of Stations having Common Costs.
The Internal Market Monitor will review each Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bids from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs pursuant to the following methodology:

(i) Calculate the average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs of each asset at the Station.
(ii) Order the assets from highest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs to lowest average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs; this is the preferred de-list order.

(iii) Calculate and assign to each asset a station cost that is equal to the average cost of the assets remaining at the Station, including Station Going Forward Common Costs, assuming the successive de-listing of each individual asset in preferred de-list order.

(iv) Calculate a set of composite costs that is equal to the maximum of the cost associated with each asset as calculated in (i) and (iii) above.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust the set of composite costs to ensure a monotonically non-increasing set of bids as follows: any asset with a composite cost that is greater than the composite cost of the asset with the lowest composite cost and that has average Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs that are less than its composite costs will have its composite cost set equal to that of the asset with the lowest composite cost. The bids of the asset with the lowest composite cost and of any assets whose composite costs are so adjusted will be considered a single non-rationable bid for use in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Internal Market Monitor will compare a de-list bid developed using the adjusted composite costs to the de-list bid submitted by the Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs. If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is less than or equal to the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs, then the bid shall be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). If the Internal Market Monitor determines that the submitted de-list bid is greater than the bid developed using the adjusted composite costs or is not consistent with the submitted supporting cost data, then the Internal Market Monitor will establish an Internal Market Monitor-determined or Internal Market Monitor–accepted price for the bid as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.

III.13.1.2.3.2. Review by Internal Market Monitor of Bids from Existing Capacity Resources.

The Internal Market Monitor shall review bids for Existing Capacity Resources as follows.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1. **Static De-List Bids and Export Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids at or Above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.**

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Static De-List Bid and each Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); (3) reasonable risk premium assumptions (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4); and (4) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5).

The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold and each Retirement De-List Bid greater than 20 MW that is at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold to determine whether the bid is consistent with: (1) the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B); (2) reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3); and (3) the resource’s reasonable opportunity costs (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5). If more than one Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted by a single Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24), the Internal Market Monitor shall review each such bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold if the sum of all such bids at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold is greater than 20 MW. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Permanent De-List Bid and each Retirement De-List Bid submitted at any price pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b) if the sum of the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids submitted by the Lead Market Participant or its Affiliates (as used in Section III.A.24) is greater than 20 MW. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids that are not reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

Sufficient documentation and information about each bid component must be included in the Existing Capacity Retirement Package or the Existing Capacity Qualification Package to allow the Internal Market Monitor to make the requisite determinations. If a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.1(b), all relevant updates to previously submitted documentation and information must be provided to support the newly submitted price and allow the
Internal Market Monitor to make updated determinations. The updated information may include a request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid such that it will not be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction, in which case the update must include sufficient supporting information on the nature of resource investments that were undertaken, or other materially changed circumstances, to allow the Internal Market Monitor to determine whether discontinuation is appropriate.

The entire de-list submittal shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by a corporate officer attesting to the accuracy of its content, including reported costs, the reasonableness of the estimates and adjustments of costs that would otherwise be avoided if the resource were not required to meet the obligations of a listed resource, and the reasonableness of the expectations and assumptions regarding Capacity Performance Payments, cash flows, opportunity costs, and risk premiums, and shall be subject to audit upon request by the ISO.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1. Internal Market Monitor Review of De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor may seek additional information from the Lead Market Participant (including information about the other existing or potential new resources controlled by the Lead Market Participant) after the qualification deadline to address any questions or concerns regarding the data submitted, as appropriate. The Internal Market Monitor shall review all relevant information (including data, studies, and assumptions) to determine whether the bid is consistent with the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs. In making this determination, the Internal Market Monitor shall consider, among other things, industry standards, market conditions (including published indices and projections), resource-specific characteristics and conditions, portfolio size, and consistency of assumptions across that portfolio.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. Review of Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review Static De-List Bids and Export Bids and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Export Bid shall be equal to the Static De-List Bid or Export Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted...
by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Static De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Export Bid that is consistent with the sum of the resource’s net going forward costs plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable risk premium assumptions plus reasonable opportunity costs.

If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price is established for a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, both the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4 and the informational filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(c) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2. Review of Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids identified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 and, after due consideration and consultation with the Lead Market Participant, as appropriate, shall develop an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid. The Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid and Internal Market Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid shall be equal to the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant unless the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s) for the same de-list bid. If the de-list bid price(s) submitted by the Lead Market Participant are more than 10% greater than the Internal Market Monitor-accepted de-list bid price(s), the Internal Market Monitor shall calculate an Internal Market Monitor-accepted Permanent De-List Bid or Internal Market-Monitor-accepted Retirement De-List Bid that is consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a) shall include an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-accepted price and the Internal Market Monitor determination on any request to discontinue the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid.
III.13.2.3.2.1.2.A.  Static De-List Bid and Export Bid Net Going Forward Costs.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report expected net going forward costs for the applicable Capacity Commitment Period in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. A Static De-List Bid or Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold shall be considered consistent with the Existing Capacity Resource’s net going forward costs based on a review of the data submitted in the following formula.

\[
\text{Net Going Forward Costs} = \frac{(GFC - IMR) \times \text{InfIndex}}{(CQ_{\text{Summer, kw}}) \times (12 \text{ months})}
\]

Where:

GFC = annual going forward costs, in dollars. These are the expected costs and capital expenditures that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period (i.e., maintaining a constant condition of being ready to respond to commitment and dispatch orders). Costs that are not avoidable in a single Capacity Commitment Period and costs associated with the production of energy are not to be included. Service of debt is not a going forward cost. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only in the absence of a Capacity Supply Obligation may be included. Staffing, maintenance, capital expenses, and other normal expenses that would be avoided only if the resource were not participating in the energy and ancillary services markets may not be included, except in the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period.

\(CQ_{\text{Summer, kw}}\) = capacity seeking to de-list in kW. In no case shall this value exceed the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity.
IMR = expected annual infra-marginal rents, in dollars. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will not be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be calculated by subtracting all submitted cost data representing the cumulative expected cost of production (total expenses related to the production of energy, e.g. fuel, actual consumables such as chemicals and water, and, if quantified, incremental labor and maintenance) from the Existing Generating Capacity Resource’s total ISO market revenues. In the case of a resource that has indicated in the submission of a Static De-List Bid that the resource will be participating in the energy and ancillary services markets during the Capacity Commitment Period, this value shall be $0.00.

InfIndex = inflation index. infIndex = (1 + \(i\))^t

Where: “\(i\)” is the most recent reported 4-Year expected inflation number published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland at the beginning of the qualification period. The specific value to be used shall be specified by the ISO and available to the Lead Market Participant.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Net Present Value of Expected Cash Flows.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall report all expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures in a manner and format specified by the Internal Market Monitor, and may supplement this information with other evidence. The Internal Market Monitor will review the Lead Market Participant’s submitted data to ensure that it is consistent with overall market conditions and reflects expected values.

The Internal Market Monitor will adjust any data that are inconsistent with overall market conditions or do not reflect expected values. The Internal Market Monitor shall enter all relevant expected costs, revenues, prices, discount rates and capital expenditures into a capital budgeting model and shall determine the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows as follows:

The net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s expected cash flows is equal to (i) the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows over the resource’s remaining economic life (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C) plus the net present
value of the resource’s expected terminal value, using the resource’s discount rate, divided by (ii) the product of the resource’s Qualified Capacity (in kilowatts) and 12 months.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for the first Capacity Commitment Period of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit excluding expected capacity revenues less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

The Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flow for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life is the resource’s expected annual net operating profit less its expected capital expenditures in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Where:

**Expected net operating profit**, in dollars, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected annual profit that might otherwise be avoided or not accrued if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Period. Expected labor, maintenance, taxes, insurance, administrative and other normal expenses that can be avoided or not incurred if the resource is retired or permanently de-listed may be included. Service of debt is not an avoidable cost and may not be included.

**Expected capacity revenues**, in dollars, are the forecasted annual expected capacity revenues based on the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices for each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life. The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the forecasted expected capacity prices. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions about expected resource additions, resource retirements, estimated Installed Capacity Requirements, estimated Local Sourcing Requirements, expected market conditions, and any other assumptions used to develop the forecasted expected capacity price in each Capacity Commitment Period.

If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the forecasted expected capacity prices, the Internal Market Monitor will
replace the Lead Market Participant’s forecasted expected capacity prices with the Internal Market Monitor’s estimate thereof in each of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods of the resource’s remaining economic life.

**Expected capital expenditures**, in dollars, are the Lead Market Participant’s expected capital investments that might otherwise be avoided or not incurred if the resource were not subject to the obligations of a listed capacity resource during the Capacity Commitment Periods.

**Expected terminal value**, in dollars, for resources with five years or less of remaining economic life, is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource. For resources with more than five years of remaining economic life, the expected terminal value in the fifth year of the evaluation period is the Lead Market Participant’s expected revenue less expected costs associated with retiring or permanently de-listing the resource at the end of the resource’s economic life plus the net present value of the Existing Capacity Resource’s net annual expected cash flows from the sixth year of the evaluation period through the end of the resource’s remaining economic life, using the resource’s discount rate.

**Discount rate** is a value reflecting the Lead Market Participant’s weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted to reflect the risk to cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B.

The Lead Market Participant shall provide the Internal Market Monitor with documentation supporting the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. The supporting documentation must include a detailed description and sources of the Lead Market Participant’s assumptions associated with the cost of capital, risks and any other assumptions used to develop the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk. If the Internal Market Monitor determines the Lead Market Participant has not provided adequate supporting documentation for the weighted average cost of capital for the Existing Capacity Resource adjusted for risk, the Lead Market Participant has included risks not associated with cash flows calculated pursuant to the net present value of expected cash flows analysis in this Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.B or the Lead Market Participant has submitted costs, revenues, capital expenditures or prices that are not reflective of expected values, the Internal Market Monitor will replace the Lead Market Participant’s discount rate with a value determined by the Internal Market Monitor.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.C  Permanent De-List Bid and Retirement De-List Bid Calculation of Remaining Economic Life.

The Internal Market Monitor shall calculate the Existing Capacity Resource’s remaining economic life, using evaluation periods ranging from one to five years. For each evaluation period, the Internal Market Monitor will calculate the net present value of (a) the annual expected net operating profit minus annual expected capital expenditures assuming the Capacity Clearing Price for the first year is equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and (b) the expected terminal value of the resource at the end of the given evaluation period. The economic life is the evaluation period in which a resource’s net present value is maximized.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.3.  Expected Capacity Performance Payments.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing the expected Capacity Performance Payments for the resource. This documentation must include expectations regarding the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, the number of hours of reserve deficiency, and the resource’s performance during reserve deficiencies.

III.13.1.2.3.2.1.4.  Risk Premium.

The Lead Market Participant for an Existing Capacity Resource that submits a Static De-List Bid, or an Export Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold that is to be reviewed by the Internal Market Monitor shall also provide documentation separately detailing any risk premium included in the bid. This documentation should address all components of physical and financial risk reflected in the bid, including, for example, catastrophic events, a higher than expected amount of reserve deficiencies, and performing scheduled maintenance during reserve deficiencies. Any risk that can be quantified and analytically supported and that is not already reflected in the formula for net going forward costs described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.2.A may be included in this risk premium component. In support of the resource’s risk premium, the Lead Market Participant may also submit an affidavit from a corporate officer attesting that the risk premium submitted is the minimum necessary to ensure that the overall level of risk associated with the resource’s participation in the Forward Capacity Market is consistent with the participant’s corporate risk management practices.
III.13.1.2.3.2.1.5.  Opportunity Costs.
To the extent that an Existing Capacity Resource submitting a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid, Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold has additional opportunity costs that are not reflected in the net going forward costs, net present value of expected cash flows, expected Capacity Performance Payments, discount rate, or risk premium components of the bid, the Lead Market Participant must include in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package evidence supporting such costs. Opportunity costs associated with major repairs necessary to restore decreases in capacity as described in Section III.13.1.2.2.4, capital projects required to operate the plant as a capacity resource or other uses of the resource shall be considered, provided such costs are substantiated by evidence of a repair plan, documented business plan and fundamental market analysis, or other independent and transparent trading index or indices as applicable. Substantiation of opportunity costs relying on sales in reconfiguration auctions or risk aversion premiums shall not be considered sufficient justification.

III.13.1.2.3.2.2.  [Reserved.]

III.13.1.2.3.2.3.  Administrative Export De-List Bids.
The Internal Market Monitor shall review each Administrative Export De-List Bid associated with a multi-year contract entered into prior to April 30, 2007 in the first Forward Capacity Auction in which it clears. An Administrative Export De-List Bid shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.2.3.2.4.  Static De-List Bids for Reductions in Ratings Due to Ambient Air Conditions.
A Lead Market Participant may submit a Static De-List Bid for up to the megawatt amount that the Lead Market Participant expects will not be physically available due to the difference between the summer Qualified Capacity at 90 degrees and the expected rating of the resource at 100 degrees. The ISO shall verify during the qualification process that the rating is accurate. Such Static De-List Bids may be entered into the Forward Capacity Market at prices up to and including the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, subject to validation of the physical limit. Static De-List Bids for reductions in ratings due to
ambient air conditions shall not be subject to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and need not include documentation for that purpose.

**III.13.1.2.3.2.5. Static De-List Bid Incremental Capital Expenditure Recovery Schedule.**

Except as described below, the Internal Market Monitor shall review all Static De-List Bids using the following cost recovery schedule for incremental capital expenditures, which assumes an annual pre-tax weighted average cost of capital of 10 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Existing Resource (years)</th>
<th>Remaining Life (years)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Capital Cost Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 plus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Market Participant may request that a different pre-tax weighted average cost of capital be used to determine the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery by submitting the request, along with supporting documentation, in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package. The Internal Market Monitor shall review the request and supporting documentation and may, at its sole discretion, replace the annual rate of capital cost recovery from the table above with a resource-specific value based on an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital. If the Internal Market Monitor uses an adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for the resource, then the resource’s annual rate of capital cost recovery will be determined according to the following formula:

\[
\frac{Cost\ Of\ Capital}{(1 - (1 + Cost\ Of\ Capital)^{-Remaining\ Life})}
\]

Where:
Cost Of Capital = the adjusted pre-tax weighted average cost of capital.
Remaining Life = the remaining life of the existing resource, based on the age of the resource, as indicated in the table above.

III.13.1.2.4. Retirement Determination Notification for Existing Capacity and Qualification Determination Notification for Existing Capacity; Right to Increase Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid up to IMM-determined substitution auction test price.

(a) No later than five Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid and substitution auction test price concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2 and Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. This retirement determination notification shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, within five Business Days of the issuance of the retirement determination notification, a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid and a substitution auction demand bid for the resource associated with the de-list bid, may make the following adjustments:

(i) for a Retirement De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Retirement De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Retirement De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Retirement De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated;

(ii) for a Permanent De-List Bid, if, but for the limits in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1.1.2 on adjusting a Market Participant-submitted Permanent De-List Bid, the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated a Permanent De-List Bid price that is higher than the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid price and the Market Participant-submitted de-list bid is less than the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9, the Market Participant may increase the de-list bid price up to the minimum of (x) the Internal Market Monitor-determined substitution auction test price multiplied by 0.9 and (y) the higher Permanent De-List Bid price that the Internal Market Monitor would have calculated.
(b) No later than 127 days before the Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to the Lead Market Participant that submitted each Static De-List Bid and Export Bid concerning the result of the Internal Market Monitor’s de-list bid review conducted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2. The qualification determination shall not include the results of the reliability review pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.

III.13.1.2.4.1. Participant-Elected Retirement or Conditional Treatment.

No later than five Business Days after the issuance by the ISO of the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), a Lead Market Participant that submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid may make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b). If the Lead Market Participant does not make an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the prices provided by the Internal Market Monitor in the retirement determination notifications shall be the finalized prices used in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b) (unless otherwise directed by the Commission).

(a) A Lead Market Participant may elect to retire the resource, or portion thereof, for which it has submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will not be subject to reliability review and will be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a); provided, however, that when making the retirement election pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).

(b) A Lead Market Participant may elect conditional treatment for the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The capacity associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid subject to this election will be treated as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii), Section III.13.2.5.2.1, and Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3; provided, however, that in making this election the Lead Market Participant may opt to have the resource reviewed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, in which case the Lead Market Participant may have the opportunity (but will not be obligated) to provide capacity from the resource if the ISO determines that the resource is needed for reliability reasons, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d).
III.13.1.2.5. **Optional Existing Capacity Qualification Package for New Generating Capacity Resources Previously Counted as Capacity.**

A resource seeking to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) may elect to submit an Existing Capacity Qualification Package in addition to the New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Capacity Qualification Package that it is required to submit pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2. The bids contained in an Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must clearly indicate which New Generating Capacity Resource the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is associated with, and if accepted in accordance with Section III.13.1.2.3, would only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction where: (i) the new resource is not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2; or (ii) no offer from that New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e). An Existing Capacity Qualification Package submitted pursuant to this Section III.13.1.2.5 must conform in all other respects to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.2.

III.13.1.3. **Import Capacity.**

The qualification requirements for import capacity shall depend on whether the import capacity is an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. Both Existing Import Capacity Resources and New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction must be backed by one or more External Resources or by an external Control Area throughout the relevant Capacity Commitment Period. An external demand resource may not be an Existing Import Capacity Resource or a New Import Capacity Resource. External nodes shall be established and mapped to Capacity Zones pursuant to the provisions in Attachment K to Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

An Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service under Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be included in the FCM (1) after it has established a contractual association with an Import Capacity Resource and that Import Capacity Resource has met the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements or (2) after it has met the requirements of an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Long
Lead Time Facility treatment pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. An external node for such an Elective Transmission Upgrade will be modeled for participation in the Forward Capacity Market after the Import Capacity Resource meets the requirements to participate in the FCA. The Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade shall not exceed the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. In order for an Elective Transmission Upgrade to maintain its Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service, an associated Import Capacity Resource must meet the Forward Capacity Market qualification requirements and offer into each Forward Capacity Auction. Otherwise, the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service will revert to Network Import Interconnection Service for the portion of the Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service for which no Import Capacity Resource is offered into the Forward Capacity Auction and the Elective Transmission Upgrade’s Interconnection Agreement will be revised. The provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election, shall apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade seeking to reestablish Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service if the threshold to be treated as a new resource in Section III.13.1.1.1.4 is met. If the threshold to be treated as a new increment in Section III.13.1.1.1.3 is met, only the increment will be eligible for the provisions in Sections III.13.1.3.5.4, permitting a Capacity Commitment Period Election, and in Section III.13.1.3.5.8, permitting a rationing election.

III.13.1.3.1. Definition of Existing Import Capacity Resource.
Capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as an Existing Import Capacity Resource, except that if that Existing Import Capacity Resource has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.2. Qualified Capacity for Existing Import Capacity Resources.
The summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity of an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be based on the data provided to the ISO during the qualification process, subject to ISO review and verification.

The qualified capacity for the Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the VJO and NYPA contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) as of the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2014 shall be equal to the lesser of the stated amount in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) or the median amount of the energy delivered from the Existing Import Capacity Resource during the New England system coincident peak over the previous five Capacity Commitment Periods at the time of qualification.

III.13.1.3.3.A Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are not associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except as follows:

(a) The Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

(b) The rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1 shall not apply.

(c) The Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below may qualify to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A for the duration of the contracts as listed. For each Forward Capacity Auction after the first Forward Capacity Auction, in order for an Existing Import Capacity Resource associated with a contract listed below to qualify for the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A, no later than 10 Business Days prior to the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the Market Participant submitting the Existing Import Capacity Resource must also submit to the ISO documentation verifying that the contract will remain in effect throughout the Capacity Commitment Period and that it has not been amended. For the first Forward Capacity Auction, Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in the table below are qualified to receive the treatment described in Section III.13.2.7.3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Description</th>
<th>MW</th>
<th>Contract End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(d) In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each bid from Existing Import Capacity Resources. A bid from an Existing Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.3.B. Qualification Process for Existing Import Capacity Resources that are associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service.

Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with Capacity Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources as described in Section III.13.1.2.3, except the Qualified Capacity shall be the lesser of the multi-year contract values as documented in the new resource qualification determination notification and the capacity clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction to which the new resource qualification determination notification applied.

III.13.1.3.4. Definition of New Import Capacity Resource.

Capacity not associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for the whole Capacity Commitment Period, but that meets the requirements of Section III.13.1.3.5.1, shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource. For capacity associated with a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification
Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside the New England Control Area for a period including the whole Capacity Commitment Period, or capacity from an External Resource that is owned or directly controlled by the Lead Market Participant and which is committed for at least two whole consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods by the Lead Market Participant in the New Capacity Qualification Package, if the import capacity has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, then the import capacity shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.1.3.5. Qualification Process for New Import Capacity Resources.
The qualification process for a New Import Capacity Resource, whether backed by a new External Resource, by one or more existing External Resources, or by an external Control Area, shall be the same as the qualification process for a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2, except as follows:

III.13.1.3.5.1. Documentation of Import.
(a) For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit: (i) documentation of a one-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (ii) documentation of a multi-year contract entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the contract period including the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract; (iii) proof of ownership or direct control over one or more External Resources that will be used to back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, including information to establish the summer and winter ratings of the resource(s) backing the import; or (iv) documentation for system-backed import capacity that the import capacity will be supported by the Control Area and that the energy associated with that system-backed import capacity will be afforded the same curtailment priority as that Control Area’s native load. For each New Import Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must specify the interface over which the capacity will be imported. The Project Sponsor must indicate whether the import is associated with any investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with an Interconnection Request for Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services
Tariff that has not yet achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff. The Project Sponsor must submit a contract confirming its association with the Elective Transmission Upgrade Interconnection Customer and the ISO will confirm that relationship. If the import will be backed by a single new External Resource, the Project Sponsor submitting the import capacity must also submit a general description of the project’s equipment configuration, including a description of the resource type (such as those listed in the table in Section III.A.21.1 or some other type).

(b) To qualify for Capacity Commitment Periods prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which the import capacity is qualifying, the Project Sponsor must submit documentation of one or more one-year contracts for each prior Capacity Commitment Period, entered into before the New Capacity Qualification Deadline to provide capacity in the New England Control Area from outside of the New England Control Area for the entire Capacity Commitment Period, including documentation of the MW value of the contract(s); the Project Sponsor must also satisfy the relevant requirements of Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(a), III.13.1.3.5.2, III.13.1.9, and III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.1.3.5.2. Import Backed by Existing External Resources.
If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by one or more External Resources existing at the time of the Forward Capacity Auction and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit a description of how the New Import Capacity Resource will meet its Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it seeks to qualify.

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The description must indicate specifically which External Resources will back the New Import Capacity Resource during the Capacity Commitment Period, and if those External Resources are not owned or controlled directly by the Project Sponsor, the description must include a commitment that the External Resources will have sufficient capacity that is not obligated outside the New England Control Area to fully satisfy the New Import Capacity Resource’s potential Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period and demonstrate how that commitment will be met.

III.13.1.3.5.3. **Imports Backed by an External Control Area.**

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall not apply, and the Project Sponsor shall instead submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource.

If the New Import Capacity Resource will be backed by an external Control Area and the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade and the capacity will be imported over an interface that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, the provisions regarding site control (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.1) and critical path schedule (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2) shall apply in addition to the requirement that the Project Sponsor submit system load and capacity projections for the external Control Area showing sufficient excess capacity during the Capacity Commitment Period to back the New Import Capacity Resource for the length of the multi-year contract.

III.13.1.3.5.3.1. **Imports Crossing Intervening Control Areas.**

The preceding rules define requirements associated with the import of capacity from a Control Area, or resources located in a Control Area, directly adjacent to the New England Control Area. Imports of capacity from a Control Area or resources located in a Control Area where such import crosses an intervening Control Area or Control Areas shall comply with the following additional requirements: (1) For imports crossing a single intervening Control Area, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, that the remote Control Area will afford
the energy export to the adjacent intervening Control Area the same curtailment priority as its native load, that the adjacent intervening Control Area has procedures in place to explicitly recognize the linkage between the import and re-export of energy in support of the import contract, and that the energy export to the ISO will not be curtailed (except pro-rata with a curtailment of native load) so long as the linked import is flowing. (2) For imports crossing more than one intervening Control Area, in addition to the requirements above, the Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate, as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals, by the New Capacity Qualification Deadline, that explicit market and operating procedures exist among the intervening Control Areas to ensure that the energy required to be delivered to the New England Control Area will be guaranteed the same curtailment priority as the intervening native loads, and that none of the intervening Control Areas will curtail the transaction except in conjunction with a curtailment of native load. (3) The Project Sponsor entering the import contract shall demonstrate that capacity it supplies to the New England Control Area will not be recalled or curtailed to satisfy the load of the external Control Area, or that the external Control Area in which it is located will afford New England Control Area load the same curtailment priority that it affords its own Control Area native load.

III.13.1.3.5.4. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
The provisions regarding Capacity Commitment Period election (Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4) shall only apply to a New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request. All other New Import Capacity Resources clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation and shall receive payments only for the one-year Capacity Commitment Period associated with that Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.3.5.5. Initial Interconnection Analysis.
The provisions regarding initial interconnection analysis (Section III.13.1.1.2.3) shall not apply unless the capacity will be imported over an Elective Transmission Upgrade pursuing Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

III.13.1.3.5.5.A. Cost Information.
The offer information described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21.2 may be submitted in the form of a curve (up to five price-quantity pairs) associated with a specific New Import Capacity Resource. The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. Each price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that Section.

III.13.1.3.5.6.  Review by Internal Market Monitor of Offers from New Import Capacity Resources.

In addition to the review described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and Section III.A.21, the Internal Market Monitor shall review each offer from New Import Capacity Resources. An offer from a New Import Capacity Resource shall be rejected if the Internal Market Monitor determines that the bid may be an attempt to manipulate the Forward Capacity Auction, and the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)).

III.13.1.3.5.7.  Qualification Determination Notification for New Import Capacity Resources.

For New Import Capacity Resources, the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8 shall be modified to reflect the differences in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1.3.5.

No later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is (i) backed by a single new External Resource and associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, or (ii) associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) that submitted a request to submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices that are below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.3.5 may: (a) lower the requested offer price of any price-quantity pair submitted to the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.3, provided that the revised price is greater than or equal to the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, or (b) withdraw any price-quantity pair of a requested offer price.

III.13.1.3.5.8.  Rationing Election.
New Import Capacity Resources are subject to rationing except New Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request, which are eligible for the rationing election described in Section III.13.1.2.2.3(b).

III.13.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.
To participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a Demand Capacity Resource, a resource must meet the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4. Each Demand Capacity Resource shall be a minimum of 100 kW. An Active Demand Capacity Resource comprises one or more Demand Response Resources located in a single Dispatch Zone. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource comprises one or more Assets located in a single Load Zone. A Demand Capacity Resource may include an end-use customer facility with a Net Supply Capability of 5 MW or more only if the facility’s Net Supply Capability does not exceed its Maximum Facility Load. Demand Capacity Resources must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local regulatory, siting, and tariff requirements, including interconnection tariff requirements related to siting, interconnection, and operation of the Demand Capacity Resource. Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to submit import or export bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids.

III.13.1.4.1. Definition of New Demand Capacity Resource.
A New Demand Capacity Resource is an Active Demand Capacity Resource that has not cleared in a previous Forward Capacity Auction, and On-Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction, or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource consisting of measures that have not been in service prior to the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. A Demand Capacity Resource that has previously been defined as an Existing Demand Capacity Resource shall be considered a New Demand Capacity Resource if it meets one of the conditions listed in Section III.13.1.1.2.

For Forward Capacity Auctions a New Demand Capacity Resource shall have a summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity based on the resource’s estimated demand reduction value as submitted and reviewed pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4. The FCA Qualified Capacity for a New
Demand Capacity Resource shall be the lesser of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, as adjusted to account for applicable offers composed of separate resources.

(a) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the resource’s Project Sponsor must make two separate submissions to the ISO: First, the Project Sponsor must submit estimated demand reduction values and supporting information in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1. Second, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package as described in Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.

(b) For a resource to qualify as a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor must in addition submit, as part of the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, a Measurement and Verification Plan providing the documentation, analysis, studies and methodologies used to support the estimates described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1, which shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure consistency with the measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.1.1. New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form.
For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form as described in this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.1 during the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, as described in Section III.13.1.10. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

A completed New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form shall include, but is not limited to, the following information: project name; Load Zone within which the Demand Capacity Resource will be located; the Dispatch Zone within which an Active Demand Capacity Resource will be located; estimated summer and winter demand reduction values (MW) per measure and/or per customer facility (measured at the customer meter and not including losses); estimated total summer and winter demand reduction value of the Demand Capacity Resource (for an Active Demand Capacity Resource, this estimate must be consistent with the baseline calculation methodology in Section III.8.2); supporting documentation (e.g., engineering estimates or documentation of verified savings from comparable projects) to substantiate the reasonableness of the estimated demand reduction values; Demand Capacity Resource type (Active...
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Demand Capacity Resource, On-Peak Demand Resource, or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource); brief Demand Capacity Resource project description including measure type (i.e., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, and/or Distributed Generation); types of facilities at which the measures will be implemented; customer classes and end-uses served; the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor's New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value; ISO Market Participant status and ISO customer identification (if applicable); status under Schedules 22 or 23 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (if applicable); project/technical and credit/financial contacts; for individual Distributed Generation projects and Demand Capacity Resource projects from a single facility with a demand reduction value equal to or greater than 5 MW, the Pnode and service address at which the end-use facility is located; capability and experience of the Project Sponsor.


For each resource that a Project Sponsor seeks to offer in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Demand Capacity Resource, the Project Sponsor must submit a New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package no later than the New Capacity Qualification Deadline. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package shall conform to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2. The ISO may waive the submission of any information not required for evaluation of a project.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.1. Source of Funding.

The Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the source of funding, which includes, but is not limited to, the following: the source(s) of public benefits funding or private financing, or a funding plan supplemented by information on how previous projects were funded; and a completed ISO credit application.


For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, the Project Sponsor must provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a Measurement and Verification Plan that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.
III.13.1.4.1.2.3. Customer Acquisition Plan.

(a) A Project Sponsor with more than a single customer must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a description of its plan to acquire customers that includes, but is not limited to, the following information: a description of proposed customer market; the estimated size of target market and supporting documentation; a marketing plan with supporting documentation describing the manner in which customers will be recruited; and evidence supporting the viability of the marketing plan.

(b) A Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource that includes one or more end-use customer facilities with behind-the-meter generation must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package information demonstrating that each facility’s Net Supply Capability will be less than 5 MW or less than or equal to the facility’s Maximum Facility Load.

III.13.1.4.1.2.4. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with a Demand Reduction Value of at Least 5 MW at a Single Retail Delivery Point.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with a demand reduction value of at least 5 MW at a single Retail Delivery Point shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule as set forth in Section III.13.1.2.2.2.

III.13.1.4.1.2.5. Critical Path Schedule for a Demand Capacity Resource with All Retail Delivery Points Having a Demand Reduction Value of Less Than 5 MW.

The Project Sponsor of a Demand Capacity Resource with all Retail Delivery Points having a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW shall provide in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package a critical path schedule comprised of a delivery schedule of the share of total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates, as follows: (i) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; (ii) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second annual Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s capacity award was made; and (iii) target date 3 which is the date by which the Project Sponsor expects to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full
demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100% of total demand reduction value must be complete.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.6. [Reserved.]

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7. Capacity Commitment Period Election.
In the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Project Sponsor must specify whether, if its New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only. If no such election is made in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package, the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price associated with the New Demand Capacity Resource offer shall apply only for the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the New Demand Capacity Resource offer clears. If the Project Sponsor elects to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, then the Project Sponsor may not change the Demand Capacity Resource type as long as that Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. If an offer from a New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the capacity associated with the resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to any type of de-list or export bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply pursuant to this Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7.

III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8. Offer Information From New Demand Capacity Resources.
(a) All New Demand Capacity Resources that might submit offers in the Forward Capacity Auction at prices below the relevant Offer Review Trigger Price must include in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package the lowest price at which the resource requests to offer capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and supporting documentation justifying that price as competitive in light of the resource’s costs (as described in Section III.A.21). This price is subject to review by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to Section III.A.21.2 and must include the additional documentation described in that section.
(b) The Project Sponsor for a New Demand Capacity Resource must indicate in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package if an offer from the New Demand Capacity Resource may be rationed. A Project Sponsor may specify a single MW quantity to which offers may be rationed. Without such indication, offers will only be accepted or rejected in whole. This rationing election shall apply for the entire Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.1.4.1.3. Initial Analysis for Active Demand Capacity Resources.
For each New Demand Capacity Resource that is an Active Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO shall perform an analysis based on the information provided in the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form to determine the amount of capacity that the resource could provide by the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. This analysis shall be performed consistent with the criteria and conditions described in ISO New England Planning Procedures. Where, as a result of this analysis, the ISO determines that because of overlapping interconnection impacts, such a New Demand Capacity Resource that is otherwise accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the other provisions and requirements of this Section III.13.1 cannot deliver any of the capacity that it would otherwise be able to provide (in the absence of the other relevant Existing Capacity Resources), then that New Demand Capacity Resource will not be accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

The ISO shall review the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package for consistency with its New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. The New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package may not contain material changes relative to the New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form. A material change may include, but is not limited to the following: (i) a change in the designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type; (ii) a change in the Project Sponsor, subject to review by the ISO of the capability and experience of the new Project Sponsor; (iii) a change in the Load Zone within which the project is located, and a change in the Dispatch Zone within which the Active Demand Capacity Resource is located; (iv) a change in the total summer or winter demand reduction value of the project by more than 30 percent; (v) a change in the general type of measure being implemented (e.g., Energy Efficiency, Load Management, Distributed Generation); or (vi) a misrepresentation of the interconnection status of a Distributed Generation project.
III.13.1.4.1.5. **Evaluation of New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Materials.**

The ISO shall review the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources and shall determine whether the information submitted complies with the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and whether, based on the information provided, the Demand Capacity Resource is accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction. In making these determinations, the ISO may consider, but is not limited to consideration of, the following:

(a) whether the information submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources is accurate and contains all of the elements required by this Section III.13.1.4;

(b) whether the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources includes all necessary elements and is sufficiently developed;

(c) whether the milestones in the critical path schedule submitted by New Demand Capacity Resources are reasonable and likely to be met;

(d) whether, in the case of a resource previously counted as a capacity resource, the requirements for treatment as a New Demand Capacity Resource are satisfied; and

(e) whether, in the case of a New Demand Capacity Resource that is an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Measurement and Verification Plan complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.1.6. **Qualification Determination Notification for New Demand Capacity Resources.**

No later than 127 days prior to the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, the ISO shall send notification to Project Sponsors for each New Demand Capacity Resource indicating whether the New Demand Capacity Resource has been accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(a) For a New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will specify the Demand Capacity Resource type and the Demand Capacity
Resource’s summer and winter Qualified Capacity, which shall be the ISO-determined summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses (that is, eight percent).

(b) For a New Demand Capacity Resource not accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction, the notification will provide an explanation as to why the resource did not meet the requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4 and was not accepted.

III.13.1.4.2. **Definition of Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

Demand Capacity Resources that previously have been in service and registered with the ISO, and which are not otherwise New Demand Capacity Resources, shall be Existing Demand Capacity Resources. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall include and are limited to Demand Capacity Resources that have been in service and registered with the ISO to fulfill a Capacity Supply Obligation created by clearing in a past Forward Capacity Auction before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction. Except as specified in this Section III.13.1.4, Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to the same qualification process as Existing Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.1.2.3. Existing Demand Capacity Resources shall be subject to Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2. An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may not include in its demand reduction value a measure whose Measure Life will expire before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.2.1. **Qualified Capacity Notification for Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

(a) For each Existing Demand Capacity Resource, the ISO will notify the Resource’s Lead Market Participant no later than 15 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline of: the Demand Capacity Resource type; summer and winter Qualified Capacity (which shall be the summer and winter demand reduction value increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses); the Load Zone in which the Demand Capacity Resource is located; and, for Active Demand Capacity Resources, the Dispatch Zone in which the resource is located.

(b) If the Lead Market Participant believes that the ISO’s assessment of the Qualified Capacity is inaccurate, the Market Participant must notify the ISO within five Business Days of receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.
(c) If a Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource wishes to change its Demand Capacity Resource type, the Market Participant must submit an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan to reflect the change in its resource type. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification. Designation of the Demand Capacity Resource type may not be changed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

(d) A Market Participant with an Existing On-Peak Demand Resource or Existing Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may provide an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan as described in Section III.13.1.4.3.1.2 that complies with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Updated Measurement and Verification Plans must be received by the ISO no later than five Business Days after receipt of the Qualified Capacity notification.

(e) If an Existing Demand Capacity Resource is not submitting a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid for the Forward Capacity Auction, then no further submissions or actions for that resource are necessary, and the resource shall participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) with Qualified Capacity as indicated in the ISO’s notification.

III.13.1.4.2.2. Existing Demand Capacity Resource De-List Bids.
An Existing Demand Capacity Resource may submit a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5 no later than the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline or a Static De-List Bid pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline, provided, however, that no de-list bid shall be used as a mechanism to inappropriately qualify Assets associated with Existing Demand Capacity Resources as New Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.1.4.3. Measurement and Verification Applicable to On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources.
To demonstrate the demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, the Project Sponsor or Market Participant of such a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, or reconfiguration auctions shall submit to the ISO the Measurement and Verification Documents in accordance with this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the
ISO New England Manuals. The ISO shall review such Measurement and Verification Documents to determine whether they are consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in this Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals.

**III.13.1.4.3.1. Measurement and Verification Documents.**

Measurement and Verification Documents must demonstrate both availability and performance of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in reducing demand coincident with Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours such that the reported monthly demand reduction value shall achieve at least a ten percent relative precision and an eighty percent confidence interval as described and applied in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall serve as the basis for the claimed demand reduction value of an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall document the measurement and verification performed to verify the achieved demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource. The Measurement and Verification Documents shall contain a projection of the On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s demand reduction value for each month of the Capacity Commitment Period and over the expected Measure Lives associated with the Demand Capacity Resources. An On-Peak Demand Resource’s or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the methodology used to calculate electrical energy load reduction or output during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours, or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If an On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource includes Distributed Generation, the Measurement and Verification Documents must describe the individual metering or metering protocol used to monitor and verify the output of the Distributed Generation, consistent with the measurement and verification requirements set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

The Measurement and Verification Documents shall include a Measurement and Verification Plan submitted in the Forward Capacity Auction Qualification, as described in Section III.13.1.4.3 and a monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Report during the Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall reference the measurement and verification protocols and performance data documented in the Measurement and Verification Plan or the Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s). Such monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports will document the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from eligible pre-
existing measures and new measures, and the Project Sponsor’s total demand reduction value from both eligible pre-existing measures and new measures, for all measures it had in operation as of the end of the previous month. The monthly Measurement and Verification Summary Reports shall be based on Measurement and Verification Documents determined in accordance with Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be the basis for monthly settlement with Project Sponsors. All Measurement and Verification Documents shall conform to the ISO’s specifications with respect to content, format and delivery methodology, and shall be submitted in accordance with the timelines and deadlines set forth in Market Rule 1 and the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.1.4.3.1.1. Optional Measurement and Verification Reference Reports.
At the option of the Project Sponsor, the Measurement and Verification Documents for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may also include one or more Measurement and Verification Reference Report(s) submitted during the Capacity Commitment Period subject to the schedule in the Measurement and Verification Plan and consistent with the schedule and reporting standards set forth in the ISO New England Manuals. Measurement and Verification Reference Reports shall update the prospective demand reduction value of the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource based on measurement and verification studies performed during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.1.4.3.1.2. Updated Measurement and Verification Documents.
At the option of the Project Sponsor, an Updated Measurement and Verification Plan for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource may be submitted during a subsequent Forward Capacity Auction qualification process prior to the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period of the Demand Capacity Resource project. The Updated Measurement and Verification Plan may include updated project specifications, measurement and verification protocols, and performance data. However, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall not modify for the duration of the Capacity Commitment Period the total claimed demand reduction value or the Demand Capacity Resource type from the applicable Forward Capacity Auction in which the Project Sponsor’s offer cleared. Additionally, the Updated Measurement and Verification Plan shall provide measurement and verification consistent with the requirements specified in the ISO New England Manuals, and shall be comparable to the quality of the original Measurement and Verification Plan accepted during the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process in which the Demand Capacity Resource project cleared the Forward Capacity Auction.
III.13.1.4.3.1.3. Annual Certification of Accuracy of Measurement and Verification Documents.

Project Sponsors for On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall submit no less frequently than once per year, a statement certifying that the Demand Capacity Resource projects for which the Project Sponsor is requesting compensation continue to perform in accordance with the submitted Measurement and Verification Documents reviewed by the ISO. One such statement must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days before the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline.

III.13.1.4.3.1.4. Record Requirement of Retail Customers Served.

For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, Project Sponsors shall maintain records of retail customers served including, at a minimum, the retail customer’s address, the customer’s utility distribution company, utility distribution company account identifier, measures installed, and corresponding monthly demand reduction values. For On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources targeting customer facilities with under 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, the Project Sponsor shall maintain records as described above for customer facilities with greater than or equal to 10 kW of demand reduction value per facility, or shall maintain records of aggregated demand reduction value and measures installed by Load Zone and meter domain. Project Sponsors shall maintain such records until the end of the Measure Life, or until the Demand Capacity Resource is permanently delisted from the Forward Capacity Market, and shall submit such records to the ISO upon request in a readable electronic format.

III.13.1.4.3.2. ISO Review of Measurement and Verification Documents.

The ISO shall review the Measurement and Verification Documents and complete such review and identify any necessary modifications in accordance with the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process as described in Section III.13.1 and pursuant to the ISO New England Manuals. In its review of the Measurement and Verification Documents, the ISO may consult with the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant to seek clarification, to gather additional necessary information, or to address questions or concerns arising from the materials submitted. At the discretion of the ISO, the ISO may consider revisions or additions to the Measurement and Verification Documents resulting from such consultation; provided, however, that in no case shall the ISO consider revisions or additions to the
Measurement and Verification Documents if the ISO believes that such consideration cannot be properly accomplished within the time periods established for the qualification process.

### III.13.1.5. Offers Composed of Separate Resources.

Separate resources seeking to participate together in a Forward Capacity Auction shall submit a composite offer form no later than 10 Business Days after the date on which the ISO provides qualification determination notifications, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.8, Section III.13.1.2.4, and Section III.13.1.4.1.1.6. Offers composed of separate resources may not be modified or withdrawn after the deadline for submission of the composite offer form. Separate resources may together participate in a Forward Capacity Auction as a single resource if the following conditions are met:

(a) In all months of the summer period (June through September where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, April through November where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, only one resource may be used to supply the amount of capacity offered during the entire summer period. In all months of the winter period (October through May where the summer resource is not a Demand Capacity Resource, December through March where the summer resource is a Demand Capacity Resource) of the Capacity Commitment Period, multiple resources may be combined to supply the amount of capacity offered, provided that: (i) the resources together meet the amount of the offer in all months of the winter period; and (ii) to combine for a month, that month must be considered a winter month for both the summer resource and the resource combining with that summer resource in that month.

(b) Each resource that is part of an offer composed of separate resources must qualify in accordance with all of the provisions of this Section III.13.1.5 applicable to that resource type. An offer composed of separate resources participates in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the resource type of the resource providing capacity in the summer period. A resource electing (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer clears shall not be eligible to participate in an offer composed of separate resources as the resource providing capacity in the summer period in the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource is a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource.
(c) The summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources shall be the summer Qualified Capacity of the single resource that will provide the Capacity Supply Obligation during the summer period. If the summer Qualified Capacity of an offer composed of separate resources is greater than the winter capacity for any month, then the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5.2 shall apply, even where any of the resources comprising the offer composed of separate resources is an Intermittent Power Resource. If the winter capacity of the offer composed of separate resources in any month is higher than the summer Qualified Capacity, then the capacity offered from the winter resources will be reduced pro-rata to equal the summer Qualified Capacity.

(d) Offers composed of separate resources are subject to the locational restrictions specified in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Winter Resource</th>
<th>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
<th>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>Eligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone where nested export-constrained Capacity Zone is located)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nested Export-Constrained Capacity Zone</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>Eligible (within same Capacity Zone)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) A Renewable Technology Resource may only participate in an offer composed of separate resources if its FCA Qualified Capacity has not been prorated pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10.

III.13.1.5.A. Notification of FCA Qualified Capacity.
No later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources, the ISO shall notify the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant for each New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, and New Demand Capacity Resource of the resource’s final FCA Qualified Capacity for the Forward Capacity Auction. Such notification will detail the resource’s financial assurance requirements in accordance with Section III.13.1.9.


Where a Project Sponsor elects to designate all or a portion of a New Generating Capacity Resource or an Existing Generating Capacity Resource as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, the Project Sponsor must make such designation in writing to the ISO no later than the date by which the Project Sponsor is required to submit the FCM Deposit and, if the Project Sponsor is not also the associated load serving entity, the Project Sponsor must at that time provide written confirmation from the load serving entity regarding the Self-Supplied FCA Resource designation. A New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource. All Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall be subject to the eligibility and locational requirements in this Section III.13.1.6. If designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource and otherwise accepted in the qualification process, the resource will clear in the Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(c) and, with the exception of demand programs for Self-Supplied FCA Resources, shall offset an equal amount of the load serving entity’s Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period. A load serving entity seeking to self-supply using a Demand Capacity Resource shall realize the benefit through the actual reduction in its annual system coincident peak load, shall not receive credit for a resource and, therefore, is not required to participate in the qualification process described in this Section III.13.1. All designations as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process are binding.


Where all or a portion of a resource is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, it shall also maintain its status as a New Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource, and must satisfy the Forward Capacity Auction qualification process requirements set forth in the remainder of Section III.13.1 applicable to that resource type, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6. Where an offer composed of separate resources is designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, all of the requirements and deadlines specified in Section III.13.1.5 shall apply to that offer, in addition to the requirements of this Section III.13.1.6.
total quantity of capacity that an load serving entity designates as Self-Supplied FCA Resources may not exceed the load serving entity’s projected share of the Installed Capacity Requirement during the Capacity Commitment Period which shall be calculated by determining the load serving entity’s most recent percentage share of the Installed Capacity Requirement multiplied by the projected Installed Capacity Requirement for the commitment year. No resource may be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for more MW than the lesser of that resource’s summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity.

III.13.1.6.2. **Locational Requirements for Self-Supplied FCA Resources.**

In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource for a load in an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be located in the same Capacity Zone as the associated load, unless the Self-Supplied FCA Resource is a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights. In order to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource in an export-constrained Capacity Zone for a load outside that export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Self-Supplied FCA Resource must be a pool-planned unit or other unit with a special allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.1.7. **Internal Market Monitor Review of Offers and Bids.**

In addition to the other provisions of this Section III.13.1, the Internal Market Monitor shall have the authority to review in the qualification process each resource’s summer and winter Seasonal Claimed Capability if it is significantly lower than historical values, and if the Internal Market Monitor determines that it may be an attempt to exercise physical withholding, the matter will be referred to the Commission in accordance with the protocols set forth in Appendix A to the Commission’s Market Monitoring Policy Statement (111 FERC ¶ 61,267 (2005)). Where an entity submits: (i) an offer as a New Generating Capacity Resource, a New Import Capacity Resource or a New Demand Capacity Resource; and (ii) a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in the same Forward Capacity Auction, the Internal Market Monitor shall take appropriate steps to ensure that the resource bid to de-list, retire or export in the Forward Capacity Auction is not inappropriately replaced by that new capacity in a subsequent reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In its review of any offer or bid pursuant to this Section III.13.1.7, the Internal Market Monitor may consult with the Project Sponsor or Market Participant, as appropriate, to seek clarification, or to address questions or concerns regarding the materials submitted.
III.13.1.8. **Publication of Offer and Bid Information.**

(a) Resource name, quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located about each Permanent De-list Bid and Retirement De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(b) The quantity and Load Zone (or interface, as applicable) in which the resource is located of each Static De-List Bid will be posted no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(c) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface of Export Bids and Administrative Export Bids shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(d) Name of submitter, quantity, and interface about offers from New Import Capacity Resources shall be published no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted.

(e) No later than three Business Days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, the ISO shall post on its website information concerning Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.

(f) The name of each Lead Market Participant submitting Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative Export De-List Bids, as well as the number and type of such de-list bids submitted by each Lead Market Participant, shall be published no later than three Business Days after the ISO issues the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b), and III.13.1.3.5.7. Authorized Persons of Authorized Commissions will be provided confidential access to full information about posted Static De-list Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, and Retirement De-List Bids upon request pursuant to Section 3.3 of the ISO New England Information Policy.

(g) No later than five Business Days after the close of the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window, the ISO shall post on its website the aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids that have been elected to participate in the substitution auction by Capacity Zone (where the zones used are those being studied for inclusion in the associated Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4).

III.13.1.9. **Financial Assurance.**
Except as noted in this Section III.13.1.9, all financial assurance requirements associated with Forward Capacity Auctions and annual reconfiguration auctions and other payments and charges resulting from the Forward Capacity Market shall be governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.1. **Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Participating in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

In order to participate in any Forward Capacity Auction, New Generating Capacity Resources (including Conditional Qualified New Resources) and New Demand Capacity Resources shall be required to meet the financial assurance requirements as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. Timely payment of the FCM Deposit by the Project Sponsor for a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction constitutes a commitment to offer the full FCA Qualified Capacity of that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. If the FCM Deposit is not received within the timeframe specified in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource shall not be permitted to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction. If capacity offered by the New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP shall be applied toward the resource’s financial assurance obligation, as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If no capacity offered by that New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the financial assurance required prior to the auction pursuant to FAP will be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2. **Financial Assurance for New Generating Capacity Resources and New Demand Capacity Resources Clearing in a Forward Capacity Auction.**

Where a New Generating Capacity Resource’s offer or a New Demand Capacity Resource’s offer is accepted in a Forward Capacity Auction, that resource must provide financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.1.9.2.1. **Failure to Provide Financial Assurance or to Meet Milestone.**

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If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource: (i) fails to provide the required financial assurance as described in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy or (ii) has its Capacity Supply Obligation terminated by the ISO pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, it shall lose its Capacity Supply Obligation and its right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation, and it shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation.


Once a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, its financial assurance obligation shall be released pursuant to the terms of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy and it shall have the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy. If a New Generating Capacity Resource or New Demand Capacity Resource is only capable of delivering less than the amount of capacity that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the portion of its financial assurance associated with the shortfall shall be forfeited.

III.13.1.9.2.2.1. [Reserved.]


Where any financial assurance is forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13, there shall be no further coverage for such forfeit under the ISO New England Billing Policy. Any financial assurance that is forfeited pursuant to Section III.13 shall be used to reduce charges incurred by load in the relevant Capacity Zone.


A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a new External Resource or will be delivered over an Elective Transmission Upgrade with a Capacity Network Import Interconnection Service Interconnection Request pursuant to Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as a New Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9.1 and Section III.13.1.9.2. Once the new External Resource or the Elective Transmission Upgrade achieves FCM Commercial Operation, the New Import Capacity Resource shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as described in Section III.13.1.9. A New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by one or more existing
External Resources or by an external Control Area shall be subject to the same financial assurance requirements as an Existing Generating Capacity Resource, as governed by the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.1.9.3. Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit.**

For each New Capacity Show of Interest Form and New Demand Capacity Resource Show of Interest Form submitted for the purposes of qualifying for either a Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction, the Project Sponsor must submit to the ISO a refundable deposit in the amount shown in the table below ("Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit"). The Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit must be received in accordance with the ISO New England Billing Policy. Such deposit shall be used for costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. An additional Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit is not required if: (i) the Project Sponsor is actively seeking qualification for another Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction, or is having the project’s critical path schedule monitored pursuant to Section III.13.3; and (ii) the costs already incurred in the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring do not equal or exceed 90 percent of the amount of the previously-submitted Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s). The ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with an annual statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. In any case where resources are aggregated or disaggregated, the associated Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposits will be adjusted as appropriate. After aggregation or disaggregation of resources, historical data regarding the costs already incurred in the qualification process of the original resources will no longer be provided. Coincident with the issuance of the annual statement, where incurred costs are equal to or greater than 90 percent of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit(s) previously submitted, the ISO will issue an invoice in the amount determined pursuant to the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit table contained in Section III.13.1.9.3.1 plus any excess of costs incurred to date by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owners, associated with the qualification process described in Section III.13.1 and with the critical path schedule monitoring described in Section III.13.3. Any refunds that may result from aggregation of resources will be issued coincident with the annual statement. Payment on the invoice must be received in accordance with the

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ISO New England Billing Policy. If the Project Sponsor fails to pay the amount due by the stated due date, the ISO will consider the resources that were invoiced withdrawn by the Project Sponsor. Such a withdrawal shall be irrevocable, and payment on the invoice after the due date will not remedy the failure to pay or the withdrawal.

### III.13.1.9.3.1. Partial Waiver Of Deposit.

A portion of the deposit shall be waived when there is an active Interconnection Request and an executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or Interconnection System Impact Study Agreement under Schedule 22, 23 or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff or where a resource modification does not require a revision to the Interconnection Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources $\geq$ 20 MW or an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade that has not achieved Commercial Operation as defined in Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources $&lt;$ 20 MW and $\geq$ 2 MW</th>
<th>Imports and New Demand Capacity Resources</th>
<th>New Generating Capacity Resources $&lt;$ 2 MW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td>Including Up-rates, Re-powering, Environmental Compliance &amp; Intermittent Power Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
<td>With Executed Interconnection Feasibility Study Agreement or System Impact Study Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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III.13.1.9.3.2. Settlement of Costs.

To participate in the Forward Capacity Market or Reconfiguration Auction, a resource must meet certain qualifications set forth by the ISO. These qualifications involve the resources participating in a Forward Capacity Auction or Reconfiguration Auction. If a resource withdraws from the process or fails to meet the requirements set forth in Section III.13.1, the ISO shall provide the Project Sponsor with a statement in writing of the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring. If any portion of the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit exceeds the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring, the ISO shall refund to the Project Sponsor the excess including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). If the costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of the affected Transmission Owner(s), associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring exceed the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, the Project Sponsor shall pay such excess, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2) – For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.
Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit that exceeds the costs associated with the qualification process and critical path schedule monitoring incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). The ISO shall charge the Project Sponsor the amount of such costs incurred by the ISO and its consultants, including the documented and reasonably-incurred costs of affected Transmission Owner(s), that exceeds the Qualification Process Cost Reimbursement Deposit, including interest calculated in accordance with 18 CFR § 35.19a(a)(2). For Demand Capacity Resources, the ISO shall provide all of the above concurrently with the annual statement required under Section III.13.1.9.3.

III.13.1.9.3.2.3. Crediting Of Reimbursements.
Cost reimbursements received (excluding amounts passed through to the ISO’s consultants and to affected Transmission Owner(s)) by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.1.9.3.2 shall be credited against revenues received by the ISO pursuant to Section IV.A.6.1 of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff.

Beginning with the timeline for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2017 (the eighth Forward Capacity Auction), and for each Capacity Commitment Period thereafter, the deadlines will be consistent for each Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(a) each Capacity Commitment Period shall begin in June;

(b) the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline will be in March, approximately four years and three months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(c) the New Capacity Show of Interest Submission Window will be in April, approximately four years and two months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(d) the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline will be 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline, approximately four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period;

(e) the New Capacity Qualification Deadline will be in June or July that is just under four years before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period; and
(f) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period will begin in February approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.1.11 Opt-Out for Resources Electing Multiple-Year Treatment.**

Beginning in the qualification process for the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2018), any resource that had elected in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which its New Capacity Offer cleared may, by submitting a written notification to the ISO no later than the Existing Capacity Qualification Deadline (or, in the case of the ninth Forward Capacity Auction, no later than September 19, 2014), opt-out of the remaining years of the resource’s multiple-year election. A decision to so opt-out shall be irrevocable. A resource choosing to so opt-out will participate in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions in the same manner as other Existing Capacity Resources.

Each Forward Capacity Auction will be conducted beginning on the first Monday in the February that is approximately three years and four months before the beginning of the associated Capacity Commitment Period (unless, no later than the immediately preceding December 1, an alternative date is announced by the ISO), or, where exigent circumstances prevent the start of the Forward Capacity Auction at that time, as soon as possible thereafter.

The total amount of capacity cleared in each Forward Capacity Auction shall be determined using the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve and the Capacity Zone Demand Curves for the modeled Capacity Zones pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3.

III.13.2.2.1. System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve.
The MRI Transition Period is the period from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020 through the earlier of:

(i) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the amount of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) that is filed by the ISO with the Commission pursuant to Section III.12.3 for the upcoming Forward Capacity Auction is greater than or equal to the sum of: 34,151 MW, and: (a) 722 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020); (b) 375 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021), or; (c) 150 MW (for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022);

(ii) the Forward Capacity Auction for which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4, specifies a quantity at $7.03/kW-month in excess of the MW value determined under the applicable subsection (2)(b), (2)(c), or (2)(d), below, or;
(iii) the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022.

During the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall consist of the following three segments:

(1) at prices above $7.03/kW-month and below the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4;

(2) at prices below $7.03/kW-month, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be linear between $7.03/kW-month and $0.00/kW-month and determined by the following quantities:
   (a) At the price of $0.00/kW-month, the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be 1616 MW plus the MW value determined under the applicable provision in (b), (c), or (d) of this subsection.
   (b) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2020, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,437 MW; and
      2. 722 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (c) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2021, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 35,090 MW; and
      2. 375 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month;
   (d) for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2022, at $7.03/kW-month, the quantity shall be the lesser of:
      1. 34,865 MW; and
      2. 150 MW plus the quantity at which the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value and the scaling factor yield a price of $7.03/kW-month.
(3) a price of $7.03/kW-month for all quantities between those curves segments.

In addition to the foregoing, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

Following the MRI Transition Period, the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price for system capacity quantities based on the product of the system-wide Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.1.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. For any system capacity quantity greater than 110% of the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

**III.13.2.2.2. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**
For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the import-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.1.3, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an import-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-negative. At all quantities greater than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero. The Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall not specify a price in excess of the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

**III.13.2.2.3. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curves.**
For each export-constrained Capacity Zone, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price for all Capacity Zone quantities based on the product of the export-constrained Capacity Zone’s Marginal Reliability Impact value, calculated pursuant to Section III.12.2.2.1, and the scaling factor specified in Section III.13.2.2.4. The prices specified by an export-constrained Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall be non-positive. At all quantities less than the truncation point, which is the amount of capacity for which the Capacity Zone Demand Curve specifies a price of negative $0.01/kW-month, the Capacity Zone Demand Curve shall specify a price of zero.

**III.13.2.2.4. Capacity Demand Curve Scaling Factor.**
The demand curve scaling factor shall be set at the value such that, at the quantity specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at a price of Net CONE, the Loss of Load Expectation is 0.1 days per year.

III.13.2.3. **Conduct of the Forward Capacity Auction.**

The Forward Capacity Auction shall include a descending clock auction, which will determine, subject to the provisions of Section III.13.2.7, the Capacity Clearing Price for each Capacity Zone modeled in that Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.12.4, and the Capacity Clearing Price for certain offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d). The Forward Capacity Auction shall determine the outcome of all offers and bids accepted during the qualification process and submitted during the auction. The descending clock auction shall be conducted as a series of rounds, which shall continue (for up to five consecutive Business Days, with up to eight rounds per day, absent extraordinary circumstances) until the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.2.3.3. Each round of the Forward Capacity Auction shall consist of the following steps, which shall be completed simultaneously for each Capacity Zone included in the round:

III.13.2.3.1. **Step 1: Announcement of Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price.**

For each round, the auctioneer shall announce a single Start-of-Round Price (the highest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction) and a single (lower) End-of-Round Price (the lowest price associated with a round of the Forward Capacity Auction). In the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for all modeled Capacity Zones. In each round after the first round, the Start-of-Round Price shall equal the End-of-Round Price from the previous round.

III.13.2.3.2. **Step 2: Compilation of Offers and Bids.**

The auctioneer shall compile all of the offers and bids for that round, as follows:

(a) **Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

(i) The Project Sponsor for any New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity
Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource accepted in the qualification process for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. A New Capacity Offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each strictly less than the Start-of-Round Price but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and an associated quantity in the applicable Capacity Zone. Each price shall be expressed in units of dollars per kilowatt-month to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point, and each quantity shall be expressed in units of MWs to an accuracy of at most three digits to the right of the decimal point. A New Capacity Offer shall imply a supply curve indicating quantities offered at all of that round’s prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii).

(ii) If the Project Sponsor of a New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability, New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade, or New Demand Capacity Resource elects to offer in a Forward Capacity Auction, the Project Sponsor must offer the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price in the first round of the auction. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may in no event be for greater capacity than the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity at any price. A New Capacity Offer for a resource may not be for less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the New Capacity Offer is for a capacity quantity of zero.

(iii) Let the Start-of-Round Price and End-of-Round Price for a given round be $P_S$ and $P_E$, respectively. Let the m prices $(1 \leq m \leq 5)$ submitted by a Project Sponsor for a modeled Capacity Zone be $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m$, where $P_S > p_1 > p_2 > \ldots > p_m \geq P_E$, and let the associated quantities submitted for a New Capacity Resource be $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_m$. Then the Project Sponsor’s supply curve, for all prices strictly less than $P_S$ but greater than or equal to $P_E$, shall be taken to be:
where, in the first round, $q_0$ is the resource’s full FCA Qualified Capacity and, in subsequent rounds, $q_0$ is the resource’s quantity offered at the lowest price of the previous round.

(iv) Except for Renewable Technology Resources and except as provided in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(v), a New Capacity Resource may not include any capacity in a New Capacity Offer during the Forward Capacity Auction at any price below the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price. The amount of capacity included in each New Capacity Offer at each price shall be included in the aggregate supply curves at that price as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(v) Capacity associated with a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) shall be automatically included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 at prices at or above the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) and shall be automatically removed from the aggregate supply curves at prices below the resource’s offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2), except under the following circumstances:

In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, the Project Sponsor for a New Import Capacity Resource (other than a New Import Capacity Resource that is backed by a single new External Resource and that is associated with an investment in transmission that increases New England’s import capability or a New Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade) with offer prices (as they may be modified pursuant to Section III.A.21.2) that are less than the Dynamic Delist Bid Threshold may submit a New Capacity Offer indicating the quantity of capacity that the Project Sponsor would commit to provide from the resource during the Capacity Commitment Period at that round’s prices. Such an offer shall be defined by the submission of one to five

$$S(p) = \begin{cases} q_0, & \text{if } p > p_1, \\ q_1, & \text{if } p_2 < p \leq p_1, \\ q_2, & \text{if } p_3 < p \leq p_2, \\ \vdots, & \text{if } p_m, & \text{if } p \leq p_m. \end{cases}$$
prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such an offer shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may not increase the quantity offered as the price decreases.

(b) **Bids from Existing Capacity Resources**

(i) Static De-List Bids, Permanent De-List Bids, Retirement De-List Bids, and Export Bids from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources, as finalized in the qualification process or as otherwise directed by the Commission shall be automatically bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction, such that each such resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until any Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement D-List Bid, or Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. In the case of a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, or where a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid is subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be reduced by the quantity of the de-list bid (unless the resource was retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1) and the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction. Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids subject to an election under Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) or Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) shall not be included in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be treated according to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(ii). In the case of a Static De-List Bid, if the Market Participant revised the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the revised bid shall be used in place of the submitted bid; if the Market Participant withdrew the bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If the amount of capacity associated with Export Bids for an interface exceeds the transfer limit of that interface (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface), then the set of Export Bids associated with that interface equal to the interface’s transfer limit (minus any accepted Administrative De-List Bids over that interface) having the highest bid prices shall be included in the auction as described above;
capacity for which Export Bids are not included in the auction as a result of this provision shall be entered into the auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(c).

(ii) For Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids, the ISO will enter a Proxy De-List Bid into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction in the following circumstances: (1) if the Lead Market Participant has elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) to retire the resource or portion thereof, the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price, and the Internal Market Monitor has found a portfolio benefit pursuant to Section III.A.24; or (2) if the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the price specified in the Commission-approved de-list bid is less than the price specified in the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant and less than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Proxy De-List Bid shall be non-rationable and shall be equal in price and quantity to, and located in the same Capacity Zone as, the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid, and shall be entered into the appropriate rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction such that the capacity associated with the Proxy De-List Bid will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3 until the Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, as described in Section III.13.2.5.2, and is removed from the aggregate supply curves. If the Lead Market Participant has elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), the resource has not been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1, and the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid is equal to or greater than the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant, no Proxy De-List Bid shall be used and the Commission-approved de-list bid shall be entered in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2(b)(i).

(iii) For purposes of this subsection (b), if an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for a Static De-List Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then (unless otherwise directed by the Commission) the lower of the Internal Market Monitor-determined price and any revised bid that is submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1 will be used in place of the initially submitted bid; provided, however, that if the bid was withdrawn pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.1, then the capacity associated with the withdrawn bid shall be entered into the auction pursuant to
Section III.13.2.3.2(c). If an Internal Market Monitor-determined price has been established for an Export Bid and the associated resource’s capacity is pivotal pursuant to Sections III.A.23.1 and III.A.23.2, then the Internal Market Monitor-determined price (or price directed by the Commission) will be used in place of the submitted bid.

Any Static De-List Bid for ambient air conditions that has not been verified pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.4 shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection (b).

(c) **Existing Capacity Resources Without De-List or Export Bids and Self-Supplied FCA Resources.** Each Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, and Existing Demand Capacity Resource without a Static De-List Bid, a Permanent De-List Bid, a Retirement De-List Bid, an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid in its Existing Capacity Qualification Package, and each existing Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its FCA Qualified Capacity, such that the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3, except where such resource, if permitted, submits an appropriate Dynamic De-List Bid, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(d). Each new Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall be automatically entered into each round of the Forward Capacity Auction at its designated self-supplied quantity at prices at or above the resource’s New Resource Offer Floor Price, such that the resource’s designated self-supply quantity will be included in the aggregate supply curves as described in Section III.13.2.3.3.

(d) **Dynamic De-List Bids.** In any round of the Forward Capacity Auction in which prices are below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold, any Existing Generating Capacity Resource, Existing Import Capacity Resource, or Existing Demand Capacity Resource (but not any Self-Supplied FCA Resources) may submit a Dynamic De-List Bid at prices below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. Such a bid shall be defined by the submission of one to five prices, each less than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold (or the Start-of-Round Price, if lower than the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold) but greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price, and a single quantity associated with each price. Such a bid shall be expressed in the same form as specified in Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(i) and shall imply a curve indicating quantities at all of that round’s relevant prices, pursuant to the convention of Section III.13.2.3.2(a)(iii). The curve may in no case increase the quantity offered as the price decreases. A dynamic De-List Bid may not offer less capacity than the resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit at any price, except where the amount of capacity offered is zero. All Dynamic De-List Bids are subject to a reliability review as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and if not rejected for reliability reasons, shall be included in the round in the same
manner as Static De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(b). Where a resource elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7 to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, the capacity associated with any resulting Capacity Supply Obligation may not be subject to a Dynamic De-List Bid in subsequent Forward Capacity Auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods for which the Project Sponsor elected to have the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price continue to apply. Where a Lead Market Participant submits any combination of Dynamic De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, and Administrative Export De-List Bid for a single resource, none of the prices in a set of price-quantity pairs associated with a bid may be the same as any price in any other set of price-quantity pairs associated with another bid for the same resource.

(e) **Repowering.** Offers and bids associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(e). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a New Generating Capacity Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). As long as any capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, the amount of capacity offered is the amount that the auctioneer shall include in the aggregate supply curve at the relevant prices, and the quantity of capacity offered from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall not be included in the aggregate supply curve. If any portion of the New Generating Capacity Resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource shall be permanently de-listed as of the start of the associated Capacity Commitment Period. If at any price, no capacity is offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, then the auctioneer shall include capacity from the associated Existing Generating Capacity Resource at that price, subject to any bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for that Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5. Bids submitted and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 shall only be entered into the Forward Capacity Auction after the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity), and shall only then be subject to the reliability review described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.
(f) **Conditional Qualified New Resources.** Offers associated with a resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a Conditional Qualified New Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f) shall be addressed in the Forward Capacity Auction in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.2.3.2(f). The Project Sponsor shall offer such a Conditional Qualified New Resource into the Forward Capacity Auction in the same manner and pursuant to the same rules as other New Generating Capacity Resources, as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(a). An offer from at most one resource at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location will be permitted to clear (receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction. As long as a positive quantity is offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction by the resource having a higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then no capacity from the Conditional Qualified New Resource shall clear. If at any price greater than or equal to the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction, zero quantity is offered from the resource having higher queue priority at the Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location, as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f), then the auctioneer shall consider capacity offered from the Conditional Qualified New Resource in the determination of clearing, including the application of Section III.13.2.7.

(g) **Mechanics.** Offers and bids that may be submitted during a round of the Forward Capacity Auction must be received between the starting time and ending time of the round, as announced by the auctioneer in advance. The ISO at its sole discretion may authorize a participant in the auction to complete or correct its submission after the ending time of a round, but only if the participant can demonstrate to the ISO’s satisfaction that the participant was making reasonable efforts to complete a valid offer submission before the ending time of the round, and only if the ISO determines that allowing the completion or correction will not unreasonably disrupt the auction process. All decisions by the ISO concerning whether or not a participant may complete or correct a submission after the ending time of a round are final.

**III.13.2.3.3. Step 3: Determination of the Outcome of Each Round.**

The auctioneer shall use the offers and bids for the round as described in Section III.13.2.3.2 to determine the aggregate supply curves for the New England Control Area and for each modeled Capacity Zone included in the round.

The aggregate supply curve for the New England Control Area, the Total System Capacity, shall reflect at each price the sum of the following:
(1) the amount of capacity offered in all Capacity Zones modeled as import-constrained Capacity Zones at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);

(2) the amount of capacity offered in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone at that price (excluding capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources);

(3) for each Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) the amount of capacity offered in the Capacity Zone at that price (including the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to the export-constrained Capacity Zone up to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits)), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at zero minus that price, and;

(4) for each interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area mapped to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, the lesser of:
   (i) that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits), or;
   (ii) the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources.

In computing the Total System Capacity, capacity associated with any New Capacity Offer at any price greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price will not be included in the tally of total capacity at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for that Capacity Zone. On the basis of these aggregate supply curves, the auctioneer shall determine the outcome of the round for each modeled Capacity Zone as follows:

(a) **Import-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an import-constrained Capacity Zone, if either of the following two conditions is met during the round:
(1) the aggregate supply curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), equals or is less than the quantity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the difference between the End-of-Round Price and the price specified by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve (at a quantity no less than Total System Capacity at the Start-of-Round Price), or;

(2) the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for that Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of: (1) the sum of the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, or; (2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If neither of the two conditions above are met in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

If the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), and adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, equals or is less than the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, then the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is concluded and the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.
The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone shall be set at the highest price at which the Total System Capacity is less than or equal to the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If the Forward Capacity Auction for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone is not concluded then the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction, and the auctioneer shall publish the Total System Capacity at the End-of-Round Price, adjusted to include the additional supply in the import-constrained Capacity Zone that may be cleared at a higher price, less the amount of capacity determined by the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve at the End-of-Round Price, and also shall publish the quantity of capacity from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price.

**(c) Export-Constrained Capacity Zones.**

For a Capacity Zone modeled as an export-constrained Capacity Zone, if all of the following conditions are met during the round:

1. the aggregate supply curve for the export-constrained Capacity Zone, adjusted as necessary in accordance with Section III.13.2.6 (Capacity Rationing Rule), is equal to or less than the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero;
2. in the case of a nested Capacity Zone, the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, and;
3. the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone;

then the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Zone is concluded and such Capacity Zone will not be included in further rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction.

The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

1. the sum of:
   1. the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   2. the Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

or;
(2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

The Capacity Clearing Price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be set at the greater of:

(1) the sum of:

   (i) the price specified by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at the amount of capacity equal to the total amount that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in that Capacity Zone; and
   (ii) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the nested Capacity Zone is located,

or;

(2) the highest price of any offer or bid for a resource in the Capacity Zone that is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.

If all of the conditions above are not satisfied in the round, then the auctioneer shall publish the quantity of excess supply in the export-constrained Capacity Zone at the End-of-Round Price (the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the export-constrained Capacity Zone minus the maximum amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve at a price of zero) and the quantity of capacity in the Capacity Zone from Demand Capacity Resources by type at the End-of-Round Price, and that Capacity Zone will be included in the next round of the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) Treatment of Import Capacity. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than or equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offers from those resources shall be treated as capacity offers in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface. Where the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the following provisions shall apply (separately for each such interface):

(i) For purposes of determining which capacity offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface shall clear and at what price, the offers over the interface shall be treated in the descending-clock auction as if they
comprised a separately-modeled export-constrained capacity zone, with an aggregate supply curve consisting of the offers from the New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface.

(ii) The amount of capacity offered over the interface that will be included in the aggregate supply curve of the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface shall be the lesser of the following two quantities: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface; and the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF).

(iii) The Forward Capacity Auction for New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is concluded when the following two conditions are both satisfied: the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resource and Existing Import Capacity Resources over the interface is less than or equal to the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF); and the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with the interface.

(e) **Treatment of Export Capacity.** Any Export Bid or any Administrative Export De-List Bid that is used to export capacity through an export interface connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone from another Capacity Zone, or through an export interface connected to the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone from an export-constrained Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the export interface that is identified in the Existing Capacity Qualification Package is located. The Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Capacity Zone where the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid is modeled.

(i) Then the MW quantity equal to the relevant Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid from the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located. If the export interface is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone, the MW quantity procured will be in addition to the amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curve for the import-constrained Capacity Zone.
(ii) If the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid does not clear, then the resource associated with the Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid will not be de-listed in the Capacity Zone where the resource is located.

III.13.2.3.4. Determination of Final Capacity Zones.

(a) For all Forward Capacity Auctions up to and including the sixth Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2015), after the Forward Capacity Auction is concluded for all modeled Capacity Zones, the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those having distinct Capacity Clearing Prices as a result of constraints between modeled Capacity Zones binding in the running of the Forward Capacity Auction. Where a modeled constraint does not bind in the Forward Capacity Auction, and as a result adjacent modeled Capacity Zones clear at the same Capacity Clearing Price, those modeled Capacity Zones shall be a single Capacity Zone used for all purposes of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

(b) For all Forward Capacity Auctions beginning with the seventh Forward Capacity Auction (for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning June 1, 2016) the final set of distinct Capacity Zones that will be used for all purposes associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, including for the purposes of reconfiguration auctions and Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, shall be those described in Section III.12.4.

III.13.2.4. Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and the Cost of New Entry.

The Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price is max [1.6 multiplied by Net CONE, CONE]. References in this Section III.13 to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall mean the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the Forward Capacity Auction associated with the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is $11.35/kW-month.

Net CONE for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2021 is $8.04/kW-month.
CONE and Net CONE shall be recalculated for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2025 and no less often than once every three years thereafter. Whenever these values are recalculated, the ISO will review the results of the recalculation with stakeholders and the new values will be filed with the Commission prior to the Forward Capacity Auction in which the new value is to apply.

Between recalculations, CONE and Net CONE will be adjusted for each Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.A.21.1.2(e). Prior to applying the annual adjustment for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2019, Net CONE will be reduced by $0.43/kW-month to reflect the elimination of the PER adjustment. The adjusted CONE and Net CONE values will be published on the ISO’s web site.

**III.13.2.5. Treatment of Specific Offer and Bid Types in the Forward Capacity Auction.**

**III.13.2.5.1. Offers from New Generating Capacity Resources, New Import Capacity Resources, and New Demand Capacity Resources.**

A New Capacity Offer (other than one from a Conditional Qualified New Resource) clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction if the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. An offer from a Conditional Qualified New Resource clears (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) in the Forward Capacity Auction, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6, if all of the following conditions are met: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than or equal to the price specified in the offer; (ii) capacity from that resource is considered in the determination of clearing as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(f); and (iii) such offer minimizes the costs for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, subject to Section III.13.2.7.7(c).

The amount of capacity that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation through the Forward Capacity Auction shall not exceed the quantity of capacity offered from the New Generating Capacity Resource, New Import Capacity Resource, or New Demand Capacity Resource at the Capacity Clearing Price.
III.13.2.5.2. **Bids and Offers from Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources.**

III.13.2.5.2.1. **Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids.**

(a) Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid or Proxy De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

(b) Unless the capacity has been retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, if all or part of a resource with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid does not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the Lead Market Participant shall enter the uncleared portion of the bid into the qualification process for the following Forward Capacity Auction as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.

(c) If the Capacity Clearing Price is greater than the price specified in a de-list bid submitted by a Lead Market Participant that elected conditional treatment for the de-list bid pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b), and there is an associated Proxy De-List Bid that does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation), the resource will receive a Capacity Supply Obligation at the Capacity Clearing Price.

(d) The process by which the primary auction is cleared (but not the compilation of offers and bids pursuant to Sections III.13.2.3.1 and III.13.2.3.2) will be repeated after the substitution auction is completed if one of the following conditions is met: (1) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction; or (2) if any Proxy De-List Bid entered as a result of a Lead Market Participant electing conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) does not clear (receives a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process, the de-list bid submitted by the Lead Market Participant is at or above the Capacity Clearing Price, and the Proxy De-List Bid retains some portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process: (i) excludes all Proxy De-List Bids, (ii) includes the offers and bids of resources compiled pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.2 that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the first run of the primary auction.
auction-clearing process, excluding the offers, or portion thereof, associated with resources that acquired a Capacity Supply Obligation in the substitution auction, and (iii) includes the capacity of resources, or portion thereof, that retain a Capacity Supply Obligation after the first run of the primary auction-clearing process and the substitution auction. The second run of the primary auction-clearing process shall not affect the Capacity Clearing Price of the Forward Capacity Auction (which is established by the first run of the primary auction-clearing process).

(e) Resources (other than those still subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election as described in Sections III.13.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) that receive a Capacity Supply Obligation as a result of the first run of the primary auction-clearing process shall be paid the Capacity Clearing Price during the associated Capacity Commitment Period. Where the second run of the primary auction-clearing process procures additional capacity, the resulting price, paid during the associated Capacity Commitment Period (and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods, as elected pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7) to the additionally procured capacity, shall be equal to or greater than the adjusted price resulting from the first run of the primary auction-clearing process for that Capacity Zone.

III.13.2.5.2.2. Static De-List Bids and Export Bids.
Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.5, a Static De-List Bid or an Export Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6.

III.13.2.5.2.3. Dynamic De-List Bids.
A Dynamic De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) if the Capacity Clearing Price is less than or equal to the price specified in the bid, except possibly as a result of the Capacity Rationing Rule described in Section III.13.2.6. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, such Dynamic De-List Bids shall be cleared pro-rata, but in no case less than a resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.5.2.4. Administrative Export De-List Bids.
An Administrative Export De-List Bid clears in the Forward Capacity Auction (does not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation for the associated Capacity Commitment Period) regardless of the Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.2.5.2.5. Reliability Review.

The ISO shall review each Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, and substitution auction demand bid to determine whether the capacity associated with that bid is needed for reliability reasons during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction; Proxy De-List Bids shall not be reviewed.

(a) The reliability review of de-list bids will be conducted in descending price order using the price as finalized during qualification or as otherwise directed by the Commission. De-list bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability; where bids are the same price and provide the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If de-list bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d) and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. The reliability review of substitution auction demand bids that would otherwise clear will be conducted in order beginning with the resource whose cleared bids contribute the greatest amount to social surplus. The capacity associated with a bid shall be deemed needed for reliability reasons if the absence of the capacity would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules. Bids shall only be rejected pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5 for the sole purpose of addressing a local reliability issue, and shall not be rejected solely on the basis that acceptance of the bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for a Capacity Zone.

(b) If a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for reliability reasons, then the de-list bid having capacity needed for reliability will not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. If the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with a substitution auction demand bid that would otherwise clear is needed for reliability reasons, then the entire demand bid will not be further included in the substitution auction.
(c) The Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the de-list bid; or (ii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons. In no event, however, shall a Lead Market Participant be notified that a bid submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.5 and accepted in the qualification process for an Existing Generating Capacity Resource did not clear for reliability reasons if the associated New Generating Capacity Resource remains in the Forward Capacity Auction. In such a case, the Lead Market Participant shall be notified that its bid did not clear for reliability reasons at the later of: (i) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the auction price reaches the price of the bid; (ii) immediately after the end of the Forward Capacity Auction round in which the associated New Generating Capacity Resource is fully withdrawn (that is, the Forward Capacity Auction reaches a price at which the resource’s New Capacity Offer is zero capacity); or (iii) as soon as practicable after the time at which the ISO has determined that the bid must be rejected for reliability reasons.

(d) A resource that has a de-list bid rejected for reliability reasons shall be compensated pursuant to the terms set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and shall have a Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.6.1.

(e) The ISO shall review the results of each annual reconfiguration auction and determine whether the reliability need which caused the ISO to reject the de-list bid has been met through the annual reconfiguration auction. The ISO may also attempt to address the reliability concern through other reasonable means (including transmission enhancements).

(f) If the reliability need that caused the ISO to reject a de-list bid is met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, the resource shall retain its Capacity Supply Obligation through the end of the Capacity Commitment Period for which it was retained for reliability (provided that resources that have Permanent De-List Bids or Retirement De-List Bids rejected for reliability shall be permanently de-listed or retired as of the first day of the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period (or earlier if the resource sheds the entirety of the Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii) or Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii))).
(g) If a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid is rejected for reliability reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable, is no longer eligible to participate as an Existing Capacity Resource in any reconfiguration auction, Forward Capacity Auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for that and subsequent Capacity Commitment Periods. If the resource, or portion thereof, continues to be needed for reliability reasons, it shall be counted as capacity in the Forward Capacity Auction and shall be compensated as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1.

(h) The ISO shall review with the Reliability Committee (i) the status of any prior rejected de-list bids reported to the Commission in an FCA results filing pursuant to Section 13.8.2, and (ii) the status of any Retirement De-List Bid or Permanent De-List Bid that has been rejected for reliability reasons and has elected to continue to operate, prior to the New Capacity Qualification Deadline in accordance with Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT.

If an identified reliability need results in the rejection of a Retirement De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Static De-List Bid, or Dynamic De-List Bid while executing an FCA, the ISO shall (i) review each specific reliability need with the Reliability Committee in accordance with the timing provided for in the ISO New England Operating Documents and, (ii) update the current system Needs Assessments pursuant to Section 4.1(c) of Attachment K of the ISO OATT. This review and update will follow ISO’s filing of the FCA results with the Commission pursuant to Section 13.8.2.

III.13.2.5.2.5A Fuel Security Reliability Review

(a) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will remain in effect for the 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Period, after which this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will sunset.

(b) This Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply to (i) Retirement De-List Bids, (ii) substitution auction demand bids, and (iii) bilateral transactions and reconfiguration auctions demand bids submitted by an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that has been identified as being needed for fuel security during a Forward Capacity Auction. Terms set out in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will apply only for the period and resources described within this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A. Where the terms and conditions in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A differ from terms otherwise set out in Section III.13, the terms of this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A will control for the period and circumstances described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5A.
(c) A fuel security reliability review for the Forward Capacity Market will be performed pursuant to Appendix L to Section III of the Tariff, and in accordance with the inputs and methodology set out to establish the fuel security reliability standard in Appendix I of Planning Procedure No. 10.

(d) For fuel security reliability reviews performed for the primary Forward Capacity Auction, the fuel security reliability review will be performed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline and conducted in descending price order using the price as submitted in the Retirement De-List Bids. Bids with the same price will be reviewed in the order that produces the least negative impact to reliability. Where multiple bids have the same price and the retirement of the Existing Generating Capacity Resources would have the same impact to reliability, they will be reviewed based on their submission time. If bids with the same price are from a single generating station, they will be reviewed in an order that seeks to provide (1) the least-cost solution under Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(d), and (2) the minimum aggregate quantity required for reliability from the generating station. An Existing Generating Capacity Resource may be needed for both fuel security and for transmission security pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5. The fuel security reliability review will be performed in advance of the reliability review for transmission security. Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is needed for both fuel security reasons pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5A, and transmission security reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the generator will be retained for fuel security for purposes of cost allocation.

(e) If an Existing Generating Capacity Resource is identified as being needed for fuel security reasons, and the reliability need is not met through a reconfiguration auction or other means, that resource, or portion thereof, as applicable may not participate in Annual Reconfiguration Auctions for the Capacity Commitment Period(s) for which it is needed for fuel security, or earlier 2022/23, 2023/24 and 2024/25 Capacity Commitment Periods. Such an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is identified as being needed for fuel security may participate in monthly bilateral transactions and monthly reconfiguration auctions, but may not submit monthly bilateral transactions for December, January or February, or demand bids for the December, January, or February monthly reconfiguration auctions for any period for which they have been identified as being needed for fuel security.

(f) Participants that have submitted a Retirement De-List Bid will be notified by ISO New England if their resource is needed for fuel security reliability reasons no later than 90 days after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. Participants that have submitted a substitution auction demand bid, and
where the demand bid has been rejected for reliability reasons, will be notified after the relevant Forward Capacity Auction has been completed.

(g) Where a Retirement De-List Bid would otherwise clear in the Forward Capacity Auction, but the ISO has determined that some or all of the capacity associated with the de-list bid is needed for fuel security reliability reasons, the provisions of III.13.2.5.2.5(b) shall apply.

(h) Existing Generating Capacity Resources that have had their Retirement De-list Bid rejected for fuel security reliability reasons and that do not elect to unconditionally or conditionally retire shall be eligible for compensation pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1, except that the difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated on a regional basis to Real Time Load Obligation, excluding Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demand Resources (DARD Pumps and other electric storage based DARDs) and Real-Time Load Obligation associated with Coordinated External Transactions, allocated and collected over a 12 month period. Resources that that are identified as needed for fuel security reliability reasons will have their capacity entered into the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to III.13.2.5.2.5(g) and III.13.2.3.2(b).

(i) Where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource elects a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 to address a fuel security reliability need, the term of such a cost-of-service agreement may not exceed two years, including renewal through evergreen provisions. A cost-of-service agreement entered into for the 2024/2025 Capacity Commitment Period shall be limited to a total duration of one year.

(j) The ISO shall perform an annual reevaluation of any Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability under this provision. If a resource associated with a Retirement De-List Bid that was rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to this section, is found to no longer be needed for fuel security, and is not needed for another reliability reason pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be retired from the system as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(1). In no case will a resource retained for fuel security be retained for fuel security beyond June 1, 2025.

(k) The ISO will review Retirement De-List Bids rejected for fuel security reliability reasons with the Reliability Committee in the same manner as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5(h).
III.13.2.5.2.5.1. Compensation for Bids Rejected for Reliability Reasons.

(a) In cases where a Static De-List Bid, Export Bid, Administrative Export De-List Bid, Dynamic De-List Bid, partial Permanent De-List Bid, or partial Retirement De-List Bid has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid by the ISO in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its de-list bid as accepted for the Forward Capacity Auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price. Under this Section, accepted Dynamic De-List Bids filed with the Commission as part of the FCA results filing are subject to review and approval by the Commission pursuant to the “just and reasonable” standard of Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. If a resource with a partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the partial Permanent De-List Bid or partial Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(a).

(b) In cases where a Permanent De-List Bid or a Retirement De-List Bid for the capacity of an entire resource has been rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, the resource will be paid either (i) in the same manner as all other capacity resources, except that payment shall be made on the basis of its Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period instead of the Forward Capacity Market Clearing Price or (ii) under the terms of a cost-of-service agreement pursuant to Section III, Appendix I. Resources must notify the ISO of their election within six months after the ISO files the results of the relevant Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission. A resource that has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability reasons and does not notify the ISO of its election as described in this paragraph will be paid on the basis of the resource’s Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid. Cost-of-service agreements must be filed with and approved by the Commission, and cost-of-service compensation may not commence until the Commission has approved the use of cost-of-service rates for the unit in question or has accepted the use of the cost-of-service rates subject to refund while the rate is reviewed. In no event will payment under the cost-of-service agreement start prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was submitted. If a resource continues to be needed for reliability in Capacity Commitment Periods following the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was rejected, payment will continue to be pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b). Resources that elect payment
based on the Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid or Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid may file with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to update its Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid if the unit is retained for reliability for a period longer than the Capacity Commitment Period for which the Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid was originally submitted.

(c) The difference between payments based on resource de-list bids or cost-of-service compensation as detailed in this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 and payments based on the market clearing price for the Forward Capacity Market under this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1 shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

(d) **Compensation for Existing Generating Capacity Resources at Stations with Common Costs that are Retained for Reliability.** If a Static De-List Bid, Permanent De-List Bid, or Retirement De-List Bid from an Existing Generating Capacity Resource that is associated with a Station having Common Costs is rejected for reliability reasons, the Existing Generating Capacity Resource will be paid as follows: (i) if one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assume a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets comprising that Existing Generating Capacity Resource; or (ii) if no Existing Generating Capacity Resources at the Station assumes a Capacity Supply Obligation through the normal clearing of the Forward Capacity Auction and one or more Existing Generating Capacity Resources are retained for reliability, then each Existing Generating Capacity Resource retained for reliability will be paid the sum of the Asset-Specific Going Forward Costs for the assets associated with that Existing Generating Capacity Resource plus a portion of the Station Going Forward Common Costs (such that the full amount of Station Going Forward Common Costs are allocated to the Existing Generating Capacity Resources retained for reliability).

(e) If ISO-NE is a party to a cost-of-service agreement filed after January 1, 2019 that changes any resource performance-related obligations contained in Section III, Appendix I (provided that those obligations are different than the obligations of an Existing Generating Capacity Resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation), no later than 30 days after such agreement is filed with the Commission, ISO-NE shall provide to stakeholders quantitative and qualitative information on the need for, and the impacts of, the proposed changes.
III.13.2.5.2.5.2.  Incremental Cost of Reliability Service From Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid Resources.

In cases where an Existing Generating Capacity Resource or Existing Demand Capacity Resource has had a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid for the entire resource rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Sections III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1 or III.13.2.5.2.5, does not elect to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1(d), and must make a capital improvement to the unit to remain in operation in order to continue to operate to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO, the resource may make application to the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act to receive just and reasonable compensation of the capital investment pursuant to the following:

(a)  Notice to State Utility Commissions, the ISO and Stakeholder Committees of Expectation that a Capital Expense will be Necessary to Meet the Reliability Need Identified by the ISO: A resource seeking to avail itself of the recovery mechanism provided in this Section must notify the state utility commissions in the states where rate payers will fund the capital improvement, the ISO, and the Participants Committee of its intent to make the capital expenditure and the need for the expenditure. This notification must be made at least 120 days prior to the resource making the capital expenditure.

(b)  Required Showing Made to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: In order to receive just and reasonable compensation for a capital expenditure under this Section, a resource must file an explanation of need with the Commission that explains why the capital expenditure is necessary in order to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. This showing must demonstrate that the expenditure is reasonably determined to be the least-cost commercially reasonable option consistent with Good Utility Practice to meet the reliability need identified by the ISO. If the resource elects cost-of-service treatment pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.1(b), the Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing described in this Section must be made separately from and may be made in advance of the resource’s cost-of-service filing.

(c)  Allocation: Costs of capital expenditures approved by the Commission under this provision shall be allocated to Regional Network Load within the affected Reliability Region.

III.13.2.5.2.5.3.  Retirement and Permanent De-Listing of Resources.

(a)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the commencement of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii), if the resource: (1)
submitted a Retirement De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) submitted a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid, elected to retire pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(a), and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (3) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Retirement De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (4) had a Commission-approved Retirement De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. In the case of a Retirement De-List Bid rejected for reliability, if the reliability need that resulted in the rejection for reliability is met, the resource, or portion thereof, will be retired coincident with the end of Capacity Supply Obligation (or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(ii)) unless the Commission directs that the obligation to retire be removed or the retirement date extended as part of an Incremental Cost of Reliability Service filing made pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.2. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(a)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be retired pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(a)(i) may retire the resource, or portion thereof, earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Retirement De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the relevant Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.1. A resource, or portion thereof, electing to retire pursuant to this provision must notify the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource, or portion thereof, will be converted to retired on the date of retirement, consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT.

(b)(i) A resource, or portion thereof, will be permanently de-listed from the Forward Capacity Market as of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, or earlier as described in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(ii), if the resource: (1) submitted an Internal Market Monitor-approved Permanent De-List Bid at or above the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; (2) elected conditional treatment pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1(b) for a Permanent De-List Bid with a submitted price at or above the Capacity Clearing Price and was not retained for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.1.5.1; or (3) had a Commission-approved Permanent De-List Bid clear in the Forward Capacity Auction. The CNR Capability interconnection rights, or relevant portion thereof, for the resource will be adjusted downward to reflect the Permanent De-List Bid,
consistent with the provisions of Schedules 22 and 23 of the OATT. A resource that permanently de-lists pursuant to this Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) is precluded from subsequent participation in the Forward Capacity Market unless it qualifies as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2.

(b)(ii) A resource, or portion thereof, that is to be permanently de-listed pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(b)(i) may be permanently de-listed earlier than the Capacity Commitment Period for which its Permanent De-List Bid was submitted if it is able to transfer the entire Capacity Supply Obligation of the resource to another resource through one or more approved Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral transactions as described in Section III.13.5.1 or reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(c) A resource that has never been counted as a capacity resource may retire the asset by notifying the ISO in writing of its election to retire and the date of retirement. The date specified for retirement is subject to the limit for resource inactivity set out in Section III.13.2.5.2.5.3(d). The interconnection rights for the resource will terminate and the status of the resource will be converted to retired on the date of retirement.

(d) A resource that does not operate commercially for a period of three calendar years will be deemed by the ISO to be retired. The interconnection rights for the unit will terminate and the status of the unit will be converted to retired on the date of retirement. Where a generator has submitted an application to repower under Schedule 22 or 23 of the OATT, the current interconnection space will be maintained beyond the three years unless the application under Schedule 22 or 23 is withdrawn voluntarily or by the operation of those provisions. Where an application is withdrawn under Schedule 22 or 23, the three year period will be calculated from the last day of commercial operation of the resource.


Except for Dynamic De-List Bids, Export Bids, and offers from New Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5.8 and Existing Import Capacity Resources that are subject to rationing pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.3.A, offers and bids in the Forward Capacity Auction must clear or not clear in whole, unless the offer or bid specifically indicates that it may be rationed. A resource may elect to be rationed to its Rationing Minimum Limit pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.3 and III.13.1.2.1.2. Offers from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources
will not be rationed where such rationing would violate any applicable physical minimum flow requirements on the associated interface. Export Bids may elect to be rationed generally, but regardless of such election will always be subject to potential rationing where the associated external interface binds. If more Dynamic De-List Bids are submitted at a price than are needed to clear the market, the bids shall be cleared pro-rata, subject to honoring the Rationing Minimum Limit of the resources. Where an offer or bid may be rationed, such rationing may not result in procuring an amount of capacity that is below the associated resource’s Rationing Minimum Limit.

III.13.2.7. Determination of Capacity Clearing Prices.
The Capacity Clearing Price in each Capacity Zone shall be the price established by the descending clock auction as described in Section III.13.2.3, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.7. The Capacity Clearing Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and the Capacity Clearing Price for each import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not exceed the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price. The Capacity Clearing Price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be less than zero.

III.13.2.7.1. Import-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Floor.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be lower than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. If after the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted, the Capacity Clearing Price in an import-constrained Capacity Zone is less than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone, all resources clearing in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be paid based on the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone during the associated Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.2.7.2. Export-Constrained Capacity Zone Capacity Clearing Price Ceiling.
The Capacity Clearing Price in an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The Capacity Clearing Price in a nested Capacity Zone shall not be higher than the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

III.13.2.7.3. [Reserved.]
At the Capacity Clearing Price, if the amount of capacity offered from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources over an interface between an external Control Area and the New England Control Area is greater than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF):

(a) the full amount of capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall clear, unless that amount of capacity is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), in which case the capacity offered at that price from Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) shall be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded; and

(b) if there is space remaining over the interface after the allocation described in subsection (a) above, then the capacity offered at that price from New Import Capacity Resources and Existing Import Capacity Resources other than Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) will be rationed such that the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) is not exceeded. If the capacity offered at that price by any single New Import Capacity Resource or Existing Import Capacity Resource that is not associated with the contracts listed in Section III.13.1.3.3.A(c) is greater than the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the capacity offered by that resource that is above the interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF) shall not be included in the rationing.

III.13.2.7.4. Effect of Capacity Rationing Rule on Capacity Clearing Price.

Where the requirement that offers and bids clear or not clear in whole (Section III.13.2.6) prohibits the descending clock auction in its normal progression from clearing one or more Capacity Zones at the precise amount of capacity determined by the Capacity Zone Demand Curves specified in Section III.13.2.2, then the auctioneer shall analyze the aggregate supply curve to determine cleared capacity offers and Capacity Clearing Prices that seek to maximize social surplus for the associated Capacity.
Commitment Period. The clearing algorithm may result in offers below the Capacity Clearing Price not clearing, and in de-list bids below the Capacity Clearing Price clearing.

III.13.2.7.5. Effect of Decremental Repowerings on the Capacity Clearing Price.
Where the effect of accounting for certain repowering offers and bids (as described in Section III.13.2.3.2(e)) results in the auction not clearing at the lowest price for the required quantity of capacity, then the auctioneer will conduct additional auction rounds of the Forward Capacity Auction as necessary to minimize capacity costs.

III.13.2.7.6. Minimum Capacity Award.
Each offer (excluding offers from Conditional Qualified New Resources that do not satisfy the conditions specified in Sections III.13.2.5.1(i)-(iii)) clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction shall be awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation at least as great as the amount of capacity offered at the End-of-Round Price in the final round of the Forward Capacity Auction. For Intermittent Power Resources, the Capacity Supply Obligation for months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) shall be adjusted based on its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.2 and Section III.13.1.1.2.6.

III.13.2.7.7. Tie-Breaking Rules.
Where the provisions in this Section III.13.2 for clearing the Forward Capacity Auction (system-wide or in a single Capacity Zone) result in a tie – that is, where two or more resources offer sufficient capacity at prices that would clear the auction at the same minimum costs – the auctioneer shall apply the following rules (in sequence, as necessary) to determine clearing:

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) If multiple projects may be rationed, they will be rationed proportionately.

(c) Where clearing either the offer associated with a resource with a higher queue priority at a Conditional Qualified New Resource’s location or the offer associated with the Conditional Qualified New Resource would result in equal costs, the offer associated with the resource with the higher queue priority shall clear.
(d) The offer associated with the Project Sponsor having the lower market share in the capacity auction (including Existing Generating Capacity Resources, Existing Import Capacity Resources, and Existing Demand Capacity Resources) shall be cleared.


III.13.2.8.1. Administration of Substitution Auctions.
Following the completion of the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction as provided for in Section III.13.2, the ISO shall conduct a substitution auction, using a static double auction to clear supply offers (offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation). Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected.

The substitution auction shall maximize total social surplus as specified by the demand bids and supply offers used in the auction. The maximization is constrained as follows:

(i) By the external interface limits modeled in the primary auction-clearing process.
(ii) Such that the net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero.
(iii) Such that, for each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is less than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.
(iv) Such that, for each export-constrained Capacity Zone, if the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction is greater than the zone threshold quantity specified below, then the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is equal to zero; otherwise, the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process is greater than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

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Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than or equal to the zone threshold quantity specified below.

In applying constraint (iii), the zone threshold quantity for an import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the sum of its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located outside the import-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to the import-constrained Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraint (iv), the zone threshold quantity for an export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to its Capacity Zone Demand Curve truncation point quantity specified in Section III.13.2.2.3 less the total quantity of any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids for which the exporting resource is located in the export-constrained Capacity Zone, including any Export Bids and any Administrative Export De-List Bids in an associated nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, that are used to export capacity across an external interface connected to another Capacity Zone, and that cleared in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction.

In applying constraints (iii) and (iv), a zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction shall include the Capacity Supply Obligations of Import Capacity Resources at each external interface connected to the Capacity Zone.

In cases in which there are multiple clearing outcomes that would each maximize the substitution auction’s objective, the following tie-breaking rules will apply in the following sequence: (i) non-rationable demand bids associated with Lead Market Participants having the largest total FCA Qualified Capacity of Existing Capacity Resources will be cleared first; and (ii) rationable supply offers will be cleared in proportion to their offer quantity.
For Intermittent Power Resources, other than those participating as the summer resource in a Composite FCM Transaction, the cleared award for supply offers and demand bids shall be adjusted for the months in the winter period (as described in Section III.13.1.5) using the ratio of the resource’s cleared offer or bid amount divided by its FCA Qualified Capacity multiplied by its winter Qualified Capacity as determined pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.6 and Section III.13.1.2.2.2 after removing any portion of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity that is participating in a Composite FCM Transaction.

The cleared offer amount awarded to a Composite FCM Transaction in the substitution auction will be assigned to the summer and winter resources for their respective obligation months during the Capacity Commitment Period as described in Section III.13.1.5.

If, after the substitution auction, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.2.8.1.2.  Substitution Auction Pricing.
The substitution auction will specify clearing prices for Capacity Zones and external interfaces as follows.

For each import-constrained Capacity Zone, if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is greater than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

For each export-constrained Capacity Zone,

(i)  if the sum of the zone’s total Capacity Supply Obligations, including Capacity Supply Obligations in a nested Capacity Zone, awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction including net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations in the nested Capacity Zone is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the export-constrained Capacity Zone (excluding supply offers and demand bids in the nested Capacity Zone that are not treated as offers and bids in the export-
constrained Capacity Zone pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.1.2(ii)) shall be treated as offers and bids in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

(ii) if the sum of a nested Capacity Zone’s Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction and the nested Capacity Zone’s net cleared Capacity Supply Obligations (total acquired less total shed) in the substitution auction is less than its zone threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1, then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction in the nested Capacity Zone shall be treated as offers and bids in the export-constrained Capacity Zone within which the nested Capacity Zone is located, for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

The substitution auction clearing prices for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone and for any constrained zones pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing prices shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Prices.

The substitution auction clearing price for a constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer associated with the separately-priced constrained Capacity Zone that is marginal. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for the constrained Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not pooled with the export-constrained Capacity Zone in which it is located for pricing purposes shall be determined by the price of the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal in the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone. If a demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal, then the substitution auction clearing price for the nested export-constrained Capacity Zone shall be equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that nested export-constrained Capacity Zone.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is less than that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then supply offers and demand bids in the substitution auction at
the interface shall be treated as offers and bids in the modeled Capacity Zone associated with that interface for purposes of determining substitution auction clearing prices.

If the net quantity of Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary Forward Capacity Auction and substitution auction over an interface between the New England Control Area and an external Control Area is equal to that interface’s approved capacity transfer limit (net of tie benefits, or net of HQICC in the case of the Phase I/II HVDC-TF), then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface will be determined by the demand bid or supply offer that is marginal at that interface. If a cleared demand bid associated with a Proxy De-List Bid is marginal at the external interface, then the substitution auction clearing price for that interface shall be set equal to the Capacity Clearing Price for that interface.

The substitution auction clearing price for an import-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary action-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are greater than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not be lower than the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for an export-constrained Capacity Zone that is not a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone, where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone.

The substitution auction clearing price for a nested export-constrained Capacity Zone where the total Capacity Supply Obligations awarded in the primary auction-clearing process of the Forward Capacity Auction are less than or equal to the zone’s threshold quantity specified in Section III.13.2.8.1.1 shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price for the Capacity Zone within which it is located.

The substitution auction clearing price at an external interface shall not exceed the substitution auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone connected to the external interface.

If, pursuant to the rules specified above, the substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface would exceed the Capacity Clearing Price for that location, the substitution auction clearing price for that location only is set equal to its Capacity Clearing Price.
The substitution auction clearing price for any Capacity Zone or external interface cannot be less than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

III.13.2.8.2. Supply Offers in the Substitution Auction.

III.13.2.8.2.1. Supply Offers.

To participate as supply in the substitution auction, a Project Sponsor for a New Capacity Resource must meet the following criteria:

(a) The Project Sponsor and the New Capacity Resource must meet all the requirements for participation in the Forward Capacity Auction specified in Section III.13.1.

(b) The Project Sponsor must elect to have the resource participate in the substitution auction during the New Capacity Show of Interest Window. Pursuant to an election, the resource’s total amount of FCA Qualified Capacity that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource will be obligated to participate in the substitution auction, including any capacity of a Renewable Technology Resource that was not qualified due to proration pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.10(a), and subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.2.

(c) The Project Sponsor must certify that the New Capacity Resource is a Sponsored Policy Resource as part of the submission of the New Capacity Qualification Package.

Substitution auction supply offers are rationable.

A resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 (resources previously counted as capacity resources) is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction. A resource is not eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction if it has submitted a demand bid for the substitution auction.

A Composite FCM Transaction comprised of a summer resource that is a Sponsored Policy Resource is eligible to participate as supply in the substitution auction.

A Conditional Qualified New Resource may participate in the substitution auction provided that the resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impacts: (i) did not receive a Capacity Supply
Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process, and: (ii) is not eligible to participate in the substitution auction. A resource having a higher priority in the queue than a Conditional Qualified New Resource with which it has overlapping interconnection impact may participate in the substitution auction provided that the Conditional Qualified New Resource did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation, fully or partially, in the primary auction-clearing process.

### III.13.2.8.2.2. Supply Offer Prices.

Project Sponsors must submit substitution auction supply offer prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.

A substitution auction supply offer must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price increases. A supply offer price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the offer quantity does not equal the resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity, the quantity for which no offer price was submitted will be assigned a price equal to the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

### III.13.2.8.2.3. Supply Offers Entered into the Substitution Auction

Supply offers for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.2.1 to participate in the substitution auction may be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) Any portion of a resource’s FCA Qualified Capacity that was cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the resource’s substitution auction supply offer beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pairs.

(b) After performing the adjustment specified in Section III.13.2.8.2.3(a), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction supply offer with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface are removed from the offer.

### III.13.2.8.3. Demand Bids in the Substitution Auction.

### III.13.2.8.3.1. Demand Bids.
Market Participants with Existing Generating Capacity Resources or Existing Import Capacity Resources associated with External Elective Transmission Upgrades may elect to submit demand bids for the substitution auction for those resources by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline. The election must specify the total amount of the resource’s Qualified Capacity that will be associated with its demand bid.

A resource, including any portion of an existing resource that qualifies as a New Capacity Resource, must have achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b) in order to participate as demand in the substitution auction.

Regardless of whether an election is made, a demand bid is required for any portion of a resource that is associated with a Retirement De-List Bid, provided that the entire resource has achieved FCM Commercial Operation no later than seven days after the issuance by the ISO of the qualification determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(b).

A resource for which a demand bid election has been made cannot participate in a Composite FCM Transaction, cannot be designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource, and will not have incremental summer or winter capacity that does not span the entire Capacity Commitment Period subjected to the treatment specified in Section III.13.1.1.3.A.

Demand bids are non-rationable.

A demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction for the portion of the resource that receives a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process, subject to the other provisions of this Section III.13.2.8.3. A resource, or portion thereof, associated with a cleared demand bid shall be retired from all New England Markets at the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction.

III.13.2.8.3.1A Substitution Auction Test Prices.

(a) Participant-Submitted Test Price. For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants that submit a substitution auction demand bid must submit a test price, calculated using the method described below, by the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline.
The test price for the capacity associated with a resource’s demand bid must be calculated using the same methodology as a Retirement De-List Bid, except that a Market Participant may not submit test prices for multiple price-quantity segments but must submit a single test price using, as necessary, aggregated cost and revenue data. The test price must be accompanied by the same documentation required for Retirement De-List Bids above the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1. A Market Participant must submit a test price regardless of whether the price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold.

A Market Participant is not required to submit a test price for any resource for which the demand bid is less than 3 MW. The applicable test price for any such resource is $0.00/kW-month.

(b) IMM-Determined Test Price. The Internal Market Monitor shall review each test price submission using the methodology specified in Section III.13.1.2.3.2.1 for evaluating Retirement De-List Bids, regardless of whether the submitted test price is below the Dynamic De-List Bid Threshold. For purposes of this review, the expected revenues for a cleared substitution auction demand bid shall not be included as a component of opportunity costs. After due consideration and consultation with the Market Participant, as appropriate, the Internal Market Monitor shall replace the submitted test price with an IMM-determined test price if the submitted test price is not consistent with the sum of the net present value of the resource’s expected cash flows plus reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments plus reasonable opportunity costs.

The Internal Market Monitor’s determination regarding a Market Participant-submitted test price shall be included in the retirement determination notification described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a) and in the filing made to the Commission as described in Section III.13.8.1(a).

The test price used for purposes of the substitution auction shall be the Market Participant-submitted test price, as adjusted by the Internal Market Monitor pursuant to this Section III.13.2.8.3.1A(b), and as further adjusted by the Commission in response to the Internal Market Monitor’s filing pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4(a).

III.13.2.8.3.2. Demand Bid Prices.
Market Participants must submit substitution auction demand bid prices no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources.
A substitution auction demand bid must be in the form of a curve (with up to five price-quantity pairs). The curve may not decrease in quantity as the price decreases. A demand bid price for the substitution auction may not be greater than the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price or lower than negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

If the bid quantity does not equal the total bid amount submitted by the Market Participant or required for a Retirement De-List Bid pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1, the quantity for which no bid price was specified will be assigned a price equal to negative one multiplied by the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

For auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, Market Participants may elect either of the demand bid adjustment methods specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b) for the resource by no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of offers composed of separate resources. If no such election is made, the adjustment applied shall be the method specified in Section III.13.2.8.3.3(b)(i).

### III.13.2.8.3.3. Demand Bids Entered into the Substitution Auction.

If a resource is determined to be needed for reliability pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, then any demand bid associated with the resource will not be further included in the substitution auction. If a resource is awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process and the Capacity Clearing Price is less than ninety percent of the resource’s test price as established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A, then the resource’s demand bid will not be included in the substitution auction.

Demand bids for resources that satisfy all of the criteria in Section III.13.2.8.3.1 to participate in the substitution auction will be adjusted prior to conducting the substitution auction-clearing process using the following adjustments:

(a) For the substitution auction associated with the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2022, any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pairs.
(b) For substitution auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2023, a resource’s demand bid will be adjusted using one of the following methods as elected pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.2:

(i) The portion of a resource’s capacity that did not receive a Capacity Supply Obligation in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the highest priced price-quantity pair.

(ii) Any portion of a resource’s demand bid that exceeds its Capacity Supply Obligation awarded in the primary auction-clearing process will be removed from the substitution auction demand bid beginning with the lowest priced price-quantity pair.

(c) After performing the modification specified in Sections III.13.2.8.3.3(a) or III.13.2.8.3.3(b), any price-quantity pairs in a resource’s substitution auction demand bid with a price greater than the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface will have its price reduced to the Capacity Clearing Price for the resource’s Capacity Zone or external interface.

Except as provided in Section III.13.2.5.2.1(c), a rationable demand bid will be entered into the substitution auction on behalf of any Proxy De-List Bid associated with a Permanent De-List Bid or Retirement De-List Bid. The demand bid quantity will equal the portion of the Proxy De-List Bid that was not cleared (received a Capacity Supply Obligation) in the first run of the primary auction-clearing process. The demand bid will have priority to clear before non-rationable demand bids.
III.13.3. Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1. Resources Subject to Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.

III.13.3.1.1. New Resources Electing Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.
A Project Sponsor that submits a critical path schedule for a New Capacity Resource in the qualification process may request that the ISO monitor that resource’s compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3. The ISO will monitor the New Capacity Resource’s compliance from the time the ISO approves the request until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.

In addition, a Lead Market Participant with a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more existing External Resources seeking to qualify for Capacity Commitment Period(s) prior to the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for which it is qualifying must request monitoring under this Section III.13.3.1.1.

A request under this Section III.13.3.1.1 must be made in writing no later than five Business Days after the deadline for submission of the FCM Deposit pursuant to Section III.13.1.9.1.

For each new resource required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process, including but not limited to a New Generating Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2), a New Import Capacity Resource backed by a new External Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.3.5), or a New Demand Capacity Resource (pursuant to Section III.13.1.4), if capacity from that resource clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall monitor that resource’s compliance with its critical path schedule in accordance with the provisions of this Section III.13.3 (regardless of whether the Project Sponsor requested monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1) from the time that the Forward Capacity Auction is conducted until the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation, loses its Capacity Supply Obligation pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A, or withdraws from critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.6.
III.13.3.1.3. New Resources Not Offering or Not Clearing in the Forward Capacity Auction.

If no capacity from a new resource that was required to submit a critical path schedule in the qualification process clears in the Forward Capacity Auction, or if such a resource does not submit an offer in the Forward Capacity Auction, then the ISO shall not monitor that resource’s compliance with its critical path schedule after the Forward Capacity Auction unless the Project Sponsor previously requested pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1 that the ISO continue to monitor that resource’s compliance with its critical path schedule. However, if a New Generating Capacity Resource participated but did not clear in the Forward Capacity Auction either as: (i) a Conditional Qualified New Resource, or (ii) a New Generating Capacity Resource with a higher priority in the queue and overlapping interconnection impacts with a Conditional Qualified New Resource, the ISO will not continue to monitor that resource’s compliance with its critical path schedule even if that resource requested critical path schedule monitoring pursuant to Section III.13.3.1.1.

III.13.3.2. Quarterly Critical Path Schedule Reports.

For each new resource that is being monitored for compliance with its critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor for that resource must provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO no later than five Business Days after the end of each calendar quarter. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO by the fifth Business Day after the end of the calendar quarter, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Each critical path schedule report shall include the following:

III.13.3.2.1. Updated Critical Path Schedule.

The critical path schedule report must include a complete updated version of the critical path schedule as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.2.2, dated contemporaneously with the submission of the critical path schedule report. The updated critical path schedule should clearly indicate if the Project Sponsor is proposing to change any of the milestones or dates from the previously submitted version of the critical path schedule, and must include an explanation of any such proposed changes. In the critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor should also explain in detail any proposed changes to the project design and the potential impact of such changes on the amount of capacity the resource will be able to provide.
III.13.3.2.2. Documentation of Milestones Achieved.

(a) For all new resources except for Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW (discussed in Section III.13.3.2.2(b)), for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Major Permits.** For each major permit described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the permit was applied for and obtained as described in the critical path schedule. For permit applications, this documentation could include a dated copy of the permit application or cover letter requesting the permit. For approved permits, this documentation could include a dated copy of the approved permit or letter granting the permit from the permitting authority.

(ii) **Project Financing Closing.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the sources of financing identified in the critical path schedule have committed to provide the amount of financing described in the critical path schedule. This documentation could include copies of commitment letters from the sources of financing.

(iii) **Major Equipment Orders.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was ordered as described in the critical path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of the order from the manufacturer or supplier. This documentation should confirm scheduled delivery dates consistent with milestone Section III.13.3.2.2(a)(vi).

(iv) **Substantial Site Construction.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the amount of money expended on construction activities occurring on the project site has exceeded 20 percent of the construction financing costs.

(v) **Major Equipment Delivery.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the equipment was delivered to the project site and received as preliminarily acceptable as described in the critical path schedule.
path schedule. This documentation should include a copy of a dated confirmation of delivery to the project site.

(vi) **Major Equipment Testing.** For each major component described in the critical path schedule, the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the component was tested, including major systems testing as appropriate for the specific technology as described in the critical path schedule, and that the test results demonstrate the equipment’s suitability to allow, in conjunction with other major components, subsequent operation of the project in accordance with the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period in accordance with Good Utility Practice. This documentation could include a dated copy of the satisfactory test results.

(vii) **Commissioning.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the resource has demonstrated a level of performance equal to or greater than the amount of capacity obligated from the resource in the Capacity Commitment Period. This documentation should include a copy of a dated letter of confirmation from the applicable manufacturer, contractor, or installer.

(viii) **Commercial Operation.** The Project Sponsor is not required to provide documentation of Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) to the ISO as part of the ISO’s critical path schedule monitoring. The ISO shall confirm that the resource has achieved Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) as described in the critical path schedule through the resource’s compliance with the other relevant requirements of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff and the ISO New England System Rules.

(ix) **Transmission Upgrades.** If during the qualification process it was determined that transmission upgrades (including any upgrades identified in a re-study pursuant to Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 22, Section 1.7.1.3 of Schedule 23, or Section 3.2.1.3 of Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff) are needed for the new resource to complete its interconnection, then the Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing that the transmission upgrades have been completed.
(b) For Demand Capacity Resources installed at multiple facilities and Demand Capacity Resources from a single facility with a demand reduction value of less than 5 MW, for each critical path schedule milestone achieved since the submission of the previous critical path schedule report, the Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report documentation demonstrating that the milestone has been achieved by the date indicated and as otherwise described in the critical path schedule, as follows:

(i) **Substantial Project Completion.** The Project Sponsor shall provide documentation showing the total offered demand reduction value achieved as of target dates which are: (a) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 1 occurring five weeks prior to the first Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier’s capacity award was made; (b) the cumulative percentage of total demand reduction value achieved on target date 2 occurring five weeks prior to the second Forward Capacity Auction after the Forward Capacity Auction in which the Demand Capacity Resource supplier’s capacity award was made; and (c) target date 3 which is the date the resource is expected to be ready to demonstrate to the ISO that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the Project Sponsor’s New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, which must be on or before the first day of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period and by which date 100 percent of the total demand reduction value must be complete.

(ii) **Additional Requirements.** For each customer and each prospective customer the Project Sponsor shall provide: name, location, MW amount, and description of stage of negotiation. If the customer’s Asset has been registered with the ISO, then the Project Sponsor shall also provide the Asset identification number.

**III.13.3.2.3. Additional Relevant Information.**

The Project Sponsor must include in the critical path schedule report any other information regarding the status or progress of the project or any of the project milestones that might be relevant to the ISO’s evaluation of the feasibility of the project being built in accordance with the critical path schedule or the feasibility that the project will achieve all its critical path schedule milestones no later than the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.3.2.4. Additional Information for Resources Previously Counted As Capacity.**
For each resource participating in the Forward Capacity Auction as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, or III.13.1.1.4 or New Demand Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.1 and clearing in that auction, the Project Sponsor must provide information in the critical path schedule report demonstrating: (a) the shedding of the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1.2.2.5(c); and (b) that the relevant cost threshold (described in Sections III.13.1.1.2, III.13.1.1.3, and III.13.1.1.4) is being met.

III.13.3.3. Failure to Meet Critical Path Schedule.
If the ISO determines that any critical path schedule milestone date has been missed, or if the Project Sponsor proposes a change to any milestone date in a quarterly critical path schedule report (as described in Section III.13.3.2.1), then the ISO shall consult with the Project Sponsor to determine the impact of the missed milestone or proposed revision, and shall determine a revised date for the milestone and for any other milestones affected by the change. If a milestone date is revised for any reason, the ISO may require the Project Sponsor to submit a written report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of each month until the revised milestone is achieved detailing the progress toward meeting the revised milestone. If the Project Sponsor does not provide a written critical path schedule report to the ISO on the fifth Business Day of a month, then the ISO shall issue a notice thereof to the Project Sponsor. If the Project Sponsor fails to provide the critical path schedule report within five Business Days of issuance of that notice, then the resource will be subject to termination pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A. Such a monthly reporting requirement, if imposed, shall be in addition to the quarterly critical path schedule reports described in Section III.13.3.2.

III.13.3.4. Covering Capacity Supply Obligations.
(a) If a capacity supplier determines that a resource may not be able to demonstrate its ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation, the capacity supplier may take actions to cover all or part of the Capacity Supply Obligation for any portion of the Capacity Commitment Period, as follows:

(i) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through reconfiguration auctions as described in Section III.13.4.

(ii) A capacity supplier may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation through one or more Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5.
(iii) A capacity supplier that has qualified a resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2 may cover its Capacity Supply Obligation by electing, no later than ten Business Days prior to the offer and bid deadline for the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period, to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource for up to two Capacity Commitment Periods. If an election is made to have the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource cover the Capacity Supply Obligation of the New Generating Capacity Resource, the capacity supplier with the resource that was previously counted as a capacity resource shall be required to comply with the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 so long as it continues to cover for the New Generating Capacity Resource.

(b) During a Capacity Commitment Period, a failure to cover charge will apply to any capacity resource that has not demonstrated the ability to deliver the full amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation by the end of an Obligation Month. The failure to cover charge is the difference between a resource’s monthly Capacity Supply Obligation and its Maximum Demonstrated Output, multiplied by the Failure to Cover Charge Rate, where:

**Maximum Demonstrated Output Period**

Maximum Demonstrated Output Period is the period beginning six years prior to the start of the applicable Capacity Commitment Period and ending with the most recently completed calendar month in the Capacity Commitment Period, including all prior months in the Capacity Commitment Period.

Provided that, for a resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource and for which an election has been made to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2, and for which a cover election has been made pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then: (1) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period will be the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the resource that has been previously counted as capacity, and; (2) the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period of the New Generating Capacity Resource will begin on the earlier of: (i) the date that the resource that has previously been counted as a capacity resource began any outage as provided in Section III.13.1.1.2, and; (ii) the date that the New
Generating Capacity Resource commenced Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

**Failure to Cover Charge Rate**

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the higher of the Capacity Clearing Price and the clearing price in any annual reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the Failure to Cover Charge Rate for a Capacity Zone is the price determined by a second clearing of the third annual reconfiguration auction prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the aggregated zonal quantities of undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation, as of the completion of the third annual reconfiguration auction, and as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4 (b), are included as demand bids at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for each applicable Capacity Zone.

Provided that, if an existing resource is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the undemonstrated Capacity Supply Obligation for the New Generating Capacity Resource is the difference between the existing resource’s Maximum Demonstrated Output and the new resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation.

**Maximum Demonstrated Output**

The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest output levels achieved by each Generator Asset associated with a Generating Capacity Resource, each Demand Response Asset associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resources, and assets associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or On-Peak Demand Resource, during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period as specified below. The minimum Maximum Demonstrated Output for all assets is zero.

Provided that, if a resource that was previously counted as capacity is covering for a New Generating Capacity Resource pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(iii), then the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the sum of the highest aggregate output level achieved by each asset associated with the resource that has previously been counted as capacity during the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period.
At the asset level, Maximum Demonstrated Output is calculated as follows:

**Demand Response Assets associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource**: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to June 1, 2018 is the highest audit value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses. The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after June 1, 2018 will be equal to the highest demand reduction calculated, pursuant to Section III.8.4, in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Distributed Generation associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource**: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly metered output in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation, increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Load Management associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource**: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest hourly demand reduction value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses for non-Net Supply.

**Energy Efficiency associated with a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource or an On-Peak Demand Resource**: The Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest reported monthly performance value in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

**Generator Assets**: The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring prior to March 1, 2017 is the highest hourly Revenue Quality Metering in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff). The Maximum Demonstrated Output for dates occurring on or after March 1, 2017 is the highest Metered Quantity for Settlement in the Maximum Demonstrated Output Period beginning on or after Commercial Operation.
Operation (as defined in Schedule 22, 23, or 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff).

If a single Generator Asset is split into two or more new Generator Assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output associated with the single Generation Asset will be prorated among the new assets based on their summer maximum net output. If multiple Generator Assets are consolidated to fewer assets, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of the Generator Assets that are being consolidated will be allocated to the consolidated assets based on the summer maximum net output.

**Import Capacity Resources:** For an Import Capacity Resource that is backed by external generation that has not achieved commercial operation at the time of qualification, in part or entirely, the Maximum Demonstrated Output is the highest revenue quality metered output for a five-minute or greater interval after the resource has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation. Provided that, the Maximum Demonstrated Output of an Import Capacity Resource associated with an Elective Transmission Upgrade may be limited by the highest demonstrated capability of the Elective Transmission Upgrade after the Elective Transmission Upgrade has completed testing and has achieved commercial operation.

**III.13.3.4A  Termination of Capacity Supply Obligations.**
If a Project Sponsor fails to comply with the requirements of Sections III.13.3.2 or III.13.3.3, or if a Project Sponsor covers a Capacity Supply Obligation for two Capacity Commitment Periods, or if, as a result of milestone date revisions, the date by which a resource will have achieved all its critical path schedule milestones is more than two years after the beginning of the Capacity Commitment Period for which the resource first received a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, shall have the right, through a filing with the Commission, to terminate the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for any future Capacity Commitment Periods and the resource’s right to any payments associated with that Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period, and to adjust the resource’s qualified capacity for participation in the Forward Capacity Market; provided that, where a Project Sponsor voluntarily withdraws its resource from critical path schedule monitoring in accordance with Section III.13.3.6, no filing with the Commission shall be necessary to terminate the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation. Upon Commission ruling, the Project Sponsor shall forfeit any financial assurance provided with respect to that Capacity Supply Obligation. If in these circumstances, however, the ISO does not take steps to terminate the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation and instead
permits the Project Sponsor to continue to cover its Capacity Supply Obligation, such continuation shall be subject to the ISO’s right to revoke that permission and to file with the Commission to terminate the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation, and subject to continued reporting by the Project Sponsor as described in this Section III.13.3.

If a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation that was acquired in a substitution auction at a negative price is withdrawn or terminated, the Project Sponsor shall remain obligated for any settlement charges associated with the terminated Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period.

**III.13.3.5. Termination of Interconnection Agreement.**

If the ISO terminates, or files with the Commission to terminate, a resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation as described in Section III.13.3.4A, the ISO shall have the right to terminate the Interconnection Agreement with that resource through a filing with the Commission and upon Commission ruling. If the Project Sponsor continues to cover all of its Capacity Supply Obligations while challenging such termination before the Commission, it shall retain its Queue Position.

**III.13.3.6. Withdrawal from Critical Path Schedule Monitoring.**

A Project Sponsor may withdraw its resource from critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO at any time by submitting a written request to the ISO. The ISO also may deem a resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring if the Project Sponsor does not adhere to the requirements of this Section III.13.3. Any resource withdrawn from critical path schedule monitoring shall be subject to the provisions of Section III.13.3.4A.

**III.13.3.7 Request to Defer Capacity Supply Obligation**

A resource that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation and that is subject to critical path schedule monitoring by the ISO pursuant to this Section III.13.3 may seek to defer the applicability of its entire Capacity Supply Obligation by one year pursuant to the provisions of this Section III.13.3.7.

A Project Sponsor seeking such a deferral must notify the ISO in writing no later than the first Business Day in September of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If, after consultation with the Project Sponsor, the ISO determines that the absence of the capacity in the first Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, as well as in the subsequent Capacity Commitment Period, would result in the violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria or
of the ISO New England System Rules, not solely that it may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) or the Local Sourcing Requirement for the Capacity Zone, then the ISO will review the specific reliability need with and seek feedback from the Reliability Committee and provide the Project Sponsor with a written determination to that effect within 30 days of the Project Sponsor’s notification to the ISO.

If the ISO provides such a written determination, then the Project Sponsor may file with the Commission, no later than the first Business Day in November of the year prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, a request to defer the applicability of its Capacity Supply Obligation by one year. Any such filing must include the ISO’s written determination, and must also demonstrate that the deferral is critical to the resource’s ability to achieve FCM Commercial Operation and that the reasons for the deferral are beyond the control of the Project Sponsor.

If the Commission approves the request, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation described in Sections III.13.3.4(b), III.13.6 and III.13.7 shall only apply beginning one year after the start of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if the resource achieves FCM Commercial Operation prior to the deferred date, it will not be eligible to receive revenue in the Forward Capacity Market until the deferred date. Beginning on the deferred date, all of the rights, obligations, payments, and charges associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation shall apply, and the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) associated with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource cleared as a new resource shall apply for the full duration of the Capacity Supply Obligation (including multi-year elections made pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7). A Project Sponsor will not take actions to cover the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the deferral period as described in Section III.13.3.4(a), but the other requirements of III.13.3, including all reporting requirements and the ISO’s right to seek termination, shall continue to apply during the deferral period. Upon Commission approval of the deferral, the resource may not participate in any reconfiguration auctions or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for any portion of the deferral period. Beginning at 8:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) 30 days after Commission approval of the request, the Project Sponsor shall be required to provide an additional amount of financial assurance as described in Section VII.B.2.c of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

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Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13, if any of the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation in the deferral period was shed in a reconfiguration auction or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral prior to Commission approval of the deferral request, then the resource’s settlements shall be adjusted by the ISO to ensure that the resource does not receive any payments associated with that transaction in excess of the charges associated with that transaction; the resource will be responsible for any charges in excess of payments.

### III.13.3.8 FCM Commercial Operation.

A resource (or portion thereof) achieves FCM Commercial Operation when (1) the ISO has determined that the resource (or portion thereof) has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, including completion of any transmission upgrades necessary for the resource to obtain the requisite interconnection service; and (2) the ISO verifies the resource’s (or a portion of the resource’s) summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating).

(a) For a Generating Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation as soon as practicable following the ISO’s verification of the resource’s summer capacity rating (or, for a resource with winter capacity only, its winter capacity rating), which may take place in any month of the year. The ISO shall verify the summer capacity rating of a Generating Capacity Resource that is an Intermittent Power Resource following no fewer than 30 consecutive calendar days of operation (for periods from October 1 through May 31, a Market Participant must request such verification).

(b) For a Demand Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon verifying that the Demand Capacity Resource described in the New Demand Capacity Resource Qualification Package has achieved its full demand reduction value, subject to the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.5.3(b).

(c) For an Import Capacity Resource (or portion thereof) that has achieved all its critical path schedule milestones, the ISO shall confirm FCM Commercial Operation upon demonstration that the Import Capacity Resource described in the New Capacity Qualification Package has achieved its full Qualified Capacity.
III.13.4. **Reconfiguration Auctions.**

For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct annual and monthly reconfiguration auctions as described in this Section III.13.4. Reconfiguration auctions only permit the trading of Capacity Supply Obligations; load obligations are not traded in reconfiguration auctions. Each reconfiguration auction shall use a static double auction (respecting the interface limits and capacity requirements modeled as specified in Sections III.13.4.5 and III.13.4.7) to clear supply offers (i.e., offers to assume a Capacity Supply Obligation) and demand bids (i.e., bids to shed a Capacity Supply Obligation) for each Capacity Zone included in the reconfiguration auction. Supply offers and demand bids will be modeled in the Capacity Zone where the associated resources are electrically interconnected. Resources that are able to meet the requirements in other Capacity Zones shall be allowed to clear to meet such requirements, subject to the constraints modeled in the auction.

III.13.4.1. **Capacity Zones Included in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period shall include each of, and only, the final Capacity Zones and external interfaces as determined through the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, as described in Section III.13.2.3.4.

III.13.4.2. **Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Each supply offer and demand bid in a reconfiguration auction must be associated with a specific resource, and must satisfy the requirements of this Section III.13.4.2. All resource types may submit supply offers and demand bids in reconfiguration auctions. In accordance with Section III.A.9.2 of Appendix A of this Market Rule 1, supply offers and demand bids submitted for reconfiguration auctions shall not be subject to mitigation by the Internal Market Monitor. A supply offer or demand bid submitted for a reconfiguration auction shall not be limited by the associated resource’s Economic Minimum Limit. Offers composed of separate resources may not participate in reconfiguration auctions. Participation in any reconfiguration auction is conditioned on full compliance with the applicable financial assurance requirements as provided in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy at the time of the offer and bid deadline. For annual reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than 30 days prior to that deadline. No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the offer and bid deadline will be announced by the ISO no later than
10 Business Days prior to that deadline. Upon issuance of the monthly bilateral results for the associated obligation month, the ISO shall notify each resource of the amount of capacity that it may offer or bid in that monthly auction, as calculated pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2. For monthly reconfiguration auctions in which the most recently approved Winter Seasonal Claimed Capability established as of the fifth Business Day in June of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period is greater than the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall apply the greater of these two values to offer limits starting with the first monthly reconfiguration auction in the winter delivery period for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability.

III.13.4.2.1. Supply Offers.
Submission of supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.1. All supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the resource, the amount of capacity offered in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month. In no case may capacity associated with a Retirement De-List Bid or a Permanent De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction, or a demand bid that cleared in a substitution auction, for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that, or any subsequent, Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof. In no case may capacity associated with an Export Bid or an Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period be offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof.

III.13.4.2.1.1. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in an Annual Reconfiguration Auction.
For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall calculate the difference between the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, and the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. The minimum of these 12 values shall be the amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in the annual reconfiguration auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2. Calculation of Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
III.13.4.2.1.2.1. First Annual Reconfiguration Auction and Second Annual Reconfiguration Auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1. Generating Capacity Resources Other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s summer Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any summer Seasonal Claimed Capability values for summer periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):
(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the higher of the resource’s winter Qualified Capacity as calculated for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and any winter Seasonal Claimed Capability values for winter periods completed after the Existing Capacity Retirement Deadline for the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period and before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and where the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii)
for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.1.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3. Import Capacity Resources Backed By an External Control Area.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to its summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.3.1. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.

For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the greater of:
(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined for the
Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and
approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity
Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements
in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance
requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4. Demand Capacity Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period,
the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be the sum of the values
determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-
determined summer Qualified Capacity.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being
monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its
critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii)
for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance
requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.1.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the first and second annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period,
the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be the sum of the values
determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s most recently-
determined winter Qualified Capacity.
(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2. Third Annual Reconfiguration Auction.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources other than Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Generating Capacity Resource that is not an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as
applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the resource’s winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2. Intermittent Power Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and its summer Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently competed summer period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.1(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii)
for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Intermittent Power Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below, limited, as applicable, by the resource’s CNR Capability and any relevant overlapping interconnection impacts as described in Section III.13.1.1.2.3(f):

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and its winter Seasonal Claimed Capability value in effect after the most recently completed winter period. The amount of capacity described in this Section III.13.4.2.1.2.2.2.2(a) shall be zero, however, where the resource cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period as a new resource pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.1.2 and the project has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3. Import Capacity Resources.

III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.1 Import Capacity Resources Backed by an External Control Area.

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its summer Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October. For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource shall be equal to the lesser of its winter Qualified Capacity as determined for the Forward Capacity Auction for that Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of
capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.3.2. Import Capacity Resources Backed by One or More External Resources.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of an Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources shall be the lesser of:

(a) the summer Qualified Capacity and winter Qualified Capacity, respectively, as determined by the most recent Forward Capacity Auction that does not reflect a change to the Import Capacity Resource applicable to that Capacity Commitment Period; and

(b) the amount of capacity available to back the import, if submitted by the Lead Market Participant and approved by the ISO by the fifth Business Day in October and, if submitted for a New Import Capacity Resource backed by one or more External Resources, also subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Sections III.13.1.3.5.1(b), III.13.1.3.5.2, and III.13.3.1.1 and the relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4. Demand Capacity Resources.**

**III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.1. Summer ARA Qualified Capacity.**

For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Summer ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (i) its most recently-determined summer Qualified Capacity and (ii) its summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii)
III.13.4.2.1.2.2.4.2. Winter ARA Qualified Capacity.
For the third annual reconfiguration auction associated with a Capacity Commitment Period, the Winter ARA Qualified Capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource shall be the sum of the values determined pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) below:

(a) For capacity that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the lesser of: (i) its most recently-determined winter Qualified Capacity and (ii) its winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value in effect at the time of qualification for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) Any amount of capacity that has not yet achieved FCM Commercial Operation but: (i) is being monitored by the ISO pursuant to the provisions of Section III.13.3; (ii) is expected to achieve all its critical path schedule milestones prior to the start of the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (iii) for which the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor has met all relevant financial assurance requirements as described in Section III.13.1.9 and in the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy.

III.13.4.2.1.3. Adjustment for Significant Decreases in Capacity.
For each month of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the third annual reconfiguration auction, for each resource that has achieved FCM Commercial Operation, the ISO shall subtract the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity, as applicable, from the amount of capacity from the resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the month. For the month associated with the greatest of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019) or the least of these 12 values (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020), if the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity (as applicable) is below the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month by:

(1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or before June 1, 2019, more than the lesser of:
   (i) 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or;
   (ii) 40 MW;

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(2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 20 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
   (ii) 40 MW;

(3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, more than the lesser of:
   (i) the greater of 10 percent of the amount of capacity from that resource that is subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month or two MW, or;
   (ii) 10 MW;
then the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Lead Market Participant may submit a written plan to the ISO with any necessary supporting documentation describing the measures that will be taken and demonstrating that the resource will be able to provide an amount of capacity consistent with its total Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period by the start of all months in that Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation. If submitted, such a plan must be received by the ISO no later than 10 Business Days after the ISO has notified the Lead Market Participant of its Summer ARA Qualified Capacity and Winter ARA Qualified Capacity for the third annual reconfiguration auction.

(b) If no such plan as described in Section III.13.4.2.1.3(a) is timely submitted to the ISO, or if such a plan is timely submitted but the ISO determines that the plan does not demonstrate that the resource will be able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, then the ISO shall enter a demand bid at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price on behalf of the resource (with all payments, charges, rights, obligations, and other results associated with such bid applying to the resource as if the resource itself had submitted the bid) in the third annual reconfiguration auction in an amount equal to:
   (1) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2020, the greatest of the 12 monthly values determined pursuant to this Section III.13.4.2.1.3;
   (2) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on June 1, 2020, June 1, 2021 and June 1, 2022, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:
      (i) the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.8), and;
(ii) the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 40 MW;

(3) for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2023, where the Capacity Supply Obligation and Qualified Capacity values are those for the month in which the values as determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3 vary the least, the greater of:

(i) the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation minus (Qualified Capacity divided by 0.9),

and;

(ii) the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation minus Qualified Capacity minus 10 MW.

(c) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020, if the ISO determines that the resource is not able to provide the necessary amount of capacity by the start of all months in the Capacity Commitment Period in which the resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation, and if the resource was part of an offer composed of separate resources when it qualified to participate in the relevant Forward Capacity Auction, then before a demand bid is entered for the resource pursuant to subsection (b) above, the resource may submit monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, subject to the satisfaction of the requirements in Section III.13.5, to cover the deficiency for the months of the Capacity Commitment Period in which the Capacity Supply Obligation is associated with participation in an offer composed of separate resource prior to the third annual reconfiguration auction, but in no case may such a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral for a month be for an amount of capacity greater than the difference between the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the month and the resource’s lowest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation during the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.4.2.1.4. Amount of Capacity That May Be Submitted in a Supply Offer in a Monthly Reconfiguration Auction.

A resource that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation may not submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a supply offer for that reconfiguration auction in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation. The amount of capacity up to which a resource may submit a supply offer in a monthly reconfiguration auction shall be the difference (but in no case less than zero) between (i) the resource’s Summer ARA Qualified Capacity or Winter ARA Qualified Capacity as adjusted pursuant to Section III.13.4.2, as applicable, for the auction month for the third annual reconfiguration auction for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period; and (ii) the amount of capacity from that resource that is already subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for that month. However, a resource may not submit a supply offer for a monthly reconfiguration auction if it is on an approved outage during that month.
III.13.4.2.1.5. **ISO Review of Supply Offers.**

Supply offers in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with cleared supply offers to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the offer is accepted. The ISO shall reject supply offers that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria, or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such offers, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Supply offers that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

III.13.4.2.2. **Demand Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.**

Submission of demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be governed by this Section III.13.4.2.2. All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be submitted by the Project Sponsor or Lead Market Participant, and shall specify the amount of capacity bid in MW, and the price, in dollars per kW/month.

(a) To submit a demand bid in a reconfiguration auction, a resource must have a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) associated with that reconfiguration auction. Where capacity associated with a Self-Supplied FCA Resource that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period is offered in a reconfiguration auction for that Capacity Commitment Period, or any portion thereof, a resource acquiring a Capacity Supply Obligation shall not as a result become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource.

(b) Each demand bid submitted to the ISO for reconfiguration auction shall be no greater than the amount of the resource’s capacity that is already obligated for the Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) as of the offer and bid deadline for the reconfiguration auction.
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(c) All demand bids in reconfiguration auctions shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s reviews will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the committed capacity is withdrawn. The ISO shall reject demand bids that would otherwise clear in a reconfiguration auction that will result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC criteria or ISO New England System Rules during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the reconfiguration auction, provided that for annual reconfiguration auctions associated with a Capacity Commitment Period that begins on or after June 1, 2018, the ISO shall not reject a demand bid solely on the basis that acceptance of the demand bid may result in the procurement of less capacity than the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs). For monthly reconfiguration auctions, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the capacity associated with demand bids that would otherwise clear from resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation is needed for local system conditions. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess such bids, beginning with the marginal resource, based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. Where the applicable reliability needs cannot be met if a Demand Bid is cleared, such Demand Bids will be rejected in their entirety and the resource will not be rejected in part. Demand Bids from rejected resources will not be further included in clearing the reconfiguration auction, and the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reconfiguration auction of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

III.13.4.3. ISO Participation in Reconfiguration Auctions.

Section III.13.4.3 is applicable for reconfiguration auctions associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020.

The ISO shall not submit supply offers or demand bids in monthly reconfiguration auctions. The ISO shall submit supply offers and demand bids in annual reconfiguration auctions as appropriate to address year-to-year changes in the Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs), Local Sourcing Requirements and Maximum Capacity Limits for the associated Capacity Commitment Period, to procure capacity not purchased in the Forward Capacity Auction as a result of the “Inadequate Supply” rule for
Forward Capacity Auctions conducted prior to June 2015, to procure any shortfall in capacity resulting from a resource’s achieving FCM Commercial Operation at a level less than that resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation or other significant decreases in capacity, and to address any changes in external interface limits, as follows:

(a) For each Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall submit demand bids for the amount of additional capacity needed to meet the Local Sourcing Requirements and shall submit supply offers in the third annual reconfiguration auction for a Capacity Commitment Period to release capacity exceeding the Maximum Capacity Limits or external interface limits.

(b) No later than 15 days before the offer and bid deadline for an annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall provide notice regarding whether the ISO will be submitting supply offers or demand bids in that auction.

(c) Any demand bid submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be at the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price.

(d) Any supply offer submitted by the ISO in an annual reconfiguration auction shall be in the form of a supply curve having the following characteristics:

(i) at prices equal to or greater than 0.75 times the Capacity Clearing Price, from the Forward Capacity Auction for the Capacity Commitment Period covered by the annual reconfiguration auction, the ISO shall offer the full amount of the surplus;

(ii) at prices between 0.75 times such Capacity Clearing Price and 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the amount of the surplus offered by the ISO shall decrease linearly (for example, at 0.5 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer half of the amount of the surplus); and

(iii) At prices equal to or below 0.25 times such Capacity Clearing Price, the ISO shall offer no capacity.
(e) For purposes of this Section III.13.4.3, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.4.

(f) Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not subject to the requirements and limitations described in Section III.13.4.2.

(g) Supply offers and demand bids submitted by the ISO in annual reconfiguration auctions are not associated with a resource.

III.13.4.4. Clearing Offers and Bids in Reconfiguration Auctions.
All supply offers and demand bids may be cleared in whole or in part in all reconfiguration auctions. If after clearing, a resource has a Capacity Supply Obligation below its Economic Minimum Limit, it must meet the requirements of Section III.13.6.1.1.1.

III.13.4.5. Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.
Except as provided below, after the Forward Capacity Auction for a Capacity Commitment Period, and before the start of that Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct three annual reconfiguration auctions for capacity commitments covering the whole of that Capacity Commitment Period. For each annual reconfiguration auction, the capacity demand curves, New England Control Area and Capacity Zone capacity requirements and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled in the auction consistent with the Forward Capacity Auction for the associated Capacity Commitment Period. For purposes of the annual reconfiguration auctions, the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price used to define the System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve shall be the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price associated with the Forward Capacity Auction for the same Capacity Commitment Period addressed by the reconfiguration auction.

III.13.4.5.1. Timing of Annual Reconfiguration Auctions.
The first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of June that is approximately 24 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The second annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of August that is approximately 10 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period. The third annual
reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period shall be held in the month of March that is approximately 3 months before the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.4.5.2. Acceleration of Annual Reconfiguration Auction.
If the difference between the forecasted Installed Capacity Requirement (net of HQICCs) for a Capacity Commitment Period and the amount of capacity obligated for that Capacity Commitment Period is sufficiently large, then the ISO may, upon reasonable notice to Market Participants, conduct an annual reconfiguration auction as much as six months earlier than its normally-scheduled time.

III.13.4.6. [Reserved.]

Prior to each month in the Capacity Commitment Period, the ISO shall conduct a monthly reconfiguration auction for whole-month capacity commitments during that month. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning before June 1, 2020, the Local Sourcing Requirement and Maximum Capacity Limit applicable for each Capacity Zone and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. For each monthly reconfiguration auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning or after June 1, 2020, the truncation points for import-constrained Capacity Zones and export-constrained Capacity Zones specified in Section III.13.2.2.2 and Section III.13.2.2.3, and external interface limits, as updated pursuant to Section III.12, shall be modeled as constraints in the auction. The System-Wide Capacity Demand Curve is not modeled in monthly reconfiguration auctions.

III.13.4.8. Adjustment to Capacity Supply Obligations.
For each supply offer that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be increased by the amount of capacity that clears. For each demand bid that clears in a reconfiguration auction, the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period (or portion thereof, as applicable) shall be decreased by the amount of capacity that clears.
III.13.5. **Bilateral Contracts in the Forward Capacity Market.**

Market Participants shall be permitted to enter into Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals and Capacity Performance Bilaterals in accordance with this Section III.13.5, with the ISO serving as Counterparty in each such transaction. Market Participants may not offset a Capacity Load Obligation with a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.5.1. **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.**

Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are available for monthly, seasonal and annual periods. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for seasonal and annual periods are only available for periods prior to June 1, 2020. The qualification of resources subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral is determined in the same manner as the qualification of resources is determined for reconfiguration auctions as specified in Section III.13.4.2.

A resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (Capacity Transferring Resource) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer its Capacity Supply Obligation, in whole or in part (Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral), to a resource, or portion thereof, having Qualified Capacity for that Capacity Commitment Period that is not already obligated (Capacity Acquiring Resource), subject to the following limitations.

(a) A monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a calendar month, and an annual Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be coterminous with a Capacity Commitment Period. A seasonal Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral can be entered into only during the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral window associated with the third Annual Reconfiguration Auction, must be contained within a single Capacity Commitment Period, and must contain all the months in the summer or winter season identified by the Capacity Transferring Resource and only those months. For the purposes of this Section III.13.5, the summer season of a Demand Capacity Resource is all of the months from June through November and April through May of the same Capacity Commitment Period and the winter season of a Demand Capacity Resource is all of the months from December through March; for all other resource types, the summer season is all of the months from June through September and the winter season is all of the months October through May.

(b) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the lowest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource.
during the month, season or Capacity Commitment Period covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation amount that is greater than the lowest monthly amount of unobligated Qualified Capacity (that is, Qualified Capacity as determined in the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or reconfiguration auction qualification process that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation for the relevant time period) of the Capacity Acquiring Resource during the month, season or Capacity Commitment Period covered by the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, as determined in the qualification process for the most recent Forward Capacity Auction or annual reconfiguration auction prior to the submission of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. If the season of the Capacity Transferring Resource is not aligned with the season of the Capacity Acquiring Resource and the seasonal Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral spans more than one season of the Capacity Acquiring Resource, the lowest monthly amount of unobligated Qualified Capacity of the Capacity Acquiring Resource will be used.

(c) A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral may not transfer a Capacity Supply Obligation to a Capacity Acquiring Resource where that Capacity Acquiring Resource’s unobligated Qualified Capacity is unobligated as a result of an Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid that cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction.

(d) [Reserved.]

(e) [Reserved.]

(f) [Reserved.]

(g) [Reserved.]

(h) A resource, or a portion thereof, that has been designated as a Self-Supplied FCA Resource may transfer the self-supplied portion of its Capacity Supply Obligation by means of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. In such a case, however, the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall not become a Self-Supplied FCA Resource as a result of the transaction.

(i) A monthly Capacity Supply Obligation may not be acquired by any resource on an approved outage for the relevant Capacity Commitment Period month.
A resource that has not achieved FCM Commercial Operation may not submit a transaction as a Capacity Acquiring Resource for that Capacity Commitment Period month, unless the resource has a negative Capacity Supply Obligation, in which case it may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral in an amount up to the absolute value of its Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.5.1.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.

III.13.5.1.1.1. Timing of Submission and Prior Notification to the ISO.
The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either the Capacity Transferring Resource or the Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. A Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

A Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor seeking to submit a monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(a)(ii) or a monthly Capacity Supply Obligation bilateral pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.3(c) (significant decrease of offers composed of separate resources) must notify the ISO in writing of its intention to do so no later than four Business Days prior to the start of the relevant annual Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submittal window.

III.13.5.1.1.2. Application.
The submission of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource; (ii) the amount of the Capacity Supply Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (iii) the term of the transaction; and (iv) the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the parties to a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral so choose, they may also submit a price, in $/kW-month, to be used by the ISO in settling the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral. If no price is submitted, the ISO shall use a default price of $0.00/kW-month.

III.13.5.1.1.3. ISO Review.
(a) The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.1 are not met. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted before the relevant submittal window opens, this review shall occur once the submittal window opens. For a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral submitted after the submittal window opens, this review shall occur upon submission.

(b) After the close of the relevant submittal window, each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a reliability review by the ISO to determine whether the transaction would result in a violation of any NERC or NPCC (or their successors) criteria, or ISO New England System Rules, during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the transaction. Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals shall be reviewed by the ISO to ensure the regional and local adequacy achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction and other reliability needs are maintained. The ISO’s review will consider the location and operating and rating limitations of resources associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral to ensure reliability standards will remain satisfied if the capacity associated with the Capacity Transferring Resource is withdrawn and the capacity associated with the Capacity Acquiring Resource is accepted. The ISO’s reliability reviews will assess transactions based on operable capacity needs while considering any approved or interim approved transmission outage information and any approved Generator Asset or Demand Response Resource outage information, and will include transmission security studies. The ISO will review all confirmed monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for each upcoming Obligation Month for reliability needs immediately preceding the monthly reconfiguration auction. For a monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the ISO shall obtain and consider information from the Local Control Center regarding whether the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource is needed for local system conditions and whether it is adequately replaced by the Acquiring Resource.

The ISO will review the net impact of all annual and seasonal Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals to ensure that the regional and local adequacy and other reliability needs achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction are maintained in the Capacity Transferring Resource’s Capacity Zone and the Capacity Acquiring Resource’s Capacity Zone or across the external interface.

If after its review of the net impact of all annual and seasonal Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals the ISO determines that the regional and local adequacy and other reliability needs achieved through the Forward Capacity Auction are not maintained, and for all monthly Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals,
the ISO will approve or reject Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals based on the order in which they are confirmed. If multiple Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals are submitted between the same resources, they may be reviewed together as one transaction and the most recent confirmation time among the related transactions will be used to determine the review order of the grouped transaction. Transactions that cannot meet the applicable reliability needs will only be accepted or rejected in their entirety and the resources will not be accepted or rejected in part for purposes of that transaction. Where the ISO has determined that a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral must be rejected for reliability reasons the Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor, as appropriate, for the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be notified as soon as practicable of the rejection and of the reliability need prompting such rejection.

(c) Each Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be subject to a financial assurance review by the ISO. If the Capacity Transferring Resource and the Capacity Acquiring Resource are not both in compliance with all applicable provisions of the ISO New England Financial Assurance Policy, including those regarding Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals, the ISO shall reject the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

**III.13.5.1.1.4. Approval.**
Upon approval of a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Transferring Resource shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, and the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Capacity Acquiring Resource shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

**III.13.5.2. Capacity Load Obligations Bilaterals.**
A Market Participant having a Capacity Load Obligation seeking to shed that obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant”) may enter into a bilateral transaction to transfer all or a portion of its Capacity Load Obligation in a Capacity Zone (“Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral”) to any Market Participant seeking to acquire a Capacity Load Obligation (“Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant”). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be in whole calendar month increments, may not exceed one year in duration, and must begin and end within the same Capacity Commitment Period. A Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant will be permitted to transfer, and a Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant will be permitted to acquire, a Capacity Load Obligation if after entering
into a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and submitting related information to the ISO within the specified submittal time period, the ISO approves such Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.13.5.2.1. Process for Approval of Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals.

III.13.5.2.1.1. Timing.
Either the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant or the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant may submit a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO. All Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals must be submitted to the ISO in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the first month of the term of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month (though a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral submitted at that time may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process). A Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO no later than the same deadline that applies to submission of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.13.5.2.1.2. Application.
The submission of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the amount of the Capacity Load Obligation being transferred in MW amounts up to three decimal places; (ii) the term of the transaction; (iii) identification of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant and the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant; and (iv) the Capacity Zone in which the Capacity Load Obligation is being transferred is located.

III.13.5.2.1.3. ISO Review.
The ISO shall review the information provided in support of the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and shall reject the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section II.13.5.2 are not met.

III.13.5.2.1.4. Approval.
Upon approval of a Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral, the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Transferring Participant in the Capacity Zone specified in the submission to the ISO
shall be reduced by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral and the Capacity Load Obligation of the Capacity Load Obligation Acquiring Participant in the specified Capacity Zone shall be increased by the amount set forth in the Capacity Load Obligation Bilateral.

III.13.5.3.  Capacity Performance Bilaterals.
A resource’s Capacity Performance Score during a Capacity Scarcity Condition may be adjusted by entering into a Capacity Performance Bilateral as described in this Section III.13.5.3.

III.13.5.3.1.  Eligibility.
If a resource has a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition, that resource may transfer all or some of that Capacity Performance Score to another resource for that same five-minute interval so long as both resources were subject to the same Capacity Scarcity Condition.

III.13.5.3.2.  Submission of Capacity Performance Bilaterals.
The Lead Market Participant for a resource having a Capacity Performance Score that is greater than zero in a five-minute interval that is subject to a Capacity Scarcity Condition may submit a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO assigning all or a portion of its Capacity Performance Score for that interval to another resource, subject to the eligibility requirements specified in Section III.13.5.3.1. The Capacity Performance Bilateral must be confirmed by the Lead Market Participant for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score.

III.13.5.3.2.1.  Timing.
A Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted in accordance with resettlement provisions as described in ISO New England Manuals. However, to be included in the initial settlement of payments and charges associated with the Forward Capacity Market for the month associated with the Capacity Performance Bilateral, a Capacity Performance Bilateral must be submitted to the ISO no later than 12:00 pm on the second Business Day after the end of that month, or at such later deadline as specified by the ISO upon notice to Market Participants (though a Capacity Performance Bilateral may be revised by the parties to the transaction throughout the resettlement process).

III.13.5.3.2.2.  Application.
The submission of a Capacity Performance Bilateral to the ISO shall include the following: (i) the resource identification number for the resource transferring its Capacity Performance Score; (ii) the resource identification number for the resource receiving the Capacity Performance Score; (iii) the MW amount of Capacity Performance Score being transferred; (iv) the specific five-minute interval or intervals for which the Capacity Performance Bilateral applies.

III.13.5.3.2.3. ISO Review.
The ISO shall review the information provided in submission of the Capacity Performance Bilateral, and shall reject the Capacity Performance Bilateral if any of the provisions of this Section III.13.5.3 are not met.

III.13.5.3.3. Effect of Capacity Performance Bilateral.
A Capacity Performance Bilateral does not affect in any way either party’s Capacity Supply Obligation or the rights and obligations associated therewith. The sole effect of a Capacity Performance Bilateral is to modify the Capacity Performance Scores of the transferring and receiving resources for the Capacity Scarcity Conditions subject to the Capacity Performance Bilateral for purposes of calculating Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2.

III.13.5.4 Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.
Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are available for annual reconfiguration auctions for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2020, except that Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are not available for the first annual reconfiguration auction for the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2020.

III.13.5.4.1 Timing of Submission.
The Lead Market Participant or Project Sponsor for either a Capacity Transferring Resource or a Capacity Acquiring Resource may submit an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO in accordance with posted schedules. The ISO will issue a schedule of the submittal windows for Annual Reconfiguration Transactions as soon as practicable after the issuance of Forward Capacity Auction results. An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must be confirmed by the party other than the party submitting the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction to the ISO no later than the end of the relevant submittal window.

III.13.5.4.2 Components of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.
The submission of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction must include the following:

1. the resource identification number of the Capacity Transferring Resource;
2. the applicable Capacity Commitment Period;
3. the resource identification number of the Capacity Acquiring Resource, and;
3. a price ($/kW-month), quantity (MW) and Capacity Zone, to be used in settling the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction.

The maximum quantity of an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is the higher of:

(1) the Capacity Transferring Resource’s maximum demand bid quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.2(b), less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions, and;

(2) the Capacity Acquiring Resource’s maximum supply offer quantity determined pursuant to Section III.13.4.2.1.1, less the quantity of any previously confirmed Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

An Annual Reconfiguration Transaction may not be submitted unless the maximum demand bid quantity and maximum supply offer quantity are each greater than zero.

Each Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is limited to a single Capacity Acquiring Resource and a single Capacity Transferring Resource.

If any demand bid of a Capacity Transferring Resource or supply offer of a Capacity Acquiring Resource that is associated with an Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.2(c) or Section III.13.4.2.1.5, respectively, the Annual Reconfiguration Transaction is cancelled.

### III.13.5.4.3 Settlement of Annual Reconfiguration Transactions.

Annual Reconfiguration Transactions are settled on a monthly basis during the applicable Capacity Commitment Period. The monthly payment amount is equal to the transaction quantity multiplied by the difference between the annual reconfiguration auction clearing price and the transaction price. If the payment amount is positive, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource. If the payment amount is negative, payment is made to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Acquiring Resource and charged to the Lead Market Participant with the Capacity Transferring Resource.
III.13.6. **Rights and Obligations.**

Resources assuming a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Forward Capacity Auction or resources assuming or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation through a reconfiguration auction or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with this Section III.13.6 for each Capacity Commitment Period. In the event a resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral can not be allowed to shed its Capacity Supply Obligation due to system reliability considerations, the resource shall maintain the Capacity Supply Obligation until the resource can be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation. No additional compensation shall be provided through the Forward Capacity Market if the resource fails to be released from its Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.1. **Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

A resource with a Capacity Supply Obligation assumed through a Forward Capacity Auction, reconfiguration auction, or a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall comply with the requirements of this Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, in which the Capacity Supply Obligation applies.

III.13.6.1.1. **Generating Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.**

III.13.6.1.1.1. **Energy Market Offer Requirements.**

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the resource is physically available. If the resource is physically available at a level less than its Capacity Supply Obligation, however, the resource shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market at that level. Day-Ahead Energy Market Supply Offers from such Generating Capacity Resources shall also meet one of the following requirements:

   (i) the sum of the Generating Capacity Resource’s Notification Time plus Start-Up Time plus Minimum Run Time plus Minimum Down Time is less than or equal to 72 hours; or

   (ii) if the Generating Capacity Resource cannot meet the offer requirements in Section III.13.6.1.1(a)(i) due to physical design limits, then the resource shall be offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than its Economic Minimum Limit at
a price of zero or shall be self-scheduled in the Day-Ahead Energy Market at a MW amount equal to or greater than the resource’s Economic Minimum Limit.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Generating Capacity Resource is a Settlement Only Resource, it may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

For each day, Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market offers for the listed portion of a resource must reflect the then-known unit-specific operating characteristics (taking into account, among other things, the physical design characteristics of the unit) consistent with Good Utility Practice. Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to the offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the known capability of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to economic penalties described in Appendix B.

III.13.6.1.1.3. [Reserved.]

III.13.6.1.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.6.1.1.5. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources.
Generating Capacity Resources having a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1 and the requirement to provide to the ISO, upon request and as soon as practicable, confirmation of gas volume schedules sufficient to deliver the energy scheduled for each Generating Capacity Resource using natural gas;

(c) outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures (except that Settlement Only Resources are not subject to outage requirements),
provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to
the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and
ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.13.6.1.2. Import Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource must offer one or more External Transactions to
import energy in the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for every hour of each
Operating Day at the same external interface that, in total, equal the resource’s Capacity Supply
Obligation, except that:

(i) the offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which any External Resource associated
with an Import Capacity Resource is on an outage;
(ii) the Day-Ahead Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to any hour in which the
import transfer capability of the external interface is 0 MW, and;
(iii) the Real-Time Energy Market offer requirement does not apply to Import Capacity Resources
with Capacity Supply Obligations at an external interface for which Coordinated Transaction
Scheduling is implemented.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Day-Ahead Energy Market must reference the associated
Import Capacity Resource.

Each External Transaction submitted in the Real-Time Energy Market in accordance with Section
III.1.10.7 must reference the associated Import Capacity Resource.

In all cases an Import Capacity Resource is subject to the provisions in Section III.13.7 for the entire
Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource.

III.13.6.1.2.2. Additional Requirements for Import Capacity Resources.
A Market Participant with an Import Capacity Resource that is associated with an External Resource
must:
(i) comply with all offer, outage scheduling and operating requirements applicable to capacity resources in the External Resource’s native Control Area, and;
(ii) notify the ISO of all outages impacting the Capacity Supply Obligation of the Import Capacity Resource in accordance with the outage notification requirements in ISO New England Operating Procedure No. 5.

III.13.6.1.3. Intermittent Power Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.

(a) Market Participants may submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation. Market Participants are required to submit offers for Intermittent Power Resources with a Capacity Supply Obligation for use in the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. Day-Ahead projections of output shall be submitted as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, Intermittent Power Resources shall have a generation deviation of zero.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an Intermittent Power Resource that is a Settlement Only Resource may not submit Supply Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.1.3.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.6.1.3.3. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.
Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals (except that Intermittent Power Resources that are Settlement Only Resources need not comply with outage requirements).

III.13.6.1.4. [Reserved.]
III.13.6.1.5. Demand Capacity Resources with Capacity Supply Obligations.


(a) A Market Participant with an Active Demand Capacity Resource having a Capacity Supply Obligation shall submit Demand Reduction Offers for its Demand Response Resources into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. The sum of the Demand Reduction Offers must be equal to or greater than the Active Demand Capacity Resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation whenever the Demand Response Resources are physically available. If the Demand Response Resources are physically available at a level less than the Active Demand Capacity Resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation, the sum of the Demand Reduction Offers will equal that level and shall be offered into both the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market. Each Demand Reduction Offer from a Demand Response Resource made into the Day-Ahead Energy Market shall also meet the following requirement:

(i) the sum of the Demand Response Resource Notification Time plus Demand Response Resource Start-Up Time plus Minimum Reduction Time plus Minimum Time Between Reductions is less than or equal to 72 hours.

(b) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.1.5.2. Requirement that Offers Reflect Accurate Demand Response Resource Operating Characteristics.

For each day, Demand Reduction Offers submitted into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and Real-Time Energy Market for a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource must reflect the then-known operating characteristics of the resource. Consistent with Section III.1.10.9(d), Demand Response Resources must re-declare to the ISO any changes to offer parameters that occur in real time to reflect the operating characteristics of the resource. A resource failing to comply with this requirement shall be subject to economic penalties described in Appendix B.

III.13.6.1.5.3. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources.
(a) A Market Participant may not associate an Asset with a non-commercial Demand Capacity Resource during a Capacity Commitment Period if the Asset can be associated with a commercial Demand Capacity Resource whose capability is less than its Capacity Supply Obligation during that Capacity Commitment Period.

(b) For purposes of confirming FCM Commercial Operation as described in Section III.13.3.8, the ISO shall use a summer Seasonal DR Audit value or summer Passive DR Audit value to verify the capacity rating of a Demand Capacity Resource with summer Qualified Capacity. A winter Seasonal DR Audit value or winter Passive DR Audit value may only be used to verify the winter commercial capacity of a Demand Capacity Resource.

(c) For Active Demand Capacity Resources, a summer Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from April 1 through November 30 and a winter Seasonal DR Audit value shall be established for use from December 1 through March 31. The summer or winter Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource is equal to the sum of the like-season Seasonal DR Audit values of its constituent Demand Response Resources as determined pursuant to Section III.1.5.1.3.1. The Seasonal DR Audit value of an Active Demand Capacity Resource shall automatically update whenever a new Seasonal DR Audit value is approved for a constituent Demand Response Resource or with changes to the makeup of the constituent Demand Response Resources.

(d) On-Peak Demand Resources and Seasonal Peak Demand Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the ISO’s measurement and verification requirements pursuant to Section III.13.1.4.3 and the ISO New England Manuals; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Sections III.13.6.1.5.4 and III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.

(e) Active Demand Capacity Resources shall in addition: (i) comply with the measurement and verification requirements and the Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals and Market Rule 1, and with outage requirements in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures, provided, however, that the portion of a resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation is not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures; and (ii) comply with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals.
III.13.6.1.5.4. On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource Auditing Requirements.

(a) A summer Passive DR Audit value and a winter Passive DR Audit value must be established for each On-Peak Demand Resource and Seasonal Peak Demand Resource in every Capacity Commitment Period during which the On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource has an annual or monthly Capacity Supply Obligation.

(b) Summer Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the summer Passive DR Auditing Period (June through August). Winter Passive DR Audit values shall be determined based on data for one or more months of the winter Passive DR Auditing Period (December through January).

(c) Passive DR Audit values will be made available to the Market Participant within 20 Business Days following the end of the period for which the audit value is determined by the ISO.

(d) The audit value of an On-Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the On-Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource On-Peak Hours.

(e) The audit value of a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource is determined by evaluating the Average Hourly Output or Average Hourly Load Reduction of each Asset associated with the Seasonal Peak Demand Resource during the Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours. If there are no Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours in a month during the Passive DR Auditing Period, performance during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours in that month may be used.

(f) Passive DR Audit values shall become effective one calendar day after being made available to the Market Participant and remain valid until the earlier of: (i) the next like-season Passive DR Audit value becomes effective or (ii) the end of the following Capability Demonstration Year.

(g) At the request of a Market Participant, a summer or winter Passive DR Audit value may be determined based on data for, respectively, a summer or winter month outside of the Passive DR Auditing Periods. (For Demand Capacity Resources, summer months are April through November; all other months are winter months.) Such an audit shall not satisfy the Passive DR Audit requirement.
III.13.6.1.5.5. Additional Demand Capacity Resource Audits.
The ISO may perform additional audits for a Demand Capacity Resource to establish or verify the capability of the Demand Capacity Resource and its underlying assets and measures. This additional auditing may consist of two levels.

(a) Level 1 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by conducting a review of records of the Assets and measures to verify that the reported Assets and measures have been installed and are operational. The audit shall include, but is not limited to, reviewing project or program databases, invoices, installation reports, work orders, and field inspection reports. In addition, the audit may involve reviewing any independent inspections or evaluations conducted as part of program implementation and program evaluation.

(b) Level 2 Audit: the ISO will establish the audit results by initiating or conducting an on-site field audit to verify the installation and performance of the Assets and measures. Such an audit may include a random or select sample of facilities and measures.

A level 1 audit is not required to precede a level 2 audit. If the results of the audit indicate that the demand reduction capability of the Demand Capacity Resource is less than or greater than its most recent like-season Passive DR Audit value or Seasonal DR Audit value, then the Demand Capacity Resource’s audit value shall be adjusted accordingly.

III.13.6.1.6. DNE Dispatchable Generator.

Beginning on June 1, 2019, Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators with a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market for the full amount of the resource’s expected hourly physical capability as determined by the Market Participant. Market Participants with DNE Dispatchable Generators having a Capacity Supply Obligation must submit offers for the Real-Time Energy Market consistent with the characteristics of the resource. For purposes of calculating Real-Time NCPC Charges, DNE Dispatchable Generators shall have a generation deviation of zero.

III.13.6.2. Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.
A resource that does not have any Capacity Supply Obligation shall comply with the requirements in this Section III.13.6.2, and shall not be subject to the requirements set forth in Section III.13.6.1 during the Capacity Commitment Period, or portion thereof, for which the resource has no Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.2.1. Generating Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.


A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the operating day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

A Generating Capacity Resource having no Capacity Supply Obligation may submit an offer into the Real-Time Energy Market. If any portion of the offered energy clears in the Real-Time Energy Market, the entire Supply Offer, up to the Economic Maximum Limit offered into the Real-Time Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow ISO Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.2.1.2. Additional Requirements for Generating Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.
Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:
(a) complying with the auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals;

(b) complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(c) complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Generating Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.13.6.2.2. [Reserved.]

III.13.6.2.3. Intermittent Power Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.2.3.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

III.13.6.2.3.2. Additional Requirements for Intermittent Power Resources.
Intermittent Power Resources are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) auditing and rating requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and

(b) Operating Data collection requirements as detailed in the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.6.2.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.6.2.5. Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation.

III.13.6.2.5.1. Energy Market Offer Requirements.

Seasonal Peak Demand Resources and On-Peak Demand Resources may not submit Demand Reduction Offers into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.2.5.1.1. Day-Ahead Energy Market Participation.
A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation may submit a Demand Reduction Offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market. If any portion of the Demand Reduction Offer clears in the Day-Ahead Energy Market, the entire Demand Reduction Offer, up to the Maximum Reduction offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market, will be subject to all of the rules and requirements applicable to that market for the Operating Day, including the obligation to follow Dispatch Instructions. Such a resource that clears shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.2.5.1.2. Real-Time Energy Market Participation.
A Market Participant with a Demand Response Resource associated with an Active Demand Capacity Resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation, that did not submit an offer into the Day-Ahead Energy Market or was offered into the Day-Ahead Energy Market and did not clear, may submit a Demand Reduction Offer in the Real-Time Energy Market and shall be subject to all of the requirements associated therewith. Such a resource shall be eligible for dispatch in the Real-Time Energy Market.

III.13.6.2.5.2. Additional Requirements for Demand Capacity Resources Having No Capacity Supply Obligation.
Demand Capacity Resources without a Capacity Supply Obligation are subject to the following additional requirements:

(a) complying with Section III.13.6.1.5.3(a) and (b) and with the auditing and rating requirements described in Section III.13.6.1.5.5 and the ISO New England Manuals; and

(b) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with the Operating Data collection requirements detailed in the ISO New England Manuals; and
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(c) for Active Demand Capacity Resources, complying with outage requirements as outlined in the ISO New England Operating Procedures and ISO New England Manuals. Active Demand Capacity Resources having no Capacity Supply Obligation are not subject to the forced re-scheduling provisions for outages in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals and ISO New England Operating Procedures.

III.13.6.3. Exporting Resources.
A resource that is exporting capacity not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation to an external Control Area shall comply with this Section III.13.6.3 and the ISO New England Manuals. Intermittent Power Resources and Demand Capacity Resources are not permitted to back a capacity export to an external Control Area. The portion of a resource without a Capacity Supply Obligation that will be used in Real-Time to support an External Transaction sale must comply with the energy market offer requirements of Section III.1.10.7.

III.13.6.4. ISO Requests for Energy.
The ISO may request that an Active Demand Capacity Resource or a Generating Capacity Resource having capacity that is not subject to a Capacity Supply Obligation provide energy for reliability purposes in the Real-Time Energy Market, but such resource shall not be obligated under Section III.13 of this Tariff by such a request to provide energy from that capacity. If such resource does provide energy from that capacity, the resource shall be paid based on its most recent offer and is eligible for NCPC.

III.13.6.4.1. Real-Time High Operating Limit.
For purposes of facilitating ISO requests for energy under Section III.13.6.4, a Market Participant must report an up-to-date Real-Time High Operating Limit value at all times for a Generating Capacity Resource.
III.13.7. Performance, Payments and Charges in the FCM.

Revenue in the Forward Capacity Market for resources providing capacity shall be composed of Capacity Base Payments as described in Section III.13.7.1 and Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.2, adjusted as described in Section III.13.7.3 and Section III.13.7.4. Market Participants with a Capacity Load Obligation will be subject to charges as described in Section III.13.7.5.

In the event of a change in the Lead Market Participant for a resource that has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the Capacity Supply Obligation shall remain associated with the resource and the new Lead Market Participant for the resource shall be bound by all provisions of this Section III.13 arising from such Capacity Supply Obligation. The Lead Market Participant for the resource at the start of an Obligation Month shall be responsible for all payments and charges associated with that resource in that Obligation Month.


Resources acquiring or shedding a Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month shall receive a Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month reflecting the payments and charges described in Section III.13.7.1.1, as adjusted to account for peak energy rents as described in Section III.13.7.1.2.


Each resource that has: (i) cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, except for the portion of resources designated as Self-Supplied FCA Resources; (ii) cleared in a reconfiguration auction; or (iii) entered into a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral shall be entitled to a monthly payment or charge during the Capacity Commitment Period based on the following amounts:

(a) Forward Capacity Auction. For a resource whose offer has cleared in a Forward Capacity Auction, the monthly capacity payment shall equal the product of its cleared capacity and the Capacity Clearing Price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located as adjusted by applicable indexing for resources with additional Capacity Commitment Period elections pursuant to Section III.13.1.1.2.2.4 in the manner described below. For a resource that has elected to have the Capacity Clearing Price and the Capacity Supply Obligation apply for more than one Capacity Commitment Period, payments associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation and Capacity Clearing Price (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) shall continue to apply after the Capacity Commitment Period associated
with the Forward Capacity Auction in which the offer clears, for up to six additional and consecutive Capacity Commitment Periods, in whole Capacity Commitment Period increments only.

(b) **Reconfiguration Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in an annual or monthly reconfiguration auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the appropriate reconfiguration auction clearing price in the Capacity Zone in which the resource cleared.

(c) **Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals.** For resources that have acquired or shed a Capacity Supply Obligation through a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of the Capacity Supply Obligation being assumed or shed and price associated with the Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral.

(d) **Substitution Auctions.** For a resource whose offer or bid has cleared in a substitution auction, the monthly capacity payment or charge shall be equal to the product of its cleared capacity and the substitution auction clearing price. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monthly capacity charge for a demand bid cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above its bid price shall be calculated using its bid price.

### III.13.7.1.2  Peak Energy Rents.

For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2019, Capacity Base Payments to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations, except for (1) On-Peak Demand Resources, (2) Seasonal Peak Demand Resources, and (3) New Generating Capacity Resources that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and have completed construction but due to a planned transmission facility (e.g., a radial interconnection) not being in service are not able to achieve FCM Commercial Operation, shall be decreased by Peak Energy Rents (“PER”) calculated in each Capacity Zone, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4 in the Forward Capacity Auction, as provided below. The PER calculation shall utilize hourly integrated Real-Time LMPs. For each Capacity Zone in the Forward Capacity Auction, as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, PER shall be computed based on the load-weighted Real-Time LMPs for each Capacity Zone, using the Real-Time Hub Price for the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone. Self-Supplied FCA Resources shall not be subject to a PER adjustment on the portion of the resource that is self-supplied.
III.13.7.1.2.1 Hourly PER Calculations.

(a) For hours with a positive difference between the hourly Real-Time energy price and a strike price, the ISO shall compute PER for each hour ("Hourly PER") equal to this positive difference in accordance with one of the following formulas, which include scaling adjustments for system load and availability:

For hours within the period beginning September 30, 2016 through May 31, 2018:

\[
\text{Hourly PER} \left( \frac{\text{$/kW}}{} \right) = \left[ \left( \text{LMP} - \text{Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price} \right) \times \text{Scaling Factor} \times \text{Availability Factor} \right]
\]

Where:

Adjusted Hourly PER Strike Price = Strike Price + Hourly PER Adjustment

Hourly PER Adjustment = average of Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment values

Five-Minute PER Strike Price Adjustment = MAX (Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price - $500/MWh, 0) + MAX (Ten-Minute Non-Spinning Reserve clearing price – Thirty-Minute Operating Reserve clearing price - $850/MWh, 0).

Strike Price = as defined below

Scaling Factor = as defined below

Availability Factor = as defined below

For all other hours:

\[
\text{Hourly PER} \left( \frac{\text{$/kW}}{} \right) = \left[ \left( \text{LMP} - \text{Strike Price} \right) \times \text{Scaling Factor} \times \text{Availability Factor} \right]
\]

Where:

Strike Price = the heat rate x fuel cost of the PER Proxy Unit described below.

Scaling Factor = the ratio of actual hourly integrated system load (calculated as the sum of Real-Time Load Obligations for the system as calculated in the settlement of the Real-Time Energy
Market and adjusted for losses and including imports delivered in the Real-Time Energy Market) and the 50/50 predicted peak system load reduced appropriately for Demand Capacity Resources, used in the most recent calculation of the Installed Capacity Requirement for that Capacity Commitment Period, capped at an hourly ratio of 1.0.

Availability Factor = 0.95.

(b) PER Proxy Unit characteristics shall be as follows:

(i) The PER Proxy Unit shall be indexed to the marginal fuel, which shall be the higher of the following, as determined on a daily basis: ultra low-sulfur No. 2 oil measured at New York Harbor plus a seven percent markup for transportation; or day-ahead gas measured at the AGT-CG (Non-G) hub;

(ii) The PER Proxy Unit shall be assumed to have no start-up, ramp rate or minimum run time constraints;

(iii) The PER Proxy Unit shall have a 22,000 Btu/kWh heat rate. This assumption shall be periodically reviewed after the first Capacity Commitment Period by the ISO to ensure that the heat rate continues to reflect a level slightly higher than the marginal generating unit in the region that would be dispatched as the system enters a scarcity condition. Any changes to the heat rate of the PER Proxy Unit shall be considered in the stakeholder process in consultation with the state utility regulatory agencies, shall be filed pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, and shall be applied prospectively to the settlement of future Forward Capacity Auctions.

III.13.7.1.2.2 Monthly PER Application.
The Hourly PER shall be summed for each calendar month to determine the total PER for that month ("Monthly PER"). The ISO shall then calculate the Average Monthly PER earned by the proxy unit. The Average Monthly PER shall be equal to the average of the Monthly PER values for the 12 months prior to the Obligation Month. The PER deduction for each resource shall be calculated as the Average Monthly PER multiplied by the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (less any Capacity Supply Obligation MW from any portion of a Self-Supplied FCA Resource); provided, however, that in no case shall a resource’s PER deduction for an Obligation Month be less than zero or
greater than the product of the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation and the relevant Forward Capacity Auction Capacity Clearing Price.

III.13.7.1.3. Export Capacity.
If there are any Export Bids or Administrative Export De-List Bids from resources located in an export-constrained Capacity Zone or in the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that have cleared in the Forward Capacity Auction and if the resource is exporting capacity at an export interface that is connected to an import-constrained Capacity Zone or the Rest-of-Pool Capacity Zone that is different than the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located, then charges and credits are applied as follows (for the following calculation, the Capacity Clearing Price will be the value prior to PER adjustments).

\[
\text{Charge Amount to Resource Exporting} = (\text{Capacity Clearing Price}_{\text{location of the interface}} - \text{Capacity Clearing Price}_{\text{location of the resource}}) \times \text{Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-List Bid}
\]

\[
\text{Credit Amount to Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone where the export interface is located} = (\text{Capacity Clearing Price}_{\text{location of the interface}} - \text{Capacity Clearing Price}_{\text{location of the resource}}) \times \text{Cleared MWs of Export Bid or Administrative Export De-list Bid}
\]

Credits and charges to load in the applicable Capacity Zones, as set forth above, shall be allocated in proportion to each LSE’s Capacity Load Obligation as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.2.

III.13.7.1.4. [Reserved.]

III.13.7.2 Capacity Performance Payments.

III.13.7.2.1 Definition of Capacity Scarcity Condition.
A Capacity Scarcity Condition shall exist in a Capacity Zone for any five-minute interval in which the Real-Time Reserve Clearing Price for that entire Capacity Zone is set based on the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing for: (i) the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement; (ii) the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement; or (iii) the Zonal Reserve Requirement, each as described in Section III.2.7A(c); provided, however, that a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall not exist if the Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing results only because of resource ramping limitations that are not binding on the energy dispatch.
**III.13.7.2.2 Calculation of Actual Capacity Provided During a Capacity Scarcity Condition.**

For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate the Actual Capacity Provided by each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, in any Capacity Zone that is subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition. For resources not having a Capacity Supply Obligation (including External Transactions), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be calculated using the provision below applicable to the resource type. Notwithstanding the specific provisions of this Section III.13.7.2.2, no resource shall have an Actual Capacity Provided that is less than zero.

(a) A Generating Capacity Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the resource’s output during the interval plus the resource’s Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval; provided, however, that if the resource’s output was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the resource’s Actual Capacity Provided may not be greater than the sum of the resource’s Desired Dispatch Point during the interval, plus the resource’s Reserve Quantity For Settlement during the interval. Where the resource is associated with one or more External Transaction sales submitted in accordance with Section III.1.10.7(f), the resource will have its hourly Actual Capacity Provided reduced by the hourly integrated delivered MW for the External Transaction sale or sales.

(b) An Import Capacity Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the net energy delivered during the interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurred. Where a single Market Participant owns more than one Import Capacity Resource, then the difference between the total net energy delivered from those resources and the total of the Capacity Supply Obligations of those resources shall be allocated to those resources pro rata.

(c) An On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided for each of its components, as determined below, where the MWhs of reduction, other than MWhs associated with Net Supply, are increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

(i) For Energy Efficiency measures, if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs during Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the applicable reported
monthly performance value; if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(ii) For Distributed Generation measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted meter data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iii) For Load Management measures submitting meter data for the full 24 hour calendar day during which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs, the Actual Capacity Provided shall be equal to the submitted demand reduction data, adjusted as necessary for the five-minute interval in which the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs.

(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), for any On-Peak Demand Resource or Seasonal Peak Demand Resource that fails to provide the data necessary for the ISO to determine the Actual Capacity Provided as described in this Section III.13.7.2.2(c), the Actual Capacity Provided shall be zero.

(d) An Active Demand Capacity Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be the sum of the Actual Capacity Provided by its constituent Demand Response Resources during the Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(i) A Demand Response Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during a Capacity Scarcity Condition shall be: (1) the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets (provided, however, that if the Demand Response Resource was limited during the Capacity Scarcity Condition as a result of a transmission system limitation, then the sum of the Real-Time demand reduction of its constituent Demand Response Assets may not be greater than its Desired Dispatch Point during the interval), plus (2) the Demand Response Resource’s Reserve Quantity For Settlement, where the MW quantity, other than the MW quantity associated with Net Supply, is increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses; provided, however, that a Demand Response Resource’s Actual Capacity Provided shall not be less than zero.
The Real-Time demand reduction of a Demand Response Asset shall be calculated as described in Section III.8.4, except that: (1) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, a Real-Time demand reduction shall also be calculated for intervals in which the associated Demand Response Resource does not receive a non-zero Dispatch Instruction; (2) in the case of a Demand Response Asset that is on a forced or scheduled curtailment as described in Section III.8.3, the minuend in the calculation described in Section III.8.4 shall be the unadjusted Demand Response Baseline of the Demand Response Asset; and (3) the resulting MWhs of reduction, other than the MWhs associated with Net Supply, shall be increased by average avoided peak transmission and distribution losses.

III.13.7.2.3 Capacity Balancing Ratio.
For each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Balancing Ratio using the following formula:

\[
\frac{(\text{Load} + \text{Reserve Requirement})}{\text{Total Capacity Supply Obligation}}
\]

(a) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(b) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement such that the associated system-wide Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:
Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the New England Control Area during the interval.

Reserve Requirement = the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement during the interval.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the New England Control Area during the interval.

(c) If the Capacity Scarcity Condition is a result of a violation of the Zonal Reserve Requirement such that the associated Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing applies, then the terms used in the formula above shall be calculated as follows:

Load = the total amount of Actual Capacity Provided (excluding applicable Real-Time Reserve Designations) from all resources in the Capacity Zone during the interval plus the net amount of energy imported into the Capacity Zone from outside the New England Control Area during the interval (but not less than zero).

Reserve Requirement = the Zonal Reserve Requirement minus any reserve support coming into the Capacity Zone over the internal transmission interface.

Total Capacity Supply Obligation = the total amount of Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone during the interval.

(d) The following provisions shall be used to determine the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio where more than one of the conditions described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) apply in a Capacity Zone.

(i) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement, but not the Zonal Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio shall be calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) for resources in that Capacity Zone.
(ii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with both the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement, but not the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement, the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(b) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

(iii) In any Capacity Zone subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Minimum Total Reserve Requirement and the Zonal Reserve Requirement (regardless of whether the Capacity Zone is also subject to Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor pricing associated with the Ten-Minute Reserve Requirement), the Capacity Balancing Ratio for resources in that Capacity Zone shall be the higher of the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(a) and the Capacity Balancing Ratio calculated as described in Section III.13.7.2.3(c).

III.13.7.2.4 Capacity Performance Score.
Each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, will be assigned a Capacity Performance Score for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource’s Capacity Performance Score for the interval shall equal the resource’s Actual Capacity Provided during the interval minus the product of the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation (which for this purpose shall not be less than zero) and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio; provided, however, that for an On-Peak Demand Resource or a Seasonal Peak Demand Resource, (i) if the Capacity Scarcity Condition occurs in an interval outside of Demand Resource On-Peak Hours or Demand Resource Seasonal Peak Hours, as applicable, then the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation associated with any Energy Efficiency measures shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource’s Capacity Performance Score; and (ii) for any Energy Efficiency, Load Management, or Distributed Generation measures reflected as a reduction in the load forecast as described in Section III.12.8 the Actual Capacity Provided and Capacity Supply Obligation shall be excluded from the calculation of the resource’s Capacity Performance Score. The resulting Capacity Performance Score may be positive, zero, or negative.

III.13.7.2.5 Capacity Performance Payment Rate.
For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2018 and ending May 31, 2021, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $2000/MWh. For the three Capacity Commitment Periods beginning June 1, 2021 and ending May 31, 2024, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $3500/MWh. For the Capacity Commitment Period beginning on June 1, 2024 and ending on May 31, 2025 and thereafter, the Capacity Performance Payment Rate shall be $5455/MWh. The ISO shall review the Capacity Performance Payment Rate in the stakeholder process as needed and shall file with the Commission a new Capacity Performance Payment Rate if and as appropriate.

III.13.7.2.6 Calculation of Capacity Performance Payments.

For each resource, whether or not it has a Capacity Supply Obligation, the ISO shall calculate a Capacity Performance Payment for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. A resource’s Capacity Performance Payment for an interval shall equal the resource’s Capacity Performance Score for the interval multiplied by the Capacity Performance Payment Rate. The resulting Capacity Performance Payment for an interval may be positive or negative.

III.13.7.3 Monthly Capacity Payment and Capacity Stop-Loss Mechanism.

Each resource’s Monthly Capacity Payment for an Obligation Month, which may be positive or negative, shall be the sum of the resource’s Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month plus the sum of the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month, except as provided in Section III.13.7.3.1 and Section III.13.7.3.2 below.

III.13.7.3.1 Monthly Stop-Loss.

If the sum of the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource’s Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the product of the applicable Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price multiplied by the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month (or, in the case of a resource subject to a multi-year Capacity Commitment Period election made in a Forward Capacity Auction prior to the ninth Forward Capacity Auction as described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.2.4 and III.13.1.4.1.1.2.7, the amount subtracted from the resource’s Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the
product of the applicable Capacity Clearing Price (indexed for inflation) multiplied by the resource’s
Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month).

III.13.7.3.2 Annual Stop-Loss.

(a) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate a stop-loss amount equal to:

\[
\text{MaxCSO} \times [3 \times (\text{FCAcp} - \text{FCAsp}) - (12 \times \text{FCAcp})]
\]

Where:

\(\text{MaxCSO}\) = the resource’s highest monthly Capacity Supply Obligation in the Capacity Commitment Period to date.

\(\text{FCAcp}\) = the Capacity Clearing Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

\(\text{FCAsp}\) = the Forward Capacity Auction Starting Price for the relevant Forward Capacity Auction.

(b) For each Obligation Month, the ISO shall calculate each resource’s cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as the sum of the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments for all months in the Capacity Commitment Period to date, with those monthly amounts limited as described in Section III.13.7.3.1.

(c) If the sum of the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments (excluding any Capacity Performance Payments associated with Actual Capacity Provided above the resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation in any interval) for all five-minute intervals in the Obligation Month is negative, the amount subtracted from the resource’s Capacity Base Payment for the Obligation Month will be limited to an amount equal to the difference between the stop-loss amount calculated as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(a) and the resource’s cumulative Capacity Performance Payments as described in Section III.13.7.3.2(b).

III.13.7.4 Allocation of Deficient or Excess Capacity Performance Payments.
For each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition as described in Section III.13.7.2.1 and for each Capacity Zone, the ISO shall allocate deficient or excess Capacity Performance Payments as described in subsections (a) and (b) below. Where more than one type of Capacity Scarcity Condition applies, then the provisions below shall be applied in proportion to the duration of each type of Capacity Scarcity Condition.

(a) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is positive, the deficiency will be charged to resources in proportion to each such resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month, excluding any resources subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month. If the charge described in this Section III.13.7.4(a) causes a resource to reach the stop-loss limit described in Section III.13.7.3, then the stop-loss cap described in Section III.13.7.3 will be applied to that resource, and the remaining deficiency will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(a).

(b) If the sum of all Capacity Performance Payments to all resources subject to the Capacity Scarcity Condition in the Capacity Zone in an Obligation Month is negative, the excess will be credited to all such resources in proportion to each resource’s Capacity Supply Obligation for the Obligation Month. For a resource subject to the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3 for the Obligation Month, any such credit shall be reduced (though not to less than zero) by the amount not charged to the resource as a result of the application of the stop-loss mechanism described in Section III.13.7.3, and the remaining excess will be further allocated to other resources in the same manner as described in this Section III.13.7.4(b)

III.13.7.5. Charges to Market Participants with Capacity Load Obligations.

III.13.7.5.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges Prior to June 1, 2022.
The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to a charge equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; and (b) the applicable Net Regional Clearing Price. The Net Regional Clearing Price is defined as the sum of the total payments as defined in Section III.13.7 paid to resources with Capacity Supply Obligations in the Capacity Zone (excluding any capacity payments and charges made.
for Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and excluding any Capacity Performance Payments), less PER adjustments for resources in the zone as defined in Section III.13.7.1.2, and including any applicable export charges or credits as determined pursuant to Section III.13.7.1.3 divided by the sum of all Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding (i) the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals and (ii) the quantity of capacity clearing as Self-Supplied FCA Resources) assumed by resources in the zone. A load serving entity satisfying its Capacity Load Obligation by a Self-Supplied FCA Resource shall not receive a credit for any PER payment for its Capacity Load Obligation so satisfied. A load serving entity with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month may also receive a failure to cover credit equal to the product of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone, and; (b) the sum of all failure to cover charges in the Capacity Zone calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), divided by total Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone.

**III.13.7.5.1.1. Calculation of Capacity Charges On and After June 1, 2022.**
The provisions in this subsection apply to charges associated with Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022. For purposes of this Section III.13.7.5.1.1, Capacity Zone costs calculated for a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Capacity Zone costs of the nested Capacity Zone. A Market Participant with a Capacity Load Obligation as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be subject to the following charges and adjustments:

**III.13.7.5.1.1.1 Forward Capacity Auction Charge.**
The FCA charge, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone FCA Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone FCA Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total FCA Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total FCA Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, (i) Capacity Supply Obligations in each zone (the total obligation awarded to or shed by resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month in the zone, excluding any obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources that are the basis for the Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment specified in Section III.13.7.5.1.1.6 and excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) multiplied by the applicable
clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded to (or shed by) the resource, and (ii) the difference between the bid price and the substitution auction clearing price that was not included in the capacity charge pursuant to the second sentence of Section III.13.7.1.1(d). Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to Proxy De-List Bids in the primary auction, or shed by demand bids entered into the substitution auction on behalf of a Proxy De-List Bid, are excluded from Total FCA Costs.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.2 Annual Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**

The total annual reconfiguration auction charge, for each Capacity Zone and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Capacity Zone Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs, for each Capacity Zone, are the Total Annual Reconfiguration Costs multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Total Annual Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum, for all Capacity Zones and each associated annual reconfiguration auction, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone (adjusted for any obligations procured in the annual reconfiguration auction that are subsequently terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) and the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the amount of any Capacity Supply Obligation shed through the annual reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price.
Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.3. Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Charge.**
The monthly reconfiguration auction charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Total Monthly Reconfiguration Auction Costs are the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, the product of Capacity Supply Obligations acquired through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price, minus the sum of, for all Capacity Zones, any Capacity Supply Obligations shed through the monthly reconfiguration auction in each zone and the applicable monthly reconfiguration auction clearing price.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.4. HQICC Capacity Charge.**
The HQICC capacity charge is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) Total HQICC Credits divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.

Where

Total HQICC credits are the product of HQICCs multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone in which the HQ Phase I/II external node is located.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.5. Self-Supply Adjustment.**
The self-supply adjustment is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) the Self-Supply Variance divided by Total Capacity Load Obligation.
Where

Self-Supply Variance is the difference between foregone capacity payments and avoided capacity charges associated with designated self-supply quantities.

Foregone capacity payments to Self-Supplied FCA Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the zonal Capacity Supply Obligation (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A) designated as self-supply, multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Avoided capacity charges are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of any designated self-supply quantities multiplied by the sum of the values calculated in Sections III.13.7.5.1.1.1(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.2(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.3(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.6(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.7(b), III.13.7.5.1.1.8(b), and III.13.7.5.1.1.9(b) in the Capacity Zone associated with the designated self-supply quantity.

Total Capacity Load Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

**III.13.7.5.1.1.6. Intermittent Power Resource Capacity Adjustment.**

The Intermittent Power Resource capacity adjustment in a winter season for the Obligation Months from October through May is: (a) total Capacity Load Obligation for all Capacity Zones; multiplied by (b) the Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Intermittent Power Resource Seasonal Variance is the difference between the FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resource in the Obligation Month and the base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources.

FCA payments to Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the Capacity Supply Obligations awarded to or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process for the Obligation Month pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 or Section III.13.2.8.1.1 (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction).
Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Base FCA payments for Intermittent Power Resources are the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the product of the FCA Qualified Capacity procured from or shed by Intermittent Power Resources in the Forward Capacity Auction process (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the applicable clearing price from the auction in which the obligation was awarded.

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total Capacity Load Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.7. Multi-Year Rate Election Adjustment.
For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period, multiplied by the Zonal Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal Capacity Clearing Price.
Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

For multi-year rate elections made in the primary Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, the multi-year rate election adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is: (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal Multi-Year Rate Election Costs is the sum in each Capacity Zone, for each resource with a multi-year rate election in the Obligation Month, of the amount of Capacity Supply Obligation designated to receive the multi-year rate (excluding any obligations procured in the Forward Capacity Auction that are terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A), multiplied by the difference in the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the Forward Capacity Auction in which the resource originally was awarded a Capacity Supply Obligation (indexed using the Handy-Whitman Index of Public Utility Construction Costs in effect as of December 31 of the year preceding the Capacity Commitment Period) and the applicable zonal Capacity Clearing Price for the current Capacity Commitment Period.

III.13.7.5.1.1.8 CTR Transmission Upgrade Charge.
The CTR transmission upgrade charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zones to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity, multiplied by (b) Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where

Zonal CTR Transmission Upgrade Cost for each Capacity Zone to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity is the amount calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.4 (f), multiplied by the Zonal Capacity Obligation and divided by the sum of the Zonal Capacity Obligation for all Capacity Zones to which the interface limits the transfer of capacity.

III.13.7.5.1.1.9 CTR Pool-Planned Unit Charge.
The CTR Pool-Planned Unit charge is: (a) the Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5, multiplied by (b) CTR Pool-
Planned Unit Cost divided by Total Zonal Capacity Obligation less the amount of any CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5.

Where

The CTR Pool-Planned Unit Cost for each Capacity Zone is the sum of the amounts calculated pursuant to Section III.13.7.5.4.5(b).

Total Zonal Capacity Obligation is the total of the Zonal Capacity Obligation in all Capacity Zones.

III.13.7.5.1.1.10. Failure to Cover Charge Adjustment.
The failure to cover charge adjustment, for each Capacity Zone, is (a) Capacity Load Obligation in the Capacity Zone; multiplied by (b) Zonal Failure to Cover Charges divided by Zonal Capacity Obligation.

Where:

Zonal Failure to Cover Charges are the product of: (1) the sum, for all Capacity Zones, of the failure to cover charges calculated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4(b), and; (2) the Zonal Peak Load Allocator and divided by the Total Peak Load Allocator.

Zonal Peak Load Allocator is the Zonal Capacity Obligation multiplied by the zonal annual reconfiguration auction clearing price as determined pursuant to Section III.13.3.4.

Total Peak Load Allocator is the sum of the Zonal Peak Load Allocators.

III.13.7.5.2. Calculation of Capacity Load Obligation and Zonal Capacity Obligation.
The ISO shall assign each Market Participant a share of the Zonal Capacity Obligation prior to the commencement of each Obligation Month for each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4. The Zonal Capacity Obligation of a Capacity Zone that contains a nested Capacity Zone shall exclude the Zonal Capacity Obligation of the nested Capacity Zone.

Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the total of the system-wide Capacity Supply Obligations (excluding the quantity of capacity subject to Capacity Supply Obligation Bilaterals for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022 and...
excluding any additional obligations awarded to Intermittent Power Resources pursuant to Section III.13.2.7.6 that exceed the FCA Qualified Capacity procured in the Forward Capacity Auction for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) plus HQICCs; and (ii) the ratio of the sum of all load serving entities’ annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022) to the system-wide sum of all load serving entities’ annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load from the calendar year two years prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022) and from the calendar year one year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning on or after June 1, 2022).

The following loads are assigned a peak contribution of zero for the purposes of assigning obligations and tracking load shifts: load associated with the receipt of electricity from the grid by Storage DARDs for later injection of electricity back to the grid; Station service load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and the Resource is complying with the maintenance scheduling procedures of the ISO; load that is modeled as a discrete Load Asset and is exclusively related to an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource following AGC Dispatch Instructions; and transmission losses associated with delivery of energy over the Control Area tie lines.

A Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone shall equal the product of: (i) the Capacity Zone’s Zonal Capacity Obligation as calculated above and (ii) the ratio of the sum of the load serving entity’s annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period to the sum of all load serving entities’ annual coincident contributions to the system-wide annual peak load in that Capacity Zone from the calendar year prior to the start of the Capacity Commitment Period.

A Market Participant’s Capacity Load Obligation shall be its share of Zonal Capacity Obligation for each month and Capacity Zone, adjusted as appropriate to account for any relevant Capacity Load Obligation Bilaterals, HQICCs, and Self-Supplied FCA Resource designations. A Capacity Load Obligation can be a positive or negative value.
A Market Participant’s share of Zonal Capacity Obligation will not be reconstituted to include the demand reduction of a Demand Capacity Resource or Demand Response Resource.

III.13.7.5.2.1. Charges Associated with Dispatchable Asset Related Demands.
Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resources will not receive Forward Capacity Market payments, but instead each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource will receive an adjustment to its share of the associated Coincident Peak Contribution based on the ability of the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource to reduce consumption. The adjustment to a load serving entity’s Coincident Peak Contribution resulting from Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource reduction in consumption shall be based on the Nominated Consumption Limit submitted for the Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource. The Nominated Consumption Limit value of each Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource is subject to adjustment as further described in the ISO New England Manuals, including adjustments based on the results of Nominated Consumption Limit audits performed in accordance with the ISO New England Manuals.

III.13.7.5.3. Excess Revenues.
(a) For Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022, revenues collected from load serving entities in excess of revenues paid by the ISO to resources shall be paid by the ISO to the holders of Capacity Transfer Rights, as detailed in Section III.13.7.5.3.

(b) Any payment associated with a Capacity Supply Obligation Bilateral that was to accrue to a Capacity Acquiring Resource for a Capacity Supply Obligation that is terminated pursuant to Section III.13.3.4A shall instead be allocated to Market Participants based on their pro rata share of all Capacity Load Obligations in the Capacity Zone in which the terminated resource is located.

III.13.7.5.4. Capacity Transfer Rights.

III.13.7.5.4.1. Definition and Payments to Holders of Capacity Transfer Rights.
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

Capacity Transfer Rights are calculated for each internal interface associated with a Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4). Based upon results of the Forward Capacity Auction and reconfiguration auctions, the total CTR fund will be
calculated as the difference between the charges to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations and the payments to Capacity Resources as follows: The system-wide sum of the product of each Capacity Zone’s Net Regional Clearing Price and absolute value of each Capacity Zone’s Capacity Load Obligations, as calculated in Section III.13.7.5.1, minus the sum of the monthly capacity payments to Capacity Resources within each zone, as adjusted for PER.

Each Capacity Zone established in the Forward Capacity Auction (as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4) will be assigned its portion of the CTR fund.

For CTRs resulting from an export constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between the absolute value of the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the exporting Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources, and the absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the exporting Capacity Zone.

For CTRs resulting from an import constrained zone, the assignment will be calculated as the product of: (i) the Net Regional Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Net Regional Clearing Price for the absolute value of the Capacity Zone from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the difference between absolute value of the total Capacity Load Obligations in the importing Capacity Zone and the total Capacity Supply Obligations obtained in the importing Capacity Zone, adjusted for Capacity Supply Obligations associated with Self-Supplied FCA Resources.

III.13.7.5.4.2. Allocation of Capacity Transfer Rights.
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

For Capacity Zones established in the Forward Capacity Auction as determined pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.4, the CTR fund shall be allocated among load serving entities using their Capacity Load Obligation (net of HQICCs) described in Section III.13.7.5.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from their Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.
(a) **Connecticut Import Interface.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with the Connecticut Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the Connecticut Capacity Zone.

(b) **NEMA/Boston Import Interface.** Except as provided in Section III.13.7.5.3.6 of Market Rule 1, the allocation of the CTR fund associated with the NEMA/Boston Import Interface shall be made to load serving entities based on their Capacity Load Obligation in the NEMA/Boston Capacity Zone.

**III.13.7.5.4.3. Allocations of CTRs Resulting From Revised Capacity Zones.**
This subsection applies to Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022.

The portion of the CTR fund associated with revised definitions of Capacity Zones shall be fully allocated to load serving entities after deducting the value of applicable CTRs that have been specifically allocated. Allocations of the CTR fund among load serving entities will be made using their Capacity Load Obligations (net of HQICCs) as described in Section III.13.7.5.3.1. Market Participants with CTRs specifically allocated under Section III.13.7.5.3.6 will have their specifically allocated CTR MWs netted from the Capacity Load Obligation used to establish their share of the CTR fund.

(a) **Import Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined import-constrained Capacity Zones restricting the transfer of capacity into a single adjacent import-constrained Capacity Zone shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations in that import-constrained Capacity Zone.

(b) **Export Constraints.** The allocation of the CTR fund associated with newly defined export-constrained Capacity Zones shall be allocated to load serving entities with Capacity Load Obligations on the import-constrained side of the interface.

**III.13.7.5.4.4. Specifically Allocated CTRs Associated with Transmission Upgrades.**
(a) A Market Participant that pays for transmission upgrades not funded through the Pool PTF Rate and which increase transfer capability across existing or potential Capacity Zone interfaces may request a specifically allocated CTR in an amount equal to the number of CTRs supported by that increase in transfer capability.
(b) The allocation of additional CTRs created through generator interconnections completed after February 1, 2009 shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the ISO generator interconnection or planning standards. In the event the ISO interconnection or planning standards do not address this issue, the CTRs created shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(c) Specifically allocated CTRs shall expire when the Market Participant ceases to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(d) CTRs resulting from transmission upgrades funded through the Pool PTF Rate shall not be specifically allocated but shall be allocated in the same manner as described in Section III.13.7.5.4.2.

(e) **Maine Export Interface.** Casco Bay shall receive specifically allocated CTRs of 325 MW across the Maine export interface for as long as Casco Bay continues to pay to support the transmission upgrades.

(f) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price to which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity minus the Capacity Clearing Price from which the applicable interface limits the transfer of capacity; and (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs across the applicable interface.

### III.13.7.5.4.5. Specifically Allocated CTRs for Pool-Planned Units.

(a) In import-constrained Capacity Zones, in recognition of longstanding life of unit contracts, the municipal utility entitlement holder of a resource constructed as Pool-Planned Units shall receive an initial allocation of CTRs equal to the most recent seasonal claimed capability of the ownership entitlements in such unit, adjusted for any designated self-supply quantities as described in Section III.13.1.6.2. Municipal utility entitlements are set as shown in the table below and are not transferrable.
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<th>Stonybrook GT 1C</th>
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Effective Date: 10/1/2019 - Docket # ER19-2421-000
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This allocation of CTRs shall expire on December 31, 2040. If a resource listed in the table above retires prior to December 31, 2040, however, its allocation of CTRs shall expire upon retirement. In the event that the NEMA zone either becomes or is forecast to become a separate zone for Forward Capacity Auction purposes, National Grid agrees to discuss with Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company ("MMWEC") and Wellesley Municipal Light Plant, Reading Municipal Light Plant and Concord Municipal Light Plant ("WRC") any proposal by National Grid to develop cost effective transmission improvements that would mitigate or alleviate the import constraints and to work cooperatively and in good faith with MMWEC and WRC regarding any such proposal. MMWEC and WRC agree to support any proposals advanced by National Grid in the regional system planning process to construct any such transmission improvements, provided that MMWEC and WRC determine that the proposed improvements are cost effective (without regard to CTRs) and will mitigate or alleviate the import constraints.

(b) The value of CTRs specifically allocated pursuant to this Section shall be calculated as the product of: (i) the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone where the load of the municipal utility entitlement holder is located minus the Capacity Clearing Price for the Capacity Zone in which the Pool-Planned Unit is located, and; (ii) the MW quantity of the specifically allocated CTRs.

III.13.7.5.5. Forward Capacity Market Net Charge Amount.

The Forward Capacity Market net charge amount for each Market Participant as of the end of the Obligation Month shall be equal to the sum of: (a) its Capacity Load Obligation charges; (b) its revenues from any applicable specifically allocated CTRs; (c) its share of the CTR fund (for Capacity Commitment Periods beginning prior to June 1, 2022); and (d) any applicable export charges.
III.13.8. Reporting and Price Finality


(a) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 20 Business Days after the issuance of retirement determination notifications described in Section III.13.1.2.4(a), the ISO shall make a filing with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act describing the Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids established pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.3.2, and the substitution auction test prices established pursuant to Section III.13.2.8.3.1A. The ISO will file the following information confidentially: the determinations made by the Internal Market Monitor with respect to each Permanent De-List Bid, Retirement De-List Bid, and substitution auction test price, and supporting documentation for each such determination. The confidential filing shall indicate those resources that will permanently de-list or retire prior to the Forward Capacity Auction and those Permanent De-List Bids and Retirement De-List Bids for which a Lead Market Participant has made an election pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.4.1.

(b) The Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted using the determinations as approved by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

(c) For each Forward Capacity Auction, no later than 90 days prior to the first day of the auction, the ISO shall make an informational filing with the Commission detailing the following determinations made by the ISO with respect to that Forward Capacity Auction, and providing supporting documentation for each such determination, provided, however, that the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) below shall be filed confidentially with the Commission in the informational filing, except determinations on which new resources have been rejected due to overlapping interconnection impacts (the determinations in subsections (vi), (vii), and (viii) shall be published by the ISO no later than 15 days after the Forward Capacity Auction), with the exception of de-list bid price information, which shall remain confidential):

(i) which Capacity Zones shall be modeled in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(ii) the transmission interface limits as determined pursuant to Section III.12.5;
(iii) which existing and proposed transmission lines the ISO determines will be in service by the start of the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction;

(iv) the expected amount of installed capacity in each modeled Capacity Zone during the Capacity Commitment Period associated with the Forward Capacity Auction, and the Local Sourcing Requirement for each modeled import-constrained Capacity Zone and the Maximum Capacity Limit for each modeled export-constrained Capacity Zone;

(v) [reserved];

(vi) which new resources are accepted and rejected in the qualification process to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction;

(vii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding each requested offer price from a new resource submitted pursuant to Section III.13.1.2.2.3 or Section III.13.1.4.1.1.2.8, including information regarding each of the elements considered in the Internal Market Monitor’s determination of expected net revenues (other than revenues from ISO-administered markets) and whether that element was included or excluded in the determination of whether the offer is consistent with the resource’s long run average costs net of expected net revenues other than capacity revenues;

(viii) the Internal Market Monitor’s determinations regarding offers or Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids submitted during the qualification process made according to the provisions of this Section III.13, including an explanation of the Internal Market Monitor-determined prices established for any Static De-List Bids, Export Bids, and Administrative De-List Bids as described in Section III.13.1.2.3.2 based on the Internal Market Monitor review and the resource’s net going forward costs, reasonable expectations about the resource’s Capacity Performance Payments, reasonable risk premium assumptions, and reasonable opportunity costs as determined by the Internal Market Monitor. The filing shall identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were accepted as justified, and shall also identify to the extent possible the components of the bid which were not justified and which resulted in the Internal Market Monitor establishing an Internal Market Monitor-determined price for the bid;
(ix) which existing resources are qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction (this information will include resource type, capacity zone, and qualified MW);

(x) aggregate MW from new resources qualified to participate in the Forward Capacity Auction and aggregate de-list bid amounts; and

(xi) aggregate quantity of supply offers and demand bids qualified to participate in the substitution auction.

(d) Any comments or challenges to the determinations contained in the informational filing described in Section III.13.8.1(c) or in the qualification determination notifications described in Sections III.13.1.1.2.8, III.13.1.2.4(b) and III.13.1.3.5.7 must be filed with the Commission no later than 15 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing. If the Commission does not issue an order within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing that directs otherwise, the determinations contained in the informational filing shall be used in conducting the Forward Capacity Auction, and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c). If within 75 days after the ISO’s submission of the informational filing, the Commission issues an order modifying one or more of the ISO’s determinations, then the Forward Capacity Auction shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days following that order using the determinations as modified by the Commission (unless the Commission directs otherwise), and challenges to Capacity Clearing Prices resulting from the Forward Capacity Auction shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.8.2(c).

III.13.8.2. Filing of Forward Capacity Auction Results and Challenges Thereto.

(a) As soon as practicable after the Forward Capacity Auction is complete, the ISO shall file the results of that Forward Capacity Auction with the Commission pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, including the final set of Capacity Zones resulting from the auction, the Capacity Clearing Price in each of those Capacity Zones (and the Capacity Clearing Price associated with certain imports pursuant to Section III.13.2.3.3(d), if applicable), the substitution auction clearing prices and the total amount of payments associated with any demand bids cleared at a substitution auction clearing price above their demand bid prices, and a list of which resources received Capacity Supply Obligations in each Capacity Zone and the amount of those Capacity Supply Obligations. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, such list of resources that receive Capacity Supply Obligation shall also specify which
resources cleared as Conditional Qualified New Resources. Upon completion of the fourth and future auctions, the filing shall also list each Long Lead Time Facility, as defined in Schedule 22 or Schedule 25 of Section II of the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff, that secured a Queue Position to participate as a New Generating Capacity Resource in the Forward Capacity Auction and each resource with lower queue priority that was selected in the Forward Capacity Auction subject to a Long Lead Time Facility with the higher queue priority. The filing shall also enumerate de-list bids rejected for reliability reasons pursuant to Section III.13.2.5.2.5, and the reasons for those rejections.

(b) The filing of Forward Capacity Auction results made pursuant to this Section III.13.8.2 shall also include documentation regarding the competitiveness of the Forward Capacity Auction, which may include a certification from the auctioneer and the ISO that: (i) all entities offering and bidding in the Forward Capacity Auction were properly qualified in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.1; and (ii) the Forward Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section III.13.

(c) Any objection to the Forward Capacity Auction results must be filed with the Commission within 45 days after the ISO’s filing of the Forward Capacity Auction results. The filing of a timely objection with the Commission will be the exclusive means of challenging the Forward Capacity Auction results.

(d) Any change to the Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff affecting the Forward Capacity Market or the Forward Capacity Auction that is filed after the results of a Forward Capacity Auction have been accepted or approved by the Commission shall not affect those Forward Capacity Auction results.